Accountability in International Aid: the Case of Georgia

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Accountability in International Aid: the Case of Georgia Accountability in International Aid: The Case of Georgia by Till Bruckner [email protected] Abstract This thesis explores accountability in international aid to the Republic of Georgia in 2008-2009. Conceptualizing accountability as the obligation to manage the expectations of multiple stakeholders with often divergent interests, it challenges the common assumption that making aid more accountable per se will automatically lead to better aid. Instead, it argues that accountability relationships reflect power relationships; power influences which stakeholders' expectations are met, to what degree they are met, and what kinds of accountability demands by which stakeholders are viewed as legitimate and therefore entail an organizational obligation to respond. After discussing the links between power and accountability in international aid, with particular reference to donors, NGOs and the Georgian government, the thesis proceeds to explore how power and accountability relationships have influenced the allocation, management and implementation of international aid in Georgia, focusing on the aftermath of the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. Based on extensive fieldwork in Georgia during 2008-2009, the thesis examines the influence of power and accountability relationships on emergency relief operations, the composition of an international aid package worth USD 4.5 billion, donor involvement in formulating state policy on internally displaced persons and the subsequent donor-financed provision of housing to the displaced, and the provision of bulk food aid to conflict-affected Georgians. This thesis concludes that accountability relationships in international aid reflect power relationships. As aid recipients wield little or no power over donors and NGOs, these aid providers often can (and do) ignore the expectations generated by this stakeholder group, instead giving priority to managing the competing expectations of more powerful stakeholders. Therefore, the widely observed lack of effectiveness of international aid is not due to an overall lack of accountability within international aid, as is commonly believed. Rather, aid is often ineffective at relieving human suffering and generating pro-poor development because aid providers are primarily accountable to powerful stakeholders with little interest in making aid more effective. PhD thesis, University of Bristol, 2011 Supervisors: Dr Timothy Edmunds and Reverend Dr Martin Gainsborough Viva Examiners: Professor Mark Duffied and Dr Vanessa Pupavac 1 Table of Contents Chapter One: Introduction page 3 The August 2008 War and its Aftermath page 3 The Global Aid Industry page 5 Accountability and International Aid page 6 Surviving Georgia‟s Foreign Overlords page 7 Research Methodology page 10 Chapter Overview page 14 Chapter Two: Accountability, Power and Third Party Government page 16 Accountability and Power page 17 Third Party Government in the West page 20 Conclusion page 25 Chapter Three: Accountability and Power in International Aid page 26 Aid Accountability and Aid Effectiveness page 26 Third Party Government in International Aid page 29 Donors, NGOs and Phantom Accountability page 31 Conclusion page 37 Chapter Four: Geopolitics, Humanitarian Relief and Macro-Level Aid page 39 The “Military-Humanitarian Operation” of August 2008 page 40 The Joint Needs Assessment and Brussels Donor Conference page 48 Conclusion page 58 Chapter Five: Georgian IDP Policy and the Mushroom Villages page 61 Georgian IDP Policy: From Separation to Integration page 61 The Mushroom Villages page 67 Conclusion page 77 Chapter Six: Inedible Food Aid and Phantom Accountability page 81 Inedible Food Aid page 81 Formal Accountability Standards and Food Aid page 88 Accountability Failure page 92 Conclusion page 94 Chapter Seven: Conclusion page 98 Accountability and Power in International Aid page 98 Aid Accountability to Domestic Stakeholders page 101 Donors and Phantom Accountability page 105 The Aid Charade page 108 Rethinking International Aid page 110 Bibliography page 111 2 Chapter One: Introduction This thesis explores accountability in international aid to the Republic of Georgia in 2008-2009, arguing that accountability relationships in international aid reflect power relationships. This introductory chapter opens with an overview of the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war and the ensuing provision of billions of dollars in humanitarian and development aid by international donors. It then moves on to examine the supply side of aid, discussing the main theoretical approaches to the global aid industry in general before focusing in greater depth on the issue of aid and accountability. A subsequent section explores the political context within which this aid was received in Georgia, highlighting enduring patterns in the nation‟s long history of interaction with external great powers. After briefly discussing the research methodology used to explore the links between power and accountability in aid to Georgia, this chapter closes with an overview of the thesis as a whole. The August 2008 War and its Aftermath The Republic of Georgia and Russia went to war in August 2008, following weeks of escalating tensions in and around the self-declared republic of South Ossetia. The Georgian armed forces were decisively defeated on the battlefield within days and fled. Russian troops and local paramilitary forces assumed control of the entire territory of South Ossetia, a sizeable portion of which had previously been controlled by Georgia. Unopposed, the Russian army then pushed further south into Georgia proper, occupying the town of Gori and advancing towards the capital of Tbilisi. Meanwhile, in the west, Russian forces evicted Georgian troops from the Kodori gorge, a highland valley that was Georgia‟s last foothold inside the territory claimed by the self-declared republic of Abkhazia, and temporarily occupied several towns in western Georgia. While the conflict made headlines around the world, military engagements only lasted for several days and were generally limited to a small geographical area. Contrary to initial claims by both sides and early media reports1, damage to infrastructure was minor and largely confined to the theatre of engagement (EC/WB 2008), and combined military and civilian fatalities added up to less than a thousand people.2 Nevertheless, the impact on Georgia was huge. Around 127,000 people fled the Russian advance and took refuge with relatives or in public buildings in the capital Tbilisi and other locations in Georgia.3 Most of the displaced came from in and around Gori and were able to return home following the Russian withdrawal from the area several weeks later. In contrast, over 20,000 Georgians who had fled South Ossetian territory and the Kodori gorge were expected to remain displaced, adding to Georgia‟s over 200,000 long-term displaced from earlier conflicts in the 1990s (MRA 2010). Following the war, Georgia plunged from double-digit growth into deep recession as trade ground to a near halt, foreign investors fled, tax revenues plummeted, and the banking system teetered on the brink of collapse, threatening economic turmoil (UN/WB 2008). The Georgian government remained in power and the administration continued to function unimpeded, but the August 2008 episode had strongly shaken the leadership‟s credibility both at home and abroad, not least because a mounting body of evidence suggested that Tbilisi rather than Moscow had been the main instigator of the war.4 Western donors and aid organizations reacted quickly to the conflict. Initially, the US military took the lead in relief operations, putting uniformed US troops on the ground as a “humanitarian tripwire” to 1 “1,500 Reported Killed in Georgia Battle”, NYT, 09 August 2008; “Georgia conflict: Screams of the injured rise from residential streets”, The Telegraph, 09 August 2008; “Pensioners burned alive in a church and a baby stabbed to death - just some of the horrific stories from Georgia”, Daily Mail, 12 August 2008; “Saakashvili Says Russia Hit Pipeline; BP Unaware”, Civil Georgia, 12 August 2008; “An Uncertain Death Toll In Georgia-Russia War”, Washington Post, 25 August 2008; “Saakashvili: 1,600 Houses „Destroyed‟ in Buffer Zone”, Civil Georgia, 17 October 2008 2 “Official Interim Report on Number of Casualties”, Civil Georgia, 03 September 2008 3 “2011 UNHCR country operations profile – Georgia”, UNHCR website. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d2e6 (acc. 07 April 2011) 4 "Georgia Claims on Russia War Called Into Question", NYT, 07 November 2008; "Georgia fired first shot, say UK monitors", Sunday Times, 09 November 2008; "British Monitor Complicates Georgian Blame Game", Wall Street Journal, 19 December 2008; “Missiles Over Tskhinvali”, The National Interest, 20 April 2010; see also: Bruckner 2010a, Halbach 2009, Richter 2009. 3 deter further Russian advances (Hansen 2010). In order to signal continuing support for Georgia and its government, and to boost economic confidence, the Bush administration announced a one billion dollar American aid package in early September 2008 (TIG 2008g). During a conference held in Brussels the following month, international donors pledged a total of 4.5 billion dollars in aid over a three year period (TIG 2008e). This donor largesse towards Georgia was remarkable. The total amount pledged was huge for a middle-income country of just over four million inhabitants that had suffered little direct war-related damage. In fact, the 4.5
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