Addressing Libya's Multiple Crises: When Violent Politics, Extremism

JULY 2015 Addressing Libya’s multiple crises: CRU Policy Brief When violent politics, extremism and crime meet Libya is in chaos: the country’s transition out of Qadhafi’s dictatorship is plagued by an extreme polarization in politics and an ongoing military conflict. Added to that are other pressing issues such as the current migrant-smuggling crisis and the proliferation of jihadism. This policy brief explains how Libya’s multiple crises in the fields of politics, the military, crime and extremism are interlinked through the interests and actions of influential (armed) actors. It also offers a critical reflection on current and future international engagement in the country.1 Introduction lawlessness and violence which the country has been unable to address. At present, Abdo & Iba Kamouni-Janssen El Floor The tragic chain of disasters involving there are two rival administrations and no migrant-smuggling boats departing from functioning central government, and real Libya has again turned the world’s attention power is in the hands of armed brigades and to the war-torn country. In view of the latest militias. series of tragedies in April and May of this year, finding a way to cooperate with Libya Libya is suffering from many ‘sub-crises’ in combating human trafficking and dealing – in the fields of politics, the military, with the expansion and actions of the Islamic extremism and crime – which are connected State (IS) have become a pressing issue through the diverse interests of influential for the international community. However, actors. After the 2011 revolution, a wave since the toppling of President Muammar of interest groups emerged, engaging Qadhafi in 2011, Libya has fallen into chaos, in alliances in order to acquire political and military dominance and to exclude opponents from positions of influence. The atomization in Libya’s polity following 1 This policy brief concentrates on the domestic the ousting of Qadhafi preceded an dimensions of the conflict in Libya. Although intense polarization and militarization in important, the role of external forces (including the subsequent years, as two powerful and regional states) that support Libyan actors is broad political-military power blocs emerged. left outside the scope of the analysis. We would A closer examination of actors within the like to thank Mariska van Beijnum, Jort Hemmer, Ivan Briscoe, Rosan Smits and Nick Grinstead for opposing camps, however, reveals that their their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The sole interests are manifold, fluid, localized and responsibility for the brief’s content lies with often based on ideological, tribal and social the authors. connections. These actors’ connections CRU Policy Brief and strategies often go beyond their the other. Beyond secular-versus-Islamist political-military coalition, meaning that stereotyping, the rivalry between the two other linkages have been formed in addition blocs essentially comes down to a division to existing alliances. Many powerful Libyan between new and old elites: on the one hand players can also be linked to jihadi groups there are those who consider themselves the and criminal networks. true revolutionaries and who want a definitive break with the past by purging all Qadhafi This state of affairs presents significant remnants, while on the other hand there challenges for policy-making. Despite are those who are marked by their (alleged) the launch in 2014 of a United Nations participation in the Qadhafi regime, and (UN) initiative designed to bring together who are more receptive to an institutional the warring parties in a dialogue, current continuity between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ dynamics on the ground should prompt a Libya. Deep-rooted reciprocal mistrust over critical reassessment of the international this issue was aggravated by the presence of aim of supporting the creation of a central huge numbers of armed groups and militias government. Likewise, the EU’s plans to that did not demobilize after the toppling of target the human trafficking networks routes Qadhafi but allied themselves with political through Libya prompts questions on the actors to acquire more territorial control roles of Libyan political and military factions and resources. And in a country with no in these networks. functioning national army and where guns are everywhere, political actors reached out to armed groups for their own protection and The militarization of politics to further their agendas. Most notably, the hardline revolutionary brigade from the city of Libya’s current dichotomization is rooted Misrata, one of the revolutionary strongholds in the immediate post-revolutionary during the uprising, sided with the JCP period, when the sudden opening up of coalition. Brigades from the city of Zintan2 and political space led to a power game in some tribal armed groups linked themselves to which patronage and exclusion resurfaced. the NFA and their political affiliates. With no existing state structure in place, the unity of the Libyan state was challenged Characteristic of the post-Qaddafi era is the by a plethora of interest groups and their urge by all political factions to be part of the constituencies based on tribes, cities, ruling establishment, as being out of power regions and various Islamist tendencies. is considered to be politically overpowered An intense power struggle emerged by others. This might sound obvious in a in which everyone wanted a piece of the healthy political climate, however in a country post-Qadhafi cake and attempted to secure devoid of a constitution and a functional access to Libya’s resources at the expense of state apparatus and in which no democratic others. The unified effort that characterized political culture exists exclusion is equal to the revolution (thawra) quickly turned political extinction. When faced with the into a zero-sum struggle over resources threat of exclusion, all political faction did not (tharwa) in which alliance-building became recoil from relying on armed politics to further the key to political power. Since 2011, their political agendas. Exclusionary politics the marginalization of political enemies reached a climax in 2013, when the JCP-led through the forging of pragmatic and often bloc managed to push through parliament unexpected alliances has been a widely the Political Isolation Law, a law designed to adopted survival strategy. In 2012, elections generated two political blocs in parliament (the General National 2 Under Qadhafi, the city of Zintan was closely linked to the Warfalla and the Qadhadhfa tribes, which were Congress, GNC): the national-centrists of allies of the regime. Zintan was long perceived as a the National Forces Alliance (NFA) on the ‘regime stronghold’, even though the Zintani fought one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood- alongside the Misratans in the uprising against associated Justice and Construction Qadhafi. After the ousting of the regime, animosity Party (JCP) and other Islamist factions on between the two cities quickly resurfaced. 2 CRU Policy Brief ban all former Qadhafi officials from public In an effort to consolidate and legitimize their life. The passage of the law was a turning power, Libya’s political actors participated point in Libya’s transition, not only because in the June 2014 general elections which it provided the Islamist bloc in the GNC with took place amidst the Dignity–Dawn a legal instrument to target its political rivals confrontation. Voter turnout was low (18%), represented by the NFA, but also because it but NFA-affiliated politicians managed to win happened at gunpoint and thereby illustrated a majority that significantly altered the power the level of militarization of Libyan politics. balance in parliament at the expense of the JCP and affiliated parties. However, as the A response to this law came in early 2014, Islamist–Misratan brigades were powerful when former Qadhafi general Khalifa Haftar, enough to take over Tripoli and because in a televised speech, vowed to “rescue” of the deteriorating security situation in Libya from the “terrorist [Islamist] threat”. He Benghazi where the new parliament was subsequently launched a military campaign, ought to settle, the newly elected parliament dubbed Operation Dignity (Karama)3, that (House of Representatives, HoR) was forced rallied various armed groups against the to move to the eastern city of Tobruk. In one dominance of the Islamists in the GNC and of its first sessions, the HoR branded those the power of the Misrata brigades. Operation involved in Operation Dawn as “terrorists”. Dignity is a loose alliance and this is what Unsurprisingly, the former members of the makes it successful: it grants disadvantaged GNC rejected the elections result, repudiated groups the opportunity to pursue factional the administration in Tobruk, and instead interests while at the same time battling established a rival government in Tripoli. the Islamists’ dominance – despite differing The political divide was deepened when the views within the alliance regarding the Islamist-controlled Supreme Court, which transition and post-Qadhafi Libya. It was is based in Tripoli, ruled that the election not long before brigades from Misrata and of the Tobruk-based government was Islamist armed groups responded in turn by unconstitutional. initiating a military campaign of their own, Operation Libya Dawn (Fajr Libia)4 with the The far-reaching polarization in Libyan aim of bringing down the Dignity camp. politics has led to a remarkable situation: the country now hosts two rival governments that both claim to be the legitimate power holder and that reside in two 3 Operation Dignity consists of a patchwork of actors political capitals: Tripoli and Tobruk5. The notably in the East, but also in the West and the connection of the parallel governments South. Prominent members include former army with, respectively, Operation Dawn and units such as the Sa’eqa Special Forces Unit and Operation Dignity, moreover signals a shift the federalist-linked Barqa Military Council. In the in the relational balance between political West, it is supported by the Zintan armed groups and military forces in Libya.

Load more