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European Rule of Law Mechanism: Input from Member States (POLAND)

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European Rule of Law Mechanism: input from Member States (POLAND) I. Justice System A. Independence 1. Appointment and selection of judges and prosecutors Pursuant to Article 179 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, judges are appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland, at the request of the National Council of the Judiciary, for an indefinite period of time. Under Article 144(3)(17) of the Polish Constitution, the appointment of judges is the prerogative of the President of the Republic of Poland – an act excluded from the Prime Minister's countersignature. The clarifying standards of statutory rank (Act of 27 July 2001 – the Law on the Common Court System, Journal of Laws of 2020, item 365, as amended, hereinafter referred to as LCCS, the Act of 12 May 2011 on the National Council of the Judiciary, Journal of Laws of 2019, item 84, as amended, hereinafter referred to as NCJA) regulates the procedure for appointing a judge. Once the Minister of Justice has announced the vacancy, candidates may submit their applications via the ICT system supporting the procedure. Applications are submitted together with documents required by law, depending on the profession or status (judge, prosecutor, advocate, legal counsel, notary public, Professor in Law, Ph.D. (doktor habilitowany) in Law). Afterwards, the president of the competent court orders an evaluation of the candidates' qualifications by a designated judge. The candidate is assessed in turn by the board of the competent court. The information collected in this way is then transmitted, in the ICT system, to the National Council of the Judiciary, which evaluates the candidates. The Council considers and assesses all the submitted candidacies for a given judicial post on the basis of the position prepared by the team appointed within the Council and adopts a resolution including decisions on presenting to the President a motion to appoint a candidate to perform the office of a judge and presents to the President a resolution containing a motion to appoint a judge together with a justification and information on the remaining candidates and an assessment of all the candidates. If new circumstances come to light, the Council may, ex officio or at the request of a participant in the proceedings, reconsider the case and the President may also request a reconsideration. The President finalises the appointment of a judge. Prosecutors of common organisational units of the prosecutor's office are appointed by the General Prosecutor on the motion of the National Prosecutor. Prior to appointment, the General Prosecutor may consult with the relevant board of prosecutors about the candidate (Article 74 of the Act of 28 January 2016. – Law on Public Prosecutor's Office (Journal of Laws of 2019, item 740 and of 2020, item 190, hereinafter referred to as LPPO). The General Prosecutor appoints the first prosecutor post (district prosecutor) in the competition procedure, and in particularly justified cases, the General Prosecutor appoints for this post a candidate indicated in the motion of the National Prosecutor, without conducting the competition procedure (Article 80 LPPO). 2. Irremovability of judges, including transfers of judges and dismissal 1 Pursuant to Article 180(1) to (5) of the Polish Constitution: Judges are irremovable. The submission of a judge ex officio, suspension from office, transfer to another seat or position against their will may only take place by virtue of a court decision and only in cases specified in relevant law. A judge may be retired due to illness or loss of strength preventing them from exercising their office. The procedure and manner of appealing to the court is specified in detail in relevant law. The law defines the age limit at which judges are retired. In the event of a change in the court system or a change in the boundaries of court districts, a judge may be transferred to another court or retired, with full remuneration. In accordance with LCCS, the submission of a judge ex officio may be effected by a disciplinary court ruling. Moreover, if the disciplinary court issues a resolution allowing a judge to be held criminally responsible for an intentional offence prosecuted by public indictment, it shall ex officio suspend the judge in their official activities. Disciplinary court may also suspend a judge against whom disciplinary proceedings or proceedings for incapacitation have been instituted, and also if it passes a resolution allowing the judge to be held criminally responsible. If the penalty of removing a judge from office has been imposed and the disciplinary court has not previously suspended the judge in their official duties, the judgement shall result in the suspension of the judge in their official duties. Subsequently, if a judge is detained for being caught in the act of committing an intentional offence or if, due to the nature of the act committed by the judge, the seriousness of the court or important interests of the service require their immediate removal from the performance of their official duties, the president of the court or the Minister of Justice may order an immediate suspension in the official duties of the judge until the disciplinary court issues a resolution, no longer than for a month. The president of the court or the Minister of Justice shall notify the disciplinary court of the issue of the order, within three days of its issue, which shall immediately, not later than before the expiry of the period for which the suspension was ordered, issue a resolution suspending the judge in their official activities or revoking the order for the suspension in the performance of those duties. With regard to the transfer of a judge within the same court, it should be pointed out that the president of the court may establish a new distribution of the functions of judges at any time, if this is justified by the need to ensure the proper distribution of judges, associate judges and division officials in the divisions of the court and an even distribution of their duties and the need to guarantee the smooth running of the court proceedings, and, if this would result in the transfer of a judge to another division, it requires the consent of the judge. However, the consent of the judge to transfer to another division is not required, if: 1) the transferred judge is assigned to a division where cases of the same scope are examined; 2) no other judge in the division from which the transfer is made has consented to the transfer; 3) the transferred judge is assigned to a land and mortgage registers division or a commercial division for the register of pledges (to which only court registrars are assigned, unless this is not possible). The provisions of points 1 and 2 do not apply to a judge who has been transferred to another division for three years without their consent. When a judge is transferred to another division without their consent in the case referred to in point 2, particular account shall be taken of the judges' seniority in the division from which the judge is transferred. A judge or associate judge who has changed the division of activities in a way that results in a change in the scope of their duties, in particular a transfer to another division of the court, may appeal to the National Council of the Judiciary, but is not entitled to do so in the case of: 1) transfer to a division where cases of the same scope are handled, 2) entrusting duties in the same division in accordance with the rules applicable to other judges, and in particular the cancellation of assignments to a division or other form of specialisation. The National Council of the Judiciary adopts a resolution accepting or dismissing a judge's appeal, and a resolution of the National Council of the Judiciary is non-appealable. A judge may be transferred to another official place (to another court) by the ruling of disciplinary court, under one of the disciplinary penalties. Furthermore, a judge may be transferred to another place of employment only with their consent, and the judge's consent to the transfer is not required in cases of: 1) the abolition of the position developed by a change in the organisation of the judiciary or the abolition of a given court or a local division or the transfer of the seat of the court, 2) the inadmissibility of holding the position of a judge in a given court due to the occurrence of circumstances of remaining in the relationship of kinship in a straight line or 2 affinity in a straight line or in the relationship of adoption, marriage and in case of being a sibling with another judge, associate judge or division official at the same division of the court; 3) when required by the seriousness of the position, on the basis of a decision of the disciplinary court, issued at the request of the board of the competent court or the National Council of the Judiciary; 4) transfer as a result of a disciplinary penalty (as already mentioned above). The transfer of a judge shall be decided by the Minister of Justice, whereas the transfer of a judge for the reasons set out in point 1 may take place if it is not possible to grant a judge's request for a new place of employment. In the cases referred to in points 1 and 2, the judge may appeal against the decision of the Minister of Justice to the Supreme Court. A judge may also be retired. A judge shall be retired at their request or at the request of the board of the competent court if, due to illness or loss of strength, the judge has been declared permanently incapable of performing the duties of a judge by a certifying physician of the Social Insurance Institution.
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  • Poland Country Report BTI 2018

    Poland Country Report BTI 2018

    BTI 2018 Country Report Poland This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2018. It covers the period from February 1, 2015 to January 31, 2017. The BTI assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of political management in 129 countries. More on the BTI at http://www.bti-project.org. Please cite as follows: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Poland. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Contact Bertelsmann Stiftung Carl-Bertelsmann-Strasse 256 33111 Gütersloh Germany Sabine Donner Phone +49 5241 81 81501 [email protected] Hauke Hartmann Phone +49 5241 81 81389 [email protected] Robert Schwarz Phone +49 5241 81 81402 [email protected] Sabine Steinkamp Phone +49 5241 81 81507 [email protected] BTI 2018 | Poland 3 Key Indicators Population M 37.9 HDI 0.855 GDP p.c., PPP $ 27811 Pop. growth1 % p.a. -0.1 HDI rank of 188 36 Gini Index 32.1 Life expectancy years 78.2 UN Education Index 0.876 Poverty3 % 0.3 Urban population % 60.5 Gender inequality2 0.137 Aid per capita $ - Sources (as of October 2017): The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2017 | UNDP, Human Development Report 2016. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate. (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII). (3) Percentage of population living on less than $3.20 a day at 2011 international prices. Executive Summary Poland experienced relatively calm years from the time of the 2005 elections.