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National role conceptions and foreign assistance policy behavior toward a cognitive model

Breuning, Marijke, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1992

Copyright ©1992 by Breurdng, Marÿke. All rights reserved.

UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS

AND

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE POLICY BEHAVIOR

TOWARD A COGNITIVE MODEL

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

Marijke Breuning, B.A, M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1992

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

Donald A. Sylvan

Anthony Mughan Advisety^ Richard K. Herrmann Department of Political Science ^ Copyright by Marijke Breuning 1992 To the memory of Geertje Van den Berg-de Fey ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation has been an exciting journey. Now that I have reached its end and reflect on the distance covered and the new horizons in front of me, the time has also come to recognize the many who made it possible for me to embark on the journey, and who in small and big ways facilitated the work.

First and foremost I want to thank my adviser, Donald Sylvan, who gave generously of his time and attention. His critical comments helped me think more clearly and his encouragement kept me going at times I was not sure of my progress. He takes his role as mentor seriously and I have benefitted greatly.

Anthony Mughan and Richard Herrmann, who rounded out my dissertation committee, are each valued advisers as well. In addition, a number of members of the

Invisible College associated with the Mershon Center Research Training Group on the Role of Cognition in Collective Decision Making have provided helpful comments on parts of this dissertation. I specifically want to name Tom Ostrom and Stephen Walker, but I have benefitted from discussions with many others.

The Mershon Center Research Training Group also was significant to this research in practical terms. It provided me with a fellowship out of its National Science Foundation grant (DIR-9113599) which allowed me to work on this dissertation full time. In addition.

1:1 my research was supported by a grant from the Graduate School and by the Harry and Esther

Sonkin Family Scholarship for International Understanding and Peace.

The Mershon Center Research Training Group provided fellowship in a more literal sense as well: it brought together a group of students at work on dissertations and gave us all a place to talk about our ideas or simply about the process of completing a dissertation.

Except for the three months I spent in Europe collecting data, my parents. Max

Breuning and Eva Breuning-Van den Berg, had to be content with encouraging me from afar.

Despite the distance, they have never failed to provide support and encouragement when I needed it. In many ways, they deserve this work to be dedicated to them, although I know they’ll understand why I chose otherwise.

There are many others who have contributed to the development of my ideas or made it possible for me to complete this research. Frances Hewins and Jo Van den Berg-Van

Schelven deserve a very special ’thank you.’ Many persons remain unnamed, but they nevertheless deserve my gratitude.

IV VITA

October 12, 1957 ...... Bom - The Hague, The Netherlands

1980 ...... Diploma, School voor de Jouraalistiek (School for Journalism), Utrecht, The Netherlands

1982 ...... B. A., Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1983 ...... M.A., School of Journalism, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science

Studies in Comparative Foreign Policy, Transnational Relations, Traditional Theory, Formal Models and Methods TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... iii

VITA ...... V

LIST OF TABLES ...... ix

LIST OF FIGURES...... xiii

CHAPTER PAGE

I. THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE POLICY P U Z Z L E ...... 1

Introduction ...... 1 Foreign Aid as a Public G o o d ...... 7 Donor Interests and Foreign Assistance ...... 12 The Puzzle ...... 16

II. ROLE THEORY AND DECISION MAKER COGNITIONS ...... 20

Introduction ...... 20 The National Role Concept in the Study of International Relations . . . 22 Bounded Rationality and Frames ...... 28 The Limitations of Structural Role Theory ...... 32 Role Theory and its Extentions ...... 36 National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Behavior ...... 43

III. OPERATIONALIZING NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS ...... 50

Introduction ...... 50 Conceptualizing Role Conceptions for Foreign Assistance Decision Makii@ The Good Neighbor Role Define ...... 55 The Social Engineer Role Defined ...... 58 The Merchant Role Defined ...... 60 The Power Broker Role Defined ...... 61

vi Assessing Role Conceptions Empirically ...... 64 How a Good Neighbor Role Manifests Itse lf ...... 64 What Social Engineers Talk About and D o ...... 65 The Merchant Role: The Bottom Line and P o licy ...... 67 Power Broker Rhetoric and A c tio n ...... 69 The Impact of Foreign Policy Decision Making Setting on Decision Makers ’Role Conceptions’ ...... 72 Cases, Data, and Methods ...... 77 Connecting Rhetoric and Behavior ...... 85 C onclusion ...... 88

IV. THE NETHERLANDS...... 90

Introduction ...... 90 Ministers of Development Cooperation and their Role ...... 91 Historical Context ...... 98 The D a t a ...... 100 The Overall Picture ...... 102 Evidence for the Good Neighbor Role Conception ...... 115 Evidence for the Social Engineer Role Conception ...... 119 Evidence for the Merchant Role Conception ...... 122 Evidence for the Power Broker Role Conception ...... 126 Assessment of the Evidence ...... 131 Congruence with Policy Behavior ...... 132 Conclusions ...... 139

V. B ELG IU M ...... 140

Introduction ...... 140 The Role of Ministers and State Secretaries for Development CooperatioMl Historical Context ...... 147 The D a t a ...... 150 The Overall Picture ...... 155 Evidence for the Good Neighbor Role Conception ...... 168 Evidence for the Social Engineer Role Conception ...... 170 Evidence for the Merchant Role Conception ...... 175 Evidence for the Power Broker Role Conception ...... 179 Assessment of the Evidence ...... 180 Congruence with Policy Behavior ...... 182 Conclusions ...... 185

VI. THE UNITED KINGDOM ...... 189

Introduction ...... 189 Ministers of Development Cooperation and their Role ...... 190

vii Historical Context ...... 194 The D a t a ...... 198 The Overall Picture ...... 201 Evidence for the Good Neighbor Role Conception ...... 216 Evidence for the Social Engineer Role Conception ...... 220 Evidence for the Merchant Role Conception ...... 223 Evidence for the Power Broker Role Conception ...... 229 Assessment o f the Evidence ...... 232 Congruence with Policy Behavior ...... 233 Conclusions ...... 239

VII. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT...... 241

Introduction ...... 241 The Roles of the M inisters ...... 242 Historical Context ...... 245 The D a t a ...... 248 The Results; the Rhetoric ...... 249 The Results: Policy Behavior ...... 258 Conclusions ...... 262

APPENDICES

A. CODEBOOK ...... 265

B. LIST OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ...... 276

LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 286

vni LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

1. Hypothesized Foreign Assistance Role Conception Profiles ...... 63

2. Features of Donor State Relevant to Hypothsized Dominant Role Conception . 75

3. Relative Foreign Assistance Performance of European OECD Members .... 82

4.1. Ministers of Development Cooperation in the Netherlands for the Period 1975-90 ...... 95

4.2. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Various Debate Topics . 101

4.3. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for the Periods of Tenure of the Various Ministers of Development Cooperation ...... 104

4.4. Frequency of References to Desired Policy for the Role Conceptions for the Periods of Tenure of the Various Ministers of Development Cooperation . 105

4.5. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for the Individual Ministers 107

4.6. Frequency of References to Desired Policy for the Role Conceptions for the Individual M inisters ...... 107

4.7. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Coalition Parties for the Tenure of Minister Schoo, 1982-86 ...... 109

4.8. Frequency of References to Desired Policy for the Role Conceptions for Coalition Parties for the Tenure of Minister S ch o o ...... 109

4.9. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Coalition Parties for the Tenure of Minister Bukman, 1986-89 ...... 110

4.10. Frequency of References to Desired Policy for the Role Conceptions for Coalition Parties for the Tenure of Minister Bukman ...... 110

IX 4.11. Frequency of Reference to the Role Conceptions for Debates on the Budget for Development Cooperation ...... 112

4.12. Frequency of Reference to the Role Conceptions for the Various Political Parties ...... 113

4.13. Frequency of References to Good Neighbor Them es ...... 116

4.14. Frequency of References to Social Engineer Them es ...... 120

4.15. Frequency of References to Merchant Themes ...... 123

4.16. Frequency of References to Power Broker T h e m e s...... 127

4.17. The Netherlands: Multilateral Expenditures ...... 133

4.18. The Netherlands: Relative Emphasis on Bilateral and Multilateral Official Development Assistance ...... 135

4.19. The Netherlands: Grant Percentage of Bilateral Official Development A ssistan ce ...... 137

4.20. The Netherlands: Tying Status of Official Development Assistance ...... 138

5.1. Ministers of Development Cooperation in Belgium for the Period 1975-90 . . 143

5.2. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Various Debate Topics . 151

5.3. Relative Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Debate on Budget Topics ...... 151

5.4. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for the Periods of Tenure of the Various Ministers of Development Cooperation ...... 156

5.5. Frequency of References to Desired Policy for the Role Conceptions for the Periods of Tenure of the Various Ministers of Development Cooperation . . . 159

5.6. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for the Individual Ministers 163

5.7. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for the Coalition Parties for each Period ...... 165

5.8. Differences in Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Flemish and Walloon Parties ...... 167

5.9. Frequency of References to Good Neighbor Them es ...... 169

X 5.10. Frequency of References to Social Engineer Them es ...... 172

5.11. Frequency of References to Merchant Themes ...... 176

5.12. Frequency of References to Power Broker Them es ...... 178

5.13. Belgium: Multilateral Expenditures ...... 183

5.14. Belgium: Grant Percentage of Bilateral Offical Development Assistance .... 184

5.15. Belgium: Tying Status of Official Development Assistance ...... 186

5.16. Belgium: Relative Emphasis on Bilateral and Multilateral Official Development Assistance ...... 187

6.1. Ministers of Overseas Development in the United Kingdom for the Period 1975-90 ...... 193

6.2. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Various Debate Topics . 200

6.3. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for the Periods of Tenure of the Various Ministers of Overseas Development ...... 202

6.4. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Lynda Chalker’s Tenure under Prime Ministers Thatcher and M ajor ...... 204

6.5. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Lynda Chalker Personally under Prime Ministers Thatcher and M ajor ...... 204

6.6. Frequency of References to Desired Policy for the Role Conceptions for the Periods of Tenure of the Various Ministers of Overseas Development 206

6.7. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for the Individual Ministers 207

6.8. Frequency of Reference to the Role Conceptions for the Various Political Parties ...... 209

6.9. Frequency of References to Desired Policy for the Role Conceptions for the Various Political Parties ...... 209

6.10. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Front and Back Benchers 211

6.11. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Conservative Front and Back Benchers ...... 212

XI 6.12. Frequency of References to the Role Conceptions for Labour Front and Back Benchers ...... 213

6.13. Frequency of References to Good Neighbor T hem es ...... 217

6.14. Frequency of References to Social Engineer Them es ...... 222

6.15. Frequency of References to Merchant Themes ...... 225

6.16. Frequency of References to Merchant Themes for the Various Political Parties 227

6.17. Frequency of References to Power Broker Them es ...... 230

6.18. United Kingdom: Relative Emphasis on Bilateral and Multilateral Offîcial Development Assistance ...... 234

6.19. United Kingdom: Grant Percentage of Bilateral Offical Development Assistance235

6.20. United Kingdom: Tying Status of Official Development Assistance ...... 236

6.21. United Kingdom: Multilateral Expenditures ...... 238

7.1. Comparison of Tense and Strength of References ...... 251

7.2. Relative Frequency of Role Conceptions for Each S ta te ...... 253

7.3. Relative Frequency of Themes for Each S ta te ...... 254

XII LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

1. Relationships Between National Attributes, National Role Conceptions, and Foreign Policy Behavior ...... 27

2. National Role Conceptions and Operational Indicators ...... 29

3. Typology of Foreign Assistance Role Conceptions ...... 54

4. Relations Among the Three Dimensions of the Role Conception Construct . . 73

Xlll CHAPTER I

THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE POLICY PUZZLE

Introduction

Foreign assistance can be regarded both as an instrument of foreign policy and as a tool for development. Some studies have approached their subject matter exclusively from one of these two perspectives, while others have attempted to assess empirically whether foreign assistance is motivated by foreign policy or development aims.' Although such work has found support for the hypothesis that assistance is generally motivated mostly by foreign policy objectives, it has not linked particular objectives with specific policy patterns.

However, to say that foreign policy objectives guide assistance policy is to be guilty of the same analytical fiizziness that characterizes the concept of ’interest’ in international relations more generally (Kratochwil 1982). Therefore, this dissertation is motivated by a desire to enhance understanding of the nature of the objectives to be attained through foreign

' The thesis that foreign assistance is a tool of foreign policy is either implicitly or explicitly present in McNeill (1981), Edelman and Chenery (1977), Wall (1973), Huntington (1972), Griffin and Enos 1970, Black (1968), Nelson (1968), Chenery (1964), Mason (1964), Montgomery (1962), Morgenthau (1962) and Liska (1960). Work that builds on the notion that foreign assistance is, or should be, a tool for development includes Wennergren (1991), Hellinger et al 1988, Streeten (1989), Wood (1986), Brandt Commission (1980), Johansen (1980), and Hensman (1971). Empirical assessments of foreign policy motivation versus development objectives include studies by Gang and Khan (1990), Gulhati and Nallari (1988), Frey (1984), Maizels and Nissanke (1984), Cassen et al (1982), Mosley (1981), Dudley (1979), and McKinlay and Little (1979, 1978). Gulhati and Nallari (1988) divide the literature in a comparable manner.

1 2 assistance. The national role conceptions of decision makers with regard to this issue area will provide the framework for doing so. The concept of national role as perceived by decision makers serves to capture these individuals’ understanding of their environment and is based on the conviction that these actors’ grasp of their environment forms the foundation for the aspirations and motives that are expressed in the foreign assistance policies they pursue. This investigation thus aims, in Kratochwil’s words, to "understand the rules underlying particular actions" (1982, 29) and proceeds from the assumption that human behavior is rule-governed (Kratochwil 1982, 27).

At a policy level, understanding the goals decision makers set out to attain through foreign assistance, and the policies they advocate and choose to that end not only helps assess the potential for foreign assistance to effect positive change in the South, it also provides greater insight into the future of North-South relations in general (Packenham 1973). The thesis thus links theoretical and policy concerns. The significance of foreign assistance within the scope of North South relations is underscored by Maizels and Nissanke (1984).

They outline three reasons for the study of foreign assistance policy motivation: first, such an investigation may "bring traditional assumptions concerning aid motivations into question," second, it may yield "greater insight regarding actual aid allocations," and last but certainly not least, "the motivations of donor governments on aid can throw useful light on their policies and actions in related fields" (1984, 880). However, their results are limited to a confirmation of the importance of donor interests, and the observation that the "relative importance of the various donor interests differs sharply among donors" (1984, 879). The question of what motivations shape foreign assistance policy and how these objectives relate 3 to differences in the foreign assistance policies of various donor countries remains unanswered.

The question of foreign assistance policy motivation has an apparent link to work proceeding from the thesis that aid serves as an instrument of foreign policy. However, the difference between the question posed here and older work proceeding from the foreign policy thesis is significant: rather than making assumptions about the nature of the interests pursued through foreign assistance programs, this thesis seeks to uncover what those motives are and to explain the variations in foreign assistance policy patterns on basis of the objectives that underlie them. Moreover, the foreign policy thesis has generally assumed the interests pursued through foreign assistance to be of a short-term, self-interested nature.

The perspective taken here is that foreign aid policy is one of the strategies through which decision makers seek to advance their state’s foreign policy objectives, but that these objectives may range from immediate needs to long-term goals or international social justice concerns. Whether or not such motives actually guide policy and what types of policies various motivations yield is the puzzle at the heart of this dissertation. The importance of such an investigation was expressed by Cable, who argued that foreign assistance, despite the lofty rhetoric, was "inspired in practice by what are thought to be national interests.

Attempts to modify these policies therefore need to be preceded by a clear understanding of these interests" (1982, 182). That such clarity is often lacking can be illustrated with reference to Hellinger et al’s (1988) argument for reform of the current foreign assistance structures. The thesis that such assistance should serve development objectives is central to their work, but they are nevertheless well aware that "[a]id’s primary significance today lies 4 in its policy leverage" (1988, 3-4). However, this observation seems to have had little impact on their proposals, a problem often found in work of this nature. To state that the countries of the North should contribute more or more relevant assistance, or that assistance should be structured around donor-and-recipient dialogue regarding how needs can best be met is not sufficient. Such statements ignore that "[international politics lie at the heart of foreign aid and, indeed, are the very reason for its existence" (Montgomery 1962, 4). Even though humanitarian ideals form an important part of the ’rhetoric of aid’ (Wall 1973), previous work on foreign assistance policy has indicated that it is generally driven by donor country interest (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; McKinlay and Little 1979, 1978) or a desire for influence (Frey 1984; Dudley 1979). The implication is that in practice foreign assistance has been at least as much an expression of the unbalanced relationship between North and

South as it has been expected to function as a tool for the transformation of that relationship.

Part of the expectation that foreign assistance serve as a tool for transforming the

North-South relationship may stem from the frequent linkage of foreign assistance to the

South to the earlier Marshall Plan (Krueger et al 1989; Wood 1986; Huntington 1972;

Montgomery 1962). Wood asserts that "there is no radical discontinuity between the

Marshall Plan and the later aid programs focused more exclusively on the Third World"

(1986, 65). Comparisons between the two are attractive because the Marshall Plan carries an aura of unselfish statesmanship. However, Mosley’s observation that foreign assistance is a by-product of decolonization is significant, especially since he also points out that concessional resource flows to colonies date from the nineteenth century (Mosley 1987).

Ohlin’s much older work provides a similar linkage of foreign assistance with decolonization 5

(1966, 99). Furthermore, he notes that in "the history of diplomacy, subsidies and tributes have been common," but also points out that "peacetime economic aid among governments is novel" (Ohlin 1966, 9; see also Morgenthau 1962). Specifically, "the use of public funds for the specific purpose of promoting and assisting in the economic development of other sovereign countries has no significant precedent before the Marshall Plan" (Ohlin 1966, 9).

Ohlin’s argument nicely illustrates that the historical perspective within which one frames foreign assistance affects one’s expectations of it. The Marshall Plan represented an innovative approach to the relations between states, but resource transfers as such are part of a much older tradition.^

This is not to say that one or the other is the ’correct’ or legitimate ancestor to present-day foreign assistance programs, but that the connection with the Marshall Plan leads to expectations of such programs that are not borne out by actual practice. Viewed from the perspective that assistance policies at least partially have roots in much older diplomatic practices, they acquire a much less benign image and are more easily linked with international politics more generally. Griffin and Enos (1970) made this connection over twenty years ago, noting also that foreign assistance was not the exclusive domain of rich countries. They write: "It is not richness or poverty that distinguishes China, a lender, from

Brazil, a receiver; it is the desire of the country for power" (Griffin and Enos 1970, 314).

In other words, the role the decision makers of the country seek for it to play in international relations importantly shapes their desire to serve as a donor of foreign assistance. While

Griffin and Enos’ (1970) use of the expression ’desire for power’ lends a cynical tone to their observation, restated in terms of national role conceptions -either existing or aspired

See Liska (1960) for a short history of foreign assistance. 6 to-- it may go further to explain foreign assistance policy patterns than theories and models that seek to assess whether donor country interests or development objectives guide a state’s foreign assistance program. Cassen et al hint at the possible usefulness of the concept of national role in structural terms with the statement that “perceptions of individual countries as to their national standing" affect their foreign assistance policies (1982a, 18).

Stokke (1989b) in a study covering the foreign assistance policies of Canada,

Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, remarks that foreign assistance is part of foreign policy and as such designed to further national interests. Yet he also holds the assistance policy motivations of the countries in the study to serve the "pursuance of peace and international stability" (1989b, 278). Such motivations could scarcely fall under the heading ’desire for power,’ but do reveal something about the role that decision makers pursuing such goals perceive their state to play in world politics. While such a role conception is not simply reduceable to traditional assumptions of political interest, it is important to acknowledge the possibility of such role conceptions if we are to understand the international politics of foreign assistance.

In other words, the categorization of foreign assistance policy into foreign policy motivations and development objectives does not capture the kind of policy motivation described by Stokke. This is in part due to the nature of the assumptions employed by studies utilizing the foreign policy versus development aims dichotomy. Two distinct traditions exist within this literature. First, there is work that focuses on the question of whether or not foreign assistance is an international public good and, second, another group of studies posits the dichotomy in terms of donor interest versus recipient need. Each approach presents problems that the national role conceptions framework responds to. 7

Foreign Aid as a Public Good

Whether foreign assistance is an international public good or alternatively a tool for influence (Frey 1984; Dudley 1979) is a dilemma that assumes that the structure of international relations dominates the relations between North and South. Research that takes this question as its point of departure can therefore be characterized as looking for an explanation of the provision of foreign assistance at the systems level.

If foreign assistance is an international public good, then each potential donor country would benefit from the assistance extended to a Third World country by one of them since all would ostensibly benefit from the more stable international environment encouraged by such transfers. The implications of this are explained differently by different authors, mainly as a result of varying interpretations of the free rider problem. In regard to this, Frey has commented that although the public goods concept is "extremely useful and intuitively plausible," it is also true that the "exact conditions under which free riding occurs are still unknown" (1984a, 203). Public goods theory may thus be deceptively simple, especially with regard to its assumptions about the tendency to free ride. Yet it is exactly this tendency to free ride which forms the crux of the argument regarding the foreign assistance policy behavior of states.

According to Streeten (1989) two mechanisms ensure that development assistance will be undersupplied. First, each country will realize that it will benefit regardless of whether it contributes. It will therefore decide to let others foot the bill. Second, no one country will want to foot the bill for something that also benefits those who did not contribute. At this level, Streeten’s argument treats all potential donor countries as equal ’partners in crime.’

All have equal incentive to free ride, i.e. to let others take care of the provision of a good g that as a result will not be provided. To indicate how this dilemma can be overcome, he turns to Olson’s logic of collective action: "some smaller subset of countries, the Group of

5 or the Group of 7, may take responsibility for the rest, but they may also act in a way that imposes cost on others" (Streeten 1989, 1355). In other words, the free rider problem may be overcome if one very powerful state, a hegemon, or a small group of more or less equally powerful countries provide the leadership. Yet in practice these states have not been leaders either in regard to the level or the terms of the foreign assistance they have provided.

Instead, their leadership has been perceived as perpetuating or even aggravating the enormous differentials between North and South (Hellinger et al 1988, Cardoso and Faletto 1979). In other words, the leadership that has been provided has served to benefit those providing it, which rather than overcoming the free rider problem is a result of comparable dynamics.

A different sort of argument which also appeals to the concept of foreign assistance as public good is put forth by Frey (1984) and Dudley (1979). Rather than positing that foreign assistance is a public good, they seek to test empirically whether it functions as such.

If it is not a public good, then it is a tool for influence. Contrary to Streeten, they hypothesize that the tendency to free ride is not distributed equally among all states. Instead, smaller countries, with smaller budgets and GNPs, would be expected to free ride or provide relatively lesser amounts of aid, since the benefits resulting from aid extended by their larger counterparts also accrue to them. Rather than proposing the leadership of larger states as a vehicle for overcoming the free rider problem, here it is assumed that larger states will somehow have a greater incentive to provide the public good of foreign assistance. This assumption seems to run counter to Olson’s (1971) logic of collective action, which would predict that large states form an ’interest group’ to promote policies that serve them. 9

According to that logic, those large states could only be expected to provide the good of foreign assistance to the extent that it could be expected to yield a positive payoff for them.

Streeten (1989), while hoping for enlightened leadership, notes this as a possibility.

The alternative hypothesis put forth by both Frey (1984) and Dudley (1979) regards foreign assistance as a tool for enhancing influence. If this is the case, then a smaller country would be expected to provide a disproportionately large share of aid, presuming that each state seeks to maximize its power. Dudley (1979) finds that small countries do tend to give more aid per capita, rather than free ride. He speculates that aid spending "seems to be a way for a country to gain political recognition and influence among other countries, both recipients and donors" (1979,571). This observation is of interest because the foreign policy benefits of assistance have mainly been studied utilizing such variables as whether or not the recipient votes with the donor country in the United Nations General Assembly (cite). Such measures overlook that foreign assistance may be given to impress or persuade a third party.

This may be especially the case with the provision of multilateral aid, the impact of which

"is limited essentially to the recognition they [the donors] receive among the other donor countries of their reference group" (Dudley 1979, 571). In that sense, multilateral aid may be as much a tool for influence as bilateral aid, although the political object is likely to differ.

Hoadley’s (1980) analysis of small states as aid donors confirms that small states on average pursue more generous foreign assistance policies than larger states. However, he overlooks the significance of the inconsistent cases, justifying the maintenance of the categories large and small with the observation that "the average index for small donors is clearly higher than that for large donors" (pl36). The emphasis on general tendency 10 obscures that small countries do not consistently exhibit the expected pattern. Rather, figures on Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) show marked differences in the foreign assistance expenditures of the smaller OECD countries, with Norway, Sweden, Deiunark and the Netherlands outspending the other small countries (OECD 1988). A few small countries appear to outspend both other small countries and larger countries, and augment the average small country expenditure substantially. Thus, the support for the hypothesis is certainly a lot stronger for some countries than for others. This has led Berlage (1984) to divide the (European) donor countries into three groups. First are the large donors, which include Germany, Italy,

Britain, and France. Then he splits the smaller countries into a group which consists of countries that spend a relatively high percentage of their GNP on ODA. The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands are grouped under this heading, while Austria, Switzerland and

Finland form the third group. These countries spend a relatively low proportion of their

GNP on ODA. This scheme underscores that not all smaller countries pursue the same type of foreign assistance policy. While Hoadley (1980) may be right about the general tendency, there is a wide enough difference between the two different groups of small countries denoted by Berlage (1984) that it is difficult to maintain that a simple division between smaller and larger states is very meaningful. However, Berlage’s scheme also presents problems. He has trouble placing Belgium in one of the two small country groups and contends that

"Belgium was in a somewhat similar situation to that of the large donors” (Berlage 1984,26).

Both his initial categorization and his troubles with Belgium indicate that systemic constraints on small and large states do not operate in the manner hypothesized by Frey (1984) or

Dudley (1979). Some of the smaller states appear to free ride, while others use foreign 11 assistance as a tool for influence, in the words of their hypotheses. This necessitates the conclusion that systemic constraints cannot fully explain foreign assistance policies.

Therefore, I disagree with Hoadley’s conclusion that size is "a useful surrogate for a number of qualities of a state which structure the perceptions and policies of international actors in consistent ways" (1980, 137). One of the main reasons that renders size a problematic surrogate for the qualities Hoadley aims at is, as Baehr (1975) concludes, that size has been ill-defined as an analytical concept. For him, the contribution of small state studies has been to expose the relativity of another concept, that of the sovereign independence of states. He writes that "[f]ull independence, in the sense of governments making their own decisions without being subject to any influences from beyond the borders of their territory, simply does not now exist, if it ever did" (Baehr 1975, 464). In other words, what is relevant about the study of small states is that policy makers face constraints both from within and from outside their borders. As Keohane (1969) has pointed out, this holds not only for small states, although one might presume the constraints on the policy makers of these states to be more or more readily visible. The assumption that great powers or large states can control their own destiny is a "conventional assumption [which] has by now become an inconvenient fiction that hinders our understanding of great-power/small- power relations" (Keohane 1969, 306). Keohane suggests that it might be better to focus on

"the svstemic role that states’ leaders see their countries playing" (1969, 295, italics in original). Thus, the role that decision makers understand their country to play in world politics might better explain their policies than systemic variables that classify a state as large or small and infer foreign policy behavior from such a classification. 12

It is also intriguing that a number of authors explain the high foreign aid expenditures of these Nordic countries on basis of their decision makers’ perception that it is an international conunon good, or more specifically: that the stability of the international system is at stake (Pratt 1989; Stokke 1989; Cooper & Verloren van Themaat 1989; Lovbraek 1990;

Hart 1983). In other words, the authors argue that the decision makers of exactly those countries that most strongly seem to confirm the Frey/Dudley hypothesis that aid is not an international public good are justifying their policies in terms of aid being an international public good.

Donor Interests and Foreign Assistance

At the nation-state level, studies of foreign assistance policy have revolved around attempts to assess empirically whether such assistance can be explained by referring to donor interests or whether recipient need importantly influenced donor decisions regarding aid.

This work intersects with, and in many ways builds on, the studies that hold that assistance is importantly motivated by foreign policy concerns. While McNeill (1981), Huntington

(1972), Black (1968), Nelson (1968), Chenery (1964), Liska (1960) and others all provide slightly different versions, each lists what he or she has concluded to be the main motivating forces of foreign assistance donors. Many of these works derive either wholly or mostly from the U.S. case. Black (1968) and Mason (1964) assert that the foreign assistance policies of other countries are driven by similar motivations, but they do not test this assertion.^

^ The prevalence of the American case as a basis for theorizing may be understandable but also problematic. Holsti has criticized that "too much of international relations literature uses American experience as a prototype for all states" (1986, 647), 13

Generally, security and economic needs are held to be the most prominent motivating forces. Huntington (1972), Black (1968), Chenery (1964), and Montgomery (1962) all see a containment motive, although they express it differently. An economic motive also gets varied expression. Huntington (1972) sees economic development of the South in general as a limited interest of the U.S., but for specific countries such an interest takes on meaning as part of the policy towards those countries in general. What he means is that such an interest supplements efforts to strengthen the military security of such a country, i.e. as part of a containment strategy. Nelson’s (1968) assertion that the political importance to the U.S. of a specific country’s stability and growth is a significant factor in the determination of the foreign assistance provided would concur with the second part of Huntington’s ideas on U.S. interest in economic development. Black (1968) and Chenery (1964) on the other hand postulate a U.S. interest in enhancing the stability of the international system so that the U.S. may better pursue its own social goals. The difference between the former and the latter position is that the arguments made by Black (1968) and Chenery (1964) are based on the perception that the U.S. acts on basis of a long-term goal of creating a particular world- order, while Huntington (1972) and Nelson (1968) appear to express a more immediate economic interest linked to more immediate security concerns. In addition. Black (1968) holds that the U.S. also acts on basis of humanitarian grounds.

McKinlay and Little’s (1979, 1978) investigations dispute this. Their work is part of a group of empirical studies that endeavors to assess whether foreign assistance is holding that the superpowers may not face the same constraints as other states. While the categorization of states into superpowers, large, middle, and small states may be just problematic, as the discussion above on the similarity or dissimilarity of small and large states has sought to point out, the fact that states face constraints and that these are not distributed equally or evenly remains a significant observation. 14 motivated by donor interests or recipient need. They develop a model using a number of statistical indicators that represent donor interest and recipient need. Their regression analyses reveal that donor interest is a better explanation for foreign assistance patterns than recipient need. In particular, "the amount of aid allocated by the U.S. is determined by the importance of the recipient in the power structure of the international system" (McKinlay and

Little 1979, 248). Mosley (1981) has argued that, contrary to McKinlay and Little’s (1979) assertion, their recipient need model cannot be rejected. His critique concerns their methodology and also notes that the time period they selected for their study matters as well:

As one moves forward from the 1960s in time and outwards from the special case of donors who are ex-colonial powers to consider the case of aid donors not constrained by historical commitments to specific less developed countries, the explanatory power of the recipient need model increases (Mosley 1981, 253).

What Mosley leaves out is that in more recent times many ex-colonial powers have moved away from foreign assistance programs that emphasize past ties, but his critique serves to point out that the issue of foreign assistance policy motivation is more complex than a dichotomous framework can capture.

In an earlier study, McKinlay and Little (1978) concluded that while the foreign policy basis was present in the assistance programs of France and Britain as well as the U.S., the nature of the particular interests varied and there were differences in how clearly and explicitly the policy justifications were developed. They also noted that while Britain’s foreign assistance was by no means derived from humanitarian considerations, it had more of a humanitarian component than the policies of either the France or the U.S. (McKinlay and Little 1978). In other words, this earlier study hints at the possibility of more complex motivations. 15

A study by Maizels and Nissanke (1984) that compared what they termed the ’five main donor countries,’ the U.S., France, Germany, Japan and Britain, as well as multilateral assistance patterns. Their conclusions mirror those of McKinlay and Little (1979, 1978) in that they "generally confirm earlier studies that bilateral aid allocations are made largely (for some donors) or solely (for others) in support of donors’ perceived foreign economic, political and security interests" (Maizels and Nissanke 1984, 891). Gulhati and Nallari

(1988) replicate this finding as well. Their regression analysis shows major donors to have distinctive aid profiles, although they add that donor objectives are not rigid but change over time.

In addition, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) find that the distribution of multilateral aid conforms more to the recipient need model than bilateral aid. This finding conforms to a more generally held expectation that multilateral aid is less tainted by donor interest. Jay and

Michalopoulos (1989) caution, however, that while donors

have an opportunity to pursue national objectives much more openly and much more directly through bilateral than through multilateral assistance. Nonetheless, donors also may influence the aid practices of multilateral aid institutions, making them more supportive of the donors’ overall foreign policy objectives (1989, 68).

In other words, multilateral aid may be distributed in a manner that is less obviously linked to foreign policy objectives, but this does not preclude the pursuit of political goals by the leaders of the countries from which such funds originate. Dudley (1979) specifically mentions the possibility that foreign assistance may be motivated by the desire to influence a third party and that this may be the case especially with multilateral aid. The traditional distinction between bilateral and multilateral assistance which regards the former as more likely to be politically tainted than the latter, may be justifiable on basis of how and to whom 16 such funds are distributed but may not reflect donor country motivations for providing assistance of either kind very well.

The Puzzle

This leads to the observation that the study of foreign assistance policy suffers from three main conceptual problems. First, donor interest, as a subset of national interest for a specific issue area, becomes a grab bag that contains whatever appears to be the interest that best explains a given assistance policy at a given time and of a given country. Such a grab bag does not constitute a theoretical framework but a set of ad hoc explanations subsumed under a label that has intuitive appeal but little else."*

Second, die assumption that bilateral aid is motivated by donor interest while multilateral aid reflects attentiveness to the needs of the countries of the South is problematic.

While the motivations for providing the latter may be less a direct attempt at North-South influence, the motivations may reflect donor interest just as clearly. However, such donor interest is likely to bear very little relation to any interest in development or any specific country or region in the South, but rather to more general foreign policy objectives. The specific content of these will vary per country and likely also with shifts in leadership within countries.

Finally, the conceptualization of foreign assistance as serving either donor interest or recipient need represents a selfish-altruistic motive dichotomy that may be too simplistic.

Riddell holds that the donor interest versus recipient need debate presents a false dichotomy

(1987, 65), while Packenham regards the debate over humanitarianism versus national

See Kratochwil (1982) for a similar argument. 17 interest as the basis for foreign assistance policy as "sterile and unproductive because of the loose ways in which the terms are employed and the uncertain standards that are offered to evaluate the truth or falsity of the allegations" (1973, 323).

Thus, the dichotomy that presents foreign assistance as either stemming from selfish political motives or an altruistic development orientation is in need of réévaluation.

Morgenthau (1962) arrives at a similar conclusion with regard to humanitarian assistance.

While he initially states that "humanitarian aid is per se nonpolitical," he acknowledges within the same sentence that "it can perform a political function when it operates within a political context" (1962, 301, italics in original). This second part of his sentence blurs the distinction between the selfish and the altruistic he initially seems to draw. Although humanitarian assistance may appear to serve the latter sort of motive, this cannot be taken for granted but is instead context-dependent. Conversely, Riddell writes that while

"governments should and do act on the basis of politics and political benefit, questions of morality are not thereby forgotten or eliminated" (1987,73). He concludes that "appeals to the national interest do carry with them implicit moral assumptions about society and about humanity" (1987, 68). Packenham argues similarly that the national interest is not an objective quantity, but rather "a representation of the normative and policy preferences of individuals or groups" (1973, 325). In other words, such appeals reflect the speaker’s understanding of how the world works, a vision for that world, and the role of his or her country in both the current and potential future world. While Riddell is cognizant of the fact that not all decision makers will view the national interest in exactly the same manner, he argues that there exist within nations "dominant moral views and it is these which tend to be reflected in laws enacted" (1987,71). 18

A similar point of view drives studies by Pratt (1989) and Stokke (1989) which

advance the concept of humane internationalism to explain the foreign assistance policies of

Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. According to Pratt, at the core

of humane internationalism is "an acceptance by the citizens of the industrialized states that

they have ethical obligations towards those beyond their borders and that these in turn impose

obligations on their governments" (1989, 13). In other words, the concept of humane

internationalism hold domestic public opinion to be a primary explanation for these states’

foreign aid policies. However, Riddell (1987) points out that the acceptance of such an

obligation forms a necessary but not sufficient condition for the provision of foreign

assistance. It is therefore not surprising that Pratt has to admit in his concluding chapter that

there is "a near inevitable gap between the public positions ... and the more self-interested

measures that those in power are happy to accept" (1989,199). He phrases the problem in

terms of a discrepancy between values held by (sectors of) the domestic public and those

acted upon by decision makers. According to Riddell’s (1987) this is not exactly where the political shoe pinches. The problem is not a discrepancy between the views of the public at

large and those of decision makers, but rather that such ethical or moral beliefs may predispose decision makers to act in a certain way but will not guarantee such action.

Riddell (1987) lists constructs of how the world works and an assessment of the

appropriateness of foreign assistance as a tool to achieve policy aims as the two additional

ingredients needed to explain foreign assistance policy. These two ingredients are not

independent of each other. A decision regarding the appropriateness of foreign assistance depends on one’s ideas about how the world works and possibly also on one’s perceived

ability to affect that world. Riddell’s view that there exist dominant moral views, i.e. 19 dominant value positions, within a country, coupled with common constructs about how the world works has an affinity with the concept of national role. That is to say, decision makers’ ideas about how the world works, their belief in their ability as representatives of a particular state to affect affairs beyond their borders, and value positions they hold are likely to show variability at any one point in time and also over time. Yet certain value positions seem to win out more often in some countries than in others. The concept of national role is posited as an instrument to uncover why this is so.

The national role conception framework proposed here represents an attempt to systematically link decision makers’ ideals and ideas about how their world works with their foreign assistance policy decision making. National role conceptions thus represent the intersection of perceived constraints in the international environment, perceived constraints in the domestic environment, and the preferences of the individual decision makers. The national role conception framework takes into account the structural constraints that impinge on foreign policy decision makers, but stresses their perceptions, constructs, and values as crucially important to an explanation of their foreign assistance policy choices. The next chapter will explore the concept of national role and its usefulness as a tool for explaining foreign assistance policy patterns in greater detail. CHAPTER II

ROLE THEORY AND DECISION MAKER COGNITIONS

Introduction

The conceptions leaders have regarding their own state and its place in world politics play an important role in the foreign policies they propose, advocate, and on which they ultimately decide. It is therefore important to gain a better understanding of such cognitions and their influence on foreign policy.

Much of the work utilizing cognitive variables has focused on perceptions of the international environment or specific actors within it, rather than on conceptions of the role decision makers assign to their own country in world affairs (Kaplowitz 1990, Wish 1980).

While perceptions of that international environment matter in defining opportunities and constraints, decision makers’ views of their state’s role and position in that environment form an important cue to the motivations and objectives that determine the policies they pursue.

Perceptions of the international environment and of one’s role in it are ’two sides of the same coin.’ A state’s role in the international environment becomes defined in relation to its decision makers’ perceptions of that environment. It includes not only perceived constraints imposed by the manner in which the international environment is structured, but also perceptions of positive and negative possibilities offered by that environment. Policies are formulated on the basis of such perceptions of what is and what could possibly be. It is my

20 21 contention that perceived positive and negative possibilities form an important motivator for foreign policy action. This ’shadow of the future’ is not rooted solely in decision makers’ perceptions of the observable international environment, but also in the ’baggage’ carried along from the past. In other words, national role conceptions have multiple sources: a sense of the state’s place in the international environment relates not only to perceptions of the current international context, but also to historical residue and seeds of the (potential) future.

The national role conception framework seeks to link decision makers’ grasp of the context within which they make decisions with the objectives they seek to attain through these decisions.

The national role conception framework thus deals with cognition at a more abstract level than work that focuses on perceptions of specific events or occasions for decision. It is thus a tool for uncovering a more generalized, underlying dimension that structures perception and interpretation of events and issue areas. In other words, the framework focuses on decision makers’ perceptions of the stage rather than on the perceptions they have of any particular actor on that stage. It proceeds from the thesis that an understanding of how decision makers see the stage on which they are acting will improve our understanding of their actions and increase our potential to accurately pinpoint the future course they might choose.

The framework’s focus on the underlying dimension which structures the perceptions of events and issue areas makes it uniquely qualified to respond to Farnham’s observation that

"many theories dealing with individual decision-making in the political arena are incomplete because they fail to take into account the circumstances in which this behavior occurs" (1990,

83). In other words, such theories divorce decision and decision maker from the context 22 within which the latter functions and arrives at that decision. Such theories thus neglect the interaction between structure and state or the decision makers representing those units.

Similar criticisms have been made of social psychology (Lau and Sears 1986, 364;

Fiske and Taylor 1984, 414-18). Farnham’s observation in essence constitutes a criticism of the interaction of political science with psychology as currently constituted. That criticism parallels the dialogue between sociological and psychological perspectives of social psychology. Sociologists also see a lack of attention to social context on the part of psychologists who study social cognition (Morgan and Schwalbe 1990; Parker 1987; Farr and

Moscovici 1984; Snyder 1982; Stryker 1981). While they do not offer a unified theory, they offer concepts and frameworks that may profitably inform efforts to incorporate context into international relations theories of decision making.

This chapter will first review previous usage of the national role conceptions in international relations and proceed to critique these in light of developments within sociology’s role theory. Next, relevant concepts and ideas mostly from sociological approaches to social psychology will be reviewed to show how these might inform the study of international relations. Finally, I will propose a national role conceptions framework for the study of foreign assistance policy decision making.

The National Role Concept in the Study of International Relations

Although a number of studies have employed national role conceptions (Walker 1987,

1979; Wish, 1987, 1980; Jonsson and Westerlund 1982; Holsti 1970), its promise as a concept that can bridge levels of analysis (Holsti 1970, 309) and provide an innovative approach to what Wendt (1987) has termed the agent-structure problem remains unfulfilled. 23

The reasons are threefold and emanate from the fact that the concept of national role has been interpreted in structural terms. First, this has resulted in a static concept that suffers from many of the same failings as Waltz’ structural realism. Indeed, Walker (1987) has placed role theory squarely in that tradition. Second, previous work has sought to uncover a single national role conception, which turned out to have a relatively weak link with behavior (Walker 1979, Walker 1987) or was linked with behavioral variables that were very general in nature (Wish 1980). The problem with such a single national role concept is that -

-if it can indeed be said to exist- it either functions at a very different level than the specific behaviors it was intended to explain, or it explains behavior in such general terms that little is gained by using the role concept. A third issue is the dependent variable. The usefulness of the national role concept depends on whether one tries to explain foreign policy decisions or outcomes. Each of these points deserves greater elaboration.

First, the concept of national role has in previous work been defined in structural terms, as may be illustrated by Wish’ definition of national role conceptions as "foreign policy makers’ perceptions of their nations’ positions in the international system" (1980,

533). Walker (1987, ch. 12) supports this notion when he calls role theory an extension of

Waltz’s structural realism. In doing so, Walker subscribes to a structural functionalist version of role theory, which its critics have labeled a "static, normatively deterministic view of social life" (Stryker and Statham 1985, 341).*

These criticisms of structural role theory coincide with criticisms of Waltz’ structural realism. Waltz contends that "only through some sort of systems theory can international

* * It should be noted that Walker has more recently begun to explore a less structurally determined view of the role concept. See Walker 1990/forthcoming. 24 politics be understood" (1986b, 70). In his view, a system is comprised of a structure and interacting units, with the former defining the manner in which the latter are ordered or arranged. Since structure is the defining feature of the system, this is where our focus should be. Waltz is aware that such an emphasis leaves "aside questions about the kinds of political leaders, social and economic institutions, and ideological commitments states may have" (1986b, 71), but since the structure of relations between states determines the interactions between those states such matters are legitimately left aside. Waltz thus sees political leadership, institutional arrangements within the state, and predominant ideologies as irrelevant since the structure of state relations overrides such factors. Wendt terms this

"situational determinism" (1987,342), while Ruggie rightly points out that "structural change itself ultimately has no source other than unit-level processes" (1986, 152, emphasis in original). It would seem that Waltz is not unaware of this. He states that "[cjauses at the level of units and of systems interact, and because they do so explanation at the level of units alone is bound to mislead" (1986a, 56). If Waltz is right about the interaction between unit and systems level processes, then explanation at the systems level alone is equally problematic.

If we accept that the concept of power is at the heart of world politics (Morgenthau,

1985), then one would expect decision makers to set and pursue goals that can only be defined in terms of system transformation. While I acknowledge that ’power’ is itself an extremely ambiguous term, this would be true no matter how decision makers defined it and

no matter what goals they set as a result. This also does not mean that the structure of the

international environment does not form a constraint in either the setting of goals or the possibility of actually attaining them. What it does mean, is that neither a structural 25 explanation, nor a wholly agent-based one will capture the interplay between decision makers and the environment within which they function. Therefore, the recognition that "the properties of agents and those of social structures are both relevant to explanations of social behavior" (Wendt 1987, 338) presents a puzzle rather than solving one.

If unit and systems level processes interact, then our theories need to account for such interaction. The question is essentially: to what extent and under what circumstances does the system determine the nature of international relations and to what extent and under what circumstances do a state’s foreign policies, and the decision makers responsible for these policies, affect the nature of the international system? The question is one of the mutual impact of structure and units, of the strength of structural constraints versus the capability of the units to force change in the structure. It is exactly this question that engages researchers in role theory and symbolic interactionism, who acknowledge the significance of contextual and perceptual factors as intervening variables.

Second, most of the earlier work on national role conceptions has sought to aggregate the conceptions of individual decision makers to yield one national role conception. A study by Wish showed that "there were greater similarities among role conceptions expressed by leaders from the same nations than from differing nations" (1980, 549-50), thus justifying such aggregation. Furthermore, Wish concluded that national role conceptions "provide long-standing guidelines or standards for behavior. Their longevity and stability are assets when attempting to explain long-term patterns of behavior rather than single decisions"

(1980, 547). In other words, she sees national role conceptions as an underlying dimension and uses this to explain general patterns in foreign policy behavior. Although Wish claims that "many national role conception characteristics are strongly related to foreign policy 26 behavior" (1980, 546), the categories for both are extremely general and appear to bear a strong relation to the structural variable of relative status in the international system. As such, national role conceptions become an intervening variable that adds little explanatory power of its own.

Attempting to explain foreign policy behavior in less general terms. Walker did not find particularly strong relationships overall (1979, 193) and suspected his methodology to be at least partially responsible (1979,204; 1987, 92). It is possible. Walker concluded, that

"the aggregation and correlation of rhetoric and behavior by means of an overall valence index obscures more than it reveals. The correlation of role conceptions and role enactment behaviors in a disaggregated form, by issue area, and longitudinally by nation and dyad, might be more enlightening" (Walker 1979, 204). This conclusion points to appropriate avenues for further research.

It is noteworthy that Walker’s conclusion is in line with Holsti’s earlier assertion that the "policymakers of most states conceive of their state in terms of multiple sets of relationships and multiple roles and/or functions" (1970, 277). Although Holsti’s effort to pinpoint an average number of roles may seem simplistic, the concept of multiple roles is well-established in social psychology (Stryker and Statham 1985; Stryker and Serpe 1982;

Burke 1980). The concept of multiple roles generates questions regarding salience of particular roles, conflict between roles, and impact of contextual factors on the first two.

The national role conception framework in international relations could benefit from a further exploration of such concepts to inform its own theorizing.

Third, the system dominant perspective in Wish’s work is apparent also in her usage of East’s (1978, 1973) notion that differences in ’capacity to act’ relate to differences in the 27

B National Attributes National Role Conceptions

Foreign Policy Behavior

(from: Wish 1987, 96)

Figure 1.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES, NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

foreign policy behavior of states. Wish (1987) contends that while ’capacity to act’ or a state’s national attributes do have a direct impact on that state’s foreign policy behavior, its foreign policy behavior is also influenced by this indirectly when these attributes shape national role conceptions (see Figure I). It seems that the dependent variable, foreign policy behavior, here takes on multiple meanings. For example, the Dutch acted on basis of national role conception with regard to Indonesia at the close of World War II, but their limited capacity to act resulted in their eventually bowing to US/UN pressure, i.e. capacity to act eventually affected their behavior in the sense that it affected the eventual outcome (see

Smith 1981). This example illustrates the importance of separating foreign policy behavior into choices or decisions on the one hand, and outcomes on the other. This study will focus on foreign policy behavior as choices, which may be influenced by the system’s structure but are always filtered through decision maker perceptions of their state and its role in the 2 8 system. In other words, I argue that decision maker perceptions form an intervening variable without which one is hard pressed to explain foreign policy choices.

Role conceptions represent the intersection of perceived constraints in the international environment, perceived constraints in the domestic environment, and objectives and/or preferences of the individual decision makers. As such, the national role conceptions themselves are unobserved variables, which this study will seek to estimate on basis of statements made by decision makers. A case in which the national role conceptions of decision makers were severely tested and ultimately altered is described by Smith (1981) when he details the desperate attempts of Dutch policy makers to hang on to Indonesia (then called the Netherlands East Indies) at the end of World War II. He shows that this colony was perceived by Dutch decision makers as crucial to the Netherlands’ economic recovery

(1981, 113). Although Smith does not use national role conceptions, he clearly implies that the Dutch viewed their economic recovery as dependent on their continuation as a colonial power. Their national role conceptions thus constrained the policy options they perceived and the actual decisions made. National role conceptions can thus be seen as entailing certain mega policies (Dror 1971) or main guidelines, which may be viewed as a set of latent variables. Figure 2 illustrates this.

Bounded Rationalitv and Frames

While the work of Walker and Wish had a relatively close tie to structural realism, the current research seeks to move away from a system dominant perspective in favor of the state as an aggregate of individual decision makers and seeks to establish the perspective of 29

Latent: National Role Conceptions —> Mega Policy

Observed: Rhetoric of Decision Makers —> Individual Policy Preferences, Policy Choices

Figure 2 .

NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL INDICATORS

those decision makers. In doing so, this interpretation of national role conceptions seeks to incorporate the notions of bounded rationality (Simon 1985) and perspective (Tversky and

Kahneman 1981; Quattrone and Tversky 1988).

Decision makers act on basis of their understanding of the international environment and their state’s role in it. This understanding is conceptualized here as decision makers national role conception or set of national role conceptions. By focusing on how decision makers view their state’s role in world politics, this framework seeks to incorporate system constraints as understood bv the decision maker.

The idea that the decision makers’ grasp of their environment and their reaction to it is important is not new. International relations scholars have long acknowledged that decision makers and the foreign policy behavior of states must be understood in terms of what these leaders know and understand about their environment. Morgenthau already pointed this out (1985, 6), acknowledging that what a leader "actually knows and can know is but a small fragment of the total" (1985, 25). In the context of a critique of rational choice models in international relations, Jervis has noted that the implication of this is a need 30 to know "what situation the actors thinks he is facing, how he ranks his goals, what options he perceives, and how he thinks others are likely to react" (1989, 184). In a different critique of rational choice models, Fischoff (1988) argues in a similar vein that before expected utilities can be calculated, it must first be determined what a decision maker believes about the world and wants from it. The expected utility calculation is thus set within the bounds of how an individual perceives the world.

Only after we understand how decision makers define a situation, how they see their world and their state’s role in it, and what future they desire or fear, is it possible to grasp the reasoning that connects these ingredients with foreign policy decisions. In short, the argument is that, given the limited knowledge of any individual actor, theories regarding foreign policy decision making must be embedded in theories that seek to account for those limitations. I will argue that the answer can at least partially be found by reference to the social embeddedness of decision makers, meaning that decision makers representing a particular state have been formed and affected by the dominant culture and history of that nation (Kaplowitz 1990; Allport cited by Knowles 1982, 11; House 1981, 531). As individuals they may not all draw the same conclusions from these social influences as far as the management of the domestic society and also foreign affairs is concerned, but the influences are likely to give them similar ideas about their state’s identity as derived from historical experience and perceived current status. Their differences are more likely to concern the desired and feared futures, and the goals formulated to attain desired and avoid feared futures.

The national role conceptions of decision makers may thus be thought of as the perspective from which they view the world and how they frame the issues that confront 31 them as a result. The framework thus seeks to investigate how decision makers of different countries frame problems in a similar issue area. The importance of understanding the perspective from which decision makers operate is pointed out by the research of Tversky and Kahneman. They state that "rational choice requires that the preference between options should not reverse with changes of frame" (1981,453), but their research shows that the formulation of a problem does affect choice behavior. This essentially means that humans make ’mistakes’ with regard to deductive reasoning. Wason and Johnson-Laird argue that content matters in explaining such ’errors. ’ Accordingly, they state that "[c]ontent is crucial, and this suggests that any general theory of human reasoning must include an important semantic component" (1972, 245). Tversky and Kahneman (1981; see also Quattrone and

Tversky 1988) argue that the mistakes human beings make in relation to what objective rationality would predict are not random but follow certain patterns. To be precise, shifts in preferences or choices depend on two sets of factors. First variations in the manner in which a problem is presented affect how the problem is ’framed’ or set in context. Second are nonlinearities in values and decision weights. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) support this with evidence from experiments in which respondents were asked to choose between two options. Whether a problem that was essentially the same was phrased in terms of the potential to save lives or the likelihood that lives would be lost dramatically affected the preferences the subject voiced. The shift was from risk aversion in the first case to risk taking in the second. They do not regard these preference reversals or errors vis-a-vis objective rationality as evidence of irrationality. Rather, they consider these to be the result of rational processes set in context or, to use Simon’s terms, bounds. 32

Simon(1985) argues that once the bounds are known -which is the crucial issue- the person’s choices can be deduced just like objective rational choice can be deduced. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) make a comparable point, arguing that once frames and decision weights are understood, evaluation proceeds similarly across decision making situations. The theory postulates that the first phase accounts for the deviations from objective rational choice. Different outputs thus result from a single evaluation process tackling different input and input that is edited in varying ways. In other words, they argue that it is the representation of the problem that differs, not how the information is processed.

Delineating the ’bounds’ under which a given decision maker in a given situation operates is exactly the sort of puzzle the national role conceptions framework seeks to tackle.

The next sections will discuss how the literature on role theory and symbolic interactionism, and the interaction between these strands of theorizing within sociological social psychology, may inform the national role conceptions framework as a tool for studying foreign assistance policy.

The Limitations of Structural Role Theory

Stryker and Statham have commented with regard to structural role theory that such a view "rationalizes the subservience of persons to the social order" (1985, 340; see also

Knowles 1982, 7). In other words, structural role theory proposes a view of society in which individuals play out predetermined roles, which depend on the place they occupy within the social structure. Since this framework does not account for individual interpretations of such set roles, this leaves out any opportunity for individuals to make a difference, to affect the society in which they live. Such a view of society cannot explain 33 the emergence of, for example, a Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King. Structural role theory simply does not account for such individuals and the transforming impact they have on the society (and world) within which they live.

An explanation is provided by House and Mortimer (1990) who hold that it is not sufficient to document relations between structural positions. Rather, one needs to understand how structural positions influence the individual. This means that it is necessary to understand how a person is tied into that structure, and what the pattern of interaction among persons within a structure is and has been. Although House and Mortimer do not provide the connection, Biddle’s comment that the focus on structural factors means that within structural role theory "little attention is given to norms or other expectations for conduct" (Biddle 1986, 72-3), is consistent with their view. Whether society reproduces or transforms itself over time depends on normative expectations and goals, which can either stress the status quo or seek new patterns of social organization.^ Structural role theory accounts only for the reproduction of social structures and does not allow for the possibility of change or transformation. Similarly, structural realism does not account for such variables. However, international relations theory is not without any attention for normative aspects. The regime literature does seek to address the normative dimension of international relations, although it stresses normative commonalities in (parts of) the international community (e.g. Krasner 1983), rather than to focus on norms held by individual decision makers representing units that make up that community. Such norms may or may not conform to those international commonalities and that may lead to foreign policies that seek

^ Most likely, both forces are at work at any given time and interact in complex ways. The how and why of these forces is at the heart of this research. 34 to preserve or challenge the status quo. The national role conceptions framework I propose addresses the latter issue.

In sum, criticisms of structural role theory match criticisms of Waltz’ realism.

Within role theory, these criticisms have led to a '"new’ emphasis on the constructed character of social life" (Stryker and Statham 1985, 354). This means that there is renewed attention for the fact that individuals are not only socialized into roles but also actively shape those roles. Knowles sees such a focus on individuals as "active agents in the process of creating the role" as the necessary outcome of the ambiguous and imprecise nature of many social roles (1982, 7). In other words, Knowles holds that it often isn’t clear to people in a society what a good student, parent, teacher, or other social role looks like. There simply aren’t unambiguous packages of instructions to follow even if one had the desire to do so.

Much the same is true for world politics, which has frequently been characterized as

’anarchic’ (Keohane 1989; 1986). Strictly speaking, if one accepts the notion of anarchy, both the concepts of system and regimes become problematic. Although in very different ways, both impose a conceptual structure on an environment that especially structural realists insist is anarchic. Keohane would quarrel with such an interpretation of the term which stresses the absence of order. He argues that "anarchy implies neither an absence of pattern nor perpetual warfare" (Keohane 1989, 1) and thereby limits the term to connote an absence of common government. What is misleading is that such a formulation obscures the fact that whatever order exists is ambiguous in nature. Indeed, Morgenthau already commented on the "ambiguity of the events to be understood by a theory of international politics" (1985,

20). That same ambiguity is confronted by decision makers in world politics. A more 35 appropriate way to characterize the international system is therefore as an environment governed by ambiguity and vagueness. The former term denotes that the probabilities associated with the relevant alternatives are not known, while the latter denotes ambiguity to the extent that descriptions of likelihoods are limited to terms like ’doubtful’ or ’possible’

(Nygren).

The argument is not that structure is irrelevant, but that it does not unambiguously provide decision makers of the units comprising the system with information about

’appropriate’ or potentially successful foreign policy action. In other words, the ambiguous nature of the international environment allows decision makers to bring their own interpretations, biases, hopes, fears, and ideals to the task of constructing their state’s foreign policy (House 1981, 556).

The concept of role remains useful here. Stryker and Statham see it as providing a key link between structural role theory and its counterpart, symbolic interactionism. Whereas the former proceeds from the assumption that individuals are socialized into roles, the latter stresses that humans actively create their social roles. These two strands of theory take opposite viewpoints with regard to the question of whether society determines the individual, or the individual the society. The debate between the two regards the extent and circumstances under which social structure and person influence each other, although both

"emphasize the need to analyze social phenomena from the perspectives of participants in social processes" (Stryker and Statham 1985, 312). The importance of this debate for international relations theory lies in the attempt to integrate structural notions with those of active agency of decision makers, i.e. to integrate system and unit level theories. 36

Role Theory and its Extentions

Structural role theory provided a view of society as a static entity with significant impact on the individual (Stryker and Statham 1985; Knowles 1982; Sarbin and Allen 1968).

Turner indicates the inadequacy of this position:

Early formulations of role theory referred to a collection of behavioural prescriptions, fairly mechanically translated into behaviour as a consequence of assuming the role. But few scholars still adhere to so simple a view of role dynamics. (1987, 122)

Turner thus sees the main shortcoming of structural role theory as ignoring that individuals are simultaneously socialized into roles and active agents in shaping those roles. Backman makes a similar point, arguing that human behavior is not solely determined by the stimuli that impinge on humans. He thus sees human beings as active agents, albeit subject to social constraints which he sees as emerging out of processes of interaction (Backman 1983, 222).

The contention that constraints are defined and redefined through human interaction places

Backman closer to a symbolic interactionist perspective than to a role theoretic one, perhaps giving constraints imposed by social structure too little weight. Stryker has argued that symbolic interactionism neglects factors like habit and custom because it stresses continuous redefinition through social interaction (1981, 18). He points out that social structure, once created, constrains further interaction (Stryker 1981, 11; see also House 1981, 529). The role concept explains this by pointing out that

Roles exist before the interaction of particular occupants of positions in organized structures of relationships. These are residues from the past experience of past occupants of these positions... They are, in short, the products of culture. (Stryker and Statham 1985, 331)

In essence, Stryker argues that society Is not created anew in every interaction, but that patterns of interaction, while not unchangeable, have durability. In his view. 37

When structures in which roles are embedded meet needs, constraints will be heavy and roles will be imposed; when they do not, construction will become possible and role improvisation will occur (Stryker 1987, 93).

This formulation must be seen in the context of Stryker’s earlier assessment that "[s]ome structures are open, some closed, with respect to altering behavioral expectations and novelty in role performances" (Stryker 1981,209). In other words, he assumes that some structures are more open to behavior that may alter the structure, or conversely, that some structures impose clearer consUaints, presumably because such constraints emanate from viable roles.

This presupposes that situations in which structures and roles do and do not meet needs can always be clearly and unambiguously differentiated. While this may be the case in certain circumstances —e.g. highly ritualized interactions— it is more often the case that structures do not present themselves unambiguously (Knowles 1982), which makes discerning the extent to which roles meet needs of necessity problematic. A more satisfactory point of departure is therefore the expectation that it is exactly the vagueness of role prescriptions which opens the door to interpretation by individuals in roles. House has written that "[w]here role expectations and sanctions are less clear and consistent, the opportunity for individuals to influence the nature of their roles becomes even greater" (1981, 556). Turner argues similarly that

Human beings act as if others they meet are playing identifiable roles... But cultural cues to roles are often vague and contradictory, and so provide only a general outline within which lines of action can be constructed." (1981, 20)

The assertion that humans act as if others enact clearly identifiable roles eventhough the observable information is anything but clear, implies a process through which the cues that are available are translated into usable information. This process of making sense of available cues does not stand in a vacuum, but is instead socially determined. According to 38

Morgan and Schwalbe, socialization is "not so much the simple acquisition of information as the organization of that information into usable knowledge" (1990, 152).

It is at this intersection that sociological and psychological concepts meet. Stryker:

The fundamental commonality of attribution theory and symbolic interactionism is in their underlying phenomenological perspective, in particular their insistence on comprehending the subjective experience of the persons they study and the necessity of incorporating this comprehension in explanations of human behavior. Both argue that social conduct can be understood only through examining actors’ perceptions of their physical and social environments." (1983, 196)

Where the two differ is in the sociological perspective’s requirement that "social behavior be seen in part as a consequence of where persons are located in the larger social structures that make up society" (Stryker 1983,209). Stryker thus views a person’s location or position in social frameworks as a determinant of that person’s behavior. This is underscored by

Serpe, who sees "the relationship between self and social structure as central to a developing understanding of social action" (1987, 44). Linking a person’s location within the social structure and behavior are cognitive variables.

Thus far, two aspects of human embeddedness in society have been discussed. One is that while human beings are active agents, they are constrained by a social structure characterized by habit and custom. This may be called the historical dimension, as it denotes aspects of society that, even though resulting from human action, appear in the current situation as constraints or as role determined behaviors. The second aspect is that of location within the social structure as a determinant of one’s frame of reference and ultimately one’s behavior. The first is to a large degree a structure dominant type of explanation of behavior in which the individual follows a set of prescriptions but adds little to that role. The second could be interpreted in structural terms as well if the emphasis is on international 39 stratification (Dixon 1980). However, given the emphasis on cognition, this would not seem to be an appropriate interpretation. The literature on situated identities clarifies this.

Sociologists have used the concept of ’situated identity’ to describe the consequences of a person’s embeddedness in a social environment (Wiley and Alexander 1987, Alexander and Rudd 1984). According to Turner, "self-conceptions held or expressed in different contexts can be diverse in content and in their relations to behaviour" (1987, 126). Human beings thus define themselves and their role with reference to a specific context, and such definitions may not be the same across contexts. The assumption is that individuals see themselves as performing multiple roles. Stryker and Serpe (1982) have introduced the concept of identity salience as a framework for organizing a person’s multiple roles.

Although the concept as they formulate it implies a static hierarchy of identities, one could conceive of contextually determined hierarchies. This would mean that even though individuals perceive themselves as performing multiple roles, in different settings different identities will have a higher salience for them. Indeed, the idea of situated identities expresses exactly such a contextual variability in importance of various roles or identities.

As a result, behavior may also not be the same across contexts because of such differential self and role definitions. The implication is that it is important to understand the context within which individuals perceive themselves as operating before behavior in that context can be rendered intelligible. While most of the work utilizing the simated identities concept focuses on the individual’s various roles within a society or subsets of a society, others have pointed to a cultural component. Wiley and Alexander argue that

The structure of the society in which an individual is socialized affects role schemata learned, and the salience and importance of the dispositional dimensions that 40

comprise them, in the same way in which it affects other perceptions of the world. (1987, 109)

A study by Markus and Kitayama (1991) has attempted to delineate that social impact on how persons of U.S. and Japanese cultural settings see themselves. Their research concerns what individuals in these two settings "believe about the relationship between the self and others and ... the degree to which they see themselves as separate from others or as connected with others" (Markus and Kitayama 1991, 226, italics in original). They propose an independent versus interdependent view of the self, the former stressing individualism and autonomy, while the latter stresses the relationships of the person to others as crucial to an understanding of who one is. While they exemplify the independent view of the self with the U.S. and the interdependent view with the Japanese case, they also note that even within

Western culture persons often do not conform to the individualist ideal, and conclude that

Perhaps Western models of the self are quite at odds with actual individual social behavior and should be reformulated to reflect the substantial interdependence that characterizes even Western individualists. (1991, 247)

This in essence points out that their earlier typology may reflect cultural ideal types more than actual behavior. Nevertheless, their research does raise "questions about what have been thought to be culture-free aspects of cognition, emotion, and motivation" (Markus and

Kitayama 1991, 224), as these divergent self-construals "play a major role in regulating various psychological processes" (1991, 225).

This challenge to the —often tacit- assumption of universality in psychological research is significant and points to problems associated with the decontextualized nature of much of it. With regard to this, Burke has commented that

The problem with most measurement situations, then, is that without the normal situational constraints it becomes very easy for a respondent to give us that idealized 41

identity picture which may only seldomly be realized in normal interactional situations. (1980, 27)

Burke’s use of the term identity is somewhat confusing. He at once equates it with role, as others have done, and with self or ’I-myself.’ The latter is a more abstract concept, denoting that aspect of self-definition that remains constant across situations. He then employs the concept of ’image’ to denote identity in a specific situation or context (Burke 1980, 26).

Nevertheless, Burke’s observation that in laboratory or other nonconsequential settings it may be exceedingly difficult to capture situation-specific roles and identities experienced by individuals is a valuable insight. The reason for this is, as Turner expresses it, that

"situation [is] an essential intervening variable between society and the individual" (1988,1).

Morgan and Schwalbe elaborate on this, essentially combining Kahneman and Tversky’s

(1981) notion of framing with concepts from social cognition;

Using such concepts as ’perspective’ and ’expectation,’ interactionist role theorists argue that the perception of social objects... is influenced by the social role that an individual plays in a given situation. This view contrasts with the universalistic conceptions of prototypes, scripts, and such that schema theorists employ. Schema theorists thus gloss over the matter of how the perception and interpretation of information generated by an event can vary depending on one’s interests and standpoint, as embodied in one’s role. (Morgan and Schwalbe 1990, 158)

The historical roots of a given social structure and the individual’s location within that structure are not the sole determinants of behavior, however. Notions of the origins of current structures and of location within it as factors affecting perception of that structure do not provide an obvious link to behavior if we regard human beings as active agents,^ who pursue their own agenda within a given set of constraints. Markus and Nurius’ concept of

’possible selves’ fills this void. Possible selves are "the cognitive manifestations of enduring

^ If we regard human beings as passively enacting preset roles, then the two dimensions discussed thus far would be the only ingredients needed to explain behavior. 42 goals, aspirations, motives, fears, and threats" (1986, 954). These may be positive or negative, goals individuals seek to attain or to avoid. The importance for understanding this dimension of potentiality lies in its implications for behavior that may seem inconsistent or irrational given structural constraints. Markus and Nurius explain what the concept of possible selves contributes as follows:

one of the dramatic differences between self-perception and the perception of others can be found in the simple fact that when we perceive ourselves, we see not only our present capacities and states but also our potential. (1986, 964)

It is individuals’ sense of their potential that motivates them to engage in behavior that may not be well explained with reference to the existing structural constraints. The concept of possible selves ties cognitions of the environment to motivations for preserving or altering the status quo (Markus and Nurius 1986, 958). It is therefore especially the dimension of potentiality that moves the role concept beyond a structural theory and into the direction of a framework that incorporates structural constraints while also taking account of human agency.

In sum, three dimensions are to be incorporated into the role concept. First is that of perceived structural constraints. Second is location within the structure as a factor that determines how perceptions are framed. This location can be understood both in terms of perceived location within the system and in terms of issue area. One’s perceived location within the system mav differ with respect to different issues. Last is the dimension of potentiality which explores the motivations of humans as active agents within a social structure. 43

National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Behavior

The foregoing has discussed each of the three dimensions at the level of the individual embedded in a social context. Foreign policy decision makers of course are individuals in particular positions within their state. Additionally, they represent, set goals, and make decisions for that state in its relations with other states. How these decision makers perceive the international structure within which their state is situated, how they perceive their state’s role within that structure, and the goals and aspirations they set for their state’s future role within that structure all have important consequences for the policies they pursue. Although the fact that foreign policy decision makers are individuals embedded in the context of their own society is not unimportant, the focus here is on decision makers’ individual conceptions of their state’s role in the international system. Their embeddedness in their own society is of interest here only insofar as it affects the perspective from which they view world politics and their state’s role in it. Wiley and Alexander argue that

The structure of the society in which an individual is socialized affects the role schemata learned, and the salience and importance of dispositional elements that comprise them, in the same way in which it affects other perceptions of the world. (1987,109)

Similarly, Kiecolt argues that "[ajttitudes and social structure are reciprocally related" (1988,

398) and sees the link between attitudes and social structure as "an effort to link micro and macro levels of analysis" (1988, 382).

The assessment of the state’s location and role within the international structure explains how decision makers perceive their country’s role in the world, while their foreign policy goals link these representations with a motivational aspect to connect perceptions to foreign policy behavior -here defined as policy choices rather than outcomes. Markus and

Nurius point out the relevance of the concept of possible selves to decision making by stating 44 that ”[m]any important decisions involve a process of imaging the self under various alternative outcomes" (1986, 966). Interestingly, Holsti’s original use of actor-defined national role conceptions was motivated by the lack of normative direction provided by world politics (Jonsson 1982, 131; Holsti 1970). In other words, because the international environment is characterized by ambiguity, Holsti suspected that national role conceptions might be more useful as an explanation of foreign policy behavior than expectations for such behavior imputed by other actors in the international system or by structural explanations.

In his formulation:

A national role conception includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their "image" of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment. (Holsti 1970, 245-6)

Holsti implies that the system is a static entity within which the decision maker’s state has a specific role to fulfill. Moreover, the use of the term ’appropriate’ conveys the notion that there is a specific foreign policy that is correct, given the role of a specific state in the system. However, given the lack of precise information about what constitutes appropriate action and the assumption of active agency (which fits nicely with the traditional assumption that a desire for power drives international relations), it is imperative that the national role concept not only be studied from the perspective of decision maker cognitions, but also that the dimension of potentialities be included. It is expected that this dimension will be especially important in explaining foreign policy actions that seem to ignore or ’misinterpret’ system constraints.

Although individual decision makers are likely to espouse different opinions about what constitutes appropriate action, their common membership in a society is expected to 45 provide a commonality in terms of the perceptions of the international structure and their state’s role within it. That means that Î expect that on the first two dimensions decision makers representing the same state would have greater similarities with each other than with decision makers representing another state. As individuals socialized in the same society they are likely to have been exposed to similar interpretations of historical events, including their nation’s history and place in the world."* Such socialization, reinforced by events, affects how decision makers perceive both their state’s role in the system in general and in specific issue areas. The former is too generalized to be very useful as a subject for empirical work that seeks to relate role conceptions to foreign policy choices. It is through specific issues and occasions for decision with regard to these issues that decision makers express their sense of their nation’s role in world politics. In other words, decision makers will define their state’s identity or role with respect to a specific foreign policy issue. The contention is that in different issue areas different national identities or roles may be expressed by decision makers. While such roles are in their present form defined by individual decision makers, their definitions are affected by structural constraints and location within the system. This is in line with the ideas concerning salient identities, hierarchies of identities, and situated identities discussed above. Moreover, since the international environment is ambiguous the content of these national identities may vary per country.

A point of caution with regard to this hypothesized similarity among decision makers representing one state is the potential impact of unusual circumstances of individual decision makers, e.g. significant time spent abroad. A decision maker who has lived and worked

■* It is my view that national history carries a component of myth, i.e. what is handed down is not merely or only an account of historical fact but also a narrative that supplies the building blocks of national identity. 46

overseas either for a significant amount of time or in a situation or role that led to a

questioning of earlier worldviews, is likely not to fit the expected pattern. Although such

differences between individual foreign policy decision makers should not be ignored, their

individual conceptions of their nation’s role in world politics are expected to show substantial overlap. In others words, they are expected to operate on basis of similar assumptions which grow out of socialization and interaction in a common society. Morgan and Schwalbe stress this social aspect of role conceptions:

The key point is that such representations derive from ongoing interaction within some existing social structure. They are the shared cognitive property of a group rather than the mental property of unrelated individuals. This shared quality is what makes them social representations. (1990, 154, italics in original)

This leads to the expectation that the national role conceptions of the decision makers of a particular state should have commonalities. This is underscored by Kaplowitz (1990) who considers national self-images an important dimension of political culture, transmitted by agents of that culture. The ideas of national role conception and national self-images thus have common dimensions although they depart from different literatures.

Another source of differences among decision makers of one state is contained in the third dimension. While they may agree on the past and the present role of their nation in world politics, there are likely to be differences with regard to the goals and aspirations they bring to the task of foreign policy making. With regard to this dimension, I expect that a decision maker’s political ’color’ will have a significant impact. Beliefs about the proper role of government in human affairs and other enduring ideological predispositions are hypothesized to be significant in linking perceptions on the first two dimensions to foreign 47 policy preferences.’ Given that decision makers in any one country are likely to represent different ideological positions, this requires further conceptualization regarding the impact of this third dimension on foreign assistance policy. Expectations regarding this need to be formulated with reference to the specific government structure in each country. For instance, the role and authority of the prime minister is not equal across the three countries under study. This has consequences for the dynamics within a government and thus for the impact each decision maker’s personal preferences are likely to have on policy choices.

Some general points about the significance of individuals can be made at this point, however. Turner assigns "special importance to small numbers of people in crucial roles at crucial historical moment in shaping social structures" (1988, 8). This leaves open the question of how to identify both the people in these roles and the moments in history.

Turner suggests that "the personal styles of prominent individuals in key roles" matter (1988,

3). House (1981) cites Franklin D. Roosevelt as such a person, commenting that FDR changed the nature of the role of the presidency and the federal government in U.S. politics.

However, he also adds the caveat that it is difficult to separate the impact of the person from the demands of the time (House 1981,557). One way to look at this is to acknowledge the demands of a country in crisis, but to realize also that the specific response to the crisis cannot be explained by those circumstances alone. FDR was a person with particular political preferences and goals which influenced decision making. Another person would

’ Lewins (1989) discusses the differences between ’mundane’ beliefs, which are constantly adjusted, and the more enduring beliefs referred to here. The latter are quite resistant to change as they are supported by internal standards and not subject to external or empirical evidence. He cites religious beliefs as an example of enduring beliefs which individuals do not change easily and for which change, if it does occur "is not a trivial event" (Lewins 1989, 682). 48

have brought different preferences and goals to the same position and would have had a

different impact. Thus, the specific policy response was not only the result of the demands

of the time, but also of the person who was in a position to propose a set of policies he

deemed appropriate to deal with that problem. Different individuals will have different views

of the dimension of potentiality, in other words.

It is not possible to predict who will rise to the occasion and in what manner. To

claim the contrary would be to deny human agency. What may be possible is to identify

situations or contexts within which such individuals are likely to appear. As cited above,

Stryker (1987, 1981) assumes that some structures are more tolerant of actions that, by design or default, have the potential to alter the structure. He pinpoints situations in which the expected behavior does not constitute viable action as the type of context that opens the door to novel solutions. Conversely, House (1981) and Turner (1981) argue that it is the lack of explicit expectations for action that creates such opportunities. Put together, these two lines of argument lead to the hypothesis that when decision makers perceive that expected behavior is not likely to help achieve their foreign policy goal, they tend to act contrary to such expectations.® Additionally, expectations in a given decision making situation may be ambiguous, which would imply that the concept of ’expected behavior’ is dependent on the decision maker’s reading of those ambiguous cues. Such a reading or understanding cannot be seen apart from predispositions to frame decision making situations in one way or another.

® Theoretically, expectations for behavior could have their source both in decision makers representing other states in the system and in various domestic audiences. The reference to expectations here focuses on those of actors external to the decision maker’s state. 49

In conclusion, the national role conceptions framework stresses that what matters is how decision makers perceive their nation’s role in world politics. To test this proposition empirically I am presenting a set of four hypothesized role categories and associated expectations for foreign assistance policy behavior. The next chapter will elaborate on the four categories that comprise the framework and will explain how each is expected to relate to foreign assistance policy choice. CHAPTER III

OPERATIONALIZING NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS

Introduction

What drives donor countries to provide foreign assistance to Third World states? The reasons are numerous and varied, but the common thread running across most motivations for foreign assistance may have little to do with development in the recipient country.

Barling underscores this when he writes that: "Even the most disinterested forms of aid are potential instruments of foreign policy as it is extended to beneficiaries beyond the boundaries of national jurisdiction" (1989,42). Yet, although political motivations inherently affect the foreign assistance policies of donor states, there has been little attempt to provide empirical links between various objectives and the resulting foreign assistance.

The national role conception framework introduced in this chapter represents an attempt to connect specific foreign assistance policy objectives with the aid packages provided by donor countries. The expectation is that national role conceptions as inferred from decision maker rhetoric covary with the policy behaviors hypothesized to be associated with it. The claim is not that a role conception causes a specific behavior, but rather that a role conception sets up the parameters of a range of possible behaviors and thus makes certain policy decisions more likely than others. Tlierefore, I agree with Vertzberger that "[a] particular role does not necessarily involve a single specific behavior pattern in a particular

50 51 situation but rather an action orientation that can be translated into various action clusters"

(1990, 288). The hypothesized role conception framework reflects this in that each profile broadly describes policy behavior expected to be associated with a specific role conception, i.e. it indicates what types of policies are more likely to be considered when a particular role conception is prevalent among the decision makers representing a particular state. Given that the role conceptions are inferred from rhetoric, and given that the verbal behavior that this constitutes often sets up intentions to act in particular ways (Johnson and Sherman 1990), covariation between the role conception and policy behavior measures does not seem unwarranted.

The current research aims to establish patterns in how decision makers, individually and collectively, perceive the role tlieir state plays in the foreign assistance policy domain.

As will be explained below, I assume that the variance among the decision makers representing the same state is bounded by parameters set by their common membership in the same society. These parameters evidence themselves in a significant degree of commonality regarding the perception of structural constraints and framing of world politics.' The research therefore does not concern a simple aggregation of individual decision makers to yield a single national role conception. Instead, I am expecting a range of themes to be debated within each decision making setting, with certain themes more prevalent than others, and with different themes predominant in each of the three settings studied.

' In chapter 2, the perceived structural constraints and the location within the structure as a factor determining how perceptions are framed, were posited as two dimensions on which decision makers share a significant degree of commonality, while the third dimension, that of potentiality, was posited as the source of their differences. 52

The framework is a tool used to uncover decision makers’ national role conceptions.

These role conceptions are not just of intrinsic interest, but are important as factors that explain differences in foreign assistance policy cross-nationally. The framework’s categories can be seen as hypothesized connections between objective and action. They are in essence ideal types, which were constructed on basis of the secondary literature on donor motivation.

Therefore, the proposed categories should not be mistaken for a well-rounded theory, but at best as a step towards a theory. The theoretical element is the hypothesis that decision makers’ national role conceptions explain why certain foreign policy choices are more likely to be considered than others. The framework hypothesized here is designed to test this proposition empirically with respect to a specific foreign policy making domain.

These role conceptions are created with the issue area of foreign aid policy in mind and pertain to this issue area primarily. However, since foreign aid is understood here as a subset of foreign policy, it is hypothesized to serve objectives that are not traditionally associated with development assistance. That is to say, much of the debate on foreign aid has focused on whether or not it has actually fostered the development which ostensibly is its objective (Mosley 1987, Riddell 1987). While fostering development in a Third World country is a possible goal for a donor, it is not necessarily the primary objective underlying policy. Here, foreign policy goals that have no intrinsic connection with development are hypothesized to intrude on the domain of foreign assistance policy and shape both cognition and behavior in this issue area. Therefore, while the four profiles are designed to study a specific issue area, they must take into account that policy making in any one issue area is not totally separate from that in other issue areas. Indeed, if issue areas were wholly 53 separable the connections between motives and action would likely be much simpler to discern.

Conceptualizing Role Conceptions for Foreign Assistance Decision Making

The foreign assistance policy profiles proposed here build on the motivations described in the literature, which have been summarized into three categories: humanitarian, economic, and political (Barling 1989, 23, Hoebink 1988,43). In the proposed framework, these sets of motivations are brought together in, respectively, the good neighbor, merchant. and power broker role conceptions. The addition of a fourth role, that of social engineer, was deemed necessary to be able to distinguish a set of motivations that is often classified as humanitarian, although it is also acknowledged to deviate from what traditionally are considered to be humanitarian motives: it proceeds from an analysis of the world economic structure and portends to move towards rectifying its imbalances (Stokke 1989, Stokke 1984,

Pratt 1989). This fourth role has very definite economic elements, but it is distinguished from the merchant role in that its economic goals are not as short-term or geared to immediate benefits to the donor economy as the more traditional economic motives.

The similarities and differences between the four roles are sununarized in Figure 3.

Essentially, the four roles are combinations of two dimensions. The rows represent two very different philosophies regarding international politics. One is a ’community’ oriented philosophy or ’social conscience’ that the good neighbor and the social engineer have in common. Their very different policy orientations, which are reflected in the columns labeled

’conformist’ and ’reformist,’ set them apart. The former denotes an acceptance of the current world order, while a reformist policy orientation indicates a desire to shape the world 54

1 P hilosoD hv G eneral 1 1 of P o lic y 1 International Orientation I 1 R e la tio n s 1 1 1 C onform ist Reformist |

1 1 Community 1. 2. 1 Good Neighbor Social Engineer! 1 1

1 1 H obbesian 3. 4. 1 M erchant Power Broker | 1 I

Figure 3.

TYPOLOGY OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ROLE CONCEPTIONS

according to the preferences of the donor state’s decision makers. The good neighbor combines a conformist policy orientation and community philosophy into a do-gooder attitude that accepts the world as it is. The social engineer’s community philosophy is paired with a reformist policy orientation, indicating a desire to shape international structures according to its vision of what is good for the world, including its own state.

The second row represents a ’Hobbesian’ philosophy of world politics. It stresses direct payoffs to ones own state as opposed to benefits that accrue as a result of strategies that benefit the world community as a whole and one’s own state included. Both the merchant and power broker role conceptions proceed from such a Hobbesian philosophy, but their policy orientations set them apart. The intersection of conformist orientation and

Hobbesian philosophy indicate that the merchant seeks benefits to itself by working within 55 the system. The power broker, combining a Hobbesian philosophy with a reformist orientation, seeks to shape the world in such a way as to enhance its own power. Both of the merchant and power broker roles can be said to proceed from assumptions that realists have employed, with the power broker representing ’high politics’ and the merchant ’low politics.’ The social engineer is a hybrid that such a division into high and low politics would have difficulty with. Its economic orientation provides a commonality with the merchant role, but both its underlying philosophy and its policy orientation are incongruent with traditional conceptions of low politics. As Figure 3 aims to illustrate, the national role conception framework is not a radical departure from realist assumptions, but rather seeks to refine these by seeking to empirically investigate decision makers’ perceptions of their state’s role and interests in world politics.

The following sections provide a more detailed definition of each of the four roles.

These sections deal only with how each role conception is conceptually constituted.

Subsequent portions of the chapter will address the operationalization of each of the roles for empirical investigation.

The Good Neighbor Role Defined

Decision makers who perceive their state as a good neighbor, see foreign assistance in terms of an obligation to alleviate needs on humanitarian grounds. What is crucial to this role conception is that it lacks a vision regarding the long term and instead focuses entirely on the acute problem.

The emphasis in this role conception is on a perception of ones state as ’altruistic,’ providing foreign assistance out of a sense of duty to ones fellow human. Wall (1973) 56 termed this the "rhetoric of aid," indicating a certain cynicism with regard to its value as an explanation of aid policy choices. I share Wall’s sentiments, and doubt that decision makers are actually in any significant sense driven by a good neighbor role conception in their foreign assistance decision making. While it is not expected that this role conception dominates foreign assistance decision making in any state, it will show up in each. It will generally appear most markedly in relation to situational factors, such as when a famine or other natural disaster calls for a response. Under such specific circumstances the good neighbor role becomes salient and may guide a specific policy response.

While it will be important not to overinterpret rhetoric stressing duty to one’s fellow humans elsewhere in the world into a genuine role conception, it also seems important not to be so sceptical as to not allow for such a role conception. As indicated, under certain circumstances this role conception is likely to appear and shape decision making.

Nevertheless, not too much should be made of decision makers’ talk of their (governments’) responsibility to help poor countries. In Wall’s view, such a sense of responsibility does not explain the expenditure of tax revenue on foreign assistance: "They would not do so if they believed that they were acting against their own interests" (Wall 1973, 49). Riddell argues along similar lines, explaining that donor interests of some sort enter into development assistance that is often portrayed as being given on humanitarian grounds:

To the extent that foreign aid assists in cementing the world community by providing for greater world stability it indirectly helps the citizens of the donor country. But in this case it is not the moral imperative to help foreign citizens that is the principle invoked for government action, but the more basic concern to secure the long-term interests of its own citizens. (1987, 14) 57

Johansen makes a related point from the perspective of aid’s recipients:

For aid to be considered humanitarian, it would need to be extended as a matter of right to persons, regardless of their race, ideology, or strategic importance, who lacked minimal requirements for physical existence and a life of dignity. (1980,153)

Johansen here outlines a good neighbor perspective: assistance provided by the donor in response to a need, with no specific foreign policy goal in mind and with little perspective for a payoff beyond goodwill. Such altruistic assistance is provided on occasion, but it is not expected to dominate any country’s foreign assistance program. It will be a portion of each country’s aid package, and the good neighbor role conception is expected to become salient and a guide to foreign assistance behavior at times when acute natural disaster demands action. One could argue that such a ’force of circumstances’ means that aid is not extended as a matter of right, as Johansen specifies, but, negatively, on basis of a sense that ’one cannot stand by and do nothing. ’ However, such assistance is still provided more on basis of a perceived need than on basis of an expected return and therefore fits into the good neighbor role. Johansen goes on to say that

Humanitarian assistance also would decrease the recipient’s dependency on the donor and promote structural change empowering the weak to achieve greater equity in global decision making on economic affairs. (1980, 153)

This second aspect of humanitarian aid much more readily proceeds from a notion of a long term self-interest, along the lines suggested by Riddell above: the goal of achieving international equity does not derive from a moral principle, but from the conviction that a move toward greater international equity is in the interest of the wealthy countries as well

(e.g. Pronk 1976, Brandt Commission 1980). Such a perception of interest separates these motives, which are often classified as humanitarian, from those I classify under the heading of a good neighbor role conception. 58

However, Pratt names exactly such motivations as a significant component of what he calls ’humane internationalism,’ stressing that the aid policies of the countries in his set of studies have an ethical component (1989, 13). In the framework I propose here, this humane internationalism is broken apart into its components, some of which fall under the good neighbor role and others under the social engineer role to be described below. In separating the components out, I have attempted to achieve greater conceptual clarity in differentiating charity from ’enlightened’ self-interest. In the case of the former, the donor expects no payoff, or only one in terms of the ephemeral benefits of national prestige or international goodwill, while the latter case there are definite policy objectives that guide the decision making. Another way to look at this, is that while both the good neighbor and social engineer are motivated by a ’social conscience,’ or a sense of indignation at the inequities and concomitant injustices in the world, the implications of this indignation are not the same. The good neighbor is essentially status quo oriented. Foreign aid as charity alleviates the most pressing needs but does not essentially alter existing power relations. The social engineer, on the other hand, complements a social conscience with a desire to effect structural change. The latter thus seeks to affect the international environment in more tangible ways, even if these goals are exceedingly difficult to accomplish.

The Social Engineer Role Defined

The social engineer role conception posits that decision makers are driven by the expectation that through the provision of aid, their state can effect structural changes within the recipient country specifically and the international environment more generally. The role conception focuses on the desire to affect procedures, or ’rules of the game,’ rather than 59 specifically on outcomes, although certain outcomes are implicit in the vision that underlies this role conception.

The type of structural changes holders of this role conception aim at are a greater equality of opportunity for members of recipient societies, and for third world countries as members of the international system. The role conception builds on a diagnosis consistent with dependency theories, and an awareness of (economic) interdependence that necessitates an effort to alter international structures. The joint identification of dependency and interdependence results in the diagnosis that the gap between rich and poor is ultimately a threat to the economic well-being of the donor state. The emergence of structures that are believed to lead to a more stable international order is therefore deemed important.

As explained above, this role conception is also in part based on the ideas of humane internationalism (Pratt 1989; Stokke 1989). As posited, this role conception is especially attractive to a country with an open and vulnerable economy, although such an economy is not a sufficient explanation for such a role conception. Everts (1982, 275), writing on the

Dutch case, suggests that development assistance with as goal poverty alleviation and structural change can be linked to political and commercial interests in continual contacts with developing countries. In other words, a definite sense of self-interest drives such aid. While

Everts is not specific regarding the political and economic interests of such a country in structural change, Lovbraek explicitly states that

The key argument is that structural inequalities and inequities in North-South relations will be intensified, if structural reforms to the existing order are not implemented, and may eventually be transformed into antagonistic contradictions which could threaten the very stability of the international system. (1990, 62, see also Wood 1986) 60

Decision makers who see their state’s role in terms of a social engineer role conception thus proceed from a desire to make the world ’safe for international trade,’ including their own

(potential) trading relations with the South, while decision makers who hold a merchant conception of their own state lack a vision for the longer term evolution of the international system.

The Merchant Role Defined

This role conception also is driven by the perception that what happens in the world economy affects the donor state domestically, i.e. an awareness of interdependence. Decision makers holding a merchant conception of their state perceive it as an integral part of an international economic structure. However, the merchant role conception does not include a desire to change but rather to preserve the international system with a view toward reaping the best possible benefit from that system for ones own state.

The implication of economic interdependence is thus perceived very differently than by decision makers holding a social engineer role conception. The merchant role conceives of the donor country as a ’protector of free trade,’ although a more appropriate label would in practice often be ’protector of own economic interests.’ Along these lines. Cassen et al argue that the free market philosophy "is often abandoned when expediency requires" (1982,

19). In other words, decision makers perceive the role of government in pragmatic terms, as a facilitator of efforts by private enterprise. Both the social engineer and merchant role have a strong economic orientation, but differ in how they see themselves in the international environment. The social engineer seeks to alter the international environment per se, while the merchant seeks to make the existing international environment safe for its own immediate 61 purposes. The merchant thus differs from the social engineer on two counts: the former essentially accepts the current power relations in the international system and can be defined as status quo oriented on that score. In addition, the merchant is not guided so much by a sense of social responsibilit)' as by a basic belief that it is important to first and foremost secure benefits to ones own state.

The Power Broker Role Defined

A desire to affect the international system in such a way as to enhance the donor state’s leverage in international politics is central to this role conception and makes it analogous to the traditional realist conception of power as the motivating force driving foreign policy decisions.

Like decision makers who see their state in terms of a merchant role, securing benefits to ones own state also drives those who proceed from a power broker conception of their state’s role in world politics, but this fourth and final role conception stresses exercising and enhancing political influence, rather than economic gain. This role conception is more likely to be held by decision makers of larger and more powerful states for whom the need to secure access to resources or to markets a preoccupation that could potentially, but not preferably, be satisfied by military means. That is not to say that economic factors play no role at all, but the focus is foremost on

the positive relationship that the mind of the recipient establishes between the aid and its beneficial results, on the one hand, and the political phiicisophy, the political system, and the political objective of the giver, on tiie other. (Morgendiau 1962,308- 9)

The policy objectives of decision makers who see their state in power broker terms focus on a desire to affect the international system in such a way as to maintain or enhance that state’s 6 2 leverage in international politics. This may take the form of attempts to influence the domestic political structure of a recipient state, although it is not essentially the form of government that matters but rather whether or not that government is perceived as friendly toward the power broker. The target of the influence attempt may also be other donor states.

This may be especially evident in the goals decision makers set for their policies vis-a-vis international organizations, but is not necessarily limited to those arenas.

The power broker role conception in essence mirrors Morgenthau’s (1985) classical realist formulation, although it should be kept in mind that a conception of national self- interest drives each of the role conceptions. It is the content of that interest that is the object of empirical investigation and the power motivation as formulated by Morgenthau is seen as but one of several ways in which interest can be construed.

In contrast to the merchant, the power broker does not focus on economic benefit, but instead on a political or strategic payoff. The merchant and power broker are similar in that both take the view that benefits must first and foremost accrue to ones own state. While the merchant seeks these benefits primarily at an economic level and within the existing structure, the power broker attempts to influence the system so as to better benefit by it.

This focus on the system as currently constituted also sets the merchant apart from the social engineer. Lastly, there is an interesting parallel between the social engineer and power broker roles: both seek to effect change in the international system, although the reform they aim for is of a different nature. These similarities and differences were laid out in Figure 3. Table 1. HYPOTHESIZED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ROLE CONCEPTION PROFILES.

NATIONAL LOOOD NEIGHBOR 2. SOCIAL ENGINEER 3. MERCHANT 4. POWER BROKER ROLE CONCEPTION

D E C I S I O N Aid ia charity. Diaaster relief ii an extenaioo 'Enltgbteoed vanguard* in negotiated Own at ate ia integral part of the liberal Own country'# role in term# of power and MAKER of tucb thioldog to an acute prohlcm. (rantformaticmoribe international lyalcm. intematioul economy. SclMidcreat la inJIueoee. PERCEPTION protecting free trade and domettie economy. OF ROLE

OBJECTIVE Aid il need baaed, but not neceaiarily geared A id ia need baaed, but need ia here defined in A id ia baaed on perceived needa o f the donor Aid ia baaed on need to preaerve and enhance GUIDING toward# development. Focua ia on immediate term# of long term need#. Focua ia long term country m ore than on those o f the recipient. influence. FOREIGN AID need#. atability o f the ayatcm.

THEM ES IN Ethical and moral obiigationto 'help those lets Stability, aocial justice, empowennent. Benefit# of free trade, simultaneousbenefitato Need to auppoit friendly (form of) RHETORIC fortunate.' donor and recipient. government. Respondbility to other, leas powerful (tatei.

POLICY Bilateral: in ape cificinst an ceafuatural disaster, Bilateral: preference for program aid, large BUatenl aid: recipients correlate with trading Bilateral aid: more loans than grants, mostly BEHAVIOR drought, etc.). Ad hoc, as need arisea, not grant elem ent, low level o f tying. paitnen. Expect higher percentage of loans, tied. Donor e^tecta certain behaviors from pan of an overall plan (although re source# bn both loani and grants geared to benefit recipient. may be allotted through regular budget donor economy.

Multilateral: emphasis on agencies concerned Multilateral: focus on UN agencies to seek to Multilateral aid: emphaua on participation in Multilateral aid: not much etterxloo, bux focua w ith d isaster relief, health care, etc. effed ttructural change. Bretton Woods institutions. on Bretton Woods instituions.

TYPE OF All states will exhibit tbii rhetoric. However, Open and vulnerable economies, g d a Open and vulnerable economies, and of Larger powers, cither with colonial heritage or STATE this role will not dominate any coumty’s predisposition for redistributive solutions. ■mailer states with colonial peat. sphere of influence concerns. foreign assistance policy. Situational factors make tU t role salient, e.g. when a nmural diaaster demands action. a 64

Assessing Role Conceptions Empirically

In the previous section I have sketched each of the role conceptions and associated policy objectives. A short statement summarizing the fundamental definitional elements for each can be found in the portion above the horizontal line in Table 1. This portion of the figure presents the conceptualization of each of the roles, while the portion below the line summarizes what is being tested. It contains three elements. First, the hypothesized linkages between the role conceptions as expressed in rhetoric. Second, the policy behavior associated with it. Third, the foreign assistance decision making settings where each role conception is expected to dominate the discussion. The first two elements are the subject matter of this section, while the decision making settings will be discussed in the next.

The following explains the operationalization of each of the role conceptions for empirical assessment, outlining the how decision maker rhetoric will be evaluated and what policy behavior is expected to covary with that rhetoric.

How a Good Neighbor Role Manifests Itself

The rhetoric of decision makers expressing good neighbor role conceptions as motivating forces for state’s foreign assistance policy motivation will argue in terms of themes like ethical obligation or moral commitment. They may use religious or ideological formulations to stress a duty to ones fellow human, but their implication is that no self- serving motive guides their desire to help people and societies less fortunate than themselves and their own state.

Their expressed concerns may include generalized references to the miserable condition and abject poverty within which many humans find themselves and a felt obligation 65 to do something to alleviate this misery. However, even when the focus is on a chronic situation, the focus is on providing relief with no vision regarding the long term. Since foreign assistance is defined in terms of charity, the expressed social conscience stretches only to taking note of a need and stating one ought to help, but there is an implicit acceptance of the fact that there are rich and poor states, and rich and poor people within them.

Observations regarding human misery and an expressed wish that ones state acts to do something about it may concern not only chronic situations, but also immediate responses to natural disasters and other such emergency situations. As explained earlier, such occurrences are likely to render the good neighbor role conception salient enough that it will appear prominently in decision maker rhetoric. The coding takes this into account by creating a separate categories to code themes that focus on acute versus chronic problems.

The dependent variable, policy behavior, is operationalized in terms of foreign assistance expenditures. Congruent with the rhetoric, the aid package is hypothesized to favor agencies concerned with disaster relief, health care and related concerns for multilateral contributions, and ad hoc relief efforts as part of bilateral assistance provision.

What Social Engineers Talk About and Do

Decision makers who see their state in social engineer terms stress in their rhetoric that the long-run stability of the international environment is at stake and as a result will focus on strategies that would reduce the tensions between rich and poor states. Associated themes are environmental sustainability and population issues. The former stresses ecological dilemmas regarding the long term ability of the donor states to maintain the current standard 66 of living along with the ability of the recipient states to attain a better standard of living.

Decision makers’ expressed concern with population issues fit with the stability of the international environment only if they are seen as a pre-condition for peoples in recipient states to be able to achieve a better standard of living.

Issues of distribution and redistribution find expression in the themes of social justice and empowerment, which may be seen as strategies for achieving the stability of the international environment which is the social engineer’s concern. The social justice theme appears as an expressed concern with the division of wealth within a recipient society. The need to fight the existence of poverty as a structural condition and the need for economic growth to benefit the poorest segments of the society are further elaborations of this theme.

Lastly, an expressed concern with the status of human rights within the recipient society is taken as evidence of a social engineer role conception if a recipient state’s human rights record is held to be a determining factor in whether or not aid should be extended.

Empowerment is defined here as giving people the skills and tools to enable them to improve their situation. Decision makers may address this theme directly, focusing on education, training, job creation, support for landredistribution policies. What ties these concerns together is the premise that only after certain basics have been met will people become available to be active citizens. Further elaborations of this theme are, one, an expressed preference to work through NGOs to achieve ones goals when working through the government of the recipient state might make it difficult to do so, two, a focus on small- scale agriculture if this is discussed as a strategy that enables people to better feed themselves and thus gain a greater measure of control over their own lives, and, three, a focus on giving women a greater sense of control over their futures. 67

Lastly, decision makers may express a desire to coordinate policies with other donors, because this could help the social engineer further his or her own agenda more effectively than acting alone (Jay and Michalopoulos 1989, 68).

Although themes as social justice and empowerment are often seen as benign motivations and have as a result often been classified as humanitarian, they do proceed from a desire to influence North-South relations in a manner which donor country decision makers perceive as advancing their interests. Third World development may not be merely a by­ product in this case, but the social engineer provides development assistance primarily because it is perceived to be in the donor country’s interest to do so. Generally, the social engineer role stresses solidarity with the especially those states and people who have few opportunities, if any, to improve their situation because they lack the resources to do so.

The policy behavior congruent with the social engineer role conception favors multilateral expenditures on UN agencies and programs that stress structural change in the multilateral domain. Bilateral aid is expected to have a high grant element, a low level of tying, and to focus on the poorest states. Favored strategies will be balance of payments support and other program aid (Riddell 1987, 183). In terms of project aid, there is hypothesized to be a preference to work through NGOs, in accordance with the social justice and empowerment themes outlined above.

The Merchant Role: The Bottom Line and Policy

Rhetoric that evidences a merchant role conception will stress the importance of the preservation of the liberal international economic order. This general principle is often elaborated through a focus on trade relations. A variety of goals may appear in decision 6 8 makers’ rhetoric as evidence of such a preoccupation. They may hope that assistance will serve to create a more favorable climate for direct foreign investment in the recipient country. They may want to stimulate the production of raw materials which their state seeks to acquire from the aid recipient. They may also be concerned with access to markets. In each case, the rhetoric emphasizes that trade relations will benefit the economic situation of the recipient state.

In addition to a focus on trade, rhetoric expressing the merchant role conception proceeds from the notion that economic growth is the saviour of recipient state economies.

As a consequence, the goal of assistance is to ’jump-start’ economic growth. The focus on trade and investment discussed above is congruent with this, and coding decisions for either category depend on whether the main focus of the speech is on a practical concern with trade or on the more theoretical idea of economic growth within the recipient state. With respect to the latter, it should be noted that there is little or no attention for dynamics within the recipient society, such as which groups within that society stand to gain or lose from specific donor strategies.

The focus on trade leads decision makers to the perception that it is possible to simultaneously benefit the donor and recipient economies. Whether or not aid is officially tied to the purchase of goods or services in the donor state, decision makers defend aid expenditures on basis of the (perceived) benefits that accrue to the donor state economy.^

Alternately, decision makers may also express a preference for a greater involvement of trade and industry which may take the form of using trade and industry as a vehicle to

^ See May and Dobson (1979) for critical evaluation of whether this actually works. What is important here is not whether such a strategy actually achieves its intended goal, but that it guides decision makers. 69 help dispense government aid funds. This takes the form of an expressed preference for subsidies to the donor state’s private industry associated with investments in or exports to the

Third World. Frey (1984) has noted motivations along these lines: donor country decision makers may provide export subsidies in the hope that this will stimulate additional exports from the donor state.

The merchant thus perceives its role to a much greater extent in terms of its own success or failure within the world economy than in terms of development objectives.

Development within the recipient state is made secondary to economic benefits to the donor economy.

The policy behavior of states where a merchant role conception predominates are likely to favor utilizing the more traditional Bretton Woods institutions such as the World

Bank (IBRD), IMF, IFC, and IDA in the multilateral arena, while bilateral aid is focused on project aid (Lagerberg 1989). I expect a higher correlation of aid recipient with donor trading partners in the Third World than for the social engineer, and also a higher percentage of loans rather than grants. Aid is also more likely to be tied to purchasing goods and services from the donor state. Furthermore, I expect merchants to focus somewhat less on multilateral aid than on bilateral assistance expenditures.

Power Broker Rhetoric and Action

Themes in decision maker rhetoric that are evidence of a power broker role conception focus on political influence in several forms and gradations. Decision makers may stress non-interference in the domestic matters of the recipient state, such as an unwillingness to take a recipient government to task for consistently violating their citizens 70 human rights, on the principle that the recipient government represents a sovereign state.

The respect for the sovereignty of the recipient state is here interpreted as a desire to preserve the relationship with the existing government of that state.

If the goal is not merely to preserve the relationship but to enhance ones state’s

leverage over the recipient state, decision makers will phrase this in terms of their state’s

’responsibility’ to the recipient. The sense of responsibility expressed in such rhetoric is a reworded version of the ’white man’s burden’ and aims to increase the donor state’s stature with either the recipient or other donor states.

Huntington (1972) lists aiding a friendly government to consolidate or strengthen its position with the purpose of acquiring base rights, a supportive UN vote, or the rejection of aid from other country as a motive for providing aid. Montgomery (1962) saw checking communist expansion as the primary objective of foreign assistance to governments perceived as friendly to the U.S. While the reasons for supporting a recipient government that is perceived as friendly to one’s own state may not be so overtly stated, decision makers do talk about the need to reinforce the present regime of a recipient state.

Another motive mentioned by Huntington (1972) is the emergence of pluralistic societies. Although one could argue that support for democratic government or a move toward such a form of government is more appropriately the domain of the social engineer, the past practice of support in this area has been concerned more with exercising influence over who is in power in the recipient state than with the empowerment of the mass public which a pluralistic society entails. Therefore, expressed support for recipient state regimes

Justified on basis of their democratic nature or perceived move toward democracy is taken to be evidence of a desire to influence the recipient country’s political landscape and thus as 71 evidence of a power broker role conception. Only if decision makers express a preference for empowering the mass public is the judgment that a social engineer role conception guides them justified.

Besides the above mentioned justifications, decision makers may express a desire to encourage a recipient state to pursue policies it favors, for instance relating to the economic policies a recipient state pursues domestically.

A desire to play a role in shaping international organizations’ policies is also evidence of a power broker role conception. This may be stated in a general way, or relate specifically to the World Bank and associated institutions, the European Community, or the

UN and its agencies. The desire to play a role in international organizations often relates not so much to what happens in recipient societies as to the policies of other donor states. An expressed desire to influence other donor states is another way in which the power broker role manifests itself.

The dependent variable, policy behavior, congruent with the power broker role conception includes financial support for international organizations, with an expected focus on the World Bank and associated institutions as bodies where the greatest influence on the world economy can be exercised. The multilateral component is present only to the extent that it buys influence.

Bilateral aid is expected to go to those countries where it can be used to best effect.

It is more likely to be in the form of loans than grants, and will be mostly tied. Aid will also be supplied or (threatened to be) withheld on basis of whether or not the recipient country complies with the power broker’s demands and expectations. Foreign assistance policy thus openly serves political and stategic goals. 72

The Impact of Foreign Policy Decision Making Settings on Decision Makers’ Role

Conceptions

The rhetoric of decision makers is expected to focus most directly on the goals and objectives they consider their state’s foreign assistance policy should serve. In the previous chapter I posited that the concept of national role contains three dimensions, namely: perceived structural constraints, location within the structure as a factor that determines how perceptions are framed, and potentiality. Since this last dimension relates expressly to goals and objectives, it is expected that this dimension is most clearly reflected in decision maker rhetoric. However, the goals and objectives that decision makers are likely to entertain are constrained by their perceptions regarding the other two dimensions. Therefore, the scope of debate or the range of objectives considered provide an indirect indication of the perceived structural constraints and the resulting effect on how perceptions of ones state’s role in world politics are framed. It is possible to infer perceptions regarding these dimensions from the range of policy goals that are debated because these goals and objectives are generated as plausible alternatives on basis of knowledge of the past and the present:

Reality constrains constructions of the future. In fact, the reality that serves to constrain our generation of possible and likely futures is the past. It is the past that supplies expectancies and determines what is plausible. (Johnson and Sherman 1990, 514)

These constraints are, however, also affected by cognitive processes in which certain biases are inherent. Johnson and Sherman therefore "do not make a strong distinction between cognitive and motivational effects" (1990, 482), because they do not see the two as easily separable. They hold that even

in the absence of defined motives, cognition is not disinterested; schemas, expectancies, inferential mechanisms, goals, and so forth constantly nudge processing in some directions at the expense of others. (Johnson and Sherman 1990, 514-5) 73

1. STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS

Perceived historical roots of current structures determine constraints perceived to impinge upon state.

3. PARAMETERS OF DEBATE

Range of potential goals and objectives.

2. FRAMING OF ISSUE AREA

Perceived location within the international structure influences decision maker perspective on the world.

Figure 4.

RELATIONS AMONG THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF THE ROLE CONCEPTION CONSTRUCT 74

In other words, the range of possible goals and objectives is constrained by decision makers cognitions of the past and the present. While there are likely to be differences between individual decision makers based on political ideology, it is assumed that decision makers of one state have sufficient common background to provide them with common cognitive biases that set the parameters for political debate. In other words, decision makers as a group representing the same state have, because of their common socialization as citizens of the same state, been inculcated with the same ’truths,’ myths, and ’lessons’ of history, and as a result share certain biases in their perception and framing of their state’s role in world politics. The individual differences among them are assumed to fall within the parameters defined by their commonalities. Figure 4 graphically presents the relationships among the three dimensions of the national role conception construct.

The assumption that individual differences between the decision makers representing the same state are bounded by the parameters defined by their commonalities leads to the expectation that different role conceptions will be dominant among the decision makers of different states and will provide an explanation regarding the differences in foreign assistance policy behavior between states.

The subsequent discussion will focus on the types of environments within which the good neighbor, social engineer, merchant, and power broker role conceptions are expected to guide decision makers. Table 2 summarizes the argument, by indicating whether the various features possibly or definitely indicate that a particular national role conception significantly guides the decision makers in a particular type of decision making setting. A notation of ’possible’ indicates a feature that is likely to be present, but does not necessarily set one decision making setting apart from another. It is also a feature that, if not present. 75

Table 2.

FEATURES OF DONOR STATE RELEVANT TO HYPOTHESIZED DOMINANT ROLE CONCEPTION

FEATURES 1. GOOD NEIGHBOR 2. SOCIAL ENGINEER 3. MERCHANT 4. POWER BROKER OF STATE

Powerful itflte, sphere of infhimce possible defioitdy concerns.

Colonial heritage. possible possible possible possible

Open, vulnerable economy. possible possible definildy possible

Substantial proportioD of trade possible possible possible possible with Third World.

Redistributive welfare system possible definitdy domestically.

does not necessarily preclude a particular role conception. Those features marked ’definitely’ determine the dominance of a given role conception.

The good neighbor role is a conception of one’s state’s role in world politics that can possibly guide the perceptions of decision makers of various foreign policy decision making settings. Since a sense of obligation toward the third world is a widely held norm in international relations, this role is unlikely to provide a reliable vehicle for differentiation among decision makers of different types of states. Rather, some mention of themes associated with this role conception is likely to occur in all cases, just as foreign assistance policy behavior will generally include some provision for emergency aid, disaster relief, or other short term remedies such as food aid. This means that the necessary conditions for a 76 good neighbor role are present in many foreign assistance decision making settings. Unlike the other role conception profiles, no sufficient conditions are hypothesized. It is therefore not possible to pinpoint a type of state with which this role conception is definitely associated, but it is possibly associated with all indicators used here (see Table 2).

The leaders of powerful states throughout history have bribed those of lesser states to cooperate, to become allies, or otherwise serve their purposes. References to such practices go as far back as Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War, although more recent references specifically link bribes and other tranfers to colonial domination (Mosley

1987, Ohlin 1966, Morgenthau 1962). Two implications can be inferred. One, the realist notion that the "strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (Thucydides

1982,351) and, two, the assumption that there is a connection between foreign assistance and previous colonial involvement on the part of the donor. Former colonial states have indeed tended to include provisions for foreign assistance in their government budgets earlier than states without such a heritage. Often, the provision of foreign assistance was agreed upon as the former colonies became sovereign states. However, the role of foreign assistance in the scope of a donor state’s foreign policy is not equal for all former colonial states, but instead depends on the philosophy of international relations and the general policy orientation held by the decision makers of such a state. If a Hobbesian philosophy combines with a reformist policy orientation, the realist notion is likely to combine with the former status as colonial power to yield a policy orientation that stresses power and influence. It is not so much the colonial heritage per se as a desire for political influence and political benefit that guides policy. Such concerns are more likely to play a significant role in the conceptions decision makers of larger powers holds of their own state, as reality constraints make it less 77 likely that decision makers of small states perceive it to be possible to exercise such influence.

Decision makers representing states with open economies which are dependent on world trade to maintain their standard of living have a powerful economic incentive to provide foreign assistance. However, both the extent to which this fact guides foreign assistance decision making and the manner in which it shapes policy depend on a number of additional factors that, again, are expected to relate to both the dominant philosophy of international relations and the general policy orientation of the decision makers of a particular state.

For decision makers of open and vulnerable economies the prospect of increased tensions between rich and poor states might become an important motivator for a generous aid program that seeks not only to effect change within recipient countries, but also to convince the decision makers of other states of the merits of managed structural change as well.

The sort of structural changes decision makers who perceive their state in terms of the social engineer role conception aim at are ostensibly a greater equality of opportunity for people in recipient societies, but most important is an improved position for third world states as actors in the international system. As such, the role conception accepts the analysis of dependency and world systems theorists (e.g. Cardoso and Palette 1979), and is acutely aware of an interdependence that necessitates an effort to address the system’s inequities.

What predicts decision maker predispositions to a social engineer role conception, in addition to an open economy, is the nature of the solutions to social inequities that are favored domestically. A number of authors have suggested that the existence of social 78 democratic governments correlates with high aid expenditures, especially aid with some

’redistributive’ aspect (Lovbraek 1990, Pratt 1989, Stokke 1989, Hart 1983). Verloren van

Themaat (1982) has shown that while foreign assistance forms a varying percentage of OECD countries’ GNP, these differences disappear if foreign assistance expenditures are regarded as a percentage of public sector expenditures. In other words, his research shows that the size of the public sector and foreign assistance of OECD countries covary. Since in countries with high public sector expenditures the government generally fulfills a redistributive function through welfare programs, it may be that decision makers familiar with such methods of dealing with inequity are more prone to such solutions because that is the ’script’ they have for dealing with issues regarding income differentials and other inequalities.^ In other words, it may be a matter of the types of solutions that these decision makers are familiar with and therefore are predisposed to advance, i.e. decision makers draw on their experience of how social inequities are dealt with domestically to guide their stance on how to mediate international, North-South inequities. The social engineer role conception may thus be seen as an international extension of the role decision makers see as appropriate for government domestically as well.

As indicated earlier, although decision makers of states with open and vulnerable economies may be likely candidates for a social engineer role conception, such is not necessarily the case. One argument against such a role conception might be a relative lack of trade with the Third World. In that case, decision makers may not perceive the Third

World as relevant to their state’s welfare and consequently not develop a role conception that entails a long-range view of North-South relations.

^ Larson (1985, 54) discusses scripts in this manner. 79

A social engineer role conception is also unlikely if either an extensive social welfare system is lacking or it is perceived more in terms of charity than as a way to mediate unacceptable social inequities. In that case the general policy orientation is conformist in that it does not seek to challenge the current configuration of the international system. Rather, it will be oriented toward benefitting the donor state economy. In other words, in such cases

I expect that decision makers will see their state in terms of the merchant role conception.

Decision makers of smaller states for whom the connection with former colonies is still strongly perceived as relevant to the domestic economy are expected to fit this role conception pattern as well. The less salient connections with former colonies are perceived to be to the domestic economy, the greater the possibility that decision makers of a former colonial state might see their state in social engineer terms.

The issue of perceived relevance of past links with third world states brings up the issue of role conception change. The current study covers the time period 1975-1990 and will not explore this in detail. Whether the role conceptions remain stable over this period is ultimately an empirical question. This study does not assume that decision makers’ national role conceptions are fixed entities and posits two potential avenues of change. First, role conceptions evolve over time as new realities force decision makers to adjust their perceptions of that reality and of the possibilities that are open to them. The expectation is that such adjustments are gradual and will lag behind identifiable changes in the international environment, as decision makers’ cognitions at one point in time are shaped by previous understandings of their state’s role in world politics. However, the nature and extent of that lag are left undefined and are likely variable. A second source of change is the vision of an individual decision maker. Although such a person would be innovative, he or she would 80 also need to convince other decision makers that the proposed role is a plausible one for their state. Such a person is therefore more likely to stretch than to break the parameters within which the decision makers of a particular state operate.

Having said that, let me indicate a few plausible shifts and conditions under which they might occur. A merchant role conception may be retreated to by decision makers of larger powers which experience severe and extended economic difficulties. Similarly, a social engineer role conception may become increasingly difficult to maintain in times of severe recession and decision makers may then alter their view of their state’s appropriate role vis-a-vis North-South inequities into the direction of a merchant role conception. These shifts can be understood when one notes that the open economy that definitely needs to be present for a merchant role conception to be dominant, is a feature that is also likely to describe decision making settings where I expect a social engineer or power broker role conception to be dominant. For the latter two, the importance of an open economy is

’overridden’ by the presence of another feature which, given certain stresses, might lose its significance (see Table 2). These ’role conversions’ are meant merely to indicate plausible shifts that should not at this time be accorded the status of hypotheses. Further exploration of this issue forms a possible extension of the current project.

Cases. Data, and Methods

The hypothesized framework as presented in Table 1 above will be addressed empirically using the foreign assistance decision making settings of the United Kingdom, the

Netherlands and Belgium. In each, a different national role conception is expected to predominate. The power broker, social engineer, and merchant roles are expected to 81 dominate the debate in respectively, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

The features described in Table 2 place the United Kingdom, as a member of the Group of

7 powerful industrialized nations, in the power broker role. Within the Netherlands, with its extensive and redistributive welfare system domestically, the foreign assistance debate is expected to exhibit rhetoric consistent with the social engineer role conception. Belgium, lastly, has an open economy and a colonial heritage which yields it remaining trade links with specific Third World states. Hence, I expect a merchant role conception to be dominant there. These differences in role conception are expected to explain the differences in overall relative expenditure as identified in Table 3.

The four hypothesized national role conception profiles are best characterized as ideal types. Decision makers of a particular type of state are expected to best approximate the rhetoric associated with the role conception associated with that type of state. For instance, decision makers of Britain, which is a larger power with a colonial heritage, would be expected to express the rhetoric associated with the power broker role conception.

An exception would be debates surrounding recent natural disaster. At such a time, situational factors would be expected to mandate rhetoric that fits the good neighbor role conception. The latter is a role conception that I do not expect to dominate any particular state’s foreign policy, except when the role conception is made salient by situational factors, e.g. when the British Parliament debated their Government’s response to the cyclone which struck Bangladesh in April 1991. In essence, then, it is the social engineer, merchant, and power broker roles that are being tested, while the good neighbor role explains departures from these expected role conceptions for specific situations. TABLE 3.

RELATIVE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PERFORMANCE OF EUROPEAN OECD MEMBERS

(Official Development Assistance as percentage of GNP)

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

1. Ufgedononi France .62 .62 .60 .57 .60 .64 .73 .74 .74 .77 .78 .70 .74 .72 .77 .79 Gemuuiy .40 .31 .33 .37 .45 .44 .47 .48 .48 .45 .47 .43 .39 .39 .41 .42 Italy .11 .13 .10 .14 .08 .17 .19 .23 .20 .28 .26 .40 .35 .39 .42 .32 United Kingdom .37 .38 .45 .46 .52 .35 .43 .37 .35 .33 ,33 .31 .28 .32 .31 .27

2. small donotB Denmark .58 .56 .60 .75 .77 .74 .73 .77 .73 .85 .80 .89 .88 .89 .93 .93 Nether- .75 .82 .86 .82 .98 1.03 1.07 1.07 .91 1.02 .91 1.01 .98 .98 .94 .94 Norway .66 .70 .83 .90 .93 .85 .85 1.03 1.10 1.03 1.01 1.17 1.09 1.13 1.05 1.17 Sweden .82 .82 .99 .90 .97 .79 .83 1.02 .84 .80 .86 .85 .88 .86 .96 .90

Austria .17 .12 .22 .27 .19 .23 .33 .36 .24 .28 .38 .21 .17 .24 .23 .25 Belgium .59 .51 .46 .55 .57 .50 .59 .58 .59 .58 55 .48 .48 .39 .46 .45 Finland .18 .18 .16 .16 .22 .22 .27 .29 .32 .35 .40 .45 .49 .59 .63 .64 Switzer­ land .19 .19 .19 .20 .21 .24 .24 .25 .31 .30 .31 .30 .31 .32 .30 .31

3. United States .26 .25 .25 .27 .20 .27 .19 .27 .24 .24 .24 .23 .20 .21 .15 .21

4. OECD average .35 .33 .33 .35 .35 .38 .35 .38 .36 .35 .35 .35 .35 .36 .33 .35

Source: OECD, various years, Development Co-Operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. Paris: OECD. 83

Two types of data covering the period 1975-90 are used to assess different aspect of the framework. The mid-seventies were chosen as a starting point because the character of debate changed after 1973 oil price rises:

The oil price crisis not only raised the spectre of the new states potential to disrupt the global economic equilibrium, but also made it more difficult to avoid debate on the issue of foreign aid, as it became entangled with the issue of the changing nature of North-South relations. (Barling 1989, 272)

In addition to the issue of oil prices, the demand for a New International Economic Order was brought before the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974 (Soroos 1986,

Jacobson 1979). By the mid-seventies, then, role conceptions that are not solely an inheritance from a prior era become a possibility.

A content analysis of parliamentary debates of each of the states substantiates whether the various role conceptions are indeed dominant in the foreign policy settings or states as hypothesized. A total of 2248 pages of parliamentary debates were collected and coded. The collected British House of Commons debates cover all debates concerning foreign assistance either generally or in some aspect. The Belgian and Dutch parliaments hold yearly debates on the budgets for various departments, which are included in the material collected.

However, the Belgian House of Representatives most years debates foreign assistance in a debate that combines this topic with foreign trade and foreign affairs generally. This results in some coding challenges that will be elaborated on in the chapter concerning Belgium. A few additional debates on foreign assistance matters were held as well and these were also collected. The Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament discusses foreign assistance in a 84 separate debate each year. The collection of these debates was supplemented with a selection of additional debates on specific topics.'*

The effort here is to assess whether, for instance, decision makers of the United

Kingdom do indeed see their country in power broker terms. In addition, data on foreign assistance as collected and published by the OECD are utilized to assess policy behavior.

The content analysis focuses on themes associated with each of the four national role conception profiles as discussed above and summarized in Table 1. The codebook, which gives specific instructions regarding each of the theme-categories, is attached as Appendix

A. After some initial tests, the choice was made to code the main themes addressed by a speaker, rather than a more detailed coding of statements. Theme coding was deemed more appropriate since the goal is to infer the conceptions decision makers hold of their state and its role in this issue area. Theme coding appeared more likely to actually uncover such role conceptions and to screen out issues to which decision makers merely pay lipservice. In other words, this approach seemed most promising in terms of avoiding statements made for

’rhetorical’ purposes and including only those themes which can reasonably be inferred to give and indication of the speaker’s conception of his or her state’s role. It is expected that each of the three foreign policy settings in the study will exhibit variability in the themes addressed in the parliamentary debates, but also that the parameters of debate will remain fairly constant within each three foreign policy making settings in the study and vary across

“ Of the 2248 pages, 888 contain British, 508 Belgian, and 852 Dutch material. Whereas the British and Belgian collections represent all debates held related to foreign assistance within the time period under study, the Dutch collection does not. The chapter on the Dutch case will elaborate on the potential bias of this and I will prepare an appendix that lists all debates coded, and for the Netherlands, those excluded. 85 these settings. This means that I expect different themes to predominate in each of the three settings, but certain themes to consistently dominate the debate within each setting.

The parliamentary debates on foreign assistance which were used to analyze decision maker rhetoric were chosen because they represent speeches made in a similar setting and to a similar type of audience across time. In addition, since these debates generally concern the (critical) discussion of the state’s policy, it was expected that this source would be least likely to contain ’rhetoric,’ in the sense of language employed merely for effect. Since the events of the outside world intrude upon and often focus the attention of the debates, the circumstances cannot be controlled for. What is possible, however, is to take the subject matter of the debate and the international events that may have shaped how the subject is approached into account when evaluating the content of the parliamentary debates.

The policy behavior is here assessed through data on foreign assistance as collected and published by the OECD. These data were chosen rather than data collected nationally by the governments of the states in the study, because of consistency and comparability across the three states.

The expectation is that the two measures will covary for a particular foreign policy making setting or state. For example, it is hypothesized that content analysis results and

OECD data regarding the United Kingdom will indicate both a power broker role conception and congruent policy behavior.

Connecting Rhetoric and Behavior

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the claim is not that a role conception causes a specific behavior. Rather, a role conception predisposes decision makers to consider 86 certain types of policies over others. The expectation of covariation between the role conception and policy behavior measures does not seem unwarranted because, one, the role conceptions are inferred from rhetoric and, two, the verbal behavior that this constitutes often expresses or creates intentions to act in particular ways (Johnson and Sherman 1990).

The posited national role conceptions, as summarized in the top portion of Table 1 referred to above, are thus expected to be evidenced in the prevalence of certain themes in the debate on foreign assistance within each of the three foreign assistance decision making settings which form the subject for the empirical test. This hypothesis that role conceptions, as evidenced in rhetoric, relate in a consistent manner to foreign assistance policy choices has been called into question by previous authors (Larson 1985, Jervis 1976). However, there is some evidence in the social psychology literature that the failure to establish a connection between rhetoric and behavior relates to methodological problems. A similar conclusion is reached by Barling with regard to his investigations of the politics of British and French foreign assistance. He concludes that the linkage between what is said and what is done

is a methodological problem and not necessarily a question of whether the aid debate matters at all. In fact in Britain and France the link is clearly observable. It may often be the case that a lack of debate within a political party leads eventually to ad hoc policy led by circumstances, circumstances rarely dictated by the executive. What the aid debate within Britain and France has done is to set the parameters within which national aid policy can respond to the demands of the LDCs, the quantitative and qualitative level of the aid response in this respect is determined by the very nature of the aid debate. (Barling 1989, 475)

Barling essentially says two things. One, the debate on foreign assistance sets the parameters within which policy is decided, while, two, an absence of debate on this topic leads to a lack of clear direction with regard to policy decisions. In the latter case, one might argue that policy is made by default and that since debate is lacking, a clear connection with rhetoric 87

will be lacking as well. This statement agrees well with the contention of Fiske and Taylor

that consistency between the two is highest when it concerns behaviors that are prototypic

of particular cognitions (1984, 371).

The existence of prototypic behaviors presupposes the existence of cognitions that

covary with those behaviors. In other words, if decision makers do not have a relatively well-developed notion of their country’s role in the foreign assistance issue area, it is unlikely that a link between their foreign assistance role conception and policy choices can be

established. This hypothesis is supported by findings of Fazio et al (1986; 1983) who argue that for an attitude to guide behavior it must first be accessed from memory and that once

it has been, it influences the evaluation of new information and ultimately behavior. National role conceptions may be seen as a set of attitudes about one’s state’s role in world politics or a subset thereof related to the issue area under scrunity.

Fazio et al’s finding that if "an attitude is activated automatically upon the individual’s encountering the attitude object, it is far more likely to guide the individual’s behavior than

if it is not" (1986, 236), leads to be expectation that if an attitude is not activated behavior occurs on basis of features that are salient in the decision making situation. Along the same

lines, Fiske and Taylor suggest the importance of situational factors in determining which particular cognitions become salient as guides to behavior (1984, 374-5), i.e. particular

situations or circumstances may lead decision makers to tap into different role conceptions to guide their behavior. Research by Shavltt and Fazio supports this, indicating that

"contextual factors can temporarily heighten the salience of certain attributes when one evaluates an object" (1991,514). However, if contextual factors consistently shape policy choices, then a role conception cannot be said to exist. When new information, including 8 8 contextual factors, is interpreted within the framework of an existing roie conception the policy responses may not always be exactly alike, but there should be an underlying logic that ties them together.

If no clear pattern of prevalent themes can be discerned, policy choices are likely to be ad hoc decisions that are driven more by pressures impinging on decision makers than by a clear conception of national role. No clear pattern will emerge if decision makers as a group do not clearly have a conception of their state’s role in this issue area. This does not mean that there cannot be ’outliers,’ or decision makers who hold role conceptions that seem at variance with the more generally prevalent pattern. However, such decision makers are likely to be tangential to the decision making process. In multi-party systems where coalitions generally are needed to form a government, such decision makers are most likely to be members of those smaller parties that are rarely, if ever, included in governing coalitions. In systems with fewer and larger parties, such decision makers are more likely to be on the fringes of their parties than in important leadership positions. Ultimately, the issue of interest here is the parameters of debate within each foreign policy making setting under study and the centrality ar tangentiality of indidivual decision makers is therefore an empirical question about which more can be said on basis of the results of the content analysis portion of the research.

Conclusion

The national role conception framework as outlined in this chapter will be evaluated empirically on basis of data concerning three foreign assistance policy decision making settings, namely Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The following chapters 89 will focus on each of these states separately and will set their foreign assistance policies in historical context and thus indicate why certain role conceptions are more likely to guide decision makers, provide a review of previous research concerning the foreign assistance policies of each of these states, and report the results of the role conception and policy behavior measures. A final chapter will compare the results, assess the adequacy of the role conception framework as operationalized here, and provide directions for further investigation. CHAPTER IV

THE NETHERLANDS

Introduction

Dutch foreign assistance is relatively generous and, along with the Scandinavian states, represents a group that has met or surpassed the UN target of .7 per cent of GNP expenditure on foreign assistance. Previous studies have attributed this liberal foreign assistance program to humanitarian motivations (Pratt 1989, Stokke 1989). Other authors have argued that Dutch foreign policy has a strong moral dimension (Voorhoeve 1985, Weis

1982). Such attributions are also made more specifically to Dutch foreign assistance policy

(Schrijver 1990, Koonings and Kruijt 1988, Quarles van Ufford 1988a). The combined effect is that the impression is created that Dutch foreign assistance policy has an altruistic color. Hoebink (1988) challenges this assessment with a detailed study of Dutch foreign aid to Tanzania and Sri Lanka, but focuses on a bureaucratic politics explanation. The national role conception framework that guides this study posits that differences in decision maker rhetoric across and consistencies within states provide insight into the differences in the quantity and character of foreign assistance policy behavior. It is hypothesized that Dutch decision makers are guided by a perception of their state’s role in this issue area as social engineer. This means that they desire their state to play a role in a negotiated transformation of the current international system to a more equitable one in terms of the division of wealth

90 91 between rich and poor nations. Altruism is less likely to be a factor in such a conception of ones state’s role in the foreign aid policy domain than a perception of the state’s international role as an extension of the role of government domestically. Such a view is underscored by

Verloren van Themaat (1982), who argues that the level of development assistance provided by the Netherlands is a reflection of the social-democratic character of the society and the role of the govenunent in that society. He concludes that there is little difference in the percentage of development aid as a proportion of the public sector expenditure of the various

OECD countries. His study therefore indicates the possibility that the values underlying domestic policy preferences shape decision makers view of how their state should proceed in international affairs as well.

This chapter will first present a brief introduction on the role of Dutch ministers of development cooperation within their government and set the foreign assistance decision making of the Netherlands in context. The chapter will then proceed to a discussion of empirical evidence regarding decision maker rhetoric and foreign assistance policy behavior.

The chapter will conclude with an assessment of the evidence for the Dutch case in light of its congruence with the social engineer role conception.

Ministers of Development Cooperation and their Role

The Dutch minister for development cooperation does not head his (or her) own department but instead is attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Officially, the title for the person holding this position is minister without portfolio in charge of development cooperation, although he (or she) is generally referred to as minister of development cooperation. There is thus no separate administration for development cooperation in the 92

Netherlands. Instead, there is the Directorate General for International Cooperation (DOIS) housed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This institutional structure was created in

1964 and the first minister without portfolio assigned to development cooperation was named in 1965 (Everts and Walraven 1989,53). According to Maas, this first appointment reflected not so much the desire to elevate the importance of development cooperation as it was evidence personality conflicts and coalition tactics in forming a new coalition government

(1986, 35).

Officially the authority of the minister of development cooperation is limited. For instance, international monetary policy, which includes relations with the World Bank and associated agencies, falls under the jurisdiction of the minister of finance rather than development cooperation (Kruijssen 1986; Maas 1986). The extent to which the minister of development cooperation exercises influence over policy regarding these institutions depends on the strength of the individual minister and the working relationship he or she establishes with colleagues at other departments.

Over time the importance of the appointment has increased, due to the active role played within the cabinet by successive individuals who occupied the post of minister of development cooperation. Maas specifically mentions the active role played by several ministers of development cooperation, not only regarding their own department but within the cabinet in general:

Udink, Pronk and to a lesser extent De Koning concerned themselves expressly with general government policy, which increased the importance of [the Department of] Development Cooperation. (Maas 1986, 89)

The first of these three high profile ministers was in office before the period under consideration in this study, but a succession of strong individuals in this post resulted. 93 according to Weis, not only in a higher status of the minister of development cooperation, but also in an increased importance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in general. He contends that the minister of foreign affairs has traditionally had a weak position in both government and parliament, and attributes change in this to the fact that relations with the

Third World and human rights have become important issues in the political debate (Weis

1982, 142).

It is generally accepted wisdom that Pronk was instrumental in creating the Dutch role in this issue area (e.g. Voorhoeve 1985; Beerends 1981), although Koonings and Kruijt state that "the changes in the effective execution of the Dutch development cooperation have been much smaller than the changes in the political policy goals" (1988, 22). While they, too, perceive the changes in the stated policy preferences of the various ministers, they downplay the importance of this variance. They stress that the autonomy of the Dutch development bureaucracy has always been relatively large and that this lessens the impact of any one minister on the department (Koonings and Kruijt 1988). Tims attributes the continuity in policy not so much to the independence of the bureaucracy as to the fact that "priorities [are] being set pragmatically in accordance with domestic considerations regarding employment and export promotion" (1989,716). He holds that even under Pronk real change was modest

"as the vested interests of the business and diplomatic communities were deeply entrenched"

(Tims 1989, 716). Hoebink (1988) comes to similar conclusions in his study of Dutch aid to Tanzania and Sri Lanka.

Over the period covered by this study, there is a succession of six ministers. The tenure of these ministers coincides with the various coalition cabinets of this period, except for the ill-fated second cabinet of prime minister Van Agt, which lost one of its coalition 94 partners within a year of its formation and as a whole did not survive for much more than a year. During this period minister Van Dijk presided over development cooperation, as indicated in Table 4.1, which lists the various ministers and their periods of tenure.

Another notable feature of the list is the reappearance of Pronk in a second term as minister of development cooperation during the current period. He had held the post in the

1970s and is frequently regarded as having been an important force in shaping Dutch foreign assistance policy. Quarles van Ufford (1988a) argues that when Pronk became minister in

1973, he broke away radically from earlier modernization approaches. Indeed, Pronk desired to use foreign assistance to support regimes which followed progressive policies and, if this was not possible, to stress policies that focused on improving the situation of the poorest groups within Third world states (Voorhoeve 1985; Beerends 1981). While there is no doubt that in many ways Pronk left his mark on Dutch foreign assistance policy, Voorhoeve also mentions that during UNCTAD III held in 1972 "the Dutch delegation went to great length in trying to meet the demands of the developing nations" (1985, 257). The attitudes so cleariy evident in Pronk’s statements thus were already present before he became minister of development cooperation. Schrijver underscores this when he points out that "the

Netherlands’ involvement in the multilateral development dialogue and the operational activities led to considerable adaptations of Dutch development policy" in the early 1970s

(1990, 16). That Pronk did not appear in a vacuum is also evidenced by the fact that he received little resistance from parliament (Maas 1986,63). While parliament may in general be hesitant to attack any government minister because this jeopardizes the continued existence of coalitions which are not easily formed (Baehr 1987), a minister radically out of step with the majority of parliament or the public in general can expect resistance as this arena is vital 95

Table 4.1.

MINISTERS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE NETHERLANDS FOR THE PERIOD 1975-90

Period Development Coop. Foreien AfTiln) Prime Minister Coalition

11-05-73 Jin Pronk M ix van dcr Stoel loop den Uyl PvdA, ARP. KVP. PPR. D'66 19-12-77 PvdA PvdA PvdA

19-12-77 Jin de Koning Chr. vin dcr Kliiuw Andries van Agt CDA, W D 11-09-81 CDA W D CDA

11-09-81 Comelis vin Dijk Mix vin der Stoel same CDA, PvdA, D ’66 29-05-82 CDA PvdA

29-05-82 sime Andries Vin Agt same CDA, D'66 04-11-82 CDA

04-11-82 Eegje Schoo Hans van den Broek Ruud Lubbem CDA, W D 14-07-86 W D CDA CDA

14-07-86 Pieter Bukmin same 07-11-89 CDA

07-11-89 Jin Pronk same CDA, PvdA present PvdA

for domestic groups to influence foreign policy, however limited this influence in effect may be (Baehr 1987).

This general agreement regarding the direction in which Pronk took Dutch foreign assistance policy is supported by Voorhoeve's assessment that this "offered the Dutch an opportunity to build up a dynamic, constructive role" in a policy area not dominated by the larger powers (1985, 283). Indeed, Maas notes that minister Pronk was much admired abroad and especially in the third world: "His strong statements in favor of a New

International Economic Order contributed substantially to this, in addition to his flexible and practical negotiation style" (Maas 1986, 63). In other words, as minister of development cooperation Pronk succeeded in giving the Netherlands a distinct profile in a particular policy 96

area that well suited Dutch aspirations to status as a gidsland or "a guide to other nations that

are locked up in their power and status quo interests" (Voorhoeve 1985,283). Although this

concept was formulated by decision makers of the left end of the political spectrum (De Gaay

Fortman 1973), Voorhoeve notes that "the desire to set and example of international behavior

can be found also among the center and right wing politicians in the country, even though

it is translated differently in political action" (1985, 248).

Although some rethinking about the pretentiousness of the concept of gidsland has taken place since the seventies, the concept does appear in parliamentary debates across the years and continues to be important in the self-image of Dutch decision makers. During his first period as minister of development cooperation, Pronk himself reminds parliament that being a guide to others also includes certain limitations:

it is not the intention to be so far ahead in comparison to other states that we would have turned the comer and therefore could no longer function as a referent. (Handelingen 13 November 1975, pll34)

Nuis, a member of parliament for D66,’ similarly argues that he does "not want to drag up the old pretention of gidsland. but we would be well suited for the more modest role of scout" (Handelingen, 2 December 1982, p717). Nuis’ statement reflects an enduring desire to be out ahead and show others the way. Christian Democrat Gualtherie van Weezel echoes the sentiment:

The Dutch contribution is modest in comparison to the needs of the three southern continents. Nevertheless, the Netherlands is internationally ever lonelier at the top. ... Securing presumed self-interest will turn out to be short-term-politics in this interdependent world. If only because of this the Netherlands will have to be the

’ Irwin (1989, in Daalder and Irwin) describes D66 as a liberal party, noting that since the early 1980s its members refer to themselves as ’progressive-liberals. ’ Voorhoeve (1985), on the other hand, places the party on the left end of the spectrum. 97

draft horse and give notice of this internationally" (Handelingen 16 February 1983, p2378).

Interestingly, a few years later, fellow Christian Democrat Bukman will, as minister of development cooperation cooperation, negate this desire to play a defining role in this issue area, stating that "[e]venthough we occupy a prominent place, we do not always have to be the draft horse for all sorts of developments" (Handelingen, 25 November 1987, pl288).

During this same period, the tenure of Bukman and his immediate predecessor, the debate on development cooperation least focuses on themes associated with the social engineer role conception, as will be detailed below. It is also during this time period that Tommel comments that development cooperation "finds itself in a sort of mid-life crisis" (Handelingen

17 December 1986, p2140).

The concept of gidsland coincides with the conceptualization of the social engineer role conception. The latter stresses a negotiated transformation of the international system and of necessity takes a longer term view of international relations. As defined in chapter

3, the social engineer role entails that decision makers holding such a conception of their state actively seek to play a role in effecting change in the international system in the direction deemed appropriate by them. This constitutes the reformist dimension of this role conception. The content of that desired change is defined in terms of a communitarian philosophy of international relations, or an awareness of interdependence that guides the sort of transformation of the international system that is sought. Indeed, an awareness of such interdependence is clearly evident in the Dutch parliamentary debate. 98

Historical Context

Even though the colonial heritage of the Netherlands certainly influenced the state’s initial foreign assistance program, in the 1970s and specifically during the first period Pronk was minister of development cooperation, the Netherlands positioned itself clearly and separately from that colonial heritage. However, without some mention of these roots of the

Dutch foreign assistance program, this chapter would be incomplete.

Possession of the colonies had been an important factor in the Dutch belief that the country "counted for something in the world" (Weis 1982, 100). In light of this, it is not surprising that

whenever the possibility of giving up overseas territories came under discussion, international prestige was always brought into play alongside economic, legal and moral arguments. This held good equally for the sale of the possessions on the West coast of Africa in 1871 as for the transfer of sovereignty [of Indonesia] in 1949 and the cession of New Guinea a few years later. (Weis 1982,101)

The importance attached to the overseas territories also explains why Indonesia did not achieve its independence until the United States put pressure on the Netherlands by threatening to withold Marshall Plan aid (Beerends 1981, 39; Smith 1981).

Although Beerends (1981) dates Dutch foreign assistance back to 1870, the sort of aid he refers to stood in direct connection to the economic benefit the Dutch sought to extract from their colonies. The expenditures Beerends refers to are those associated with the building of roads, bridges and other infrastructure that facilitated the colonial exploitation of

Indonesia. These expenditures easily paid for themselves as they helped the Dutch exploit

Indonesia to produce a surplus that was to benefit of the Netherlands (Voorhoeve 1985,252).

The first steps toward development cooperation that laid any claim to benefitting the recipient state date from the post World War II era. According to Maas (1986), the initial 99

motivation for Dutch development cooperation was to get a foot back in the door of

Indonesia. This is corroborated by Beerends, who links the initial foreign assistance program

to Dutch commercial interests:

until 1964 development cooperation hardly existed. This indifference of the government changed when in the early 1960s the employers demanded a development cooperation policy from the government. (1981, 42)

He cites several reports by employers’ associations in which the government is called upon

to start a foreign assistance program, and sees this demand as motivated by the fact that after

the reconstruction of the Dutch domestic economy these employers sought access to new,

foreign markets for their products. Although Hoebink finds evidence of an enduring

influence of trade and industry on development cooperation in his study of Dutch aid to

Tanzania and Sri Lanka (1988), many others stress the humanitarian quality of the Dutch

foreign assistance program (Cooper and Verloren van Themaat 1989; Pratt 1989). The

differences in these assessments may depend on the evidence brought to bear, as Weis points

out that ''[f]rom the end of the nineteenth century in particular, the Dutch have attempted to justify their thoroughly pragmatic foreign policy by referring to ethical motivations" (1982,

98). The empirical evidence for especially the merchant role conception conforms to this

assessment by its hesitance to acknowledge benefits to the donor economy outright, as will

be shown below. 100

The Data

The debates analyzed for the Netherlands are the yearly debates on the budget for development cooperation and a selection of others.^ They were located using the heading development cooperation in the indexes provided by the annual publication Parlement en

Kiezer [Parliament and Voter]. The selected debates were chosen on basis of an initial reading, which established that many of the debates on funds for development banks were largely technical in nature. These debates mostly deal with specifics regarding the funds to be allocated for these banks and as a result were expected to yield little information pertaining to the role conception framework.^ This means in effect that the selection of

Dutch parliamentary debates which were content analyzed constitutes a purposive sample.

The potential biases in the data resulting from this can be discerned from Table 4.2 which breaks the data down by debate topic. Power broker themes clearly dominate the discussion when Dutch participation in development banks is under consideration. Much of this attention is negative or neutral, because if only references to desired policy are considered, the number of references to the power broker role conception drops from 29 to 12. In contrast, the references to social engineer and merchant themes in debates regarding participation in development banks are almost exclusively to desired policy. This means that while the power broker theme remains dominant if only references to desired policy are considered, the difference with the other role conception categories becomes less stark.

^ A list of the Dutch debates which were used and those excluded can be found in Appendix A.

’ A decision against coding all the parliamentary debates on the Netherlands was based on tlie volume of material, which exceeded the volume of Belgian and British parliamentary debates. The result was a roughly equivalent number of pages for the Netherlands and Britain (847 and 867, respectively), and a smaller volume for Belgium (508 pages). 101 Table 4.2.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR VARIOUS DEBATE TOPICS.

ROUE CONCEPTION

TOPIC OF DEBATE Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

Budget for Developmcot 61 428 193 274 956 Cooperetic& 6.4% 44.8% 20.2% 28.7% 100%

Participation in 6 4 29 39 Development Banks 15.4% 10.3% 74.4% 100%

Humanitarian Aid 12 13 1 26

46.2% 50% 3.8% 100%

Aid and the Econongr 1 9

11 . 1 % 88.9% 100%

TOTAL 74 447 206 303 1030

7.2% 43.4% 20% 29.4% 1 00 % 102

References to desired policy also form a greater proportion of the data for debates on the budget for development cooperation. The implication of this is that had all existing debates covering the Dutch participation been included in the coded material, there would likely have been a greater incidence of power broker themes. This might have resulted in a less clear emphasis on the social engineer role conception overall, although this emphasis would most likely have re-appeared if only references to desired policy were considered. The size of the potential distortion resulting from the exclusion of certain debates is difficult to predict, as some debates yield more codable information than others. Given that an initial reading established that the excluded debates were generally very technical in nature, they most likely would not have yielded a great amount of data and the overall picture would not have been markedly different. In other words, if this selection skewed the data, it is unlikely that it did so very strongly.

The Overall Picture

It was hypothesized that Dutch decision makers, representing a small state with an open economy and a preference for redistributive policies domestically, would perceive their state’s role in the foreign assistance issue area in terms of the social engineer role conception.

Their open economy was expected to create great awareness of the interdependence of the success of their own economy with that of the world economy in general, including the third world. That awareness would not necessarily lead to a social engineer role conception, but creates a condition that makes such a conception a possibility. The preference for redistributive solutions domestically makes a social engineer roie conception a realistic possibility: the focus on international redistributive solutions can be seen as an extension to 103 the global level of the thinking that guides domestic policy. This connection is literally made on several occasions in speeches in parliament. Aarts, a Christian Democrat, argues for example that

in the world of today we ought to understand our responsibility for just relations around the entire globe. With regard to that we have in mind an analogy with the social development in our own country in the last decades. From a period of free play of social forces in the last century in our country gradually all sorts of corrective mechanisms for social purposes were incorporated into the market economy. ... Although handicapped by tiie lack of a competent world government ... structural correctives will nevertheless have to be incorporated in the free [market] economic system, aimed at a better division of income between peoples, leading to a greater equivalence and equality in the world community." (Handelingen 15 February 1978, p857)

Although Aarts realizes that the international environment is qualitatively different from the domestic one because of its lack of central governance, he perceives a need for the same type of managed economy at that level that the Netherlands has created domestically. This linkage and its international extension of the domestic goal of lessening the distance between poorest and richest are definitional elements of the social engineer role conception.

Overall, the hypothesized predominance of the social engineer role conception in the parliamentary debates of the Netherlands is borne out by the data. Themes associated with this role conception are referred to more frequently than themes associated with any other single role conception during the period 1975-1990 covered by the study. If only references to desired policy are considered, the social engineer theme is more clearly what decision makers argue should guide policy: whereas 43.4 per cent of the overall number of themes mentioned by policy makers fall into the social engineer role conception, when only those referring to desired policy are considered, 50.9 per cent of themes mentioned fall into this category. (See the column totals of Tables 4.3 and 4.4). In other words, if, instead of considering the entire scope of the debate, only those references in which decision makers 104 Table 4.3.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE PERIODS OF TENURE OF THE VARIOUS MINISTERS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total/Period

73/77 Jan Pronk 10 76 37 31 154 PvdA 6.5% 49.4% 24% 20. 1% 100%

77/81 Jan de Koning 19 106 31 60 216 CDA 8. 8% 49.1% 14.4% 27.8% 100%

81/82 Cornelia van Dijk 4 40 17 5 66 CDA 6 . 1% 60.6% 25.8% 7.6% 100%

82/86 Eegje Schoo 31 79 57 94 261 WD 11.9% 30.3% 21.8% 36% 1 0 0 %

86/89 Pieter Bukman 5 70 40 72 187 CDA 2.7% 37.4% 21.4% 38.5% 1 0 0 %

89/ Jan Pronk 5 76 24 41 146 preaeot PvdA 3.4% 52.1% 16.4% 28.1% 100%

TOTAL 74 447 206 303 1030

7.2% 43.4% 2 0 % 29.4% 1 0 0 % 105

Table 4.4.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO DESIRED POLICY FOR THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE PERIODS OF TENURE OF THE VARIOUS MINISTERS OF DE\TELOPMENT COOPERATION

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Minister Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total/Period

73/77 Jan Pronk 5 62 17 17 101 PvdA 5% 61.4% 16.8% 16.8% 100%

77/81 Jan de Koning 79 13 47 147 CDA 5.4% 53.7% 1. 8% 32% 100%

81/82 Comelis van Dijk 3 31 4 46 CDA 6.5% 67.4% 17.4% 8.7% 100%

82/86 Eegje Schoo 13 62 28 63 166 WD 7.8% 37.3% 16.9% 38% 100%

86/89 Pieter Bukman 3 61 28 39 131 CDA 2.3% 46.6% 21.4% 29.8% 1 00 %

89/ Jan Pronk 3 61 18 26 108 present PvdA 2 . 8% 56.5% 16.7% 24.1% 100%

TOTAL 35 356 112 196 699

5% 50.9% 16% 28% 10 0 % 106 make statements about what should guide policy are taken into account, the preference for social engineer themes becomes more pronounced. This means that of all themes which appear in the speeches made in the Dutch parliament, those associated with the social engineer role conception are more likely to be referred to as desirable guides for policy.

This overall preference for themes associated with the social engineer role conception in Dutch parliamentary debate is not entirely consistent over time, however. When tie data are broken down by the periods of tenure of the various ministers of development cooperation, some shifts in debate across time can be discerned, as is shown in Table 4.3.

Most notably, the debate shifts to power broker themes during Eegje Schoo’s tenure as minister, while during Pieter Bukman's tenure social engineer and power broker themes are about equally frequently. The fact that Schoo is the only W D minister among those who held the post may have something to do with this. The W D , the People’s Party for

Freedom and Democracy, is often referred to as liberal and considered to be on the right of the political spectrum (Irwin 1989, 154). It is a party that generally favors free market solutions and the Schoo’s nomination to the post of minister of development cooperation may have led to the expectation that the criteria of social justice and structural poverty relief which had so clearly been formulated under Pronk and which had not been contested by his successors, would now come under question. Interestingly, if only those references which are phrased in terms of desired policy are taken into consideration the prevalence of power broker themes during this period disappears; social engineer and power broker themes are referred to in terms of desired policy 62 and 63 times, respectively (see Table 4.4).

Under Schoo’s successor, Bukman, the impact of considering only those themes which are referred to in terms of desired future policy is a shift from a slight dominance of 107 Table 4.5.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Miniater Good Neighor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

73/77 Jan Pronk 1 28 6 10 45 PvdA

77/81 Jan de Koning 35 10 26 80 CDA

81/82 Comelis van Dijk 10 17 CDA

82/86 Eegje Schoo 27 14 78 WD

86/89 Pieter Bukman 25 33 67 CDA

89/ Jan Pronk 34 19 63 present PvdA

Table 4.6.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO DESIRED POLICY FOR THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS.

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Minister Good Neighor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

73/77 Jan Pronk 26 2 36 PvdA

77/81 Jan de Koning 32 20 60 CDA

81/82 Comelis van Dijk 14 CDA

Eegje Schoo 23 20 58 WD

86/89 Pieter Bukman 24 20 51 CDA

89/ Jan Pronk 15 52 present PvdA 108 power broker themes to a definite preponderance of social engineer themes. The reason for this shift is that almost half of the references to themes associated with the power broker role conception do not refer to desired directions for policy, but instead to current or past policy or policies decision makers regard as undesirable. Given that 67.9 per cent of the coded themes overall refer to desired policy, the debate during these two periods, especially in reference to power broker themes, was phrased in unusually negative terms. The ministers themselves contributed to this. Schoo individually makes more references to power broker themes than to those of any other single role conception. However, if only references stated in terms of desired policy are considered, she more often refers to themes related to the social engineer role conception. A similar switch takes place when Bukman’s individual record is considered (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6).

Schoo may in this regard have been out of step with her political party. If the data for the two coalition parties for the period of Schoo’s tenure, the CDA and W D , are considered, the power broker role conception remains dominant whether one considers all themes or only those referring to desired policy. If the two coalition partners are compared, the pattern still holds. If however, only the references to what policy should focus on are considered, the focus of the W D politicians shifts to a slight emphasis on social engineer themes, whereas the CDA’s emphasis remains on the power broker role (see Tables 4.7 and

4.8). During Bukman’s ministry, the emphasis on power broker themes is accounted for much more by statements made by CDA politicians than by those made by W D representatives. During this period, W D politicians show a slight emphasis on merchant themes. This emphasis becomes more pronounced if only references to themes in terms of desired policy are considered (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10). 109 Table 4.7.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR COALITION PARTIES FOR THE TENURE OF MINISTER SCHOO, 1982-86

ROLE CONCEPTION

Coalition Party Good Neighor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

CDA 2 5 4 14 25

WD 11 34 21 41 107

TOTAL FOR COAimON 13 39 25 55 132

Table 4.8.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO DESIRED POLICY FOR THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR COALITION PARTIES FOR THE TENURE OF MINISTER SCHOO, 1982-86

ROLE CONCEPTION

Coalition Party Good Nciehor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

CDA 1 3 4 12 20

WD 4 29 20 26 79

TOTAL FOR COALITION 32 24 38 99 1 1 0

Table 4.9.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR COALITION PARTIES FOR THE TENURE OF MINISTER BUKMAN, 1986-89

ROLE CONCEPTION

Coalition Party Good Neighor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

CDA I 33 19 47 100

WD 10 12 1 23

TOTAL FOR COALITION 43 31 48 123

Table 4.10.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO DESIRED POLICY FOR THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR COALITION PARTIES FOR THE TENURE OF MINISTER BUKMAN, 1986-89

ROLE CONCEPTION

Coalition Party Gogd_Nwghor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

CDA 31 13 28 72

WD 8 12 20

TOTAL FOR COALITION 39 25 28 92 Ill

The individual ministers during these two periods do focus on power broker themes

overall, as is evident from Table 4.4. For both, when only references to themes phrased

in terms of desired policy are considered, the focus shifts to the social engineer role

conception. This may be taken to mean that Schoo, as a representative of the liberal party,

felt it necessary to make clear that she was not shifting policy. I.e. the overall dominance

of power broker themes during these two periods is accounted for by statements that are

negative or neutral and may be interpreted to reflect the perception on the part of the

members of parliament that policy preferences would shift away from the social engineer

conception and the wish to allay such fears on the part of the ministers.

Another possibility is that the variation in debate topics affects the prevalence of

certain themes. The successive periods during which Schoo and Bukman held the post of

minister of development cooperation are also the only two periods for which debates focusing

on the Dutch participation in development banks were coded. These debates tend to display

a higher emphasis on power broker themes and this may account for the prevalence of this

role conception in the overall debate for these periods. Indeed, if the subset of debates on the budget is considered, the emphasis shifts back to the social engineer role for the period

of Bukman’s ministry. However, for the period during which Schoo was minister of

development cooperation the emphasis on power broker themes becomes more rather than

less pronounced (see Table 4.11).

The three largest parties, CDA, PvdA, and W D , which dominate Dutch coalitions,

all show an overall dominance of social engineer themes, although the difference with the next largest category is not equally large for all three, although all three display a secondary focus on power broker themes (see Table 4.12). The preponderance of social engineer 112

Table 4.11.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCE TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR DEBATES ON THE BUDGET FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period MiiuBter Good Nciehor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

73/77 Jan Pronk 9 76 31 31 147 PvdA

77/81 Jan de Koning 19 106 31 60 216 CDA

81/82 Cornelia van Dijk 4 40 17 5 66 CDA

82/86 Eegje Schoo 19 61 53 83 216 WD

86/89 Meter Bukman 5 69 37 54 165 CDA

89/ Jan Pronk 5 76 24 41 146 preseat PvdA

TOTAL 61 428 193 274 956

themes is clearest for the PvdA, and smallest for the CDA. This means that the Christian

Democrats (CDA) show a greater secondary emphasis on power broker themes than the

Liberals (W D ). Given that the latter are a conservative party this cannot easily be explained on basis of their place in the ideological spectrum. As will be seen below, however, the themes associated with the social engineer role which are stressed by representatives of the

W D are generally phrased in terms of enabling people in the Third world to ’pull themselves up by their bootstraps.’

Representatives of D66 emphasize power broker themes, although social engineer themes form a strong second. D66 was a coalition partner during the first tenure as minister 113 Table 4.12.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCE TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES

ROLE CONCEPTION

Political Party Good Neighor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

CDA* 17 121 60 no 308

PvdA 8 149 55 76 288

WD 15 68 50 58 191

BP 7 1 9

CPN 3 5 13

DS70 I 1 2

EVP 3 1 3 7

GPV 12 2 15

Groeo Unka 5 1 6

PPR 1 18 11 4 34

PSP 2 18 6 7 33

RPF 10 4 3 5 22

Scboheo/Dijkman 2 5 2 6 15

SOP 13 18 4 4 39

D66 4 15 6 20 45

Ccotmmpartij 1 2 3

TOTAL 74 447 303 1030

* Figures include ARP. CHU, KVP. the parties that merged to become CDA. References to the separate parties occur only for the first period (1973- 77) in this study, after which the same representatives are indicated with the CDA party affiliation. 114 of development cooperation of Pronk, and again during the shortlived second cabinet of Van

Agt.

Two of the smaller, religiously based parties, the RPF and SGP, focus strongly on good neighbor themes, although only for the former is the good neighbor role dominant.

Although these parties are small and together account for only four to five seats, its representatives account for a uniquely Dutch feature of the foreign assistance debate: they frequently quote the Bible in support of their policy preferences. Although this specific form of argumentation is limited to these small parties, it does shed light on a feature that runs through the Dutch debate more generally: the confidence that one has truth on one’s side.

This confidence is expressed in the aspiration to guide other nations as expressed in the concept of gidsland discussed above.

The Dutch Communist Party (CPN) stands out in that only three out of thirteen statements by representatives of this perennial opposition party concern desired policy. Most of the contributions to debates by members of this party are criticisms of current and potential future policy. De Leeuw, for instance, comments that new directions in Dutch foreign assistance policy "assume the maintenance and stabilization of the neo-colonial system" (Handelingen 9 November 1977, pl082).

Representatives of a total of nineteen parties participated in debates on development cooperation over the period under study. For nine of those, social engineer themes are the most frequently addressed ones. For eleven of the nineteen parties there are fifteen or less coded themes across the entire period. Three of those show a preference for social engineer themes, but with so few data no firm conclusions can be attached either to such a preference of the lack of one. 115

Evidence for the Good Neighbor Role Conception

Themes associated with a good neighbor role conception are less prevalent than one

might think on basis of the frequent mention of ethical and moral considerations as strong

factors shaping Dutch development cooperation in the literature. While Weis refers to a

general Dutch preference for acting according moral standards in its foreign policy (1982,

98), others describe a sense of moral obligation as the basis for Dutch aid policy (e.g.

Koonings and Kruijt 1988). Voorhoeve adds a religous touch:

In the past, Dutch aid policy has emphasized the moral aspects of aid to poor nations. There was a tinge of Calvinist penance in aid policy, particularly in 1973-77. This helped raise the aid budget rapidly... (1985, 305).

Other than such writings might lead one to believe, themes associated with the good neighbor

role conception constitute just over 7 per cent of all references to themes associated with the

various role conceptions, as can be discerned from Table 4.3 presented above. Part of this

finding may be due to the manner in which the themes were defined as categories in the

coding scheme. Direct references to themes subsumed under the good neighbor role

conception are infrequent, but it would be possible to discern a moralistic quality to the manner in which references to themes associated with other role conceptions are phrased.

Some of the statements made by Dutch decision makers that focus on the fact that aid can benefit donor and recipient simultaneously, for instance, are worded in a manner that conveys the impression that commercial interests are secondary. The speakers apparently want to

create the impression that while they do not regard it as reprehensible to benefit the Dutch economy through aid, this aid should never in first instance be geared to such benefit.

Because they do in essence discuss the mutual benefits to donor and recipient they see attached to assistance these sorts of statements are coded as associated with the merchant role 116

Table 4.13.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO GOOD NEIGHBOR THEMES

GOOD NHGHBOR THEMES

Period Minister Ethic/Morrd Charity Disaster Total

73/77 Jin Pronk 3 7 - 10 PvdA

77/81 Jin de Koning 3 IS 1 19 CDA

81/32 Comelis vin Dijk 3 - 1 4 CDA

32/86 Eegje Schoo 2 19 10 31 WD

86/89 Pieter Bukman 3 - 2 5 CDA

89/ Jan Pronk 2 3 - 5 present PvdA

TOTAL 16 44 14 74

conception. However, their phraseology is such that in the absence of such coding categories they might be interpreted as statements that reflect a more altruistic sort of attitude.

When themes associated with the good neighbor role conception are referred to, it is the alleviation of immediate needs, or charity, which is stressed most frequently overall.

Out of a total of 74 references to good neighbor themes, the alleviation of immediate needs is the topic of decision makers’ speeches in 44 instances. The next frequently mentioned theme, that of ethical or moral duty to aid one’s fellow human, is referenced less than half as often as can be discerned from the totals given at the bottom of Table 4.13. There are variations across the various ministerial periods, however, as this same table 117 shows. The two periods during which moral obligation is stressed more frequently are both periods during which good neighbor themes get little emphasis. The slight shifts in emphasis should therefore not be overinterpreted as they are based on small amounts of data.

Those few references that are made to good neighbor themes, especially those that express a sense of moral obligation, are more likely to be made by the representatives of a few small, religiously based parties than by other members of parliament. In doing so, they often stress Biblical themes, which is unique to the foreign assistance debate in the

Netherlands.^ For Van Rossum, a member of the SGP or Political Reformed Party foreign assistance policy serves a missionary function;

The greatest virtue of development cooperation lies in the propagation of the Gospel, in the simultaneous easing of spiritual and material need, consequently, aid in Word and deed. (Handelingen 7 November 1985, pl272).

At other times he focuses less on missionary work and more on a duty to help those less fortunate. Speaking for his party, he states that "[f]or us there also is a Christian duty to aid people —especially those at the bottom of the society" (Handelingen, 22 December 1976, p2442). This moral argument is at times supported with Biblical evidence, as in the debate where Van Rossum cites Bible texts from letters of Paul to the Ephesians and Deuteronomy to support his argument (Handelingen 15 February 1978, p862-3). Although he is a frequent

References to a moral obligation to extend foreign assistance on the basis of religious beliefs do not occur in either the debates of the Belgian or British parliament. In those two settings references to this theme are generally no more specific than the relatively vague sense of obligation to one’s fellow human. TTiat these references to Biblical teachings are not limited to the debate on foreign assistance is pointed out during one of the debates by Honig van den Bossche, a representative of the BP or Farmer’s Party: "In the Dutch parliament the Bible is cited with regard to all sorts of policy" (Handelingen 12 November 1975 pl097).

^ The SGP is a small party with a steady following among very orthodox Calvinists (Irwin 1989, 155). 118 speaker in debates on foreign assistance, Van Rossum is not the only small party representative employing religous themes in his rhetoric. Leerling, who represents the RPF or Reformed Political Federation in parliament describes missionary work as essential to the development of the Third world:

We have to conclude that the need in poor countries in its deepest essence is not material in nature, but can be attributed to the religious-cultural climate in developing countries. Lacking a will to live and a vision of the calling of man have lead to a fatalistic attitude toward life, that has prevented the full development of man. (Handelingen 2 December 1981, p716)

The attitude toward peoples of the Third world that speaks through these words is unusual in the ethnocentricity it displays. The religious phraseology, however, is unique to the Dutch parliamentary debates and, while it does not occupy a large proportion of the debate, is notable because of that.

On occasion, a minister of development cooperation finds it necessary to address such themes as well. This generally occurs in response to a speech by one of these small party representatives, as when minister Jan de Koning responds to Van Rossum that

I believe that solidarity which is not rooted in a profound theological conviction indeed will not stand up against the pressures that will mount against it by conflicts of interest and by human selfishness. (Handelingen 20 February 1980, p3211)

A difference between such statements as this one by minister de Koning and the small party representatives is that the former generally remain at the level of general principle while the latter make very direct references to specific religious teachings. In that sense, the minister’s pronouncements are more in line with the t>'pe of references to moral obligation found in the

Belgian and British debates. 119 Evidence for the Social Engineer Role Conception

Almost a quarter of all references to social engineer themes stresses the need to fight poverty as a structural condition. The totals given at the bottom of Table 4.14 show this theme to appear in decision makers’ speeches 108 out of a total of 447 references to social engineer themes, or just under a quarter of all references to themes associated with this role conception. This makes this theme by far the most prevalent of the various themes associated with this role conception. If divided by the periods of tenure of the various ministers, this theme is the most frequently referred to during four of the six periods. It should be noted, however, that for one of these four the difference with the next frequently mentioned themes is only one case. During the period Bukman was minister of development cooperation, dealing with poverty as a structural condition, empowering third world citizens and donor coordination are all referred to about equally. To say that poverty is the dominant theme during this period is to overinterpret a very small difference. What is interesting is that despite the pretention to be a guide to other nations, the long-run stability of the international environment is not a more frequently mentioned theme.

A concern with addressing the structural causes of poverty and with creating better conditions for the poorest and most disadvantaged groups is expressed more frequently by

Dutch speakers. The reason for such a focus is given by Terpstra, a member of parliament for the liberal party (W D ), who stresses rural development themes and production for the home market as a necessary first step for the Third world. She explains herself by citing

Confucius: "it is better to teach a poor man to catch a fish than to give him one when he is hungry" (Handelingen 19 February 1980, p3133). This sums up well the attitude behind the

W D support for social engineer themes and displays a slightly different emphasis than is Table 4.14.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO SOCIAL ENGINEER THEMES

SOCIAL ENGINEER THEMES

Period Minister Stability Environm. Pop. Soc.Juat. Poverty Hum.RIaht Empower. NGO Agric. Women Coord. Total

73/77 Jan Pronk 10 20 8 12 76 PvdA

77/81 Jan dc Koning 18 34 12 10 106 CDA

81/82 Comelis van Dijk 13 40 CDA

82/86 Eegje Schoo 11 10 13 79 WD

86/89 Pieter Bukman 6 12 12 70 CDA

89/ Jan Pronk 3 76 present PvdA

13 55 58 19

g 121

found among labour representatives, who tend to stress equitabillty of outcome over

empowering individuals with skills which enable them to improve their situation. Labour

representatives also tend to make a more direct connection with international structural issues,

as in Verspaget’s observation that the "less aid there, the more refugees here is a painful

paradox" (Handelingen 23 January 1990, pl435). This last sentiment is not exclusive to

labour party members, but is a sentiment shared by more conservative members of parliament

as well (De Hoop Scheffer, interview).

Although the poverty theme is often expressed in terms of structure, this word here

refers to the organization of a society and not the interrelations between societies or states.

A possible reason for such a focus is that Dutch decision makers expect to be able to have

more of an impact at this micro level, where concrete projects can be implemented, while

their impact on international structures is likely to be less significant.

The two periods for which poverty is not the most frequently referenced theme are those of Van Dijk and Pronk’s second ministership. During Van Dijk’s tenure the structure of the international environment, and the transformation of it, are more frequently addressed than any other theme. Van Dijk’s tenure was shorter than any other one and as a result there

are substantially fewer data for this period. Therefore, extra care should be taken in

interpreting the data for the period Van Dijk held the position of minister of development

cooperation. The poverty theme is referenced quite often as well during this period, although

its frequency constitutes only about two-thirds of the frequency of references to the need to

address international structural issues.

In the most recent period, Jan Pronk’s second stint as minister of development cooperation, the focus has shifted to a concern with human rights issues in relation to the 122 provision of aid, although the concern with poverty is still strongly present in the discussion.

This focus on human rights issues is apparently not confined to parliamentary debate.

Recently, Indonesia declined any further assistance from the Netherlands and supported that

decision with the argument that the Dutch preoccupation with its human rights record

constituted undesired interference in its domestic affairs (NRC, March 1992).

Evidence for the Merchant Role Conception

Within the merchant role conception a preference for the greater use of trade and

industry in dispensing foreign assistance and the desire to have the aid program benefit both

the recipient state and the domestic economy, are the most frequently mentioned themes, with

41.7 and 30.1 per cent of total references respectively as can be seen from the totals given

at the bottom of Table 4.15. The first of these two dominates the discussion for five out of

the six periods, while the desire to benefit domestic trade and industry while providing

foreign assistance is focused on during Van Dijk’s short tenure as minister. This period is

also the one for which the fewest data are available and although the shift to a stress on

benefitting donor and recipient simultaneously appears solid, it may be a function of the short

tenure of the minister and small amount of data resulting from it. What is noteworthy is that both themes are linked more clearly to domestic concerns of the donor economy than to

international economic structures. It is not a concern with free trade or the international

economic order which figures prominently among the referenced merchant themes, as might

have logically coincided with the structural concerns expressed in the social engineer role

conception, but instead a concern with the role of domestic trade and industry in relation to

the foreign assistance program. This combination of a concern with the gap between rich Table 4.15.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO MERCHANT THEMES

MERCHANT THEMES

Period Mmiater Liberal Order Free trade Growth Mutual benefit Privatization Total

Jan Pronk 1 4 3 13 16 37 PvdA

Jan de Koning 10 31 CDA

81/82 Cometis van Dijk 17 CDA

82/86 Eegje Schoo 27 57 WD

86/89 Pieter Bukman 22 40 CDA

89/ Jan Pronk 24 present PvdA

20 86 206

5 124

and poor internationally and the potential tensions arising from it on the one hand, and the welfare of the domestic economy on the other, however, can be interpreted as providing

some insight into Dutch md motivations: the concern with international structural issues is

indicated by the fact that as a trading nation, the Netherlands depends heavily on a stable

international economy for its own economic welfare. The values held domestically that predispose Dutch decision makers to redistributive solutions as a means for creating stability within the society also motivate the concern with distributional issues internationally.

It is noteworthy, however, that the manner in which privatization and mutual benefit

are addressed often stresses the point that while it is alright to benefit the domestic economy, this is not what foreign assistance in first instance should be about. It is as if the moralism

expressed in the concept of gidsland prohibits the Dutch from acknowledging that their

foreign assistance does indeed serve Dutch economic interests to a substantial degree.

Minister De Koning, for instance, discusses the benefits that can accrue to the Dutch economy as a result of its foreign assistance but is careful to point out that investments made with such ftmds should in first instance serve the recipient state:

investments abroad can contribute, sometimes directly, more frequently indirectly, to the improved health of the Dutch economy. Therefore I am not saying that investments abroad only serve the interests of the Dutch economy. Yet, first and foremost, they are to serve the interests of the economies of developing countries. (Handelingen 21 February 1980, p3250)

While he starts of stressing the return on investment to the Netherlands, De Koning seems to change his mind mid-thought to focus on the less selfish objective of serving the interests

of the recipient states.

Christen Democrat Jaap De Hoop Scheffer almost apologizes for making the link between foreign assistance and its potential benefits to Dutch trade and industry: 125

We can and may talk about the relation between development cooperation and trade and industry, but we must understand that developmental relevance should always come first. (Handelingen 29 November 1988, pl703)

While De Hoop Scheffer implicitly acknowledges that Dutch trade and industry stand to benefit from the state’s foreign assistance program, his statement is typical of the manner in which the link between development cooperation and the Dutch private sector are often discussed in parliament. It is held that development should be the primary purpose, but if

Dutch trade and industry can benefit in the process, this is certainly acceptable. No one states this more succinctly than Minister Van Dijk, who says that "What is good for developing countries, can also be good for Dutch trade and industry" (Handelingen 3

December 1981, p797). To which Labour representative Eveline Herfkens retorts: "The

Minister posited that what is good for the Third world is good for us. I want to posit: what is better for the Third World is not bad for us" (Handelingen, 3 December 1981 p810). In a later debate she explains herself in greater detail:

contraction of world trade is disadvantageous for the Netherlands. Development of purchasing power in the Third world is the only efficacious means to the recovery of the economies of the industrialised countries. Hence, a substantial aid program for the Third world is needed. (Handelingen 12 May 1982, p3285)

The linkage between industrialized and third world economies is made in a somewhat different manner by Minister Pronk in an earlier era. He did not so much refer to the benefits to the Dutch economy as to the base of support for foreign assistance domestically:

it is about the tying of assistance to Dutch products, because a too substantial conflict between employment in the Netherlands on the one hand and the aid to developing countries on the other could Jeopardize the continued support for aid to developing countries. (Handelingen 10 November 1977, pi 154).

In other words, Pronk Justified benefits to the domestic economy in terms of continued support for a substantial aid program. This link between aid and employment domestically 126 in the Netherlands is also made by Minister Schoo, although the implications are different for her:

Development cooperation is not only positive for developing countries. It is in the moral but also material interest of the rich countries, too. It keeps people employed in the Netherlands. (Handelingen 17 February 1983, p2458)

Statements similar to this one can be found in both the Belgian and British debates. Tangible and immediate benefits to the domestic economy are not unique to the Dutch debate. The insight that domestic support for the foreign aid program depends on such benefits is not unique either. However, the perception of tension between domestic employment and aid to the Third world, and of the potential impact on domestic support for foreign assistance are expressed only here.

Evidence for the Power Broker Role Conception

Of all references to power broker themes, the participation in international organizations is stressed the most by far: 63.7 per cent of the references to themes related to this role fall into this category, and the pattern is similar for all periods. It should be noted, however, that during the most recent period, a sense of responsibility to a recipient state and a desire to influence the domestic policies of such a recipient are stressed a fair amount as well. During the period of tenure of minister Schoo, the desire to influence the recipient state’s policies was also mentioned a fair amount, although proportionally far less than the frequency of references to the desire to be actively involved in international organizations (see Table 4.16).

This desire to play and active role in international organizations was conceptualized as a theme typifying the power broker role conception, because such references were 127 Table 4.16.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO POWER BROKER THEMES

POWER BROKER THEMES

Period Minister Interest ResDonsibilitv Democracy Infl.Rectn. ParticiD.IO INfl.Donor Total

73/77 Jan Pronk 3 1 - 1 24 2 31 PvdA

77/81 Jan de Koning - 4 2 1 50 3 60 CDA

81/82 ComelÎB van Dijk ---- 5 ■ 5 CDA

82/86 Eegje Schoo 1 4 6 16 60 7 94 WD

86/89 Pieter Bukman 3 9 18 2 38 2 72 CDA

89/ Jan Pronk 12 1 11 16 1 41 present PvdA

TOTAL 7 30 27 31 193 15 303

construed as attempts to exert power and influence on the representatives of other states, both donor and recipient ones. In essence, the power broker role conception encompasses the more traditional aspects of realist expectations. While this conceptualization stands, such attempts at influence are not made solely by decision makers who perceive their state in terms of a power broker role. The Dutch decision makers, who overall stress social engineer themes, express the wish to affect international events as well. However, this is more likely to be phrased in terms of setting an example than in terms of being a leader.® This may be evident from the earlier discussion on the desire of the Dutch decision makers to have their

* British decision makers speak much more clearly in terms of a leadership role within international organizations. 128 state and its policy function as a guide, it is also literally stated by the decision makers. In terms of debt relief negotiations, for instance, minister Schoo argues that "the Netherlands has set an significant example" (Handelingen 24 October 1985, p807). The previous day,

Ubels-Van Veen, representative of the small Evangelical People’s Party (EVP), had argued that "the Netherlands should set a good example" with regard to debt cancellation for African states (Handelingen 23 October 1985, p773). Such wording implies that these decision makers are well aware that their state has little coercive capability, certainly with regard to other and especially larger donor states. The influence sought, if not phrased in terms of setting an example, either openly or implicitly argues rightness of the conviction espoused.

The debate on the budget for development cooperation for 1977 (Handelingen 10 November

1976), for instance, focuses on structural change, the NIEO, and the possibility of exercising influence within international organizations to bring that change about. There is the sense that one has an important contribution to make and that it is not entirely impossible to do so.

This sentiment can be found throughout the years covered by this study. Ten years after the debate cited above. Minister Bukman stops short of overtly claiming Dutch influence on the

World Bank, while simultaneously hinting at exactly that when he says that

If the World Bank nowadays gives a lot of attention to issues such as the environment, involvement and population policies, then I am not so pig-headed as to attribute this to the Netherlands, but we did play a forceful role in those discussions. (Handelingen 30 November 1988, p i775)

His successor Minister Pronk displays far less of this sort of modesty when he expresses the opinion that

our membership in the relevant Bretton Woods institutions offers us the possibility to attempt to actively influence the developmental character of those adjustment programs as much as possible. (Handelingen 24 January 1990, p 1548-9) 129

While Pronk does not go so far as to claim that the Netherlands is in the driver’s seat in

these organizations, he obviously is convinced that its representatives can have a real impact

on the decision making within these organizations. In that opinion he is not alone. Many

years earlier, Van Mierlo, representing D66 in parliament, smugly commented:

The Netherlands is well ahead of the other Western countries in operating within the multilateral sector. We do that very well. As far as I’m concerned, we can expand that role. ... The Netherlands can exercise even more influence on development in the world through the multilateral sector. (Handelingen 10 November 1976, p i 102)

Although most of these statements refer to the World Bank, the UN is on the whole referred

to more frequently as an arena within which the Dutch decision makers ought to make

themselves heard. Verwoert, a member of parliament for Democratic Socialists (DS’70),

expresses a clear preference for playing a role within the European Community:

The task of this minister lies in first instance within the EC and he will have to try to convince his EC-partners as much as possible to go along with the policy advocated by the Netherlands. (Handelingen 12 November 1975, p i090)

Although this is directed at minister Pronk during his first term in that office, his successor

De Koning adopts this position expressly when he says that "we first and foremost want to try to achieve our goal within the framework of the Nine and within that framework we will try to exercise our influence as much as possible" (Handelingen 29 November 1978, p i853).

While the Dutch discuss their involvement in international organizations in terms of exercising influence, they do not speak in terms of a leadership role as is common in the

British parliamentary debates. Yet they also do not position themselves as having to go along with what more powerful members of such bodies decide, as the Belgians do in their debates.

Thus, while Dutch decision makers realize their power to affect the decision process of international organizations has its limits, they are intent on exercising any and all influence 130

they possibly can to move such bodies in directions they regard as positive. The normative

quality of such attempts is expressed nicely by Labour (PvdA) representative Herfkens:^

It would be possible to formulate a minimum standard of living internationally. That may sound utopian now, but allow me to point out that for instance the abolition of slavery is an accepted goal today, whether or not it is economically advantageous. There is no difference in principle between this socially accepted minimum need for freedom, for human dignity, and a minimum level of basic needs [satisfaction]. (Handelingen 29 November 1988, pl696)

Although Herfkens phrases her comments in terms of an international norm to be promoted within the United Nations, the ideals she espouses in this speech are an international

application of one of the basic principles of the welfare state she represents and in the parliament of which she verbalizes these ideals.

The presence of themes associated with the power broker role conception in the Dutch debate is colored by the principles espoused by the more prevalent social engineer themes.

Both of these role conceptions have in common a ’reformist’ general policy orientation as explained in chapter 3. The content of the desired outcomes, however, differs. The Dutch decision makers’ references to the role they desire their state to play in international organizations focuses on the creation of an orderly and equitable international environment.

In other words, although these themes do indeed reflect a desire to exercise influence on the part of the Dutch decision makers, the influence attempt is in its content congruent with the social engineer role conception.

’ Eveline Herkens left the Dutch parliament after she was appointed to a position at the World Bank. (FIND: position, date, etc.) 131

Assessment of the Evidence

On the whole, Dutch decision makers display a fairly high degree of agreement regarding foreign assistance policy. There are no obvious or strong divergences between members of various political parties in terms of frequency of reference to a particular role conception. The empirical evidence from the parliamentary debates thus conforms to Van

Soest’s earlier assessment that development cooperation is neutral with respect to party politics (cited by Maas 1986, 23). This consensus regarding foreign assistance policy is implied by Aarts (CDA/KVP), who argues for his party that

We have the impression that with respect to international solidarity we as Christian democrats are closer to this Minister [Pronk] than-those of his way of thinking in the Federal Republic [of Germany]. (Handelingen 12 November 1975, pl086)

The commonality that characterizes the Dutch debate on foreign assistance can be interpreted as evidence of a national role conception. However, such an assessment needs to take into account the possible confounding influence of the consociational nature of Dutch politics

(Lijphart 1968). The following interaction between members of two parties that espouse radically different values illustrates a desire to paper over differences and creates the illusion of agreement. Van Rossum, representing one of the small, religiously based parties (SGP), argues for a missionary element to development cooperation;

Our party wants to strongly support the Minister in the elimination of poverty, illiteracy and in agricultural and housekeeping education, but we wish to see such policy tied to the spiritual elevation of those to whom this aid is extended. Material elevation alone leads to desire and a trek to the cities. (Handelingen 11 November 1976, pi 176)

To which Minister Pronk (PvdA) responds that

I am of the opinion that a new economic approach is not sufficient, but that it is about the concept of ’development’ in its social, economic, political, and cultural sense. This means that I do indeed agree with Mr. Van Rossum that it is not about bread alone. I assume he did not say this to describe the economic aspects as of 132

secondary importance and in that case we agree with each other. (Handelingen 11 November 1976, pi 181)

Whereas Van Rossum is talking about the need for missionary type work, Pronk turns the argument into one of social transformation and claims agreement with a member of parliament whose priorities are very different from his. This sort of argument style is seems more typical of the Dutch debates than of those of either Belgium or the United Kingdom.

Congruence with Policy Behavior

It was hypothesized that a social engineer role conception would manifest itself in an emphasis on UN agencies with respect to the multilateral foreign assistance expenditures.

Although the rhetoric of Dutch decision makers places them as a group in the social engineer role conception, the foreign assistance policy behavior of their state exhibits some features that are not congruent with the hypothesized behavior of states which’ decision makers hold such a role conception.

Dutch decision makers do not show a pronounced preference for UN agencies in their decision making. As Table 4.17 shows, expenditures involving UN agencies on average occupy a little over one-third of the multilateral aid budget. Especially in the 1980s, the expenditure on UN agencies remains fairly steady at that level. During the late seventies, however, there are a few years for which expenditures do indeed stress UN agencies. These cover the period 1975-78 or the latter portion of Pronk’s first period as minister of development cooperation. While expenditures involving the EC are fairly constant at under one-third of the multilateral portion of the aid budget, the World Bank Group and regional development banks gain in emphasis over the period under study. The mid-eighties show this emphasis on international lending institutions most pronounced, after which there is some Table 4.17.

THE NETHERLANDS: MULTILATERAL EXPENDITURES

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

UN Agencies 41 51 45 50 36 44 40 37 35 28 32 33 31 34 34 36 (%of multilateral)

EEC 28 26 26 18 27 30 32 26 26 27 27 24 25 27 30 28 (% of multilateraO

World 19 20 22 25 36 26 26 37 38 42 40 42 44 39 36 35 Bank Group* and Regional Banks

Other

Multi- 239 224 264 284 442 403 367 408 383 389 374 560 676 679 582 691 latere) ODA (S million)

* Includes capital subscription payments to IBRD. IFC, IDA

Source: Calculated from net disbursements figures given in reference tables of OECD, various years. Development Co-Operation; Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. Paris: OECD.

5 134 tapering off. Overall, the expenditures on these institutions remain at just below one-third.

However, across the period under study, the relative emphasis on UN agencies and international banks seem to converge.

The greater emphasis on these international financial institutions coincides with the tenures of Schoo (1982-86) and Bukman (1986-89) as ministers of development cooperation.

As was noted earlier, during these periods, the foreign assistance debate stresses power broker themes to a greater extent than during the tenures of other ministers, as was discussed above and can be discerned from Table 4.3. Furthermore, the theme focused on is indeed that of participation in international organizations. This is not surprising, since this theme is the single most frequently referred to among those themes associated with the power broker role conception (see Table 4.15). A further breakdown of this theme into general references to it and references to specific types of international organizations, however, does not show a higher frequency of direct references to these international banks during these two periods. Decision makers had to specifically state the name of such an institution for this to be coded in a sub-category of this theme and statements that implicitly referred to such institutions therefore were not included in these subcategories. This coding rule may have resulted in an underestimation of the focus on specific multilateral institutions, although this would hold equally true for the various types of international organizations.

The lack of a specific focus on UN agencies in policy behavior coincides with a desire to influence international organizations across the board. Dutch decision makers apparently perceive their role as example and guide not as limited to those UN institutions that might be predisposed towards favoring structural change. As the above discussion of the evidence for the power broker role conception shows, Dutch decision makers seek an Table 4.18.

THE NETHERLANDS: RELATIVE EMPHASIS ON BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 m S 1989 1990

Bilalcrel 60 69 71 74 70 75 76 72 68 69 67 68 68 70 72 73 (% of total)

Multilateral 40 31 29 26 30 25 24 28 32 31 33 32 32 30 28 27 (% of total)

Total ODA 604 720 908 1074 1472 1630 1510 1472 1195 1268 1136 1740 2094 2231 2094 2592 {$ million)

Source: Calculated from net disbuiaements figures given in reference tables of OECD, various years. Development Co-One ration: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. Paris: OECD. 136 active role for their state in those institutions that might be less obviously predisposed to the types of policy goals associated with the social engineer role conception. In doing so, these decision makers hope to influence such institutions in the direction they hold preferable. The social engineer role conception has much in common with the power broker role conception.

In either case, decision makers seek influence, yet the content of the influence attempt differs.

It spears also that while Dutch decision makers desire for their state to play a role in international organizations, the emphasis remains on bilateral foreign assistance, which takes up over two-thirds of Dutch aid. This pattern is fairly constant across the period under study, as Table 4.18 shows.

An increasing proportion of Dutch bilateral assistance is in grant-form (see Table

4.19). Although this is conform the hypothesized policy behavior, it should be noted that

Britain, counter to expectation, displays a larger grant percentage than the Dutch figures exhibit. Contrary to Britain, however, Dutch policy behavior has clearly moved to partially and wholly untied aid. An interesting feature of the figures displayed in Table 4.20 is that in the late 1980s there is a shift toward more partially tied aid and away from wholly untied aid. This last form of aid allows the recipient to purchase goods essentially anywhere, while partially tied aid limits procurement to the donor and developing states. Partially tied aid thus prevents Dutch aid dollars (or guilders, the local currency) to benefit the economies of other developed states because the recipient may not obtain goods there. Although partially tied aid may appear as ’developmentally friendly’ because it allows the recipient to procure desired goods anywhere in the Third world, for many products such aid is likely to have the practical effect of benefitting the donor economy. Nevertheless, the Netherlands does Table 4.19.

THE NETHERLANDS: GRANT PERCENTAGE OF BILATERAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Grants and 68 77 83 90 82 75 72 75 84 83 86 88 89 90 91 93 grant like contribution# (%of bilateral)

Bilateral ODA 365 496 644 789 1031 1228 1143 1064 812 879 762 1180 1419 1552 1511 1901 ($ million)

Source: Calculated from net disbursements figures given in reference tables of OECD, various years, Development Co-Operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. Paris: OECD. Table 4.20.

THE NETHERLANDS: TYING STATUS OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1 ^ 1989

Tied aid* 46 5 12 21 18 17 .. 11 12 12 15 14 (% of bilateral)

Partially 27 32 27 24 29 31 44 47 40 ded aid** (%of bilateral)

Untied 68 56 55 59 60 57 44 38 aid*** (*of bilateral)

* Mainly tied to procurement in the donor country. ** Contributions available for procurement from donor and substantially all developing countries. *** Fully and freely available for essentially world wide procurement.

Source: Calculated from tying status figures (commitments) in OECD, various years, Development Co-Operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. Paris: OECD.

W 0 3 139 consistently allocate a substantial proportion of its assistance to fully untied aid, which is conform the policy behavior expectations for the social engineer role conception.

Conclusions

The fact that the discussion of what should guide policy centers so clearly on social engineer themes across various time periods, may be taken as evidence that a social engineer role conception does indeed guide the Dutch members of parliament and ministers as a group. While the data regarding policy behavior do not in all instances conform to the hypothesized behavior, there does appear to be a congruence between rhetoric and behavior patterns. CHAPTER V

BELGIUM

Introduction

Not much has been written on the development cooperation policy of Belgium.

Studies that focus on it singly or in comparison with other cases often stress both the colonial heritage and economic interests. The two issues come together in Belgium’s relations with

Zaire, where as an outgrowth of

the strong, economic links with Zaire in the early 1960s, which were threatened by political instability and worsening relations with Belgium, aid was from the start closely intertwined with the defence of Belgian economic interests. (Renard 1984, 89)

It was hypothesized that Belgian decision makers, as representatives of a smaller state with an extensive reliance on international trade for its economic well-being, would perceive their state’s role in this issue area in terms of short-term benefits to the domestic economy.

Although a preoccupation with economic interests is reflected in the debate on foreign assistance in Belgium, the evidence presented in this chapter shows that the rhetoric of

Belgian decision makers does not fit neatly into the merchant role conception. There is also a realization that the longer term stability of the international system is important to the continued well-being of the Belgian economy, a theme which is associated with a social engineer role conception. While decision makers do perceive a role for Belgium in bringing such systemic changes about, their expressions of the need for such a transformation remain

140 141 abstract. It may be that Belgian decision makers, realizing very well that theirs is a small state, do not believe they have any realistic possibility of indeed being a significant force in bringing such change about, although some refer to the Netherlands in arguing that such a role may indeed be a possibility.

This chapter will first present a brief introduction on the role of Belgian ministers and state secretaries for development cooperation within their government and set the foreign assistance decision making of Belgium in context. The chapter will then proceed to a discussion of empirical evidence regarding decision maker rhetoric and foreign assistance policy behavior. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of the evidence for the

Belgian case. While some charge that Belgium lacks a coherent foreign assistance policy, it may be more accurate to state that this policy domain is tied up with Belgian foreign economic policy generally. The consequences for policy are that economic interests figure prominently in Belgian foreign assistance.

The Role of Ministers and State Secretaries for Development Cooperation

The Belgian minister or state secretary for development cooperation heads the Belgian

Administration for Development Cooperation (BADC), which is attached to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation. This configuration, whereby foreign trade is attached to foreign affairs rather than to a ministry of economic affairs may be an expression of the importance to Belgium, with its high reliance on international trade for its welfare, of its economic foreign relations. The combination of these three subject areas in one ministry has also created tensions, especially between development cooperation and foreign trade, the latter of which has sought to encroach on the domain of the former 142

(Franck 1987). The Ministries of Foreign Trade and of Finance handle soft loans (Berlage

1984, 17) and the latter also contributions to international organizations and banks (Franck

1987, 66). This formal division of competences is not unique to the Belgian situation, but whereas in the Netherlands strong ministers of development cooperation have established working relations with their counterparts in economic affairs and finance that allowed them a measure of influence over such contributions, Belgian ministers of development cooperation have not managed to gain such influence.

Vandommele (1982) and Serlon (1985) blame this lack of influence on the large number of individuals who succesively have been in charge of development cooperation. For the time period covered by this study, 1975-90, Belgium has had eight different ministers or state secretaries in charge of development cooperation, while the Netherlands has seen a succession of six ministers (although only five different individuals) and the United Kingdom six as well. This means that the Belgian officials have indeed had the shortest average tenure in comparison to the other two states under investigation. This is in many ways a reflection of the short average duration of governing coalition in this state. Table 5.1 shows not only the succession of ministers and state secretaries for the period under study, but also the various coalitions. Although there are often only minor changes with regard to the parties involved or the individuals holding office in successive coalitions, the frequency of the breakdown and reformation evidences an instability of these coalition cabinets that does not facilitate the formulation of clear and coherent policy initiatives. While this issue of instability of governing coalitions affects the governance of Belgium in all its aspects, development cooperation may be especially affected for a reason that is not totally 143

Table 5.1.

MINISTERS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN BELGIUM FOR THE PERIOD 1975-90.

Period Develooment Cooo. Foreign Affairs Prime Minister Coalition

25-04-74 Reaaat Van Eblande Renaat Van Elslande Leo Tindemans CVP/PSC. PW/PLP 18-04-77 CVP CVP CVP

03-06-77 Lucien Outers Henri Simone! Leo Tindemans CVP/PSC, BSP/PSB, VU, PDF il-10-78 FDF PSB CVP

20-10-78 ume P.Vanden Boeynants 03-04-79

03-04-79 \W k Eyskeos Henri Simonet Wilfried Martens CVP/PSC. (B)SP/PS(B), PDF 15-01-80 CVP PS CVP

23-01-80 same CVP/PSC. SP/PS 02-04-80

18-05-80 same Charlea-Ferdinand Nothomb same cvMsc, spyps, pw/raL 07-10-80 PSC

22-10-80 Daniel Coens «une CVP/PSC, SP/PS 31-03-81 CVP

06-04-81 «une «une NWc Eyskens 21-09-81 CVP

17-12-81 Jacqueline Mayeoce-Gooaaeas Leo Tindemans Wlfried Martens CVP/PSC. PW/PRL 14-10-85 state seer. / PRL CVP CVP

after 09-06-83 Fiancola-Xavier de Donnea PRL

28-11-85 Andre Kempinatre same 87 state seer. / PW

20-10-87 same same CVP 88

09-05-88 Andre Geens Eyskens same CVP/PSC, PS/SP, vu 91 VU CVP 144

independent of the problematic nature of Belgian coalition governments but is separable from

it nonetheless.

Vandommele charges that the office of Minister of Development Cooperation is used

as "small change" in the formation of coalitions (1982, 500). That is to say, the office is used to round out a coalition rather than central to the formation of it. In addition,

"development cooperation is one of those departments where one starts (or ends) a career and which one tries hard to leave for more prestigious offices" (Serlon 1985, 529). Caudron

(VU) charges similarly that

With every new coalition formation the concern for the Third World was always presented as last consolation prize to persons who used the portfolio as jumping off point to more desirable departments such as the prime-ministership. Education, or Finance. (PH/AP 23 April 1982 pl412)

This goes back to colonial days, when the Ministry of Colonies was regarded as a testing ground for junior ministers (Coolsaet 1987, 171), and suggests that development

cooperation is not seen as important subject matter among Belgian decision makers (Berlage

1984b). It also precludes the development of coherent policy, as politicians will be more

concerned with impressing or at least not antagonizing those within and outside of politics who can help further their careers, than with developing coherent ideas in the subject area of competence. Most likely, they are also individuals who are new to the subject matter, and who because of their unfamiliarity are influenceable. All this suggests that the institutional

configuration in Belgium is not amenable to the development of a high profile development

cooperation policy, or the development of a distinct conception of the role Belgium should play in this issue area. 145

This lack of clear direction has not escaped the attention of representatives, who note it in their speeches in parliament. Flemish socialist Vanvelthoven (SP), for instance, observes:

Whoever endeavors to follow Belgian development policy for a few years cannot escape the conclusion that this policy suffers from a flagrant lack of any political vision, of policy options and of policy instruments, as a result of which it is thoroughly immobilized. (PH/AP 12 March 1984 pl976)

De Mol (VU) charges that:

The weak position of development policy is the result of a lack of interest. ... Clarity and vision on a development cooperation which is detached from Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade is simply nonexistent. (PH/AP 12 March 1984 pl988).

Nevertheless, Van Elslande (CVP) in his role as minister of both foreign affairs and development cooperation refuses to accept sole responsibility for the lack of a strong foreign assistance policy, saying that

as soon as both public and parliamentary opinion are won over to a particular objective, this objective will indeed be attained. If it is not attained this is often not only the fault of the government -which is only one of the mechanisms of the politically organized society— but because the necessity of a particular goal is insufficiently shared by many. (PH/AP 8 June 1976, p3889)

Van Elslande essentially argues that if Belgium lacks a coherent foreign assistance policy this is a reflection of attitudes prevalent in the society.

While development cooperation is discussed in parliament, the representatives are thoroughly aware that their realistic impact on policy is limited or worse. According to

Fitzmaurice, "the practical impact of parliament is quite modest, " eventhough it formally has a role in foreign policy (1983, 102). This may not be atypical of parliamentary systems, but the Belgian situation is extraordinary in that it sometimes formally approves budgets after they actually have been spent. For instance, the budget for development cooperation for

1986 was not discussed until June 1987, the budget for 1983 was subjected to scrutiny in 146

March 1984, and that for 1981 was discussed in April 1982. The result of such after-the-fact policy making is that "Whatever continuity there was resulted more from inertia than from a global vision on the fiiture" (Berlage 1984b, 12). In other words, any continuity in policy resulted more from actors within the aid bureaucracy proceeding as they had in the past rather than from active attempts at shaping Belgian foreign assistance policy by the state’s leaders. Although domestic reasons such as the communitarian conflict account for part of this inertia, it also reflects a perception by decision makers that Belgium’s role in international relations is properly one of a player in the background, a conciliator behind the scenes, and as a state whose leaders sense its dependence on the greater powers very clearly.

A statement along these lines was made by Van Wambeke (CVP), who in a speech in parliament cites and interprets Keohane’s (1969) article "Lilliputians’ Dilemmas," which he identifies by its subtitle "Small States in International Politics" to conclude that

The foreign policy of a country like ours above all must be pragmatic, be open to frank discussions and consultations and, provided [we have the] approval of the large partners, be aimed at a role as bridge builder and mediator. (PH/AP 26 October 1982 pl68)

To which Minister of Foreign Affairs of that time, Tindemans, responds that although small states are often ignored, it is the task of the representatives of such governments to command respect in order that they are reckoned with (PH/AP 26 October 1982 p i69-70). Urbain (PS) similarly argues that "a small country like Belgium, if it has the political will, can play a role and occupy an important position on the scene of world affairs" (AP/PH 20 November 1984

0543). Such arguments, however, reflect what some decision makers would like, rather than the role they actually perceive Belgium to occupy at present. The same minister Tindemans is in a later debate chastised by a member of the opposition for too readily accepting a modest role for Belgium. Volksunie representative De Mol argues that 147

Belgium has indeed -contrary to what the Minister of Foreign Affairs claims— a part of its own to play; the smallness of Belgium is no argument to plead for the docility of Belgium. We consider the smallness of Belgium to be an asset in independent action; the independent position the Netherlands did and does take has never hurt it. (PH/AP 12 March 1984 pl989).

De Mol’s statement reflects a hesitance on the part of Belgian decision makers to clearly position their state, which Demeester-De Meyer (CVP) identified several years earlier, asking her parliamentary audience whether as a state, Belgium did not "act a bit too carefully"

(PH/AP 4 July 1979 pi 157). Despite the desire to have Belgium play a more bold and well- defined role, decision makers discuss such a role in a manner that conveys the impression they do not quite believe it to be possible to position their state in such a way. This coincides with the judgment of Dewachter and Verminck that Belgium is a "weak actor" in world politics and that "[i]n international politics Belgium depends primarily on its economic strength and its technological skill and expertise" (1987, 24).

Historical Context

Belgium’s historical connection with its former colony Zaire fits well with the merchant role conception hypothesized to dominate the perceptions of Belgian decision makers. Although some argue that Zaire was important in that it "gave Belgium an international status which by itself it could not hope for" (Berlage 1984b, 2), business interests always strongly have influenced relations between the two states (Craeybeckx 1990,

Coolsaet 1987). Coolsaet goes so far as to claim a very limited role for foreign policy, writing that in the relations between Belgium and Zaire "official diplomacy is limited to a few footnotes to decisions taken by the business community" (1987, 249, see also Doom

1990). Craeybeckx argument that Belgium "governed the colony, in the interests of certain 148

industrial and financial interests, in an autocratic-paternalistic manner, because of which it

was not at all prepared for independence" (1990, 352), corroborates this for an earlier

period.

That economic issues played a significant role in Belgian relations with Zaire both

before and after its independence in 1960 is not surprising, given Coolsaet’s observation that

Without the slightest doubt the promotion of industrial, commercial, and financial interests abroad is at the heart of Belgian foreign policy. Despite all sorts of changes in the international environment this has been a constant preoccupation ever since Belgium came into being, accepted by the entire political, industrial and labour union elite. (1987, 247)

Perhaps because of the significance of economic issues in its foreign affairs, Belgian relations with developing states and especially Zaire have exhibited the continuing influence of its

colonial heritage. Only in the last ten years there has been a concerted effort to draw away from the heavy reliance on Zaire. A paper published in 1984 by the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs stated that "[t]he Belgian Africa-policy would rest on two principles: it was to cover the entire continent of Africa and it was to permanently cast off its colonial character" (cited by Luykx and Platel 1985, 878). Such a new direction for policy was at least partially

indicated by the increasingly difficult relations with Zaire, which Van Dommele characterizes as marked by emotional ties and traumas instead of a realistic government policy (1982,

504), while Luykx and Platel describe the history of relations between the two states as troubled (1985).

Zaire played an important role in the economic recovery of Belgian economy after the second World War (Luykx and Platel 1985, 498), and it would be a misrepresentation to claim that the prominent place it has occupied until recently in the Belgian foreign assistance program is anything other than a reflection of that continued economic 149 significance. On balance, however, the economic importance of Zaire for the Belgian economy has decreased in the past twenty five years (Berlage 1984b) and in the 1980s Zaire has ceased to be the most important trade partner of Belgium in Africa (Vandommele 1982,

504). The government’s desire to diversify it policy towards Africa, including its development assistance, may thus have followed rather than led the changing focus of Belgian business interests. Only towards the end of the 1980s does the share of Zaire in Belgian foreign assistance drop. As late as 1987 it still received a minimum of twenty per cent of

Belgium’s total foreign aid (OECD various years).

Apart from business interests, Berlage argues that Zaire’s mineral resources make it important to the West as a whole, but that Belgium was assigned to safeguard those resources because of its traditional connection with this state:

Apparently the Western Alliance wants stability in this part of the world and Belgium is die traditional, though sometimes reluctant, agent to assure this stability. (Berlage 1984b, 9)

Although he does not specify the specific minerals that are found in Zaire, Coolsaet writes that Zaire is one of the few places where uranium is mined, linking Zaire’s significance to the development of nuclear power (1987,93). While this may not be altogether insignificant, it appears nevertheless that Belgium’s relations with Zaire have been influenced to a much greater extent by the interests of Belgian companies operating there. As the importance of their investments in Zaire has declined, so has the necessity to stay on good terms politically through a liberal foreign assistance program. 150

The Data

The Belgian parliamentary debates coded were all debates related to foreign assistance

identified through the use of annual indexes to the Official Parliamentary Reports of the

Chamber of Representatives. The annual debates on the budget for most years combine

foreign assistance with foreign trade and general foreign affairs in one debate. This

presented a problem in terms of equivalence with the debates used for the other two states:

whether foreign assistance is discussed on its own or in conjunction with these other topics

might influence how the debate is structured and which themes are focused on. The first three rows of Table 5.2 show the distribution of the prevalence of the various role categories

in debates that cover, respectively, development assistance only, debates that cover development assistance, foreign trade, and foreign affairs jointly, and a debate that covered

foreign trade only. Although the coding was guided by the speakers’ indication that they were now speaking on foreign assistance, a difference in the prevalence of various role categories can be noted. When development cooperation is debated separately, social engineer themes are the most frequently mentioned category and constitute 46 per cent, while merchant themes account for 31 per cent of the total of 78 references to themes associated with the four role conceptions. When the debate covers the various aspects of foreign affairs jointly, merchant themes occur more frequently, constituting 39 per cent, with social engineer themes 31 per cent of the total of 144 references (see Table 5.3 for percentages associated with budgetary debates). While there is little difference in emphasis on power broker themes for the two types of debates, about twenty per cent in each case, good neighbor themes receive more emphasis in debates that cover the various aspects of foreign affairs jointly. 151 Table 5.2.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR VARIOUS DEBATE TOPICS

ROLE CONCEPTION

TOPIC OF DEBATE Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

Budget for Development 1 36 24 17 78 Coopermdon

Budget for Foreign 14 45 56 29 144 Affiun

Budget for Foreign - 1 2 - 3 Tnde

Total Debates on Budget 17 82 82 46 225

Paiticÿalioa in - 3 2 3 8 Development Rank*

Farticÿation in 1 2 2 5 Intematiooal Orguuzations (odker than banks)

Humanitarian Aid 3 8 3 3 17

Aid and the Eccmomy - 1 5 - 6

TOTAL 19 96 92 54 261

Table 5.3.

RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR DEBATE ON BUDGET TOPICS

ROLE CONCEPTION

TOPIC OF DEBATE Good Neighbor Social Bigineer Merchant Power Broker Total

Budget for Develc^ment 1% 46% 31% 22% N= 78 Cooperation

Budget for Foreign 10% 31% 39% 20% N=144 Affaira

Budget for Foreign - 33% 67% - N= 3 Trade

Tc^ Debates on Budget 7% 36% 36% 20% N=225 152

The foreign trade debate provides very little evidence, although it corroborates the picture presented by the combined debates, which indicates that the fact that the discussion of development cooperation most years is combined with other foreign relations topics does affect the data obtained from them. This makes the data for Belgium qualitatively different from those for the Netherlands. While I consistently used debates on the budget for both states, the budget being discussed differs in its overall content. The fact that the emphasis shifts from social engineer themes for debates on only development cooperation to merchant themes for debates covering various foreign affairs topics is cause for caution regarding the interpretation of the data. The overall difference in emphasis between social engineer and merchant themes remains so small as to be inconclusive, but had development cooperation been debated separately more consistently, social engineer themes would have predominated if the pattern in the current data are any indication. That is, if the debates during which foreign assistance is discussed separately had made up the larger proportion of the debates addressing foreign assistance and if these debates had been similar in content to those used here covering development cooperation exclusively, the social engineer role conception would have occupied a more prominent place in the Belgian debate on foreign assistance.

However, such a counterfactual argument ignores the significance of the fact that the various foreign affairs topics so frequently are combined in Belgian parliamentary discussions. The consistent combination of these topics serves as an indication that Belgian decision makers do not conceive their role in the foreign assistance issue area as essentially separate from their economic and general foreign relations, but instead see the two as intertwined. This observation provides a significant insight into the Belgian debate on development cooperation. Nevertheless, the role conception framework that guides the 153 current study assumes foreign assistance to be a recognizable issue area to decision makers, even if it also holds that the boundaries separating one issue area from another are never neatly drawn. For the Belgian case, the boundaries between foreign assistance and other foreign affairs issues are particularly vague. The implication of the fact that Belgian decision makers are less likely to perceive a role for their state in this issue area that is to them separately conceived, is that their rhetoric is also less likely to fit neatly into role categories that assume such a perception.

Before going on to a detailed discussion of the data, however, it should to be noted that a significant proportion of the discussion on foreign assistance deals with the organizational structure of the Belgian aid bureaucracy, the Belgian Agency for Development

Cooperation (BADC), and more particularly issues that relate to the communitarian conflict.

This may take the form of a discussion on whether language parity exists among those employed within the BADC or among those sent overseas by it, whether Walloon universities tend to benefit disproportionally from Third world students acquiring an education in

Belgium, or, last but not least, arguments for and against splitting the BADC into two separate agencies, one representing each of the major language communities. These issues are of obvious concern to Belgian decision makers and may in part be responsible for the lack of a coherent vision regarding the Belgian role in the foreign assistance issue area.

Berlage, for instance, holds that issues surrounding the community conflict "have prevented the elaboration and implementation of a coherent cooperation policy" (1984b, 17). With regard to problems surrounding policy implementation he notes that "frictions along communal lines have been particularly strong" within the BADC (Berlage 1984b, 14). 154

Although Huyse (1987), in a review of US, Canadian, and English political science

scholarship on Belgian politics, charges that a number of authors' tend to dramatize the

communitarian conflict, it is difficult to avoid the sense that this issue shapes Belgian politics

to a very considerable degree. While it may go too far to state that this conflict is what

Belgian politics are all about, it does play an important role. If it does not define policy

issues, then it certainly contaminates them. With regard to the proposal to split the BADC

into two separate agencies representing each of the major language communities, Walloon

representative Ryckmans-Corin (PSC) comments that "[wjhat one calls ’communitarization’

is a dangerous attempt to export our domestic problems to abroad" (AP/PH 4 July 1979

pi 159). The Flemish Kempinaire (PW ), state secretary for development cooperation at the time, supports her point of view from the other side of the linguistic divide, arguing that a unified policy requires that the department is not divided into units representing the linguistic

communities (PH/AP 29 June 1987 pl983). These statements, however, represent a much

smaller portion of the debate than views that argue in favor of such a division.

In sum, the communitarian issue has certainly influenced both foreign assistance debate and policy. In addition, the incorporation of foreign trade into the ministry of foreign

affairs also hints at the large economic component of Belgian foreign relations. Foreign

assistance is not altogether separate from these concerns with the welfare of the Belgian

economy which relies so heavily on international trade for its welfare.

‘ Huyse cites Dunn, Fitzmaurice, Mughan. 155

The Overall Picture

Across all fifteen years, the evidence for the dominant presence of role conception in the speeches of Belgian members of parliament is inconclusive. The merchant role conception was hypothesized to dominate the Belgian foreign assistance debate, but the social engineer and merchant role conceptions both are referenced comparatively frequently.

Belgium was taken as a representative of a group of small states that spend relatively smaller proportions of their GNP on foreign assistance than the Scandinavian states and the

Netherlands with their extensive domestic welfare programs. The state’s heavy reliance on foreign trade generally and, additionally, its trade with Third world states as a colonial legacy, were hypothesized to result in the prevalence among Belgian decision makers of perceptions of their state’s role in the world in accordance with those posited for the merchant role conception.

On average, the social engineer role conception shows up slightly more often.

However, the difference between the two is small. Social engineer and merchant themes constitute, respectively, 36.8 per cent and 35.2 per cent of the total number of themes coded, as is shown in the bottom row of Table 5.4. Given that these percentages are based on a total of 261 coded themes only, the size of this difference does not allow a conclusive judgment that either of these two role conceptions clearly dominates the rhetoric of Belgian decision makers. As was elaborated above, the fact that the debate on the annual development cooperation budget is for most years combined with other foreign affairs issues is partially responsible for these results. The slight predominance of social engineer themes overall reported here is due to a higher incidence of such themes in debates other than those on the budget, as can be discerned from Table 5.2 above. If only the various budgetary 156

Table 5.4.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE PERIODS OF TENURE OF THE VARIOUS MINISTERS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Minuter Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total/Period

74/77 Reom^ Van Elslande 1 16 15 11 43 CVP 2.3% 37.2% 34.9% 25.6% 100%

77/79 Lucien Outers II 7 5 24 FDF 4.2% 45.8% 29.2% 2 0 .8 % 100%

79/80 Mark Eyskens 7 7 9 31 CVP 22.6 % 25.8% 22.6 % 29% 100%

80/81 l^iiel Coens 1 9 12 6 28 CVP 3.6% 32.1% 42.9% 21.4% 100%

81/83 Jacqueline May wee- 5 20 27 5 57 Goossens state seer. /PRL . 8 % 35.1% 47.4% 2.8% 10 0 %

83/85 Francois-Xavier 10 10 6 29 de Donnea state secr./PRL 10.3% 34.5% 34.5% 20.7% 100%

85/88 Andre Kempinaire 3 5 4 12 state secr./PW 0 % 25% 41.7% 33.3% 100%

88/91 Andre Geens 1 19 9 8 37 VU 2.7% 51.4% 24.3% 21.6 % 100%

TOTAL 19 96 92 54 261

7.3% 36.8% 35.2% 20.7% 100% 157

debates are considered, the small difference overall between the frequency of references to

social engineer and merchant themes disappears.

When the fifteen years are broken down into the periods in office of the various

ministers of development cooperation,^ the differences between references to social engineer

and merchant themes are, depending on the period, still small or somewhat more

pronounced. As can be discerned from Table 5.4, the numbers for all of the periods are so

small that it is difficult to attach conclusions to them. During the first period, the tenure of

Van Elslande as minister of both foreign affairs and development cooperation, the social

engineer and merchant role conception show up about equally strong. Under his successor.

Outers, a francophone nationalist, the social engineer role conception dominates the debate.

Under the tenure of Eyskens, the debate ranges across all four role conceptions about equally. During the periods of tenure of minister Coens and state secretary Mayence-

Goossens merchant themes do dominate the debate, but under state secretary De Donnea

social engineer and merchant themes again show up equally strongly. The evidence for the period during which Kempinaire was state secretary for development cooperation does not allow much interpretation, both because the amount of evidence is very small and because the difference between the three categories for which there is any evidence is small. It may be noted that the social engineer role conception is least in evidence during Kempinaire’s tenure, but with only a total of twelve themes coded for this period, the evidence remains very sketchy and does not allow sweeping conclusions. During the next period, during which

^ Although the periods of tenure of the ministers or state secretaries of development cooperation generally coincide with the periods of tenure for the various prime ministers, they do in four cases span more than one coalition. Please refer to Table 5.1 above for more detailed information. 158

Geens assumed the role of minister of development cooperation, there is a marked shift to the social engineer role which accounts for just over half of all themes coded for this period.

This last minister is a representative of the Flemish Volksunie (VU), which is of interest because the two periods with the clearest emphasis on the social engineer role conception are those during which a nationalist of either community held the post of minister of development cooperation. While Outers and Geens represent Walloon and Flemish nationalism, respectively, the periods of their ministership share a focus on social engineer themes in common. While the reasons for this are mere speculation, it would appear that their concern with the advancement of their community domestically translates into rhetoric that focuses on greater equity for third world peoples as well.

These differences across administrations prompt Demeester-de Meyer (CVP) to state that while policy need not be fixed one and for all, policy changes ought to be related to the object of policy:

It must of course be possible for the attitude of Belgium with respect to a developing country to change in relation to change which occurs in the policy of a developing country. However, the attitude of Belgium cannot change arbitrarily with the change of a minister in our own country. (PH/AP 4 July 1979 pll58)

The implication of her observation is that there is a lack of direction in Belgian foreign assistance policy.

If instead of the references to themes associated with the various role conceptions overall, only those referring to desired policy are considered, the tenures of Outers and

Geens remain the period during which social engineer themes are stressed most clearly, as

Table 5.5 shows. However, if only such references are considered, the social engineer role is referenced most frequently for six of the eight periods. Of the remaining two, power 159

Table 5.5.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO DESIRED POLICY FOR THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE PERIODS OF TENURE OF THE VARIOUS MINISTERS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Minister Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total/Period

74/77 Reoaat Van Elslaode 11 9 28 CVP 39.3% 32.1% 28.6% 100%

77/79 Lucien Outers 10 3 3 17 PDF 5.9% 58.8% 17.6% 17.6% 100%

79/80 Mark Eyakens 6 6 9 28 CVP 25% 21.4% 21.4% 32.1% 100%

80/81 Daniel Coens 1 9 7 5 22 CVP 4.5% 40.9% 31.8% 22.7% 100%

81 /83 Jacqueline Mayence» 4 18 16 4 42 Gooesens state secr./PRL 9.5% 42.9% 38.1% 9.5% 100%

83/85 Francois-Xavier 3 4 15 de Donnea state secr./PRL 53.3% 2 0 % 26.7% 100%

85/88 Andre Kempinaire 3 3 2 state secr./PW 37.5% 37.5% 25% 100%

88/91 Andre Geens 1 17 4 4 26 VU 3.8% 65.4% 15.4% 15.4% 100%

TOTAL 14 82 51 39 186

7.5% 44.1% 27.4% 2 1 % 100% 160 broker themes are referred to most often during the period Eyskens served as minister of development cooperation, while the period during which Kempinaire functioned as state secretary shows an equal number of references to social engineer and merchant themes. This change in emphasis when only references to desired policy are considered indicates that a larger proportion of the references to merchant themes refer to undesirable and/or current policy. Such statements often focus on perceived problems with the current state of affairs, as for example the statement by Volksunie (VU) representative Caudron, whose party was in the opposition at the time, that

At this moment our development cooperation drags along a whole string of wrongheaded projects that often cmne about under pressure of all kinds of lobbies, both industrial and otherwise. (PH/AP 29 June 1987 pl974)

This same issue was addressed ten years earlier by a member of the francophone socialist party (PS), Petry, who referred also from the opposition benches to a government statement made at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi as

glaring evidence that the politics of our country are in the service of large private economic interests and not the needs of the populations, whether these populations belong to the Third world or the industralized countries. AP/PH 8 June 1976 p3866

Apart from a preoccupation with the current influence of trade and industry on the sh ^ e of foreign assistance policy, there is the concern that return to the Belgian economy should not become an overriding determinant of aid policy. Flemish socialist (SP) representative Vanvelthoven cautions that

development cooperation should in first instance remain development cooperation and should not degenerate into an egoistic striving for an ever greater flow back to promote domestic production, employment and export. (PH/AP 7 July 1981 p2801)

The combined flemish and francophone socialist parties have been part of governing coalitions during four of the eight periods and the Volksunie during only two of the eight. 161

While Vanvelthoven’s statement dates from a period when his party was a coalition member, the representatives cited here might be more inclined to be critical of established policies because they infrequently have their chance to make their mark. However, even representatives of the Christian People’s Party (CVP), which together with its francophone counterpart takes part in every coalition government during the period under study echo the sentiments expressed by representives like Vanvelthoven. Diegenant, for instance, states that his party "would regret it if a too marked shift of our development cooperation should render our development cooperation more a development trade than a development aid" (PH/AP 17

May 1978 p.2056). On the other hand, there are many representatives of various parties who see nothing wrong with a strategy of benefitting the Belgian economy through its foreign aid program. The manner in which this issue is discussed in the Belgian parliament will be explored further in the section on evidence for the merchant role conception below. The greater proportion of critical statements regarding the merchant role conception, as compared to statements regarding the social engineer role conception, implies a dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs regarding Belgian foreign assistance. As the statements cited here indicate, this dissatisfaction concerns the influence of interest groups as much as it concerns criticism of the focus on short term economic interests. These two issues may not be entirely separate, but may both evidence a lack of vision with regard to the role Belgium should play in the foreign assistance issue area. As there is some indication that there is no strong conception of this as a separate issue area among decision makers, this will come as no surprise. This lack of a strong or coherent conception of Belgium’s role in this issue area may be responsible for Berlage’s observation that 162

there was an increasing ambiguity in official statements. Basic needs, self-reliance etc. and economic activity and employment within Belgium were all put forward as policy objectives. (1984b, 14)

This lack of and resistance to developing such a coherent vision speaks from an interaction between a member of parliament and the minister for development cooperation of that time period, Geens. Van der Sande (SP), referring to the Dutch report A World of Difference in which minister Pronk outlines a framework for development cooperation policy for the

1990s, sees a need for Belgium to create its own policy plan, stating that "we would again like to press the Minister to, following the Dutch example of Minister Pronk, create a general policy plan for the nineties" (PH/AP 7 November 1990, p376). Minister Geens responds that such a policy plan is not a very useful exercise, although he declares himself

prepared to draft it. Indeed, it will not require too much effort, but to do what with? I have read the policy plan of Mr. Pronk, too. Despite my appreciation for his policy plan and tiie contents of it, I ask what to do wiüi it. ... It is an interesting document about development cooperation, but questions arise regarding the efficiency of the policy approach of it, other than as a frame of reference for the future. I am prepared to draft such a plan, on the condition that Parliament will discuss it in all its details and desires to turn it into a serious matter, otherwise it will all be dead letter. (PH/AP 7 November 1990, p383)

The statement is revealing in its cynicism about the parliamentary support for the development of a coherent foreign assistance policy. As it turned out, Geens never completed any such plan as he was replaced before he could do so. But more than the length of any minister or state secretary’s tenure, the structure within which these individuals find themselves makes it difficult to leave a definite stamp on policy in this domain.

The frequency of references to the various role conceptions for the individual ministers or state secretaries for the various periods displayed in Table 5.6, show that the various ministers seldom exhibit a strong preference for a particular role conception. While the amount of data for each minister or state secretary for development cooperation is very 163 Table 5.6.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Miniiter Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total/Period

74/77 Reaaat Van Eblande 2 2 4 CVP

77/79 Lucien Outers PDF

79/80 Mark Eyskens CVP

80/81 Daniel Coens CVP

81/83 Jacqueline Mayence» Goosscns state secr./PRL

83/85 Fnncots-Xavier de Donnea state secr./PRL

85/88 Andre Kempinaire state secr./PW

88/91 Andre Geens VU 164 small, the distribution across the role categories is generally fairly flat. Except for Mayence-

Goossens, who stresses merchant themes, none of the officials show a distinct emphasis on a particular role conception. Of the various ministers, three represented the Christian

People’s Party or CVP (Van Elslande, Eyskens, and Coens) and three the liberal PRL or its

Flemish counterpart, the PW (Mayence-Goossens, De Donnea, and Kempinaire). No consistency in role conception emphasis can be found among either the first three or the latter three. Although, as already pointed out, the amount of data is too small to attach any firm conclusions to these results, the fact that officials belonging to the same party exhibit so little consistency would seem to indicate a lack of a clear role conception at the party leadership level.

A look at the coalition partners for each period, however, not only enlarges the N but also creates the impression that the leadership of a particular period may have some impact.

Again, the distribution across the various role categories is fairly flat for most periods.

Nevertheless, for three out of the four coalitions in which the socialists (SP/PS) took part the social engineer role conception was referenced slightly more often, while for three out of four coalitions in which the liberals (PW/PRL) were involved the merchant role was mentioned more often. For the one period for which this is not the case for coalition containing the liberals, there is an even split between references to social engineer and power broker themes. These frequencies are shown in Table 5.7. It needs to be emphasized that these figures are too small to attach firm conclusions, especially since the distributions are fairly flat. 165

Table 5.7.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE COALITION PARTIES FOR EACH PERIOD.

ROLE CONCEPTION

P ç^ Coalition Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total/Period

74/77 CVP/PSC, 6 8 22 PW/PRL

77/79 CVP/PSC, 19 BSP/PSB, YU, PDF

79/80 CVP/PSC, 21 (B)SP/PS(B), [PDF (*tü 15-01.80)1, [PW/PRL (from 18-05-80)1

80/81 CVP/PSC, 20 SP/PS

81/83 CVP/PSC, 32 PW/PRL

83/85 CVP/PSC, PW/PRL

85/88 CVP/PSC, PW/PRL

88/91 CVP/PSC. 28 PS/SP VU n = no themes coded for this party during this period 166

The language communities participate in the development cooperation debate in proportions roughly equal to their relative size in the general population, a point that is easily overlooked. Some debates on foreign assistance are mostly or entirely in Dutch, giving the

impression that the Flemish pay more attention to this subject matter. In addition, some

speakers make comments like VU representative Maes, who comments regarding the attendance at a debate on development cooperation that "apparently only the Flemish who concern themselves with development cooperation or are concerned about it these days"

(PH/AP 29 June 1987, pl980). The frequencies of participation in the debate by representatives of the two language communities do not bear this out. Bilingual speakers, generally government officials, provide close to ten percent of the coded themes. Of the remaining 90 percent, 58 per cent is provided by Dutch speakers and 32 per cent by French speakers.^ There is, however, a difference between representatives of Flemish and Walloon parties in terms of the relative emphasis on the various role conceptions, as can be observed from the totals for the Flemish and Walloon parties presented in Table 5.8. Representatives of four out of five Flemish parties tend to focus on the social engineer role, which accounts for 40 per cent of all themes coded for representatives of Flemish parties. For the

Francophone parties, the differences between the social engineer, merchant, and power

^ According to the Eurooa World Yearbook 1991. the Belgian population can be divided into 57% Dutch speaking, 42% French speaking, and .6% German speaking. The Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1992 reports 57% Dutch speakers, 33% French speakers, .7% German speakers, and includes Brussels as a separate, legally bilingual, category constituting 9.3% of the population. None of the representatives spoke in German in the parliamentary debates I used. The bilingual category in my data does not coincide with that of the second yearbook cited here, but instead notes those speakers who use both languages in the particular speech coded. Hence, these decision makers are generally representatives of one or the other community, who use both languages generally because they are government officials communicating across language communities. 167

Table 5.8.

DIFFERENCES IN FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR FLEMISH AND WALLOON PARTIES.

ROLE CONCEPTiON

Political Party Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

Flemiah Parties Eouivalent*

Agakv Ecok) 4 1 1 6

BCP FOB - --•

CVP PSC 3 28 21 10 62

PW PRL 1 2 11 8 22

SP PS 1 16 11 5 33 vu - 4 18 16 9 47

TOTAL FLEMISH PARTIES 9 68 60 33 170

5% 40% 35% 19% 100%

Walloon Parties Eouivalent*

Ecolo Agalev - 3 1 - 4

PDF - - 6 6 2 14

PCB BCP 2 - -- 2

PS SP 3 7 7 8 25

PSC CVP 2 9 8 6 25

PRL (incl PLP) PW 3 3 10 5 21

TOTAL WALLOON PARTIES 10 28 32 21 91

11% 31% 35% 23% 100%

*Equivalcct party of the other language community. 168 broker themes are generally less pronounced, although the merchant theme is stressed more overall.

This overall pattern of difference between the two language communities disappears for most pairings, however, if one considers equivalent parties of the two language communities. Representatives of the CVP and PSC both mention social engineer themes more frequently than any other category. The Flemish and Walloon green parties (Agalev and Ecolo) both stress social engineer themes as well, while members of the P W and PRL both favor merchant themes. However, the Flemish SP and its Francophone counterpart, the

PS, do not share a similar role conception: while representatives of the SP stress the social engineer role conception in their parliamentary speeches, the PS does not seem to have a clear preference for social engineer, merchant, or power broker themes, which are each referred to about equally.

Evidence for the Good Neighbor Role Conception

The good neighbor role conception does not get much emphasis in Belgian debates on foreign assistance. Just 19 references are made to themes associated with this role conception, which constitutes 7.3 per cent out of a total of 261 coded themes. The emphasis among good neighbor themes is on relief efforts such as food aid to relieve hunger. Aid of this type if best characterized as charity, which is the heading under which the frequency of reference to this theme is presented in Table 5.9. This is also how Belgian decision makers themselves perceive such aid, as may be evidenced by Van Elewyck’s (SP) observation that

"[flood aid, understood as emergency aid is necessary to save large population groups from 169

Table 5.9.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO GOOD NEIGHBOR THEMES

GOOD NEIGHBOR THEMES

Period Educ/Mofal Charity Total

74/77 Reoaat Van Ebiaode 1 1 CVP

77/79 Lucien OutefB 1 PDF

79/80 Mark Eyakeoa CVP

80/81 Daniel Coens CVP

81/83 Jacqueline Mayenco* Gooaseos state secr./PRL

83/85 Francots-Xavier de Donnea state secr./PRL

85/88 Andre Kempinaire state secr./PW

88/91 Andre Geens VU

19 170 starvation" (PH/AP 16 March 1983, pl747). The necessity to incorporate such a component in the aid program is underlined by other representatives of both the Flemish and Walloon language communities, although it is understood that "our development cooperation cannot be solely charitable" as is stressed by Mayence-Goossens during her tenure as state secretary for development cooperation (PH/AP 23 April 1982 pl428).

An interesting observation regarding the imperative to provide emergency assistance is made by Volksunie representative Kuijpers. He asks a ’what if question to illustrate the burdens refugee populations place on their host communities and concludes that aid may serve to lessen that burden:

We would like to argue in favor of giving them all that they need... Just image for a moment that next to a Flemish village community a camp is placed with 8000 units, what tensions this would create with regard to provisioning and care giving. Those circumstances are plentiful along the Honduran-Salvadoran border. We absolutely have to do something about that. (PH/AP 22 April 1982 pl391)

On the whole, however, good neighbor themes do not occupy a very prominent place in the

Belgian foreign assistance debate.

Evidence for the Social Engineer Role Conception

Of the various themes that provide evidence for a social engineer role conception, the

Belgian decision makers most frequently stress the need to transform international structures and a concern with the stability of the current international system. Given the preoccupation with economic the economic welfare of Belgium which seems to characterize the foreign affairs of this state (Coolsaet 1987), the references to this theme may need to be interpreted as a complement to the references to merchant themes rather than in isolation from these.

The emphasis on this one theme of the various themes associated with the social engineer role 171 conception is quite strong, as can be observed from the totals shown at the bottom of Table

5.10. Overall, 41 of 96 social engineer themes fall into this category, and for six of the eight periods this theme is the one tiiat is referred to most frequently. For the most recent of the two periods for which this theme is not the most frequently referenced category, the tenure of Kempinaire as state secretary for development cooperation, very little data are available. Only three references were made to social engineer themes, one of which addressed the issue of stability of the international environment. With so little data, nothing more can be said than that the social engineer role conception was not very salient during this time period. In addition, the period Eyskens served as minister of development cooperation shows no particular preference for a theme within the social engineer role conception. References are made to a number of themes during this period, but none is stressed markedly more than any other.

With these noted exceptions, the need to create a more stable international structure is emphasized across time. The fact that Belgium has an open economy and depends heavily for its economic well being on international trade may explain this concern with the international structure as a theme within the social engineer role conception, although the same does not hold true for the Netherlands, which has an equally open economy. It may be that references to more abstract international structural issues are more easily sprinkled

into the debate by decision makers who have no clear vision of how their state should

actually go about playing a role in bringing such a transformation about. Indeed, references made to this theme by Belgian decision makers generally are phrased in abstract language.

They argue that the peaceful transformation of the international system is important, that such Table 5.10.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO SOCIAL ENGINEER THEMES

SOCIAL ENGINEER THEMES

Period Minuter Stability Environm. Po p . Soc.Just. Poverty Hum. Right Empower. NGO Agric. Women Coord. Total lA m Renaat Van Elslande 10 - 1 2 - - 3 - 16 CVP

77/79 Lucien Outers 1 1 II PDF

79/80 Mark Eyskeiu CVP

80/81 Daniel Coens CVP

81/83 Jacqueline Mayence- 20 Goossens state secr./PRL

83/85 Franco is-Xavier 10 de Donnea state secr./PRL

85/88 Andre Kempinaire state secr./PW

88/91 Andre Geens 19 VU

41 10 10 16 id 173

a goal should guide Belgian policy, but rarely put forward concrete proposals in relation to such a goal.

A decade prior to the end of the Cold War, Coens (CVP), as minister of development cooperation, comments that

We must be well aware that in fact the North-South contrast is perh^s more fundamental than the East-West contrast. ... This [the fact that many live on less per year than Belgians make per week] is an untenable situation and it in fact constitutes the largest threat to world peace. (PH/AP 19 November 1980 p304)

The francophone Outers (PDF) concurs with the observation that "we live in a crucial period of the history of humanity," which renders it incumbent on the government to "establish new equilibria between the nations that have and those that don’t" (AP/PH 7 July 1981 p2773).

In addition, minister of foreign affairs Nothomb (PSC) draws a parallel with the domestic struggles for greater social equity that led to welfare programs and the like:

In a sense, North-South relations transpose social tensions to a planetary scale, and we should not forget the big lesson of the social struggles of last century: the road of generosity is also one of good sense and the route of sharing wealth is also the one of economic growth. This is much more promising of stability than caution or a sterile conservatism. (AP/PH 19 November 1980 p287)

Nothomb thus perceives social stability, whether domestically or on a larger mundial scale, as contingent upon greater equity among the individuals of nations that constitute that society.

He is not alone in that opinion, as the Flemish Steverlynck (CVP) also expresses the view that it is in Belgium’s long term self-interest to play its part in building a more stable international order:

In the concert of the countries of the world it is true that Belgium is small but certainly not unimportant. For our state international trade, and definitely export, are of vital importance for our employment and prosperity. Yet we also have a duty to cooperate for a new economic world order. Indeed, it is in our own interest. (PH/AP 29-2-84 p i899) 174

This focus on development cooperation as an instrument to enhance Belgium’s long term

security is not limited to representatives of the Walloon and Flemish Christian democrat

parties, but is also expressed by the francophone green party. Daras (Ecolo) argues that:

It is essential that we let go of the logic of short term interest in development cooperation. The true interest should aim at fighting extreme poverty, not only for moral reasons but also because in doing so, we will reduce tensions on a world scale and, as a result, we will enhance our own security. (AP/PH 12-3-84, pl995)

The observation that a stable international environment is in Belgium’s long term interest is

thus expressed by representatives of both language communities and not limited to a

particular political ideology, but all who address the issue do so at an abstract level. When

policy makers occasionally argue with greater specificity, the attitude that emanates from

their words is a lack of respect for the human dignity of the Third world citizen. Statements

such as the following recall attitudes prevalent in an earlier era:

Yet it is this entrepreneurial spirit which must be cultivated. The poor [human] is resigned in his fate. He must resist it. The attempts of those who desire to escape it are like drops of water on a hot surface, they evaporate quickly! Those daring ones ought to be aided. ... To every rural development or to every industrialization, objectives that must be pursued, an educative program must precede or be attached. The education must give the people the desire to do something about it themselves, to give insight into possibilities and to trust in a better future. (Steverlynck (CVP) PH/AP 4-7-79 p lllS )

While Steverlynck (CVP) addresses the empowerment of people in the recipient state, his phraseology displays a moralism thoroughly rooted in Western views of the world and

lacking in understanding of the social and cultural dynamics of the societies he talks about.

This sort of attitude toward third world peoples is expressed by other decision makers as well and appears quite acceptable within the Belgian debate on foreign assistance.

If the debates which cover only foreign assistance are compared with the more all- inclusive foreign affairs debates, the concern with the long term stability of the international 175 environment is stressed in both types of debates. In other words, even if the social engineer role conception has a relatively stronger presence in such debates, the content of the references is not significantly different.

Evidence for the Merchant Role Conception

As Table 5.11 shows, the desire to benefit the Belgian economy while providing development assistance is a major concern decision makers express in their speeches in parliament when they address themes associated with the merchant role conception. Overall, close to two-thirds of the coded themes related to the merchant role conception fall into this category. Out of a total of 92 references to merchant themes, sixty express a desire to benefit the Belgian economy through the foreign assistance program. This is also the most frequently mentioned theme for all but one of the ministerial periods. During Kempinaire’s tenure, privatization of aid is stressed instead. In addition, during Eyskens’ term as minister of development cooperation, the principle of free trade is stressed almost as much as mutual benefit. Since the difference between the two categories is only one observation out of a total of seven, the evidence for the Eyskens ministry can certainly not be called conclusive.

During the tenure of Mayence-Goossens (PRL) as state secretary this theme is most clearly in evidence, partially as a result of her own conviction that Belgian aid should serve the Belgian economy in addition to its development purpose. She states, for instance, that the driving force behind her policy is to "know how to aid the Third world while simultaneously stimulating the Belgian economy" (AP/PH 26 October 1982 plSl). Earlier she had been somewhat more circumspect, saying that Table 5.11.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO MERCHANT THEMES

MERCHANT THEMES

Period Mmister liberal Order Free trade Growth Mutual benefit Privatoation Total

74/77 Reiuat Van Eblande 3 6 2 15 CVP

77/79 Lucien Outers PDF

79/80 Mark Eyskens CVP

80/81 Darnel Coens 12 CVP

81/83 Jacqueline Mayence- 24 27 Goossens state secr./PRL 83/85 Francob-Xftvier de Donnea state secr./PRL

85/88 Andre Kempinaire state secr./PW

Andre Geens VU

TOTAL 60 10 92 177

I agree that our cooperation must be selective and must benefit especially the needs of those who suffer. ... It must not be an extension of international trade, I emphasize this. But it is no less important ... to come to a better integration of development cooperation and foreign trade. One must take care that our economy in crisis receives a just return, if possible. (PH/AP 23 April 1982 pl426)

During the same debate, the minister of foreign affairs of that period, Tindemans (CVP), calls this approach to development cooperation "a pragmatic and realistic as opposed to an ethical and humanitarian policy" (AP/PH 23 April 1982, pl425). This sentiment is not limited to the period Mayence-Goossens was in charge of development cooperation, as

Ryckmans-Corin (PSC) a few years earlier equated the desire to benefit the donor with interdependence: "The economic effects of development cooperation cannot be denied and are not scandalous. That’s interdependence." (AP/PH 19 November 1980 p304). In a debate about Belgian participation in the interamerican development bank. De Clerq, minister of finance (PW ), states very plainly that participation in such an institution serves to "facilitate the penetration of our industrial enterprises into the Latin American market" (AP/PH 29 June

1976 p4326).

Such open and often blatant statements of the need to make aid work for the Belgian economy are made equally by both representatives of the Flemish and Walloon language communities. Eventhough the cumulative pattern does not show this role and its associated themes to be dominant, according to Franck (1987, 65) the relation between development cooperation and trade is more and more articulated and admitted. At the time he wrote, this was true, but subsequently under Geens as minister of development cooperation, there has been a pronounced shift toward social engineer themes (see Table 5.4 above). Since the succession of ministers has also resulted in a succession of different role conceptions being referenced more frequently over time, it is not possible to judge from these data whether this 178

Table 5.12.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO POWER BROKER THEMES

POWER BROKER THEMES

Period Miniiiter Intcfcrt Reap. Friendiv DcmocTBCv Infl.Re^. ParticîP.IO Infi.Donor Totai

74/77 Reoaat Van Eblande - - 1 - - 10 11 CVP

77/79 Lucien Outen 1 1 - -12-5 PDF

79/80 Marie Eyakeas 4---3119 CVP

80/81 Daniel Cocoa 1---2216 CVP

81/83 Jacqueline Mayence* 1 - - 1-215 Gooaaena state aecr./FRL 83/85 Fnuicois-Xavicr 1---23-6 de Donnea state aecr./PRL 85/88 Andre Kempinaire 4 - 4 state aecr./PW

88/91 Andre Geens 15-1-1-8 VU

TOTAL 9 6 1 2 8 25 3 54 179 shift is idiosyncratic to the Geens ministry, or whether there is a more enduring shift towards a social engineer role conception or a perception that the longer term interests of the Belgian should figure more prominently in its policies.

If a comparison is made of debates in which development cooperation is discussed alone, versus those that include foreign trade and foreign relations, the mutual benefit theme is the most frequently mentioned in each type of debate. In other words, there is no significant difference between these two types of debate.

Evidence for the Power Broker Role Conception

Among the themes coded in association with the power broker role conception, the

Belgian decision makers speak most frequently of their participation in international organizations. As is evidenced by the totals shown at the bottom of Table 5.12, close to half of the references to power broker themes concern Belgium’s role in international organizations. However, if the data are considered for the periods of tenure of the various ministers and state secretaries for development cooperation, this theme is not emphasized equally over time. Specifically, during the tenure of Eyskens and Geens, the Belgian participation is stressed less than some other themes. During Eyskens’ tenure, the focus is on defending the Belgian interest in the third world and influencing the politics of the recipient state. Comet d’Elzius (PRL), for example, prefers bilateral aid because it allows more direct control than multilateral aid (AP/PH 4 July 1979 pi 115). He apparently sees foreign assistance very clearly in classical realist terms. With regard to

Belgium’s relations with its former colony Zaire he argues that

it suits to, under certain circumstances, impose ones will and 1 insist on it, certainly when one is the donor and has all the reasons for doing so at ones disposal. 180

Allow me, Minister, while on the subject, to recall the words of Thucydides who said that ’it is in human nature to command those who give in.’ (AP/PH 19 November 1980 p311/

Although Comet d’Elzius expresses himself in terms of power politics, economic interests play an important role in the continued significance of Zaire to Belgium. Foreign minister

Tindemans (CVP) is very clear that there "are undeniably also economic interests. Our supply of raw materials should not be Jeopardized unnecessarily or lightly. I don’t hesitate to say this" (PH/AP 27 October 1982 p210).

Under Geens, the discussion shifts toward a sense of responsibility to the recipient state. Furthermore, during the period Coens was in office, attempts to influence recipient states are spoken of as often as the Belgian participation in international organizations, but with very few data spread fairly evenly across the various categories the evidence for this time period does not allow any conclusions.

The participation in 10 theme is brought up most frequently of the various power broker themes both in debates that cover foreign assistance only and those that cover foreign trade and relations as well.

Assessment of the Evidence

Although at first glance the fact that the social engineer and merchant role conception are referenced about equally frequently may be explained by Berlage’s pronouncement that

"[t]he possibility of contradictions between the objectives of helping the poor and stimulating the Belgian economy has been denied" (1984b, 16), a closer investigation of the themes

In addition to this quote, Cornet d’Elzius cites this same line from Thucydides during debates held on 17 May 1978, 4 April 1979, and 22 April 1982. 1 8 1 focused on within each of these role conceptions reveals that aiding the poor plays a secondary role to Belgian decision makers. The themes stressed within the merchant role conception display what these decision makers perceive to be a pragmatic attitude about the need to secure the welfare of the Belgian economy. The focus on the longer term stability of the international environment within the social engineer role conception, rather than contesting such a preoccupation with economic issues, confirms it. The main point of confusion for Belgian decision makers seems to be the need to secure immediate payoffs for their economy, while they also realize that they cannot ignore the tensions within the international system as these may threaten their ability in the longer term to continue to secure the necessary benefits for the Belgian economy. While these perceptions do not fit neatly into the four posited roles, they do fit logically together.

Previous authors have argued that of all bilateral foreign relations, foreign trade and development cooperation are most subject to pressure groups and that these groups are in a position to influence policy because of a lack of leadership that gives policy direction (Franck

1987, 83, Serlon 1985, 530, 538). The foreign assistance debates, however, indicate that it may not be a lack of leadership, but a leadership that coincides with the interests of the

Belgian economy. The perception expressed by CVP representative Steverlynck may describe a more generally held conception of the role the government should play regarding foreign affairs generally:

The government has as its first duty to create a generally favorable economic climate, also in foreign relations. It is the government that enters into trade treaties, and participates in all kinds of international meetings for the benefit of international trade. (PH/AP 29-2-84 pi 899)

Steverlynck's argument supports the notion that economic issues dominate the foreign policy agenda of Belgium. The joint occurrence of the mutual benefit and stability of the 182 international environment themes may not fit neatly into the hypothesized role conceptions, since these themes are associated with, respectively, the merchant and social engineer roles.

However, both role conceptions share a focus on economic issues. The fact that the expressions related to the social engineer role conception are phrased in fairly abstract terms may indicate that Belgian decision makers are concerned about the longer term future of their international economic relations, but not sure how to affect that environment in ways that ensure that desired stability for them.

In addition, the fact that the discussion on development cooperation is often held jointly with that on foreign trade and foreign affairs generally, indicates that securing

Belgium’s economic interests extends into the issue area of foreign assistance as well. Put differently, foreign aid may not be perceived as a wholly separate and distinct subject matter by the Belgian decision makers.

Congruence with Policv Behavior

It was hypothesized that the merchant role conception would exhibit itself in an emphasis on the Bretton Woods institutions in the multilateral domain. The data for Belgium bear this out as the World Bank Group and regional banks generally receive a greater share of its multilateral aid than UN agencies. However, the EC receives an even greater share of Belgian aid on average, although there are great fluctuations across the years. Across the period under study, the EC receives an average of 43 per cent of Belgian multilateral assistance, while the international banks receive an average of 36 per cent. Both are a greater focus than the UN agencies, which on average receive about 16 per cent of Belgian Table 5.13.

BELGIUM: MULTILATERAL EXPENDITURES

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 198Q 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

UN Agencies 14 22 29 24 19 10 23 16 17 12 11 5 18 16 4 20 (»of multilateral)

EEC 41 45 50 16 41 64 45 40 43 43 44 46 38 72 32 35 (%of multilateral)

World 45 28 14 58 28 8 30 42 33 42 42 48 39 12 64 41 Bank Group* and Regional Banks

Other 12 18

Multi­ 126 111 109 226 198 139 206 206 181 183 165 187 259 185 347 342 lateral ODA ($ million)

* Includes capital subscription payments to IBRD, IFC, IDA

Source: Calculated from net disbursements figures given in reference tables of OECD, various years. Development Co-Operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. Paris: OECD.

82 Table 5.14.

BELGIUM: GRANT PERCENTAGE OF BILATERAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Gnntaand 87 89 84 90 79 78 80 82 81 82 87 80 89 88 90 95 grant like contributions (%of bilateral)

Bilateral ODA 252 229 262 310 445 455 369 293 298 263 275 359 428 415 356 548 ($ million)

Source: Calculated from net disbursements figures given in reference tables of OECD, various years, Development Co-Oneratlon: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistant Committee. Paris: OECD.

% 185 multilateral foreign assistance funds. As Table 5.13 shows, the expenditures on these various types of organizations vary across the years. The extensive focus on the EC can be interpreted to coincide with the focus on economic issues in the rhetoric of Belgian decision makers, while the greater share of financial attention paid to the international lending institutions wouid also support this assessment.

The hypothesized policy behavior also outlined a greater focus on loans versus grants.

The grants percentage of Belgian biiateral aid is fairly high, as can be discerned from Table

5.14. However, Belgian decision makers seen to favor tied aid generally, although the g ^ between tied and untied foreign assistance narrows in second half of eighties. In contrast to the Dutch case,

Belgian decision makers make hardly any use of partially tied aid (see Table 5.15).

In agreement with the perception expressed by Cornet d’Elzius above that biiateral aid allows a greater control on the part of the donor country, Belgian foreign assistance has favored bilateral over multilateral expenditures (Table 5.16). Presumably, such control extends to the potential use of foreign assistance in the service of trade relations.

Conclusions

The rhetoric of Belgian decision makers at first glance appears inconclusive, although the themes stressed within the roie conceptions lead to the conclusion that economic concerns strongly influence the thinking of Belgian decision makers regarding foreign policy in general and development cooperation as an issue within this larger domain. There is some indication that development cooperation is not generally perceived as an issue area that stands totally independent from Belgian foreign economic policy, as it is generally debated together with Table 5.15.

BELGIUM: TYING STATUS OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Tied aid* 74 73 24 71 77 74 67 57 57 (% of bilateral)

Paitially tied aid** (%of bilateral)

Untied 26 27 76 29 23 26 33 43 43 aid*** (%of bilateral)

* Mainly tied to procurement in the donor country. ** Contributiona available for procurement from donor and aubstantially all developing countries. *•* Fully and freely available for essentially world-wide procurement.

Source: Calculated from tying status figures (commitments) in OECD, various years, Development Co-Operation; Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Cwnmhtee. Paris: OECD. Table 5.16.

BELGIUM; RELATIVE EMPHASIS ON BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1975 1976 3977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 19(8 1989 1990

Bilateral 67 67 71 58 69 77 64 59 62 59 63 66 62 6<> 51 62 {% of total)

Multilateral 33 33 29 42 31 23 41 37 34 38 49 38 (% of total)

Total ODA 536 595 575 547 889 ($ million)

Source: Calculated from net dbbursements figures given in reference tables of OECD, various years, Development Co-Operation; Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Amistance Committee. Paris: OECD.

S3 188 foreign trade and foreign affairs. Although some representatives argue that development cooperation should not stand in the service of Belgian economic interests, on the whole this connection is not something Belgian decision makers feel a need to apologize for.

This lack of a conception of a separate issue area may account for difficult fit between the data and the hypothesized role conceptions. The themes stressed most frequently support the notion that the economic well being of Belgium is a definite concern. The desire to benefit the domestic economy through its foreign assistance shows this clearly. The secondary focus on the longer term stability of the international environment is a preoccupation that supports the notion that Belgian decision makers are well aware that their economy is open and vulnerable to events beyond their borders. CHAPTER VI

UNITED KINGDOM

Introduction

Leadership and responsibility are two words that show up time and again in the

British debate on foreign assistance. The first refers to a desire to lead other donor states

in aid efforts and to shape international policy towards the Third World, frequently through

international organizations. The latter refers to an attitude towards the developing world and,

more specifically. Commonwealth nations and former colonies, that appears to motivate the

desire to maintain influence in those parts of the world. The usage of such terminology in

speeches on foreign assistance is partially responsible for the conclusion that British decision

makers are indeed guided by a power broker conception of their state’s role in the world.

This is the role conception that was hypothsized to significantly influence British decision

makers on the basis that they represent a larger power with a colonial history and sphere of

influence concerns that derive from that history.

This chapter starts with a brief introduction of the role of British ministers of overseas

development within their government and the changes in status of their department. The

chapter will briefly discuss the historical context of Britain as an imperial power to provide background to the current debate on foreign assistance. The chapter will then proceed to a discussion of empirical evidence regarding decision maker rhetoric and foreign assistance

189 190 policy behavior. Finally, the evidence for both rhetoric and behavior will be assessed in light of the hypothesized prevalence of the power broker role conception among British decision makers.

Ministers of Overseas Development and their Role

For most of the period under study the minister of overseas development did not enjoy cabinet level status. The exception is the short period during which Prentice filled the position under Callaghan’s prime ministership. Whether or not the minister of overseas development is part of the cabinet , is at the discretion of the prime minister, who also determines which administrative departments exist and what functions they are assigned (King

1991). With the arrival of Thatcher as prime minister in 1979 the Ministry of Overseas

Development (ODM) was dissolved as an independent unit and replaced by the Overseas

Development Administration (ODA) which is part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Hewitt and Sutton write that the downgrading of this ministry was not unexpected, as it had a history of changing status with shifts between Labour and Conservative governments (1980,

4). These status shifts are evidence that "no office of overseas development has been able to cultivate much of a powerbase in the corridors of power" (Burnell 1987, 59). In other words, foreign assistance is not seen as a centerpiece of Britain’s foreign policy. Hart underscores this:

The functions and responsibilities of overseas aid and development are unlikely in the future to impinge greatly upon most home departments. Nor does it have a base of electoral popularity. It follows that its strength or weakness will be largely determined by its Minister. (1973, p i87)

While the individual who holds the office of minister of overseas development may make a difference, it is unlikely that a potentially strong advocate for overseas development would 191 be appointed unless a prime minister would actively seek to encourage a higher profile policy in this issue area. Given these institutional constraints it is more likely that a relatively junior person, or one who will not seek to make a strong mark, will hold this office. The implication is that it is unlikely that foreign assistance policy will be differentiated very strongly from foreign policy goals in general. The merits of such linkage were discussed in the House of Commons during the debate on the dissolution of the ODM, The debate centered on the need to link foreign assistance with foreign policy more generally, although not everyone in the Conservative party was convinced of the wisdom of doing so, as may be evidenced from an interaction between two Conservative members of parliament. Mills commented that the institutional intregration of development cooperation under the umbrella of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office facilitates the coordination of the former with the latter;

It is also important that aid and foreign policy should work and plan together, and that is more important now than before. We live in changing times, and foreign policy and overseas aid become more difficult matters. (Hansard 30 October 1979, C1134).

To which Braine retorted

My hon. Friend almost invites me to intervene. Is he aware that in the United States overseas aid was always specifically linked with foreign policy and proved quite disastrous to American and Western interests? (Hansard 30 October 1979, cll34).

Of course, British foreign policy is not U.S. foreign policy, although the point is that

the existence of a separate ministry enabled development issues to be seen as a clearly defined area of government policy with objectives which were distinct from other foreign policy goals. (Hewitt and Sutton 1980, 4)

The shifts in status of the department of overseas development reflect changes in its distinctiveness as an aspect of British foreign policy, its placement within the foreign ministry is not unusual if the arrangements of other states are considered (Burnell 1987, 31). That 192 arrangement per se does not indicate a less highly profiled policy. It is more the series of shifts in status leading up to the final dissolution of the ODM in 1979 that are telling of policy shifts regarding overseas development. Within the scope of British foreign and assistance policy, therefore, the implication of the dissolution of the separate ministry is a less distinctly separate policy. Hewitt and Sutton note a shift in emphasis to a policy that is geared more toward promoting British exports and less to the benefit of the recipient states

(1980, 7). They are aware that donor interests always play some role, but argue that

While the motives for aid-giving have always included a mixture of altruism and self- interest the multiple criteria for aid allocation put forward in the review represent a distinct change of orientaion in the British aid programme. The pre-eminence of development criteria has now been challenged. (Hewitt and Sutton 1980, 5-6)

Nevertheless, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) is the most important institution within the organizational framework of British foreign assistance policy (Zehender

1989), eventhough it is "politically weak" (Burnell 1991, 15). It is responsible for formulating and carrying out British development policy. The secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs is formally responsible to parliament for ODA, although the minister for overseas development is in charge of the administration and generally is the one to address these issues in parliament. However, the minister for overseas development does not have cabinet level status, as was pointed out earlier.

Not all functions associated with development cooperation fall under the ODA’s authority. The Treasury draws up and implements the annual budget, including that for development. The Department of Trade and Industry has a voice in the allocation of aid and, in addition, has its own instrument through the Aid and Trade Provision (ATP), which is a budget title for mixed financing projects in support of the British economy’s exports

(Zehender 1989, 41). These divisions reflect the formal competences of various agencies. 193

Table 6.1.

MINISTERS OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR THE PERIOD 1975-90

Period Development Coop. Fofcign Affaira ]Mme_Mmuter Party in Government

04-03.74 ’tü75 •ta 05-04-76 *til 05-04-76 Labow 05-79 Judidi Haft lames Callaghan Harold Wlson Ub Lab Lab

75/76 Reg Prentice Lab

76/79 05-04-76 / 05.79 05-04-76 / 05-79 Judith Hart Anthony Crosland lames Callaghan Lab Lab Ub

05-79 Neil Marten 4Ü 04-82 Margaret Thatcher 09-06-83 C Lord Carrington C C

04-82 / 09-06-83 Francis I^m C

09-06-83 'til 86 GeoflFr^ Howe 11-06-87 Innotfay Raison C C

86/87 Christopher Utten C

11-06-87 'til 89 'til 89 'til 11-90 92 same

from 89 from 89 from 11-90 Lynda ChaDcer Douglas Hurd John Major C C C

Source: Dod’a Parliamentary CcKnpanion. various years. 194 the meaning of which in practice depends on the working relationships the minister for overseas development establishes with his or her colleagues in the other relevant departments.

Given the assessments made earlier, it is unlikely that the individual holding this position will seek a highly profiled role in his or her relations with such other departments.

During the period under study, 1975-90, six individuals occupied the position of minister of overseas development. Although Judith Hart and Reg Prentice each held the position twice, this is not reflected in the period covered by this study. As Table 6.1 shows.

Labour minister Prentice starts off the list. With a change in prime minister to Callaghan,

Judith Hart returns as Minister of Overseas Development and stays on until the Labour government is replaced with a Conservative one and Thatcher appoints Marten to the post.

After her first reelection. Marten is replaced with Raison, who in turn is followed by Patten and Chalker. This last minister is kept on by Major as he becomes prime minister. Since a new prime minister may indicate a shift in policy just as a prime minister’s replacing the minister for overseas development may be a sign of policy change, the data for the Chalker ministry to be presented below will be scrutinized for differences between the years she served under either prime minister.

Historical Context

The history of British foreign assistance is bound up with not only its colonial heritage, but also with its past imperial status. That is to say, to British decision makers the meaning of its colonial possessions lay in the power status they afforded the state rather than in the economic benefits they brought in terms of resources or trade. This does not mean that economic issues did not play a role, but that British decision makers did not first or 195 foremost define their state’s relationship with its colonies in those terms. Hart writes that paternalistic attitudes and a notion of a sphere of influence remain, rendering it "more difficult for Britain to evolve aid policies which are logical and coherent" (1973, 180), because the "psychological attitudes of imperialism linger on" (Hart 1973,179). Comments made by the current minister of overseas development Chalker during the debate on

Namibia’s entry into the Commonwealth evidence such attitudes. While she claims that "we must not impose our own concepts on that country" (Hansard 5 February 1991, c256), she simultaneously stresses that "Our assistance is designed to encourage good government, accountability and cost-effective use of resources" (Hansard 5 February 1991 c228). She is not alone in her desire to convince the Namibians of the value of Western or British ways of organizing and governing a society. Conservatives Bottomley and Shepherd both express the hope that Namibia will adopt democratic government. The latter links this specifically to the british example, saying that he looks forward to Namibia’s "participation in the form of Westminster parliamentary democracy, which is what the Commonwealth is about"

(Hansard 5 February 1991, c238). In addition to this sense that Britain has some good ideas to offer regarding the political organization of a society, its decision makers often express a sense of responsibility towards the third world that they see as emanating from their status as a former imperial power.

Nevertheless, economic issues do play a role in the United Kingdom’s relations with third world states and they have done so since colonial times. Hart, in her book Aid and

Liberation, dates Britain’s first aid legislation back to the 1929 Colonial Development Act, although she stresses that the concern was more "to provide some relief to the mass 196 unemployment at home, rather than any new and selfless regard for the poverty of the

colonies" (Hart 1973, 20).

Labour MP Skinner is more scathing in his indictment of the "colonial masters ... ripping off those countries" (Hansard 14 December 1990, cl289), implying that the UK has a greater responsibility than others because of its colonial past.

Zehender notes a marked preference for former colonial territories in Britain’s aid relations, writing that "relations concerning development being but one aspect of the close economic and political ties with them" (1989, 42). Byrd similarly holds that the

Commonwealth has influenced the United Kingdom’s relations with the third world. Hart echoes this:

It is probable that only the strength of the Commonwealth traditions and loyalties, arising from an imperialist past, protected Britain from adopting the strongly strategically-oriented type of programme of the United States. (Hart 1973, 29)

In other words, she sees Britain in terms of a power broker role conception which she also sees as applicable to the US, but contends that British policy is mediated or ’softened’ by the

Commonwealth traditions which ensure that its development aid is not purely allocated in support of strategic and power interests. Barling makes a similar argument, writing that for former colonial powers

aid was recognised as a cost of maintaining areas of influence in their former spheres of colonial jurisdiction, and less of an effort either to pursue global strategic objectives or to foster economic and political hegemony as in the case of the United States. (1989, 16)

The United Kingdom’s heritage as an imperial power also figures in assessments made by members of parliament of the role the state does and should play in relation to the third world. During the period of Labour government. Conservative Brocklebank-Fowler charges that 197

successive Foreign Secretaries have, in my view, continued, in the main, a policy of reaction to world events that ws far more appropriate when Britain was the largest single colonial Power and ... have been pretty negative in putting forward a constructive and positive foreign policy for Britain. (Hansard 7 November 1975, C818-19)

He sees British foreign policy as inappropriate to the state’s current statute in international relations. The need for a rethinking of the United Kingdom’s role in the world is discussed by others as well. Rhodes James, Conservative, casts this reconceptualization specifically in terms of the United Kingdom’s relations with developing countries:

At a time when we have no Empire and not a tremendous amount of wealth, when our power is nothing like it was, and when we seek a role in the world, I suggest that one area in which we could find that role would be in coming in actively and strongly not as conquerors or men of power but as friends and as people determined to help in overseas development. I believe that we have a role tiiere, and a role which, I hope, will be maintained whichever party may happen to be in office at one time or another. (Hansard 13 June 1977, c91)

The idea that the United Kingdom might find a role in leading the world community in the creation of a more equitable world order is one such reconceptualization. It is voiced by

Liberal MP Alton during the debate regarding the dissolution of the Ministry of Overseas

Development:

We would do well to heed the words of Dean Acheson, who observed that Britain had lost an empire and not yet found a role. We still have not found one. Our role might be to take a positive lead in creating a world free of poverty and a world where peace was more than just a figment of someone’s imagination and could become a possibility. We have lost power in the traditional sense, but we still have influence. We should be using that influence by standing up for the world’s poor and oppressed, by being on their side in the councils of the world, and by arguing for the removal of injustices about which they feel so strongly. (Hansard 30 October 1979, cl 162)

Alton perceives the dissolution of the ministry as impairing Britain’s ability to actually exercise such influence. Acheson obviously struck a nerve with his remark, as Conservative

MP Goodlad refers to it again in a later debate: 198

That irritating phrase of Dean Acheson’s about losing an empire and not finding a role can now happily be laid to rest. The fulfillment of national roles need not necessarily be sinister or ridiculous. The present generation, I am sure, perceives our country’s role as forwarding the purposes outlined in the report. I have every confidence that we shall do so. (Hansard 16 June 1980, cl282)

Gcodlad makes his comments in a debate on the Brandt report. Alton and Goodlad’s

comments appear to imply a social engineer role for the United Kingdom as they desire their

state to play a role in the creation of a more equitable world order. Both comments were

made during the first period of Conservative government in the 1975-90 period and while

British decision makers have certainly continued their state’s role in terms of leading other

nations, references to the goal of a more equitable world are no longer linked with that

leadership role. Instead, this role is now more frequently linked to Britain role in

international banking and debt relief.

The Data

In the United Kingdom, no yearly debates on the various departmental budgets are held and the set of debates used differs in that respect from those used for the Netherlands and Belgium. The debates that were selected for coding cover overseas aid and development cooperation topics, as found in the indexes to Hansard. Additional debates on foreign assistance were located searching under the name of the minister for overseas development for each period. The reason for this additional search is that only full debates on overseas aid are indexed under that heading and many additional debates pertaining to the subject matter can be located using the entries associated with the relevant ministers for the time period. A list of the debates used is included in Appendix B. 199

A difference between the debates held in the British House of Commons versus those

held in the parliaments of Belgium and the Netherlands is that there are more small debates

on separate topics in the former, while the latter during their annual debates on the budget

often span a wide range of topics during several days of discussion. The debates held in the

British House of Commons are as a result often construed more narrowly, limiting the range

of topics that may be addressed by MPs during any one such debate. The data presented

under the heading ’general’ in Table 6.2 include a variety of topics that in Belgium and the

Netherlands often show up in the annual debates. Collapsing the various debate topics into

this one category facilitates comparison with the other two states, although care needs to be

taken in interpreting the data since this category for the United Kingdom includes many small

debates rather than a few extended ones like in Belgium or the Netherlands. The fact that

issues relating to overseas development are discussed piecemeal in Britain and in annual debates on the budget in Belgium and the Netherlands means that the debate in each of these

settings takes place in a different context. Having said that, the first line of data in Table 6.2

shows that in general debates in Britain the power broker role is the most prevalent single category, which is the role conception that was hypothesized to dominate the foreign assistance debate in the United Kingdom. This role category remains the most frequently referenced one if only the subset that actually is indexed as general is considered. When all topics are combined, again the power broker role conception is the most frequently referenced of the four role categories. Because the debate on foreign assistance is Britain is structured differently, it is possible to differentiate more different topic areas than for the other two states. Across the various topics, there is variation in which role conception 200

Table 6.2.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR VARIOUS DEBATE TOPICS

ROLE CONCEPTION

Debate Topic Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

Gcaenl 37 150 144 186 517 (includes topics ctmparable to Belgian and Dutch dAates on Budget)

Development Bonks 2 12 19 48 81

International Organizatioas 1 2 8 27 38

Aid and Econ

Humanitarian 50 15 10 50 125

TOTAL 90 187 187 313 777

11.6 * 24.1* 24,1* 40.3* 100*

appears most frequently. For instance, when aid to specific states is discussed, power broker themes prevail, but when the environmental implications of development are discussed, the

social engineer role dominates. Both of these are logical emphases, given that themes considered as empirical referent for either role conception directly relate to these topics.

When decision makers speak about the desire to influence the decisions made by a recipient

state this is regarded as empirical support for a power broker role conception, while

statements stressing the need for sustainable development are coded as evidence for the social engineer role conception.

However, during the extended discussions of the Brandt report one would expect the

social engineer role to predominate, but instead the power broker role is referred to

substantially more often. Generally, if the role conception referenced most frequently 201 changes with each debate topic and is congruent with it, the evidence for a role conception that significantly guides policy across the board is not strong. The fact that the power broker role conception is referred to so often during the discussion on the Brandt report is therefore more solid evidence that such a role conception actually guides decision makers than their addressing themes congruent with such a role conception during a debate on, for instance, aid to a specific state over which some measure of influence is sought.

In this light, it is also noteworthy that during debates on humanitarian issues, such as disaster relief, power broker themes occur equally with good neighbor themes. As Table

6.2 shows, good neighbor and power broker themes are referenced equally often during debates on humanitarian issues. The context of such a debate calls for addressing themes that are congruent with the good neighbor role, so if the tendency to focus on such themes is drowned out to such a large degree by references to power broker themes, this may be taken as support for the hypothesis that such a role conception guides decision makers in Britain.

Overall Picture

It was hypothesized that the decision makers representing the United Kingdom, as a larger state and with concerns associated with maintaining a level of influence in areas that used to be part of its empire, would be guided by a power broker conception of their state’s role in the foreign assistance issue area. While the power broker role conception is indeed the most frequently referenced role conception overall, when the data are broken down by the periods of tenure of the various ministers for overseas development, as is shown in Table

6.3, one notes a shift over time. The prevalence of the power broker role conception overall 202

Table 6.3.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE PERIODS OF TENURE OF THE VARIOUS MINISTERS OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT

ROLE CONCEFnON

Period Min. Overaeag Dev. Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

75-76 Reg Prentice 2 10 14 11 37 Ub 5.4% 27% 37.8% 29.7% 10 0 %

76-79 Judith Halt 1 28 18 16 63 Ub 1.6 % 44.4% 28.6% 25.4% 100%

79-83 Neil Marten 3 36 46 24 109 C 2 .8% 33% 42.2% 22 % 100%

83-86 Timothy Raison 36 52 44 124 256 C 14.1% 20.3% 17.2% 48.4% 100%

86-89 Christopher Patten 6 22 31 48 107 C 5.6% 20.6 % 29% 44.% 100%

89- Lynda Chalker 42 39 34 90 205 C 20.5% 19% 16.6% 43.9% 100%

TOTAL 90 187 187 313 777

11.6 % 24.1% 24.1% 40.3% 100% 203

is partially due to the fact that the ministerial periods for which the power broker is dominant have larger amounts of data associated with them, which is generally the result of a greater

volume of debates.

If considered by the periods of tenure of the various ministers, it can be seen that the

power broker role becomes established after Thatcher’s first re-election as prime minister in

1983. Power broker themes remain dominant after Thatcher’s replacement with Major,

although he was in office for only the last year included in this study. Chalker remains

minister of overseas development and the change in prime minister does not yield a change

in the prevalence of the power broker role conception across the years of Chalker’s tenure.

Table 6.4 shows the data for Chalker’s tenure separated out for the years under prime

ministers Thatcher and Major. While power broker themes are referenced in about equal proportion across the two parliamentary years, themes associated with the good neighbor role

conception occur more frequently during the latter year. This may not indicate a shift in policy, as three of the seven debates held during the 1990-91 parliamentary year concerned humanitarian issues, including critical appraisals of the British response to the drought and

famine in the Horn of Africa and the cyclone disaster in Bangla Desh. The previous year, no debates concerning such topics were held. The greater proportional frequency of references to the good neighbor theme is therefore likely to be a function of debate topics, which in turn were a function of international events.*

* * These three debates constitute a little over one third of the material coded for Britain for the 1990-01 parliamentary year. 204

Table 6.4.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR LYNDA CHALKER’S TENURE UNDER PRIME MINISTERS THATCHER AND MAJOR

Year Prime Mmiatef Good Neighbor Social 15iginccr Merchant Power Broker Total

89/90 Ibatcher 1 15 ID 20 46

2% 33% 22% 43% 100%

90/91 Major 41 24 24 70 159

26% 15% 15% 44% 100%

TOTAL 42 39 34 90 205

20% 19% 17% 44% 100%

Table 6.5.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR LYNDA CHALKER PERSONALLY UNDER PRIME MINISTERS THATCHER AND MAJOR

ïar Prime Minister Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

89/90 Thatcher 1 3 2 14

7% 21% 14% 57% 100%

90/91 Major 13 6 6 35 60

22% 10% 10% 58% 100%

TOTAL 14 9 43 74

19% 12% 11% 58% 100% 205

Chalker’s personal contributions to debates across the 1989-90 and 1990-91

parliamentary years show over half of her references pertain to power broker themes for both

years. Her focus on these themes is thus somewhat stronger than that for the debate in

general. Other than that, her individual references are similar to the general debate in

their relative emphasis on themes associated with the various role conceptions (Table 6.5).

Under Prentice, themes associated with the merchant role show up most frequently,

although the distribution across the social engineer, merchant, and power broker role

conceptions is relatively flat, as can be discerned from Table 6.3. If only references to

desired policy are considered, the social engineer role is referred to most frequently, although

Table 6.6 shows that the distribution across the social engineer, merchant, and power broker roles becomes even flatter in that case. Given that the total amount of data for this period

is small as well, it is necessary to conclude that the evidence for this period is not very

strong.

Under Hart, social engineer themes dominate the debate with 44 per cent of the total references during this period associated with this role conception (Table 6.3). If only themes that address desired policy are taken into account, this emphasis becomes even more pronounced with 58 per cent of the references to desired policy being made to social engineer themes (Table 6.7). Hart’s personal preferences may have shaped the debate during this period. As can be seen from Table 6.7, Hart herself emphasizes social engineer themes.

This is no surprise given that in her book Aid and Liberation Hart (1973) had already argued that a more enlightened view of Britain’s national self-interest was imperative.

During the tenure of Marten, the first in a series of Conservative ministers of overseas development, merchant themes are referenced most frequently. There is not much 206

Table 6.6.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO DESIRED POLICY FOR THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE PERIODS OF TENURE OF THE VARIOUS MINISTERS OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Minigter Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

75-76 Rsg Prtatice 10 8 9 27 Ltb 37* 29.6% 33.3% 100%

76-79 Judith Hast 28 13 7 48 Lab 58.3% 27.1% 14.6% 100%

79-83 Neil Martes 28 34 15 77 C 36.4% 44.2% 19.5% 100%

83-86 Timothy Raiaon 14 36 32 80 162 C 8.6% 22.2 % 19.8% 49.4% 100%

86-89 Chriatopber Patten 3 21 22 26 72 C 4.2% 29.2% 30.6% 36.1% 100%

89- Lynda Chalker 11 17 13 40 81 C 13.6% 21% 16% 49.4% 100%

TOTAL 28 140 122 177 467

6% 30% 26.1% 37.9% 100% 207

Table 6.7.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Good Neiahor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

75-76 - 2 1 3 6 Lab

76-79 Judidi Hut 1 7 1 2 11 Lab

79-83 Neil Martea - 4 4 5 13 C

83-86 Timothy Raison U 4 7 23 45 C

86-89 Christopher Patten 1 4 7 16 28 C

89- Lynda Chalker 14 9 8 43 74

difference in emphasis whether all references are considered or only those phrased in terms of desired policy: 42 and 44 per cent of the respective totals for the period of Marten’s ministership are devoted to references to merchant themes (Tables 6.3 and 6.6). This shift in debate compared to the previous period is not due to Marten’s own preferences, or at least is not visible in the contributions he made to foreign assistance debates. Table 6.7 shows that Marten referenced social engineer, merchant, and power broker themes about equally.

However, Percy and Hall comment that "[i]n 1980 the government decided to give greater weight in the allocation of aid to political, industrial and commercial considerations" (1989,

4). Hewitt and Sutton (1980) make a similar assessment with regard to the change in policy as a result of the shift to Conservative government. 208

This shift in emphasis becomes clearer with the start of Raison’s ministership. He is the first in a succession of three ministers, including Raison himself, Patten, and Chalker, under whose tenures power broker themes consistently are the most frequently referenced.

As Tables 6.3 and 6.6 show, this is true whether all references or only those to desired policy are considered. The records for these three ministers individually also show a strong emphasis on power broker themes, which for each constitute over half of their individual references.

If, as these data hint, there is a difference between Labour and Conservative members of parliament (MPs), then the predominance of power broker themes is a function of the fact that the Conservatives are in government during most of the period under study. If all references to the various themes are broken down by the party affiliation of the speakers who made the references, no such difference between Labour and Conservative MPs is found.

Both reference power broker themes most frequently, although the strength of the emphasis on power broker themes is greater for Conservative MPs, for whom themes associated with the power broker role conception constitute close to 45 per cent of all references compared to 36 per cent for Labour MPs (see Table 6.8). However, when Labour and Conservative

MPs are compared on references to desired policy, it turns out that there is a real difference between representatives of these two parties. As Table 6.9 shows. Labour MPs stress social engineer themes in their positive references to what they state policy should be, whereas

Conservatives stress power broker themes. This means that Labour MPs are more likely to argue negatively when they refer to power broker themes.

In other words, on the whole representatives of both parties may make reference to power broker themes more often than those associated with any other role conception, the manner 209 T ab le 6 .8 .

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCE TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES

ROLE CONCEPTION

Political Party Good Neigfaof Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

Conieivitive 42 72 115 185 414

10.1* 17.4* 27.8* 44.7* 100*

Labour 38 105 @1 115 319

11.9* 32.9* 19.1* 36.1* 100*

Other* 10 10 11 13 44

22.7* 22.7* 2 5 * 29.5* 100*

TOTAL 90 187 187 313 777

11.6 * 24.1* 24.1* 40.3* 100*

* Inchidea: Liberal. Liberal Democrat, Plaid Cymru, Social Democrat Party.

Table 6.9.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCE TO DESIRED POLICY FOR THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES

ROLE CONCEPTION

Political Party Good Nelghor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

Cofiaervative 14 54 93 102 263

5.3* 20.5* 35.4* 38.8* 100*

Labour 8 77 25 65 175

4 .6 * 44* 14.3* 37.1* 100*

Other* 6 9 4 10 29

20.7* 31* 13.8* 34.5* 100*

TOTAL 28 140 122 177 467

6* 30* 26.1* 37.9* 100*

* Inchidea: Liberal. Liberal Democrat. Plaid Cymru. Social Democrat Par#. 210 in which these themes are referred to is qualitatively different. This leads to the conclusion that there are real differences between the two parties in terms of the stated preference for the objective to be served by foreign assistance policy.

In addition, there are differences between front and back benchers. Evidence for such a power broker role conception is stronger for front bench politicians than for back benchers: across the entire period under study, 51 per cent of the references to themes made by front benchers fall into the power broker category, while 35 per cent of the back benchers’ references do. Still, for both front and back benchers themes associated with the power broker role conception are the one most frequently referenced. If broken down by the periods of tenure of the various ministers, both front and back benchers gravitate towards the power broker theme starting with Raison’s tenure as minister of overseas development, as can be seen from Table 6.10.

If Conservative and Labour front and back benchers are considered separately, it appears that the Conservatives are on the whole more unified in their expressed views. The totals shown at the bottom of Table 6.11 shows that both front and back benchers of this party reference power broker themes more often than any other role category. However, the front benchers show a stronger emphasis on power broker themes than do the back benchers.

Labour MPs do not exhibit the same unity of opinion. While almost half of all the references to the various themes made by Labour front benchers concern power broker themes, back benchers of the same party address social engineer themes slightly more often than power broker themes. This overall divergence between Labour front and back benchers is not consistent across time, however. As Table 6.12 shows, there is variation in the congruence between Labour front and back benchers across the periods of tenure of the various Table 6.10.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR FRONT- AND BACKBENCHERS

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Min IB ter Good Neighor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

FB* BB** FB BE FB BB FB BB FB BB

75-76 Reg Prentice 2 2 1 13 3 8 6 31 Lab

76-79 Judith Hart I 10 II 20 43 Lab

79-83 NcU Marten 36 10 14 29 80 C

83-86 Timothy Raison 19 12 40 13 31 53 95 161 C

86-89 Christopher Patten 17 22 18 30 35 72 C

89- Lynda Chalker 14 28 10 29 25 47 43 80 125 C

TOTAL 36 54 47 140 46 141 136 177 265 512

14% 1 1 % 18% 27% 17% 28% 51% 35 % 100% 100%

* Front bench: includes Conservative and Labour party members.

** Back bench: includes Conservative. Labour, liberal. Liberal Democrat, Plaid Cymru, Social Democrat Party Table 6 11.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR CONSERVATIVE FRONT- AND BACKBENCHERS

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Mtniflter Good Neighor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

FB BB FB BB FB BB FB BB FB BB

75-76 Reg Prentice 11 Lab

76-79 Judith Hatt Lab

79-83 Neil Marten 25 21 37 C

83-86 Timothy Raison 12 15 12 17 33 37 63 73 C

86-89 Christopher Patten 1 16 16 15 28 40 C

89- Lynda Chalker 14 43 21 74 41 C

TOTAL 28 14 25 47 35 80 99 86 187 227

15% 6% 13 % 21% 19% 35 % 53% 38 % 100% 100%

to w Table 6.12.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO THE ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR LABOUR FRONT AND BACKBENCHERS

ROLE CONCEPTION

Period Minister Good Neighor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker Total

FB BB FB BB FB BB FB BB FB BB

75*76 Reg Prentice 1 1 6 3 5 6 18 Lab

76*79 Judith Hart 19 Lab

79*83 NeU Marten 8 38 C

83-86 Timothy Raison 10 19 20 27 32 64 C

86*89 Christopher Fatten C

Lynda Chalker 17 22 19 18 76 C

TOTAL 30 22 83 11 50 37 78 78 241

10% 13 % 28% 34% 14% 21 % 47% 32 % 100% 100% 214

ministers. Labour was in the opposition for the last four of the six periods, but there does

not seem to be a clear difference in unity between front and back benchers durir g the periods

they are in government versus those in which they hold an opposition role. Although the back

benchers on average reference social engineer themes more frequently than any other role

category, the difference with the next most frequently mentioned category, that of power

broker, is only two percentage points.

The shift from Labour to Conservative government appears as a plausible explanation

for the shift in emphasis to the power broker role conception. During the second half of the

seventies, when the Labour party was in power, social engineer themes showed up with some

frequency and in some debates were more frequent than power broker themes. During the

eighties, under Conservative governments, social engineer themes receive only occasional

mention. This shift in emphasis may be due to the fact that the Labour party now plays ah

opposition role, but it may also relate to the fact that in the second half of the seventies the

debate on the New International Economic Order (NIEO) was still in full force. The more

frequent mention of environmental sustainability in recent years would suggest an influence

of themes that are dominant in the global environment at a particular point in time. On the

other hand, bureaucratic decision makers in the British Overseas Development Administration

(ODA) believe that there are real differences between the Labour and Conservative parties

in terms of the role they seek the United Kingdom to play in this issue area. The fact that

consecutive Labour and Conservative governments have shifted the status of the ODA from

an independent ministry under the former to part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under the latter, would support this as well (Burnell 1991). 215

While the level of aid is not essentially part of the themes used to evaluate their role

conceptions, British members of parliament show a good amount of concern about it.

Prentice (Labour), while minister of overseas development, explained the concern with the

level of aid in terms of it being an expression of the state’s good will:

The clearest possible test of the will to help the developing world is the volume of the aid programme. I have never believed that volume was the only thing which mattered. Clearly the terms of aid, the priorities chosen and the kind of philosophy we adopt are of great, and in some cases of greater, importance. However, the fact we have to face is that the volume performance of the developed countries, including the United Kingdom, is falling far short of the generalised good intentions we express so often. (Hansard 7 November 1975, c786)

Across the debates, there is consistent attention for the failure of the United Kingdom to

achieve the .7 per cent of GNP target established by the UN. In more recent years. Labour

MPs clearly use reference to this target to call the government’s policy and certainly their

commitment to the foreign assistance program into question.

Raison (Conservative) defended the aid program during his tenure as minister of

overseas development with reference to the fact that Britain’s expenditure is about the OECD

average (Hansard 9 November 1984).^ Labour MPs tend to see Scandinavian countries and

the Netherlands as the model and stress that .7 per cent is a proportion, not a number.

Chalker (Conservative), the current minister of overseas development, tends to focus on the

objective size of the British aid program, which is still large despite the fact that it does not

reach the .7 per cent of GNP. In their critique and defense of British aid Conservative and

Labour MPs both use the percentage of GNP spent on aid, but use different referents to

^ In fact, Britain’s performance has been a few percentage points below the OECD average throughout most of the 1980s, while it was slightly above tiie OECD average in the second half of the 1970s. This change coincides with a change from Labour to Conservative Government. 216 evaluate Üie adequacy of the British performance. The frequent appearance of this UN target figure in debate, shows that this international norm has some influence. While most states do not live up to it, it has to be contended with, certainly if decision makers care about their state’s (or party’s) image.

John Marek (Labour) expresses dismay at a report concerning rumours that the cabinet was planning to cut overseas aid. His reaction concerns not so much the fact itself as a report that "several members of the Tory party were worried about that because it would give the wrong image of the Tory party. That is appalling" (Hansard 9 November 1984, c360). The importance of what the relative expenditure on foreign assistance communicates is expressed nicely by Roy Jenkins (Social Democrat), who ties British performance on aid to its ability to play a leadership role in the EC:

I agree entirely that we cannot do everything on our own, but if we are to give a lead to a co-operative effort in Europe we must rapidly move from having one of the lower percentages to having one of the higher percentages of aid provided by Community countries. (Hansard 22 November 1984, c444)

British decision makers have generally sought to play a leadership role without following Roy

Jenkins’ advice, although the European Community accounts for an ever larger proportion of the multilateral aid budget.

Evidence for the Good Neighbor Role Conception

The good neighbor role conception has a somewhat stronger presence in the rhetoric of British decision makers than among those of Belgium and the Netherlands. This could be regarded as evidence that a power broker role conception in which the desire to preserve and enhance the influence of the state are central also invites a greater sense of obligation. Such a sense of obligation coincides with power broker rhetoric that stresses a sense of 217

Table 6.13.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO GOOD NEIGHBOR THEMES

GOOD NEIGHBOR THEMES

Period Minbter Ethic/Moral Charity Disaster Total

75-76 Reg Prentice 1 1 - 2 Ub

76-79 Judith Hut - 1 - 1 Lib

79-83 Neil Mutca - 1 2 3 C

83-86 Timothy Rftieoa S 3 28 36 C

86-89 Chrbtc^er Fatten - 4 2 6 C

89- Lynda Chalker 4 1 37 42 C

TOTAL 10

responsibility towards the third world. The latter sentiment also is expressed relatively more frequently by British decision makers than by those of Belgium or the Netherlands.

This difference in the frequency of occurrence of good neighbor themes can also be related to the fact that the adequacy of the British response to famine and natural disaster are the central topic of several debates. Although these debates do not exclusively focus on good neighbor themes, they make their occurrence more likely. As Table 6.13 shows, among the good neighbor themes, the need to provide relief in immediate emergencies is the most frequently mentioned theme within the good neighbor role conception. The focus on this theme within the good neighbor role conception is logical in a discussion of the British response to famine and natural disaster in third world countries. 218

In the most recent period, under the ministry of Chalker, the high frequency of the disaster relief theme related to debates on drought and famine in Ethiopia, and a cyclone which struck Bangladesh in April 1991. With regard to the British relief effort in response to the latter event, several MPs stressed the special responsibility Britain has to this country.

Labour representative Foulkes, for instance stresses the special obligation Britain has because

Bangladesh is a Commonwealth state (Hansard 8 May 1991, c741), with which minister

Chalker agrees (Hansard 8 May 1991, c741). Labour MP Abbott makes the connection more direct, by stressing that a number of UK citizens have relatives in Bangladesh who may have been affected by the disaster (Hansard 8 May 1991, c729). That is one way of expressing the historical ties with that state, which are referenced by others as well and in the most critical form by Labour MP Loydon, who says that Britain has an obligation to lead the disaster relief effort because the British "exploited Bangladesh to create their wealth over the years" (Hansard 8 May 1991, c739). Although Conservative MP Stokes expresses general agreement with the idea that the United Kingdom should act to help Bangladesh, he ends his positive assessment with the critical comment that "we must ask ourselves whether we should be discussing the matter as we have no control over it and no responsibility for it" (Hansard

8 May 1991, c732). Although no one can in the final analysis be held responsible for natural disaster, a more generally held opinion is expressed by minister Chalker, who argues that when natural disaster happens "we have a moral duty to help the people involved" (Hansard

8 May 1991, c732).

While the frequency of the disaster relief theme is a function of the fact that the

British response to emergency situations is scrutinized in parliament, it should be noted that such discussions are unique to the British setting. Similar debates focusing on the emergency 219 response to a disaster are not held in Belgium or the Netherlands. One could argue that such debates are an indication that British decision makers, to a greater extent than their Dutch or Belgian counterparts, perceive good neighborliness to be of some importance. One could alternately argue that these debates are evidence of a status quo orientation and the relief efforts merely seen as relevant in support of maintaining Britain’s power and influence. The latter interpretation builds from the notion that such relief efforts are not extended as a matter of right, but on the basis of a sense that ’one cannot stand by and do nothing,’ an attitude more concerned with reputation than that it is evidence of altruism.’ The greater relative incidence of good neighbor themes in Britain may be a reflection of its status as a former imperial power, where decision makers still perceive a sense of obligation, as expressed by

Plaid Cymru MP Thomas who perceives Britain as "a state with post-colonial responsibilities towards the southern countries" (Hansard 9 November 1984 c373). While the link with

Britain’s colonial heritage is expressed more often by those critical of the government, the idea that Britain has responsibilities towards the third world appears to be widely shared.

That such a sense of responsibility does not necessarily reflect altruistic motivations is expressed in the desire to get a return in terms of prestige for such aid. Conservative MP

Jessel expresses a preference for bilateral foreign assistance specifically for such reasons:

Apart from the primary and basic aim of helping to assuage poverty in the Third world ... I want Britain to obtain the maximum possible credit and goodwill abroad for what we are doing. I want the recipient countries to know that the aid is coming from Britain. (Hansard 17 March 1989 c696)

’ Please refer to the section of chapter 3 which defines the good neighbor role. The argument presented here derives from Johansen’s (1980) discussion on criteria for aid to be judged humanitarian. 220

In sum, British decision makers apparently perceive their state’s role in aid efforts as a mechanism for the maintenance of influence and prestige, and that extends to disaster relief efforts.

Evidence for the Social Engineer Role Conception

Among the various social engineer themes, the stability of the international environment is stressed most often. Out of a total of eleven categories, references to the importance of the long-term stability of the international environment constitute over one- third of the total of 187 references to social engineer themes, as can be observed from the bottom row of Table 6.14. This theme is emphasized more often than any other social engineer theme consistently across the various periods, with the exception of an about equally strong presence of the empowerment theme during Patten’s tenure as minister of overseas development. In addition, during Prentice’s tenure as minister the need to address structural poverty was referenced almost as often as the stability theme. In both these periods, the difference between the most frequently mentioned category and the next is only one observation, which does not provide very strong evidence.

This overall focus on the structure of the international system is congruent with the power broker role which dominates the discussion in Britain overall, in that both concern the status of Britain in the international system and a desire to exercise influence on the future course of that system. Wells, a Conservative MP, argues for instance that the global implication

must banish from anyone’s mind the idea that overseas development is not our concern in the House of Commons and in northern countries, because if we ignore it the consequences will soon become apparent in changes in our climate, rises in sea level, falling trade and the lowering of our standard of living. Failure to do anything 221

about it could even lead to global warfare, as desperate people with nothing to lose confront countries and people more fortunate than themselves. (Hansard 17 March 1989, c6Sl)

Thà perception that Britain’s security is bound up with a lessening of the tensions between

North and South is disputed by Conservative MP John Townend, who perceives the Cold

War as a far more important issue;

Brandt goes on to say that aid is necessary to prevent a North-South conflict. Such a conflict is not the major danger facing the world today because of the diversity of the South. The idea of a North-South arms conflict is nonsense. The major danger facing the world today is an East-West conflict. (Hansard 18 April 1983, c95).

At the time that this comment was made, this may not have been an unusual point of view, although it is one that was rarely put forward in British debates on foreign assistance. Much more frequently are expressions of an awareness that the divide between rich and poor should concern because of Britain’s reliance on foreign trade. Labour MP Grant:

I believe that the biggest threat to peace is world economic anarchy and a situation in which the majority of the world’s population exists in apalling degrees of poverty and wretchedness while the rest of us enjoy relative happiness and prosperity. ... World peace must be founded on prosperity and good neighbourliness among all of us. That message cannot be repeated too often. Our prosperity as a trading nation depends to a great extent on that understanding. (Hansard 7 November 1975, c870)

Similar sentiments are expressed by Luce, Conservative:

My view is that until we in the West can work effectively with the countries of the Third World, particularly the poorer ones, to encourage a greater degree of rural and agricultural development, there will be continued political instability in the Third World and the long-term prospects for more trade between it and the Western world will be hampered. (Hansard 20 December 1976, cl26)

Both speakers argue that although the Western industrialized states may be more powerful, there is a level of mutual dependence that should not be ignored if Britain is to keep its longer term interests in mind. As foreign secretary, Pym (Conservative) makes exactly this point: Table 6.14.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO SOCIAL ENGINEER THEMES

SOCIAL ENGINEER THEMES

Period Minwter Stability Environm. Pop. Soc.Jiist. Poverty Hum-Right Empower. NGO Agrie. Women Coord. Total

75-76 Reg Prentice 5 - - 4 - I 10 Lab

76-79 Judith Hart 10 1 2 . - 28 Lab

79-83 Neil Marten 23 C

83-86 llmothy Raison 52 C

86-89 Christopher Patten 22 C

89- Lynda Chalker 39 C

TOTAL 70 12 25 16 223

This task presents us with a formidable challenge, but all countries are dependent on each other. Like it or not, the world is in a state of interdependence, so the challenge must be met on its merits. It is a challenge that an enlightened promotion of our national interest would in any case require us to meet. (Hansard 18 April 1983, c40)

To some, the issue is not whether a change in the international system will take place, but in what manner such a change will come about and what its impact will be on Britain.

According to Labour MP Lyon:

we must recognise not that we need compassion or charity, but that we shall have to face an increasing diversion of resources from the North to the South in any case. However, it will be unplanned, uncharted, and will lead to the kind of conflict and difGculties which will ultimately make the whole system break down. ... We need some kind of international forum in which the channeling of resources can take place on a planned basis so that it helps the whole world, not just parts of the world. (Hansard 16 June 1980, cl207)

In other words, Lyon proposes a negotiated transformation of the system in agreement with

Alton’s (Liberal) assessment that "[ijnvestment in overseas aid is investment in peace, in stability, in the supply of raw materials and, consequently, in investment in economic activity between them and us" (Hansard 11 February 1982, cll50-51). This linkage between systemic stability and trade is not surprising, given that while power broker themes are referenced most frequently, social engineer and merchant themes occur in equal amounts.

As can be observed from the statements by decision makers quoted in this section, the preoccupation with social engineer themes frequently has a close link with their perception that international trade is important to Britain.

Evidence for the Merchant Role Conception

The desire to benefit domestic trade and industry with the foreign assistance program and a preference for free trade are the two merchant themes that show up most frequently. 224 with the desire to involve trade and industry to a greater extent as a strong third. As can be discerned from Table 6. IS, there is no one theme that clearly stands out and no one theme that consistently shows up more frequently across the periods of tenure of the various ministers. What is interesting is that for the periods during which the power broker role conception predominates, the tenures of Raison, Patten, and Chalker, the merchant themes focused on most are related more to benefitting domestic trade and industry, while there is less mention of more structural concerns such as free trade. Patten, for instance, argues that

Britain has "maintained a strong commitment to an open multilateral trading system and general stability and growth in the world economy" (Hansard 12 May 1989, cl 170). Labour

MP Lestor makes the connection with the debt issue, arguing that the third world’s debt problems have damaged North-South trade relations and have as a result negatively impacted on the North’s economies. The implication for her is that "We need to achieve debt reduction that will enhance growth in trade" (Hansard 17 March 1989, c640), because this would "also help our export performance" (Hansard 17 March 1989, c643). Conservative

MP Tugendhat had made this connection many years earlier and argued it in terms of domestic support for a strong foreign assistance program:

It is important that the Government and everyone else supporting the cause of aid and development should be prepared to argue more strongly the case of self-interest as well as idealism. We must say frankly that British people who work in British industry need the markets. We must point out that it is a matter not only of handing over resources and not being able to spend on housing or other desirable projects, but of building up markets that our factories and industries will be able to serve. It is necessary to draw attention to that direct self-interest. ... Many of those concerned with aid and development in the House believe that if we cannot demonstrate a self-interest, it will be difficult to get the support that is needed to sustain the programme that we want to be implemented. (Hansard 7 November 1975, c 793-4) Table 6.15.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO MERCHANT THEMES

MERCHANT THEMES

Period Miniatef Liberal Older Free trade Growth Mutual benefit Privatization Total

75-76 Reg Prentice I • 5 3 5 14 Lab

76-79 Judith Hart 10 7 1 18 Lab

79-83 NeU Marten 16 9 46 C

83-86 Timothy Raison 16 7 C

86-89 Christopher Patten 12 31 C

89- Lynda Chalker 34 C

TOTAL 12 56 22 58 39 187 226

If Labour and Conservative MPs are compared, the latter focus more often on issues surrounding the principle of free trade, while the former more often address the need to benefit domestic trade and industry in association with foreign assistance. As Table 6.16 shows. Conservatives address free trade 34 and the need to benefit domestic trade and industry 31 times out of a total of 115 references to merchant themes, while Labour MPs reference mutual benefit 22 and free trade 20 times out of a total of 61 references. As these figures indicate, the difference in emphasis between the two categories is not extremely large for the two parties. Shown in parentheses below the frequencies for the various themes for members of the various parties are the figures for themes phrased in terms of desired policy.

These figures show that there is a marked difference in the proportion of references phrased in such terms between Conservatives and Labour MPs: a much higher proportion of the references to the various themes made by Conservatives are phrased in terms of desired policy. This may reflect the fact that for most of the period under study their party was in government, while the Labour representatives in their opposition role focused on criticizing policy. In response to Conservative MPs, Labour MPs react negatively to the stance taken by the Conservatives. Ann Clwyd, Labour spokesperson on foreign assistance, comments:

"It is fine to support British industry, but not at the expense of the third world" (Hansard 14

December 1990, cl244). She is not convinced that it is possible to benefit both donor and recipient simultaneously, and in that case, the good of the recipient state should figure foremost. Such an opinion runs counter to Government policy, which since 1979 has closer links with private industry (Percy and Hall 1989, 4). It should be noted that this reflects the tenure of the Conservatives as government party. While economic growth is the ostensible Table 6.16.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO MERCHANT THEMES FOR THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES

(with in parentheses references to desired policy)

MERCHANT THEMES

Political Party Liberal Order Free trade Growth Mutual benefit Privatization Total

Conservative 12 34 13 31 25 115

(7) (29) (10) (26) (21) (93)

20 7 22 12 61

(11) (2) (10) (2) (25)

2 5 2 11

(2) (I) ( 1) (4)

TOTAL 12 56 22 58 39 187

(7 ) (40) ( 14) ( 37) (24) ( 122)

a 228 goal of the British aid programme (Percy and Hall 1989,25), commercial considerations play an important role (Percy and Hall 1989, 4),

The difference in emphasis between the free trade and mutual benefit categories may be small, but if it is taken into account that Conservatives are the only ones to references the need to preserve a liberal international economic order, the difference becomes more notable.

The twelve references to the principles of a liberal economic order added to the 34 concerning free trade amount to forty per cent of the Conservatives’ references to merchant themes. Labour MP Skinner is not pleased with the government party’s predisposition towards free market solutions. He regards development as a problem that "cannot be solved with a man, a bike, a ladder and an enterprise allowance. It will have to be done by collective action." (Hansard 14 December 1990, cl291). This negative attention for merchant themes reflects a position frequently taken by representatives of the Labour party, who often stress that Britain should consider its long-term interests to a greater extent.

This Conservative focus on free trade principles was also noted by Zehender, who argues that

[t]he way in which development aid is provided also clearly reflects the strong commitment to the market economy and private enterprise in the present government’s economic and social policies and the considerable importance it attaches to the interests of the British economy. (1989, 42)

Percy and Hall are not quite as cynical in their assessment, noting "British aid ofhcials openly admit that the whole aid program is not intended directly to benefit the poor. Its role, they claim, is to promote economic growth." (1989, 25). Indeed, Raison literally refers to such motivations in his diagnosis that

the longer-term solution to the present difficulties of the developing countries lies in the resumption of sound, lasting growth among the industrialised countries. That will 229

enable the developing countries to export more, increase their earnings, service their debts and invest in the future. (Hansard 21 November 1983, c91)

Evidence for the Power Broker Role Conception

Among the various power broker themes, British decision makers consistently focus most on their state’s participation in international organizations, as can be discerned from the fact that 180 out of 313 references to power broker themes concern Britain role in such organizations (Table 6.17). Although many of the references do not specifically refer to

Britain’s role in a particular organization, when such specific references are made they refer slightly more often to the British role in die EC. However, since such explicit references are made infrequently, a preference for playing a leadership role through specific organizations cannot be shown clearly through such references when these are broken down by the various periods.

According to Zehender, British decision makers seek to play a prominent role within the international banking institutions, noting that the "close links between British programme aid and the IMF’s and World Bank’s stabilization and adjustment programmes are primarily due to similar notions on the internal economic causes of structural distortions and how they should be eliminated" (Zehender 1989, 50).

Generally, the debate over Britain’s role in international organizations focuses on the ability of its decision makers to play a leadership role within such bodies. The debate regarding the Conservative government’s decision to pull out of UNESCO is a case in point, although that decision was criticized equally from both sides of the House. Labour MP

Stuart Holland: 230 Table 6.17.

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO POWER BROKER THEMES

POWER BROKER THEMES

PctkxI MhuBter Iptenart Reap. Friendly Democfaey Infl.Recip. Partictp.IO Infl.Donor Total

75-76 Reg Prentice 1 7 1 11 Lab

76-79 Juditfi Hart - 3 ■ - - 13 • 16 Lab

79-83 Neil Marten 2 2 1 1 4 13 1 24 C

83-86 înnodiy RaisoD 4 11 1 3 12 83 10 124 C

86-89 Christopher Fallen 2 7 1 • 6 30 2 48 C

89- Lyoda Chalker 5 16 2 13 11 34 9 90

TOTAL 14 39 17 35 180 313

We agree that certain internal reforms are needed in UNESCO. By and large, those reforms are in progress, but how can the Government supervise reforms when they are planning to withdraw from membership?" (Hansard 22 November 1984, c436)

Others were less subtle, as evidenced by Tom Clarke’s (Labour) statement that it "is profoundly wrong to pull out of an organisation because there are members of it who do not agree with us" (Hansard 22 November 1984, c473), while former Minister of Overseas

Development Judith Hart (Labour) stressed the loss of influence associated with the departure:

... it is not possible to reform from the outside. Just as the United States no longer has the slightest influence in UNESCO, so we, henceforth, will cease to have any influence there. (Hansard 22 November 1984, c448)

Conservative Edward Heath concurs: 231

Increased influence in diplomacy is never achieved by opting out. ... I lament the decision that has been taken on UNESCO, which I consider to be wrong. It will achieve nothing and I hope the Government will change it. It will certainly fail to extend our national influence." (Hansard 22 November 1984, c441-2)

The criticisms regarding the decision to pull out of UNESCO illustrate that despite some differences, both Labour and Conservative decision makers see Britain’s role in this issue area to a large degree in power broker terms and, more specifically, want it to exercise its influence to provide leadership within international organizations.

As indicated above, power broker themes do show up unexpectedly strong in debates that concern disaster relief efforts. I hypothesized that situational factors would override the dominant role conception when natural disasters happen and the state’s response to these is being discussed. However, the conception of the state in power broker terms is strong enough not to be submerged by the salience of an immediate disaster that calls for a response. Rather, the need to respond is seen not solely in good neighbor terms, but also strongly in terms of the need to provide leadership. Chalker (Conservative), the current minister for overseas development, expresses such a power broker motive in regard to an emergency situation when she says: "The essential job before us is to galvanise the whole international community and other bilateral donors" (Hansard 19 December 1990, c..).

Noteworthy is also that the British decision makers about equally often express a sense of responsibility toward recipient states as they express a desire to influence the domestic policies of such states in a particular manner —most often economic policies.

Liberal MP Alton, for instance, comments that "(i]t is the powerful of the earth who must bear the greatest responsibility. If through inertia they do nothing, it is they who will be blamed." (Hansard 11 February 1982, cl 153). Conservative MP Lord argues similarly that

Britain has an obligation to use its influence: "While we cannot run the affairs of other 232 countries, respecting their sovereignty often happens at the expense of the people of those countries" (Hansard 14 May 1991, c239).

There is further a desire to influence other donor states, as may be evidenced from minister Chalker’s statement that "I have already encouraged my colleagues in the European

Community to follow our lead" (Hansard 19 December 1990, c29G).

Assessment of the Evidence

Like the representatives in the Belgian parliament, British MPs occasionally complain of the low attendance at debates on foreign assistance. While a small group may be debating the issue, this group does seem to feel strongly about it.

Despite some differences across time, across the parties, and across front and back benchers, the power broker role conception plays an important role in the British debate on foreign assistance. One point to consider, however, is the fact that Conservatives were in government during most of the 1975-90 period used for this study. The data presented above lead to the expectation that had the reverse been true and Labour had governed during most of this period, the evidence might have been a lot weaker as far as the power broker role conception is concerned. For the periods of tenure of the two Labour ministers covered by these data. Hart’s ministry would support the prevalence of a social engineer role conception under Labour government, while the data for Prentice’s tenure are less conclusive, as is shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.6 above. The exact impact of a more prolonged period of Labour

Government therefore remain speculative, although it does seem fair to conclude that the empirical evidence would have looked different and less strongly support a power broker role conception. 233 Congruence with Policy Behavior

The relative emphasis on bilateral and multilateral aid is in the direction that was hypothesized for policy behavior congruent with the power broker role conception. That is, bilateral aid receives a relatively greater emphasis. However, the difference between bilateral

and multilateral aid is relatively small for most years and the relative difference between the two categories of foreign assistance is not nearly as distinct as expected (see Table 6.18).

The relative emphasis on multilateral aid is stronger than hypothesized. However, it does

coincide with a relatively strong focus on playing an active leadership role within

international organizations. This theme constitutes well over half of all the references made to themes associated with the power broker role conception, or 180 out of 313 references to power broker themes. British decision makers thus see their state’s leadership importantly within international organizations and the role conception and policy behavior data are consistent in that regard.

British bilateral aid has been mostly in grant form, which is counter to the hypothesized expectation for policy behavior. Rhetoric evidencing a power broker role conception was expected to coincide with a proportionally higher level of loans than grants and a high level of tying. While Table 6.19 shows that British aid has been largely in grant form. Table 6.20 shows that it has also been tied to a large degree. Successive ministers of overseas development especially have stressed the high quality of British foreign assistance.

The connection is not always made explicit, but the claim to high quality is derived from the fact that the aid is mostly in grant form. The high level of tying finds a corollary in the decision maker rhetoric where the merchant theme of mutual benefit to donor and recipient, and sometimes outright reference to the favorable impact of certain types of aid programs on Table 6.18.

UNITED KINGDOM: RELATIVE EMPHASIS ON BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

BiUtcrel 66 70 50 58 56 72 61 53 53 55 56 58 54 54 57 56 (% of total)

MuIUlatenil 34 30 50 42 44 28 39 47 47 45 44 42 46 46 43 44 (% of total)

Total ODA 863 835 1115 1465 2156 1854 2192 1800 1610 1430 1530 1737 1871 2645 2587 2647 (S million)

Source: Calculated from net dUbureementa fîgures given in reference tables of OECD, various years. Development Co-Operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. Paris: OECD.

s Table 6.19.

UNITED KINGDOM: GRANT PERCENTAGE OF BILATERAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Granti and 66 97 98 95 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 grant like contribudortt <%of bilateral)

Bilateral ODA 566 581 552 854 1214 1328 1327 958 859 783 860 1011 1008 1430 1463 1483 <$ million)

Source: Calculated from net disbursements figures given in reference tables of OECD, various years, DevelopmentCo-Operation; Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. Paris: OECD.

s Table 6.20.

UNITED KINGDOM: TYING STATUS OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Tied aid* 50 .. 73 73 78 76 74 70 78 76 83 76 (% of bilateral)

Partially 27 12 <1 <1 tied aid*» <% of bilateral)

Untied 25 20 22 26 28 22 24 17 24 aid*** (% of bilateral)

* Mainly tied to procurement in the donor country. ** Contributions available for procurement from donor and substantially all developing countries. *** Fully and freely available for essentially world*wide procurement

Source: Calculated from tying status figures (commitmotU) in OECD, various years, Development Co«Oi>er^on: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. Paris; OECD.

s 237

British trade and industry, occur frequently/ The high level of tying therefore not only concurs with the themes British decision makers stress in their speeches, it also supports the hypothesized behavior.

British multilateral aid contains a substantial but diminishing proportion allocated to the World Bank Group and regional development banks. The share of multilateral aid allocated to these institutions remains larger than the share allocated to UN agencies and in that respect follows the expected pattern. It was hypothesized that the policy behavior coinciding with the power broker role conception would stress Bretton Woods or international banking institutions. While, as already stated, the British policy behavior emphasizes multilateral aid to a greater extent than expected, the relative expenditures on international banking institutions and UN agencies are in the expected direction. Over the course of the

1975-90 period, however, the share of these international banking institutions has been reduced in favor of the percentage allocated to the European Community’s development programs. The share allocated to EEC development efforts has grown in the 1980s to be larger than the share allocated to the World Bank Group and regional development banks

(Table 6.21). This changing emphasis reflects a refocusing of Britain’s leadership role to be played out in relation to the European Community, not a departure from a power broker role conception. Minister Chalker, for instance, speaks on different occasions of the United

Kingdom having "galvanized the EC’s decision” (Hansard 14 May 1991 c220) or having

"already encouraged my colleagues in the European Conununity to follow our lead" (Hansard

19 December 1990, c290).

* See May and Dobson (1979) for a critical evaluation of whether domestic industries do in fact benefit. What is important here is not whether such a strategy actually achieves its intended goal, but that it guides decision makers. Table 6.21.

UNITED KINGDOM: MULTILATERAL EXPENDITURES

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

UN agencies 30 20 13 17 15 21 11 12 11 13 15 16 18 16 17 17 (% of multilateral)

EEC 14 19 17 14 27 53 37 36 38 47 45 45 42 40 44 50 (56 of multilatéral)

WorW 53 56 67 65 55 22 49 50 48 38 37 36 37 40 34 30 Bank Group* and Regional Banks

Other

Multi­ 297 254 563 611 942 526 865 842 751 646 670 726 863 1215 1124 1164 lateral ODA ($ million)

* Includes capital subscription payments to IBRD, IFC, IDA.

Source: Calculated from net disbursements figures given in reference tables of OECD, various years, Development Co-Operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. Paris: OECD.

5 00 239

In sum, the foreign assistance policy behavior of the United Kingdom displays a

higher grant level and a larger emphasis on multilateral institutions than expected, although

the difference in relative expenditure between multi- and bilateral aid is in the expected

direction. Furthermore, the high level of tied aid and the focus on the international banking

institutions in multilateral aid are according to expectation. The British policy behavior can therefore be said to be congruent with the power broker role conception exhibited in the

rhetoric of its decision makers.

Conclusions

Although the overall pattern across the years favors the conclusion that the power broker role conception does indeed guide British decision makers to a large degree, it should be noted that the pattern is not equally clear for all the years considered. Specifically, years with very few debates on foreign asssistanec policy, such as the 1986-87 and 1985-86 sessions of Parliament, show an inconsistent pattern. During the 1986-87 year, only one debate was held and it concerned food aid given by the European Community. The previous year, 1985-86, good neighbor and social engineer themes appear strong. An explanation may be found in the subject matter of the debates held that year. Of the three debates on foreign assistance policy held that year, two focused on disaster relief and the third was a debate on the Address. The last does not show a clear pattern. The debate on the Address held the previous year earlier shows a split between power broker and good neighbor themes and thus also presents a mixed pattern. The problem with these debates on the Address is that they are sections on foreign assistance interspersed in general debates on foreign affairs. This may explain why the patterns are odd: the few mentions of foreign assistance are more likely 240 to focus on what sets foreign assistance apart from foreign policy in general than on what the two have in common, which could explain the relative strength of good neighbor themes.

The fact that some years there is very little debate on foreign assistance underscores the necessity to look at a longer time period and to take into account the subject matter of debates. In other words, the debates must be seen in the context within which they took place, which renders interpretation of the relative frequency of the various themes rather more complex than a simple addition.

Such a refocusing is the subject of the following quote, in which Roy Jenkins compares the relation between the United States and tlie United Kingdom to the relative influence of the Roman and Greek empires:

although the Americans may be the Romans of the modem world, we can be the Greeks. The Americans may have the power, but we can have the influence, the wisdom, and the rayonnement, as the French, who pay great attention to these matters, would describe it. (09-11-84)

Although British decision makers realize their power may have diminished, this quote beautifully summarizes that this does not mean a departure from a power broker role conception, but a rethinking of the manner in which Britain can play that role. Indeed, the desire to play a leadership role and to influence other donor states clearly play a role in the conceptions British decision makers hold of their state. CHAPTER VII

A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

Introduction

Some distinct differences in the debate on foreign assistance exist between the

Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom. From these, differences in the conceptions decision makers hold of their state’s role in this issue area can be inferred. Furthermore, there are differences in the policy behavior of the three states not only in terms of the percentage of GNP spent on foreign assistance, but also in terms of allocation within that aid budget. In this broadest sense, then, the hypothesis that conceptions of their state’s role in their world guides decision makers is thus supported. However, the specific national role conception framework as posited in chapter three for the study of the foreign assistance issue area was only partially supported by the data. The Dutch and British cases appear to conform better to the hypothesized role conceptions than does the Belgian case. As was pointed out in chapter five, which elaborates on the latter case, this is likely to be due to the fact that Belgian decision makers do not perceive foreign assistance as a distinctly separate issue area to the same extent as the Dutch and British decision makers.

This chapter will provide a comparison of the empirical results for The Netherlands,

Belgium and the United Kingdom discussed in the previous three chapters. It will then

241 242 provide an assessment of the adequacy of the national role conception framework proposed in this study and point to directions for further work in this area.

The Roles of the Ministers

The institutional configurations in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom all limit the authority of the the minister in charge of foreign assistance or development cooperation. Generally, issues related to the state’s participation in international banks are officially outside the jurisdiction of such a minister, and instead fall within the competence of a minister of finance or treasury. Some loan programs also resort under different ministries in all three states. An example is the British Aid and Trade Provision (ATP), which falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Trade and Industry. Despite these structural similarities, the practical importance of the minister of development cooperation and the manner in which individuals holding that post function within their governments varies across the three states.

In the Netherlands the importance of development cooperation as a ministry has increased over the years as a result of an active role played within their coalition cabinets by several individuals who served in that role. Minister Pronk, the first minister in the period

1975-90 covered by this study, was actually the second minister charged with development cooperation who took such an active role in the cabinet more generally, as was described in chapter four. Pronk was trained as a development economist and therefore was knowledgeable about the issues within his ministerial competence. His successor. De

Koning, was a similarly active member of his coalition. The fact that several successive individuals serving in this position were politicians of some weight reflects both the 243 importance of individuals in enhancing the status of a department and the relative importance attached to this subject matter in Dutch foreign policy. Nevertheless, development cooperation does not constitute a separate ministry but is instead administratively part of the ministry of foreign affairs. The Dutch minister for development cooperation is officially a minister without portfolio who is charged with responsibility for this issue area.

In Belgium an active role of the kind played by minister Pronk in the Netherlands would likely have meant political suicide for the politician involved. As was described in chapter five, the person appointed to the post of minister of development cooperation is generally a junior member of the cabinet and many seek to use the position to build a career.

Eyskens, for instance, served as minister of development cooperation in three successive cabinets led by prime minister Martens in the period from April 1979 until October 1980.

He went on to a stint as prime minister in a short lived cabinet (April-September 1981) and has served as minister of foreign affairs since May 1988. Eyskens is also a member of the

Flemish Christian People’s Party (CVP), which has generally furnished the prime minister of Belgian coalitions and thus can be seen as playing an important role in Belgian politics.

A similar career path may be harder to achieve for persons who represent one of the smaller parties, but the point is that the job is generally more perceived as a step on the political career ladder than that it is taken on by individuals with expertise in or commitment to the policy area. In institutional terms, development cooperation is part of the ministry of foreign affairs, foreign trade, and development cooperation. For most cabinets during the period under study, there were three separate ministers for each of these three issue areas.

Exceptions are the first period, during which Van Elslande was in charge of both foreign affairs and development cooperation, and the period from December 1981 until May 1988, 244 during which Tindemans as minister of foreign affairs was seconded by state secretaries for foreign trade and development cooperation. The latter were not included in the cabinet.

In the United Kingdom the minister for overseas development has not enjoyed cabinet level status except for the period of Prentice’s ministry during the 1975-76 parliamentary year, which means that within the cabinet the foreign secretary was responsible for development cooperation for most of the period under study. Given that any individual serving as foreign secretary has many aspects of British foreign relations to worry about, the implication is that overseas development figured less prominently within the scope of British foreign relations than in that of Dutch foreign relations. In addition, as described in chapter six, the minister for overseas development is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the prime minister, a construction which makes a highly visible policy unlikely unless a prime minister would specifically desire to clearly position Britain in this issue area.

The institutional structures, although on the surface sharing certain similarities, result in differences in the political significance of the role actually played by the minister for development cooperation. While in all three states the bureaucracy is attached to the ministry of foreign affairs, only in the Netherlands has the minister of development cooperation consistently been part of the cabinet. In Britain, this was only the case for a very short period. In Belgium there was a minister with cabinet-level status for a little over half of the years under study or, alternatively, for three out of the eight individuals in charge of development cooperation. The activist role played by several of the Dutch ministers which helped shape the Dutch high profile in this issue area may have been made possible by these variations in institutional context, although this context alone is not a sufficient explanation.

In addition, political decisions made during the cabinet formation process to appoint 245 individuals who were likely to play an active role in the government account for the emergence of an activist rhetoric and a clear positioning of its role in the foreign assistance issue area among Dutch decision makers. In other words, political decisions made by individuals operating within an institutional framework that shares many similarities with the institutional frameworks of the other two states is a more satisfactory explanation of the differences in debate and policy than an institutional explanation. The question that remains is why the Dutch context facilitated the emergence of individuals who sought to carve out new roles for their state while the Belgian and British context allow such opinion to be voiced on occasion but not to dominate debate or policy. One difference that can be pointed to is that the Netherlands domestically also is, of the three states under consideration here, the one most clearly oriented towards minimizing the gap between rich and poor through its social policies. But that leaves unanswered why these attitudes are more prevalent in the

Netherlands than in Belgium or the United Kingdom.

Historical Context

All three states have a colonial history, but it plays different roles in the debate on foreign assistance during the 1975-90 period. While the British discuss this past as imparting on their state certain responsibilities and the Belgians in terms of their resource dependence and economic needs, the Dutch discuss their aid relations with former colonies mostly in terms of historical accident.

Among British decision makers, the state’s former empire is seen as imparting it with a special responsibility towards the Third World. This ranges from a nostalgic view of colonial rule, such as Conservative MP Amery’s comment that "[w]e abandoned our 246 responsibilities in black Africa far too soon" (Hansard 22 November 1984, c467), to an assertion by Barnett (Labour) of "the special role this country has because of its colonial history" (Hansard 7 November 1975, c824).

That special role is often seen as bound up with the Commonwealth, an assertion literally made by Liberal Democrat Alton who holds that "Britain’s heritage and its traditions are bound up in the Commonwealth" (Hansard 21 November 1983, cl02). This organization is often seen as a body that gives the United Kingdom and its decision makers a unique opportunity to engage in a dialogue with developing countries. Implicitly, there appears to be the notion that the Commonwealth brings states together in a manner that is less clearly colored by what divides North and South, but more by what could (potentially) unite them in a common future. It is thus that Labour MP Eric Deakins expresses the hope that the

Commonwealth will figure prominently in British relations with the Third world:

Hon. Members have a duty to ask the Government to put the Commonwealth at the forefront of their concerns. Outside the United Nations and associated bodies, it is the only institution in the world which unites rich and poor countries and which is multi-racial. ... I hope that we shall all do our best to urge the Government of the day to make better use of that marvelous institution. (Hansard 21 November 1983, cl09)

This sentiment is not one shared only by the opposition, but also by representatives of the government. One of the Undersecretaries attached to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

Conservative Ray Whitney perceives that the "Commonwealth offers a magnificent opportunity for international understanding" (Hansard 21 November 1983, cl 19).

This implies that British foreign assistance relations are tied to a large degree to its former colonies. The argument that this is only proper is made by former minister of overseas development Raison (Conservative), supporting his argument with the sense that the 247 historical connection not only has given Britain greater knowledge of those areas, but also a greater responsibility:

we should concentrate harder on providing more help in depth in those areas that we know really well and where we have really strong obligations and historical connections. (Hansard 14 May 1991, c229)

This same perception that historical connections loom large in their foreign assistance policies is perceived somewhat differently by Belgian decision makers. As early as 1979, VU representative Baert expresses the need to lessen Belgium’s dependence on Zaire:

it is high time that our development policy is directed less exclusively at Zaire. There are enough other countries ... where we, less burdened with the —justly or unjustly- unsympathetic mortgage of a past but real colonial past, being accepted with less prejudice and more reason, can achieve purposeful and lasting development cooperation. (PH/AP 5 April 1979 pi 136)

Belgian aid has indeed had a strong focus on especially its former colony Zaire, but also its former mandates Rwanda and Burundi. Zaire alone has received a minimum of twenty percent of the total Belgian foreign assistance as late as 1987. The figure has only begun to drop to a less prominent position for Zaire in Belgian aid in the last few years.

According to Geens, this focus on Zaire was determined entirely by Belgium’s colonial past which had resulted in extensive commercial ties. Now that the importance of these commercial interests has declined, Zaire is also less prominent in Belgian foreign assistance

(Coolsaet 1987).

This resource dependence seems to have been mitigated by contacts with other

African states that have now been built up and that have facilitated a more critical stance towards Zaire. Nevertheless, the Belgian aid program was until very recently dominated by the relationship with Zaire. 248

For the Netherlands, while Indonesia certainly plays a significant role, the Dutch thinking on foreign assistance seems to have shifted to a more mondial focus early on

(relative to Belgium certainly). In terms of actual assistance dollars, the Dutch foreign assistance package has not emphasized any one state to the extent that Belgium has concentrated on Zaire. India figures prominently in Dutch foreign assistance along with

Indonesia -the two countries alternate as top recipient of Dutch aid. While this lesser focus on former colonies could be interpreted as evidence a more enlightened view, it may also plainly serve commercial interests. The two are not wholly separate as the social engineer and merchant role conceptions share a focus on economic factors that however is phrased very differently in terms of the time horizon guiding them.

The Data

The parliamentary debates of the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, while all dealing with foreign assistance, configure their subject matter differently. The

Dutch decision makers debate the section of the budget concerned with development cooperation separately on a consistent basis. Belgian decision makers frequently discuss the subject together with foreign trade and foreign affairs generally. Lastly, the British do not attach their discussions of the subject matter to budgetary issues, although issues relating to the budget allocation for aid do enter into debates on occasion. The manner in which the decision makers of each of these three states tend to discuss foreign assistance was described in the chapters dealing with each of them. As was noted there, these different configurations of the foreign assistance debate render the data for the three states less than fully comparable.

Some caution in making cross-national comparisons is therefore indicated. However, these 249 differences are also instructive in that they point to differences in the manner in which decision makers in each of these three settings construe the issue area in relation to other policy areas. The debates must be seen in the context within which they took place, which renders interpretation of the relative frequency of the various themes rather more complex than simple addition. While the figures certainly give an indication of differences in debate, it is important not to ignore that the manner in which the same theme is addressed is not fully consistent across the three states. This points to issues of methodology which will be addressed further in the conclusions to this chapter. First, a comparison of the rhetoric and behavior measures across the three states is in order.

The Results: the Rhetoric

The previous chapter have mostly focused on the content of the debates in terms of the role conceptions and the themes associated with them. A difference across the three states that has not been addressed is that references to . desired policy take up various percentages of the total references to themes made for each case. References to desired policy are themes phrased in positive terms and pertaining to policy directions desired for the future. This includes references to current policy if the speaker clearly indicates a desire for such policy to be continued. Expressions of desired policy are concerned with what the various speakers hold to be appropriate future directions and relate most clearly to decision maker perceptions of what their state’s role in the foreign assistance issue area should be.

While such expressions are most prevalent for all three states, they dominate the debate in different measures. British decision makers speak in terms of desired policy least often, while the Belgian debates focus on such themes most often. References to desired policy 250 constitute 60.1 per cent of the British data, 71.3 per cent of the Belgian and 67.9 per cent of the Dutch references. Before concluding that this is a measure of a greater level of general consensus among the decison makers of the latter two states, it should also be noted that Belgium has the highest percentage of negatively phrased references, which constitute

16.9 per cent of the data. The comparable figures for the United Kingdom and the

Netherlands are 14.8 and 9 per cent, which would indicate that the Dutch have the highest level of agreement, while both the British and Belgian decision makers display a greater level of contention in their debates (see Table 7.1). Given that both the Netherlands and Belgium are political systems where coalitions of several parties are needed to form a government, one might have expected a greater similarity in the (lack of) contentiousness of debate there.

Indeed, Pancer et al argue that the lines between government and opposition roles of political parties are less sharply drawn in coalition systems, and that representatives of the opposition have "a greater role to play in formulating policy, and are thus more accountable for actions taken while they occupy this role" (1992, 34). This would lead one to expect a lesser contentiousness of debate, or fewer negatively phrased expressions, and a greater emphasis on what should be policy in the point of view of the speaker as evidence of a sense of responsibility regarding the formulation of policy. While this is true for Dutch coalitions,

Belgian political debate displays a somewhat greater level of contentiousness that does the

British debate. This may be a reflection of the instability of Belgian coalitions. In other words, Pancer et al (1992) may be correct that for coalition governments to function productively, a blurring of government and opposition roles is helpful. However, the Belgian case shows that coalition governments do not equal a lesser contentiousness of debate. Dutch 251 Table 7.1.

COMPARISON OF TENSE AND STRENGTH OF REFERENCES

THE NETHERLANDS Tense

Strength Past Pres. Future Total

Positive 8 49 699 756

Neutral 1 44 136 181

Negative 1 38 54 93 9.9% (93)

Total 10 131 889 1030

BELGIUM Tense

Strength Past Pres. Future Total

Positive 1 9 186 196

Neutral - 3 18 21

Negative - 16 .28 44

Total 1 28 232 261

UNITED KINGDOM Tense

Strength Past Pres. Future Total

Positive 10 113 467 590

Neutral 3 28 41 72

Negative 9 80 26 115 14.8% (115)

Total 22 221 534 777 252

politics, on the other hand, has long been characterized by its consensus oriented nature

(Lijphart 1968).

Apart from these differences in the manner in which decision makers express

themselves, there are also differences in content. A comparison of the relative frequency of the role conceptions for the three state shows some differences in the debate on foreign

assistance between the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. The data for the

Netherlands show an emphasis on social engineer themes which constitute about 43 per cent of all references. References to power broker themes constitute about 40 per cent of the

British total, while for Belgium no one role conception stands out so clearly. Social engineer

and merchant themes constitute about 37 and 35 per cent of all references, respectively. It

should be noted that there are also the fewest data for Belgium and that the difference of two percentage points reflects a difference of only four references (96 versus 92). The relative frequencies for the three states are presented in Table 7.2.

These overall relative frequencies support the hypothesis that Dutch decision makers perceive their state in terms of a social engineer role conception and that British decision makers conceive of the British role in the foreign assistance issue area in terms of the power broker role conception. The overall evidence for Belgian decision makers is less straightforward and would, if anything, disconfirm a merchant role conception. However, these overall relative frequencies obscure a wealth of information. The previous three chapters discuss both the overall data and (relative) emphasis on the various themes within each role conception in detail. The data for Belgium, while not fitting neatly into the hypothesized role conception when the overall figures are regarded, do present a logical profile in terms of the themes which are referenced most frequently. The desire to benefit 253

Table 1.2.

RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR EACH STATE

Role Concentica

Sate Good Neighbor Social Biaineer Merchant Power Broker Total

The NetfaerlaodB 7.2% 43.4% 20% 29.4% N = 1030

Belgium 7.3% 36.8% 35.2% 20.7% N= 261

Ueitod Kingdom 11.6% 24.1% 24.1% 40.3% N= 777

the Belgian economy through the foreign assistance program is addressed a full 23 per cent of the total of 261 references to all themes combined. Additionally, almost 16 per cent of the references pertain to the need to secure the long term stability of the international system.

Table 7.3 presents these relative frequencies for the themes for each state.

Each of these themes was conceived as an empirical referent to measure the existence of a particular role conception. The themes thus were used to operationalize the role conceptions, which are after all abstract entities. As the data presented in Table 7.3 confirm, there are distinct differences in the relative frequencies of certain themes across the three states. Although social engineer themes constitute over 43 per cent of the total references made to the various themes by the Dutch decision makers, which amounts to the strongest focus on a single role conception across the three states, there is no one single theme wiüiin this role conception that is emphasized as strongly as the expression of the desire to actively participate in international organizations or as the most frequently mentioned themes of the

Belgian or British cases. As Table 7.3 shows, the Dutch decision makers address the need to play an active role within international organizations more frequently than the single most 254 Table 7.3.

RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF THEMES FOR EACH STATE

(Percentage of Total, presented by role conception)

Good Neighbor Social Engineer Merchant Power Broker

Theme * Theme * Theme * Theme *

THE NEÏHERLANDS N = 1030

I. Charity 4.3 1. Poverty 10.5 1. Privatization 8.3 1. Particip.IO 18.7 2. Ediic/Moral 1.6 2. Stability 5.9 2. Mutual BeneHt 6.0 2. Infl.Recip. 3.0 3. Disaster 1.4 3. Empower. 5.6 3. liberal Order 1.9 3. Responsibility 2.9 4. Hum. Right 5.3 3. Free Trade 1.9 4. Democracy 2.6 5. Agric. 3.3 4. Growth 1.7 5. Infl.Donor 1.5 6. NGO 2.8 6. Interest .7 6. Women 2.8 7. Friendly 0 7. Soc.Just 2.1 8. Pop. 1.8 8. Coord. 1.8 9. Eavironm. 1.3

BELGIUM N=261

1. Charity 5.7 1. Stability 15.7 1. Mutual Benefit 23.0 1. Particip.IO 9.6 2. Disaster 1.1 2. Agric. 6.1 2. Free Trade 5.4 2. Interest 3.4 3. Elhic/Moral .4 3. Poverty 3.8 3. Privatization 3.8 3. Infl.Recip. 3.1 3. Hum. Rights 3.8 4. Growth 2.3 4. Rcspoiuibility 2.3 4. Empower. 3.1 5. Liberal Order .8 5. Infl.Donor 1.1 5. NGO 2.3 6. Democracy .8 6. Eavironm. .8 7. Friendly .4 6. Women .8 7. Coord. .4 8. Pop. 0 8. Soc.Just. 0

UNITED KINGDOM N= 777

1. Disaster 8.9 1. Stability 9.0 1. Mutual Benefit 7.5 1. Particip.IO 23.2 2. Charity 1.4 2. Poverty 4.0 2. Free Trade 7.2 2. Responsibility 5.0 3. Ethic/Moral 1.3 3. Empowerment 3.2 3. Privatization 5.0 3. Infl.Recip. 4.5 4. Agric. 2.1 4. Growth 2.8 4. Infl.Donor 3.0 5. Soc.Just 1.5 5. Liberal Order 1.5 5. Democracy 2.2 6. Environm. 1.4 6. Interest 1.8 7. Pop. 1.3 7. Fri«id!y .6 8. Hum.Right .6 9. Coord. .5 lO.NGO .3 11. Women .1 255 frequently mentioned social engineer theme: almost nineteen per cent of their references pertain to the Dutch role in international organizations, while the need to address poverty as a structural condition is referred to a little over ten per cent. By contrast, the Belgian decision makers refer to the need to benefit their economy through aid 23 per cent of their total, while the British focus on their role in international organizations over 23 per cent of their total. If the single theme focused on most often is regarded, then, one would have to conclude that the British and Belgian decision makers refer most often to themes that evidence the role conceptiuon hypothesized to be guide their foreign assistance decision making, while the evidence for the Dutch case becomes less solid. What such an assessment disregards, is that the manner in which the same themes are addressed in each of the three states is dissimilar.

Differences across the three states do not only manifest themselves in differences in relative emphasis on themes within the same role conception, although these differences are most easily shown. Within the social engineer role the Dutch focus on the poverty theme, while Belgian and British decision makers both reference the long run stability of international environment most often. That similarity in focus on this theme, however, obscures the fact that the Belgian decision makers remain fairly abstract in their references to the importance to secure the long term stability of the international environment, while the

British decision makers phrase the need to pay attention to this issue clearly in terms of its implication for North South trade and also the welfare of the North, including Britain. The implications of the potential instability of the international system seem to be worked out more in the expressed opinions of the British decision makers than in those of the Belgians. 256

In addition to focusing on different themes within the same role conception, there are differences in which references to the same theme are phrased. Both Dutch and Belgian decision makers refer to the benefits to their domestic economy that can accrue as a result of foreign assistance. The Belgian decision makers generally perceive such mutual benefits as entirely legitimate and are quick to point out the need for foreign assistance to benefit the

Belgian economy either domestically or in its trade relations. The Dutch, on the other hand, are more circumspect and couch references to this theme in terms of the need to preserve the developmental purpose of assistance. Their rhetoric stresses that while it is alright for Dutch industry to benefit, this may not go at the cost of the purpose of development. What is an unanswered question is whether the Dutch product is in such cases always appropriate to the circumstances in the recipient state, and thus whether in the end the so-called developmental relevance of the aid is indeed preserved. Nevertheless, the rhetoric regarding this issue is very different in the Netherlands as compared to Belgium.

Another such example is the usage of references to the desire to play an active role in international organziations among British and Dutch decision makers. While the British decision makers speak of playing a leadership role within international organizations, Dutch decision makers perceive their state’s role within such bodies as that of a guide to other states. The Dutch decision makers realize they do not nearly carry the weight of a larger state like the United Kingdom, but they nevertheless feel they can have an impact by setting an example and thereby serving as a guide to others. The manner in which they seek to affect other states is in the direction of their own policy preferences which are geared towards lessening the gap between rich and poor, which they perceive as the avenue towards lessening tensions between rich and poor states and a more stable international environment. 257

The manner in which themes are phrased is interdependent with the combination of themes. The Belgian emphasis on the need to benefit the domestic economy through its aid is supported rather than contested by its use of references to the need to help work towards greater stability of the international environment. Both themes are bound up with the notion that Belgium is economically vulnerable because of its large dependence on international trade for its welfare. The British use of references to the stability of the international environment coexists with a strong emphasis on the need to play a leadership role in international organizations. The combination of the same theme, the need for a more stable international environment, carries a different meaning in each state because of its occurrence within debate that covers a different scope of issues.

The Dutch, like the British, often focus on their state’s role in international organizations, but for them it occurs in debate that also stresses the notion that the extreme poverty of large parts of the world needs to be addressed to create a more stable international environment. Together, these themes reflect the same ideas that support the domestic welfare state and translate this to a mundial scale. CDA representative Aarts, as cited in chapter four, laments the fact that no "competent world government" exists to help regulate the international economy (Handelingen 15 February 1978, p857). Fellow Christian democrat

De Hoop Scheffer claims that the "advancement of legal order is one of the central objectives" of Dutch foreign policy (Handelingen 24 November 1987, pl227), while De

Koning (CDA) in his role as minister of development cooperation compares the UN goal of

.7 per cent of GNP to be devoted to development cooperation to a tax (Handelingen 21

February 1980, p3242). All these expressions may be seen as evidencing the wish that 258 international organizations may function in the same sort of regulatory capacity that governments of welfare states do, mediating extreme differences between rich and poor.

The content of the references thus needs to be taken into account in interpreting what on basis of frequencies appear to be deviations from the hypothesized role conceptions. Tlliis leads to the conclusion that the combination and content of the references to the various themes interact and together provide insight into the manner in which the decision makers of the various states conceive of their state’s role in this issue area.

The Results: Policy Behavior

It was hypothesized that the social engineer role conception would manifest itself in a larger grant element, while the merchant and especially power broker roles would coincide with a greater emphasis on loans rather than grants. In fact, for the three states considered here, the opposite is true. Grant and grant like contributions, as reported by the OECD, have since 1980 constituted one hundred per cent of British aid,* while the rhetoric of its decision makers strongly suggests a power broker role conception. On the other extreme is the Netherlands, which exhibits the lowest grant percentage of the three states. Its averages about 83 per cent for the 1975-90 period.^ The rhetoric of the Dutch decision makers, however, displays a social engineer role conception regarding their perception of the Dutch

' Please refer to Table 6.19 for figures for the entire 1975-90 period.

^ Please refer to Table 4.19 for a more detailed account of the grant percentage of Dutch bilateral aid. 259 role in this issue area. Lastly, the Belgian aid figures show an average of 85 per cent of its bilateral aid to qualify as grant and grant like contributions.^

This could mean that the Dutch rhetoric hides a thoroughly pragmatic policy, as Weis

(1982) contends. It could also mean that the relative level of grants is not a good indicator which may very well be the case, especially since all three states show high and increasing percentages devoted to aid in grant form.

The hypothesized levels of tying are borne out a lot closer by the data. It was hypothesized that a social engineer role conception would coincide with a low level of tying, the merchant and power broker roles with higher levels of tying, which means that whatever goods and services are procured with the tied assistance must be obtained from suppliers in the donor state. The data for the United Kingdom and Belgium,"* reveal a consistently high percentage of bilateral aid to be tied. For the United Kingdom, an average of about 73 per cent of its bilateral aid is tied, and an average of about 64 per cent of Belgian aid falls in the same category. By contrast, only an average of about 16 per cent of Dutch foreign assistance is tied. There is therefore a significant difference in the level of tying between the United

Kingdom and Belgium on the one hand, and the Netherlands on the other, which is conform the expectations for policy behavior associated with the role conceptions evident in the rhetoric of each of these states. Another significant feature of the figures on levels of tying for the three states is that the Netherlands is the only one which utilizing partially tied in any significant proportion. While Belgian decision makers have never utilized such aid, the

British use of such aid has declined markedly with the rise to power of the Conservatives.

’ See Table 5.14.

"* These data are presented in Tables 6.20 and 5.15 in chapter 6 and 5 respectively. 260 For the Netherlands, partially tied aid takes up about 31 per cent of its bilateral aid on average, and it has been a stronger component of its aid in the second half of the 1980s than in earlier periods. Partially tied aid is, according to its OECD definition, aid that can be used to obtain goods from the donor and from other developing states. In other words, it is geared to prevent competition to the donor state from other developed economies, but allows procurement from other states besides the donor. This can be interpreted in two ways. Such aid can be seen as essentially tied in that the recipient is likely to procure goods from the donor state because other developing ones may not be able to supply what is needed. Alternatively, such aid can be seen as facilitating the purchase of goods that suit the environment of a developing state in that other developing nations may have developed technologies which are more appropriate to the circumstances of the recipient than are those of the donor state. If the latter interpretation is accepted, then such partially tied aid may be seen as a mechanism designed to facilitate self-reliance within the larger scope of the South as a whole and lessen dependence on the often inappropriate goods the North can supply.

On the other hand, partially tied aid can be interpreted as little different from tied aid if the goods to be procured with it can only be obtained from the North. In the latter case, partial tying is of little meaning and the end-result is that the goods will be obtained from the donor state, which has safeguarded itself from competition from other developed states in this manner. If, in light of this latter interpretation, the tied and partially tied aid of the

Netherlands are added together, the gap between its performance and that of Belgium and the

United Kingdom narrows considerably, although it remains substantial. Fully and partially tied aid together account for an average of 47 per cent of Dutch bilateral aid. 261

The Dutch use of partially tied aid can thus variously be interpreted as developmentally friendly, or, more cynically, as a clever way to ^pear to be one thing while achieving another in practice. Given that Dutch bilateral aid also shows a much higher percentage of untied aid on average than do either Belgium or the United Kingdom (53 versus 36 and 22 per cent), the more benevolent interpretation may be warranted.*

The relative emphasis on bi- and multilateral aid is different for all three states. The

Dutch focus least on multilateral aid of the three states: an average of barely thirty per cent of Dutch foreign assistance goes to multilateral channels, while the Belgian record shows an average of about 36 per cent and the British performance emphasizes multilateral aid most strongly with an average of 42 per cent.* This runs counter to East’s (1973) finding that small states rely more on multilateral foreign policy because of their lesser edacity to administer and implement programs on their own. Of course. East’s research concerned small state foreign policy more generally and it is possible that foreign assistance provides a payoff that makes it worth the effort for small states, possibly the economic return associated with much of it.

It was hypothesized that social engineer role conception would be evidenced in greater focus on UN agencies among multilateral expenditures, whereas merchant and power broker, coincide with participation in Bretton Woods institutions and power broker not focusing much on multilateral institutions. As was discussed in chapter six, the United Kingdom shows a

* It should be noted, however, that Belgium in the second half of the 1980s has come close to equalling the Dutch percentage of bilateral aid that qualifies as untied. Tables 4.20, 5.14, and 6.20 show the figures for the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, respectively.

* Based on the figures given in Tables 4.18, 5.16, and 6.18 for, respectively, the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom. 262 greater emphasis on multilateral assistance than expected. The focus among the multilateral institutions, however, seems to coincide with the rhetoric which stresses playing a leadership role within these institutions. Consequently, UN agencies receive less emphasis, on average about 16 per cent of British multilateral aid dollars, while the international lending institutions receive about 45 per cent and the EC 36. The focus on the latter organization has increased markedly over the years (Table 6.21), showing a redirection of the arena within which the

British seek to play their leadership role. While the British emphasis on multilateral assistance is thus greater than expected, the relative emphases on the various types of international organizations is as expected.

In agreement with a merchant orientation, Belgian decision makers have focused similarly on international lending institutions and the EC (UN average 16 per cent. World

Bank Group 36, EC 43).

The Netherlands, in contrast, averages an allocation of about 38 per cent of its multilateral expenditures on UN agencies, while the international banking institutions receive an average of 33 and the EEC 27 per cent. Of the three states, the Netherlands is the only one to focus so strongly on UN agencies, a fact that agrees with the social engineer role conception which is also evident in the Dutch rhetoric.

Conclusions

The role conception framework which guided this study assumed foreign assistance to be a recognizable issue area to decision makers in each state, even if it was also understood that the boundaries separating one issue area from another are never neatly drawn. For the Belgian case, the boundaries between foreign assistance and other foreign 263 affairs issues are particularly vague. The implication of the fact that Belgian decision makers do not perceive a role for their state in this issue area that to them separately conceived, is that their rhetoric is also less likely to fit neatly into role categories that assume such a perception.

This points to another issue, which is more fundamental to the design of the national role conception framework as presented in the current study. I am using role conceptions profiles or ideal types against which I measure how decision makers actually see their state’s role. While these four roles form a useful device with which to approach the empirical task, they should not be reified. In the final analysis, it is the decision makers who as a group hold certain conceptions of their state’s role in the foreign assistance issue area. It may therefore be useful to look at the overall pattern and frequency of themes, with the context of the debates taken into account, to get a sense of how decision makers construct their state’s role, rather than to force them into one or another ideal type. Tliis chapter discusses differences in the manner in which the same theme category is addressed across the different states and touches on the significance of the combination of themes which indicate the scope of debate for a particular foreign policy making setting. Both of these issues: the actual content and phraseology of themes coded in one category or another, as well as the combination of themes that recur frequently in the debate are probably more instructive than attempts to fit the rhetoric of the decision makers of any of these three statesm into shoes that do not fit.

This indicates a different methodology. The fact that the same theme is often referenced in a very different manner across the three states is information that does not appear in the relative frequencies of references, but is important information. It goes some 264 way to explaining the significance of the manner in which themes are combined by decision makers in each setting to form a total conception of their state’s role that is to them logically coherent. Modelling the role conceptions as constituted according to the decision makers of each of the three states may therefore give greater insight into the manner in which they conceive of their state’s role in this issue area than forcing them into role categories that are not necessarily their own. A logical outgrowth of the current project is therefore an attempt to model these role conceptions as the decision makers actually perceive them. The intertwining of foreign assistance with foreign economic policy goals more generally by the

Belgian decision makers offers intriguing possibilities in this regard. A comparative

^proach might investigate whether the decision makers of Belgium and the other states perceive differently configured issue areas. If this is the case, this would have implications for the manner in which this concept is used in the study of international relations.

What I am proposing is an ’artificial intelligence’ approach to national role conceptions. This would have the benefit of allowing the researcher to craft shoes to fit the decision makers who as a group represent one state. After all, the interest that drove this enterprise was to gain a better understanding of how the decision makers of the Netherlands,

Belgium, and Britain conceive their state’s role in the foreign assistance issue area, not to force their rhetoric and behavior to fit a framework. Although the posited role conceptions and their associated empirical referents were a useful device that helped gain a comparative insight into the manner in which decision makers perceive their state’s role in the foreign assistance issue area, they constitute a means to understanding and should not be reified to lead a life of their own. APPENDIX A

CODEBOOK

INTRODUCTION.

The coding instructions contained in this codebook reflect the procedures used for coding parliamentary debates concerning foreign assistance. The first section provides mechanical instructions regarding data to be collected for each debate and for each speaker. The remaining sections will provide definitions of concepts and decision rules.

I BASIC INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Prior to coding a debate, number the speaking turns. a. A speaking turn is defined as a speech ranging in length hrom one sentence to a number of paragraphs, made by one speaker uninterrupted by other speakers. b. One-word or other short interruptions that are ignored by the speaker or do not affect his or her argument may be ignored in coding. c. Statements made by the person chairing the debate regarding points of order, or establishing the ordering of the speakers in the debate may be ignored as well. d. Speaking turns related purely to procedural matters of the debate do not need to be numbered (they won't contain codable information). e. Numbering of the speaking turns allows later retrieval of portion of debate on which the assessment reflected on the sheet is based. It will also provide a code for preserving information that themes were addressed jointly in one speaking turn in the database. 2. On first sheet for a debate indicate: a. state (BE, NL, UK). b. parliamentary session year. c. debate topic. 3. Read an entire speaking turn before making any coding decisions.

265 266

4. Mark portions of the speaking turn as they relate to coding decisions. a. E.g., if there are two codable themes, mark the margins of the text with ’1’ and ’2,’ so that the text which formed the basis for the judgment can be easily retrieved. (There may be several statements throughout the speech that relate to each theme, so there may be multiple Is and 2s in the margin of a speech.) 5. Use new codesheet for each speaker for whom there is one or more codable theme(s). a. for speakers with no codable themes, don’t fill out a sheet. 6. For each speaker with (a) codable statement(s) indicate: a. speaker name. b. political party (s)he represents. c. role in government. 1. Min = Minister of Development Cooperation. 2. For other Ministers, indicate particular post held. d. (for Belgian debates only) language used by speaker: 1 .0 = Dutch (Flemish). 2. F = French. 3. D/F, F/D for bilingual speeches. e. date of debate, plus two digits if more than one separate debate on one day. f. speaking turn number. 7. Themes addressed by the speaker. a. Refer to CODABLE THEMES section below for a working definition of what constitutes a codable theme. a. Use the RHETORIC AND ROLE section below to identify the various themes. 8. Theme tense. a. Use THEME TENSE section below. 9. Theme strength. a. Use THEME STRENGTH section below. 10. If there is a concise and/or notable quote regarding the coded themes, indicate this on the code sheet by noting the page number where the quote can be found.

II. CODABLE THEMES.

The coding procedure focusing on themes addressed in speeches and debates. In order to make valid coding decisions, it is important to first read the entire speaking turn and then decide what topic(s) the speaker addresses. A theme is defined as a central or principal topic of a speaking turn. A speaking turn may contain several principal or central topics, especially if it concerns a longer speech, but it is important not to consider every statement by a speaker a theme. Although there may be a concise statement that summarizes a theme nicely, such a concise statement is generally embedded in a speech that is congruent with such a statement. For instance, the speaker may spend time developing an argument by elaborating on an actual or hypothetical occurrence or situation to support a conclusion that takes the form of a concise theme-statement. 267

The question ’what is the point of what the speaker is saying?’ should aid in making decisions regarding whether a speaker merely mentions something or whether it is a theme central to his argument.

WHAT TO CODE: 1. Expressions of opinion or attitude. a. For a theme to be codable, the speaker must express his or her view of what did, does, should or must motivate foreign assistance policy. Statements may be positive, neutral, or negative in tone. b. do not differentiate between an opinion expressed as a personal one or as one of the political party the member belongs to: the issue of interest is the speaker’s social identity, not their secret inner thoughts. A member of a party, expressing party opinion, is establishing an association with that opinion and is therefore expressing an attitude he/she wants to be known as holding. c. Whether what the speaker says is true by some ’objective’ standard is irrelevant for coding purposes. What matters is how a speaker construes the issue in his or her speech.

WHAT NOT TO CODE: 2. Statements of fact. a. BE CAREFUL: expressions of opinion sometimes take the form of statements of fact, or rather, express fact as the speaker sees them. Use context to assess. Code only if can Justify that statement really expresses opinion.

3. References made to statements made by other speakers except if: a. The current speaker uses it as preface to his/her own remarks. What is really being coded in this case is the current speaker’s opinion, not the preface itself. b. The current speaker expresses agreement or disagreement with an earlier speaker. In this case, code only if it is clear what the current speaker agrees or disagrees with.

4. l o r 2 sentence interjections by other speakers that do not impinge on current speaker’s argument. a. Such interjections should already have been excluded by not regarding them as speaking turns.

5. Procedural statements and questions. a. Questions regarding the conduct of the meeting itself should already have been excluded by not regarding them as speaking turns.

III. RHETORIC AND ROLE.

1. GOOD NEIGHBOR Decision makers see foreign assistance in terms of charity. The role conception focuses on a felt obligation to relieve immediate conditions, and may be expressed in religious or ideological terms, although this is not necessarily the case. 268

What is crucial to this role conception is that it lacks a vision regarding the long term and instead focuses entirely on the acute problem. It is designed to alleviate a perceived need within the recipient country and decision makers will stress that there is no self-serving motive, but that aid is instead extended on humanitarian grounds.

110. Ethical or moral obligation. a. Emphasis on spiritual dimension of aid. Good neighbor sees providing aid as a moral or religous duty to ones fellow human. b. Generalized concern over lack of respect for human rights (without implication for policy attached).

120. Charity. a. Poverty relief in very immediate sense, i.e. response to famine (but not aid geared toward prevention of famine). b. Code here is it regards a chronic situation.

130. Disaster relief. a. Relief regarding an immediate need. No stated purpose beyond relieving immediate need. b. Code here if it regards an acute situation.

2. SOCIAL ENGINEER This role conception is driven by the expectation that by providing aid, the donor country can effect structural changes within the recipient country specifically and the international environment more generally. The role conception focuses on the desire to affect procedures, or ’rules of the game,’ rather than specifically on outcomes, although certain outcomes are implicit in the vision that underlies this role conception. The structural changes holders of this role conception aim at are more specifically aimed at greater equality of opportunity for members of recipient societies, and for Third World countries as members of the international system. The role conception builds on a diagnosis consistent with dependency theories, and an awareness of (economic) interdependence that necessitates an effort to alter international structures. The joint identification of dependency and interdependence relates to an identification of the gap between rich and poor as ultimately a threat to the economic well-being of the donor state.

210. Stability of international environment. a. The current international environment is seen as unstable or potentially unstable. The goal is to cooperate in its transformation to achieve a more stable situation. Decision makers holding a social engineer role conception see their state play an important role in this, because it is perceived to be in tiieir state’s interest. b. There may also be a concern with the domestic situation in, or policies of, the recipient state, which decision makers will use to assess whether or not to provide aid. For such a concern to be coded under this heading, a clear link must be made to the diagnosis under 210.a, i.e. these concerns are only coded here if a clear link to the stability of the international environment is made. Otherwise, refer to 220. 269

211. Environmental sustainability. a. This theme is similar to 210, especially 210.a. However, it is expressed not in terms of the need for a more equitable distribution of resources, but instead focuses on ecological issues that affect the donor state’s long-term ability to maintain or enhance the current standard of living.

212. Population policies. a. Code only if the speaker sees this as part of sustainable development. This means that population policies are seen as a pre-condition to the achievement of the transformation of the international system described in 210.

220. Social justice. a. The concern of the speaker is whether the decision makers of the recipient state pursue policies that benefit especially the most disadvantaged in their society, i.e. a general concern with issues of distribution of wealth in a society. This means that the socioeconomic policies of recipient country are basis for determining level of aid.

221. Social justice/ Poverty. a. liie purpose of aid is to fight poverty as a condition and should be designed to benefit the poorest and most disadvantaged groups. The goal is to alter the structural conditions in which those groups live. b. Aid to the poor which is geared to alleviating an immediate need and which does not have the purpose of fighting the phenomenon of poverty does not fall under this heading. The inference that the objective is to fight the existence of poverty as a condition needs to be warranted for a theme to be coded under this heading.

222. Social justice/ Human rights. a. The human rights record of tine recipient state is the basis for determining the aid relationship. Its should affect whether aid is given, how it is given, and how much is given. b. Aid should be used contribute to an improved human rights situation in the recipient state.

230. Empowerment. a. Giving people skills and tools to enable them to improve their own situation. b. Education is coded under this heading only if the link with the definition of empowerment given under 230.a is clearly made. c. Landredistribution, training, job creation in the recipient country are coded under this heading if decision makers express the need for supporting such policies in terms congruent with 230.a. d. Economic development is perceived as a prerequisite for democracy, i.e. the perception that only after certain basics have been met will people become available to be active citizens. Whereas 220 and 221 are concerned with issues of equitable distribution, this theme is concerned with enhancing people’s abilities. 270

231. Empowerment/ NGO. a. Purpose of giving aid via NGOs is to make an impact at the grassroots level that is otherwise impossible to achieve. b. The use of NGOs, whether donor or recipient based, is only coded here if the stated purpose to proposing to utilize such an avenue is congruent with 230.a and 231.a. This may take the form of, for instance, a desire to provide a counterweight to the official policy of the recipient country, supporting a freedom movement.

232. Empowerment/ Food self-sufficiency. a. A focus on supporting agricultural projects that aim at food self-sufficiency, either as a substitute for imports of food or as a long-term strategy to combat famine.

233. Empowerment/ Women. a. Purpose of aid is to improve the situation of women in the recipient country.

240. Donor coordination. a. A desire to cooperate with other donors in the belief that joint efforts will be more effective.

3. MERCHANT This role conception also is driven by the perception that what happens in the world economy affects the donor country domestically, i.e. an awareness of interdependence. But the merchant role conception does not include a desire to change but rather to preserve the international system and especially the donor country’s current position within it. Perception of donor as integral part of an international economic structure. Preserving that economic system and working toward a more optimal functioning of it (especially as related to donor country itself) are central to this conception.

310. Preservation of liberal international economic order. a. Liberal economic principles need to be maintained and extended. The focus is more on the principle of free trade than on benefits to Third World states. b. GATT negotiations essential for the future of the developing world.

320. Protect and/or enhance free trade. a. Trade relations with the Third World are as important as aid relations. b. Whether the subject is raw materials, investment, export, the focus is on the importance of trade relations to improve the economic situation of the recipient state.

330. Growth model. a. Aid should be geared to stimulating economic growth, because a higher national income will benefit all in the recipient state. b. Aid here seen as a ’jump-start’ mechanism, that essentially helps those who want to help themselves. 271

340. Benefits to accrue to donor as well as recipient. a. Purpose of aid is to benefit donor trade and industry while providing assistance. b. The focus here is on mutual benefit to both donor and recipient as a result of providing aid. Whetlier or not this aid is officially tied, the benefits to the donor economy in the form of contracts, exports, jobs gained (or not lost), are an important justification in defense of aid for the decision makers involved.

350. Privatization of aid. a. Expressed preference for greater involvement of, or greater use of, trade and industry as vehicles for dispensing government aid funds. b. The justification is that such a channel is more efficient and better able to reach the target population. c. If delegating the task of implementation of aid to NGOs for reasons of efficiency is stressed, code here as well.

4. POWER BROKER Exercising political influence is central to this role conception. Such influence attempts focus on the government of the recipient country. The form of government of the recipient country may also a focus of influence, but not the structure of the society or the division of wealth or opportunity within it (as is the case with the social engineer). A desire to affect the international system in such a way as to enhance the donor state’s leverage in international politics is central to this role conception and makes it analogous to the traditional realist conception of power as the motivation driving foreign policy decisions.

410. Defend interest in recipient state/part of the world. a. Unwillingness to interfere in domestic matters of recipient state, because preservation of the relationship takes priority.

420. Responsibility to recipient state. a. Purpose of assistance is to increase one’s state’s political leverage, especially with the recipient state. b. Bilateral debt relief is coded here if this is seen as increasing the donor state’s stature, either with the recipient or with other donors.

430. Support friendly government. a. Purpose of assistance is to reinforce the present regime of the recipient country, generally because this regime is perceived as friendly to the donor state.

440. Support democracy or perceived move toward it. a. Purpose of giving aid is to influence the regime in the recipient country, with a focus on rewarding a perceived move toward democracy or to encourage a process of démocratisation. 272

b. To be coded here, the theme must focus on democracy or at least the outward manifestations of it. Whether the recipient state is democratic in any actual sense is not relevant here, only whether the speaker uses such a theme to justify assistance.

450. Influence recipient state. a. A desire to influence the regime of the recipient state and encourage it to pursue policies donor state decision makers see as preferable, but without either the focus on democracy or any reference to a current perception of the recipient as friendly to the donor state.

460. Desire for active participation in decision making within international organizations. a. This active participation centers on affecting the organizations policies, i.e. to play a significant and potentially leadership role within such a body.

461. International organization/ Bretton Woods institutions. a. Analogous to 460, but including a specifically stated desire to influence the World Bank (IBRD), IMF, IDA, IFC, and regional development banks.

462. International organization/ EC. a. Analogous to 460, but including a specifically stated desire to exercise influence regarding North-South issues within the EC.

463. International organzation/ UN. a. Analogous to 460, but including a specifically stated desire to exercise influence in a UN agency or within the UN in general.

470. Influence other donors. a. A desire to affect the policies pursued by other donors. This is different from 460-463 in that the influence attempt is not engaged in within an international organization. Rather, decision makers will talk in terms of influencing a particular donor state’s policies, or in terms of setting an example for others.

NON-CODABLE INFORMATION. The following features of parliamentary debates are not part of the coding scheme. However, if they do make up a large portion of the discussion, make a note about this for the debate as a whole.

a. Discussion on the need to increase aid spending, to improve the quality of aid, or to achieve the .7% of GNP target. b. Discussion regarding the quality of decision making within tlie bureaucracy, or other aspects of bureaucratic functioning. 273

TV THEME TENSE:

Its is expected that most codable themes will be future tense. This means that the expectation is that most of the discussion will center on policy directions for the future or assessment of current policies in terms of future directions the decision makers desire. The theme tense should not be derived strictly from granrunatical tense. Whether the theme regards past, current, or future policy is a more accurate guide for coding purposes, especially since linguistic precision in use of grammatical tenses varies across languages.

1. Past tense: past policy. a. Past policy addressed in terms of the way things used to be, but no stated implication for current or future policy.

2. Present tense: current policy. a. Present policy assessed by the speaker, but no stated implication for future policy.

3. Future tense: desired policy. a. A policy the speaker desires the state to adopt. b. If a something is addressed as a current policy that the speaker would like to be continued or discontinued, i.e. there is a stated implication for what (s)he desires for the future, then code as a future tense.

V. THEME STRENGTH:

1. high positive: mentioned as strong motivating factor.

3. neutral: theme is mentioned, no particular meaning attached.

5. high negative: mentioned as something that should absolutely not guide policy. 274

EXAMPLE 1.

HOW TO FILL OUT FIRST CODESHEET FOR EACH DEBATE state parliament session year debate topic

CODE FORM

SPEAKER ID (NAME) speaker name role in gov't (language) SPEAKER'S POLITICAL PARTY ______political party DEBATE ID (DATE) date of debate. + 2 digits if applicable SPEAKER # IN THIS DEBATE sp ea k in g tu rn number ______

THEMES ADDRESSED BY SPEAKER THEME TENSE THEME STRENGTH

1. theme tense strength (number references location in text where evidence for theme found)

On subsequent codesheets for the same debate, do not repeat the state, parliamentary session year, and debate topic information. Keep a ll codesheets for one debate together with a paperclip. 275

EXAMPLE 2.

CODING EXAMPLE.

The following is an example of the coding procedure. The quote regards only the portion of the speech that most directly relates to the coding decision. These quotes are embedded in a larger speech and summarize the speaker’s main points.

John Stanley (Hansard 1989-90 Vol. 149 col.661);

".. We cannot look only at the poorest countries. We must go beyond them and look equally closely at the poorest people in the poorest countries. "I fully understand the attractions, from a national economic and industrial standpoint, of major programme aid projects and major infrastructure projects which, according to the policy that we have followed for a long time, will be tied to die purchase of British goods and services and, therefore, will be good for British exports. However, we must be careful that we do not allow the aid programme to become unbalanced and unduly unfocused as a means of providing what is tantamount to an export subsidy for British providers of goods and services. First and foremost, we must focus on the poorest people in the poorest countries."

The codeform below shows the coding decisions that relate to this quote:

CODE FORM

SPEAKER ID (NAME) ______John Stanley______SPEAKER'S POLITICAL PARTY ______conservative DEBATE ID (DATE) ______1 7 -0 3 -8 9______SPEAKER # IN THIS DEBATE _18 ______

THEMES ADDRESSED BY SPEAKER THEME TENSE THEME STRENGTH

1.social justice 3.future 1.positive

2.benefits donor + recipient 3.future 5.negative p661. (These themes linked by the speaker). APPENDIX B

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

This ^pendix contains a listing of all relevant debates identified for purposes of theme coding. The lists are by parliamentary year and identify the debate by date and topic or title. For the Netherlands there are two lists, one of debates coded and ones of debate not coded. For Belgium and the United Kingdom only one lists was needed as all identified relevant debates were used.

T THE NETHERLANDS

A. DEBATES USED FOR THEME CODING

DATE #PAGES TITLE/TOPIC

NL 1990-91

11-12-90 14 Budget 1991, Development Cooperation 12-12-90 21 Continuation: Budget 1991 13-12-90 15 Continuation: Budget 1991 20-12-90 3 Continuation: Budget 1991

NL 1989-90

23-01-90 18 Budget 1990, Development Cooperation 24-01-90 24 Continuation: Budget 1990 24-01-90 14 Continuation: Budget 1990 07-02-90 6 Continuation: Budget 1990

276 277 NL 1988-89

16-11-88 6 African Development Fund 29-11-88 23 Budget 1989, Development Cooperation 30-11-88 23 Continuation: Budget 1989 06-04-89 17 IBRD, Capital Increase

NL 1987-88

24-11-87 21 Budget 1988, Development Cooperation 25-11-87 19 Continuation: Budget 1988

NL 1986-87

17-12-86 19 Budget 1987, Development Cooperation 18-12-85 28 Continuation: Budget 1987

NL 1985-86

23-10-85 22 Budget 1986, Development Cooperation 24-10-85 33 Continuation: Budget 1986

NL 1984-85

07-11-84 24 Budget 1985, Development Cooperation 08-11-84 20 Continuation: Budget 1985 22-01-85 11 Continuation: Budget 1985 26-03-85 4 Development Cooperation and Employment

NL 1983-84

08-12-83 2 Honduras (harbor) 09-02-84 7 Budget 1984, Development Cooperation 08-03-84 20 Humanitarian Aid 06-09-84 12 IDA

NL 1982-83 16-02-83 26 Budget 1983, Development Cooperation 17-02-83 23 Continuation: Budget 1983

NL 1981-82 02-12-81 20 Budget 1982, Development Cooperation 03-12-81 22 Continuation: Budget 1982 03-12-81 5 Continuation: Budget 1982 12-05-82 24 Reservoir Problem 278 NL 1980-81 no debate found

NL 1979-80

19-02-80 30 Budget 1980, Development Cooperation 20-02-80 17 Continuation: Budget 1980 21-02-80 10 Continuation: Budget 1980 21-02-80 11 Continuation: Budget 1980

NL 1978-79

28-11-78 22 Budget 1979, Development Cooperation 29-11-78 4 Continuation: Budget 1979 29-11-78 32 Continuation: Budget 1979 04-04-79 11 Letter to Parliament from Minister regarding Budget Development Cooperation

NL 1977-78

15-02-78 12 Budget 1978, Development Cooperation 16-02-78 3 Continuation: Budget 1978 22-02-78 18 Continuation: Budget 1978

NL 1976-77

09-11-76 15 Budget 1977, Development Cooperation 10-11-76 12 Continuation: Budget 1977 10-11-76 18 Continuation: Budget 1977, EC, bilateral 11-11-76 15 Continuation: Budget 1977, EC, bilateral 22-12-76 13 FMO (NL Finance Corporation for Developing Countries) Capital Increase

NL 1975-76

12-11-75 34 Budget 1976, Development Cooperation 13-11-75 24 Continuation: Budget 1976

THE NETHERLANDS TOTAL 847 PAGES USED FOR CODING 279

B. DEBATES NOT USED

1987-88

05-11-87 8 Asian Development Fund 09-12-87 12 IDA 30-06-88 14 African Development Fund

1985-86

26-09-85 3 African Development Fund 19-02-86 14 IBRD 03-09-86 13 Asian Development Bank

1984-85

04-12-84 Inter-American Development Bank

1983-84

08-12-83 7 African Development Fund 29-03-84 13 Asian Development Fund

1982-83

30-11-82 IFAD

1981-82

07-17-81 4 Min. Van Dijk’s 1960 statements regarding South Africa 23-06-82 20 NCO (National Committee for Development Education) 25-06-82 3 Letter from the Minister regarding the NCO

1980-81

03-12-80 7 Regional Development Banks 28-04-81 10 IDA

1977-78

06-04-78 20 Question, Jan Pronk 30-08-78 3 topic? 280

1976-77

22-12-76 25 FMO (NL Finance Corporation for Developing Countries)

THE NETHERLANDS NOT USED TOTAL 190 PAGES

TI. BELGIUM

A. DEBATES USED FOR THEME CODING

DATE #PAGES TITLE/TOPIC

BE 1990-91

07-11-90 14 Budget 1991, Development Cooperation

BE 1989-90

07-11-89 27 Budget 1990, Development Cooperation

BE 1988-89

25-05-89 2 Budget 1988, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation 21-06-89 30 Budget 1989, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation

BE 1987-88 none

BE 1986-87

29-06-87 10 Budget 1986 and 1987, Development Cooperation

BE 1985-86 none

BE 1984-85

20-11-84 14 Adjustment Budget 1983, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation 20-11-84 1 11.11.11 Fund Drive (Humanitarian) 20-11-84 2 Continuation: Adjustment Budget 1983 281

BE 1983-84

20-12-83 2 International Development Association, Special Contribution 29-02-84 11 Budget 1983, Foreign Trade 12-03-84 41 Budget 1983, Development Cooperation

BE 1982-83

26-10-82 21 Budget 1982, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation 27-10-82 31 Continuation: Budget 1982 17-03-83 6 Emergency Survival Fund (Humanitarian) 18-03-83 11 Continuation: Emergency Survival Fund

BE 1981-82

22-04-82 32 Budget 1981, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation 23-04-82 17 Continuation: Budget 1981

BE 1980-81

19-11-80 26 Budget 1980, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation 07-07-81 20 Fund for Development Cooperation, and Fund for Loans from State to State 09-07-81 4 Continuation: Fund for Development Cooperation

BE 1979

04-07-79 45 Budget 1979, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation 05-07-79 2 Continuation Budget 1979

BE 1978-79 none

BE 1977-78

17-05-78 38 Budget 1978, Development Cooperation 282

BE 1976-77

22-12-76 24 Budget 1977, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation

BE 1975-76

20-05-76 5 Resolution regarding UNCTAD IV 02-06-76 12 Budget 1976, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation 03-06-76 27 Continuation: Budget 1976 08-06-76 29 Continuation: Budget 1976 10-06-76 1 Continuation: Budget 1976 29-06-76 3 Approval regarding establishment of Interamerican Development Bank

BELGIUM TOTAL 508 PAGES USED FOR CODING

III. UNITED KINGDOM

A. DEBATES USED FOR THEME CODING

DATE #PAGES TITLE/TOPIC

UK 1990-91

14-12-90 33 General Debate 19-12-90 6 Horn of Africa (Aid) 14-01-91 8 Overseas Development æ Cooperation (IDA 9th Replenishment) 05-02-91 16 Namibia Bill 26-02-91 11 Lome (IV) Convention 08-05-91 10 Bangladesh (Aid) 14-05-91 21 Overseas Aid (Humanitarian)

UK 1989-90

27-03-90 8 Vietnam (Aid) 14-06-90 10 Overseas Development and C 26-06-90 20 Aid and the Environment 26-07-90 4 Lome Convention 283

UK 1988-89

23-05-89 4 Rainforest (Government Policy) 28-04-89 4 India and Nepal (Aid) 12-05-89 4 International Debt (IDA) 17-03-89 33 Overseas Development

UK 1987-88

24-11-87 17 MIGA Bill 01-02-88 3 MIGA Bill 03-02-88 10 International Development Association (8th Replenishment) 28-07-88 10 Overseas Aid and Development

UK 1986-87

09-12-86 8 Food Aid (EC)

UK 1985-86

08-11-85 15 Debate on the Address/ Foreign Affairs and Overseas Development) 17-12-85 20 Supplementary Estimates 1985-86/ Overseas Aid (Extra funds re. disaster relief) 23-05-86 6 Sub-Saharan Africa (Aid)

UK 1984-85

09-11-84 23 Debate on Address/ Foreign Affairs and Overseas Development 14-11-84 4 Ethiopia (Famine) 22-11-84 41 Opposition Day/ Overseas Aid 11-12-84 12 Overseas Aid UUA 7th replenishment 4- IBRD) 10-01-85 4 Ethiopia (United Kingdom Aid) (Famine) 11-06-85 21 Opposition Day/ Developing Countries (Famine and Debt) 24-06-85 12 European Communities (Definition of Treaties) (EC, STABEX, Lome Convention) 01-07-85 4 Overseas Development and Cooperation (African development fund 4th replenishment)

UK 1983-84

21-11-83 22 Opposition Day/ Cooperation and Economic Development in the Commonwealth 284

IJK 1982-83

20-12-82 14 Overseas Development and Cooperation (Regional Development Banks and IBRD) 18-04-83 52 The Brandt Commission Report

UK 1981-82

11-02-82 38 Supply/ Overseas Development 29-07-82 8 Overseas Development Budget (Population Programmes)

UK 1980-81 none

UK 1979-80

30-12-79 40 Ministry of Overseas Development (Dissolution) 12-03-80 10 Overseas Aid 16-06-80 76 International Development (Brandt Report) 17-06-80 5 International Development Association 17-06-80 6 European Communities (Definition of Treaties) (Lome Convention)

UK 1978-79 none

UK 1977-78 none

UK 1976-77

20-12-76 22 Crown Agents (Financial Assistance) 31-01-77 58 International Finance, Trade, and Aid Bill 13-06-77 60 Overseas Development

UK 1975-76

07-11-75 47 Overseas Aid (Debate on White Paper) 07-11-75 7 European Communities (Definition of Treaties) (Lome Convention)

UNITED KINGDOM TOTAL 867 PAGES USED FOR CODING 285

TV. SUMMARY

A. DEBATES USED FOR CODING

THE NETHERLANDS 847 PAGES BELGIUM 508 PAGES UNITED KINGDOM 867 PAGES

TOTAL 2222 PAGES

B. DEBATES NOT USED FOR CODING

THE NETHERLANDS 190 PAGES LIST OF REFERENCES

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