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Optimizing and Protecting Hard Drives ‐ Chapter # 9
Optimizing and Protecting Hard Drives ‐ Chapter # 9 Amy Hissom Key Terms antivirus (AV) software — Utility programs that prevent infection or scan a system to detect and remove viruses. McAfee Associates’ VirusScan and Norton AntiVirus are two popular AV packages. backup — An extra copy of a file, used in the event that the original becomes damaged or destroyed. boot sector virus — An infectious program that can replace the boot program with a modified, infected version of the boot command utilities, often causing boot and data retrieval problems. buffer — A temporary memory area where data is kept before being written to a hard drive or sent to a printer, thus reducing the number of writes to the devices. chain — A group of clusters used to hold a single file. child, parent, grandparent backup method — A plan for backing up and reusing tapes or removable disks by rotating them each day (child), week (parent), and month (grandparent). cross-linked clusters — Errors caused when more than one file points to a cluster, and the files appear to share the same disk space, according to the file allocation table. defragment — To “optimize” or rewrite a file to a disk in one contiguous chain of clusters, thus speeding up data retrieval. differential backup — Backup method that backs up only files that have changed or have been created since the last full backup. When recovering data, only two backups are needed: the full backup and the last differential backup. disk cache — A method whereby recently retrieved data and adjacent data are read into memory in advance, anticipating the next CPU request. -
The Rise of Autorun- Based Malware by Vinoo Thomas, Prashanth Ramagopal, and Rahul Mohandas Report the Rise of Autorun-Based Malware
Report The Rise of AutoRun- Based Malware By Vinoo Thomas, Prashanth Ramagopal, and Rahul Mohandas Report The Rise of AutoRun-Based Malware Table of Contents Abstract 3 The Return of Removable-Disk Malware 3 Distribution of AutoRun-Based Malware 4 AutoRun Woes 6 Incomplete autorun.inf cleaning 7 Traditional detection methods 8 Smart removal of autorun.inf 8 Leveraging In-the-Cloud Computing Technology 10 The Road Ahead 11 About the authors 12 Report The Rise of AutoRun-Based Malware Abstract Most people associate today’s computer viruses and other prevalent malware with the Internet. But that’s not where they started. Lest we forget, the earliest computer threats came from the era of floppy disks and removable media. With the arrival of the Internet, email and network-based attacks became the preferred infection vector for hackers to spread malicious code—while security concerns about removable media took a back seat. Now, however, our attention is returning to plug-in media. Over the years, floppy disks have been replaced by portable hard drives, flash media cards, memory sticks, and other forms of data storage. Today’s removable devices can hold 10,000 times more data than yesterday’s floppy disks. Not only can they store more data, today’s devices are “smart”—with the ability to run portable software programs1 or boot operating systems. 2,3 Seeing the popularity of removable storage, virus authors realized the potential of using this media as an infection vector. And they are greatly aided by a convenience feature in operating systems called AutoRun, which launches the content on a removable disk without any user interaction. -
Investigating Powershell Attacks
Investigating PowerShell Attacks Black Hat USA 2014 August 7, 2014 PRESENTED BY: Ryan Kazanciyan, Matt Hastings © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Background Case Study WinRM, Victim VPN SMB, NetBIOS Attacker Victim workstations, Client servers § Fortune 100 organization § Command-and-control via § Compromised for > 3 years § Scheduled tasks § Active Directory § Local execution of § Authenticated access to PowerShell scripts corporate VPN § PowerShell Remoting © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 2 Why PowerShell? It can do almost anything… Execute commands Download files from the internet Reflectively load / inject code Interface with Win32 API Enumerate files Interact with the registry Interact with services Examine processes Retrieve event logs Access .NET framework © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 3 PowerShell Attack Tools § PowerSploit § Posh-SecMod § Reconnaissance § Veil-PowerView § Code execution § Metasploit § DLL injection § More to come… § Credential harvesting § Reverse engineering § Nishang © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 4 PowerShell Malware in the Wild © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 5 Investigation Methodology WinRM PowerShell Remoting evil.ps1 backdoor.ps1 Local PowerShell script Persistent PowerShell Network Registry File System Event Logs Memory Traffic Sources of Evidence © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 6 Attacker Assumptions § Has admin (local or domain) on target system § Has network access to needed ports on target system § Can use other remote command execution methods to: § Enable execution of unsigned PS scripts § Enable PS remoting © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 7 Version Reference 2.0 3.0 4.0 Requires WMF Requires WMF Default (SP1) 3.0 Update 4.0 Update Requires WMF Requires WMF Default (R2 SP1) 3.0 Update 4.0 Update Requires WMF Default 4.0 Update Default Default Default (R2) © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. -
Norton™ Utilities Premium: User Manual
Norton™ Utilities Premium User Manual Norton Utilities Premium User Guide The software described in this book is furnished under a license agreement and may be used only in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Copyright © 2018 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. The product described in this document is distributed under licenses restricting its use, copying, distribution, and decompilation/reverse engineering. No part of this document may be reproduced in any form by any means without prior written authorization of Symantec Corporation and its licensors, if any. THE DOCUMENTATION IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE DISCLAIMED, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH DISCLAIMERS ARE HELD TO BE LEGALLY INVALID. SYMANTEC CORPORATION SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE FURNISHING, PERFORMANCE, OR USE OF THIS DOCUMENTATION. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENTATION IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. The Licensed Software and Documentation are deemed to be commercial computer software as defined in FAR 12.212 and subject to restricted rights as defined in FAR Section 52.227-19 "Commercial Computer Software - Restricted Rights" and DFARS 227.7202, et seq. "Commercial Computer Software and Commercial Computer Software Documentation," as applicable, and any successor regulations, whether delivered by Symantec as on premises or hosted services. Any use, modification, reproduction release, performance, display or disclosure of the Licensed Software and Documentation by the U.S. Government shall be solely in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. -
Hunting Red Team Activities with Forensic Artifacts
Hunting Red Team Activities with Forensic Artifacts By Haboob Team 1 [email protected] Table of Contents 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 5 2. Why Threat Hunting?............................................................................................................................. 5 3. Windows Forensic.................................................................................................................................. 5 4. LAB Environment Demonstration ..................................................................................................... 6 4.1 Red Team ......................................................................................................................................... 6 4.2 Blue Team ........................................................................................................................................ 6 4.3 LAB Overview .................................................................................................................................. 6 5. Scenarios .................................................................................................................................................. 7 5.1 Remote Execution Tool (Psexec) ............................................................................................... 7 5.2 PowerShell Suspicious Commands ...................................................................................... -
Dolphin Power Tools User's with Windows Embedded Handheld 6.5
Dolphin™ Power Tools with Windows® Mobile 6.X for the Dolphin 6000 Scanphone User’s Guide Disclaimer Honeywell International Inc. (“HII”) reserves the right to make changes in specifications and other information contained in this document without prior notice, and the reader should in all cases consult HII to determine whether any such changes have been made. The information in this publication does not represent a commitment on the part of HII. HII shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein; nor for incidental or consequential damages resulting from the furnishing, performance, or use of this material. This document contains proprietary information that is protected by copyright. All rights are reserved. No part of this document may be photocopied, reproduced, or translated into another language without the prior written consent of HII. © 2011 Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. Microsoft® Windows®, Windows NT®, Windows 2000, Windows ME, Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows .NET Framework, Windows ActiveSync®, and the Windows logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. The Bluetooth® word mark and logos are owned by Bluetooth SIG, Inc. Other product names or marks mentioned in this document may be trademarks or registered trademarks of other companies and are the property of their respective owners. Web Address: www.honeywellaidc.com Table of Contents Chapter 1 - Introduction Dolphin Power Tools Overview............................................................................................1-1 -
A Baseline for XP Boot Changes AAFS - 26 February 2010
A Baseline for XP Boot Changes AAFS - 26 February 2010 Ben Livelsberger NIST Information Technology Laboratory CFTT Project 1 Certain trade names and company products are mentioned in the text or identified. In no case does such identification imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor does it imply that the products are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 2 Introduction Methodology/Approach Expected Results Analysis/Findings Conclusion 3 Question: What changes on a hard drive when you boot a system? Answer: Sector content of installed devices containing volumes Accessed, write, created date and time metadata Files created Files deleted 4 Build Vanilla XP system not networked Cycle through several boots and shutdowns Image with dd Boot, 2 minutes idle, shutdown, and reimage (5x) Compare images- Linux & perl Analyze differences- perl scripts and SleuthKit Tools 5 Build (vanilla) XP system DCO drive to 12 GB Partitioned 7 GB primary FAT32 2 GB secondary NTFS & 2 GB secondary FAT32 Windows XP Professional SP2 Add user files to secondary partitions 5 files - 2.4 Mb Types: .inf, .pdf, .exe, .ico, & .html 6 2.1 GB secondary NTFS partition.Payload 898,594 of 5 files copied from bootable CD (a 43 unallocated byte autorun.inf, a 17 Kb .pdf, a 2.4 sectors 7.3 GB FAT32 Mb .exe, a 13 Kb .ico, & a 13 Kb .html MBR (boot code, boot partition file). partition table, with XP SP2 Primary extended signature value) installed 2.1 GB secondary partition table + Secondary + 62 sectors) FAT32 partition. 62 sectors) extended partition table + Payload same as 62 sectors) NTFS partition Primary extended Secondary extended partition 7 partition 2.1 GB secondary NTFS partition.Payload of 5 files copied from bootable CD (a 43 byte autorun.inf, a 17 Kb .pdf, a 2.4 7.3 GB FAT32 Mb .exe, a 13 Kb .ico, & a 13 Kb .html boot partition file). -
Testing the National Software Reference Library
Testing the National Software Reference Library Neil C. Rowe U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, USA [email protected] Forensics of directory metadata p We need tools to quickly find key information on a drive without searching file contents. p File and directory metadata is a big help to characterize drives (or partitions on a cloud). p We are developing a tool “Dirim”. p Our testbed the “Real Drive Corpus” is purchased from 22 countries, mostly China, Mexico, Israel, Palestine, and India – now 2420 drives and 44 million files. p It also includes wireless and storage devices. p For analysis, we exclude files with hashes found in the National Software Reference Library Reference Data Set (NSRL RDS) – it removes 30% of the files – and 5% of the hashes. p Research question: Just how good is the NSRL? The Dirim file-metadata analysis system Disk or flash drive File-directory metadata (in XML/DFXML) Common Simplified and standardized metadata hash codes File classification (from NSRL, mapping etc.) Data with deleted-file corrections Data excluding common files File classifications Statistical summaries Data clusters Special-feature analysis Suspiciousness analysis Graphical display of analysis results File metadata we extract from a disk image Ordinal features Nominal features Boolean features File size Drive name Allocated? Access minus creation File name Compressed? time Access minus File extension Encrypted? modification time Modification minus Top-level directory Empty? creation time Depth in file hierarchy Immediate directory -
GV-3D1-7950-RH Geforce™ 7950 GX2 Graphics Accelerator
GV-3D1-7950-RH GeForce™ 7950 GX2 Graphics Accelerator User's Manual Rev. 101 12MD-3D17950R-101R * The WEEE marking on the product indicates this product must not be disposed of with user's other household waste and must be handed over to a designated collection point for the recycling of waste electrical and electronic equipment!! * The WEEE marking applies only in European Union's member states. Copyright © 2006 GIGABYTE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD Copyright by GIGA-BYTE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. ("GBT"). No part of this manual may be reproduced or transmitted in any form without the expressed, written permission of GBT. Trademarks Third-party brands and names are the property of their respective owners. Notice Please do not remove any labels on VGA card, this may void the warranty of this VGA card. Due to rapid change in technology, some of the specifications might be out of date before publication of this booklet. The author assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions that may appear in this document nor does the author make a commitment to update the information contained herein. Macrovision corporation product notice: This product incorporates copyright protection technology that is protected by U.S. patents and other intellectual property rights. Use of this copyright protection technology must be authorized by Macrovision, and is intended for home and other limited viewing uses only unless otherwise authorized by Macrovision. Reverse engineering or disassembly is prohibited. Table of Contents English 1. Introduction ......................................................................................... 3 1.1. Features ..................................................................................................... 3 1.2. Minimum system requirements ..................................................................... 3 2. Hardware Installation ........................................................................... 4 2.1. -
Vista System Restore Rootkit
VViissttaa ssyysstteemm rreessttoorree rroooottkkitit Principle and protection EEdwdwaardrd SSunun PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com AAbouboutt sspeapeakkerer u Network ID : CardMagic u Author of DarkSpy anti-rootkit u Posted several articles on rootkit.com u R&D of some world famous kernel level products in global companies u Experienced in Windows kernel mode research and programming u Now is a researcher of Trend Micro threat solution team PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com WhaWhatt wwillill bebe iinnttrroduoducceded u Internals of Vista system restore u A user-mode rootkit to hide arbitrary file or registry key from Windows Vista system restore u A new way to bypass modern HIPS u Detection and protection of the threat PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com AAgendagenda u Vista system restore (VSR) introduction u VSR internals u VSR rootkit u A new way to bypass HIPS u Protect & detect VSR u Demo PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com VViissttaa ssyysstteemm rreessttoorree ((VSVSR)R) iinnttrrododuuccttiionon u VSR allows user to use restore point to return their system files and settings to an earlier point in time u System restore in Vista has been enhanced a lot and use new architecture & implementation which is different from XP’s u System Restore can make changes to Windows system files, registry settings, and programs installed on your computer. It also can make changes to scripts, batch files, and other types of executable files on your computer PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com VSVSRR iinntteerrnnaalsls u But how does VSR work? Microsoft hasn’t provided detail document about how it works . -
THE CONFICKER MYSTERY Mikko Hypponen Chief Research Officer F-Secure Corporation Network Worms Were Supposed to Be Dead. Turns O
THE CONFICKER MYSTERY Mikko Hypponen Chief Research Officer F-Secure Corporation Network worms were supposed to be dead. Turns out they aren't. In 2009 we saw the largest outbreak in years: The Conficker aka Downadup worm, infecting Windows workstations and servers around the world. This worm infected several million computers worldwide - most of them in corporate networks. Overnight, it became as large an infection as the historical outbreaks of worms such as the Loveletter, Melissa, Blaster or Sasser. Conficker is clever. In fact, it uses several new techniques that have never been seen before. One of these techniques is using Windows ACLs to make disinfection hard or impossible. Another is infecting USB drives with a technique that works *even* if you have USB Autorun disabled. Yet another is using Windows domain rights to create a remote jobs to infect machines over corporate networks. Possibly to most clever part is the communication structure Conficker uses. It has an algorithm to create a unique list of 250 random domain names every day. By precalcuting one of these domain names and registering it, the gang behind Conficker could take over any or all of the millions of computers they had infected. Case Conficker The sustained growth of malicious software (malware) during the last few years has been driven by crime. Theft – whether it is of personal information or of computing resources – is obviously more successful when it is silent and therefore the majority of today's computer threats are designed to be stealthy. Network worms are relatively "noisy" in comparison to other threats, and they consume considerable amounts of bandwidth and other networking resources. -
Norton Utilities TM
Norton TM Norton Utilities Proof Utilities of Purchase Benutzerhandbuch Wir schützen weltweit mehr Benutzer vor Bedrohungen aus dem Internet als jedes andere Unternehmen. Umweltschutz ist wichtig. Symantec hat dieses Handbuch ohne Umschlag gestaltet, um die Einwirkung auf die Umwelt durch unsere Produkte zu reduzieren. TM Norton Utilities Benutzerhandbuch Die in diesem Handbuch beschriebene Software wird unter Lizenz vertrieben und darf nur entsprechend den Vertragsbedingungen verwendet werden. Dokumentationsversion 14.0 Copyright © 2009 Symantec Corporation. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Symantec, das Symantec-Logo, Norton, Ghost, GoBack, LiveUpdate, Norton AntiSpam, Norton AntiVirus, Norton Internet Security, Norton 360 und Norton SystemWorks sind Marken oder eingetragene Marken der Symantec Corporation oder ihrer Tochtergesellschaften in den USA und anderen Ländern. Windows ist eine Marke der Microsoft Corporation. Andere Produktnamen können Marken der jeweiligen Rechteinhaber sein. Die in diesem Handbuch beschriebene Software wird Ihnen im Rahmen einer Lizenzvereinbarung zur Verfügung gestellt und darf nur unter den darin beschriebenen Bedingungen eingesetzt, kopiert, verteilt, dekompiliert und zurückentwickelt werden. Kein Teil dieser Veröffentlichung darf ohne ausdrückliche schriftliche Genehmigung der Symantec Corporation und ihrer Lizenzgeber vervielfältigt werden. DIE DOKUMENTATION WIRD "OHNE MÄNGELGEWÄHR" GELIEFERT. ALLE AUSDRÜCKLICHEN ODER STILLSCHWEIGENDEN BEDINGUNGEN, DARSTELLUNGEN UND GEWÄHRLEISTUNGEN EINSCHLIESSLICH DER STILLSCHWEIGENDEN