Th e Cambridge M anuals of Science and Literature

THE ROYA L NAVY CAM B RIDG E U NIVE RS ITY PRES S

Y MA R . F . C LA AG E C , N E ER LANE E . C . a utu mn : F TT , I OO PRINC ES S TREET

A. AS HER AND CO.

1 1 F B ROC K HAUS m m : . A.

a ’ 'c M S ON S nd G . P P T A S ' fi ” . U N

i L T D . B om bay anb G al tu tta : MAC M I LLAN AN D CO . ,

Q u : M T D S O S LT D anta . E AN J . D N N ,

Wu h an : THE MARUZ EN - KABU S H I K I - KAIS HA

’ A ll n gfits r eser ved THE ROYA L NA V Y IT S INFLUEN CE IN ENG LISH HIST ORY AND IN T HE G ROW T H OF EMPIRE

BY JOH N LEYLAND

Cambridge at h t e Un iversity Press Qram hrth ge

RINT B Y OH N AY M . A . P ED J CL , AT TH E UNIVERS ITY PRES S

W ito tfie excepti on of ti e coat of arm s at

’ toe oot tko deoz n on toe title a e is a f , g p g rep rodu ction of one wed by one earlieot known

Cam brid e ri nter Jonn Siberofi 2 x g p , , I 5 PREFACE

NE obj ect of this little Manual is to bring within the compass of a few brief ch a pters a general u r view of the nat e , character and development of the

British Navy . A larger purpose is to shew the in fluence of the Navy in sa feguarding the in dep en dence and security of the country , and the part it has played in promoting the growth and upholdi ng the integrity of the Empire . fl The in uence of the sea pervades our history , and has been instrumenta l in the shaping of our national a n d institutions character . It is therefore pre eminently worthy of study . By our maritime suprema cy an d ou r wa rdshi p of the seas the Empir e a has come into being , and without th t wardship the s Empire would have cea ed to be . Notwithstandi ng all that has bee n written during c in a till re ent years concern g the N vy , there is s a want of understa nding a mongst the people at large a of these matters of fund mental importance . When questions arise in relation to Imperial Defence , opinions are formed which are based on imperfect knowledge of the principles which underlie ou r hi maritime story . Even subjects which touch ou r

29 0 4 7 7 PREFAC E i sland defence are handled with little reference to the l essons of the past , which are the surest guide to the

. m a policy of the future We y read , in this history , of safety won by the exercise of wise fores ight in maintaining the essentials for naval sufficiency , and of adva ntages lost and interests imperilled by the want of such foresight . An outstandi ng a n d cha ra cteristic feature of naval administration in the past has been its exhibition of a stra nge ebb and flow in the provision of the prime a s essenti l for naval security , periods of development and efficiency having been succeeded by periods of a n d h as decline decay , in which sometimes Fortune r i a a favou ed us by blind ng or we kening our advers ries , when our own preparations might not have availed . ou r That we must not , through neglect , entrust welfare to the favour of Fortune is a lesson which shines forth plainl y from all our hi story . l hi We learn , too , from nava story that we possess advantages , by virtue of our island position and the u n n comm ications of the Empire bei g by sea , that are not possessed by nations which are parts of the re infl i m continent , and a therefore uenced by the nf a p eri ou s demands cf land power . We i er th t there i s something really different in ou r national character a from that of continent l nations , and that this i f a d f erence , combined with the adv ntages of our ' situ ati on h a s geographical , fitted us for success at PREFACE sea in a manner which has been denied to other a races . History w rns us that we must guard our selves from throwing a way or dim i ni shing the adva ntage which we enjoy in the fact that our se curity and ou r influence are based upon power of command at sea . The lessons of this book are not insistently put r i s forwa d . Rather , it left to the reader , with some i ind cations , to deduce the meaning of history from a n d its events circumstances . The index will shew i a where quest ons relative to inv sion , blockade and c di are l a other on tions i lustr ted . In the same way l a a n d m a he may discover the evi s that have risen , y m i m i arise , from naval and litary sunderstandings , di and from sputations with in the service itself . The book shews how the Na vy h a s on severa l occasions bee n the essential factor in the success of m i litary l l operations , in circumstances hard y a luded to in our hi story books . To bring before the reader these a n d other a n e a essenti l thi gs is the obj ct of the M nual , but , in suggesting the lessons of a ph il os0 ph i c study of naval hi story , the instrument whereby ma ritime influence s an d has been exerci ed , the incidents of its exercise ,

a a l occupy a large p rt of the book . The N vy itse f and its achievements are , indeed , in the foreground, with something of the picturesqueness of nava l r cha acter , and , though the compa ss of the book is PREFACE

a o a en but small , few spects of naval hist ry h ve be i i altogether neglected . The sh ps of success ve periods , a if the personnel and the conditions of nav l l e , the al hi ni great personalities of nav story , admi stration , a a n d strategy , t ctics , the battles and events , with — brief indi cations of salient features all these have in their place the book . The author expresses hi s indebtedness to many volumes in the wide literature of naval and other history . He gives in a short bibliography some indi cation of the best books relating to successive i s a periods and subjects . It gr tifying that in the series i i of manuals in wh ch th s book appears , is a volume Th u rs fi eld a a by Mr J . R . dealing in masterly m nner with some special branches of naval strategy . Finally the a uthor desires to place on record hi s especia l li a n d s a ob gations , for counsel assi t nce in relation to i hi s ri a th s book , to old f end and colle gue Commander R N C . N . Robinson , . .

L JOHN EYLAND .

’

S t G eor e s Da 1 91 4. g y , CONTENTS

CHAP . PREFACE

THE S EA AND THE MAKING OF ENG LAND

’ THE CONQ UEROR S S EA POW ER

HOW MEDIE VAL B ATTLES W ERE FOUGHT

S HIPS AND MEN

THE AG E or MAR ITIM E DIS COVERY AND TH E OV ER THROW or SPAIN

THE A S I O A ORS AND S UA S VI . TR N TI N N VY . TUD T RT

E NT S OR DOM N O THE F S TH NEW CO E T F I I N. IR T DUTCH W AR

THE S O A O A AND THE LOS OF THE VIII . RE T R TI N N VY C E DUTCH WARS

H r T E O O or 16 . THE B o IX . REV LUTI N 88 EGINNING THE FRENCH WARS

A A D Y X . N V L SUPREMACY AN FLEET DECA

A S O AND HA 7 W K . THE A A 7 XI . N N E REGENER TED N V Y

’ TH E S Y A XII. EVEN E RS W AR AND WORLD DOM NI ON 85

THE AR OF AM XIII . W ERI CAN INDEPENDENCE CONTENTS

PAGE

HO . OJ THE F H O O . W P C TS XIV. RENC REV LUTI N E R E or INVASION AN D THE MUTINI ES

E M D A A AND TH E . S O TH I XV NEL N, E ITERR NE N N LE . THE PEACE OF AMIEN S

A S AND P A S or B O A A XVI . IDE L N N P RTE

XVII . THE CAMPAIGN

THE F TS or O XVIII . RUI VICT RY

O S ONS XIX . C NCLU I

BIB LIOGRAPHY INDE' CHAPTER I

TH E S EA AN D THE A K G OF E G L A . M IN N ND

B EFORE we have a dva nced very fa r in this

‘ book we sha ll di scover tha t the influence of the s ea a h a s a perme tes our history deeply , and in large mea sure determined our national develop a ment and ch ra cter . Whatever might be the importance relatively to other countries of a small island kin gdom lyin g off the coast - li ne of the con tin en t r of Eu ope , its history must be most worthy a ff a of study , because essenti lly di erent from th t of a n a n s ea y part of th t conti ent . The , which has a a i alw ys been barrier, passed w th greater or less ffi l h a s al a a di cu ty , for centuries so been p thway , — a n d in these two fea tures of sea in flu en c e the — barrier a n d the pa thwa y li e the condi tions whi ch a a n d a have sh ped domin ted our English nation , and have given us our imperial heritage . r The sea has never, in its own natu e , been an a in all a es h a ve impassable barrier . H rdy seamen g a r a tr versed it . It has required o g nized forces for 1 L . R. N . l i and , in ear y t mes , di d is e nl when such forces not exist , or ex t d o y in l di termittent y , it was crossed accor ng to the ill di measure of the sk , har hood and good fortune a Of the seamen who navig ted it . When fleets came into being , formed of ships of war , or ships a n e i c pable of fighti g , as forces t nd ng towards per m an en c y , the barrier grew more secure , and seafaring u qualities alone did not s ffice for the passage . There were required fighting capacit y and sufficient material strength as well . S O secure di d the barrier of the English seas w i i f Of become , o ing to the nherent d ficulties sea transport , and the existence of sea forces to be S overcome , that never ince the Norman Conquest has it been passed by any body of enemies deserving Ou t to be taken into account . of these condi tions have come some of our institutions and our l conception of the princip es and means of defence . There arose the View that our frontier shou l d be ’ - o the enemy s coast line , which Raleigh , H ward and Drake expressed when they said that the enemy must be defeated on his own coasts , or before ’

l . he could reach the Eng ish shore Blake s view , that the object of the fleet was to keep foreigners ” lin S from foo g us , prang from the same spirit and idea . We shall deal very briefly with some parts of THE BEG INNING S

r a our earlie history , p rtly because the evidences are ec l ill few , but mainly b ause ater times w claim Ou r greater attention . Saxon ancestors were sea men before they were Englishmen . Issuing in their keels from the countries about the mouths

- of the Elbe and the Weser , they were sea wolves , a u u who c pt red what they co ld afloat , and carried fire and sword into the countries they invaded and e e afterwa rds occupi d . The vess ls in which they came appear to have been from 70 to 1 00 feet 1 6 1 8 e long , and from to feet wide , without d cks , a a n d l and having a single m st yard, with a arge a a squ re s il . Oars were used , and there was a

- rudder or steering oar over the right , or steer a a a bo rd side , or , as we now c ll it , the starbo rd , ar dl ll much like a l ge pad e . Eventua y England

n e w- was peopled by the comers , and how they u a n d fought amongst themselves , how A gustine a Christi nity came , and how a single kingdom was a a u r m de out of m ny is in all o histories . Offa is believed to ha ve been the first English u l Of r er to build a considerable fleet, and it is said him tha t he left to h i s successors the maxim tha t he who wou l d be secure on la nd must be supreme at sea . The danger came from Da nes and Nor we i a n s - a a g , sea rovers lso , seeking better l nd than u a n d a their own , and pl nder outr ge went where ever they sailed or strode . O L A R YA N VY [ OH .

Al a ou r a fred , the gre test of all e rly kings , knew that the sea could only be won by seafaring . He se nt Oth ere to examine the northern coas ts of far i e S ea Europe , who went as as the Wh t , and l t h e Wu fstan to explore Baltic , and in storm and tempest these ea rly na vigators and their comrades a a a le rned or m nifested the art and cr ft of the sea . a a Alfred fought with the D nes in many battle , and , for the work of the sea , the very navy for his ' a purpose w s to create . His long ships were an advance upon anything seen before , and some of a a them h ad more th n sixty o rs . They were better ” a a s u l a a sea bo ts , we sho d say nowad ys , th n the earlier boats , as were the other types of vessels wa s which Alfred also built . He never content tha t they shoul d be anything but better than the a n d i O ships of his enemies , , w th that bject , paid a t attention to the work the ports , the selection a n d a of the wood , the tr ining and feeding of the a a a men , thus creating fleet that was c p ble of a u a keeping the se from s mmer until utumn . ’ Alfred s immedia te successors di d not let the a a a e nava l forces dec y , and Edg r gre tly increas d a a them , so th t his fleets cruising round the co sts kept the sea clea r of pirates a n d it is rela ted tha t a eight vassal kings rowed his bo t on the Dee . O f But when Edgar was dead , the wisdom of f a and l Alfred was forgotten , and the name of Ethe red I] EARLY SHIPS

a - the Unready became b y word . The English a t men qu rrelled amongs themselves , the pirate wa s a n d u l a scourge renewed , timately Engl nd lay at the feet of the seafa ring Danes and Scandi navians V k V i c the i ings , who , from every or wick in their s coasts , is ued in war navies to seek the conquest a n d spoil of England . t a n d The nor hern ships were decked , each bore a the emblem of her commander . They were c rved a n d adorned , and a device was at the prow , while , a r c rried externally ound the bulwarks , were the ds shi el of the crew p a inted in many colours . ’ Can u te s G rea t Dra on a ship , the g , was sh ped rather

a se a - a n d wa s a 200 like monster , bout feet long , a a 70 a and is said to h ve c rried o rsmen , besides

- S a crowd of fighting men . A Vik ing hip discovered at G okstad in southern Norway measured 78 feet 1 6 6 in Sh e h a d in length , with feet . beam . oak a a n d a n d pl nking , the prow , gunwale , sternpost 32 a hi were carved . There were o rs , and the s p a a t a c rried least three small bo ts . The method of fighting was for a vessel to endeavour to sink ru n her enemy by ramming , or to alongside , and the matter wa s settled by boa rdi n g with ba ttle - axes and ' a swords . The n vy in those times wa s never a fixed a b e org nization . There was no real distinction ’ a a n d tween fighting a trading ship . The King s ships were manned by forces maintained under AL H ROY NAVY [ O .

Of les the name buscarles , and some of the great nob at s of had fleets which were the di posal the Crown . a e to hi s i C nut , the Dane , gave peace Engl sh a t se a people . Strong beyond all his rivals , and h i hi m th e h n h hi s av ng with s ips of E glish t anes , h wars were abroad in the nort , while prosperity a l grew in Engl nd . The pirates were quel ed , and across the guarded pathway of the sea traders S i r k from Denmark and cand navia b ough t iron , s ins , a n d a s to ou r ropes and m sts for ship ports , and from other countries came silks , gold , silver , gems , wine , a oil , ivory , brass , copper , and m ny other wares of use or necessity .

CHAPTER II

’ THE CONQ UER OR S S E A POW E R

W E will pause to glance at one of the great a tu rm n g points in English history . H rold had b eco me king a n d h a d sworn an oath to William of a a Normandy , or was s id to h ve sworn it , whereby di d Will ia m claimed the crown . Why Willi am become the Conqueror , and why was Harold over thrown ' i G wa s m a n Harold , l ke his father odwin , a

li c ac c a . of abi ty, resour e , tivity and our ge As a

A H ROY L NAVY [ C . burghers and others came forward to offer shi ps u l u which they owned or wo d b ild . Trees were a n d cut down , men were busy in the ports shaping a pl nks , framing ships and raising masts . Norman di a n d la es worked at standards adornments . In ’ ’ a M o m a Willi m s own ship , the , Matild , the Duke s l c a wife , p a ed a golden figure of a boy blowing horn , ” with his finger pointing towards England , and a a r in the B yeux tapestry th t figu e may be seen , though , instead of the pointing finger , there is a ’ a a flag in the boy s h nd . That f mous tapestry is not wholly accurate , but it shows us that each h a d a a a i ship single m st and a yard to c rry the sa l , e s a t a t while the st ersman the stern , with his steer

- a r i ing o work ng over the side . As to the number l of vesse s employed , it is variously computed at 0 1 5 00 from about 7 0 to . No one knows how many s a men came with William . Some y Pro a n d t bably with horses s ores , would be nearer the mark . Harold a n d William were not the onl y figures

- Ha r rad a in the struggle . Harald d of Norway had ’ s Tosti an ambition for conque t also , and g, Harold s a n d a f a jealous dis ppointed brother , was con eder ted Ha rdra da Tosti with him . If and g were not the ’ a puppets who d nced to William s piping , it is clear that William knew wha t Hardrada and the Earl l h i s were about , and that they we l served turn . n ] HAROLD AND W I LLIAM

HOW u l co d he hope to bring his vast , unwieldy , o vercrowded fleet a cross in the presence of the ' la rge fleet which Harold h ad at hi s command A s a l nl we h ve seen , in those times fleets cou d o y s ea a n d be kept at sea or ready for in the summer , wa tha t s no easy task . There existed no real per a m nent force , most of the seamen being fishermen o r a men engaged in the merch nt trade of the sea , a d a ffa a who h their own irs to look fter . Others s a a eem to h ve been f rmers , who had their crops a r to g ner . a a a a Willi m took dvant ge of this circumst nce . He a ppea rs to have encoura ged Tostig to raid the Isle of Wight a n d the south and east coasts of a a 1 066 Engl nd in the spring or e rly summer of . Tostig wa s then dr iven Off the mouth of the Humber ’ a n d a by the northern Earls , , in the me ntime , Harold s a sea was fleet was hastily got re dy for , and cruising a from May onward . Willi m gathered his forces m i A by the ddle of ugust in the River Dives , where the chroniclers say he waited for what s a ilors call ” B u a a . t sl nt of wind , to carry him across he a a a ppe rs in re lity to have been in no hurry . He a knew both when to w it and when to strike . About the middl e of September he moved up the coast to

- - - a S t Valery sur Somme , and did not get a f ir wind 2 h until the evening of September 7t . What had happened mea ntime on the English ROYAL NAVY side 'Tostig had fled with twelve ships from th e Hardrad a Wh o was Humber, and joined , at the

Orkneys with a large force . They came south , a s landed their men , defe ted those who oppo ed them , a h di and seized York . He ring t is sastrous news ,

a - a l Harold marched north , and , in hard fought b tt e , on September 2sth — two days before William got — his slant of wind utterly defeate d the northern a Hardr a da invaders at St mford Bridge , where both Tosti a and g were sl in . While this was going for ’ - ward Harold s fleet on the south east coast , e 8th 1 2th S somewhere betwe n the and eptember , a n d s had broken up disper ed , the only barrier between William and the English shore being thus removed . What was the cause of this fa ilure 'We are l to e e a a sea eft in part conj ctur . It is s id th t the n men could be held together no lo ger . They were a d a n d a husb n men , had their h rvests to gather .

They had been tossed about since the early summer , a which was a long time for the fleets of those d ys , ’ while Willia m s men had been a ssembled only for e i about six we ks . Th s was due to the raiding of ’ T ti fl was os g. Harold s personal in uence no longer Tosti Hardrad a with his fleet . g and had drawn h i m e i away . The upshot was that the fl et d spersed , and that England was lost and won .

What a spectacle it must have been , looking MEDIE VAL BATTLES

ill from Hastings Castle H , or the height of Beachy ’ a W k r He d , hen the Norman Du e s vast fleet ancho ed i n Pevensey Bay 'Hundreds of ves s el s were crowded u r al ong the vas t c ve of the shore . They drew li an d ttle water , as the keels grounded on the a ls n beach , the fl pping sai came down , and the shouti g men j umped overb oard and waded up to th e dry l r and . The ho ses were walked ashore , and the

- arms and some food stores were soon on the beach . It was not long a fterwa rds that Tail lefer on nl i r hi s Se ac H ll th ew up sword and caught it , and a a as threw it and c ught it ag in , he sang the song a of Roland , and that the sanguin ry struggle was i a fought in wh ch H rold fell . But if his fleet had n u l not broken up , the history of Engla d wo d have i b een written d fferently . The potent in fluence of h a d a n the sea shaped new the destiny of the la d .

CHAPTER III

H OW ME DIE VAL B ATTL E S W E RE FOUG HT

THE Norman expedi tion of 1066 and the fail ure of Harold show clearly that in those ti mes the sea was not a region that coul d b e continuously or a l l i n u l e . p rm nent y contro led Ra di g co d take place , a l and for centuries did t ke p ace , from one side of H ROYAL NAVY [C .

a l the Ch nne or the other , as the wind blew from a a the e stward or the westward . It was a b rrier to one and a pathway to the other . The wind that enabled the Engli shma n to leave hi s ports kept e the Frenchman at hom , and when the wind shifted F a to the opposite quarter , the renchm n could put to sea for a n enterpri se while the Englishma n could hi s with diffi culty get ships out of harbour . The blockade of ports was impossible , and the problem was to maintain fleets whi ch might possess something of the character of permanency in their chief duty ll a of being available at ca as a Ch nnel guard . The warshi p was a merchant vessel equ i pped for i fighting , and therefore by organ zing the resources a of the ports , it was possible to r ise fleets with ’ O a n economy , while bt ining for the Ki g s service f the most experienced O seafaring men . In practice this was done mainl y by employin g the masters and men of the Cinque Ports . Shipping was ta ken up at other places , but in early times there was little of organi zation outside th e fleets of the five a merchant and fishing towns of Hastings , S ndwich , '

Dover , Romney and Hythe , to which Rye and a a Winchelsea were fterw rds added . These ports possessed ma ny men of hardy chara cter skilled in ' ” ' ” a l a h nd ing the long ships , busses , cogs n d Of other vessels those and later centuries . Various privi leges were conferred upon the B a rons of the m ] MEDIZEVAL ORG ANIZATION ports in return for the services they rendered to i the Crown , and their sh ps became a kind of Royal

Navy , each of the ports being bound to provide a given numb er of ships for fixed periods .

hi b f- a n d The s ps were luf bowed capacious , but a unhandy , and unable to dvance except with the a wind astern or in some qu rter abaft the beam . a a They were decked and c rried single mast , with l e a large square sai . The bowsprit appear d in the 1 3 l a th century , being in rea ity foremast stepped well over the bow . The bow and stern curved a upw rd , and when fitted for fighting , carried structures called castles— whence our modern fore e— h a s a s castl from w ich points of vantage , well tO s e t from nests or p fix d on the mas s , the fighting u l a a men co d disch rge rrows or other missiles . The na vigator kept h i s course by the aid Of the lea ds m a n Of or the loom the land , and at night the Pole a wa s di a st r his mark and guide . In the Me terr nean hi di other classes of s ps were developed , inclu ng i i ll a n d ch efly the sw ft ga ey , propelled by sail the a a power of m ny o rs , and there , too , originated the G terrible reek fire , being some kind of inflammable il a O disch rged on the shi ps of a n enemy . This kind of a tta ck seems ra rely to ha ve been used in the h north . S ips of grea ter size were built a s time a went on , but all the early vessels were bigger th n representa tions in manuscripts might lea d us to ROYAL NAVY

o B la nch e N e supp se . The f, or White Ship , in the w e 1 1 20 i ll r ck of which , in , Pr nce Wi iam and the li flower of the English nobi ty were lost , is recorded 5 0 h ad to have pulled oars , and to have on board 300 a ll some persons told . But there were much a n d i bigger ships , it is said that some pilgrim sh ps di e l 800 n in the Me t rranean cou d carry perso s . Thi s building of la rger shi ps was coincident with Of the gradual silting up the Cinque Ports , whereby hi Portsmouth , w ch had long been a port of assembly , i came into greater prom nence , and Dartmouth and B Ii stol were places of gron importance from which ships came for the service of the King . Richa rd Coeur de Lion wa s the first English u l di a r er to employ a fleet in a st nt enterprise . This 1 1 90 a n d wa s was in the Crusade of , it no easy task to bring the huge flotilla thr ough storm and tem pest from Dartmouth a n d some French ports to e Messina , where Richard joined the fle t , and then A Of to cre , and the success the operation was an indi cation of the hardihood and seamanl ike skill of ff a . o the m riners It was Acre that Richard , in his Trench em er u l ll long ship the , or as we sho d ca her , a h a d a e i She rwater , t rrible encounter w th a big On e Saracen dromon . chronicler calls her a great ” ’ b u s es a nl Ar k , and another s ys that o y Noah s e 700 800 was bigger , for she carri d or men under seven emirs . Showers of arrows and stones , sheets

c a by Drake , more than three enturies l ter . By his a ction the intended invasion came to nought . a 1 21 7 a Ag in , when the Barons were in revolt in , a a a e se m n c lled Eustace the Monk , who had once be n J ’ di in ohn s service , was ai ng the French , and was l despatched with a convoy to help the English nob es . a t a His ships had been assembled Calais and , with a r f ir wind from the southward , he ran over towa ds s the Engli h coast , with the intention of rounding a the North Forel nd , and getting into the Thames . ’ Ki Ju G r Hubert de Burgh , ng s sticiary and overno a to e a n d of Dover Castle , prep red int rcept him , , saying If these men once la nd Engl and will b e ” lost , put to sea from Dover with the Cinque Ports a s u a s ships . He made if he wo ld fall upon C lai , but hi s evident object was to get clea r of the la nd a l a a and g in what old seamen cal ed the we ther g ge , i hi m so h e that is to bring the w nd behind , that might be able to bear down upon his enemy . Having wa l held his y long enough , he altered course , and fel ’ upon the Frenchmen s rear . It was fine seaman is Of e ship , in the first Engl h sea action which ther Ha wk s or is sure record , and , Rodney , Howe u l Nelson co d hardly have done better . Clouds of d arrows covered the French ships , and unslake in a lim e was thrown into the air to the bl ding of m ny . Some ships were sunk and others carried by bo a rdi ng O e with sword and axe and taken into Dover . nc 11 1 ] THE BATTLE OF SLUYS

more the enemy had been destroyed before he coul d

touch the land . Eustace paid the price , and his

head was carried on a pole . e Now we pass on to the days of Edward III , whos gold noble shows the armed strength of England t ni based on the sea , and who fur her orga zed the naval service and regu late d the system of impressing

men for the fleet . There had previously been great a neglect , and the French had wrought h voc at l Sandwich , Winche sea , Rye , Hastings , Southampton h a d a and Portsmouth . They even c ptured the ’ Ch ri sto h er . King s own ship , the great cog p was 1 340 Their fleet assembled at Sluys in , and 25 0 Edward , with about sail , stood over to the a i n Flemish co st , and the fleets met mortal conflict , a in the estu ry on Midsummer day . In the English a n d leading ships were posted archers , in the French van were the Chri s top h er a n d three other cogs a s i G c ptured from the Engli h , all filled w th enoese

- a cross bowmen . Ag in there was great slaughter , for sea fighting in those da ys was peculiarly ferocious

a . S l and sanguin ry hip after ship was carried , unti e the enemy were almost completely destroy d , and

quarter was neither asked nor given . This great victory ga ve Edward command of the sea for many wa s a a a day , and France fterw rds invaded and the victory of Crecy won . a c i There was yet sea a tion to fight , th s time

L . E. N . 2 ROYAL NAVY

W S a K ith the pani rds , for the ing of Castile had gone G to the aid of the French with ships from enoa , and s h ad Ba que seamen ravaged the coasts . Then , in 1 35 0 e , Carlos de la Cerda appeared with a fl et in a n d a was the Channel , that b ttle was fought which ” Le s known as Espagnols sur Mer . Froissart has a n d filled a glowing page with the story , tells of the gallant bearing of the Black Prince an d the flower a n d l of English nobility , of how the minstre s played di a n d Sir John Chandos sang to vert the mariners . was a When the fleets met , there s nguinary work a ll S a along the line , and seventeen p niards were

taken , and the victory gave to England again the Of security the sea .

CHAPTER IV

S HIPS AN D M EN

Now in a rapid course we will bridge a few i in centur es , and see what th gs of interest we may di scover in our passage . The battle of Sluys and that with the Spaniards marked the very height a of our sea power in medi eval times . There was l e neg ect afterwards , in cons quence of which the B en ch a e l l nd d in the Is e of Wight , and Folkestone ,

Rye , Hastings , Winchester and other places were Iv] SHIPS AND MEN

again sacked or burnt . English seamen were as u l brave as ever, but they co d not serve the country well without the support of Kings and Parliaments . l Chaucer has given us the type of them . The Ear of Pembroke was soundly beaten by the Spaniards 1 2 under Ambrosio Bocanegra at Rochelle in 37 . S Pirates roved the seas , and a cotsman named ’ Mercer was defeated , not by the King s forces , J l L but by those of ohn Phi pot , a ondon merchant . Henry V paid more attention to his flee t, and was able to inva de France and a chieve the great victory 1 4 1 5 a of Agincourt in . In the next ye r the Duke of Bedford infli cted a severe disaster on the French at Harfleu r i s , after a desperate action much l ke tho e wa s I have described . It not , however, until the times Of Henry VII and hi s successor that there a n a was y real reviv l of English sea power . The ships used by Hubert de Burgh had di ffered little

‘ from those in which Canute and Tostig had was sailed the seas . When Edward III besieging a 1 347 e r Cal is in , he had a fl et drawn f om most of l the ports in the Kingdom , some a so from Ireland , F f n landers and even rom Spain and Bayo ne , con 745 sisting of ships , and nearly mariners , i a th besides fighting men . This w ll give n idea of e enormous resources the country had even in those

. l days Yarmouth , Fowey in Cornwal and Dartmouth a hi L e ch sent more s ps than ondon . Dependence

2 - 2 ROYAL NAVY

i b upon the C nque Ports had egun to pass away , ’ hi and the King s s ps became more numerous . G a uns ppear to have been first mounted , or at l e i a ast used , in sh ps by the Sp niards , in the battle 1 372 n a wa s a of whe the E rl of Pembroke defe ted . ” r At first they were fi ed over the gunwale , and

the cutting of port holes came much later . The l n Of ear y gu s were indifferent value , firing stone S hot , and they were made of hooped iron bars . It was a long time before they altogether di splaced ” l i springalds , mangone s and other mach nes in f a n d for hurl g masses O stone . Bows arrows were included a mongst the stores of ships as la te as the

reign of Elizabeth . Of i l i a Some the sh ps were bri l ntly painted , and had grea t square sa ils showi ng the royal a rms or the badges and devices of the nobles who sailed in G l a them . eneral y in l ter times there were three ” s a a as ma ts . The foremast le ned or r ked , seamen a n d i l say , forward was practically a bowsprit , wh e the main ma st carried a big squa re sail on a yard r e a to which it was fu l d , and the mizzen or after m st

was lateen rigged . National flags flew from the a n d e a mast heads , with long streamers p nn nts , and one red streamer was the sign of war and promised

mercy to none . In the ti me of Henr y V the great shi p h ad its dethroned the cog from position , but there TUDOR SHIPS

ll were sti cogs , as well as carracks , barges and balin gers l The Jeeu s has been described as a shi p of 0 Hol Ghos t 760 1 00 tons , the y of tons , and the all Tri n i ty Royal Of 5 40 tons . In Henry had a 1 400 1 41 5 fleet of vessels in , raised from every port n w in the Ki gdom , ranging do n from the great 2 shi p to vessels of 0 tons . By the time of Henr y VII S hi ps were much l for id better bui t , but some of them looked more m ll . S th e able than they actua y were One big hip , R en t in e eg , launched R ding Creek on the Rother in 1 489 or ' 1 490 h a d r a , fou masts and bowsprit , and 225 ll Sh e ca rried small guns ca ed serpentines . was Off burnt in action Brest with a French carrack , the i ére 1 5 1 2 ri e la Cordel . M a , in Another ship built by S over i e , e n the s venth Henry was the g , whose name Ro al S over ei n descended to the y g of modern days . She was pa rtly built under direction of S ir Regin ald ’ a Ge Bray , rchitect of St orge s Chapel , Windsor, ’ r VI I s a and 'Hen y Chapel , Westminster , prob bly O Gr from the remains of an lder vessel , the ace a

The most famous shi p of Henry VIII was the Hen r Grace a Di en u i y , which was b lt or rebuilt at 1 5 1 4 h e a Er ith in . S was probably begun as reply to th e Grea t M i cha el i Z of the Scottish King , wh ch was a 1 5 06 s built bout , and is described by Pit cottie as having been 240 feet long over all and 36 feet broad AL A CH ROY N VY [ .

ll within board , and as having wa s ten foot thick ” Hen r Gra ce in the wall and boards . The y a Di on di was a splen d vessel of imposing aspect , with two l u i ines of g ns on her lower decks , and a th rd line on an her half deck d forecastle . Massive structures a t a n d m rose high the bow the ste , and at the latte r position S h e had actually five tiers of guns an d e n h ad s eight d cks . He ry also galleasse , and many a vessels of other r tings , some of them with three or u r a n d ten fo masts a bowsprit , mounting or a dozen s gu ns on the broad ide . The guns of the time were a fa r d perh ps not inferior to those which Nelson use . In the days when shi ps were hired for war w purposes , the men came ith them , and the was a a l master , who seam n to the core , sai ed the i l li sh p , whi e the actual commander was the mi tary a t a Officer who embarked with men arms and rchers . ’ i s Adm ral were appointed in Edward I s reign , and the development of the ranks of officers was pro

ress ive . g through the centuries As to the seamen , when they were sca rce they were seized and pressed into the service . There was a good deal of adventure in the sea career , and the promise of much spoil , i ni h but it was a hard l fe , with heavy pu s ments for l small fau ts , some of them most barbarous and cruel .

- ff We should learn to love these men , for they su ered in cold and hunger , with food of the vilest , ever fi n i d ghti g with enemies , winds and waves , pun she

CHAPTER V

TH E AG E OF DIS C OVE RY AN D THE OVE R’I‘H ROW OF S PAIN

W E have tr aced the origin of the Na vy in the e if centuries we have travers d , but we would seek its nn d begi ing , as we know it to ay , in the character of a e an imperial Navy , we sh ll find it in the discoveri s Of of the old navigators , and the enterprises the a merch nts who followed them . In the ages we have so far surveyed the sea was a region from whose il k i per s the mariners shran , keep ng within sight of ’ l i e s n the coasts , if on y , l ke Shakespear boat wai , ” a u they might h ve room eno gh , and dreading the e a e di s port nts of the storms . But in the new g of c overy and of scientific navigati on the s ea bec ame a n a n d a pathway , and means for the meeti gs the a a s rivalries of men . Its gre t figures , Professor di ae l Seeley said , were not the Hotspurs of me va i ch valry , nor the archers by whom Crecy was won , but a Hawkin se the hero bucc neers , the Drakes and s , whose lives had been spent in tossing upon that ocean whi ch to their fa thers had been an unexplored u n ” profitable desert . They were not Englis hmen who led the va n zin ni the ope ng up of the world . We take proper pride v] THE SPIRIT OF EXPLORATION 25

ll in Sir Hugh Wi oughby , who perished on the coast L a l of apland , Ch ncellor who fol owed him , Borough who sailed between Novaya Zemlya and the ma in a Se a land, and Pett who penetrated the K ra , and th e Of we glory in discoveries Frobisher , Davis , Hudson a n d ma ny more whose names are written

a a - on the m ps of the gre t North West . All were seeking the riches and splendours of the Orienta l a i a world . But they were the v l ant c ptains of a Prince Henry of Portugal , the Navig tor , who pushed i n successive voyages a long the coasts Of Africa until Bartholomew Diaz doubled the Cape S s G of torms , and Va co da ama was the first Of d r a se a mo ern men to each Indi by . It was Amerigo Vespucci who gave his na me to the

American continent , which Columbus and his comrades and success ors Opened to the world

W h o u s ed h is rows in to th e settin su n p h p g , ’ ’ An d m ad e est Eas t an d sail d th e Dra on s Mou t W , g h , An d c am e u on th e Mou n tai n of th e or d p W l , ” An d saw th e rivers roll from Paradis e '

It was Vasco Nunez de Balboa who first set eyes upon the Pacific ; it was Ma gellan who clove h i s way through the straits that bear hi s name ; and it was Juan Sebas tia n del Cano who was the first of r these great old seamen to ci cumnavigate the globe . Upon the races to whi ch such men be longed it s eem ed that the m aritime heritage of the Phoenicia ns AL H ROY NAVY [ O .

a and of C rthage and Rome , had fallen , and they drew their instincts and ambitions from the states G a l a n d of Venice and eno , and the schoo s harbours a n a r of Portugal d Sp in . F om them we received the science a n d the instruments of the new naviga a c s tion . The gre t dis overie they made , with those a a n d of the Dutch , who were before us in the E st , a the enterprises , riches and monopolies th t arose i n therefrom , were the cause of an astonish g burst of the spirit of maritime adventure and enterprise s Of a among the eafarers and gentlemen Engl nd . The exercise of sea power was called for on a much a n greater scale , and there resulted immense develop ’ m ent in the seaman s art and craft , which exerted i il i s its influence on sh pbu d ng , the con truction of

- l Of s better sea keeping vesse s , the development port , and the organiza tion of everyt hing required for the efficient service of the sea . In the course of events that succeeded private enterprise and national endeavour were inextricably confused . There was a determination to brea k through the exclusive commercial poli cy which the Spaniards a di had est blished in their West In an possessions , and men lik e Drake and Hawkins were not to be baulk ed in their search for treasure when it was to a e be won t sea . Out of the resolut enterprise of the Englishmen came the terrible incident Of S a n ’ J Ull ll of uan de oa , fo owed by Drake s enterprise v] THE STRUG G LE WITH SPAIN

vengeance , in which he captured Nombre de Dios , a sacked Venta Cruz , l id hands on the silver mules n a e a n d a of Spa ish gr nde s , came home with more tre sure tha n ship had ever brought before ; foll owed l a a a a so by the f mous n vig tion to the South Sea , in S a n d which he captured many a panish town ship , i dl set a g r e about the globe , and came home with a a a tre sure , it is s id , to the sterling v lue of a million a S a a a wa s a a n d a h lf . To the p ni rds Dr ke a pir te a l k who deserved to be h nged , but E izabeth nighted Le t him a n d kept the gold . this picture suffice to a a a call up the n ture of the qu rrel , complic ted a s it a was , no doubt , by the f vour shown to the rebellious t a Low subjec s of Sp in in the Countries , by the efforts of the Sp ani a rds to stir up rebelli on in Ireland and by ma ny other things embittered too by the a c a religious bre ch , and by cruelties to English p tives a a a in Sp in , and to Sp nish captives in Engl nd . ’ a As to the fleet of Eliz beth s time , it should be noted tha t it fell very low in the early yea rs of her

a a s u fli ci en c reign , c using une siness for its y , such as ’ h ad si ster s rei n followed the loss of Calais in her g . The regeneration bega n under the impulsion of a 1 5 83 O commission appointed in , consisting f the high f S e L a a o ficers of tat , including the ord Admir l , n d — - e s ea sub commission rs of experience Drake , Cotton , r h e u G i a G orges , F obis r , Bingham , F lke rev lle , C rew — , Raleigh , and others besides the four principa l AL A OH ROY N VY [ .

e s Holstock officers of our ships Wynt r , Hawkin , — S i and Borough the chief h pwrights , Pett , Chapman d a a n Baker , and two chief m sters who were i practica l na vigators . The Med terranean galley

Of e e - on typ e vess l , propell d by oars and with end

- gun fi re only , was of little value in the ocean ; the ga lleasss which a ttempted to combine broad side fire was unsatisfactory a n d the problem was to transform the deep - waisted single - decked cog

its a - a n d of the middle ages , with c ge work castles m hi a t the bow and ste , as developed in the big s p a of Henry VIII , into a sailing warship of we therly a n d n character sea endurance , mounting gu s of a greate r power on the bro dside . How this was a accomplished c nnot be told here . The great

m h 1 000 i - ships Tri u p of tons , carry ng thirty four u 1 6 S t M a tthew 30 pounder g ns and light guns , the , W h i te B ea r 900 Vi ctor 1 000 tons , the , tons , and the y , n ou r Ark Ro al t M er Ho and y , were the bigges ships

Of the time .

AS to the spirit of the fleet , we know that it had b een won in ma ny a ha rd - fought battle with the On gale a n d in hunger and cold . the great circum a e a na vigation , fter the ex cution of Doughty , Dr ke a a a e warned his men g inst mutiny and dis gr ement . a For , he s id , I must have the gentleman to haul a n d dr aw with the mariner and the ma riner ” a illi n with the gentlem n , and he found none unw g v] THE STRATEG Y OF DRAKE

i n to . to set hi s hand a rope Howard , wait g for a S ll the Armad , wrote , There ha be neither sick ness nor death whi ch shall make us yield until thi s ser vice be ended ; I never saw nobler minds than ” be here in our forces . If Drake had had his way , l l the Ar mada wou d never have reached the Channe . With fifty sail of S hi pping we S hall do more good upon their own coas t than a grea t many more will r a t m do he e ho e , and the sooner we are gone , the ” a i better we shall be ble to impeach them . Hawk ns , a n d wa s Frobisher Fenner thought with hi m . It

' in thi s spiri t tha t Dra ke had destroyed th e shi pping di 1 5 87 and stores at Ca z in . The same thought was in the mind of Raleigh when he would tha t the l e enemy shou d be busi d at home , and before they ” cou l d eat of our Kentish capons . i 200 all a e El zabeth had nearly vessels of cl ss s , with or men , but by far the greater hi number were not fighting s ps , and a great many Al were not present in the fighting . though the a 1 30 Sp niards left the Tagus with ships , it is doubt fu l 1 20 th e n if more than ever reached Chan el, with ill men , in a sickly state and provided , and f l e l hal of the vesse s wer victua lers , and a great S i many pinnaces and small craft . The big h ps e were unwieldy , and no match for the m er nimble

English vessels . Not many of their men knew the s tormy seas of the North Atla ntic ; and mos t of AL OH ROY NAVY [ .

them were far inferior to the hardy fellows who had d e learned their tra e in the Irish and Iceland fisheri s ,

and had sailed with Frobisher, Davis or Drake .

a - S a The Duke of Medin idonia was in comm nd , but a a h is l it was g inst own wil , for, on the death of Santa

Cruz , he had confessed his incompetence , and had al f pleaded his ignorance of nav af airs . The Spanish plan of action was to employ the ’ Duk e Of Parma s army in Flan ders for the invasion

of England . The Armada was to bring other troops in fl c transports , and the English eet was to be atta ked if met , and brought to close action , so that the r a a soldie s might pl y their p rt , but the principal object was to get up Channel in order to cover the ’ a i movement of P rma s troops from Dunk rk , who

r fla t - s we e to cross to England in bottomed boat . The huge Spani sh a rmament was Off the Lizard on a a 2oth Ju l 1 5 88 S turd y , the of y , , moving slowly a eastwa rd with a light breeze . The s me a fternoon Howard brought the Engli sh fleet out of Plym outh d a Sound , and on the next y , having gained the wind a of his adversary , and his ships being better s ilers , i a fell upon the Span sh rear under Rec lde , and so u l Of re ma ed it , with a rain shot for three hours , a o fusing to let the Sp niards approach for close acti n , a hi S that two gre t s ps were taken . till the Englis h S s men hung on the rear of the speeding paniard , and on the Tuesda y there was hard fighting off

ROYAL NAVY we i ceased , and followed the enemy . The Span sh remnant was retreating al ong the coast across the s t a h n e uary of the Th mes . T ere was never anythi g l ” ' p eased me better , wrote Drake , than to see the ” a a enemy flying with southerlywind to the northw rd . The sufferings of the Spani a rds in their long n i a w hi e ill av g tion ere terrible , for their s ps wer found ; they had been b a ttered by the storms and the English guns masts and riggi ng were shattered ; o a e an f od and w t r were scanty d bad . Many ships were lost among the Scottish Islands and on the l coast of Ireland , and probably few of the vesse s

- a that went north about ever returned to Sp in . h a d a hi i n l There been h rds ps the English ships a so , and there was sickness which the men attributed i t in su fli c en . to sour beer , and the food was and bad ’ a That , however , was too often the se man s lot . — The defeat of the Invincible Ar m ad ar that Ofli ci al description was not , for the real title was — Feli c i sim a Ar mada was one of the decisive nl ba ttles Of the world . It not o y once more pro tected England from invasion ; it put an end to sea Spanish domination at , and removed the first obs tacle to the exercise of British influence and ultimately the exertion Of British power through the a h ad world . The Sp niards sought to make the sea a a d a pathw y to their conquest , but they h found it a barrier to their ambition . v1 ] ELIZAB ETH AND THE NAVY

Thi s chapter may well cl ose wi th a reference to the heroic fight of gallant G renvill e in the Revenge against outnumbering Spanish foes at the Az ores in — 1 5 91 a fight whi ch showed the ardour and mettle a was of our seamen , but which , as se men know , s a i hi useles to the English cause , and a s cr fice w ch o u l dl c oler judgment wo d har y have approved .

CHAPTER VI

R THE TRANS ITION NAVY . TUDORS AN D S TUA Ts

TH E Ar u defeat of the mada , though ltimately it proved a most damaging blow to Spain , had not brought to Eliz abeth the immedi ate objects she di m l l desired . She but y realized that a new wor d di s had been covered , and that her seamen were breakin g down the barriers by which its treasures W di d were ithheld . She not regard the Fleet as an instrument to be used for what m i ght be call ed l was imperia purposes . It her view or hope that the operations in the Low Countries and France ’ lif - l S would sap the e b ood of pain , and Parma s invasion of France in 1 5 90 had enta ngled Phili p in a r another long and wasting w . She had asked her seamen in 1 5 88 how many Spani sh ships had been o b arded , how much treasure had been captured ,

L . R . N . 3 O H ROYAL NAVY [ O . and how many prisoners taken on which matters neither the Lord Admira l nor Drake had been able a to give very satisfactory nswers . Had not the c main body of the Armada es aped to the northward , m i e a n d ' and ght it not refit in D nmark , return Such doubts a n d a pprehensions as these had dis e i in quieted the Qu en , and her d sappointment flu en c ed di Of her policy . The expe tion Drake and Norre s L a a Ar y to isbon , in ret li tion for the mada , i O a n d e fa led in some of its bjects , was marr d by the a s e disagree ments of its le der . The enterpris s to l the Isles for the interception of Spanish supp ies , and the great stroke intended for the capture of ’ 1 5 95 —6 the enemy s treasure at Panama in , during di i which expe tion Hawkins and Drake d ed , as well ’ — even as Essex s attack on Cadiz the famous Cadiz a —in 1 5 96 ni voy ge , did not produce the pecu ary results desired— for plunder was at that time an — object Of wa r a n d they revealed disagree ments a n d a between the chiefs , quarrels between se men and soldi ers which marked the graduall y growing a and necess ry ascendancy of the former . ff s ea But in e ect the pressure of control , and the wasting can ker in the Low Countries had together S a created a sore situation in p in , and the treasury

was . empty The cities , however , were patriotic , a and Philip , sitting at the Council table , excl imed , We will sell these ca ndl esticks if other means of JAMES I raising money cannot be found '” The Spanish menace accordingly continued for several years . There was a new threat in 1 5 97 ; the Spania rds were well established on the Britta ny coast ; and 1 601 S a i di Of 35 00 in p n sh sol ers , to the number , a were even l nded in Ireland to as sist Tyrone . Mean u l l while Elizabeth , declaring that she wo d do on y a wa s wh t necessary for defence , had not properly a n d a defended Ireland , was trusting to her diplom cy a n d waiting for successes to be won vicariously by the Dutch a n d French on the continent . Yet wa s a exhaustion f lling upon both countries , and a O a ultimately it par lysed the power f Sp in . The real n qte of the p eriod wa s the presence of ni the English flag in every sea . Colo sts were es tab lis h in a A gthemselves on the co sts of North merica , a di 1 603 and before Eliz beth ed , in , merchants were preparing to dispute with the Dutch the rich promise of the eastern trade . The reign of James I was undistinguished in the a wa s a annals of the N vy , though it period of great a n d importance . The old order had passed away , Ja a di the fleet of mes was fleet vided into rates , e l controlled on a syst m that sti l exists . The period ’ s a w the King s ships employed in the keeping of the ” a a a v gue are known as the N rrow Seas , or the a S G a n d Four Seas , by me ns of a ummer uard a wa a sometimes Winter G uard . It s a m ritime 3—2 ROYAL NAVY

truce , during which new antagonisms were coming in l l in tol b e g. The Eng ish c aim to the sovereignty of the seas by the exaction of a sal ute as homage to fla n the g, was becomi g ever more irksome to the

Dutch . Their shipping was growing in volume , and they feared a quarrel whil e they were still l embroiled with Spain . They were W i ling to S how e t i a respect , but they de ply resented any h ng th t l might imply inferiority . Peace was a so the grea t J a n d 1 6 14 desire of ames , the enterprise in , of Sir William Monson and Sir Francis Howard a gainst the pirates who infested the Scottish coasts was in s was e pursuance of the peace of the sea , as Sir Rob rt ’ Ma n sel s expedition of 1 620 against the Algerine e S pirat s . The latter was futile , but howed a new spirit in the despatch of the King ’s shi ps for the protection of foreign trade . Shipbuildi ng entered fip on a new development ’ J di Pri nc e Ro al in ames s reign by the buil ng of the y ,

1 6 1 0 - - in , being a two decked ship with quarter deck i r and forecastle , wh ch , stripped of the lavish ca vings i tha t adorned her , resembled generally the sh ps 1 8th buil t up to the close of the century . Her as hi designer w the celebrated P neas Pett , son of ’ wr a t Eli z abeth s ship ight Deptford , but she was a a n d thought uns tisfactory , a survey showed that il s she had been bu t of unsea oned wood, whereby h e after a few years S became useless for the service . STUART ORG ANIZATION

Experience , however , had been gained during her in a construction , and the next reign Pett att ined S overei n o the S eas great success with the famous g f ,

l 1 6 37 - bui t in , which was the first three decker in wa a . s wa s the N vy Though good work done , it too evident that the admini stration of the dockyards had become exceedingly corrupt . An inquiry in 1 608 il had laid bare the ev s , but little had been done L to amend them . Howard , the ord High Admiral , was too old to welcome reform and the service was ffli a u l a cted with every dise se that co d infect a navy .

Ten years later , however , Buckingham having now a a f succeeded Howard , the Bo rd of Princip l O ficers i a n d a l was d ssolved , businesslike Counci of Com u r u missioners , after inq i y , carried on the work , p ri fi ed a i to some extent the docky rd admin stration , and bui lt two ships ea ch year for five consecutive

. a a a in 1 628 years Ten ye rs l ter gain , , the Principal O a a fficers were once more r ised to uthority . a a Fl gr nt corruption , waste , neglect and the decay of ma ritime enterprise exercised a disastrous effect in h the reign of C arles I , and this is true although , like S a h a d a l i a all the tu rts , he fu l sense of the mport nce of m aritime ascendancy in the presence of the gron power of continental states . The Navy a a a was still in tr nsition st ge , depending much upon

, a a a a the merc ntile m rine , and the merch nts c me unwillin gly . There was the long quarrel with the ROYAL NAVY

rl K h a d Pa iament , and the ing never money enough hi s ir . S J for purposes ohn Mervyn , commanding c a in the Narrow Seas , des ribed the deplor ble state 1 629 ill a n d of the ships in , in which men were fed i e a re mutinous , wh le their p titions to P rliament n a mai ed unread . His m jesty will lose the honour hi s a n d a r of seas , the love loy lty of his sailo s , and l i a his royal navy wil droop . When the m ser ble di i z u a r expe tion returned from Cad fo r ye s earlier , Sir John Pennington reported that most of the sea ' or L men were sick dead . St eger wrote they a s o a a re stink they go , and the p or rags they h ve ff ” rotten and ready to fall o . Mervyn recorded di a n d that foul weather , naked bo es empty bellies ’ made the seamen voice the King s se rvice worse ” than gall ey slavery . There is li ttle of interest to deta in us in the ’ di n expe tio s and cruises of Charles s reign , though to tha t period m ay be traced the first movements te nding towards the establi shment Of our naval i position in the Mediterranean . Sh p money wa s a i s an experiment which proved d sa ter to the Crown , hi l and the S p Money Fleet , though bui t to assert a our claim to the sovereignty of the N rrow Seas , a was not well employed for th t purpose . Possibly , c however , it exercised a deterrent influen e upon the Of ll r a m ambitions Ho and and F ance , and g ve ti e

. Of for the administrative reorganization the Navy .

AL A ROY N VY [ CH .

l all they cou d not remove abuses . The marvell ous crui ses and high courage of Prince Rupert and hi s companions , first near home , and then in the M di n e terranean and the Atlantic , encou teri ng or l in i n a n d e ud g succession Blake , Deane , Ayscue — Penn ( 1 649 1 65 3) showed the seamanl ike quali ties e Of which were the great ndowment Englishmen , l whether Roundheads or Cava iers . The fleet Of the Commonwealth learned much of ri its business in the chase of Rupert , which car ed di e 1 65 1 Penn into the Me t rranean in , being the first Engli sh admiral since the Crusades to enter those waters with any other object than the repression of piracy . Blake , Popham and Deane , appointed A l G i n 1 649 dmira s and enerals at Sea February , , wi were soon discovered , th their comrades , using ll an d the Fleet with vigour and ski , giving whole s some le sons thereby to Portuguese , Spaniards , Dutch and French while crushi ng out the remnants An d li . of Roya st opposition yet Blake , an Oxford l n scho ar , mercha t , politician and army Colonel , had never bee n at sea before the age of fifty . The first object of the Commonwealth leaders had been to m i i in set the ad n stration better order , and it was brought under an Admiralty Committee Of the a i d Parliament , with a N vy Board , which cons ste of a ll the Tre surer , Surveyor , Comptro er and Clerk of the il e s i s Acts who conducted the civ busin ss . The e bod e m ] RIVALRY OF THE DUTCH

l 1 65 1 n worked zealous y , and by the year , the stre gth of the Navy had practically b ee n doubled . The fidelity of the Officers was secured by appointing a n d trusted men , the content of the men by placing O f over them fficers a ter their own heart , and by

i - i better pay , better food and better pr ze money , w th i much improved admin stration in home matters . At the same time the orga nization of the Fleet was t a advanced ow rds the making of a permanent force , and the fleet ta ctics were put upon a new basis . Efforts had been made in earlier years to formu l ate u di tactical systems , but they were r mentary , and 1 65 3 orders issued in for the line ahead formation , which has since been used in all our wars and still endures , were clearly based on previous experience in the service . n J 1 5 88 Howard , writi g in une , , had laid down a — as a gre t strategic principle not , however , we h a i hi m ave seen in previous chapter , new w th tha t he woul d not go to any place to offend or to l a spoi , but to seek out the gre t force and to fight u li n with them . This r g principle began to re cei ve a exem li ficati on i n t its re l p the Du ch Wars , whi ch were not conducted by the adventures of l i all sing e sh ps or sm forces , but by steady coherent campaigns . The wars with the United Provinces

r . we e inevitable Raleigh could remember , when one ’ of Eliz abeth s ships would make forty Hollanders ROYAL NAVY

i il str ke sa and come to an anchor , but now we were to see how unwilling were they to subm i t to our power . Their prosperity , like our own , was founded

- fi h upon commerce . From a race of herring s ers ' they had become a ru lm g mercantile power in the world . They had preceded us in oversea trade and , displacing the Portuguese , had founded a great m i colonial do nion , even while they were holdin g a all their own gainst the armaments of Spain . It was the mas sacre at Amboyna in 1 623 that drove di n back our traders on the In a continent , and thus indirectly led to the foundation of the Indi an

Empire . Thus the wars with the Dutch were com m erci al a hi wars , and in volume w ch is concerned with the influence of the Navy on the growth of a r c Empire , it is import nt to lay st ess on this fa t . The commercial character of the hostili ties was a Ac t Of 1 65 1 i was indicated by the Navig tion , wh ch a inte nded to strike h rd at the Dutch carrying trade . There had as yet arisen no instinct for the use of the fleet as a political instrument . The objects a d were di rect n practical . The immedi ate cause of the outbreak was the state of undeclared hostilities whi ch existed between i France and England , Dutch sh ps , as neutrals , s being searched , sometimes har hly treated by our i z i captains , and subjected to a law of pr e wh ch was 1 65 2 T not their own . In May , , romp with some vn ] BLAK E AND TROMP

l S a forty sai , was in the traits of Dover , waiting valuable Dutc h convoys which were coming up

Channel . He had no desire to bring about a con ff fli ct . O , but was quite ready for one the Start certain of the Dutch shi ps had been compelled to r a st ike their flags after fight with Captain Young , ” i G a ar dl command ng the West u rd , and it was h y s likely that if Tromp met the Engli hmen , they

u - A ir wo ld part without a battle . Rear dm al Bourne was in the Downs with eight sail a n d Bla ke a t Wye fi e with fteen or sixteen . Tromp had orders to prot ct hi ac a n d the convoy , w ch had re hed Fairlight , on 1 9th a May Blake , seeing the Dutchmen be ring down B rederode towards him , Tromp leading in the , ” h a d a thought they a resolution to eng ge . There i a a is a d spute s to which side fired the first bro dside .

Tromp had the weather gage , that is the wind ’ a n d behind him , he made a fierce attack on Blake s Ja m es a ship , the , which was the we thermost of the ’ a squadron . The battle r ged for two hours , Tromp s a a re r being engaged by Bourne , who c me out from f a n d the Downs , but the gunnery was ine fective , l Tromp , though in overwhe ming superiority , with drew . Thi s action caused a strong outburst of fee ling a a in both countries , and every av il ble ship was a J made ready for the coming struggle . E rly in uly was S e a a Blake in the North with fifty s il , preying ROYAL NAVY [OH .

- flee ts upon the Dutch herring , by which the whole

fishery was lost for a year , and looking for Dutch

i - Ind amen coming north about round Scotland , while Ayscue was in the Downs with fifteen or si xteen hi sail waiting for s pping from the Thames . Tromp , a a with gre t fleet , made no attempt to protect the s a l a fi heries and f i ed to bring Ayscue to ction , after i which he went north to seek Blake , but was dr ven a l to his ports by storms . The g l ant old offi cer had il l s re done in this busine s , and was compelled to

linquish his charge . The attack and protection of commerce was the a main concern of the admir ls , and De Ruyter and Ayscue were both sent down Channel with this li 1 6 Object . A col sion occurred on August th , which in c on cl u sive Off h i s was i , but De Ruyter carried a a n d h a d convoy , eluding also Bl ke Penn , who come a a n d down Ch nnel , the Dutch object of getting their wa a a Of shi pping home s tt ined . The Battle the 27th Kentish Knock , fought on September outside h e Th a m es a t L , between Bl ke and Penn on the one side and Cornelius De With and De Ruyter on the wa s other , the first action of the war not directly

concerned with the protection of convoys . It was

inconclusive ; but the Dutch had the worst of it . a n d They did not fight well , some of the captains

behaved very badly , being apparently supporters il i of Tromp , unw l ng to support De With and De ’ m ] THE THREE DAYS BATTLE

Ruyter . The Dutch now prepared a great arma a n d ll r ment , reca ed T omp to the command , as the

man of experience who inspired confidence . Tromp 400 got his huge convoy , about sail , through the off 3oth Straits , and Dungeness on November , 80 40 a se l having ships to , inflicted rever upon B ake , e l l who was s verely hand ed and ost two vessels . a a This lesson was t ken to he rt , and a great fleet 0 80 of 7 or ships , with Blake , Deane and Monk executing the ofli ce of Lord High Admiral in com a t a 1 65 3 mand sea , was in the Ch nnel in February , , 1 8th a and on the gain encountered Tromp , who had

80 90 - of- a or men war , and cloud of merchantmen e behin d him . The battle last d three days and

extended from Portland to the Straits of Dover . dl On the first day , the English were severely han ed the second day ’s fighting was inconclusive but on hi da off G ri sn ez the t rd y , in a close action , Penn , Cape , ’ broke through Tromp s formation , and several men

- an d 5 0 a a Of war some merch ntmen were c ptured . The Dutch a dmiral showed fi n e seaman ship in es a a n d c ping , the action was really indecisive , for the l bu k of the convoy reached the Dutch ports . Both a an d a Bl ke De ne were wounded , there were heavy a losses among officers and se men , and the victorious fleet was reduced to a condi tion scarcely more battle a worthy th n that of its adversary . I But from this time Onward superiority reste d AL H ROY NAVY [ O .

with the Englishmen . Their ships were better i than the Dutch sh ps , and the men fought better . a l a 'There was gre ter skil lso in the handling of fleets . O 1 6 5 3 perations were not resumed until May , , J 2n d 3rd a and on une and De ne and Monk , with over 80 sa il were once more engaged with Tromp off G a S s a the bbard hoal out ide the Th mes . Seeing hi s a e a danger the l tter accept d b ttle to leeward , so u l i that he co d escape , wh ch he did , keeping in the shallows of the Flemish coast a n d reaching his

. e harbours In this action there were severe loss s , an d Dea ne was cut in two by a ca nnon shot in the s Of first broad ide , but the defeat the Dutch was r complete . This misfortune , which sp ead consterna U tion throughout the nited Provinces , was due in ll no measure to lack of courage or ski , but to the ' i ni inferiority of the Dutch sh ps , concer ng whi ch u Tromp had proteste d to the States G eneral . O t The spoken as he always was , De With exclaimed , ’ s a Of English are at pre ent m sters of us and the seas . So dire was the situation tha t the Dutch sought ’ too peace , but Cromwell s terms were harsh , and the States G eneral would not submit to conditions a which were thought an outr ge .

Thus came to be fought the last fight of the war, a Of 1 6 5 3 off hi the famous b ttle the Texel , in w ch Monk was in command with Penn and Lawson as l h ad Off hi s colleagues . The F eet been kept the

ROYAL NAVY [ OH . i of h e wh o e t Dutch , had been wast d by land e ls warfar , and a o the increasing sense in England th e Of hi z of need gher fighting organi ation , and the b u ilding of the right cla sses of ships for adm i ral s l a to hand e . Next we may remark the advant ge resu l ting to thi s country in the war from undivided i an d e organ zation direction , as contrast d with the divided counsels an d di vergent inte rests of the e L t ff United Provinc s . as ly we may see the e ect of the war—the striking of what promised to be l l a s a mortal b ow at the pros perity of the Nether nd . s l The Briti h Is es , by their geographical situation , w s it c ere eated , as were , athwart the Dut h lines of r communications , and by exe ting the compression Of A sea power , as dmiral Mahan has said , the Fleet caused the grass to grow in the streets of a ” Amsterd m .

CHAP TER VIII

THE RES TORATION NAVY AND THE CL OS E OF THE DUTCH W ARS

E W are confronted , when we reach the Navy of e ad m i n is the Restoration , with a contrast b tween trati ve W is dom on the one hand and the effects of m i ni i e ad strat ve failure on the other . Before Charl s vm ] THE RESTORATION NAVY

n L i A la ded at Dover , he appointed as ord H gh dmiral , h is J Of J brother ames , Duke York , afterwards ames II , whose name will always be remembered wi th those of our greatest naval administrators . The large committee appointed by the Rump Parli ament to a wa s manage the affairs of the N vy swept away , and the four Pri ncipal Officers were restored

G t r a - officer Sir eorge Car eret , the T e surer , a sea of f a great experience ully trusted , and , s ys Pepys , a most honest man the Comptroller, Sir Robert Sl n esb i e hi s h a d y g , who from childhood been bred a n d u r up employed in the Navy ; the S veyor , Sir a n e ffi William B tte , who had h ld the same o ce h a d a n d before , and served in active commands ; A the Clerk of the cts , Samuel Pepys himself , the

Diarist , whose Diary covers but a very small period h is i of long and active serv ce for the State . With m i them were associated three com ssioners , all men of experience , and their successors were men of l fi a ll experience a so . These of cers came to be c ed ’ a L the Navy Bo rd , acting as the ord High Admiral s u co ncil of advice , and the Board continued to exist a L as Board long afterwards , when the office of ord High Admir al had been pla ced in Commission in r a the hands of the Boa d of Admir lty . A great work wa s ra pidly accomplished in firmly establishing the Of a l code n val discip ine , and the Duke applied himself pa rticularly to the better ordering of th e

L . B . N . 4 H ROYAL NAVY [ O .

( Economy of the Navy Office and the con f stitu ti on of an organi zed corps of naval O ficers . Notwi thsta nding all the experience brought to bear upon the business , deep disappointment ” l i G e fol owed . Back again to Spr ng arden , wrot ' 3rd J 1 667 Pepys , on the of une , , and then to walk up and down the garden , reflecting upon the a wi bad man gement of things now , compared th what it was in the late rebellious times , when men , s li ome for fear , and some for re gion , minded their f ” O . business , which none now do , by being void both No one knew better than Pepys that want Of money Of ni il was at the root the admi strative fa ure , and ’ that the evil Of private gain at the country s cost seemed incurable . When the King came back the situation had been deplorable . The Navy was even l then overwhe med with debt , and the requirements w adm in i s ere ever increasing , and outgron the ra tive r t machinery . Du ing the Second Dutch War

il e . the ev fruit rip ned Did business , though not ffi 7th O much at the o ce wrote Pepys , ctober, 1 6 65 e , aft r the first battles , because of the horrible crowd and lamentable moan Of the poor seamen ” li e i in l that starv ng the streets for ack of money . ad With the remark that as time passed on , good is i min trative means began to bear better fruit , w th am endment at the dockyards and in the service , we i n ew w i pass on to th s war ith the Dutch , prem sing vm ] SECOND DUTCH W AR

l 1 662—3 that the F eet was employed in , against the r Of Barbary pi ates , and in taking possession Tangier , a part Of the dowry of Catherine of Br ganza . 1 665 —7 The Second Dutch War , , arose from Old l i l l the commercia r valry , embittered by po itica n l exasperation . The E glish , as Monk frank y said a wanted a l rger share in the trade of the Dutch , hi l v u w ch had great y increased since the pre io s war, mainl y owing to the anti - Spanish operations of ll i Cromwe , which had thrown the Span sh trade in to their hands . The chartered trading companies , l nf lin by their riva ries , contributed to the u riend ess ;

di J L c o - in the Me terranean , Sir ohn awson , operating against the pirates with De Ruyter , had exacted a sal ute which he had refused to return ; and in h i s w 1 663 well kno n cruise of , Sir Robert Holmes had dealt in a very hostile manner with the Dutch possessions on the West Coast of Africa and at New i Of Amsterdam . The sign ficant feature the war tha t followed was that th e Dutch abandoned their trade in order to fight for the essential command Of l the sea . The fleets were organized on a great sca e , 1 665 k and , in May , , the Du e of York , with nearly a il hi m a hundred s , having with Penn , Prince Rupert S a and andwich , stretched over to the Dutch co st il e . but fa d to force an action , and returned The

Dutch had been unprepared , but they were soon l s n at sea , and Opdam , with re uctance due to a e se 4—2 AL A H ROY N VY [ C .

i i of nferiority , came over with a large fleet , wh ch was severely beaten in the b a ttle off Lowestoft 3rd J i ( une) . Serious losses were infl cted on the l Eng ish ships in this action , especially among the highly placed officers in immedi ate attendance upon the Duke in the Royal Cha rles . The Earls of a J L Marlborough and F lmouth , Sir ohn awson , e ir l perhaps the most ardent spirit in the fl et , Adm a S an s u m L Mu sk crr and ord y were amongst the slain , ’ a fact whi ch may account for the Du ke s failure to i pursue hi s enemy . Some of the Dutch capta ns l a n d had behaved very bad y , four of them were afterwards shot . Probably their misconduct was ’ l a O da m s l argely instrument l in p fai ure , for his di d a t l material losses not exceed bout fif een sai . De Ruyter was now the only man whom the Dutc h u l co d trust , and Sandwich , in the North Sea , let him slip by as he returned from a long cruise to th e West Indies grea tly encumbered with the prizes in a his comp ny . wa s in a ill The English fleet a bad st te . It was a a n d provided , pay was in rrear the victualling e dif l service was disorganiz d . With great ficu ty a fleet of some eighty - five sail was a ssembled in the 1 666 Of Downs in May , , under command Monk , for di il Sandwich was scredited , wh e Rupert was in the i d Channel look ng for the French , who , it was feare , t Com eli s would join the Dutch . De Ruy er , with ’ vm j THE FOUR DAYS BATTLE

Evertsen and the younger Tromp , came over in J 1 s t greatly superior force , and on une the hard ’ fought four da ys battle of the Straits of Dover ’ a S wi ts n re beg n . The f , Sir William Berkeley s Off a a flagship , was cut and c ptured , the admir l being l a a Sir J kil ed . Out of the struggle broke g ll nt ohn a a n d H rman , giving proof of grim dauntless courage , when deeply wounded , with his ship on fire and his a crew in a p nic . ’ The second day s fighting was inconclusive , and once more there was misconduct amongst the

Dutch captains . The English had shown them i n o selves superior man euvring and fighting power , hi da nk but were outnumbered , and on the t rd y Mo found it necessary to retire to the Thames to make a n d good damage . The Dutch followed , captured ’ Pri nc e G A sc u e s a the , Sir eorge y fl gship , which had

G a . stranded on the lloper Sand Fortunately , at h a d the moment , Rupert , who been anxiously Off a awaited , appeared the Forel nd , whereupon the Dutch made sail with their prize . But on the wa s a t a n d next day valiant Monk again sea , in a a a hi s fight which l sted m ny hours , fleet got the worst a of it , but not without inflicting such dam ge upon ’ De Ru yter s shi ps that he cou l d make no immedi ate use of his success , and was obliged to retire to his e ports to r fit .

There was evidence in all that had taken place , ROYAL NAVY with abundant courage in the few and even in very a a m ny , of a decline in the mor l quality of the English

Fleet , and of the nation behind it . The pages of P ’ epy s s Diary bear evidence of an ominous change . as a Of Yet in the l t b ttle of the war , in a burst shame a t ful resentment what had occurred , a new spirit d Ru ter ‘ was was create , De y forced from the station i s a wh ch he had as umed at the mouth of the Th mes , and Monk and Rupert crossed to the Dutch coast , i driving sh pping to shelter and capturing prizes , while the opera tion known as Sir Robert Holmes his B on efire recalls how Holmes burned 1 60 sail of merchantmen and two warshi ps at Terschelling s 8 t (Augu t th) , and captured s ores and destroyed l a ll magazines , to the total va ue , it is s id , of we over i a milli on sterl ng .

But the Dutch were neither beaten nor cowed , and with stubborn coura ge within a month were at s ea i again , look ng for a junction with the French

i a . i fleet , wh ch Rupert forest lled The immed ate a l a danger passed aw y , but the mora we kness and a all l dec y uded to asserted itse f afresh . Penury ’ i reduced Charles s fleet to mpotence , and the cup of shame was filled when the Dutch under De Ruyter and Van G hent entered the Thames and captured i l and burned the sh ps at Chatham . Seven arge a r ships burned or taken , with many sm lle , were the ll es an d l to of the Dutch succ s , ong after , the event

ROYAL NAVY [ CH .

l own forces suffered a most as severely . The last action of the war was the ha rd - fought Battle of the 1 1th 1 6 73 Texel , August , , which was not a victory for our arms . The Dutch a dmir a l had once more saved h is u a s i l co ntry by his cour ge , fore ight and tactical sk l . But the Uni ted Provinces could no longer hold their Of place amid the growing power their neighbours .

a l f - d As with the Spani rds before them , their i e bloo a n was wasting in exhausting struggle on land . They had clung too long to the friendship of France but Louis never forgave their resis tance in the Spanish t m i Ne herlands , and when his ar es marched the

- fires A glare of its watch was seen even in msterdam . lli Then arose the old stubborn spirit , and Wi am of a dh e a Orange , who bec me Sta older aft r the ass ssina i e n c tion of De Witt , won prov nce aft r provi e back r from the French . But the bu den was too great , Of 1 688 and, if the Revolution , which was to make the Dutch our friends , had not taken place , they coul d never have held their position at sea in the presence of the gron power and resou r ces Of

England . Of But in England the malady decay , the terrible a di w ste due to want of money and want of cre t , reduced the Navy to a shameful degree at the close ’ e h ad of Charles s r ign . Yet there been many a c ill i tions that u m nated its story . The Operations of THE NAVY IN 1 6 88

a Harman in the West Indies , of Munden at St Helen , Of s ls and others on the coa ts of India and e ewhere , showed how the building of empire was going on . a l u r Much of the Dutch tr de fe l into o hands . Tangier d B ook s a Sh ovell had been occupie , and , M rlborough , and others had shown the true qualities of our sea di men in the Me terranean . Tangier , however , that outpost of power , at one of the gates of the world , 1 6 84 was abandoned in the impotence of .

CHAPTER IX

E 1 8 TH REVOLUTION OF 6 8 . THE B EG INNING OF TH E FRENCH W ARS

IT will have been Observed in the precedi ng chapters that the removal Of the Spani ards and the Dutch fr om the pathways of our enterprise and our a approaches to the position of World Power, was not brought about by the great engagements and l actions of the Navy in the wars . No batt e we have mentioned can in a real sen se be spoken Of as de n oisive . It can ot be said that the defeat of the Armada in 1 5 88 reduced Spain to the impotence 0 to whi ch she subsequently fell . N battle of the Dutch wars brought a bout the decay Of the Dutch

Republic . We must rather trace the causes of ROYAL NAVY [OH . these cha nges in the rela tive positions of nations to

all - rv - the pe ading pressure of sea power, not always nor merely by the di rect gripping of the avenues e of commerce or communications , but oft n by the exhaustion which resu l ts from the wastin g Of u r reso ces , the material and personal losses , the u e u l destr ction of industri s , and conv sions in the a a social st te , called up by the loud voices of F ction ff a and Want . These things a ected Engl nd as they di d a r Sp in and the Netherlands , and thei con sequences were di sastrous for the socia l sta te ; but we had not to bear the double burden of land and a sea , and we did not m intain great standing armies , a l conduct v st mi itary campaigns , or empty our resources in covering the la nd wi th mighty fortresses a wa and entrenched c mps . Here s the real cause u r h e ar of our end ance of what others could not . e a The fl ets had protected us from inv sion , and opened the seas for us , and we were free to pursue alike our industries within and our activities without . a t i Nevertheless , the close of the reign of Charles I hi s the King was at the end of resources , and few ships were in comm i ssion ; the rest were out of l i . repa r , and the magazines were a most empty James II therefore appointe d a commission to inquire into the affairs of the Navy , which con 6 88 l 1 . ducted its work unti October , Much was a done for the betterment of the service , but not ll LANDING OF WILLIAM the defects resulting from years of corruption cou ld a t be removed . Yet the close of the period , there i 1 73 l i existed an establ shment of vessels , inc ud ng

9 firs t - 1 1 - 39 r - rates , second rates and thi d rates , ir besides 26 fireshi p s and three yachts . S Roger h ad 20 i n s Strickland a squadron of sail the Down , whi ch was strengthened and placed under command Of L ord Dartmouth . The new menace from the wa s O Netherlands discerned , and the Prince of range a a ll was expected to a ttempt a l nding . We know how that landing took place . It was not due to the inability of an efficient and resolute Navy to pre a Of vent invasion , but to the tre son of ficers and the acquiescence of men who di d not desire to avert but to bring about the Revolution whi ch put a n a end to the Stuart dyn sty . hi J a The fleet w ch ames had ssembled , and the system he had created were a va luable possession Ki n wa s a di for his successor . But the new g sol er , a o in i O t re who c me lo k g for m litary bjec s , and ga rded the Navy a s a means for their immedi ate l accomp ishment . He showed no large un der i Of il a di stand ng sea power , unt l ter when he scerned that it must be the chief agency in the di plomacy

. i of his grouping of the nations His access on , il li wh e it made the Dutch our al es , opened on a l li r larger scale our secu ar hosti ty to F ance , and ultimately brought Spain and the House Of Austria ROYAL NAVY

L into a coalition against ouis XIV , which laid the ’ G li a foundation of the new rand Alliance . Wil m s immediate objects were to secure the Narrow s a n d Seas , for inva ion was an imminent danger , a i to maintain communic tions with Ireland , wh ch J had to be conquered from ames , who had been landed in the isla nd by French ships under a G abaret . That the naval d nger existed was ’ shown by Ch Ateau r en a u lt s success in landing a small body of troops at Bantry B ay in despite of a squadron under command of Herbert , afterwards t O e Earl of Torring on , an honour that ffic r received r a in recognition of this , the fi st n val action of the new reign . Louis ’ real object was to secure such command of the sea as would prepare the way for invasion , and thereby brin g a bout a rising for the restoration a of the Stuarts . The gre t minister Colbert had a fin e provided and organized the N vy , and that ll wa s seaman Tourvi e charged with the operation . Torrington wa s in comma nd of the fleet whi ch was a to frustrate the attempt . At the Admir lty he a a u f had protested g i nst its ins ficiency , and afloat , i e know ng his inferiority , he d sired to pursue a policy an d of Observation , to keep his fleet in being ff i u l il rather than to su er defeat , wh ch wo d imper the sa fety of the country and probably the stabili ty ’ of the throne . Torrington s action has been the 1 x ] THE FLEET I N BEING

i subject of a good deal of d scussion . His ideas were prevalent at the time both in the French navy u l and in our own . They res ted from experience of the sa ili ng navy in times when fleets could not keep u l the seas in all weathers , and when , if they co d be maintained without encountering the enemy , they might win time for reinforcement for a later cam ai n a p g . Queen M ry , acting as regent , or her ’ advisers , amongst whom was Russell , Torrington s hi s professional rival , objected however to policy , W and peremptory orders ere issued to him to fight . was a a Thus brought about the B ttle of Be chy Head , 3oth J 1 690 une , , wherein the Dutch van under ff a Evertsen su ered severely , being first eng ged , a s a and Torrington , having , he considered , c rried hi s a n d n out instructions , knowi g he had no chance of success , withdrew to the Thames , as Monk had hi m f done before , though in di ferent circumstances . He was tried by court martial for h i s failure and u i acq tted . The battle was reckoned a victory by the French . The consequences Torrin gton feared did not L immediately follow , but ouis gained great con fiden ce ear from the success , and in the next y r ll a Tou vi e m de , under instructions , what is known ” h i s a u as campagne large , in which he was not to hi s fight , but to keep fleet intact , to protect French interests and the coasts , and if possible to capture ROYAL NAVY

was to e the Smyrna convoy . He forbidden ent r 1 692 all the Channel . In the following year , , was considered ready for the great expedi tion against Th e i l England . sold ers had spoken the ast word , and it was for the Navy to carry out their behests . s Precisely the ame situation arose a century later , when other soldiers were ready for a like enter s eu prise . Troops to the number of were La camped near Hougue , under command of l l n J e Marsha de Be lefonds , with whom was Ki g am s , and cavalr y and artillery were to b e embarked at i hi s s Havre . But Colbert had d ed , and succes or Seignelay was less than half - hearte d in the duties h i of s office . His record shows that he had no l appreciation of the essentia s of sea power , and he relinquished the affairs Of the expedition into the J hands of King ames , Bellefonds and the soldiers . ’ Tou rvill e s list shows that he had onl y forty - four l sail with his flag . Prudence wou d have coun ’ sell ed nf i D Estrées waiting for rei orcements wh ch , Ch at ea u ren a u lt a n d De la Porte could have brought ,

b - raising the num er of ships to eighty eight . But ill was e di Tourv e allow d no scretion, and was con dem n ed rOl e r hi to play a in an ope ation w ch , he t l li said , ook account neither of nava nor mi tary ’ Of difficul ties . The King s caution the previous ni l year had va shed . Tourville was very wil i n g to lli fight the a es , but had no relish for a rash

ROYAL NAVY

ll e seamen from boyhood , who we knew the tid s and l O s ha f tides round the French coast . The ppo ing fleets drifted westward with the tide and anchored when it was against them , and on the morning of the 21st a number of the French ships rounded a n d l Cape de la Hague , ultimate y found shelter at R a l l St Malo . The S olei l oy and two other cripp ed shi ps had not weathered the Cape and were driven a shore and burned near Cherbou rg by Sir Ralph l a De av l . Other French ships faili ng to anchor were dri ven eastward before the wind between the shore and the lli a n d i n a B arfleu r a es round g C pe , sought refuge in the harbour of Saint Vaast de la Hougue . There , in t firesh i s at acks with boats and p , under the conduct 22n d 23rd e i of Rooke , on the and , thirt en sh ps were

- destroyed . The long drawn action thus ended in illi a i d br ant f sh on , and nothing of a like kind occurre l for many ong years to follow . There were great rejoicings in England , for had not the fleet saved the country from invasion once more Peace was 1 69 O 7. signed in ctober , a n d U Between this period the Peace of trecht , 1 1 3 n hi 7 , there was a great deal of fighti g w ch shall not detain us here . Attacks which we had made on the French Channel ports di d little to affect the ’ Tou r vill e s a s situation . exploit gain t the great a convoy at Lagos on the coast of Portug l , had struck I x] EXHAUSTI ON OF FRANCE

di smay i n the hearts of London merchants . Much ’ might b e written concerning the King s policy in

di e . i the Me t rranean New combinations had ar sen , and the great Sea Power began to make her influence felt on the states bordering the basin of old - world i a r e 1 702 n . W domi on was declar d afresh in , and an attack on Cadiz failed owing to di ssensions l between seamen and so diers . The capture of G ibral tar by Roc k s and Sh ovell in 1 704 gave us a l one of the gre t strategic keys of the wor d, in the very year in whi ch the victory of Blenheim detached the Bavarian s from the alli ance with France ; and in the sanguinary battle of Mala ga nothi n g was l n accomp ished to restore it to Spai . Four years l L i ater eake took Sardin a and Minorca , with the r valuable ha bour of Port Mahon . We were thus as strongly based in the western Medi terranean as r di d either France or Spain , and the F ench fleet u l not dare to leave To on .

The . most signi ficant feature Of the war was i ndeed the progressive exhaustion of France , which , nl Of r combined with the une ightenment her Ministe s , brought about the withdr awal of her fleets from the wa s sea . It the golden age of the great privateers , but

J a - ean Bart , Dugu y Trouin and the rest , do what damage they might to commerce by their brilliant deeds , could neither decrease the strain that was

s ff . trangling France , nor a ect the result of the war 5 L . R . N . L ROYA NAVY [CH .

If it were necessa ry to make a catalogue of gallant e actions in our own servic , we might think of Hop 1 702 Of sonn breaking the boom at Vigo , , Benbow a a vali ntly fighting against Du Casse , but ab ndoned a by his capt ins in the same year , and of other hard a a a f fighting se men . The betr y l O Benbow by his capta ins is evidence of a moral fa ilure in the flee t of o a which s mething sh ll yet be said .

In this remarkable period , the fleets of the a a i a n d lli nce cru sed unchecked , hemmed France in , n a injuri g her coasts , annihil ting her commerce at s ea a n d a s O , rendering aid to the rmie perating s a against her . S quadrons were ent out year by ye r to attack French poss essions in the New World and to defend our own . It was the period in which

a ou r - a a r the found tions of world empire , l id centu y a n d a n d before , were strengthened deepened , as Ma han h as written of the War of the Spani sh S u c was Of cession , Before that war England one the S e a Powers ; a fter it she wa s th e Se a Power with ” out any exception . CHAPTER X

NAVAL S UPREMACY AN D FL E ET D ECAY

TH E Peace of Utrecht is one of the great a la ndm a rks in European history . It affected n a stonishing aggrandi sement of the position of r a a a England in Eu ope , g ve her commerci l suprem cy , a n d Opened wider wa y for her polity a n d trade in a the New World . It m rked , as the war which it a Of closed had determined , the dec y her ancient wa r a . riv l , who had been her ally in the From a a G a a P a a n d Sp in we ret ined ibr lt r , ort M hon the in O a a a Isle of M orca , and bt ined the v lu ble privilege ” a a c lled the Asiento , or right to supply negro sl ves ni a a s to the Spa sh possessions in Americ , well as authority to send a shi p laden with manufactured a a goods once a year to the Spanish M in . Fr nce a a surrendered to us Nova Scoti , Newfoundl nd and ’ B a the Hudson s y Territory . The Dutch were a deeply mortified t the result . The Spanish Nether a h a d a a Of r a l nds been s ved from the h nd F nce , but wa s a there no sh re for them in the Asiento , or a t G a a a ibr lt r or Port M hon . They had , however , ta ken no a ctive p a rt in the Mediterra nea n since 1 706 a , and no heed was p id to their abstract claims for colonies or stations . Through sheer exhaustion n they were declini g . Their navy was shrinking 5 — 2 AL CH ROY NAVY [ .

u r it from want of reso ces to maintain , and they graduall y withdrew from the wars and the di plomacy of Europe . Al though it wou l d be impossible to estimate the al — a li relative weight of the sever factors n val , mi o — tary , economic and s cial which gave us the h ad a wi supremacy we ttained , we may say th ds J Hollon d certainty, in the wor of ohn , quoted i n a e al was a previous ch pt r , that the nav part the thread that ran through the whole wooft of the war . Blenheim , Ramillies , Oudenarde and l Malp aquet have made more noise in the world . But the controlli ng force in the whole war had been ’ ' ou r fd om in an ce and the pervadin g influence Of our a ma stery of communic tions at sea . By this means we carried on our industries and commerce u n a t checked . By the one we gained riches home ,

' wa r supporting the demands of the , and by the a other we won we lth and power from other lands , which enabled us to establish our credi t on an u n a l e assailable b sis and to e evate the spirit of our p ople , u l i thus , as Maca ay says of the war, lay ng the deep and solid foundations on which was to rise the most gigantic fabric of commercia l prosperity ” l which the world h a s ever seen . Nava supremacy wi i s rooted in commercial prosperity , and thout n a the one the other cannot be mai t ined .

The peace of the seas which we had won , enabled x] THE PEACE OF THE SEAS us to develop the enormous resources of our growing

Empire , and gave us means whereby to create the commercial supremacy whi ch was to enable us to support the bur den Of the great wars that were to u a come before the cent ry closed . W lpole was a O peace minister . His bject was to withhold the country from the continenta l enga gements which a wa s thre tened to entangle it , and he enabled for about a quarter of a century to pursue thi s policy a a t solely because the N vy was supreme sea . ” a a Madam , he s id to Queen C roline one morning 1 734 a re f in , there fi ty thousand men slain this ” a a ye r in Europe , and not one Englishm n . It was naval supremacy alone that ena bled a peaceful lli a 1 71 7 a ance with France to be est blished in , and brought about the hi storic Qua druple Alli ance of the

following year . We m a y pass over a considerable period of u n u l a O eventf character with few bservations , while i On we recogn ze the great significance of the time . e remarkable feature wa s a rapid revival of the Spanish a a Al i N vy , under the powerful inspir tion of beron , but tha t new force had not ripened to the exp eri

. l ence of our own It was helpless , and was utter y G a destroyed by Admiral eorge Byng , fterwards Off Viscount Torrington , in the action Cape Passaro , ’ 1 l th 1 71 8 B n s on the of August , . y g secretary wrote of the action tha t the English might be said rather AL A ROY N VY [ OH .

to have made a seizure than to have gotten a ” victory . a a a i Pe ce was m int ined only by power , and Engl sh nava l power was used to impose peace upon Russia S a in her struggle with weden in the B ltic , whence O a a a we bt ined n v l stores , and where the balance a wa s being changed to our di sadvant ge . We must Observe also tha t peace was contributing rapidl y to the commercial and maritime prosperity of Fra nce — and French commerce and with it the development a — i n L i G of n val means ou siana , uadeloupe and a ni L a M rti que , in the Mediterranean and evant tr de , di a and in In and the East , where Pondicherry , a He a n d Chandern gore , the Bourbon the Ile de a e a n d Fr nce were outposts of enterpris and power , where a va st movement was inspired and di rected by those grea t sta tesmen and administra tors Dupleix — and La Bourdonna is the latter a seama n possessing a true instinct for sea power .

But , for the time being , France and England a a wa r were the gre t b rrier against , and for many e in l n yea rs were unit d hosti ity to Spai . The fleet a a al m int ined control in the B tic , it protected a an d c G ibraltar from a Spanish ttack , a deta hment under command of Admiral Hoz i er was sent to e a a Porto Bello , where it overaw d the Sp ni rds , e wi s though the ships were ravag d th pe tilence , and Hoz i er himself di ed Relations with

AL A ROY N VY [OH .

Want of c o - operation between naval and mili tary ’ 1 702 forces had led to Rooke s failure at Cadi z in . ” e We are here, Colonel Stanhope had writt n , l i in not on y d vided sea aga st land , but land against ” s ea land and against sea . There had been bitter ’ jealousies during Peterb orou gh s Opera tions in Cata 1 706 Of lonia in . the situation at Cartagena in 1 701 , Vernon wrote that he hoped to have orders ' to come home being heartily sick of conjunct ” i A L te expeditions w th the rmy . a r on it was want of understandi n g between the naval and il e s J n m itary forc s , repre ented by oh Byng and G led o i eneral Blakeney , that to the l ss of M norca

and the execution of Byng . These failures might e be exemplified by other instanc s , and deserve di attention , because they have minished the proper

influence and effect Of sea power . There was evidence also of a slow moral wea ken

in g withi n the Navy itself . There had grown up a

s al l - a a e spirit of profes ion se f s tisf ction , whenc had efli ci en c d come no stimulus to y , and no isposition l to we come criticism from without . Hence had al l arisen a tendency to unre ity and forma ism . The long pe ace di d not spu r th e Navy to progress P li l ff or change . o tica embitterments a ected it li i s adversely, and the m ted use of the fleet had cau ed l its importance not to be rea iz ed . We were sub si di z i ng fore ign soldiers to fight for causes that were x] OFFICERS AND SHIPS

l e on y in part our own , and money and interest wer

di verted from the naval service . The breath of li fe and the inspiration of commanding minds was

wanting , and no standard existed of conduct nor l i r l k a prevai ing spirit of honour to d ect all men a i e . li S u erb 1 740 Some captains , ke Hervey of the p in ,

- were brutal , others were self seekers , and a few were men to whom patriotic loya lty to their chi efs and to ’ a the nation s interests made no appe l . There was di corruption in administration , and the con tions of

pay resulted in fraud upon the men , and bad and a l insufficient food , and harsh tre tment fil ed the cup

Ou r hi s ps were inferior to those of the French , 1 71 9 as was proved in the war . In the Navy Board laid down a scale of dimensions whi ch proved a bar S l to progress , compelling hipwrights to observe forma u l S a d i r es , while the French and p niar s were mak ng a m ny advances . Admiral Knowles wrote to the Admiralty in 1 745 tha t ou r 70 - gu n shi ps were little 5 2 superior to the French ships of guns , and there a were bitter complaints th t our ships were crank , so that in blowing weather the lower - deck gu n ports u l b e Th co d not opened . e shi ps were also weak in l W their scant ing , which was a serious defect in inter ds weather, and they were too light in broa ide fire . l t F ee s , moreover , were used in a manner that con ff di tributed to ine ective action . To scuss tactics ROYAL NAVY

is impossible here , but the vigorous attack favoured ll was Of by Monk , De Ruyter and Tourvi e out favour , wa s and caution had taken its place . There no con a n li a s fa r centration on y part of the ne , and as waS va n possible ship Opposed to ship from to rear . u a We o ght not , however , to conclude th t this rigid system was a lwa ys due to a reluctance to push thi ngs fini to a sh . It sometimes arose from a reluctance a a to accept risks . There was gre t fear th t the end b e a n d e i of the line might doubled on , to for stall th s action the practice was to be ar down rapidl y together in order to bring the whole fleet into a ction a s soon as possible . The condi tions which have been suggested bore evil fruit in some of the events that followed . By 1 743 the internationa l weathercock had veered a r Of h ad round . The W the Austrian Succession a h a d a broken out . Sp in entered the continent l wa r a n d France was unofficia lly aidi ng her against l ri the Austrians in Italy . Before F eury , the f end di a was d th e of England , ed , treaty signe between two countries for joint operations , but war between them had not been declared when Mathews met a l off a 1 44 7 . the lies Toulon in Febru ry , Mathews ’ is described as Il Furibondo in Horace Ma nn s a o correspondence with W lpole , but he was a go d , O though not a brilliant fficer , and no coward .

Le stock - h as , his rear admiral , been pictured in x] MATHEWS AND LESTOCK u n f a n u avour ble colours by historians . He was li a conci atory , austere in comm nd , restless as a w a di n . subor ate , ith few friends C mpbell says he ” a n u l i a was artf , vindictive d sciplinari n , and Beatson a sserts tha t he and Mathews bore each ” a a other most r ncorous hatred . Thus the con di ti on s a a a n d i s were not f vour ble to success , it ’ worth while to note also that Math ews s age was

- Lestock sixty seven , and that of not much less , while Nelson wa s only forty a t the Nil e and forty a seven at Tr falgar . The allied French and Spani sh squadrons left

u l - 1 9 To on , with twenty seven sail , on February th ,

a - ni wi and M thews , with twenty ne ships , came up th a Les tock them three d ys later , but was several n a a miles to windwa rd a d to the re r . He m de all di d ff sail to join , but not enter e ectively into the S action . The ailing Instructions had given sanc s tion to his aloofness , and the Fighting In tructions permitted him to ma ke no u se of his ships i n a support of the Admir l . The signal for the line of b a ttle was flying when the S igna l to enga ge wa s a a n d u l O m de , he co d not bey the latter without dis ' va n B erwi ck obeying the former In the , in the , was Captain Edwa rd Hawke the precursor of — Nelson who compelled the Spa nish ship Poder to strike . In the centre , where some captains were ’ a Le s tock s a a sh ken by in ction , were several gall nt AL A OH ROY N VY [ .

i capta ns , and amongst them Edward Cornwall i n M arlborou h 22 the g , who fell fighting with of his u dl men . The allies were ro ghly han ed , but the action di d not plac e either the di scipline or the i intell gence of the Navy in a favourable light, and a M thews relinquished the pursuit . The cank er a of a long peace had r vaged it . The business s s ended in a erie of courts martial , in which

Mathews was condemned to be cashiered , because li Le stoc k he had not pursued the al es , while , who O l u r l had correctly bserved regu ations , was hono ab y ” AS i . acqu tted to the captains , several of them d di were awarde sentences accor ng to their deserts . There were other incidents a t the time which e e ll show d the state into which the Fle t had fa en . Happily this was the dark shadow that preceded North u m berla nd 74 the dawn . The , , was lost through u n offi cerlik e i the conduct of her capta n , Watson , 1 44 a who was ki lled May 8th in 7 . Capt in Elton of An les ea 44 f 22 the g , , suf ered the same fate on April n d n ext ear di in in the y , after rashlyand sastrouslyengag g hi a French privateer , to w ch his ship struck . Con Sir fiden c e was lost . When Charles Hardy left the a t sea 1 744 French under De Rochambeau in , the Admiralty brought out from his retirement Sir John

al ch en - fiv B , at the age of seventy e, a veteran of ll ’ King Wi iam s wars , who drove the French to port , and , as he returned , perished with his flagship , the x1 ] ANSON AND THE NEW SPIRIT 77

r o Vi cto y and over a thousand men , in a great st rm 20th in the Channel , on October .

CHAPTER XI

D E HE RE E ERA E ANS ON AN HAW K . T G N T D NAVY

THE declin e which was noted in the last chapter i as preced ng the dawn , forms a strange feature of naval history , though one not inscrutable , and it does not stand alone , for we shall find the same di nfl sastrous i uences operating later on . But before the close of the War of the Austrian Suc 1 748 cession in , a new leaven was at work , which was beginni ng to lift the Navy to a height then u n u l paralleled , though it co d not save it from the colossal failure associated with the name of Byng . An son and Hawke were the men of the new mould An ni son the great teacher , orga zer and administrator , A and Hawke , whom dmiral Mahan has aptly de as scribed the spirit of the regenerated Navy . An son h ad shown great vigour in dealings with pirates on the coast of South Carolin a and in other was u i matters , and , when a commodore req red to proceed against the Spanish shi pping on the West A was merican coast, he selected as one of the fore of most seamen the time . It has been said of him ROYAL NAVY

a a that he was unch nge ble of purpose , crafty of in in a counsel , triumph most sober , f ilures of ” a m a n m e m or endurance beyond mort l . In his able circumnaviga tion he had with him a band of h men who were fit to be comrades of a ero , men who h a d k a Le stock s no inship with the M thews , and Cen tu rion others of their kind . With his flag in the , 60 Glou ces ter 5 0 , he had in his company the , , S vern 5 0 a a n d a e , , and three sm ller vessels , set s il 1 8 te 1 740 s a on the th of Sep mber , , short of e men , a n d a 5 00 e i n h ving Chelsea p nsioners his ships , instead of the young soldiers who were to have a S . r v formed p rt of his company cu y broke out , a a n d n and bad we ther , bad food i sufficient clothing , ff e l a a ffl with the e ect of p sti enti l climates , icted his a r s s a te squ dron g ievou ly . The ships ep ra d in the a Le S storms , some p ssing through Maire trait and a a n d Cen tu rion some round C pe Horn , when the reached Juan Fernandez she h a d only 200 men a live 400 h a a out of , and most of t em were inc pacit ted by a n d a wa s too disease debility . The squ dron weak a a a a n d to do nything against Pan m , Anson , having a n d refitte d his ships , encouraged his officers men , a and determined to cross the P cific . There he intercepted the great Acapulco ga lleon on her way i a to Manila . Th s vessel , being c rried to Macao for sale , proved to be worth more than and was the richest prize of the time .

ROYAL A N VY [ CH .

3rd 1 747 i the May , , he wrought an mportant succes s i n l Lou i s master y fashion . The capture of b ou rgi in Cape Breton by a Colonial expedition convoyed by 1 746 di Commodore Warren in , and danger in In a , h ad r a f s stung the F ench into gre t ef ort , and De la Jon u iere to q was to carry a strong force America , and a a G detach C ptain de S int eorges , also with a strong i dr . o force , to Ind a Both squa ons sailed t gether, in all i a r fourteen vessels , includ ng Indi men , with t ans l ports and merchant vesse s , and they were to separate A at sea . nson , with sixteen vessels , was to intercept ilf l i u the squadrons , and by sk u handl ng he bro ght them to action just as they were parting company . nl He was in great superiority , for o y nine of the

Frenchmen were fit to lie in a line against him . f a An son formed no line o b ttle , but ordered a general l chase . The French fought most gal antly , and n i Ofli c ers i fl cted serious loss upon us in and men , i was but the v ctory complete , six sail of the lin e and four of the French Indi a Company ’s shi ps n a bei g t ken , though many of the merchantmen escaped . Thus a single action in European waters near home prevented reinforcements reaching two — di s tant quarters of the world an example of the i all pervadi ng nfluence of sea power . c The French , indeed , were unable to prote t their e m i com merce at sea , and serious cono c resu l ts

ll . a in J 1 74 fo owed Captain Thom s Fox, une , 7, x1 ] THE NEW LEAVEN AT WORK

a commanding small squadron , scattered the French a n m i a convoy from S Do ngo , and c ptured forty a n d eight prizes . The war had become world wide , from 1 744 onward small squadrons were sent to di e m In a , where the cont st for power and co merce a i was incre sing . Very little was accompl shed there a a to our s tisf ction , and even when Boscawen went — — out one of the new race of offi c ers with the most u l r powerf squadron ever seen in those wate s , ten a u l s il of the line and five smaller vessels , he co d do a i little , bec use the sold ers failed him in the siege of Pondi cherry and he himself had no experience as a a gener l ashore . ’ The la st important event of the war wa s Hawke s ’ i i a I Ete n du er br ll nt action with De e, on the 1 4 4 A 25 O 1 7 7. 0 th of ctober , convoy of mer c h a n tm en for the West Indies was about to leave

Rochelle , and was to reach the destination after the a hu rricane se son . The French admiral had his Ton na n t di 80 s flag in the , a splen d vessel of gun , a t i we h ad u il superior to ny h ng yet b t , and with him , to protect the large convoy , were seven other

’ 64- s di a ; ships of the line , and a gun Ea t In am n a Hawke , whose conduct had shone brilli ntly against ’ Math ews s the spiritless background of action , was now a rea r - admiral and had fourteen shi ps with i f v u s him , all n erior in indi id al trength to the

Frenchmen .

L ROYAL NAVY [ OH .

The admiral repe ated th e success of Ans on in the same way . When the strength of ’ ’ L Eten du re h ad é s squadron been made out , a general chase was ordered , and there followed a ’ r desperate conflict , in which Hawke s ships we e d much injured . The French a miral defended his an d c fu a n d hi s a convoy nobly suc ess lly , c ptains ’ L Ete n du ere w fought with great gallantry . as hi s outnumbered , and six of eight ships were ‘ th e captured , much wrecked by our fire , but T n na n t u l o was too powerf to be overcome , and broke I é N i n tr ide . ott n ha m away with the p The g , Captain i t dn Philip Saumarez , and the sh ps of Cap ains Ro ey ls and Saunders , both to become famous admira , r l pursued , and Sauma ez was kil ed . The French merchantmen escaped , but without convoy , and many of them were captured by our cruisers on n approaching their desti ation , for Hawke had despatched a swift sl oop to give tidings of their coming . Hawke has be en styled the prec ursor of ” l o e f Ne s n , and betw en these two great o ficers nl there was certai y some kinship of temperament . Nelson was possessed with a singleness of purpose ’ in pursui ng his country s good that made h i m dl l a l regar ess of se f , and c re ess of prize money , which was the reward of the service of many . The same characteri stics are found in Hawke who x1 ] THE PRECURSOR OF NELSON might have detached some of hi s ships to deal with hi s s the convoy , but preferred to keep quadron together for the purpose of defeating the stri king force of the enemy . I have nothing so much at heart as the faithfu l di scharge of my duty ; thi s s ll ha ever be my utmost ambition , and no lucre of profit or other views , shall induce me to act other i As s ff w se . to my elf it is a matter of indi erence if ‘ l to me whether, I fight the enemy , they shou d wi i come out , th an equal number, one sh p more hi ” or one s p less . If they can by any means be ll G ’ if es . d troyed , it sha be done For od s sake , l you shou d be so lucky as to get sight of the enemy , et l g as c ose to them as possible . These sayin gs ’ m i l of Hawke s ght have been said by Ne son , and ill they ustrate the character of the great seaman , whose comman ding powers as a sea officer were yet to be shown in the glorious action of Quiberon Bay . Both nations had suffered disa strous losses to their commerce , but the advantage , to the extent h of rested wit England . We had entered upon the war badly, for the Navy had fallen from its a if l high est te , and an enemy had had a powerfu ill u s fleet at sea , it would have gone very with . e A n But , before the war clos d , nso , Hawke and s h ad n other , added lustre to our naval an als .

La - B onfils r l pey rouse , the F ench nava historian , ’ di L Eten d u é re states that after the saster to , the 6 —2 L H ROYA NAVY [ O .

a s s French fl g di appeared from the ea . Privatee rs a a a a made few prizes , and they lmost lw ys fell into a a s ea English h nds . British n val forces passed the

al . i without riv s And yet th s sea power , which r a s might have seized F ench and Sp nish colonie , made few conquests from want of unity and per sistence in the directions given .

- - l The inconclusive Peace of Aix la Chapelle (Apri , ' e left many questions uns ttled , and gave f the promise of uture trouble . Practically it left the situation unchanged . France and England reli nquished the conquests they had made during the war , and France abandoned the cause of the u Stuarts . Such a concl sion was perhaps inevitable a r after the inconclusive character of the n val st uggle . h a d a a a a S h ad There been milit ry defe t bro d , a tuart l a anded on the co st of Scotland . and the hopes of ac i i a the J ob tes ran h gh . Exhaustion had f llen upon a e the nations , and they h sten d to make peace . In l a effect it was on y truce . Were the fortunes of the New World to be moulded by Englishmen or Frenchmen ' Was Indi a to be attached to the dominions of Engla nd or Fra nce Thes e were the was s questions which the coming war to ettle , thus shaping the destiny of mankind . CHAPTER XII

’ THE S EVEN Y EARS W AR AN D W ORLD D OMI N I ON

’ E 1 75 6 TH Seven Years War , dating from , began h a d tu ally in the previous year . There been no a re l peace , for no ferment had perturbed the world a by which we had not been stirred . The Ch nnel , O a i a a the ce n , the Med terrane n , Indi , the North a n d American coast , the West Indies , all these regions were , or became , the scenes of strife . Inevita bly we cannot here describe a world - wide Ou r a conflict . purpose must be r ther to indicate di the general rection and character of the war , to touch upon some salient features , and to arrive at a n understa ndi ng of certain lessons . A s Men of progressive mind , of the mould of n on a n d a Hawke , did not view the appro ch of war with W misgiving . They were in conflict ith enormous di u l ffic ties at home , in their work , and there were some things in the camp of the enemy which they , di d l or some of them , not know or fully rea ize . It was not a system originated in pe ace that was to be tested by the war . In the school of fighting the a reform of the fighting service beg n . In the lessons of the fighting the need of better di scipline had been n o discerned . There must be more fa ilures like ROYAL NAVY

Le s toc k that of Mathews and . Thenceforth , under W a r the revised Articles of , he who , through cowar i i or di sa flecti on l e i d ce , negl gence , fai ed to r l eve or assist a k nown friend in view to the utmost of h is power was adjudged , without alternative , to have merited th e pen al ty of death . The uniform first established for ofli cers in 1 748 was not to b e di s u d was i hono re , and the ferocity that d splayed in the treatment of Byng was the grim measure of the asto ni shment and indignation of the G overnment i c and the service at th s new instan e of incapacity . ’ Anson s work h ad included the givi ng of a new u l e al i e i i mp s to nav arch t cture and construct on , and though the dockyards were still in a sad state i i of disarray , they were better adm n stered . The u manning of the Navy was the most serio s difficulty , and extraordi nary efforts were made to procure n men by the press rigorously applied , by bou ties ,

- d and even by accepting gaol bir s , and practically — i i to hold the rabble in awe , the Marines or ginat ng ’ in the Duke of York an d Al bany s Maritime Regi ment — of Foot in 1 666 were pl aced upon a permanent 1 75 5 footing in at the outbreak of the war . The tr ouble began in North America in that r lli l year . The F ench were expe ng our co onists ll i is s from the va eys of the Oh o and M sis ippi , and l th e Fort Duquesne bui t at fork of the former river , o l e i on the sp t whence the co onists had b en dr ven , was

ROYAL NAVY

para lysed by di sease on the other side of the a l Atlantic . Hawke had f i ed , and the French were l s m once more p anning an inva ion , this ti e under a a B ell ei sl comm nd of M rshal e . A shameful panic a e thereupon demor liz d the land . Every French ’ was a a a n d a port bustling with rm ments , Newc stle s n gover ment , denounced by Pitt , was ready to import s both Dutch and Hessian to defend us . The sea

ward vocation of the country was forgotten . The a a cl mours of the merchants , wrote Horace W lpole ,

a l - sometimes re sonable , always se f interested , ter rifi ed s a n d to the Duke of Newca tle , , while , pre i L d vent their outcries in the C ty of ondon , he mince n u i a n d the navy of Engla d into cr sers convoys , ’ every other service was neglected . Newcastle s di d n fears not i fect Anson , but it is now impossible properly to allocate responsibility for the distribution e u l of the fl et , though pop ar clamour seems to have a influenced it . Cert in it is that the French were i m not ready at Brest , that the invasion was an l a c possibi ity , and that too l rge a for e was maintained Min in the Channel , while the position at orca , where G eneral Blakeney was calling for reinforcements was neglected . The resu l t of all this was that French Du e troops under command of the de Richelieu , convoyed by that very able se a - offi c er the Ma rqui s ali s son ié re a de la G , landed in Minorc , where Mahon THE PENALTY OF BYNG was blockaded by sea and land when Byng arrived with a squadron of thirtee n sail . He well knew that sooner or later the place would fa ll u n less men

a h ad a . could be l nded , and he no men av ilable Therefore he had no choice but to bring De la G ali s s on iere 20th to action , which he did on the May ,

1 75 6 e . . The engagement has b en much discussed wa s a n d It inconclusive , though the French lost three ships , the main body escaped without serious a d mage . There had been great bungling in the a hi a h a d h ndling of our s ps , the n val fight not been a fi fought to nish , and then no help was extended a to the bele guered citadel of Mahon . Instead , on a wa r a c the advice of council of , th t resour e of a a a we k men , Byng left Minorc to its f te . and went G l a a u l to ibra t r lest an ttack sho d be delivered there . l b owl di n a There fol owed a of in g ation in Engl nd , a n d a cry went up for a victim . Hawke had gone a n d out to replace Byng , who came home , a court a a 2n d 1 75 7 h i m m rti l on the February , , found u i to g ilty of negl gence , and condemned him death the onl y punishment authorized under the new

a - Articles of War . Byng was shot on the qu rter deck of the M ona rqu e in Portsmouth ha rbour on the 1 4th of a wa s a M rch . It not without a p ng that the members of the court had condemned a brother Offi cer to dea th ; ‘ they would will in gly have spa red him the tra gic pena lty of hi s failure ; but the service rebelled ROYAL NAVY a gainst the type of leadership whi ch the u nfor l tu n ate admiral had exemp ified . It must be observed that events i n Europe were largely subsidiary or ancilla ry to the stru ggle for New Al dominion in the World . so that the system of controlling an enemy by close blockade had not at that time been perfecte d as it was late r m i c i s u fli cin by St Vincent . Inter ttent wat h ng not g, two several expeditions from Brest and Rochefort a n d s i n one from Toulon got to the we tward , g vi g the French commander - in - chief eighteen sail of the i c line and five fr gates . Pitt had suc eeded New r e castle . and fo med proj cts for the capture of L r in ouisbourg and Quebec , whe eby French power c i North Ameri a might be destroyed . Accord ngly A Boscawen , conveying mherst with troops , fif s ail lif in a hundred and ty tran ports , s ed for Ha ax , J 1 75 8 L was and in uly , , ouisbourg taken , the French il u r d u loss beingfour sa of the line b ne and one capt red . Just a year l ater Vice - Admiral Saunders and G eneral — Wolfe one of the happiest ill ustrations of complete understandin g between the two services in all our l — 1 7 r anna s left Spithead , and on the th Februa y , 1 75 9 ll n r , Quebec fe before the dyi g he o in an action i s all li which glorious in our mi tary story , though the es sential service of the Fl eet is too often over a a looked by the histori n . The m stery of the ’ s S r di eaman s art which aunde s splayed at that time ,

ROYAL NAVY a l nd , and Hawke was burned in effigy even on the da a very y when he won imperishable f me . But the first blow was stru ck on the 1 8th of August by a a a Boscawen , in very fine action , equally g ll nt on both sides , in which De la Clue was defeated , and a ll e on flans hop of his joining C came to an end . A large body of troops for the intended invasion ’ under command of D Ai gu i ll on had bee n muste red a r a s round Quiberon Bay , whe e tr nsport were ready , a n d Con fla n s was to a n d issue from Brest , escort e e them to the int nded plac of disembarkation . to a Hawke had been driven Torb y by a great gale , r a se a 1 4th a n d the F ench admir l put to on November . The wind that favoured him als o enabled Hawke to a Du fl et . g away from Torbay Capt in , with a small r h a d e s squad on , b en watching the transport in

Quiberon Bay , and only j ust escaped on the appear Con flan s ance of , who had decided to remain in s the Bay , with the tran ports , until another gale a di d shou l d blow Hawke from his st tion . He not e know what manner of man Hawke was , nor for see the chara cter of the attack . Qui beron Bay lies about 1 5 0 miles south - east U from shant , protected from the west and south u i u l a west by the Q beron penins , Belle Isle , and a the rugged Cardinal rocks . with other d ngerous l l n r rocks and shoa s , wel k own to the F ench , but ’ little to Englishmen in Hawke s time . It was on 'II ] HAWKE AT QUIBERON BAY

20th the of November , with a gale from the westward l Con fla n s fla b owing , that Hawke sighted in his g o i l R al di a a S le o . ship , the y , roun ng the C rdin ls a D rkness was approaching , when Hawke in the Ro a l G eor e 1 00 y g , guns , came swooping from the ” Con flan s west , and did not suppose that his adversary would venture hi s fleet in those perilous a a t l and uncharted w ters , and attack head ong speed , a r hi m in a he vy sea , with the wind d iving towards hi s h a n d a lee shore . But Hawke knew s ips men ,

li - a and wha t risks he could run . His own sai ng m ster a a wa s remonstr ted , but the Admir l not to be held

a . a b ck You have done your duty , Sir , he s id , in showing the da nger you ha ve now to comply a n d l a R a l with my order y me alongside the S olei l oy . a Thus was the battle gained , one of the most desper te a ever fought by British fleet . The French ships

e - fir e were scatter d , many of them shattered by gun , k S l n . some captured , others driven on hoa s , and two su ’ a a i a a n d W Con fl n s fl gsh p went shore was burned , ith a a b a nother . Sever l other ships ran up the y , threw a their guns overboard , and escaped into the Vil ine a river , where they remained for many months . H wke hi s lost two ships on the rocks , but victorywasglorious i a and decisive , and , night hav ng f llen , he anchored the i a fleet , being on a part of the coast among sl nds and shoals of which we were totally ignorant , without a n d a pilot , as was the greatest part of the squadron , ROYAL NAVY [on

l l ’ ll b owing hard on a ee shore . Hawke s name wi ever be immortalized by his magnificent victory over l ofl men , the stormy seas and the peri ous rocks e Quiberon , whereby invasion was averted once mor . was r i The victory the T afalgar of the t me , without precedent a n d without a suc ces s or for forty years to come . 1 762 The Peace of Paris , November , , did not content the country , but it marked our triumph . s a n In North America , by ces ion from France d a a Spain , we obt ined an empire embracing C nada and all the present United States east of the Mi ssis n sippi . We retai ed Tobago , Dominica , St Vincent , G s n di i and renada , in the We t I es ; and in Ind a r a the F ench milit ry establishment was given up . a Louisiana passed to Sp in .

CHAPTER XIII

THE W AR OF AMERICAN IND EPEND ENCE

’ I T h as been sa id of the Seven Years War that while it continued the trade of England increased a n d r every year , that such national p osperity , o during a long , costly and bl ody war had never before been shown by any people in th e world . The ll ni a French Navy had been practica y an hil ted , and the main objection to the peace was that it left to

ROYAL NAVY ff e ected a wonderful change for the better . This was L the work of seamen , but under the rule of ord 1 771 ni s Sandwich , from onward , admi tration de c a a a n a y ed . Politic l corruption d jobbery ag in worked their evil end , and money was voted which l u was never app ied to the p rpose intended . Thus , while in many respects the Navy was in a bette r a n d posture for fighting , there were serious defects , 1 778 this at a time when , in , it was to be matched e e 1 779 with the regenerat d Navy of France , alli d in S 1 780 with a respectable panish force , and in with Al a the small but efficient navy of the Dutch . re dy a the admir ls on the American station , where Howe Ju l 1 776 assumed command in y , , had not been given a a force sufficient to de l with the situation . Americ n privateers were ravaging commerce and cutting off a or menacing supplies , with the practical counten nce c a of Fran e and Sp in . In short we were about to be presente d with a situation analogous to that of S pain in former times , with her great disjointed a wa r empire , in which extended throughout the world . u r o h e The surrender of B goyne at Sarat ga , on t 1 h 1 777 l 7t of October , , was the spark that kind ed the 1 778 ni flame , and in February , , the French recog sed d Uni the indepen ence of the ted States , and in March As l e . the war b gan with the ast war , so here we can deal onl y with certain points of the conflict . The 'II I ] W AR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 97

z i l sei ure of Pond cherry , and the arriva of Sir Edward u a i H ghes with eight s l of the line , followed three years later by that great French officer Suffren , di a marked the new conflict for dominance in In . In wa s nf homewatersthe situation u avourable , andwhen ’ D Orvilli ers Keppel encountered the French , under 27th Ju l off Ushant , in equal strength , on the of y , an inconclusive a ction followed in which neither fleet c e flete suffered mu h damage . This performance was followed by a very acri monious wrangle between Sir a W h o a Keppel and Hugh P lliser, was ccused of i n a hav ng preve ted his chieffrom g ining a victory , and Sa ndwich encouraged and permitted Palliser to bring a a Keppel before a court marti l . This f ct is mentioned in order to S how how politics were influencing a n d e undermining discipline , as they too oft n do . ’ D Estain Meantime g, with twelve sail of the line a n d a and four frigates , had crossed the Atlantic , p off 1 2 J l peared Sandy Hook on the th of u y , finding i ' s a . Howe at a great d advant ge But , characteristically , a as a French officer , he withdrew rather th n run great risks , though the stroke might have j ustified bold r h ad ente prise . Howe pursued a masterly defensive , a and the French officer , on his p rt , showed no dis a s position to attack , so that the n val event of the u was s mmer were inconclusive . Howe relieved by

Byron and came home , with his brother the general , resentful at the want of support that had been given

L . R . N . 7 ROYAL NAVY

to him during the trouble with the colonists . He hi s had been deceived into command , and he was il ” deceived wh e he retained it . Political factions and personal jealousies were undermining the spiri t of the Navy , and there was a saying that if a naval f b e o ficer were to roasted , another officer could always ” ’ a b e found to turn the spit . S ndwich s profligate rul e had di sgusted and in some ways demoraliz ed s wa s will n the ervice . Howe , he said , un i g to trust the little reputation he had earned by forty ’ years service , his personal honour and everything l e se he held dear , in the hands of men who had i neither the abil ty to act on their own judgment , nor the integrity and good se nse to follow the advice ” n of others , who might k ow more of the matter . So completely wa s the Navy sa crificed to party i ofli cer that Barrington , a very d stinguished , ” e refused to take command of a fl et . Who , u l f he wrote , wo d trust himsel in chief command with such a set of scoundrels as are now in office These facts S how tha t there existe d a very Serious al weakness in the service at a critic time . — Howe was succeeded by Byr on known as Fou l Weather Jack from his ceaseless conflicts — with the elements and there was much inconclusive o u man e vring , with the capture of islands in the West

Indies . It must not be supposed that the reluctance ’ of D Estain g and other French admirals to engage

L ROYA NAVY [ OH .

c brothers . After this a tion Rodney put his fleet a s a o through eries of strenuous m n euvres , and a a o G twice came g in int touch with De uichen , who , having the wind of him , declined to be brought a n d e a to action , the op rations rem ined inconclusive . Th e press u re of the situation was now telling a l a al r a s . r he vi y upon our n v esource The c ptu e , by a n d a 6 3 s di a French Sp nish force , of ail of In amen , a e tr nsports and merchantmen , int nded for the West

di a . In es , showed how commerce was men ced When s a the Dutch ranged them elves ag inst us , the trade in Se a to b e a n d a the North had protected , squadron of old vessels under comma nd of Sir Hyde Pa rker

a a - a Vineg r P rker was eng ged in the duties , and h a d a sanguina ry but inconclus ive battle at the a 5 th u u 1 78 1 Dogger B nk ( A g st, ) with the Dutch Zou tm a n ac fl under , e h eet fighting ship to ship in the old style . But the rea l scene of interest was ac ross the A tlantic , where the French were using their fleets so intelligently tha t ultima tely the independence i s e of the Un ted States was establi h d . Yet things G e mi ght have gone otherwise . The Comte de rass a was sent out from Brest with great armament . There was no blockade to prevent hi s issuing from a nd the port . So urgent insistent were the demands on the Navy that home waters were deprived of r an adequate force of ships of the line . The e can XIII] be little doubt that we l a y under the shadow of i a A d s ster . When dmiral Darby with a powerful force wa s in the vicinity of De G ras se off the south a e coast of Irel nd , he did not striv to bring him to

h a d O . action . He other bjects in view Yet if

De G rasse had been destroyed there and then , the history of North America might have been di fferently a if G an written . On the other h nd De rasse had n ih il ated G a u l e Darby , ibralt r wo d not have b en s di fo r th e relieved , a quadron and In amen Cape G off of ood Hope might have been cut , and a rein forcement of shi ps and men might not ha ve reached the West Indi es . It wa s not ea sy for Sa ndwich to find a successor ” ’ n to Vinegar Parker , who had been Rod ey s second in command . They had not agreed , and when Parker h a d wa s u returned it in high d dgeon . Samuel Hood ou r was chosen , one of ablest sea officers , whom l Rodney knew wel , but a stern critic who had little d a ofli cers of a mir tion for his chief , or for some other of the time . He thought G raves cunning and i n o competent , though posterity d es more justice to fli r a o c e . ll a th t To Hood , Rowley was si y , Pigot nonentity , and Douglas feeble to the verge of ’ as imbecility . But time went on Hood s chief wa s b e contempt for his own chief , who , it must m a n a a confessed , being a much emb rrassed by w nt of money , interested himself vastly in the huge SRO AL A H Y N VY [ C .

o b oty at Saint Eustatius , which the Dutch declara i h t on of war had placed at his mercy , but of w ich a large pa rt was ca ptur ed by the French under La wa Motte Picquet on its y home . The a rriva l of De G rasse did not bring the u l s r li res t the F ench had looked for . He dec ned to be entangled in an enga gement with Hood on the l st 1 78 1 wa s of May , , and , as customary , damaged i a the English sh ps in masts and sp rs , reducing some La of them to temporary impotence . ter on he eluded a a G i f . c and b ffled Rodney lso raves , re n or ed by a Hood , failed against the French at the Ches peake , and Cornwa llis surrendered with his a rmy at York of U town . Thus the independence the nited States was won . But the Navy could yet deal hard blows at the o W as enemy . While Ho d outmatched in the West K em enfelt 1 5 0 U a Indies , p , miles west of sh nt , practically a nnihilate d a force which was to have K em enfelt joined De G rasse . p is best known to 800 posterity because he was lost , with souls , by the a e a i Ro a l c psizing of his old and rott n fl gsh p , the y 2 h 1 82 G eor e 9t 7 . g , at Spithead on the of August ,

Hi s sword was in its s eat h h , Hi s fin ers eld th e en g h p , en Kem enfelt wen t down Wh p , it twi ce ou r u n dr ed m e W h f h n .

a u di e It was well th t he sho ld so , for the veteran

AL ROY NAVY [ OH .

ir a n d i l S Samuel Hood , four other sh ps of the ine a e were taken . Much more might h ve b en done . Hood told Rodn ey tha t twenty shi ps might ha ve been s captured , and would him elf have liked to take up a a a the ch se . Come , we h ve done very h ndsomely ”

is . as it , said Rodney There was nothing in him of Nelson ’s fiery resolve to destroy the enemy where i l . S r a ever he cou d be found Ch rles Douglas , a a n d ll c ptain of the fleet , Cornwa is and other captains a ll deplored the failure to reap the full fruit of the a victory . Nelson afterw rds expressed the same

View . We conclude this record of the W a r of American ’ Independence with a reference to Howe s magni ficent G a 1 782 relief of ibralt r , long besieged , in , and to the five a ctions which Suffren fough t with Hughes a di d in Indi n waters . In none of them he take an e English ship , nor did he succ ed in his main object , but Frenchmen dwell with legitimate pride upon hi s hi ac evements , and we cannot but recognize that S u flren was a a a a n d re lly gre t man a fine seaman , i who inspired his fleet , and brought it with n an ace of victory . We had been confronted in the war by the triple a a S a n d alli nce of Fr nce , pain Holland , at a time when these powers were not embroiled in any con tin en tal a n d i complications , we were at the same t me li trying to subjugate our rebel ous colonists . The xrv] RESULTS OF INS UFFICIENCY

wa s l French Navy in a highly efficient state , whi e a our Na vy h ad suffered rel tive decline . The cor u l ruption of the House of Commons , the vir ent e a a a bitt rness of p rtiz ns , dissension in the C binet and i i faction in the country , comb ned w th the corrupt h a d administration of Sandwich , undermined the

S pirit of the service . We were outmatched in

a n d . numbers , unable to defend what we had won

But , though we lost the American Colonies we l consolidated e sewhere our dominions , and the Navy emerged the better from the struggle, which ended 1 783 a a a in , and lready on the p thw y to the period of its greates t splendour .

CHAPTER XIV

E R E H RE L . R J E TH F NC VO UTION HOW E . P O CTS OF INVA S ION AN D THE MUTINIES

a e a PITT , being a Pe ce Minist r , strove h rd to with sta nd the tempest tha t was driving u s rapidl y towards wa s war with Revolutionary France , but swept into the vortex when the Revolutionary a rmy invaded a a wa s Holl nd , and the declar tion of hostilities a 1 93 a 7 . s delivered in Febru ry , The rmy establi h ments had been allowed to S ink to the lowest degree of a n d weakness inefficiency , but fortunately the Navy continued upon the high level to which it h a d been AL A OH ROY N VY [ .

its c raised . Throughout the long war offi ers , with few a exceptions , were men of high c pacity and courage and not seldom of brilliant attainments , and though a the fleet c rried within itself , on the lower deck , s eeds of di s a flec ti on which were to ripen in to mutiny e f four years lat r , its o ficers were able to lea d it an d a a u regenerate it , with the most adv nt geo s results n for the cou try and the world . For a number of years the miserable im pote nce of our efforts on land was f c , in ef ect , matched with an unbroken re ord of a success at se . The French Navy had been greatly demoraliz ed by the Revolution . The monarchy had left behind it the elements of a fine fleet in 75 ships with 6000 — — guns we had 1 1 5 shi ps with a bout 8700 guns but a a n d the docky rds were in a shocking state , bitter a n d a a a n d rancour , the memory of m ny h rdships di wrongs filled the ships with scontent or mutiny . f i s a a The old corps of o ficers had almost d ppe red . ’ Its members were either em igrés or had gone to the a ff h ad di s sc old , and with them gone the spirit of li n a c ip e . Their successors were men who gener lly received comm a nd because their ci vi sm e had been declared or tried , and they eagerly donned the c ca rde republican o . They were mostly drawn from a the merc ntile marine , the habits of the trader

’ a dhered to some of them , and many of them gained their first notions of naval tactics in the presence

ROYAL NAVY

was made fit for her duties . The advantage of coppering the ships had been fully recognized at the a n d a to beginning of the American War , m ny went l i a sea which wou d otherw se have rotted in h rbour .

- i n Three decked sh ps were built in increasi g numbers . The stra tegy of th e Admiralty and the G overn ment provided for the exertion of our na val power A chiefly in three regions of the world . In pril and Lo May , twenty sail , under command of rd Hood , l went to the Medite rranean . Before the c ose of the ' Sir J J i t year ohn erv s , the future Earl St Vincen — grea t s ea offi cer and stem disciplinari an departe d 7000 with four sail of the line , and troops under a G to comm nd of Sir C . rey , the West Indies where a n a L G M rti ique , S nta ucia , and uadeloupe were a wa s occupied , but the occup tion the work of th e di d ff soldiers , and chequered events not a ect the wa r results of the . e e In the Medit rranean , Hood , by agre ment with s o a n d i the Royalist , ccupied Toulon , the new garr son a S a i dm l lso included p n ards , Pie ontese and Neapo i

O - u l as tans . N counter revolution res ted , had been a expected , and the pl ce being menaced by attack wa s on the land side , it evacuated amid terrible a n d a e a scenes , Hood dep rt d , carrying way some a n d u French ships crowds of ref gees . Other ships

as . were destroyed , well as the arsenal At Toulon a l c Napoleon Bon parte , then a young artil ery offi er , XIV] FRENCH M ORAL RESTORED

for the first time set eyes upon the British fleet . a a As we all know , in the coming ye rs , to use a cl ssic

a - phra se those far dist nt , storm beaten ships , G upon which the rand Army never looked , stood ” n between it a n d the domi ion of the world . a a n d a In the Ch nnel oce n , where Howe was to a 1 793 wa s strike the first blow , the ye r uneventful , a s s for the French were yet powerles , though , under o a - J di ff c mm nd of Villaret oyeuse , extraor nary e orts a a t were made to prep re the main fleet Brest . When l 6th Ma 1 794 wa s a it put to sea on the y , , it in better sta te tha n any French squadron we met during the wa r a remainder of the . Meantime Admiral V n stab el h a d escaped from Brest, in the previous December , a to cross the Atl ntic , in order to convoy home a S dm a Ni ell huge fleet of grain hips , and A ir l y in a a April had lso got way to meet him . Howe di d not ma intain the close form of blocka de which is a Of a ssociated with the n me St Vincent . He had a n d di d not the same means , he not desire to keep L . to the French in Brest ike Nelson , he wished meet h a d them at sea . He orders to intercept the grain k convoy , but like old British admirals , he new that the thing tha t reall y ma ttered was to destroy the ’ ’ f Va n stab el enemy s fighting fleet , and in ef ect s convoy escaped him . The two flee ts were in S ight of one another on 28th the of May , and on that day and the next Howe ROYAL NAVY

made determined attacks on the French rear . On 28th Révolu ti on na i re 1 1 0 the the huge , guns , bore a the brunt , and having dam ged some of her assail n off l a ts severely , made to Brest . The fol owing two days were occupied in manoeuvring in light airs n G u and fogs , and on the morni g of the lorio s First ” J is r of une , the French were d cove ed ahead , on the lee - l bow , with twenty six sai , being one ship more than Howe had with his flag . We shall not describe the battle , much discussed as it has been . More its desirable it is to observe salient features . It was exem lifi ca ti on h e an p , in its igh st form , of the new s a a tactics of the fleet . An on and H wke , and C ptain ’ was l Ma th ews s Cornwall , who kil ed in action of 1 744 K em enfelt , had planted the seed , p had worked , Clerk of Eldi n (not a sea man) had written a book on the new tactics , and Rodney had broken the ’ 1 2 A 1 82 i 7 . enemy s l ne on the th of pril , But the — inspiration had come from Fra nce from the fleet a t — e we were to be from the teachings of P re Hoste , Vilh u et Mah é l a Bigot de Morogues , De , and de

Bourdonnais . EHowe revised the signals and removed the G J ” tactical fetters , and on the lorious First of une , ” a n lin e to made the action close , by be ri g down Z line with the object of breaking through at every t off r i par ij, cutting ret eat , and mak ng the enemy l u att e o t . fight the b l to the end He had the wind ,

ROYAL NAVY

i absurdity and a comedy . The futile exped tion of B a Hoche to Bantry y , engendered in strife , and dogged by misfortune , ended in perilous failure .

- J Morard Villaret oyeuse q uarrelled with Hoche , and G d s de alles was appointe , protesting that he posse sed an d a was none of the qualities necessary th t he old , ill l A and partially b ind . nother victory wrote the general , he is the very man for the business are h i m o if his eyes feeble we will see for . But b th Admir al and G eneral esca ped by a miracle from an u English purs ing ship , and were not with their friends when they la nded at Bantry- landed wi thou t a a a guine , a tent , or a horse to dr g their four useless to guns . The Frenchmen who stole back Brest were a a rs a e th nkful th t nothing wo e had h ppen d to them . There was a subsequent project of landin g a men in England , under the egis of the S t fleets — French , panish and Du ch for our former — ’ a llies were now against u s but Jervi s s splendid m a 1 4th triu ph off C pe St Vincent , on the of February , ’ followed by Duncan s great and not sufficiently 1 l th appreciated victory at Camperdown , on the of

O 1 797 . ctober , , put an end to the whole scheme It 1 798 was revived , however , against Ireland in , where b s the re ellion seemed to promise result , but such was the pressure of the Britishfleetthat the expedition had to be divided into six expeditions , of which five put to i an d e sea , two being utter fa lures two disast rs , while THE G REAT MUTINIES

l t on y one , that of Humbert , a tained an impotent

measure of success . hi di n We see , therefore , once again the Navy s el g ’ th e n Empire s heart , defeati g its enemies at sea , and i extend ng its sway , for this was the period in which we were enriched with the splendi d acquisitions G a n d of the Cape of ood Hope , Ceylon other places i won from the enemy . The Med terranean events b e shall dealt with in the next chapter .

But there is another side to the picture . The ff a seeds of disa ection which h ve been alluded to , u were now breaking into the evil growth of m tiny , an d 1 797 SO ll the year , which opened bri iantly, a a t th e became one of gloomy ch r c er for country . i a a n d n F nance was in a desper te condition , the Ba k a of Engl nd suspended its cash p ayments . In April lli the seamen at Spithead became openly rebe ous , i s f th e d smis ed their of icers , and hoisted red flag . an d Their grievances were many real , their demands were modera te and they mainta ined some of the forms di n a of scipli e . When their claims had been gr nted ,

with promise of an amnesty , the mutiny came to

an end . It broke out , however , with more menacing an d th e criminal features at the Nore , presenting e a a app ar nce of revolution , and causing the se men at Spithead to declare that the c onduct was a ” a s scandal to the n me of Briti h seamen . If it h a d n ot Ofli cers been for good and capable , and

L . R. N . 8 ROYAL NAVY [ OH .

a n d a chiefs like Howe St Vincent , the situ tion ’ a might h ve proved very dangerous . But Duncan s victory at Camperdown showed tha t the malady of wa s a n d a mutiny not really deep , th t the Navy was sou nd at heart after all .

CHAPTER XV

L H E E ERRA EA AN D TH E I LE NE S ON , T M DIT N N N . THE PEAC E OF AMIENS

THE di brilliant events in the Me terranean , which were made illustrious by the battle of the Nile , were contemporary with some of the occurrences that ha ve been described . There were two theatres wa r a a of Operations in the same , for Bon p rte , while e i n shaping his great Medit rranean policy , which l e wi vo ved the subjugation of the stat s of Italy , th a i a di splend d aspir tion towards dominion in In a , was still seekin g to weld i nto his combin ation S a i against us , the p n ards , the Dutch and the r Northern Powers . He e in the Medi te rranean we l a A a m em non 1 793 meet Ne son , c ptain of the g in , an ffi n ar i cu o cer not much k own at that time , nor p t arl n e l y well liked , but desti ed to b come the most s s pop u lar of captains and the greate t of admiral . The p rofitles s occupation of Corsica has obtained

L A ROYA N VY [ OH .

ff ha ve bee n written di erently . The Riviera road i m ass a b l e to would have been made p theFrench army , the splendid actions of Bona parte might never ha ve been fought , the whole history of Italy would have a n d a a u l been changed , prob bly Sp in wo d have kept aloof from the French alliance . J i di i m ervis replaced Hotham , and mme ately a parted new vigour to the squadron , but the Sp niards a 5 th 1 796 decl red war on the of October, , Corsica a n wa s a i bec me unte able and bandoned , and Adm ral G a n n i Man , who was at ibralt r , thi ki g an mpossible task had been imposed upon him , in orders received from Jervis that he should proc eed from G ibraltar a to join the flag at Elba , c me home instead , to the a exas peration of the Admir l . Thus the abandon a a a ment of the Mediterr ne n bec me necessary , so u a a n d nfortun te for us in its consequences , SO di a ” shonour ble to the dignity of England , said e Nelson , whose fleets are equal to m et the world l 1 4 in arms , and thus , too , the batt e of the th Feb ru ar 1 797 w s y , a fought off Cape St Vincent , instead of in the inl and sea . ’ Tha t famous St Val entine s Da y battle has been w many times des cribed . O ing to a signa l made by J a ervis , directing faulty tactical movement , it wou l d not have proved decisive if Nelson had not i r a d sobeyed the o der , and t ken upon himself to wear out of the line , and stand down to meet the Spani s h ST L ’ 1 797 xv] VA ENTINE S DAY ,

a l S a n ti s i m a Tri n ida d s admir in the , the large t ’ a l Ca ta i n hi . s p then float Ne son s ship , the p , was 74 a ni a , and after being eng ged with the Spa sh a a o l fl gship and others , c me int c ose action with S a n Ni cola s 84 S a n Jos e 1 1 2 the , , and the f, , both of hi a a i w ch were c ptured by bo rd ng , Nelson and his a comrades p ssing over from one ship to the other . Collingwood in the Excellent took a fine part in this di d r Cu lloden episode , as T oubridge in the , in the ’ a u l d a wa s l gre t res t , but the glory of the y Ne son s , and Jervis gladl y recogni zed the worth of such splendid di sobedi ence . The merit of the achieve ment wa s that Nelson h a d rea lized the small power S a ni of resistance possessed by the p ards , and knew l a . h ad a wh t risks he cou d run He s id , The

a ill - offi c ered Sp nish fleet is manned , and worse , a l o I f ncy . The resu t of the vict ry has al rea dy been indica ted . It defeated the combined purpose of S a the French and p nish fleets , and destroyed a ll di t n imme ate prospec s of invading E gland . It wa s on the 24th of Ju l y in the sa me year tha t Nelson lost hi s a a right arm in the ttack on Sant Cruz , Teneriffe , i an operation wh ch ended in failure . We come now to that remarka ble ill ustration of i a r the magination , the enterprise , the d ing and the a x moral cour ge of Bonaparte , the e pedition to 1 798 All hi s Egypt in . plans were laid during the a period when we had ab ndoned the Mediterranean , L H ROYA NAVY [ O . a n d when the pathway to Egypt a n d to hi s a mbitions a wa s a a in Indi lay open . It known th t great a t a n d armament was preparing Toulon , that the Spaniards had some twenty - five S hips ready for a n a t i St wa s enterprise Cad z . Vincent blockading a a the latter port , but detached Nelson , nticip ting a O the views of the Admir lty , to bserve Toulon . l n a l r Ne son , u fortun tely having with him on y th ee s i a n d a — ail of the l ne , three frigates sloop for the previous administration had not provided enough S hips and St Vincent coul d spa re no m oreg l ook ed i 1 nto Toulon on the 7th of May .

Then arose a gale in which his flagship , the a s a h wa an d Va n u a rd w di . S e s e g , sm sted tow d piloted by her consorts for shelter a n d re pair to S a n S a ni a a Pietro , rdi , while the three frig tes and the sloop had depa rted to G ibra lta r and were not a seen by Nelson for months . By extraordin ry Va n u a rd exertions , the g was refitted within four a e a off d ys , but when the thr e ships came gain Toulon , a a they found that the gre t French rmament , which B ru e s they had seen , had departed . Admiral y , with a a e twelve s il of the line , and a number of frig t s , a ac companied by cloud of transports , had put to 1 9 e h a d sea on the th , favour d by the wind that l off a a blown Ne son , and fter t king possession of G Ma lta and being joined by convoys from enoa , a n d a c h a d e Ajaccio Civit Ve chia , proceed d on his

ROYAL NAVY

The prese nce ‘ of the En gli sh had shadowed our ” iz e Den on hor on , wrot Vivant , who had gone ahead of the fleet in the Ju non ; when I remembered that three days before we had deplored the calms l a n d a that he d us back , th t without them we ’ l a a e e shou d h ve f llen amid the enemy s fl et , I vow d my self thenceforward to fata li sm and commended ” myself to the star of Bonaparte . It was realiz ed that Nelson might return at any r o rec i i hour , and therefore the t o ps were sent p p ta tel y ashore , while the squadron , unable to enter the port , and fearing the risk of going to Corfu , went i k B a nto Abou ir y , there to await the onslaught of i Nelson . Such was the invasion of Egypt , wh ch en ded in the destruction of a fleet and the surrender After hi s l of an army . g visit to Alexandria , Ne son , ill e u st s eking the French , had gone to Syrac se , and i s there , w th the persua ion of force , and a letter a i n i from Acton , the Ne politan Pr me Mi ster , had a li n e n n secured the revictu l g of his fl et , notwithsta di g a a wi i the Neapolit n tre ty th France . It was dur ng thi s l ong cruise that he i mparted to his captains ” a — i hi s band of brothers , as he c lled them his deas as to h i s plan of action on meeting the enemy at sea or at anchor . It was in the latter situation that l n e ir l B ru e s l i in Ne son fou d the fl et of Adm a y , y ng an irregu l ar line about three miles from the shore in shall ow water . The French fleet was nomi nall y xv] BATTLE OF THE NILE

f s uperi or to the English , but in ef ect it was not so , ’ because Nelson s shi ps were in a state of hard di s ci li n e a p , while the reverse was the c se with the

French . a 1s t s The b ttle began on the of August , j u t as the ’ l s u n touched the horizon . Nelson s p an was to il overpower the French van and centre , and, wh e G oli ath s e the , followed by four other ships, pa s d a hi ter inside the French line , r king the s ps with a rific Va n u a rd fire , Nelson in the g , followed a by sever l other ships passed outside . Thus by a tempest of fire the French van was crushed . A i e tremendous confl ct took place in the centre , wher wa s the French adm i ral (who wa s killed) in the Ori en t 1 20 Fra n kli n Ton n a nt , , with the and , both ’ 8o s B ellero hon an d M a es tic ff e . The p j su er d very e l i s vere y , but the French flagsh p blew up , a terrible disaster for the French . In this way the victory ’ In di Or i en t Ti m o . leon was won ad tion to the , the , ni being driven ashore , was burnt by her crew , and ne sail of the line were captur ed . Never in modern war G u l had there been a victory so complete . The i ’ la u m e Tell and G en ereu x were the only French lin e a s u b se ships th t escaped , and both of them were

l e s Ne son arriv d at Naple in a blaze of glory , resu lt of l ac in which had the j gp g him under a shadow , th e pe rson al rea sons for which must be sought in ROYAL NAVY

the biographies . It is impossible to regard the subse quent ha ndling of the fleet with much satis I f faction . a strong force had been left in the a i e r a a E stern Med t r ne n , the grip on the French army a e a in Egypt would h ve been tight r, and N poleon might not have returned . If the whole fleet had e e been concentrat d in the West rn basin , there a a B ru i x might well h ve been no need for Trafalg r . ,

- five n n di r with twenty sail of the li e , i clu ng fou of 1 10 80 l u guns and two of , eft Brest , nder the nos e f — ff e o Bridport who , besides , had insu icient forc di n and appeared in the Me terra ean . But our S hips were scattered , and he was not interfered with . a a He reached Toulon , ranged long the Italian co st a n d to assist the French armies , in due course re a turned to Brest , carrying with him somewhat unwilling Spani sh squadron . Pitt was successful in cre a ting a sec ond coa lition of a 1 799 the Powers ag inst France , and the year opened with splendid prospects . But Austria wavered , and when the Peace of Luneville was signed in 1 80 1 i a n February , , the great coal tion came to end , a leaving us without an lly on the continent . The a na val events of the period cannot det in us . They ff were neither important nor decisive . E orts were in a e scattered , but the m ny combined op rations , the

N avy a lways did its duty well . It was sometimes a the object that was at f ult , and the soldiery that

AL ROY NAVY [ OH . r Al a a hi m efuge at geciras . There Saum rez ttacked

a a n d s . in most g llant style , not without los Then Li n ois dr c a , with a Spanish squa on in his omp ny ,

se a . r put to , and ran out into the ocean The e S e a aumarez again attack d , and two big Sp nish o 2000 m en ships were destr yed , with a loss of . Th e u s naval sit ation was hopeles for Bonaparte , w now First Con sul . Every here triumphant on i i h r the cont nent , the Brit s Navy had p oved both sword and buckler to the Power whi ch sto od in th e pathway of his ambition beyond the sea . Respite was sought by both countries from the te rrible strain e s of the war , an overmast ring desire for peace exi ted l among the peoples , and after ong negotiations the transient Peace of Amiens was signed on the 2 1 802 7th . of March ,

CHA PTER XVI

ID EA S AN D PLANS OF B ONAPARTE

THE Am Peace of iens was merely a truce , and there was yet need for a supreme effort on the part of Bonaparte if all hi s projects aga inst En gland were a not to f il . In this country few people were well pleased with the se ttlement that had been arrived in e at . Add gton had succeed d Pitt , and the nation was not satisfied to fin d that after so many sacrifices OBJECTS OF BONAPARTE their enemy remained unshorn by reverses in the war . France was , in fact , ringing with the noise of a a n d a di plomatic triumph . Elb Piedmont were annexed ; the Sta tes of Parma were occupied ; the ’ Ita lian Republi c was Bonaparte s ; G ermany was partitioned ; Holland was a vassal ; Austria was crushed and broken Switzerland had been brought under the protection of France and Louisiana had ain been wrung from Sp . a u n There were , it is true , but few me ns for der ta king ma ritime war . The remnant of the fleet was e e di S a n dispers d , and the exp tion to Domingo had a exhausted m ny resources . The schemes in the West Indi es were unrealized ; and the finances were in a h ad shocking sta te . But nothing occurred to darken ’ the a First Consul s dream of world dominion . L e ll b The Treaty of un vi e , which was not affected y the Peace of Amiens , had freed him from continental a embarra ssments . The politic l mission of Sebas ti an i a n d G a - G , that of ener l Decaen as Captain eneral i a of the French forces in Ind a , had reve led his d pu rposes . But he had realize that not for ten years to come cou ld he hope to muste r a fleet that u l a co d be fairly m tched with the British . He hoped to accompli sh hi s purp os es in alliance with n a hi s Spai and Holl nd , and in all invasionary schemes he had counted on rebell ion in Ireland as c a chief factor for suc ess . ROYAL NAVY

With the exception of Trinidad a n d Ceylon we h a d surrendered our conquests , but the provision tha t we should restore Ma lta to the Knights of

J a a wa St ohn , virtu lly h nding it over to France , s u l pec iarly obnoxious to the nation and the Navy . ou r a Whitworth , mbassador in Paris , spoke of the ” a a - o isl nd as the w tch t wer of Egypt , and to Nelson ” was a - it most important out work of India . di 1 803 Neither Ad ngton in , nor Pitt after his return 1 804 u l e to power in , wo d tolerat the idea of surrender in l g Malta . The First Consu knew how little ca use a we had to be s tisfied , and dreaded that we might se i e as ize the initiative , wh ch he r garded the begin

. a ning , middle and end of warfare Peace , he s id , was onl y conditiona l so long as we could throw our a Navy and our gold into the sc le . Most French i a i S r l a h stori ns , including Th ers and Albert o el , y the responsi bility for the new outbreak of war at ou r door . It is certain that the First Consu l was exasperated by what had occu r red . It was reported to him that ff was the Navy , after its long e orts , in a very bad state . No one could remember seeing it in a con r di tion so deplora ble . The vast expenditu e on the hi Army had di verted supplies from it . The s ps were rotten and reekin g with di sease ; the offi cers demoraliz ed ; and the men mutinous and unpaid . The ravages of revolution and the effects of di sas trous

L OH ROYA NAVY [ .

Navy . But the Navy h ad be en kept practically u on a war footing d ring the peace , and had never u been better fo nd nor better supplied , nor had the men ever been better fed or clothed . At the out break of war we had 39 sail of the lin e and many i s e nl fr gate , whil the French had o y thirteen avail

s . ou r able , and tho e in a bad state But number L was insufficient , and when ord Barham went to A a e the dmiralty in the next ye r , he was utt rly aston i s h ed i i at the l ttle care there had been , in th s mate rial ” n matter , in maintaini g the empire of the sea . Our conduct of the war was based on the sys a n d e tem of blockade , the blockade ext nded from was ff Toul on to Flushing . Nelson o Toulon wi th J 1 803 nine sail of the line, in uly, , and he had every thing to provide , including the establishment of a

a L - re ll th . e base at Madd lena atouche T vi e , French wa s i ni admiral , a man of surprising v gour and i tia dl ’ e a . l tiv , and was r pi y reviving the fleet Ne son s i l u l pr ncip e was not to hold the French in To on , but to get them out to sea , where he might defeat At a d them . Brest , gall nt Cornwallis ro e out many h i s off i a gale at station the Black Rocks , bear ng s up sometime for Torbay for refit and repair, and f L organizing a mos t ef icient system of reliefs . ike u l k d Nelson he wo d have li e to meet the French , but in those narrow wa ters there was no better ’ m ethod than a close blockade on St Vincent s xvx] FRENCH PROJECTED INVASION 1 29

S i i an system . Some French h ps return ng from S ' a n d a Domingo got into Ferrol Corunn , and those ports were blockaded by the statesma nlike Pell ew a a a n d a a wa s and the vigil nt Cochr ne , close w tch c L kept also upon Ro hefort and orient . The blockade wa s L extended by ord Keith in the Downs , who watched the coasts from Havre to the Texel . Th ere ‘ wa s no certainty a s to the actual purposes a li of Bonap rte . Cornwal s thought every contin L ll o . gen y must be kept in view ord Melvi e , First L a a S i ord of the Admir lty , feared th t h ps might a a u l bre k out from the oce n ports , join the To on a a u squ dron , and ende vo r to crush Nelson . Nelson in also incl ed to this View , though sometimes he a a thought th t mission to Ireland was intended . British Officers never atta ched much importance

ll fla t - a to the invasionary floti a of bottomed bo ts , a which wa s being ssembled in the ports . They di d a a an immense mount of d mage to it , by coura geous inshore attacks and cutting out ex p edi ti on s whi ch constitute a drama tic pa ge of the a a rom nce of the N vy . Under the pressure of the ’ a a a blockade Bonap rte s own pl ns constantly ch nged . wa s a Let There a time when he s id , us be masters of the Channel for S i x hours and we S hall be ” G an te a u m e a masters of the world . , comm nding a a t e hi m the squ dron Br st , told this enterprise of evasion wou l d be extremely bold a n d extremely

. . 9 L . R N ROYAL NAVY [ OH .

il a w i u l per ous . When Forf it rote to the F rst Cons a flotill a s describing the redoubt ble character of the , Decres a ri Admiral , Minister of M ne , said his assertions were monstrous and absurd paradoxes , coming from one who had never left the shore nor heard the a whistle of bullet . 1 803 a a 1 804 In December , , and g in in , Bonaparte was urging Admira l Latouche - Tr evill e to deceive Nelson into thinking an expedition to Egypt was to n intended , and then come rou d and join forces wa s s a t c t he to relea e Cadiz and Ro hefort , and wi h l L them to appear in the Channe . But atouche e di 1 804 wh Tr ville ed in August , , and Villeneuve , o hi m f replaced , had orders to leave Toulon , e fect a i junction w th the Rochefort squadron , cruise to s the West Indies , seize our colonie , proceed to

Surinam and return to relieve the blockade of Ferrol . Fresh orders gave directions tha t the Tou l on and Roch efort squadrons shou l d go westward inde s a n d pendently . Nelson foresaw these pos ibilities i others , and said , Whatever may be the r des tin a ti on I shall certainly follow , be it even to the ” 1 4 1 8 . c 04 East Indies But on the th De ember , , Villeneuve wrote to Napoleon deploring the weakness a of his squadron , and decl ring it to be unfit to go to wa s sea . The truth that the stringency of the blocka de forbade the c o- operation of the French admirals owing to the doubt as to their escape

AL A OH ROY N VY [ .

the line and six frigates , to elude the blockadi ng off G squadron , attack Calder Ferrol , signal to ourdon , wa s hi m who there . to join with the French a n d S S i panish hips , to proceed to Mart nique , where he Mi ssi es s an d was to join Villeneuve and y , then to i a a return w th forty s il of the line , and ppear off u r Boulogne , where he would receive f ther orders . G an tea u m e e was quit ready to issue from the port , l but the squadron of Cornwal is was outside , and he ' wa s l A on the horns of a di emma . victory in Cl rc u m s tan c es l to these wou d lead nothing . Have O — te s G o but one bj ect to execu your mi sion . out ” ’

S . without fighting . uch were Bonaparte s orders The Admiral rema ined in port and awaited the l opportuni ty that n ever came . His inabi ity to get a ni S aw y was the dete rmi ng factor of the ituation . a At Toulon Villeneuve was fortun te . On the 3oth a hi s i of M rch he issued from port , and mak ng a a e 1 4 fair passage , rriv d at Martinique on the th May , there to learn that Mi ssi es sy had returned and tha t f an tea u m nothing had been seen O G e . Then orders ll were issued to Vi eneuve to assume chief command .

- five ni He was to wait thirty days at Marti que , and G an tea u m e did a i was if not rr ve , to return , gather to his fla g fifteen French and Sp a nish ships from ’ G an tea u m e s - Ferrol , and twenty one from Brest , and thus assume command of a fleet of fifty - six sa il of the line . ’ xvn ] CRAIG S EXPEDITION

Nelson ’s system of a loose form of blockade had a l a t f i ed to keep the French Toulon , which indeed d i a h a d he had not es red . A gre ter failure been his ina bility to bring them to action when they left the port . But his movements must be judged in ’ a the light of Pitt s policy t the time . The Minister fea red that Sicil y might fall into the hands of the a n d French , was despatching for its succour an di a w expe tion , under Cr ig , which , hen he heard of ’ a it , constituted a grave emb rrassment for Nelson s ’ position . Nelson s mind was turned to the East . n a When , however , he defi itely le rnedwhich course the a i French admiral had t ken , he immed ately pursued a wa s in a m nner that a triumph of seamanlike skill . It h a s sometimes been alleged tha t he was decoyed a l f aw y , but nothing cou d be further from the act .

His object was to bring his adversary to action , and he took his westward cour se with a well - defin ed strategic object .

CHAPTER XVII

THE CAMPAIG N OF TRAFALG AR

WHEN Nelson went westwa rd it was with a defini te knowledge of the course that Vill eneuve had taken . The interest of a great commerce lay s in the We t Indies , and it was necessary either to L OH ROYA NAVY [ . defeat the French in that region or to drive them

. a thence Nelson s id that if the islands fell , the people would be so clamorous for peace that we S hould el wa humble ours ves . His force s numerically i n ’ feri or hi s l , and adversary had a fu l month s start of th him , but he had weighed every point in e game . At home great apprehens ion prevailed owing to uncertainty as to the position and movements of the fleets . Colonel Robert Crau fur d told the Commons that our naval forces might be dra wn away a to the West Indies , and th t the enemy , hastening i back to Europe , m ght gain temporary command of the Channel , capture the anchorage in the Downs , i and br ng the army over . It is recorded that Mr B ra e a t gg , Secretary at War , smiled the idea , and certa inly St Vincent and the se a offi cers entertained e n no such appr hensions . They k ew that strategy and adequate force would make the operation i m possible . Nevertheless there were sundry alarms , and on one occasion a quantity of burning straw , mistaken for a beacon , brought the forces of Derby u n shire and West Yorkshire der arms . ’ The protean ch a racter of Napoleon s plans has been suggested in the last chapter . They followed a the lines of least resistance . M ny of them were dictated during h i s triumphant progress thr ough l L Ita y , when he placed the iron crown of ombardy o on his head , and, intoxicated with p wer, fancied

ROYAL NAVY

i a e e J requ red for the p ssage to De r s , six hours ( une) , twelve hours (August) , fourteen days (September) ll a to Vi eneuve , three d ys (May) , four or five days

J l - u G a n te a u m e ( u y) , twenty four hours (Aug st) to , u l d J . h a three days ( y) But , in effect , Napoleon l earned that a ste a lthy pa ssage wi thin a few hours a n d a would be impossible , the combin tion of fleets i off upon a vast scale , d rected to their concentration

Boulogne , entered into his plans . In his later years the Emperor was accustomed to a ssert that he had never been in earnest in this was expedition , but it usual with him thus to seek a s h a d l esc pe from the obloquy of chemes which fai ed . There had come indee d a time when he had question

li . s ed the possibi ty of success In such ca e , he said B ou rri enn e to , I shall make my Army of England ” a the Army of the E st and go to Egypt . Egypt was

- ll the outpost of India . Europe is a mere mole hi it is only in the East , where there are a of human beings , th t there have been vast empires ” Ré v . a a m u sat and mighty re olutions M d me de , e G L s Miot de M lito , eneral Hulot , ucche ini and Metterni ch all inclin e to doubt whether there was any rea l intention of putting the pla n of in vasron - i into execution . But the great expend ture upon a a n d prep rations for the enterprise , the minute ex h a u s tive care displa yed in many parts of the a a organization , the v st importance that N poleon 'VII] THE NAPOLEONIC DREAMS

attached to success , the earnestness that breathes i n l n every ine he wrote concerni g the scheme , and more than all the meani nglessness which otherwi se a a would have m rked his pl ns , all forbid us to doubt that , against England , he had staked everything upon the success of the enterprise . The invasion of England , which blocked the pathway to his world wa s ambition , one of the great objects he had set hi l before mse f , and we cannot question that the flotill a was intended to transport to our shores those troops which he hoped would dictate peace at the capital . The Navy wa s to S hatter the fa bric of the great

S . Com imperial dream . The ituation was this a G an te au m e w llis was blockading Brest , where had

- - S twenty one sail of the line , Rear Admiral tirling off Rochefort was holding tight Allemand (who had Mi s si es s a Off succeeded y ) , Sir Robert C lder was a G G a a Ferrol block ding ourdon and r ndall na , and ’ l off Col ingwood was off Cadiz , with some ships Carta gena . When it became known , from despatches sent Cu ri eu sc home by Nelson in the brig , that the com b i n ed fleets of France and Sp a in under command of Vill eneuve and G ra vina were actually homeward L d bound , ord Barham , that most able a ministrator, L ll who had succeeded ord Melvi e at the Admiralty , and hi s collea gues ordered a certain redistribution of forces . There was not an adequa te strength for every ROYAL NAVY

h i s station , and consequently Stirling was to leave a n d nf post before Rochefort rei orce Calder off Ferrol , w e a i who thereupon , ith fift en s il of the l ne and other wa s h vessels , to stretch t irty or forty leagues to the westward with the object of intercepting the enemy . ’ n ll a Stirli g s departure released A em nd , who made a most adventurous cruise with the object of meeting ’ ll Di don ll Vi eneuve , but the , carrying Vi eneuve s a Ph oen i x desp tches , was captured by the , and the di d c meeting not take pla e . Calder met the combined squadron on the 22n d J 49 Of uly , about leagues west Ferrol , in a drifting ’ mist and endeavoured to en gage the enemy s rear and i a a centre . Th s att ck was p rried , and then fog e descend d upon the combata nts . Two Spanish l o ships , which had suffered a good dea , drifted int ’ the midst of Calder s fleet and were captured . The c l a tion was creditable , though not either conc usive or decisive . Calder thought well of what he had i accomplished , but he fa led to renew the action on u the following day , being nder apprehension that the shi ps at Ferrol wou l d join Vill eneuve and crush ” h ad him He appears , wrote Nelson , to have the shi ps of Ferrol more in his head than the squadron ” i S in S ight . For th s lackness Calder was greatly e blamed , and was subs quently tried by court martial , for not having done his utmost to renew the sa id engagement , and to take every ship of the enemy .

ROYAL NAVY

to prevent the combined fleet from putting to sea . a This division of the fleet has been dversely criticised , — and Napoleon described it as an i n s ign e beti s e a — S ignal blunder but Cornwallis had mea sured th e a off a risk , and knew th t Ferrol the squ dron might check the enemy whether he went south or north . Napoleon himself was gu i lty of a n i ns ign e beti s e at i Marengo , where he d vided his forces by detaching

Desaix and another general , and narrowly escaped l osing the battle . il wi t But V leneuve , th the great fleet , lef Ferrol before the squadron deta ched by Cornwallis could a G an te au m e re ch the station . Napoleon told that Villeneuve ’s apparent intention was to pass through e the Raz de Sein and ent r Brest harbour , but G a n te a u m e was given supreme authority . He was a 5 0 S i to permit no such del y , but with h ps was to proceed into the Channel and appear before Boulogne . Villeneuve ’s fleet began to get under way from the l oth oute r bay of Ferrol on the of August , but was not 1 4th clear of the coast until the . As is well known , instead of doing what Napoleon had desired , the dispiri tedand di scoura ged a dmira l turned to the south z a n d entered Cadi . He had been alarmed at what he a thought the pproach of Cornwallis , and declared that he had no confidence in his own fleet , that he i bel eved he had freedom of action , that the situation had changed since he had received his orders , and XVII] THE NELSON TOUCH

is that he saw no prospect of success . In th supreme ’ a moment of N poleon s career , the pressure of British i n sea power, the crush g weight of our superiority , wa s dashed the cup of success from his lips . It the a most bitter moment of his career , and his ex spera a i wa tion at the f lure s terrible to behold . What a a fleet he excl imed , What sacrifices for nothing Wha t a n Admi ra l 'All hope is gone I m m edi a tely he broke up his ca mp at Boulogne a n d marched 28th on the of August for the Danube , to win his first S igna l success a gainst the Austrians at Ul m on the da a t a a very y on which his fleet was destroyed Tr f lgar . Nelson left Spithead in the Vi ctory on the 1 5 th of a n d a a off September , ssumed comm nd of the fleet

' 28 th r . Cadiz on the . He hoped for einforcements ” ni i a Numbers only can an h l te , he wrote , and therefore I hope the Admiralty will send the fixed ” a s force as soon s possible . He e timated that the a li - l es would have forty six sail of the line , and hoped l a himse f to h ve not less than forty , and with this expectation issued to the fleet on the 9th of October hi s famous a n d masterly Memora ndum on the tactics to be employed in the coming battle , which he had di scussed with his friends before leaving England . ” a d This Nelson touch , as he called it , is the most i a m r ble exposition of ta ctica l principles ever penn ed .

u n a - It wo ld bri g forward pell mell battle , and ” i s Th u rs field J . that what I want . Mr . R has ROYAL NAVY very ably di senga ged the great principles of the a n a n pl , which , he says , was exceedingly subtle , a n d a a not less origin l , combin tion of the several ideas of concentration on the rear , of complete freedom of action for the second in command ’ i a (Coll ngwood) , of cont ining the enemy s van and centre until the business of twelve sa il of the enemy was seen to be so fa r advanced that its interru ption a a ll was no longer to be feared , and , bove , of the concealment of his own inte ntions until the last ’ moment , so as to confuse the enemy s mind by not letting him know where and how the attack of the ” wa weather line s to be delivered . a 21 s t The battle of Trafalg r , fought on the of

a n . a October , c n ot be described here It was decisive and immorta l victo ry the incidents of which n a a n d have been recou ted by m ny pens , whose splendours are in all our histories . Nelson was a fortunate in his de th , for he fell in the hour of his triumph . The numbers were not what he had

a l - expected , for the l ies had thirty three sail of the — nl - line , and he o y twenty seven twelve in his own n weather line , and fifteen in the lee li e of Colling a n d wood . The engagement was fought in light va ria ble a irs which ma de it impossible for the shi ps to assume the definite forma tions which Nelson h ad a t anticipated , and the allied line began to wear the a beginning of the action , ltering course to return to

O AL A H R Y N VY [O .

l i l nl bui d ng of many new ships of the ine , not o y in b t S ea France , u in the ports of the North and Italy , i h i s wh ch came under sway . They were not much a S a employed , because it was e sier to build hips th n a a a n d to provide c p ble officers and contented men , , e many of the ships being constructed of gre n timber ,

soon rotted into uselessness . The Berlin Decree aga inst our commerce was the was S ign of the naval fail ure . It not possible for us to blockade every pla ce which became a source a s of danger to trade , and sw rms of privateers i sued r a n d s from the F ench ports , from port in the West i a n d r c Ind es Mau itius , and the Dut h harbours of a a a Java and Sumatr . Thus great str in was put a a a upon the N vy in m ny p rts of the world , lasting wa r up to the very end of the long . The result was a considerable increa se in the number of sea - going S 1 806 a n d hips , beginning in , the numbers remained n i 1 8 1 5 high in every year u t l , when for the first time 1 805 : 485 as they fell below the establishment of , 5 08 a a . At comp red with the s me time , the number i 1 805 8 1 of sh ps building , which in had been , rose 1 3 1 1 806 1 08 1 807 to in , and the figure was in and 1 8 8 di d Of 1 805 1 1 1 in 0 . It not fall below the figure 1 8 1 0 1 1 0 1 8 1 3 until , and it rose to in . Necessarily

also , in the years following Trafalgar , the Navy a tta ined its greatest number of officers and men up 1 8 1 5 to the peace of . XVIII] AFTER TRAFALG AR

The attack upon our commerce by privateers a n d light squadrons in those years caused trouble to our a S merch nts , but all experience hows that commerce destroyin g never has been a n d never can be a primary object in war . During the twenty years of fighting in the French Revoluti onary a n d Na po l eon i c stru ggle our annual loss in S h ipping was only about per cent . We captured in privateers

seamen , and of war vessels engaged in com merce - destruction we took about five for every 21 merchant vessels lost . During this period the volume of our maritime trade more than doubled , while the French mercantile flag practically disappeared from a u l the se s . It wo d be wrong therefore to attach high importance to the operations of commerce e a a destroyers either before or aft r Traf lg r . Some notes may be a dded upon the a ctivity of a a warships in the ye rs subsequent to Trafalg r . The Admiralty rela xed the strictness of the blockade of — 1 805 6 - Brest in the winter of , and Vice Admiral Le i s sé u es g , with five sail of the line , and Rear

Admiral Willaumez with six , slipped away , the former to be defeated by Sir John Duckworth off S an 6th 1 806 a n d Domingo on the February , , the a a a n a l tter , fter dventurous cruise in West Indian r and North Atlantic waters , to have his squad on broken up in a ction with va rious British forces . 1 809 When Napoleon , in , decided to venture a strong

R 10 L . . N . AL ROY NAVY [OH . squadron composed of S hips from Brest and Roche on to di a fort a cruise the West In es , the arm ment was driven into the Basque Roads and there a t ta cked with fi re sh ip s under the orders of Lord te a a i Cochrane , af rw rds E rl of Dundonald , and ru ned , L G though ord ambier , in superior command , inter fered t to check the comple eness of the operation . ’ That we were n ot always able to control the enemy s communications was S hown by the passage of Al le a l l m nd from Rochefort to Tou on , with five sai of the l 1 808 w ine , in , hen Sir Richard Strachan , who was di blocka ng the former port , was away revictualling z a n d l G an te au m e at his rende vous , a sobythe cruise of , i u l who was then command ng at To on , to revictual a n d the garrison at Corfu , his unimpeded return to his port . But our own communications were in every case secure . Oversea possessions are the fruit of sea a power , though in ne rly every case the fruit must li be gathered by the exercise of mi tary force . When war broke out in 1 803 we re - occupied the Dutch West n ds e Indian isla , which had b en surrendered at the 1 8 4 0 . peace , and in we occupied Surinam The Cape wa s re - in 1 806 a n d th e n a occupied , in followi g ye rs G Curacao , Martinique , Cayenne , uadeloupe , Mauri J ll tius , Amboyna , the Moluccas and ava fe into our hands . The sea power whi ch had been won at Trafalgar

AL A n ROY N VY (o .

The s trength of Torres Vedras was rooted in the a n d support of the fleet in the Tagus , the communi cations which that fleet maintained with England . When a t length the great advance began which carried the Army from the b a sin of the Douro to G L sl ascony and anguedoc , Welle ey , finding that ” dr n i at each remove he agged a lengthe ing cha n , S s r hifted his ba e , by means of sea power , f om the

Tagus to the Basque provinces . The transports l L i sai ed round from isbon to Santander , furnish ng a fine ill ustration of the influence of sea command a in the creation of an alternative naval b se , and a li a U great factor in mi t ry success . p to the very end of the war the fleet was the base for the opera a a tions of the Army . The dmir ls felt no such anxiety for the safety of the transports as perturbed the soul ’ di of Nelson , in the case of Craig s expe tion , in the a times before Traf lgar , when the French were still u l a t powerf and active sea . a Engl nd was now the mistress of the seas , and her prosperity grew by leaps and bounds , though it was prosperity generally for the rich and not a i alw ys for the poor . On the cont nent , the French armies were driven back across the Pyrenees and a d d the Rhine , the foemen adv nce , Paris surrendere , d i and the Emperor ab icated . But th s series of triumphs had been marred for us by the outbreak of a new struggle across the Atlantic , which arose THE W AR OF 1 8 1 2

l l l from the Ber in and Mi an Decrees of Napo eon , al O the ret iatory rders in Council , and the non intercourse policy of the United States . Some incidents in the war of 1 8 1 2 gave a rather rude awakening to the British Navy , which , when war a was declared , was at the very zenith of its f me , rich in the inherited experience of its overthr ow of the historic maritime Powers , and brought to a high sta ndard of efficiency by warfare that had con tin u ed almost without interruption for eighteen years .

It seemed , in certain untoward events of this war , as if a pigmy was wrestling successfully with a giant , and the giant was aroused to a knowledge of hi s di sc om fitu re s a deficiencies by his . The story goes th t Nelson once saw an Am erican squadron in European — waters perha ps that of Ca ptain Richard Dale in 1 801 i 1 802—3 , Captain Richard Morr s in , or Captain Edward Preble in 1 803— and that he uttered a fore cast in these words There is in the handling of these Tr ansatlantic shi ps a nucleus of trouble for ”

G . the Navy of reat Britain The trouble was , a dl i di indeed , in the h n ng of in vidual ships , usually i a a a in fr g te actions , for there was no gener l eng ge a ment , and the impression created by few mis wa s fortunes out of all proportion to their importance . In a volume which is concerned with the building up of the Empire through the influence of the Navy , ROYAL NAVY and inferentially with its conservation by the same means , some evidences of apparent weakening in the spirit of the service may well deserve attention .

S s a - con fiden ce Possibly some lacknes rose from over , and m ay have been due in a measure to ea sy content i l a in great things achieved . The adm rals at e st ’ seem to have thought tha t Nelson s Memorandum which not a ll of them understood- was the l ast word upon tactics . Some captains were probably so intent upon the extem al s of efficiency that the a li A essentials esc ped them , and gunnery dec ned . great body of the men were prime seamen , but they had been rigorously treated , and a considerable number of the class h a d gone over to America and U a i joined the nited St tes Navy , to wh ch they had ffi imparted a good deal of its e ciency . Those who to remained were brought into association , owing ff u the enormous demand for men , with the o sco rings of gaols , gathered in by the press . Convicts , a hi vag bonds , t eves not brought to justice from lenity , i smugglers , Wh te Boys , suspected Irish during the li l rebel on , all who from loss of character cou d not ” l a n d procure employment , the id e the worthless , wrote Captain Anselm G ri ffi th s all was fish that ” came to the net . History is rich in examples of defeats inflicted upon old experience and tried capacity by anta goni sts whose power has not been suspected . The

L H ROYA NAVY [O .

l 44- Un i ted S ta tes Con sp endid gun frigates , the , s titu ti on Pres iden t o and , which were superior t any 1 9th A frigates in the British Navy . On the ugust , 1 8 1 2 Con s ti tu ti on , the , after a most desperate fight ‘ i 3 8 - e G u err i ere w th the British gun frigat , reduced a S th t vessel to helplessness by heer weight of fire , and captured her in such a condition tha t she had to 25 th Un i ted S ta tes . O t be destroyed On the c ober , the ,

e a - aft r hard fought action , captured the British M acedon ia n frigate , to which in every respect save S h e speed she was greatly superior . Moreover had

fir - a te a st rate c ptain in the person of S phen Decatur . Four days later the 3 8 - gun frigate Ja c a was captured

Cons ti tu ti on . by the , and there were other captures The most famous action of the wa r was tha t of the 1 st J n 1 8 1 3 S ha n non u e , , between the British frigate , hi A Captain P lip Broke , and the merican frigate Ches a ea ke a J L l p , C ptain ames awrence , being vesse s of about equal power commanded by equally valia nt men ; an action which showed that the fighting quality of the British Navy still existed l h a d and still cou d dominate . The S h a n non been ffi Ch es a brought to a high state of e ciency , and the ea k e p , as her commander reported , had her crew in fine spirits The victory of the British S hip was complete , and her antagonist was carried by l di . l boar ng The ga lant American capta in was ki led . There was fighting on the great lakes with varying xxx ] END OF THE FRENCH W AR 1 5 3

l fortune , and the Navy p ayed a large part in the operations which brought about the surrender of a a i Washington , and in the tt cks on Balt more and

New Orleans , which were ineffective . Peace was 21 t 1 8 14 S G s . igned at hent on the of December, Our long struggle with the Revolution and the Empire came to an end when Na poleon for the B ellero h on second time surrendered , on board the p , a Capt in Maitland , and peace was concluded at Paris 1 8 1 5 l in November , . We had bui t up our Empire , and had waged no war of aggression . We were therefore content to see Holland released from her subjection to the French yoke , and to retain for all ou r a nl a ourselves , of c ptures , o y M lta , Mauritius L (the Ile de France) , Tobago and St ucia .

CHAPTER XIX

C ONCLUS IONS

IN this concludi ng chapter we S ha ll make a bri ef survey of the naval events which succeeded the grea t Of 1 8 1 5 peace , not , of course , to describe them , but a n d to ascertain their character , the conditions which ruled them and resulted from them , and then we m a y draw a general conclusion from the whole . It a a has been said ccurately of the phrase , comm nd of i l h as the sea , that it mp ies a state of war and no special application to a state of peace . In the — century which has elapsed S ince the great peace a century in which our naval predominance has never l — s ea s been chal enged command of the , exerci ed a n d a a by ourselves our llies , has been the tmosphere i in which certain th ngs have been done . The fighting of b a ttles is not the common occupa a tion of the Navy . N val engagements are incidents a s of great rarity , and since N varino the Briti h Navy hi s has not been concerned in one . T s lead us to con sider that the Navy has a fu nction in peace as well r as in war . As a modern o ganization it began wi th a n d the activities of the old navigators , to the r names of Raleigh , Frobisher, D ake , Narborough , a n d to Dampier , Cook Vancouver , mention but a few , we add , in a very incomplete list , those of Ross , in Li ddon Mc Cl u re Mc Cli n toc k Frankl , Parry , , , ,

Nares and las tly of Scott . The Navy has also taken

r e - s ea a great part in the work of hyd ography , d ep sou n di ng and other branches of scientific investi a ti on Li htn i n Porcu i n e 1 868—70 g , and the g g p ( ) and Cha ll en ger ( 1 872 were vessels whi ch engaged in important work in this department of naval service .

In another sphere of activity the Navy , often in condi tions of hardship and di fficulty which l k w are ittle no n to the world , and often , too , in

ROYAL NAVY

Meh em et Ali assured . But when the ambition of u r G threatened the integrity of T key , reat Britain headed a coalition against him . France took no was a n d r action , but opposed to us , war th eatened a e at a time when the N vy had b en neglected , when comparatively few ships were in commission and the o n rest in a bad state , when the pers n el had been e e reduced , and our influence r st d probably more upon prestige than upon the actual possession of power .

Never , however , was there a more complete instance of the possession of sea power in an absolute 1 85 4—5 form than in the Russian War of . The e i Th e world had never s en the l ke . Russ ian fleet l li z was complete y neutra ed , and the transport of troops through the Medi te rranean and into the Black a i Sea , even including the disembark tion in the Cr mea, was conducted almost as if it had been a peace di d operation . We not even attempt to cover the landi ng of the troops by masking the Russian fleet l at Sevastopo . Russia was not accessible except a by sea , and the success of the whole of the oper tions depended upon the possession of sea power . It was the atmosphere in which they were conducted , but it was as little recogni zed by many people at the time (and since) as the atmosphere they breathed . The responsibility for the safe arrival of the troops u r was , of co se , felt, but the worthlessness of the e i Russian fleet was suspect d , and so l ttle were the U A W AR 1 85 4—5 XIX] THE R SSI N ,

principles of naval warfare remembered , that the transports were apparently thought capable of pro tectin g themselves . But if the Russians had had a n effective fleet no soldier could ever have set foot a in the Crimea , or , having l nded , would ever have left it by sea . Yet , from the fact that the results of the war were visibly attained by military forces , it has been assumed that the Navy contributed nothi ng to th e result . The operations in the Baltic have attracted less S ea notice than those in the Black , but they also i m were of great importance , and had the effect of mobilizing large bodi es of tr0 0 ps in Northern Russia which might otherwise have been sent to the seat of li l mi tary activity . There can a so be no doubt that S ea the presence of the allied fleets in the Black , and the uncertainty felt as to the places where troops h e might landed , made it impossible for the Russians to locate their forces in sufficient numbers in the regions where the events proved they were actually ff required . Here we notice a signal mark of the e ect of sea power , when , by the menace of its readiness to convey troops to one or several of many places ’ ’ a on the enemy s coast , it paralyzes the enemy s ction . An immunity from interference or resista nce at sea , similar to that which existed in the Russian War , was found in the operations for the suppression of a the Indi n Mutiny , and in our wars in China , South ROYAL NAVY [ox

Af Z ’ rica and New ealand . In the South African W a r 1 8994 902 a of , sea power was ag in the condi tion which was essential for success . Without comma nd Af u l a of the sea , South rica wo d h ve been lost to the a Empire . In those years the Navy w s th oroughly efficient for all its duties , and , by patrol and control , a n d the transport of troops , horses war material was conducted with the utmost smoothness and without AS any interference . in the Peninsular War , the ili Ar i Navy gave mob ty to the my , establ shed and s f supplied its ba es , and it was ready with o ficers , men and guns to take part in the fighting ashore .

e We have se n in the course of this inquiry , e de ply graven in the pages of history , that the Navy h as ever protected the Mother Country from invasion , and that it has also been the creator and bond of the

Empire , the means by which the Empire has grown a a t and must be maint ined . It was sea that we u vanq ished the Armada , and at sea that we broke the monopolies of Spain . Sea power gave us victory in our long struggle with the Dutch , and i i laid the foundation s of a larger domin on . Th s is the power which gave us the coloni es which have grown into the Empire , and against sea power the ambition of Napoleon was broken and failed . The immunity of the kingdom from attack by i sea li v rtue of sea barrier properly held , has estab shed

ROYAL NAVY [ox

S l the uez Cana , and the Straits of Malacca . The Panama Ca nal will be a key whi ch we m a y use but cannot hold . At and near these points and others , hostile naval forces may be Observed an d controlled . U nerring instinct and wise statesmanship , using the a l N vy wel , have caused us to seize and retain nearly all the important strategical positions along the communications of the world . The great advantage possessed by this country has been her position as a Sea Power alone . She was never greatly concerned in the fighting on the l continent , except by her subsidies , unti the time of the Peninsular War , and in the campaign of Waterloo . She has mainta ined her standing army upon a limited basis almost wholly for the defence of her di stant possessions ; while the countries of the continent a have been turned into v st armed camps , absorbing

a n d . the interests , the lives the wealth of their peoples S n a The pa iards , deeply involved in continent l

n a . strife , had no power to attai suprem cy at sea The

Dutch , embroiled in wars on land with a frontier always threatened , and with a Navy which at one a s own time was every whit good as our , could not maintain the fleets they had raised , and they faded

- Th e from the world position they had won . French , having embarked on vast European enterprises , could not withstand the wastage arising therefrom , which a t reduced their strength sea . x xx ] CONCLUSION

s S h a h a d Thu , if it hould be said t t we have more than our share of good fortune , that we have been a ided by something like luck when on some occasions a a a n d a we h ve been end ngered , that , but for a ch nce a i S which h a s turned ga nst our adversaries , we hould a e h ve been undone , we must r member that there is really something essentiall y different from the S ituation of other countries in the cha racter of our a n d ni a kingdom domi ons , pl cing means at our a n disposa l which rule and sh pe these thi gs . It is our preoccupa tion on the sea which has given us a our great seamen , for the H wkes , Rodneys , Howes , St Vincents and Nelsons are the products of a great a m ritime nation , and not of one which is amphibious . We have won the rewards of sound judgment a n d a u sust ined , though fluct ating , endeavour . But we m a y notice a lso that the common ex p eri en c e of sea men has couns elled us never to trust merely to what we have achieved . The lessons which ff i we have learned have , in e ect , been real zed by s a i other nation , who are forming n vies and train ng them by the light of the doctrines we have taught . a a M teri l strength is much , because it gives us the a machinery for action , but the action is t ken by men , who are more tha n the machines th ey direct and Sh ovell control . and Nelson , and many other sea O a nf i fficers , have s id they would not fight with i er or material strength if they could avoid it , but they

L R . N . 1 1 AL ROY NAVY [OH . XIX ha ve been much more anxious to secure the right stamp of officer and man . if The lesson , then , is that we would secure the n a a immu ity from attack , which our foref thers h ve e a enjoyed , and would retain the Empire th y h ve won , we must keep our Navy in both materia l a n d persona l respects on a level commen sura te with our re sp on i u ib il it es . s For it is as tr e now , as when the words th e were embodied in Naval Discipline Act , that G od on the Navy , under the good Providence of , i ” our wealth , prosper ty and peace depend .

BIBLIOG RAPHY

Peri od o th e Frenc h Revolu ti on a nd Em re and he Am eri ca n f pi , t W a r

His to f re t B r t AM JAM S . Th e a a r o G a i ain WILLI E N v l y , — — 1793 1820. 1822 24.

ir I HO AS ARRIS I O A Th Dis atc es and S N C L H N C L S . e p h

Letters of c e - Adm ira Lor s co u n e s on 1 Vi l d Vi t N l . 844 6 4 .

. K LA H O . tters f Horati Sir . Le an d Dis atc es o o J UG T N p h ,

is c ou n t els on . 1 V N 886 .

- A ira MAHA . Th e nflu e ce f ea Pow Rear dm l A. T . N I n o S er

on h ren c e ir 1892. t e F h R volu ti on an d Em p e . ’ ’ - . LA JO E L Ex dition d E te 1798 1801 . . é C DE NQ UI RE p gyp ,

M . H er a a t u i JA S . e s n nd ot S d e E R T URS FIELD N l o a h N v l s . 1 909.

H W B O Th e Yea r of ra a ar. 1905 . ENRY NE LT . T f lg O B i n of ra r 1 N R T e a m a a . 1 A . h a 9 0. JULI S C ETT . C p g T f lg

e M ri EDOUARD DES RRI ERE . La Cam pagn a tim e de 1805 1907 Tra falgar . 1 . e a r 906 EDW ARD FRA S ER Th En em y t T afalgar .

R T Th e a a ar of 18 12. 1889. THEOD O E ROOS EVEL . N v l W

- P wer in i el a i o MAHA . Sea o ts t ns to Rear Adm i ral A. T . N R

1 . 2 ols . th e W ar of 1812. v 905 INDEX

A m i ni strat on a n d r a ni s at on a m m e ren shi s estro e d i O g i D , F ch p d y d A m ra t 12 23 2 3 40 a t 15 d i l y, , , 7, 7, , , 49 9 85 86 96 98 127 De B u r Hu ert 16 , 7 , , , , , gh, b , ’ Al re s shi s 4 De R u te r 44 47 5 2—5 5 f d p , y , , , Am er an n e en en e W a r i s o er an d sea o er 24—26 ic I d p d c , D c v y p w , of 96—105 ra e Sir ra n s 27—29 32 34 , D k , F ci , , , ’ An son sea m an a n d ad m i nis u n an s tor 1 12 , D c vic y, trator 77- 80 u t a rs s ee et er an s , D ch W , N h l d Arm a a S a ni s 30—34 d , p h , E t ren oc u at on 1 17 gyp , F ch c p i , e f 6 B a rfleu r, B attl o , 3 , 64 1 21 B ea Hea B a tt e of 6 1 E i z a et a n d h er fleet 27- 29 chy d , l , l b h , , Ben o o n 63 66 33- 35 b w, J h , , Bl a e 40 43- 45 Em re a a n d th e rowt of k , , pi , N vy g h , B o a e 90 128 133 66 - 69 94 1 13 146 15 3 15 8 l ck d , , , , , , , , B osc a en Sir E wa r 81 87 En a n a u ses of n a a reat w , d d , , , gl d , c v l g 2 n ess 5 8 160 1 6 1 90, 9 , , , B r ort Lor 1 1 1 Et elre th e Unrea 5 idp , d , h d dy, B n Adm ra o n 87 89 y g, i l J h , , Fren Co on a Em re 70 ch l i l pi , Cadi z 34 65 72 140 ren a effe t of Revol u , , , , F ch N vy, c Ca er Sir Ro ert 138 t on n ld , b , i o , 106 ’ Can u te s n a al o er 6 v p w , an n e En s ross rai n G ra tar 65 89 99 104 Ch l , gli h, c di g, ib l , , , , 1 8 G ree e B r t s a a n d n e c , i i h N vy I d a of 3 —39 en d en c e of 1 N vy , 7 p , 5 5 Chesa ea a n d S h a n non 15 2 p ke , ’ n a ars a and 15 7 Ha ro s a u re 1066 10 Chi W , N vy , ld f il , C n u e orts F eet 1 2 Ha e Lor 75 81—83 92 i q P l , wk , d , , , om m er e atta a n d e en e 94 C c , ck d f c 44 65 1 109 144 145 Hoo r , , 7 , , , d , Lo d , 101 , 108 m m on ea t a 40- 42 Ho e 1 - 1 1 Co w l h N vy, w , Lord , 97, 98, 09 1 Co en a en el son at 1 23 p h g , N , ’ ’ ra s Ex edi t on e son s m res s m en t of m en 107 1 5 0 C ig p i , N l I p , , an x et 133 n a n —th e ren e n e 91 94 i y, I di F ch d cli , , INDEX

n as on attem te ru st ra te Pen n su ar W ar an d sea o er I v i , p d , f d , i l p w , 1 —1 —2 1 1 4 5 7, 30 3 , 64, 94, 13 , 137, 7, 148 141 15 8 15 9 e s S a m u e 49 50 , , P py . l , , Pett P i n ea s 36 , h , a m es a of 35 —3 7 J I , N vy , a m es a of 5 8—5 9 u e e Fa of an d th e a J II . N vy , Q b c , ll , N vy, er is Sir o n s ee S t in en t u eron Ba B attl e of 93 94 J v , J h , V c Q ib y , , ,

Kem enfelt hi s nflu en ce on th e esto rati on a of 48 p , i R , N vy , a 103 Re o u ti on — N v l of 1688, 5 7 5 9 Ke e an d Palli ser 97 R c ar oeu r de Lon 14 pp i h d C i , Ro n e 99 1 104 d y, , 03, Les ols su r Mer 18 u ssi an W ar 1 85 4- 5 5 a in R , , N vy , Lestoc a n d Ma t e s 5 15 6 15 h w 7 , 7

’ Mat e e s a t on 75 St n en t Ear 1 12 1 16 1 17 h w c i , Vi c , l , , Mon Du e of A em ar e 44—46 S an wi Lo r h i s corru t k, k lb l , d ch , d, p M ti n o 1 1 13 ad m ni st rati on 8 u y f 797, i , 9 ’ u a S a m rez ac tion . 123 a o eon hi s ans 1 25 - 126 S a u n ers a t u e ec 90 N p l , pl , , d Q b , 129- 132 e s on sea - cra t S ea as a rr er a n d a t wa 1 2 ; vi w f , , b i p h y, , , 127 h i s ro e te n asi on 12 p j c d i v , 135 —137 Sea om m an 147 153 15 6 c d, , , a a nd m i tar m isu nd er S i s of war escr e 3—5 8 N v l a il y h p d ib d , , , 12—14 — dm 72, 88 , 89 , 20 22, 28 , 36 , 73 , 79 Naval d g; e er o s of 72 73 S u s B att e of 17 , p i d , , , l y , l , 6 150 Soleb a B att e of 5 5 7 , 77, y , l , a a u arre s 74 75 97 Sou t A ri can W ar a and N v l q l , , , h f , N vy , a in eac e 15 4 15 8 N vy p , a its u a ti es 29 So ere nt of th e seas 36 N vy, high q li , , 77 v ig y , 23 , 83 95 106 1 10 127 S a n au ses of n a a ec ne , , , , p i , c v l d li , 4 1 4—2 1 Nelson , 99, 10 , 1 1 3, 33 , 34 69 138 142 S ai n th e stru e w t 26—35 p , ggl i h, et er an s 36 39; F rst Du tc S trate ca ea s a n d m o em ents N h l d , , i h gi l id — v , ar - c n ar 5 1 9 1 12 1 1 Dra e an d W , 39 48 Se o d W , , 0, , 5 , 29 4 ( k 5 5 hi r W ar 5 5 - 5 6 a u s es Ho a r 60 orr n ton 80 ; T d , ; c w d) , (T i g ) , , i n e 4 6 1 1 1 2 1 8 1 —140 of n a val decl , 8, 7 95 , 97, 0 , 0 , 0 , 37 , e B att e of th e 1 21 155 —15 8 15 9 Nil , l , , orm an n asi on 6—1 1 N I v , a ti s 16 17 41 74 99 1 10 T c c , , , , , , fi ers an d m en 22 38 40 72 orr n ton Her ert Ear of Of c , , , , , T i g b , l , 60—6 1 73 , 76

Qtam brih gr

PRINT D BY JOHN CLAY M A E ,

AT THE NIV RS ITY PRE U E SS . CAMBRIDG E MANUALS

OF SCIENCE AND LITERATURE

Pu blis he d b y th e Ca m b ridge Un ive rs ity Pre s s u nder G f P. es Li D r rs o tt . M h e e n e a l ed to . a s r t g i hip il , , te of

Co e e a n d A . . S e wa rd F. Em m an u e R. l ll g , C , S Pro fes s or o f Botan in th e Un ers t of Ca m b r d y iv i y i ge .

HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOG Y

n i L . D Re . . H. . s tt 2 n e n t A s s r a . v o . 4 A ci y i By C W J h .

Re . H . o n s Litt n a v D. 5 1 A n e n t a o . . . . ci B byl i By C W J h , n P f z a t on i Pa e n r . 40 H s tor o s t e . o . A . A i y Civili i l i By f R S . r P S A M a a s te M . A . . . c li .

D A n r n M . 78 Th e Pe o e s o f n di a . . . de so A . pl I By J .

H. A . G s L . 49 C n a n d th e M a n u s . Pro . e L D a . hi ch By f il , N Th u t o n f e a an . P H n r 9 e E o o w . . Lo o d 7 v l i j p By ro f J gf . 3 Th z n f A n n Me x 4 e C a t o o e t o . Le s S ivili i ci ic By wi p en ce .

Th V n Pr . M r M .A . 60 e s . o A e n a e iki g By f ll w ,

24 N Z e a n d h e Ho n . Si r S ew a . t o e rt tou t l By R b .

LL. D n S u n d Lo a to t LL. B . . a J. g , . M l r H th e n 85 ta s t r Ho . Fo rtes u e . i i y i o y . By J. W . c

84 Th e o al o n Le a n d. R y Na vy . By J h yl u d M 6 a r a re . rs e A . 7 al a . . . N v W f By J R Th fi l ,

15 Th e G rou n P a n o f th e En s Pa r s u r . A d l gli h i h Ch ch By .

Ham ilt n om n M .A P.S .A . o Th ps o , 16 Th e H s to r a G ro t o f th e En s Pa r s i ic l w h gli h i h Chu rch . By A H m . a t n o o m s o n M . A . P. S .A . il Th p . . 68 En M is o n a s te r e s . A H g . . o m s o n M . A F S l h i By Th p , . . A.

5 0 ra s s e s . M . S . . a rd B A y . . B B J W , . 5 9 A n e n t S ta n e d a n d Pa n te d G a E S . ss . Ede n ci i i l By . . 80 A G ra m m a r of En l s H r l e dr H. a . St . H g i h y By W . J ope . i D L tt . . ECONOMICS

70 o a rtn e rs in n d t u s r . Fa M . A C p hip I y By C . R . y . . n d re d 6 a s a t. D . A . r r C h C i By B a ke . 67 Th e f M n e eo r o o . D. A . a r e r Th y y By B k .

86 E on om s a n d S n d a l s m . P Ki rk ro . A . . a l c ic y ic i By f W dy . LITERARY HISTORY

Th e Ea r e o u s Po e f th He b r 8 tr o e e s . th e R ly R ligi y w By e v . E G K n D D . . i g, . . e f 21 Th e Ea r ou s Poe tr o Pe rs a . th e Rev Pro ly R ligi y i By . f . H u D D D Th l . e Mo t n . . e r n o o . e o . J p l . . ( B li ) . H l Bibl 9 Th e s to r o f th e En i s h e . o n ro n D D i y g By J h B w , . . 12 En glis h Dia le cts fro m th e Eighth Ce n tu ry to th e Pre s e n t i D t L tt . D. S ea . a . . . E. B A . y By W W k , .

K n A rt u r i n d Le e n d. r 2 H s to r a n P . Le 2 i g h i y g By o f W. wis n A Jo e s . M . .

e a n d S . A . D 5 4 Th e a a s ra e LL. . Ic l ic g . By W C igi ,

d . e a r M A 23 G re e ra e . . S . . k T g y By J T h pp d , H Th e a a i n L t ra tu r . F n de rs n 3 e . . e o 3 B ll d i e By T .

G o e t e a n d th e e n t e t e n tu r . Pro . . 37 h Tw i h C y By f J G .

h . D. o e rts o n M .A P R b , h h R v H C o r M A . h r u a o u rs t e e . . a t . 39 T e o . . T b d By J y , En l s L te ra tu re M s s F M s t s m i n . . . 66 y ici g i h i By i C E. u r Sp ge o n . PHILOSOPHY A ND RELIG ION d D f G o i n e o n s . F Th e e a o Ea r r . . e o n s 4 Id ly R ligi By B J v .

Dr . e o n s m a ra t e e o n . P. 5 7 Co p iv R ligi By B J v .

M rs . A a m r n d P a de . 69 Pl a to Mo a l a olitic l I al s By J d . S r L e n r Pro . o e Li . D 6 Th e Mo ra a d Mo a o rt . tt . 2 l if l W h By f l y ,

D. D h En s Pu r ta n o n ro n . T e s . 3 gli h i By J h B w , l l An His to rica l A cco u n t o f th e Ris e a n d De ve lo pm e n t o f h t e Rt Ho n . Pre s byte ria n is m i n S cotla n d. By th e

Lo rd al o u r o f u r e K. T B f B l igh ,

D Li . R . r m an . t m H. o Me t o d s . ev . 4l h i By B W k . EDUCATION M A . Un r t . S . a t . Me d e al e s . 38 Life i n th e i v iv i y By R R i .

PHYSICS

5 2 Th Ea e P . P in rt . . H o n t R ro . F. . S . h By f J y g. 5 3 Th e Atm r A os e e . . . e rr M . A h By J B y . 8 ] Th e S u n P . ro . A . S a m n D . S F R S . so c . . y f R p , . 65 e n h t o t e A o m o o x M . A . . n C B y d By J h , 5 5 Th P s f M e A d M . a a s s o u s . . oo A hy ic l B i ic By W . 7I a tu ra l S ou r e f En e r P H G D s o . ro . A . . s on N c gy By f ib . .Sc . PSYC HOLOG Y

I4 An I rodu cti on to Ex e rim en ta l Ps olo . Dr C. p ych gy By s.

fiy e rs .

45 Th e Ps o o o f n sa n t . e rn a rd Ha rt M . D. ych l gy I i y By B ,

V . 77 Th e Bea u tifu l . By e rn o n Lee INDUSTRIAL AND MECHANICAL SCIENCE

m . Ed 3 1 Th e Mo de rn Lo co o tive By C . ga r

e rn a rs . . L. 5 6 Th e Mo d W hip By E A ttwoo d.

i m o t o n . H. H All I7 A e r a Lo o E. ar e r M .A. n d a n l c i By p . . a

u B . S E. Fe rg so n , c .

i n L o m t n . . s . 18 Ele tr t o o o A G . te E. c c ici y c i By Why .

e r P u M .A . re e e a ro . Fo e L. rte 63 ss . . s Wi l T l g phy By f C c .

f L f r d. M. 5 8 Th e Sto r o a o a o e a Pro . . . d A y f B By f T B Woo . . C n Ch m . A. a s to a P l 47 re n an . . c . B wi g By h .

- M n n . a n t 82 Co al i i g By T . C . C

L e r Pro . H Proc ter. 83 e a th . By f . R .

A ve ry va l u a ble se ries o f b o o ks which com b in e i n a very h ha ppy w a y a po pu l a r p re s e n ta tion o f s cie n tific tru th a lo n g W i th t e a ccu ra cy o f tre a tm e n t which i n s u ch s u bje cts i s thei r d n e ra l a e a ra n e a n d i n th e u a t o f t e r b n di n , r n t. an ge pp c , q li y h i i g p i e r t e s e o u m e s a re e r a s th e m o s t s a t s a tor o f a ll t os e pa p , h v l p h p i f c y h f w i o ffe r to th e in u irin g l a ym an th e a rdly e a rn e d p ro du ts o h ch q ' h c d s t re a r - S ec ta tor te chn ica l a n p e cialis s e ch . p

' h u A co m pl e te s e t of th e s e m a n u a ls i s a s e s s e n tia l to t e eq ip e m en t o f a go o d s choo l a s i s a n ca n co n ce i v t an t s e n o be tte r se rie s o f ha n dy bo oks fo r re a dy re fe re n ce h ho '— u S ch ool W orld rep re s en te d b y th e Ca m bridge M a n a ls .

Cam b ridge Un ive rs ity Pre s s

F C a Ma n a e r C . . l y , g C E . e tte r La n e . LONDON : F , EDINBURG H : 100 Prin ce s S treet