Text and Subtext on the Silk Road

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cp.leads 30 March 2015 text and subtext on the Silk Road

The CCP unabashedly studied Lee Kuan Yew‘s rule over Singapore for three decades. On Lee’s death the most Beijing could do was describe its ties as a business affair. Omitting the word ‘friendly’ in its eulogy, China’s MFA took aim at his firm pro-US position. Lee’s disregard for human rights suited China, but his clean government measures were set aside on grounds of ‘Chinese characteristics’. What Lee saw as beyond challenge—e.g. US advances in innovation—China sees as no more than a leap away. Underlying this are two divergent narratives of Chineseness: Singapore a former colony proud of its rise in global ratings, China taking the high moral ground of indigenous values. The sage is gone—will his vision of universal values go with him? Singapore-China relations after Lee Kuan Yew Ding Dong 丁咚 | Sina Blog

Regional strongman Lee Kuan Yew was in the end, it seems, a Trojan horse for Western values, and hence inadmissible to the highest hall of honour in Beijing’s temple of Chinese sagehood. Piqued at his prompting of Obama’s pivot to Asia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would give him no greater credit than ‘mutually beneficial cooperation’. The pivot is read in China as anti-Chinese; Lee’s clear distinction between China as a nation and the Beijing regime is denied by Beijing as manifest—not to say treacherous—nonsense. But in the non-PAP Singapore that Ding sees in the making, this is the most likely of Lee’s international relations doctrines to endure. with the UK joining the China-led AIIB, is the US far behind? Deng Yuwen 邓聿文 | Caijing

Twisting on a spit of injured dignity and self-interest, the US may well rue the congressional warfare that led it to decline membership of China’s AIIB, while admonishing others to decline with it. Yet, finds columnist Deng Yuwen, a cooler appraisal is available. The UK accession to AIIB can be read as continuity with deep-rooted Asian interests. Advantage flowing to China is conditional on the rest of the world feeling comfortable with its new role. China’s main gain—a voice at the table—is in fact relatively modest, as is the barrier to the US applying for membership. nothing normal about the ‘new normal’ Zhang Jun 张军 | Financial Times Chinese Pessimism about the economy results, finds Zhang Jun, from taking the officially designated ‘new normal’ of low growth rates at face value: it is indeed quite abnormal. His vision of the economy resembles a zombie sci-fi film: despite ever- slower fixed asset investment, shambling hordes of debtors addicted to liquidity rush every form of shadow banking, pushing up the cost of finance. The urgent priority is to shrink the future growth rate of debt. Zhang’s dystopia thus reverts to orthodox prescriptions: capital market reform, a shrink-ray beamed at Local Government Finance Platforms; the starship troopers of higher labour productivity, technological innovation and industrial upgrading are on their way. Growth in investment demand will, however, stay its zombie course.

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Ding Dong 丁咚 | public intellectual

Widely-read political and social affairs columnist Ding also focuses on global strategy. A prominent critic of China’s foreign policy, he speaks for a rising generation little beholden to orthodoxy. Seeing the North Korean alliance unsentimentally, he asks why China is otherwise so isolated in Asia. A new-style realist, he supports Sino-American peaceful coexistence. Ding argues the Middle East, rather than China, should be seen by the US as its primary challenge: Beijing must bear in mind how much it owes its rapid development to US-led globalisation, reducing its commitment to pariah states like Russia, North Korea and Venezuela.

Deng Yuwen 邓聿文 | independent columnist

Former deputy chief editor of Study Times at the Central Party School, Deng was dismissed for a 2013 proposal to disengage with North Korea. A foreign policy realist, he disliked Hu Jintao’s 胡锦涛 peace/harmony narrative, arguing it lacked credibility. He finds Xi’s ‘great power diplomacy’, deviating from Deng Xiaoping’s 邓小平 low-profile strategy, more sustainable. China must however limit its assertiveness, especially in backing the risky tactics of Russia’s Putin.

Zhang Jun 张军 | Fudan University China Centre for Economic Studies director

The dichotomy of extensive and intensive growth driven by investment and total factor productivity (TFP) respectively, is for Zhang a red herring. More meaningful is to consider what drove China’s TFP gains. Lower than those of the US, they nonetheless surpassed others in East Asia. Understanding this would enable China’s leaders to plan more effectively to safeguard the economy’s long-term growth prospects.

10 misconceptions about Belt and Road

On 29 March Xi Jinping presented key policy announcements at the Bo’ao Asia Forum. Dealing primarily with the AIIB and the Belt and Road, Xi’s message dealt in generalities focusing on openness and inclusiveness; a detailed plan was issued by Xinhua separately. Checking Xi’s announcement against a listing of possible misinterpretations offered the previous week by Zhao Lei 赵磊 Central Party School, we note Xi, unlike scores of propagandists who still fail to measure the impact of such formulations, managed to avoid Zhao’s ‘cognitive errors’ listed below.

1. Be cautious in using ‘bridgehead’ Such expressions are military

2. Be cautious in references to ‘overcapacity’ Do to others as you would have them do to you

3. Claims that ‘there are 65 countries along the route,’ is inaccurate Use ‘65+’ countries and look towards the United States, Latin America, and so on

4. Saying ‘The Silk Road is mainly composed of developing countries’ is inaccurate Developed countries in ASEAN and Europe are also important members of Belt and Road

5. ‘Cooperation on resources and energy’ is not the only theme of Belt and Road

6. Your position depends on what you do; don’t worry about positioning yourself historically or geographically

7. What China should be selling to Silk Road countries first requires understanding what these partners need It is no longer confined to silk, tea or ceramics

8. The Belt and Road strategy needs both top-level design and bottom-up innovation 9. Belt and Road cannot be self-enclosed, we must understand differences among the Silk Road countries If Belt and Road is to be truly viable, we must really get to know every country and every group

10. While having no end date, Belt and Road has a critical path needing research

In short, in building the Silk Roads, we should always think about what kind of China is attractive to those countries. Put simply, development and stability come first, openness and convenience second. China Silk Road 2.0 is not only about industrial upgrading and market expansion, but also about cognitive upgrading; only with roads for ideas can there be Silk Roads.

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