SOUTHERN THAILAND: INSURGENCY, NOT JIHAD Asia Report N°98 – 18 May 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................ i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. HISTORICAL GRIEVANCES ..................................................................................... 2 A. PATANI AND SIAM.................................................................................................................2 B. NATIONALIST ASSIMILATION POLICIES .................................................................................3 C. HOPES OF INDEPENDENCE .....................................................................................................4 D. HAJI SULONG AND THE DUSUN NYUR REBELLION ................................................................5 III. 1960-1990: REBELLION AND CONCILIATION...................................................... 6 A. BNPP ...................................................................................................................................6 B. BRN.....................................................................................................................................7 C. PULO...................................................................................................................................8 D. THE 1975 PROTESTS .............................................................................................................9 E. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE ............................................................................................11 IV. NEW STRAINS EMERGE.......................................................................................... 12 A. BRN AND PULO SPLIT.......................................................................................................12 B. GMIP .................................................................................................................................13 C. BERSATU AND THE "FALLING LEAVES" CAMPAIGN.............................................................14 D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AND THE MALAYSIA FACTOR......................................................14 E. BEGINNING THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL..................................................................................16 V. 4 JANUARY 2004 ......................................................................................................... 17 A. THE ARMY CAMP RAID.......................................................................................................17 B. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE....................................................................................................17 C. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS ...................................................................................................18 VI. 28 APRIL 2004.............................................................................................................. 21 A. USTADZ SOH'S BROTHERHOOD ...........................................................................................21 B. THE BATTLE OF KRUE SE MOSQUE.....................................................................................22 C. ATTACKS ELSEWHERE ........................................................................................................24 D. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS ...................................................................................................25 E. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE....................................................................................................26 VII. 25 OCTOBER 2004 ...................................................................................................... 27 A. THE TAK BAI PROTEST .......................................................................................................27 B. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS ...................................................................................................30 C. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE....................................................................................................31 VIII. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE 2004 UPSURGE......................................................... 32 A. INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC INSPIRATION AND THE WAR IN IRAQ...........................................32 B. POVERTY AND UNDER-DEVELOPMENT................................................................................33 C. GOVERNMENT ARCHITECTURE REVAMPED .........................................................................33 D. DETERIORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WAR ON DRUGS..........................................35 IX. PROSPECTS FOR A BROADER REGIONAL JIHAD .......................................... 37 X. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 39 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THAILAND .............................................................................................................40 B. MAP OF THAILAND'S THREE SOUTHERN PROVINCES ...........................................................41 C. GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................42 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................44 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2002............................................45 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................47 Asia Report N°98 18 May 2005 SOUTHERN THAILAND: INSURGENCY, NOT JIHAD EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Violence in Thailand's southern, mainly Malay Muslim broad amnesty. The insurgency looked to be all but over provinces has been steadily escalating since early 2004, by the mid-1990s. exacerbated by the disastrously heavy-handed policies of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. There is widespread But new strains then appeared, with four particularly concern in the region that left unchecked, the unrest could significant groups emerging or re-emerging, and major turn into a mass-based insurgency, or even a regional violence erupting in early 2004. The major groups active jihad, although to date there is no evidence of external today include: involvement in the bombings and killings that have BRN-C (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate, become almost a daily occurrence. National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate) the only active faction of BRN, first established in the early The rise of more puritanical strains of Islam in southern 1960s to fight for an independent Patani state. Thailand is often cited as contributing to the violence, Thought to be the largest and best organised of the particularly given Muslim anger at the deployment of armed groups, it is focused on political organising Thai troops in Iraq. But while Islamic consciousness and recruitment within Islamic schools; and a sense of persecution and solidarity with fellow Muslims has grown over the last two decades, it would Pemuda, a separatist youth movement (part of be a mistake to view the conflict as simply another which is controlled by BRN-C), believed to be manifestation of Islamic terrorism. The violence is responsible for a large proportion of day-to-day driven by local issues. sabotage, shooting and bombing attacks; GMIP (Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani, Patani There is no question that the Muslim south is one of the Islamic Mujahidin Group), established by poorest parts of Thailand, but the grievances are political, Afghanistan veterans in 1995, committed to an and even well thought-out development policies will not independent Islamic state; and deal with the unrest effectively unless those grievances are addressed. However, almost every step the government New PULO, established in 1995 as an offshoot has taken has exacerbated the problem. of PULO and the smallest of the active armed groups, is fighting for an independent state. The origins of the current violence lie in historical grievances stemming from discrimination against the In an effort to understand the current violence and who ethnic Malay Muslim population and attempts at forced is involved, this report focuses in detail on three recent assimilation by successive ethnic Thai Buddhist major outbreaks. The first, on 4 January 2004, involved governments in Bangkok for almost a century. carefully coordinated attacks in which militants raided an army arsenal, torched schools and police posts, and Armed separatist groups have been active there since the following day, set off several bombs. the late 1960s, with particularly virulent violence in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The largest and most The second, on 28 April 2004, involved synchronised effective group of several operating then was PULO attacks on eleven police posts and army checkpoints (Patani United Liberation Organisation), which called across Pattani, Yala and Songkhla, and ended in a for an independent Islamic state but whose thrust was bloody showdown at the Krue Se Mosque when the more ethno-nationalist than Islamist. Thai army gunned down 32 men inside. By the end of the day, 105 militants, one civilian and five members The Thai government managed to stem the unrest with of the security forces were dead. political and economic reforms that undercut support for armed struggle, and hundreds of fighters accepted a The third, on 25 October 2004, began with a demonstration outside a police station and ended