Statute of Frauds and Land Transactions
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Oxford Scholarship Online
Uses, Wills, and Fiscal Feudalism University Press Scholarship Online Oxford Scholarship Online The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume VI 1483–1558 John Baker Print publication date: 2003 Print ISBN-13: 9780198258179 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198258179.001.0001 Uses, Wills, and Fiscal Feudalism Sir John Baker DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198258179.003.0035 Abstract and Keywords This chapter examines property law related to uses, wills, and fiscal feudalism in England during the Tudor period. It discusses the conflict between landlords and tenants concerning land use, feoffment, and land revenue. The prevalence of uses therefore provoked a conflict of interests which could not be reduced to a simple question of revenue evasion. This was a major problem because during this period, the greater part of the land of England was in feoffments upon trust. Keywords: fiscal feudalism, land use, feoffments, property law, tenants, wills, landlords ANOTHER prolonged discussion, culminating in a more fundamental and far-reaching reform, concerned another class of tenant altogether, the tenant by knight-service. Here the debate concerned a different aspect of feudal tenure, the valuable ‘incidents’ which belonged to the lord on the descent of such a tenancy to an heir. The lord was entitled to Page 1 of 40 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). -
Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg Paradigm: the Dawn of the Electronic Will
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Volume 42 2008 Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg Paradigm: The Dawn of the Electronic Will Joseph Karl Grant Capital University Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons Recommended Citation Joseph K. Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg Paradigm: The Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 105 (2008). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol42/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SHATTERING AND MOVING BEYOND THE GUTENBERG PARADIGM: THE DAWN OF THE ELECTRONIC WILL Joseph Karl Grant* INTRODUCTION Picture yourself watching a movie. In the film, a group of four siblings are dressed in dark suits and dresses. The siblings, Bill Jones, Robert Jones, Margaret Jones and Sally Johnson, have just returned from their elderly mother's funeral. They sit quietly in their mother's attorney's office intently watching and listening to a videotape their mother, Ms. Vivian Jones, made before her death. On the videotape, Ms. Jones expresses her last will and testament. Ms. Jones clearly states that she would like her sizable real estate holdings to be divided equally among her four children and her valuable blue-chip stock investments to be used to pay for her grandchildren's education. -
Overreaching: Beneficiaries in Occupation
-The Law Commission (LAW COM. No. 188) TRANSFER OF LAND OVERREACHING: BENEFICIARIES IN OCCUPATION Laid before Parliament by the Lord High Chancellor pursuant to section 3(2) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 19 December 1989 LONDON HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE L4.90 net 61 The Law Commission was set up by section 1 of the Law Commissions Act 1965 for the purpose of promoting the reform of the law. The Commissioners are- The Right Honourable Lord Justice Beldam, Chairman Mr Trevor M. Aldridge Mr Jack Beatson Mr Richard Buxton, Q.C. Professor Brenda Hoggett, Q.C. The Secretary of the Law Commission is Mr Michael Collon and its offices are at Conquest House, 37-38 John Street, Theobalds Road, London WClN 2BQ. OVERREACHING BENEFICIARIES IN OCCUPATION CONTENTS Pa ragraph Page PART I: INTRODUCTION 1.1 1 Background and scope 1.1 1 Recommendations 1.7 2 Structure of this report 1.8 2 PART 11: THE PRESENT LAW 2.1 3 Introductory 2.1 3 Equitable interests 2.3 3 Overreaching 2.9 4 Mortgagees 2.14 5 Personal representatives 2.16 6 Bare trustees 2.17 6 Safeguard for beneficiaries 2.18 7 Registered land 2.2 1 7 Registration of beneficiary’s interests 2.25 8 Beneficiary in occupation: summary 2.28 9 PART 111: NEED FOR REFORM 3.1 10 Change of circumstances 3.1 10 Protecting occupation of property 3.4 10 Bare trusts 3.10 12 PART IV REFORM PROPOSALS 4.1 13 Principal recommendation 4.1 13 Beneficiaries 4.4 13 (a) Interests 4.5 13 (b) Capacity 4.8 14 (c) Occupation 4.11 14 (d) Consent 4.15 15 Conveyances by mortgagees 4.20 16 Conveyances by personal representatives 4.22 16 Conveyances under court order 4.23 17 Conveyancing procedure 4.24 17 Second recommendation: bare trusts 4.27 18 Transitional provisions 4.28 18 Application to the Crown 4.30 18 PART V: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 19 APPENDIX A Draft Law of Property (Overreaching) Bill with Explanatory Notes 21 APPENDIX B: Individuals and organisations who com- mented on Working Paper No. -
Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: a Comment
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1996 Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A Comment Eric A. Posner Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Eric Posner, "Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A Comment," 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1971 (1996). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NORMS, FORMALITIES, AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS: A COMMENT ERIC A. POSNERt INTRODUCTION Jason Johnston's Article makes three contributions to the economics and sociology of contract law.' First, it provides a methodological analysis of the use of case reports to discover business norms. Second, it makes a positive argument about the extent to which businesses use writings in contractual relations. Third, it sets the stage for, and hints at, a normative defense of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) section 2-201. Although the first contribution is probably the most interesting and useful, I focus on the second and third, and comment only in passing on the first. I conclude with some observations about the role of formalities in contract law. I. JOHNSTON'S POSITIVE ANALYSIS A. The Hypothesis Johnston's hypothesis is that "strangers" use writings for the purpose of ensuring legal enforcement. "Repeat players" do not use writings for this purpose because they expect that nonlegal sanctions will deter breach. -
United States District Court Southern District of Indiana New Albany Division
Case 4:06-cv-00074-JDT-WGH Document 45 Filed 08/07/07 Page 1 of 19 PageID #: <pageID> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA NEW ALBANY DIVISION MADISON TOOL AND DIE, INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) 4:06-cv-0074-JDT-WGH ) ) ZF SACHS AUTOMOTIVE OF AMERICA, ) INC., ) ) Defendant. ) ENTRY ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO STRIKE JURY DEMAND (Docs. No. 21 & 29)1 This matter comes before the court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike Jury Demand. (Docs. No. 21 & 29.) Plaintiff Madison Tool and Die, Inc. (“Madison”) filed this cause in Jefferson County, Indiana, Circuit Court alleging that Defendant ZF Sachs Automotive of America, Inc. (“Sachs”) breached a contract under which Madison was to supply parts to Sachs. On May 11, 2006, Defendant removed this case to United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. (Doc. No. 1.) (The parties are diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.) On March 22, 2007, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the Indiana Statute of Frauds (“Statute of Frauds” or “Statute”) rendered the alleged oral contract unenforceable and that promissory estoppel does not take this oral 1 This Entry is a matter of public record and will be made available on the court’s web site. However, the discussion contained herein is not sufficiently novel to justify commercial publication. Case 4:06-cv-00074-JDT-WGH Document 45 Filed 08/07/07 Page 2 of 19 PageID #: <pageID> contract or promise outside the operation of the Statute. -
Estoppel to Avoid the California Statute of Frauds Philip H
McGeorge Law Review Volume 35 | Issue 3 Article 4 1-1-2004 Estoppel to Avoid the California Statute of Frauds Philip H. Wile University of the Pacific; cGeM orge School of Law Kathleen Cordova-Lyon University of the Pacific; cGeM orge School of Law Claude D. Rohwer University of the Pacific; cGeM orge School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Philip H. Wile, Kathleen Cordova-Lyon & Claude D. Rohwer, Estoppel to Avoid the California Statute of Frauds, 35 McGeorge L. Rev. 319 (2004). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Estoppel to Avoid the California Statute of Frauds Philip H. Wile,* Kathleen C6rdova-Lyon** and Claude D. Rohwer*** TABLE OF CONTENTS I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL ............................ 321 II. SEYMOUR AND ITS PROGENY ..................................................................... 325 III. THE IMPACT OF THESE INROADS ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS .............. 337 IV. THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT CASES ............................................................ 341 V. FULLER'S THREE FUNCTIONS REVISITED ................................................. 344 VI. MONARCO AND ITS PROGENY .................................................................... 344 V II. THE BROKER CASES ................................................................................. 355 VIII. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN ARTICLE 2 .................................................. 363 IX. THE CALIFORNIA PRINCIPLES AND THE RESTATEMENT ........................... 364 The statute of frauds was enacted to prevent fraud.' The statute of frauds 2 cannot properly be asserted as a defense when to do so would perpetrate a fraud. -
English Contract Law: Your Word May Still Be Your Bond Oral Contracts Are Alive and Well – and Enforceable
Client Alert Litigation Client Alert Litigation March 13, 2014 English Contract Law: Your Word May Still be Your Bond Oral contracts are alive and well – and enforceable. By Raymond L. Sweigart American movie mogul Samuel Goldwyn is widely quoted as having said, ‘A verbal contract isn’t worth the paper it’s written on.’ He is also reputed to have stated, ‘I’m willing to admit that I may not always be right, but I am never wrong.’ With all due respect to Mr Goldwyn, he did not have this quite right and recent case law confirms he actually had it quite wrong. English law on oral contracts has remained essentially unchanged with a few exceptions for hundreds of years. Oral contracts most certainly exist, and they are certainly enforceable. Many who negotiate commercial contracts often assume that they are not bound unless and until the agreement is reduced to writing and signed by the parties. However, the courts in England are not at all reluctant to find that binding contracts have been made despite the lack of a final writing and signature. Indeed, as we have previously noted, even in the narrow area where written and signed contracts are required (for example pursuant to the Statute of Frauds requirement that contracts for the sale of land must be in writing), the courts can find the requisite writing and signature in an exchange of emails.1 As for oral contracts, a recent informative example is presented by the case of Rowena Williams (as executor of William Batters) v Gregory Jones (25 February 2014) reported on Lawtel reference LTL 7/3/2014 document number AC0140753. -
The Cohen Case and the One Year Provision of the Statute of Frauds
Fordham Law Review Volume 25 Issue 4 Article 7 1956 The Cohen Case and the One Year Provision of the Statute of Frauds Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation The Cohen Case and the One Year Provision of the Statute of Frauds, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 720 (1956). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol25/iss4/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25 of an indemnity agreement. The failure to consider this principle may result in an injustice to the insured. This point may be illustrated by contrasting the O'Dowd and Union Paving cases. The basis of the injured party's cause of action in the former case was that the Housing Authority was passively negligent and the insured was actively negligent. The theory of the cross-claim was that the insured was ultimately liable on its indemnity agreement because it had been solely negligent. Thus an implied in law obligation to indemnify was easily recognized as the real basis of the insured's liability. In the latter case, however, the Paving Company's complaint merely alleged the sweeping indemnity agree- ment as the basis of the insured's liability. The important difference in the two cases is that in the latter the court failed to recognize the possibility of a liability of the insured which (though in form the result of his indemnity agree- ment) was in substance a liability he would have incurred in the absence of such an agreement. -
Trusts, Equitable Interests and the New Zealand Statute of Frauds
TRUSTS, EQUITABLE INTERESTS AND THE NEW ZEALAND STATUTE OF FRAUDS ROBERT BURGESS* The Property Law Amendment Act 1980 1 contains provisions which effectively patriate sections 7-9 of the Statute of Frauds 1677, replacing the "archaically worded and often obscure provisions"2 of the original English statute with a more modern set of provisions which again have an English derivation being "taken almost word for word"3from that country's Law of Property Act 1925. 4 The new provisions take effect as section 49A of the Property Law Act 1952 and, in so far as they concern the law of trusts, read as follows: 49A(2) A declaration of trust respecting any land or any interest in land shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by some person who is able to declare such trust or by his will. (3) A disposition of an equitable interest or trust subsisting at the time of the disposition shall be in writing signed by the person disposing of the same or by his agent lawfully authorised in that behalf, or by will. (4) This section does not affect the creation or operation of resulting, implied or constructive trusts. Section 49A is stated5 as being "in substitution for" the corresponding provisions of 1677 and represents a consolidation of those provisions, although perhaps not, as has been suggested, 6 a "true consolidation". The point is that the structure of section 49A would appear to indicate that the ambit of its application is different from that of its predecessor. In particular, the provision contained in section 49A(4) appears to have an application within the context of the section as a whole whereas under * LLB Hons (London), PhD (Edinburgh), Reader in Law, University of East Anglia. -
The Statute of Frauds and Partnership/Operating Agreements
November–December 2008 State Law & State Taxation Corner By Thomas E. Rutledge The Statute of Frauds and Partnership/Operating Agreements n a recent decision, Olson v. Halvorsen,1 the Delaware Supreme Court addressed whether the IStatute of Frauds, as it relates to agreements that are not susceptible to performance within one year, is applicable to LLC operating agreements. In this in- stance, and as a matter of law, the Delaware Chancery Court held that the Statute of Frauds does apply to those aspects of an oral operating agreement that are not susceptible to performance within a single year. Olsen v. Halvorsen and Its Facts Olsen, Halvorsen and Ott formed a series of com- panies for the purpose of operating a pair of hedge funds, Viking Global Equities LP and Viking Global Equities III Ltd., focused on, respectively, on-shore and off-shore opportunities. Viking Global Found- ers LLC (“Founders”), whose relationship with the two hedge fund limited partnerships is never made express in the opinion, had as members Olsen, Halvorsen and Ott. The draft operating agreement of Founders, which agreement was never signed, contained an earn-out provision entitling a departing partner to an earn-out over six years. For several of the other related companies, written operating agree- ments were executed and put in place. In 2005, Halvorsen and Ott, with Halvorsen repre- senting a 55-percent interest and Ott a 22.5-percent interest, determined to expel Olsen from the busi- ness. Consequent to that determination, they paid to Olsen his capital account balance and the remainder Thomas E. -
Law of Property Act 1925 Is up to Date with All Changes Known to Be in Force on Or Before 01 July 2021
Changes to legislation: Law of Property Act 1925 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 July 2021. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes Law of Property Act 1925 1925 CHAPTER 20 15 and 16 Geo 5 X1 An Act to consolidate the enactments relating to conveyancing and the law of property in England and Wales. [9th April 1925] Editorial Information X1 A dagger appended to a marginal note means that it is no longer accurate Modifications etc. (not altering text) C1 Act applied by Land Registration Act 1925 (c. 21), ss. 36, 38, 69(3), S.R. & O. 1925/1093 (Rev. XII, p. 81: 1925, p. 717) Act applied by Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (c. 50), s. 8(4) Act applied by Finance Act 1949 (c. 47), s. 40(4)(b) Act applied by Highways Act 1959 (c. 25), s. 81(3) Act applied by Housing Act 1964 (c. 56), s. 80(5) Act applied by Building Act 1984 (c. 55, SIF 15), s. 107(2) Act applied (1.11.1993) by 1993 c. 28, s. 69(3); S.I. 1993/2134, arts. 25 Act applied (5.1.1994) by 1990 c. 43, s. 81A(8) (as inserted (5.1.1994) by 1993 c. 40, ss. 10(2), 12(1)(2) Act applied (21.9.1995 for E. specified purposes and 1.4.2000 for E. -
Future Interests in Property in Minnesota Everett Rf Aser
University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Minnesota Law Review 1919 Future Interests in Property in Minnesota Everett rF aser Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Fraser, Everett, "Future Interests in Property in Minnesota" (1919). Minnesota Law Review. 1283. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1283 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW FUTURE INTERESTS IN PROPERTY IN MINNESOTA "ORIGINALLY the creation of future interests at law was greatly restricted, but now, either by the Statutes of Uses and of Wills, or by modern legislation, or by the gradual action of the courts, all restraints on the creation of future interests, except those arising from remoteness, have been done away. This practically reduces the law restricting the creation of future interests to the Rule against Perpetuities,"' Generally in common law jurisdictions today there is but one rule restricting the crea- tion of future interests, and that rule is uniform in its application to real property and to personal property, to legal and equitable interests therein, to interests created by way of trust, and to powers. In 1830 the New York Revised Statutes went into effect in New York state. The revision had been prepared by a commis- sion appointed for the purpose five years before. It contained a code of property law in which "the revisers undertook to re- write the whole law of future estates in land, uses and trusts ..