MARXISM and THE- PROBLEM of DETERMINISM by Bruce G

Authors Marshall, Bruce Gordon, 1944-

Publisher The University of Arizona.

Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.

Download date 01/10/2021 21:53:13

Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/318050 MARXISM AND THE- PROBLEM OF DETERMINISM

by Bruce G, Marshall

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree MASTER OF ARTS

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1968 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis, has "been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable with out special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quo tation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Bean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the pro posed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNED s M- Irf/j

APPROVAL.BY. THESIS DIRECTOR This thesis has been approved on the date shown belows

Ronald D. Milo Date Doctor of Philosophy TABLE OF CONTENTS

, . . - Page A

I, INTRODUCTION . „ , . „ „ , » . 0 „. „ „ 0 . . . 1 II. THE CRITICISM , o . . „ . . 3 III. EVALUATION OF THE CRITICISM . . . . „ 0 *■. . 8

Historical Determinism and Free-Will » . . 8 Mechanism and Historical Determinism . . » 16 IV. THE MARXIST CONCEPT OF FREEDOMi AN

INTERPRETATION , . 0 . . 0 = . . . 0 , , . 26 LIST OF REFERENCES »•, . . . . . » » . = „ . „ 0 . 4l

iii ABSTRACT

This thesis is a defense of Marxism on what is per haps its most persistent point of criticisms the charge of determinism, Xsaiah Berlin is presented as the principal critic, although there are, indeed, many others. The thesis has a negative as well as positive purpose, The negative side of the thesis is twofold. In the first place, it holds that historical determinism can never be logical grounds for fatalism. In the second place, it argues that those who fear that universal causality is destructive of human freedom are seriously misconceiving the free-will problem. The fear of mechanism, it is argued, is a mere bogy and a baseless fear. The positive side of the thesis is an effort to interpret the Marxist concept of freedom. Three elements fundamental to the Marxist concept of freedom are distin guished: (1) social context, (2) knowledge of social and historical causation, and (3) material social condition.

Many other conceptions of freedom ignore one or another of these elements and are thus one-sided and incomplete.

iv CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Marxism as a philosephieal doctrine has been criti cized on a number of grounds0 One major criticism is that Marxism is "deterministic.* However» if "determinism" is taken in its most common philosophical form as the doctrine of universal causation, it is at once evident that the critics of Marx are confusing determinism with fatalism. When determinism and fatalism are equated, a great number of philosophical issues are bluntly ignored. Fatalism "denies that human beings have the power to change the course of events." (Hospers 1953» P« 322) The logic behind fatalism seems to be that if something is going to happen, it will happen, and if it is not going to happen, then it will not happen. It is easy to see how the critic of Marx who con fuses determinism and fatalism will conclude that Marxism is destructive of human freedom.

The thesis presented here is that the critics of Marx who charge that Marxism is a pernicious doctrine de structive of free-agency are mistaken. Such critics, it will be argued, erroneously search for a small area of in determinism, where the "will"'may have a free reign. Again, it is not hard to see that the critic who equates determinism with fatalism, will seek to. identify human freedom with indeterminismo Surely there is something which needs_to he ex plained in McFadden0 s contention that fatalism "logically follows” from Marx0s determinism, (McFadden 1939» P= 2*0)

McFadden can make such a claim only because he has ignored the problems of determinism and presupposed that determinism is fatalistic,

Isaiah Berlin, our chief critic here, also passes from Marxian determinism to fatalism at the expense of blur ring the issues at hand, Marxism, as well as a host of other historical theories which are ”in one sense or another, forms of determinism,” says Berlin, implies "that the indivi dual ■s freedom of choice is ultimately an illusion,” (Berlin 1954, Po 20) The following, chapter will deal with Berlin's criticism in some detail. CHAPTER II

THE CRITICISE

Berlin0 s Historical Inevitability is an attempt' to classify, as well as to criticize, what Hr=. Berlin considers to he the major deterministic theories of history, "The notion that one can discover patterns or regularities in the procession of historical events," (Berlin 195^» P« 5) says Berlin, is quite natural to those impressed by the advance of modern science. This belief in historical regu larity may be divided into two theories of history8 per sonal theories and impersonal theories. Personal theories of history stress the efficacy of individuals in the course of history, while the impersonal theories emphasize "large numbers of unspecified persons," (Berlin 195^» P, 6) Of the impersonal theories, which agree that history obeys laws, three types of theory may be distinguished8 (1) teleological, (2) transcendental and (3) scientific. An historical explanation for the teleological theory of history consists in defining the goal towards which history is progressing. To explain an event on this account is to discover its purpose, Needless to say, such a theory is "profoundly anti-empirical," (Berlin 195^» p, 14) To the transcendental theory, -pattern is of prime Importance„ Such a theory posits a "permanent, trans cendent reality, "above,* "outside,0 or "beyond*"" (Berlin

195^o P» 15) Explanation, on this account, says Berlin, in volves "pattern" rather than "goal0" Such a view pre supposes an ultimate structure of reality which is permanent - c and unchanging. Lastly, there is the scientific conception of his tory, Although this view rejects metaphysics, it too has a metaphysico This view holds "that all that exists is necessarily an object in material nature, and therefore susceptible to explanation by scientific laws." (Berlin

195^o Po 18) This view holds that nothing is, in principle, incapable of measurement and calculation. Social engineer ing on this account, says Berlin, is nothing but the "physiology of every feeling and attitude and inclination."

(Berlin 195^ P° 19) Moreover, "what all these concepts— metaphysical and scientific alike— have in common ... is the notion that to explain is to subsume under general formulae, (Berlin

195^0 Po 19), "Why," for the teleologist is answered by re ference to the end. The transcedental1st answers "why" in terms ©f pattern, and for the historical scientist, "why" means "resulting from what causes?" (Berlin 195^» P» 19) Berlin does not hesitate to inform his reader that: All these theories are, in one sense or another, forms of determinism, whether they he teleological or scien tific, And one common characteristic of all such outlooks is the implication that the individual's freedom of choice is ultimately an illusion, that the notion that human beings could have chosen otherwise than they did usually rests on ignorance of facts, (Berlin 195^» P° 20) It is further,argued that each of these three forms of historical determinism admits of two different versions, the one optimistic and benevolent and the other pessimistic and malevolent. The optimistic version, we are told, is.humanitarian and is exemplified by Owen, Fourier, Comte, Shaw and others. These theories are "generously disposed towards all mankind,

(Berlin 195^'$ P» 22) and really attempt to lift man out of his ignorance, misery and sorrow. The pessimistic version of determinism "is a good deal less amiable in tone and feeling," (Berlin 195^9 P« 22) although it too may be optimistic about the final outcome,

(Berlin 195^> P° 22) Both Hegel and Marx belong to this category, each believing that historical advances "always take the form of violent cataclysmic leaps, destructive revolutions which, most often with fire and sword establish a new order upon the ruins of the old," (Berlin 195^? P» 22) To clear up the matter of where Marx stands on all these questionable distinctions, we are later assured that Marx represents a version of the "materialistic or scien tific interpretation" (Berlin 195^» p. 71) of history. To summarize, for Berlin, Marxism puts forth an im personal view of history which is materialistic or scienti fic in the sense that it holds everything to be matter and thus the subject of scientific law. (Berlin 195^» P- 18) For this view, "Why?" means "resulting from what causes?"

(Berlin 195^» P= 18) Thus, every historical event is ex plained in terms of causes and effects. However, Berlin does not stop here, for the charge that .Marxism is deter ministic in the sense that it affirms historical (or uni versal) causation is hardly a "charge" at all. Such a charge will turn few readers against Marxism. The real im port of Berlin's critique consists in the charge of fatal ism. In asserting that Marxism is a form of historical determinism, Berlin wants to show not that Marxism is a dogma of universal causation (although he believes it is), but that such a determinism is destructive of human free dom. It is a "common characteristic” (Berlin 195^5 P« 20) of the doctrine of historical determinism, says Berlin, that it implies "that the individual's freedom of choice is ultimately an illusion," (Berlin 195^» P° 20) This is indeed the real force of Berlin's critique. 7 It is at this point that the confusion between de terminism and fatalism, mentioned in the introduction, becomes evident„ It seems that this confusion is based on an equivocation of the word "determinism." Berlin has correctly pointed out that the category of causality is essential to the Marxian theory of history0 Accordingly, Berlin argues that Marxism is an attempt to deal with his tory in terms of cause and effect. However, Berlin im mediately equates determinism with the doctrine that human beings are unable to change the course of events (fatalism)„

The first part of the next chapter will deal with this im portant confusion. emPTER in

EVALUATION OF THE CRITICISM

Historical Determinism and Free-Will As we have seen in Chapter I, Berlin "began by pointing out that Marxism was a form of determinism (his torical determinism) and concluded by claiming that it was

"fatalistic'"' and destructive of freedom0 If there were no gap between determinism (the assertion of universal causa tion) and fatalism, or in other words, if determinism en tailed fatalism, Berlin0 s argument would be a sound one„ Yet there is such a gap, and it is known as the "problem of determinism,," The problem is whether or not determinism is compatible with freedom, choice, responsibility, etc.

In his criticism of Marxism, Berlin begins by cor rectly pointing out that Marxism is one of a number of limpersonal" historical theories. He then goes on to clas sify Marxism as one of "the materialistic or scientific interpretations" (Berlin 195^» P<> 71) of history, "All that exists," on the scientific conception, "Is necessarily an object In material nature, and therefore susceptible to explanation by scientific laws," (Berlin 195*, p, 6) It is difficult to understand why Berlin, as a eritio of Marx, would want to classify Marxism as scientific; it seems an unnecessary concession to Marxism. Thus, Berlin in criticizing Marx, will be criticizing science in the same breath, and science is a formidable opponent. Nonetheless, Berlin does consider Marxism a scientific approach, for like science in general, Marxism would take existence as "material in nature" and attempt to explain history in terms of cause and effect. Now it is important to note where Berlin goes from here. One would expect that Berlin would next try to show that the doctrine of universal causation, implicit in Marxism, leads to the undesirable consequence of fatalism. One would expect some kind of argumentation from Berlin to show how fatalism follows from what he has already described as the Marxist theory of history. Unfortunately, however, Berlin puts forth no such argument. He merely asserts8 All these theories [beleological, trans cendental, scientific! are, in one sense or another, forms of determinism, whether they be teleological or mechanistic, or aesthetic, or scientific. And one common characteristic of all such outlooks is the implication that the individual°s freedom of choice is ultimately an illusion, that the notion that human beings could have chosen otherwise than they did usually rests rapem ignorance of facts, (Berlin 1954, P. 20) 10 So without stating how fatalism is Mimplied" by the Marxian theory of history„ Berlin implies that it is im plied* In speaking of the "optimistic" and "pessimistic" forms of historical determinism, both of which "agree that the world has a direction and is governed by laws,” (Berlin 195^9 P» 24) Berlin again states that what both of "these attitudes entail, like all forms of genuine determinism, is the elimination of the notion of individual responsibility,"

(Berlin 195^» p, 25) The question which must be raised, Berlin's assurances aside, is just how does historical determinism (this paper is concerned with historical determinism, but the problem is quite general and applies to determinism in general) ehtsil what Berlin says it entails? It may be worthwhile at this point to mention that Berlin is not alone in his reasoning. Porter (1962), Hunt

(1950 and 195^)s McFadden (1939)» and other critics of Marx, pass quite readily from determinism to fatalism, McFadden, for example, exclaims s One of Marxism's peculiar character istics is that it invariably sets forth a principle and then endeavors by subtle means to avoid whatever odious conclusions may logically follow from the principle. Thus Marxism will profess determinism, but strongly protest against the theory, being labeled fatalistic, (McFadden 1939» P° 240) The implication here is that fatalism clearly and "logically" follows (or is entailed by) determinism. But 11 this is the whole issue at stake„ _ MePadden, as a trained philosopher» is surely guilty of begging the issue at hand. As with Berlin8 the onus is on MoFadden to show "fatalism" is entailed by determinism. It would be quite appropriate to charge Berlin with begging the question, did he not show himself at least aware of the issue involved here ("Does determinism entail fatal- 1 ism?") Although Berlin allots only one footnote to the pro= blern, he does indicate that he is not wholly unaware that he is dealing with one aspect of the classical "free-will" pro blem.

In the first place, he states that the "dissolution of the problem of free-will by the British empiricists , , , does not seem to , , „ solve the problem, merely to push it a step further back , , , if I were convinced that although choices did affect what occurred, yet they were themselves wholly determined by factors not within the individual0 s control, (including his own motives and springs of action), I should certainly not regard him as morally praiseworthy or blameworthy," (Berlin 195^» P» 26) Thus, the move to equate freedom with "caused by his choice or the absence of it,"

(Berlin 195^6 P= 26) does not seem to solve the real problem for Berlin, In fact, such a "dissolution" of the problem only pushes the problem a step further back. 12 In the second place9 Berlin shows that he is cogni zant of another alternative "solution,, ^ mainly the "doctrine that free-will is tantamount to a capacity for being (cau sally) affected by praise, blame, persuasion, education, and etc0" (Berlin 195^» P» 27) Berlin also attacks this solution as inadequate. Whether the causes that are held com pletely to determine human action are physical or psychical or of some other kind, and in whatever pattern or pro portion they are deemed to occur, if they are truly causes— if their outcomes are thought to be as certain as say, the effects of physical or physiological causes— this of itself seems to me to make the notion of a free choice between alternatives inapplicableo (Berlin 195^» P- 27) Berlin is arguing here that the move to Vpsyehical66

(or other than physical) causes will not do, because if an act is truly caused, it is determined by its antecedents and could not have been otherwise, regardless of whether the cause was material, psychical, or whatever. It is here that Berlin offers his own conception of free-willi' Freedom to act depends not on absence of ' only this or that set of fatal obstacles, to action— physical or biological, let us . : say— while other obstacles, e,g,, psycho logical ones— character, habits, 0compul- ■i sive® motives, and etc,-— are present; it requires a situation in which no sum total of such causal factors wholly determines ■ the result— in which there remains some area, however narrow, within which choice is not completely determined, (Berlin 195^o p. 27) vi 13 Ignoring for the moment what may be regarded as an enormous misconception of the whole free-will problem to which we shall return later» the important question right now is, "how is all this related to Marxism?" It was stated in Chapter II that Marxism was classified by Berlin as an "impersonal" theory of history of. the scientific variety. It not only treats existence as "material in nature," but attempts to explain everything in terms of cause and effect and scientific laws„ (Berlin 195*H P» 18) The rationale behind Berlin0s charge of fatalism seems to be that if this program is consistently carried out, it will finally en compass the psyche in a mass of fatalistic causal connec tions, so that even the move to psychical causes cannot save one from the odious conclusions of fatalism. Let us now reorient ourselves in the Marxist theory, Marxism is not principally a theory of universal causality (although it is certain that Marx would have, held to such a view), rather it is an historical materialism. As such it holds (generally) that the means of production and the re lationship which men enter into upon production causally determine the course of social and historical development. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their social being, but on the contrary, their social being which determines their consciousness, (Marx 1961) As a social and historical theory, its significance can only he understood in contrast to the various forms of historical idealismso Historical idealism interprets social and his torical development in terms of "consciousness," Conscious ness may foe identified with the "independent" and "super natural" (the Hegelian interpretation of history)» or it may foe connected with human consciousness (Barker), (Cohen I96S, pp. 663-668)o "The argument here advanced," says Barker, "is simply and only, an argument that the modern state is the product of a shift of ideas . . The important point for our discussion, however, is that Marxian historical materialism does seem to entail an historical determinism.

For if one holds to the view that history has material causes, it obviously (truistically) follows that history is "deter mined" by those causes. It is to just this point that Berlin has made his case. Berlin has argued, quite correctly it may foe added, that Marxism is a form of historical determinism. But the theory of historical determinism is no more,than one sub class of the theory of "universal causation?" it is merely causation applied to history. It is by a peculiar reasoning that Berlin thinks he has made his case for Marxian fatalism at this point, for there is a logical gap between "historical determinism" and "fatalism" which needs explanation. 15 Historical determinism is an historical theory (ioCot, it asserts historical causality) and the Marxian version, as Berlin has pointed out, is an Mimpersonal” theory, Mow let us grant for the moment the most determine istic theory of history. Let us say that the course of history is absolutely determined, and there is nothing any one can do about it. Let us say that the final outcome will be complete destruction by nuclear warfare on January 1, 1999o Would such a doctrine entail that free-will was an illusion? Would it mean one could not have a ham sandwich for lunch tomorrow? Would it mean that one was incapable of any free choice? Clearly not. On Berlin's own admission the Marxian theory is not a Mpersonal*1 one (not about in dividuals) but an **impersonal" theory of history. Of course one would not have a freedom of choice on January 1, 1999 as to whether the world would be destroyed or not, but then, there are many things over which people have no control. One cannot stop the war in Vietnam, but does that mean that one's freedom is an illusion? On the contrary, human free dom, has significance only in a context of limitations. If one could do anything and everything, one's freedom would be an illusion. In any event, the claim of Berlin that the Marxian view of history "entails" "the elimination of the notion of individual responsibility" (Berlin 195^» P- 25) is a curious 16 one. Just how a theory of history (especially an impersonal theory) can "entail" anything about individuals is not clear. Certainly the course of history does not determine all one's choices, although it may determine some of them $ and that some of one's choices are determined, even Berlin's theory of freedom will admit.

Mechanism and Historical Determinism Berlin's main objection to Marxism,, and to all other "scientific" theories of history, seems to be that it attempts "explanation by scientific laws" in terms of cause and effect. It appears, that Berlin does not really mean to criticize Marxism as an historical theory at all (historical materialism), but the consequences of extending the scienti=> fic method into the realm of mind. It is here that the "enormous misconception of the whole free-will problem" men tioned on page 13 is most conspicuous. For reasons that will be discussed, many philoso phers have felt it necessary to bifurcate the world into two essentially distinct realms, that of "mind" and that of "matter." Today such a dichotomy is more of a pre-supposition than a consciously worked out view. In any event, some phil osophers hold such a view as a shield against "mental mechan ism. " It is thought that there are two basic realms or modes of existence, mental and physical. Mental (spiritual) 1? existence or substance is essentially thinking substance and as such is not extended, solid, mobile, etc. Physical being or substance on the other hand, so the conception goes, is extended, solid, mobile, etc, . The laws of science (rigidly deterministic laws) apply to this second realm, but it is inconceivable that they could apply to the first. Mental substance is absolutely beyond scientific examination; and free-will is, after all, a mental exercise, not a phy sical one. The very thought of a "mental mechanism" (science applied to mental phenomenon) is, on this account, absurd. Freedom to act ,,, requires ,,, some area, however narrow, within which choice is not completely determined, (Berlin 1954, p, 18) Let us call this conception of two separate exis tences "the two world view," Mow it must be readily agreed that "mental mechanism" is not a very sound solution to the free-will problem; and just as readily it must be admitted that not every question or problem can be solved by science. However, nothing is gained by positing an occult world of mental and spiritual substance. On the contrary, confusion results and such a theory ends up by positing a "nook and cranny" where causality does not apply in order to account for freedom. That Berlin assumes the two world view can be seen from Chapter II, as well as the first half of this chapter. His whole argument is that if the Marxian con ception of history is eonsistantly carried out, it will lead 18 to umiversal determinism (eansallty)„ Suck a view, argues Berlin, leads to the conclusion that all human actions are caused, and thus to the denial of any truly free choice6

(Berlin 195^» P- 27) Berlin seems to be exhibiting.the same fear of mechanism of which Ryle sneaks in Concept of Mind, (Ryle

19^9s> P= 76-fofo) The belief that it is at least theoreti cally possible that everything may some day be explained in terms of mechanism, and that mechanics is the ideal type of scientific law, Ryle calls the "Bogy of Mechanism,"

I have spoken of Mechanism as a bogy. The fear that theoretically minded per sons have felt lest everything should turn out to be explicable by mechanical laws is a baseless fear. And it is base less not because ,,,: it makes no sense to speak of such a contingency , not all questions are physical questions ,,, The laws that.they have found and will find may, in one sense of the metaphorical verb, govern everything that.happens, but they do not ordain everything that happens ,,, Laws of nature are not fiats, (Ryle 1949, P, 77) Ryle goes on to give an example of what he is getting at, A scientifically trained spectator, not acquainted with chess

or any other game, is permitted to look at a chess game. He sees only the chess board between moves; he does not see the players, making their moves. After a while he discerns various regularities in the game. Pawns move one square at a time—

and only forward— except in special eases where they move 19 diagonally. The bishops move diagonally— any number of squares at a time, Knights move in a dog=legged fashion, ete. After a good deal of sueh study the spectator will have worked out all the rules of chess. Then he is allowed to see the players make their moves, "Every move that you make," he says, "is governed by unbreakable rules," (Kyle 19.49p Po 77) He further asserts that nearly every move may be predicted with startling accuracy. The whole game, from beginning to end, is hopelessly preordained. Nothing takes place which is not governed by some law or other which is iron-fast. Relentless necessity dictates every move, leav ing no room for intelligence, agency, or purpose. In such a ease, of course, the players would explain to the spectator that he had radically misconceived the game. While the moves may be predictable from the rules, they are not ordained by the rules. How far the bishop will be moved is not deducible from the rules. Moreover, there is always room to display cleverness, stupidity, etc. Though one may predict or explain a player°s move he may not deduce it from the rules of the game, Indeed, the spectator0s notion of "explanation" was too narrow, "The sense in which a rule "explains® a move made in conformity with it is not the same as the sense in which a tactical principle explains a move,"

(Ryle 1949s P» 78) Tactical principles "obey" the rules, but r ^ it is a mistake to think that these principles are reducible to the rules of the game. It should toe noted that there are two quite separate, tout compatible notions of explanation here. One is in terms of the tactical cannons of the game and presupposes the rules. Reference to the rules them selves constitute the second type of explanation. The point

of the illustration is not that scientific laws are like the rules of chess, tout that there is no contradiction in one and the same process toeing in accordance with two principles of completely different types. How does all this apply to Berlin's critique of Marx? Berlin argues that causal explanation must somehow be om- mitted from agency lest the agent toe the unfortunate victim of causal laws. He further argues that Marxism is incom patible with free-will because it espouses a theory of his

torical causality, which, if carried to its conclusion, will engulf all of us in the causal bonds of fatalism. The argument which has been presented attempts to show that the

laws of physics, chemistry, etc,, "apply to what is animate as well as to what is inanimate,*' (Ryle 19^9» P° 79) to people (agents) as well as animals, idiots and chairs, and

that their application to agents is toy no means destructive or contrary to the phenomenological fact of free-agency. 21

The modern interpretation of natural laws as statements not of necessities "but of very, very long odds is some times acclaimed as providing a desid erated element of non-rigorousness in matureo Now at last, it is sometimes felt, we can be scientific while re serving just a very few occasions in which appraisal-concept s can be pro perly applied. This silly view as sumes that an action could not merit favorable or unfavorable criticism, unless it were an exception to scienti fic, generalizations o o o The fears ex pressed by some moral philosophers that the advance of the natural sciences diminishes the field within which the moral virtues can be exercised rests on the assumption that there is some con tradiction in saying that one and the same occurrence is governed by both mechanical laws and by moral principles, an assumption as baseless as the assump tion that the golfer cannot at once con form to the laws of ballistics and obey the rules of golf and play with elegance and skill.,," (Ryle 1949, pp, 80-81) Ryle further goes on to argue that not only is pur pose compatible where everything is governed by mechanical laws, "but there would be no place for purpose if things were not so governed," (Ryle 19^9» P° 81) After all, the ability to predict is necessary for any, planned action what soever. Mechanism, concludes Ryle,, is a. "mere bogy." "There is no need," says Ryle (in a remark that may be directed to Berlin), "for the desperate salvage-operation of withdrawing the applications of (the special disciplines— sociology, biology, physics, etc,) out of the ordinary world to some 22 postulated other world» or of setting up a partition be tween things that exist in Nature and things that exist in non-Efature oM (Hyle 19^9» p 0 81) Such a "desperate salvage-operation" is precisely what Berlin would recommend against the Marxian view of history. Berlin himself states quite clearly that what is needed to save freedom of choice is "some area, however narrow, within which choice is not completely determined."

(Berlin 195^» P° 2?) Nor does it matter if the "causes" are physical (biological) or mental (psychological)' for Berlin; in either case if causation applies, free-will is an illusion. It was mentioned earlier that Berlin in calling Marxism a "scientific" view of history, was taking on a formidable opponent, science herself, Marxism, says Berlin, "is much the boldest, the most intelligent, and the least successful in its gallant and desperate attempt to treat history as a science." (Berlin 195^» p. 71) The imputation here is that the notion of a scientific history is a de lusion of grandeur, not fit for a clear-headed person. So the little peep-hole of indeterminism (a realm where causal ity does not apply) on which Berlin counts for free-will has turned out to engulf the whole of history and sociology. Berlin began by begging only "some area, however narrow, within which choice is not determined," but that narrow area 23 $@ not so narrow,' The whole area of social and historical phenomena turn out to he exceptions to determinism. Of ”social determinism" Berlin statess ,,,. if it is true» and if we begin to take it seriously, them indeed, the changes in our language, our moral mo- . tions, our attitudes toward one another, our views of history, of society and of everything else will be too profound to be even adumbrated. The concepts of praise and blame, innocence and guilt, are but a small element in the structure, which would collapse or disappear, (Berlin 1954, P* 75) Berlin further statess If social and psychological determinism were established as an accepted truth, our world would be transformed far more radically than was the teleologies! world of the classical middle ages by the tri umphs of mechanistic principles or those of natural selection. Our words— our modes of speech and thought— would be transformed in literally unimaginable ways $ the notions of choice, voluntary action, responsibility, freedom, are so deeply embedded in our out look, that our new life as creatures in a world genuinely lacking these concepts, can, I should maintain, literally not be con ceived by us, (Berlin 1954, p, 75) It appears that Berlin is entertaining some rather strange beliefs about causality. How is it possible that the stability of our world depends on our rejection of historical materialism? Is it to be imagined that our ideas about the truth or falsity of social and/or.historical determinism swing so much weight? To assume that they do is to hold to a 24 theory of history which Marxism denies $ historical idealism. And what should be noted is that this argument itself as sumes causality. It assumes that our ideas about ourselves and about the world we live in determine a great deal at a social and historical level, and that if we had different ideas (i,e,, if we accepted social determinism) some un imaginable chaos would result,

Berlin’s whole argument from social and historical causality will not do for the simple reason that it is totally misconceived. The fear of mechanism is a baseless fear and the peep-hole of indeterminism or uncausality

(which turns out to be a fathomless abyss for Berlin) is a needless construction to solve a problem which has been wrongly formulated. This is not to say that there is no problem of free-will, or that the last word has been said by Ryle, These claims are patently false, but it is to say that there have been some very basic confusions concerning the laws of science, causality, and mechanism, and their relation to the free-will controversy. Scientific laws are not fiats, and to hold that they operate universally is not to deny freedom of choice, re sponsibility, blame, praise, etc. The cranny of indetermin ism and the "two world view" are reactions resulting from a needless fear of mechanism which confuse the problem more than they help to solve it. There is just one world, and the laws of science apply to it universally, and making choices is part of that world. In fact, if one could not rely on causal generalizations, choices would be much less free than they are. Far from being the condition for re sponsibility, blame, praise, and so on, indeterminism would withdraw the background in which such phrases have meaning. Not only is one barred on such a view from causal explana tions of free actions (e.g., "I chose that one because it was the largest"), but we must be held responsible in a world where causality may fail. What I normally do to achieve certain results may result, through no fault of my own, in horrendous consequences. Two arguments have now been presented against Berlin”s critique of Marxism, The first was meant to show that historical determinism can never be logical grounds for fatalism? nor can it be grounds for the conclusion that free will is an illusion. The second argument was meant to show that Berlin”s whole critique of Marxian historical deter minism is based on a serious confusion about scientific laws, causes, mechanism,.etc, and their gelation to the free-will controversy. CHAPTER IV

THE MARXIST CONCEPT OF FREEDOM;■AN INTERPRETATION

..... So far, the thesis has been mainly a negative one.

Marx has been defended, but not exposlted. It has been said what Marxism is not (i.e., fatalism), but it has' not been set forth in a positive manner. The task of this final chapter is to put forth the Marxian conception of freedom. Since the thesis is not only that Marxism is not fatalistic, but that the concept of freedom plays an important and integral role in the Marxian philosophy, it is clear that this chapter is essential. What is Marxism, anyway? A philosophy? An histori cal theory? A sociological theory? An economic theory? Marxism is an amazingly encompassing world view; perhaps if we look at it as a "weItanschauung” philosophy we can include all these various aspects under one head. If we do look at it as a Weltanschauung, it must be remarked that it is one of the very few alive today. While most other weItans chauung philosophies have passed away, Marxism has not. Platonism, Aristotelianism, Kantianism, Hegelian-: ism, and so on, are not out of existence, but they have passed 26 27 away in the sense that they have ceased to be living al ternatives, This is not to say that they do not contain valuable„insights» but as .world-view they must be discarded. On the contrary»_ Marxism is more and more becoming a "live option," Part of the reason that this is so lies in the Marxist concept of freedom. Before going on, however, it may be_worthwhile to dispel two very widespread misconceptions about the Marxist theory. The first deals with materialism, the second with economic motivation. It is a widely held view that Marx's materialism is an ontological materialism. On this view Marx is supposed to have viewed matter as the ultimate constituent of the universe and to have relegated "mind" or spirit to a second ary importance, On this account, matter is held to be "primary" and mind is dependent on and "secondary" to matter. It is not difficult to see how such an interpre tation would lend credence to Berlin's fear of mechanism. This is not to say that such a view would .justify Berlin's fear. However, such a materialism is not Marx's position at all. For, in fact, Marx does not espouse an ontological materialism, but an historical one. That is to say, the Marxian theory4 as developed by Marx, is not a theory about the ultimate composition of the universe, but about the causes of social and historical development„ low Engels (and Lenin later on) did Indeed take materialism ontol©= gieally as. well as historically , but in any event such a materialism (ontological) is more of an ornament than a corner-stone ©f Marxism? any refutation of the latter will have little bearing on Marxism in general» The second widespread misconception concerning Marx ism deals with motivation, ©m this view the..sole or. dominant "motivation" of man is economic0 Man is "homo economieus," at the mercy of his uncontrollable economic impulses0 Every thing is "economics" according to this interpretation, and man dangles helplessly from his own purse-strings„ As in the misconceptions of materialism, it is easy to see how this "homo economieus" view would lend credibility to the charge of fatalism,, It cannot be overemphasized that Marx ism is not a theory of motivation* Again, Marxism is a theory of social and historical development and not a psychological theory of motivation. Hot only is there me evidence in Marxist literature to confirm the "homo economieus" interpretation, but Marxism would actually reject such a view as a form of historical idealism if it were used to explain history. The view that history is made by the "homo economieus" is precluded by historical materialism, the basis of the Marxian theory. Marx does not explicitly develop a positive doc trine of freedom; so what is said here will be mainly extrapolative and to some extent a matter of interpretation,, Marx's reluctance to deal specifically with freedom may be accounted for by his general attitude towards moralizing,,

In Popper's words, Marx, I believe, avoided an explicit moral theory because he hated preach ing, Deeply distrustful of the moral ist who usually preaches water and drinks wine, Marx was reluctant to formulate his ethical convictions ex plicitly, (Olafson 1961, p, 287) If we are going to construct the Marxist view of freedom, three elements must be considered; (1 ) social con text (2) knowledge, and (3) material social condition. It is, indeed, one of the great insights of Marxism to have realized that freedom is essentially a social disposition, and not a personal indulgence, Spinoza, for example, viewed freedom as a mental condition or state of mind. On the

Marxian view, Spinoza has ignored the social element involved in freedom and has wrongly treated man as a social atom, apart from society, Marxism also rejects the curious doc trine that men are free by nature and that the unnatural con ventions of society have come to odds with man's God-given freedom. Just exactly what the "natnral-freedom" theory states is not clear, but on any account, Marxism does not see freedom as innate. On the contrary, it is something which earn toe "won," "lost," "fought for," ete„ On this account, the atosolute dichotomy between freedom on the one hand, and unfreedom on the other, must toe rejected, Marxism would rather see it, as a matter of degree. It is clear that the fear of mechanism has lent credibility to this unfortunate dichotomy. It was thought that either we were completely subject to natural law and thus unfree, or that there was "some small area" where causality did not operate where we could toe free. The di chotomy here is absolute s either we are free or we are not. This, incidently is precisely how Berlin presents the issue,

f Mow Marxism has two bones to pick with the "inle- terminacy" theory of freedom (i,e,, the theory that freedom lies in an uncaused action), In the first place, freedom is- a matter of degree and so the either/or dichotomy is a misconception as well as an absolute theory. In the second place, the indeterminacy theory wholly ignores the social context, On the "indeterminacy" theory of freedom it is not only a logical possibility that one be free under a dicta torship or in jail, but these factors could make no dif ference, for freedom consists in indeterminant motivation and to that motivation external social conditions can have no relation. In other words the "indeterminacy" theory ignores all external conditions and rests its case entirely 31 on internal events0 Now social; theory before Marx was decidedly "atomistic" in the sense that it tended to abstract individuals from their social contexts, (With the notable exception of Hegel,) Consequently freedom was viewed as a property of the individual, something the in dividual either "had" or did not have, It is one of Marx ism °s chief criticisms of other social theories that they treat men as abstractions, apart from society. Yet the Marxist conception of freedom does not rest with social context alone, Marxism does, indeed, recognize knowledge as a fundamental condition for free-agency. Al though Engels is somewhat misleading in the following passage, he does bring light on the importance of knowledge for freedom. He sayss Freedom of the will ,,, means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with real knowledge of the subject, (Engels 1939, P» 125) Engels, of course, does not really mean that freedom con sists only in knowledge, as can be seen by the previous discussion. Knowledge is, however, a condition sine qua non of the Marxist conception of freedom, and one of the import ant factors already mentioned. What.is the nature of this knowledge? Or is the con tent irrelevant? How can what we know make us free? These are questions which immediately arise upon the introduction of knowledge as a factor in freedom. Like all other great systems of philosophy (Spinoza, Hegel), what Marxism is pointing to is itself as the path to "salvation,” Accord ingly, the kind of knowledge which it considers necessary for freedom is knowledge of social and historical causation. The man who is moved in an historical process caused from without is unfree in a very significant sense for Marx, Of course he can choose between the alternatives offered him (and here, Marxism takes ''psychological" freedom for grant ed), but the alternatives themselves may be socially and historically determined. That, is to say, one can choose be tween a red and a blue automobile only because one lives in an automobilized society. Can one choose to be born in an automobilized society? This example is a crude one, but what the Marxist conception of freedom is pointing to here is that complete freedom would include the ability of man to control the social and historical process— and this means that he must possess knowledge of what causes that process to go in the direction it does, Somerville puts the point this ways "[the] point is that it is scientific insight-— verified knowledge of causes and laws— that enables man to free himself from things that are harmful to.him, and gives him freedom to do those things that are beneficial to him," (Somerville 1967, p, 150) 33 .But Somerville fails to point out that for Marxism this knowledge is Basically of social and historical causality0 It should also be noted that Marxism does not ask for an exemption from causality .in order to base its concept of freedom. Bather„ Marxism realizes that in ignorance causal ity may work against us* while with knowledge it may serve our ends. 1 The answer» then, to the questions posed at the be ginning of the previous paragraph are as follows„ The ’’knowledge" important to the Marxist conception of freedom is a knowledge of what causes social and historical de velopment o This knowledge can be a factor in true freedom for Marxism, because it can enable man to control the alter natives that will be laid before him in the very process of his social and historical development.

There is one last factor which must be mentioned in a positive exposition of the Marxist notion of freedoms material condition. Many of those who have identified free dom with knowledge alone, have done so at the expense of ignoring the fact that man is first of all a material being with material requirements, Man mast live in order to make history, and to live man must produce, (Fromm 1 9 6 1 , pp. 199- 201) So long as man is totally pre-occupied with merely

sustaining himself he does not distinguish himself from 34 animal existencei he is thus/ free enly in the sense that an animal is free. As man rises historically above a "bare" existencej needs are created which transcend "bare" (i.e., animal) needs. These become human needs, and history begins. With the development of human as opposed to animal needs» comes freedom and its correlative responsibility;.. Inasmuch as man preoccupies himself with merely existing, "freedom" has no significance for him. However, as man learns to con trol his environment to suit his own desired purpose, he becomes free. The important point for the Marxian concept of freedom is to extend this knowledge beyond a merely tech nical control to a social and historical control. For what good are the greatest developments in science if they be put to use in wars which nobody wants and which nobody plans for? Three essential elements for the Marxian concept.of freedom have now been brought together. Many theories of freedom have stressed one or another of these elements (e.g., "knowledge") at the exclusion of the others, and thus have presented a one-sided view of freedom. It may be asked, "How are these three factors (social context, knowledge, material condition) related?" Obviously, they are related, and in an intimate way. Despite very significant progress in technology (knowledge) and its cor responding higher standard of living, (material condition), 35 man may still be very nnfree with respect to controlling his social and historical environment„ Today9 for example» war, starvation, disease and poverty rage in the midst of a thriving technology because man is unable to control his social environmento Han reacts rather than acts; and that, from the Marxian point of view, is to be unfree in a very significant sense. The three factors may be viewed in this way. First of all, man must rise above "bare" subsistence (material

condition). Second of all, man must achieve a society de void of class antagonisms (social context). Lastly, only then can man be in a position to have the "knowledge" requisite for his freedom in the Marxian sense, that is, social and historical knowledge, Man cannot have this knowledge at an animal level any more than he can have it in class society. In class society, man”s understanding is distorted by prevailing ideologies, and thus man is pre vented from attaining an adequate understanding of his social conditions and their causes. So the "knowledge" of which Marxism speaks in connection with freedom is an over coming of ideology. Very briefly, an ideology is an il lusion or collectively false idea about our social and his torical condition. For example, it was (and still is) thought that the civil war was fought to free the slaves. 36

This, aecording to Harz, is an ideological explanation of a social phenomenon. Indeed, these kinds of explanations (ideological) were the only ones offered in Marx°s time for the explanation of social and historical events, and it is the insight of Marx's historical materialism to have seen that o o o in the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political super structure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It Is not the consci ousness of men that determines their social being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. (Marx and Engels. 1955p pp. 362=4) Taking the last sentence of this passage, it may be said that true freedom for. Marx would consist in its con trary. When man can determine his social being, rather than be determined by it, he will be free. It may be said at this point this is the very thing which is precluded by the Marxian theory. If man Is deter mined by; his social existence, how can he come to determine his social being? Is this not an impossibility on the Marxian account of historical materialism? The answer to this seeming paradox is not to be found in social and historic indeterminism as some of Marx°s critics would suggest0 (MePadden 1939» P= 84) Again, it is a mistake to look for special exemption from causality, his torical, social, or otherwise0 The answer to this seeming paradox lies in the overcoming of ideology— in knowledge of what causes social and historical events, lan is condition ed by his social surroundings and he always will be. To ask that it be otherwise is foolish at best. The point is that man may determine (effectively cause) his social existence, when, and only when, he knows what causes social phenomena0 As long as man does not know, for example, what causes wars, he cannot possibly prevent them from occurring. The Marxist does not envision the day when man will not be conditioned by his social being, but he does entertain the possibility that man may effectively and humanly determine the conditions that will condition him. The paradox disappears when we realize that determinism is not only not destructive of human freedom, but its very condition. Medical science, for example, seeks to discover the causes of human sickness in order that we may be free from sickness, but it does-not seek "indeterminacy," or a "small area” of uncausality, Such science seeks to understand the causes of sickness so that we may be able to increase health. How there is no reason to "believe, according to the Marxian account, that the situa tion is any different when dealing with social and histori cal phenomena. Just as social and historical determinism may work against man, so it may be put to work for man. In fact, it is only in light of determinism (in this case social and historical) that we may become free.

The result of our inquiry may seem somewhat para doxical. It is concluded not only that Marxism is not de structive of human freedom, but that the determinism of Marx ism (and here it is social and historical determinism) is a necessary condition for the achievement of human freedom.

Both our knowledge of and our ability to change our social condition in accordance with our own true ends, presupposes such determinism. It should be evident by now that the Marxian con ception of freedom is significantly wider than theories of free-will or free action. Ignoring the quagmire of con fusions concerning free-will and free action, it should be noted that such conceptions of freedom must be labeled "atomistic" from the Marxian point of view. If, for example, true freedom is to be found in a faculty of the mind called free-will, then the social cir cumstances seem irrelevant to freedom... For as long as one possesses this power or faculty of free-will, one is entitled to consider one’s self free. Also, on this account, a slave 39 in the Roman Empire, a serf to a feudal lord, and a citizen of a modern democratic republic, would all stand as equally free insofar as they possessed a "will" in working order. The concept of free-aetion is similarly narrow and socially atomistic from the Marxist point of view.' Marxism

is concerned with free society and free people, not free action. Of course the concepts of a free society and a free people presuppose, voluntary (free) action, but the essence of freedom for Marxism does not consist in signaling for left-hand turns and so on. Freedom for Marxism consists, ultimately in the free society which is a society consciously

conducted by humanity rather than a humanity unconsciously conducted by society. It may be said that the (apparent) paradox ment ioned earlier arises here in a different form. For if a society is net free, it is not free to seek or gain freedom. Yet if a society is free (in the Marxist sense), it is not free ■to seek or gain freedom either (you cannot get rich when you are already rich), since it cannot gain what it has already gained. However, by the same token, if a society is not free it does have freedom to gain, and if it is free theh it need not worry about gaining its freedom. Such a paradox is misleading. In the first place it

suggests an absolute dichotomy between freedom or non- freedom which has already been rejected. In the second place» it suggests that societies consciously seek free dom, and this, too is rejected by the Marxist account» To summarize, there are three very important elements in the Marxist concept of freedoms (1) social con text, (2 ) knowledge of social and historical causation, and (3) material social condition. While it cannot be said that these elements are exhaustive, they are fundamental, and they have been very often ignored in theories of freedom. LIST OF REFERENCES

Berlin, Isaiah, Historical Inevitability, London! Oxford Pniversity.Press, 195^« - Cohen, Carl, Communism, Fascism and Democracy, New York: Random House, 1961, . . _ . . Engels, Frederick, Anti-Durhing, Trans, Emile Burns, New York: International Publishers, 1939» Fromm, Erich, Marx's Concept of Man, New"Yorks Ungar Publishing Company, 1961, This is from Marx's German Ideology of 184-5, Hespers, John, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Ednglewood Cliffs, N, J, Prentice“Hall, 1953° Hunt, N, Carew, Theory and Practice of Communism, London: Geoffrey Bles, Publisher, 1950° „ Marxisms Past and Present, New York: The MacMillan Company, .1954, " Marx, Earl, --German Ideology, Trams, B, T, Bottomore; Marx'"s"concepts of man. Edited by Erich Fromm, New XorkV Ongar Publi^ihg Company, 1961,

______, and Fredrick Engels, "Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy," Selected Works, Vol,. I, Moscow: Foreign. Languages Publishing House, 1955° McFadden, Charles J, The Philosophy of Communism, New York: Bengigef Brothers, 1939° V " Olafson, Fredrick A, Society, Law and Morality, Englewood Cliffs, N, J, Prentice“Hall, 1961, Porter, Eugene 0, The Fallacies of Earl Marx, El Paso, Texas: Texas iftfestern College Press, 1962, Ryle, Gilbert, The Concent of Mind, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949° Somerville, John, The Philosophy of Marxism, New York: Random House, 1967< 41