DOCSLIB.ORG

Newly Independent and Separating States' Succession to Treaties: Considerations on the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet Union Andrew M

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Newly Independent and Separating States' Succession to Treaties: Considerations on the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet Union Andrew M American University International Law Review Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 4 1994 Newly Independent and Separating States' Succession to Treaties: Considerations on the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet Union Andrew M. Beato Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Beato, Andrew M. "Newly Independent and Separating States' Succession to Treaties: Considerations on the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet Union." American University International Law Review 9, no. 2 (1994): 525-558. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NEWLY INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATING STATES' SUCCESSION TO TREATIES: CONSIDERATIONS ON THE HYBRID DEPENDENCY OF THE REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION Andrew M. Beato* INTRODUCTION While the leadership of Russian President Boris Yeltsin heralded a welcome change in the historically antagonistic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States,' the dissolution of the Soviet Un- ion2 engenders grave concern over the stability of U.S. foreign relations with Eurasia.3 Formerly composed of fifteen republics under one central authority,4 the Soviet Union has fractured into fifteen independent * J.D. Candidate, 1994, Washington College of Law, The American University; B.A., 1991, Boston University. 1. See Richard Pipes, The Soviet Union Adrift, FOREIGN AFF., Vol. 70, No. 1, at 70, 70-73 (1991) (discussing cold war hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union, and former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's reform efforts includ- ing glasnost and perestroika). See also AMERICAN BAR AssOcIATION, CONFRONTATION IN THE AMERICAN-SOvIET RELATIONSHIP: CAN IT BE MANAGED? (1980) (discussing causes of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union despite ddtente). 2. See ACCORD ON THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (1991), reprinted in PERESTROIKA IN THE SOVIET REPUBLICS: DOCUMENTS ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION 355-58 (Charles F. Furtado, Jr. & Andrea Chandler eds., 1992) (providing a translation of the accord officially disbanding the Soviet Union). The Accord dissolved the Soviet Union as a "subject of international law and geopolitical reality." Id. at 355. The named parties in the Accord-Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine-were found- ing members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) and original signa- tories of the Union Treaty of 1922. Id. See infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the Union Treaty of 1922). 3. See Dimitri Simes, America and the Post-Soviet Republics, FOREIGN AFF., Vol. 71, No. 3, at 73 (1992) (commenting that political changes in the former Soviet Union are destabilizing potentially and present opportunities for U.S. initiatives). 4. See ROBIN MILNER-GULLAND & NIKOLAI DEJEVSKY, CULTURAL ATLAS OF RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION 185-224 (Andrew Lawson et al. eds., 1989) (citing the former republics of the constituent Soviet Union as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 525 526 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 9:2 states.' Each of these states has proclaimed their -sovereign indepen- dence;6 with the exceptions of the Baltic countries and the former Re- public of Georgia, each has joined voluntarily the loosely aligned con- federation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Commonwealth or CIS). The dismemberment of the Soviet empire seemed to signal the tri- umph of Western democratic institutions over the coercive rule of au- thoritarianism.' Nonetheless, it has become painfully apparent to observ- Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan,). 5. See Focus on the Emerging Democracies: A Periodic Update, U.S. Dep't of State Dispatch, Mar. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, ITrade Library, DState File (stating that the former republics composing the confederation are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan); George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander, The Arms Control Obligations of the Former Soviet Union, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 323, 323-24 (1993) (noting that fifteen nations were formed out of the dissolution of the Soviet Union). Each of these new states was accorded formal recognition by the United States Government. Id. at 324. 6. See Michael Mendelbaum, Coup De Grace: The End of the Soviet Union, FOREIGN AFF., Vol. 71, No. 1, at 164, 168 (1992) (explaining that each republic de- clared its sovereignty and asserted that its laws took precedence over those of the defunct Soviet Union). The republics declared independence in the period from April through December 1991. See Chronology 1991, FOREIGN AFF., Vol. 71, No. 1, at 184, 195-206 (Patricia Lee Dorff ed., 1992) [hereinafter Chronology 1991]. The first republic to declare its independence was Georgia on March 31, 1991. Id. at 197. The last republic to declare its independence was the Ukraine on December 1, 1991. Id. at 204. See also Bunn & Rhinelander, supra note 5, at 323-24 (noting declaration of in- dependence by the former republics). 7. See Chronology 1991, supra note 6, at 184, 205 (stating that on December 21, 1991, eleven republics coalesced to form the Commonwealth of Independent States (Commonwealth or CIS)). The agreement guarantees "separate sovereignties" to each signatory republic. Id. See also Armenia-Azerbaijan-Belarus-Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan- Moldova-Russian Federation-Tajikistan-Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Ukraine: Agreements Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 8, 1991, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 138 (1992). Neither the Republic of Georgia nor the Baltic States entered the Commonwealth. Chronology 1991, supra note 6, at 184, 205. Furthermore, the eleven members of the Commonwealth signed an additional accord stating that: Until the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the decision on the need for their use is made by the President of the Russian Federation in agreement with the heads of State of the Republic of Belarus, the Re- public of Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and in consultation with the heads of the other Member States of the Commonwealth. Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces, Dec. 31, 1991, art. 4, reprinted in ARMS CON- TROL TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 39. 8. See, e.g., Robert E. Hunter, Starting at Zero: U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1994] STATES' SUCCESSION 527 ers of the emerging new world order9 that international law provides few clear answers to some of the critical legal issues arising from the0 dismantling of the Soviet State. Out of concern for global security, the foremost of these issues prompted inquiry into whether the former Soviet republics, vested with newly found independence, would inherit the bilateral treaty" rights and obligations that existed between the for- mer Soviet Union and other nations, particularly the United States. 2 1990s, WASH. Q., Vol. 15, No. 1, at 24, 26 (1992) (suggesting that the breakup of the Soviet Union has been interpreted as a "triumph for two basic tenets of Western power and position: the market economy and the pluralistic society"). 9. See generally Joseph S. Nye, Jr., What New World Order?, FOREIGN AFF., Vol. 71, No. 2, at 83 (1992) (providing text of a statement by former President George Bush that the new world order includes peaceful resolution of disputes, unity against aggression, and the fair treatment of all individuals). 10. See Bunn & Rhinelander, supra note 5, at 323-27 (disscussing the splintering of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Un- ion). See also Pipes, supra note 1. at 76 n.6 (detailing concern over the fate of Sovi- et intercontinental nuclear missiles); Simes, supra note 3, at 91-95 (noting apprehen- sion over the dismantling of the second most powerful military in the world and the presence of intercontinental ballistic missiles on Ukrainian soil); Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's Catapult to Independence, FOREIGN AFF., Vol. 71, No. 3, at 108, 118- 19 (1992) (noting concern over safety and stability of nuclear weapons currently situ- ated in the former republic of Kazakhstan). 11. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in" Respect of Treaties, adopt- ed Aug. 22, 1978, opened for signature Aug. 23, 1978, art. 2(a), U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 80/31 (1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1488, 1490 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (de- fining a treaty as an "international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation"). 12. See The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: Hearings on S. 607 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 309-19 (1992) [here- inafter Hearings] (memorandum of George Bunn and John Rhinelander) (suggesting that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Con- ventional Forces in Europe Agreement, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty are bilateral accords of primary concern after the collapse of the Soviet Union); Bunn & Rhinelander, supra note 5, at 323-50 (examining the status of specific arms limitation agreements of the former Soviet Union in the wake of dissolution by application of the conventional law of state succession); Edwin D. Williamson & John I. Osborn, A U.S. Perspective on Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the Wake of the Breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 261, 264-70 (1993) (stating that bilateral agreements between the former Soviet Union and the United States, effective at the moment of dissolution, should continue to have effect in each former republic except the Baltic nations); Rein Mullerson, New Developments in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 33 VA.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Conflicts-In-Federal-Systems-Mintz
    PUBLICATIONS SPP Research Paper Volume 12:14 April 2019 TWO DIFFERENT CONFLICTS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: AN APPLICATION TO CANADA*† Jack M. Mintz SUMMARY Canadians are used to taking seriously the threat of separation when it comes to Quebec, but a more serious, less manageable form of conflict may eventually emerge in the federation between Western Canada and the rest of Canada. Where the Canadian government has been successful so far in managing the “conflict of taste” that has led to Quebec’s historic discomfort in the Canadian federation, because the federal government possesses the tools to address that challenge, it does not have the same tools to manage the “conflict of claim” that is creating increased dissatisfaction with Confederation in the West. The result is that Canada is a less stable federation than many observers realize. Interestingly, the future of its unity depends largely on whether the West is able to establish a lasting political alliance with Ontario even though that would mean Quebec no longer being critical for national coalitions. Conflicts of taste revolve around differences in political preferences between regions within a federation. While Quebec is animated by its different culture, history and language than the rest of Canada, which has created a conflict of taste, mechanisms have been put in place to help mitigate the friction, including: Provincial powers over key cultural institutions such as education and health, special fiscal and immigration arrangements for Quebec, guaranteed bilingualism in federal institutions and tax-collection powers unique to Quebec. Quebec’s ability to wield federal power through a Central Canadian alliance with Ontario has also helped partially alleviate the province’s discomfort within Confederation.
    [Show full text]
  • Empire and English Nationalismn
    Nations and Nationalism 12 (1), 2006, 1–13. r ASEN 2006 Empire and English nationalismn KRISHAN KUMAR Department of Sociology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA Empire and nation: foes or friends? It is more than pious tribute to the great scholar whom we commemorate today that makes me begin with Ernest Gellner. For Gellner’s influential thinking on nationalism, and specifically of its modernity, is central to the question I wish to consider, the relation between nation and empire, and between imperial and national identity. For Gellner, as for many other commentators, nation and empire were and are antithetical. The great empires of the past belonged to the species of the ‘agro-literate’ society, whose central fact is that ‘almost everything in it militates against the definition of political units in terms of cultural bound- aries’ (Gellner 1983: 11; see also Gellner 1998: 14–24). Power and culture go their separate ways. The political form of empire encloses a vastly differ- entiated and internally hierarchical society in which the cosmopolitan culture of the rulers differs sharply from the myriad local cultures of the subordinate strata. Modern empires, such as the Soviet empire, continue this pattern of disjuncture between the dominant culture of the elites and the national or ethnic cultures of the constituent parts. Nationalism, argues Gellner, closes the gap. It insists that the only legitimate political unit is one in which rulers and ruled share the same culture. Its ideal is one state, one culture. Or, to put it another way, its ideal is the national or the ‘nation-state’, since it conceives of the nation essentially in terms of a shared culture linking all members.
    [Show full text]
  • Town Charter
    Taken from: Province of New Hampshire—Records of Council 1716 ( pages 690 & 691 ) Province of New Hampshire At a Council held at the Council chambers in Portsmouth March 14, 17151715----16161616 PRESENT: The Honorable George Vaughan, Esq., Lt. Governor; Richard Waldron, Samuel Penhallow, John Plaisted, Mark Hunking, John Wentworth, Esquires. Mr. Smith appeared at this Board on behalf of sundry inhabitants of Swampscott and presented a petition (against making Swampscott a town) as on file, bearing date, January 14, 1715-6*. Notwithstanding which petition and sundry other objections which have been made since ye first motions about making said Swampscott a town, it is In Council Ordered, that Swampscott Patent land be a township by the name of Stratham, and have full power to choose officers as other towns within this Province, and that the bounds of said town be according to the limits specified in a petition proffered to this board by Mr. Andrew Wiggin, the 13 th day of January last, except some families lying near to Greenland (viz.) John Hill, Thomas Leatherby, Enoch Barker, and Michael Hicks, which said some families shall belong to the Parish of Greenland: And that a meeting house be built on the King’s great road leading from Greenland to Exeter, within half a mile of the midway between ye bounds yet are next Exeter and the bounds that are next Greenland, as the road goes; and that they be obliged to have a learned orthodox minister to preach in said meeting house within one year from the date hereof. R. Waldron, Cleric Con.
    [Show full text]
  • I Am Honoured to Have Been Invited Here to Deliver the Keynote Address
    KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY H.E. MR. ABDULQAWI A. YUSUF, PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE I am honoured to have been invited here to deliver the keynote address, and I am particularly happy that my first speech before you as President of the International Court of Justice should be on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the International Law Commission. As a judge of the International Court, but also first and foremost as an international lawyer, the work of the International Law Commission has played, and continues to play, a crucial role in my daily work. Your dedication and that of your predecessors has allowed the international legal system to develop into what it is today. For that, on behalf of international lawyers everywhere, I thank you. Of course, in the first rank of these international lawyers are my colleagues at the International Court of Justice, many of whom have passed through the Commission and have asked me to convey to you their congratulations on this 70th anniversary as well as their best wishes for the future. The theme of today’s celebration is “Drawing a Balance for the Future”, but I want to take a few minutes to look back into the past in order to understand the role that the International Law Commission has played over the past seven decades. This brings to mind an African proverb, which says: “If you want to know the end, look at the beginning.” The twentieth century was a time of particular upheaval for the international legal system. On the one hand, the century marked the evolution of the international law from a system that was applicable only among a small circle of European States to one that has a credible claim to be a universal legal system, one in which States from all corners of the globe participate.
    [Show full text]
  • A Global Comparison of Non-Sovereign Island Territories: the Search for ‘True Equality’
    Island Studies Journal, 15(1), 2020, 43-66 A global comparison of non-sovereign island territories: the search for ‘true equality’ Malcom Ferdinand CNRS, Paris, France [email protected] Gert Oostindie KITLV, the Netherlands Leiden University, the Netherlands [email protected] (corresponding author) Wouter Veenendaal KITLV, the Netherlands Leiden University, the Netherlands [email protected] Abstract: For a great majority of former colonies, the outcome of decolonization was independence. Yet scattered across the globe, remnants of former colonial empires are still non-sovereign as part of larger metropolitan states. There is little drive for independence in these territories, virtually all of which are small island nations, also known as sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs). Why do so many former colonial territories choose to remain non-sovereign? In this paper we attempt to answer this question by conducting a global comparative study of non-sovereign jurisdictions. We start off by analyzing their present economic, social and political conditions, after which we assess local levels of (dis)content with the contemporary political status, and their articulation in postcolonial politics. We find that levels of discontent and frustration covary with the particular demographic, socio- economic and historical-cultural conditions of individual territories. While significant independence movements can be observed in only two or three jurisdictions, in virtually all cases there is profound dissatisfaction and frustration with the contemporary non-sovereign arrangement and its outcomes. Instead of achieving independence, the territories’ real struggle nowadays is for obtaining ‘true equality’ with the metropolis, as well as recognition of their distinct cultural identities.
    [Show full text]
  • Table 1 Comprehensive International Points List
    Table 1 Comprehensive International Points List FCC ITU-T Country Region Dialing FIPS Comments, including other 1 Code Plan Code names commonly used Abu Dhabi 5 971 TC include with United Arab Emirates Aden 5 967 YE include with Yemen Admiralty Islands 7 675 PP include with Papua New Guinea (Bismarck Arch'p'go.) Afars and Assas 1 253 DJ Report as 'Djibouti' Afghanistan 2 93 AF Ajman 5 971 TC include with United Arab Emirates Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area 9 44 AX include with United Kingdom Al Fujayrah 5 971 TC include with United Arab Emirates Aland 9 358 FI Report as 'Finland' Albania 4 355 AL Alderney 9 44 GK Guernsey (Channel Islands) Algeria 1 213 AG Almahrah 5 967 YE include with Yemen Andaman Islands 2 91 IN include with India Andorra 9 376 AN Anegada Islands 3 1 VI include with Virgin Islands, British Angola 1 244 AO Anguilla 3 1 AV Dependent territory of United Kingdom Antarctica 10 672 AY Includes Scott & Casey U.S. bases Antigua 3 1 AC Report as 'Antigua and Barbuda' Antigua and Barbuda 3 1 AC Antipodes Islands 7 64 NZ include with New Zealand Argentina 8 54 AR Armenia 4 374 AM Aruba 3 297 AA Part of the Netherlands realm Ascension Island 1 247 SH Ashmore and Cartier Islands 7 61 AT include with Australia Atafu Atoll 7 690 TL include with New Zealand (Tokelau) Auckland Islands 7 64 NZ include with New Zealand Australia 7 61 AS Australian External Territories 7 672 AS include with Australia Austria 9 43 AU Azerbaijan 4 994 AJ Azores 9 351 PO include with Portugal Bahamas, The 3 1 BF Bahrain 5 973 BA Balearic Islands 9 34 SP include
    [Show full text]
  • The Partition of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands W
    Island Studies Journal , Vol. 7, No.1, 2012, pp. 135-146 REVIEW ESSAY The Partition of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands W. David McIntyre Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies Christchurch, New Zealand [email protected] ABSTRACT : This paper reviews the separation of the Ellice Islands from the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, in the central Pacific, in 1975: one of the few agreed boundary changes that were made during decolonization. Under the name Tuvalu, the Ellice Group became the world’s fourth smallest state and gained independence in 1978. The Gilbert Islands, (including the Phoenix and Line Islands), became the Republic of Kiribati in 1979. A survey of the tortuous creation of the colony is followed by an analysis of the geographic, ethnic, language, religious, economic, and administrative differences between the groups. When, belatedly, the British began creating representative institutions, the largely Polynesian, Protestant, Ellice people realized they were doomed to permanent minority status while combined with the Micronesian, half-Catholic, Gilbertese. To protect their identity they demanded separation, and the British accepted this after a UN-observed referendum. Keywords: Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Gilbert and Ellis islands; independence; Kiribati; Tuvalu © 2012 Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, Canada Context The age of imperialism saw most of the world divided up by colonial powers that drew arbitrary lines on maps to designate their properties. The age of decolonization involved the assumption of sovereign independence by these, often artificial, creations. Tuvalu, in the central Pacific, lying roughly half-way between Australia and Hawaii, is a rare exception.
    [Show full text]
  • Autonomy, Indigenous Peoples, and Afro-Descendants in Colombia
    Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies Vol. 3 Issue 1 Autonomy, Indigenous Peoples, and Afro-Descendants in Colombia Mauricio Romero Vidal and Juan David Niño Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies, 3(1) 2019, 8–26 URL: http://jass.ax/volume-3-issue-1-Vidal_Nino/ 8 Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies Vol. 3 Issue 1 Abstract The article analyzes how indigenous and Afro-descendant communities achieved participation in the National Constitutional Assembly in 1991 in Colombia and how this process influenced the definition of new territorial institutions in which territorial autonomy and self-rule were successfully granted – against all odds. How did this happen? What circumstances facilitated the agency of these marginalized groups to such an extent that it shaped the new constitution to their benefit? The argument in this article highlights a historical juncture between a global discourse in favor of human rights, and ethnic and cultural diversity – supported by the United Nations – and a regional trend towards democratization and constitutional change. This juncture occurred during the times of a domestic peace negotiation process between the Colombian government and the country’s guerrilla groups, a process that was joined by an unusual social mobilization of underprivileged groups. Taken together, these international and national circumstances created conditions that paved the way for a successful outcome of the constitutional process, for the indigenous and Afro-descendant communities. Despite this constitutional achievement, reality has however not been easy. The territory of the two groups is rich in natural resources, something that creates opportunities for large scale agribusiness investments, and they are also well located for coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Status and Development: the Implications for Australian Foreign Policy Towards the Pacific Islands
    Political Status and Development: The Implications for Australian Foreign Policy Towards the Pacific Islands STEWART FIRTH SSGM DISCUSSION PAPER 2013/6 Introduction Table 2: Pacific Islands Freely Associated Entities Nine in every 10 Pacific islanders live in the independent countries of the region — Fiji, Kiribati, Entity External State Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Federated States of Micronesia USA Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The remaining tenth — almost a million people in all — live in the Republic of the Marshall Islands USA territories and freely associated states, where formal Republic of Palau USA connections with a metropolitan state offer access Cook Islands New Zealand to its resources and opportunities. In different ways, Niue New Zealand and with different levels of devolution of power to local governments, eight of the Pacific island entities in the Pacific community are territories Geoff Bertram points out, a large body of evidence of external states, and a further five Pacific island now supports the view that there is ‘a negative entities are freely associated with an external state. association between sovereign independence and present-day per-capita income, indicating that Table 1: Pacific Islands Territories while decolonization may have brought political and psychological gains, it retarded rather than Territory External State advanced the material prosperity of the decolonized American Samoa USA populations. The reasons are straightforward: Commonwealth of the USA small island jurisdictions which are sub-national Northern Mariana Islands (that is, retain constitutional links to metropolitan Guam USA powers) get more financial assistance per head, better access for migrant labour, and a wide range New Caledonia France of jurisdiction-related opportunities to capitalize on French Polynesia France non-sovereign status’ (Bertram 2007, 239–40).
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Decentralization and Centralization in a Federal System : the Case Of
    Rev. Sociol. Polit. vol.1 no.se Curitiba 2006 Decentralization and centralization in a federal system: the case of * democratic Brazil Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida University of São Paulo Abstract: This paper discusses the contradictory impulses towards decentralization and centralization in Brazil during the 1990s and early 2000s. After discussing the analytical issues related to the specific nature of decentralization in federal systems, the paper examines two sets of policy issues: those regulating the fiscal relations between national and sub-national governments and those redefining responsibilities for social services provision (basic education, health care, social assistance). Against conventional academic wisdom, it sustains that although there has been some re-centralization of fiscal decisions and of targeted income transfer programs, a clear re-centralization tendency cannot be siad to exist. Decentralization and centralization trends coexist propelled by different forces, with different motives and different outcomes. Keywords: centralization; de-centralization; democratization; fiscal relations; social welfares. After a decade of steadfast decentralization is Brazilian federation undergoing a process of re-centralization? Academic conventional wisdom, both within and outside Brazil, seems to say that indeed it is. Decentralization was a major issue of the Brazilian democratization agenda, during the 80s. The bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (1964-1984) concentrated decisions, financial resources and administrative capacities at federal level. The country became an extreme case of centralized federalism1, almost undistinguishable from a unitary polity. Therefore, it was only too natural that democratic opposition to military rule took decentralization as one of its most cherished aims, together with social justice, rule of law and citizens participation. Decentralization to the local level was argued for in the name of democracy as much as in the name of governmental efficiency and efficacy.
    [Show full text]
  • CF-130--Chapter 13
    166 13. On the Future of the “Post-Soviet Region” Dmitrii E. Furman* Contradictory trends and events appearing after the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union five years ago present analysts with a weighty challenge in attempting to anticipate the political future of the former Soviet region. Will the new states solidify their independent status, or will they tend towards convergence, cooperation, and even reunification? The decision of Russia’s State Duma to denounce the Belovezhsky Agreements and make new agreements on the “extended integration” of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus strongly contrasts with the Russian president’s assignment of nearly independent status to Chechnya.1 These apparently contradictory actions demonstrate the indefinite political borders and instability of the post-Soviet region. Neither in Russia, nor in the other countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), is there yet a sense of “naturalness” or stability in the present political situation. In almost every republic, separatist movements, and some self-proclaimed (i.e., “illegal”) states have emerged. Meanwhile, all manner of integrationist ideas and initiatives are proposed simultaneously. It could take decades for the region to assume a stable form, and there is no guarantee that by then all of the present states will still exist. In 1989–1991, anti-Soviet feelings were on the rise. Politicians, publicists, and scholars strove to harness these feelings and express them in compelling terms. At that time, while various “anti-imperial” thoughts and phrases filled newspapers and magazines, nobody was concerned with consistency or logic. The idea of sovereignty for the republics was presented side by side with the idea of ethnic minorities’ rights to independence from Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • How Do Citizens Participate in the Government?
    How do citizens participate in the government? Autocratic/Autocracy Oligarchic/Oligarchy Democratic/Democracy Rule of ONE Rule of a FEW Rule of ALL Long definition: a country or nation that Long definition: a country or nation Long definition: a country or nation that is governed by a single person with controlled by a small group of people receives its power from the people (all unlimited power that hold the key to power the people hold the key to power) Examples of autocratic governments Examples of oligarchic governments Examples of democratic governments Dictatorship Theocracy Parliamentary democracy Absolute Monarchy Presidential democracy Theocracy How do citizens participate in the government? Autocratic/Autocracy Oligarchic/Oligarchy Democratic/Democracy Rule of ONE Rule of a FEW Rule of ALL Picture Picture Picture Long definition: Long definition: Long definition: Examples of autocratic governments Examples of oligarchic governments Examples of democratic governments How do governments distribute power? Unitary Confederation Federal Central government has all the power to Individual states make their own laws Power to make laws and decision for the make laws and decision for the people. and decision and are loosely aligned to a people is SHARED between central weak central government government and states Picture: Picture: Picture: Long definition: Long definition: Long definition: Examples of unitary governments Examples of confederation governments Examples of federal governments How do governments distribute power? Unitary Confederation Federal Central government has all the power to Individual states make their own laws Power to make laws and decisions for make laws and decision for the people. and decision and are loosely aligned to a the people is SHARED between a weak central government central authority and regional authorities Picture: Picture: Picture: Long definition: One central government Long definition: A weak or loose Long definition: Power is shared by a controls weaker states.
    [Show full text]