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International Dimensions of the Korean

Youngho Kim (Department of Political Science, Sungshin Women's University)

Introduction The was the disaster unprecedented in the modern history of the Korean nation. The opening of the Soviet and Chinese archives enables us to reevaluate the international dimensions of the origins and development of this tragic war.1) The intensity of the war and the enormous suffering of the nation cannot be adequately explained without due regard to the international dimensions of the war. Yet International dimensions have been eclipsed by civil war theories which find the locus of the war in domestic factors such as border clashes between North and South . Civil war theories were first advanced by I. F. Stone and D. F. Flemming in hypothetical forms.2) They were elaborated by Bruce

1) Russian President handed over Soviet archival documents on the Korean War to President Kim Young Sam of the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the latter's visit to Moscow in June 1994. The collection of Soviet documents includes 216 previously classified documents, dated 1949 to 1953, totaling 548 pages. The summarized version of the Korean translation of the collection was released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROK in July 1994. The Korean translation will be hereafter called the Soviet Documents. The Soviet Documents will be cited in English from translation of the Korean version with the date of the documents. Most of the Soviet archival documents have been translated into English by Kathryn Weathersby. If the documents are quoted from her translation, they will be specified. For her translation, see Kathryn Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Winter 1993), pp. 425-58; also Weathersby, "To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," International History Project Bulletin, No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1-9 (hereafter cited as CWIHP Bulletin); also Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin, Nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995-1996), pp. 30-84. For Soviet documents on Chinese intervention, see Alexander Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim and Chinas Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," CWIHP Bulletin, Nos. 6-7, pp. 94-119. One of the most important Chinese sources is a collection of 's manuscript entitled Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengo (Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the Founding of the Republic) which has been translated into English. See Li Ziaobing, Wang Xi, and Chen Jian, "Mao's Dispatch of Chinese Troops to Korea: Forty-Six Telegrams, July-," Chinese Historians, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 63-86; also Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 229-291. 2

Cumings, most notably in his "second mosaic" thesis which finds the origins of the war in the South's provocation of the border conflict and the counterattack by the North along the 38th parallel.3) Cumings greatly benifited from the declassification of US official documents in the 1970s. In contrast, the traditional theories which emphasize the international dimensions of the war cannot provide solid evidence because of the inaccessibility of Soviet documentary sources. With the opening of the Soviet and Chinese archives it is possible to critically evaluate civil war theories and to shed new light on the international dimensions of the war. This essay has two objectives. The first objective is to critically analyze civil war theories. Analysis will focus on Cumings's civil war theory, the most systematic of the genre. New Soviet documents show that the border conflicts on the 38th parallel constitued the focal point around which the strategic calculations of Stalin and Kim Il Sung revolved before the decision on the North's invasion was made. This essay will demonstrate that Stalin put tight reins on the major border conflicts which might escalate into a general war between the North and South. Thus Cumings's claim that the origins of the war can be found in the extension of the border clashes cannot be substantiated. Despite Kim's repeated requests Stalin did not allow Kim to invade the South until there emerged an advantageous strategic environment to advance Soviet national interests in the Cold War struggle with the United

States. The second objective of this essay is to explain when Stalin decided to allow Kim to invade the South. The timing of Stalin's decision has been an unresolved question before the declassification of the Soviet documents. New

2) I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), p. 44; D. F. Flemming, The Cold War and its Origins, Vol. II, 1950-1960 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), p. 606. Stone's book, originally published by the Press in 1951, was reprinted with a new preface by Cumings in 1988. 3) , The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 568-621. 3

evidence shows that Stalin expressed his intention to approve Kim's invasion on January 30, 1950, just after the agreement on the new Sino-Soviet alliance treaty had been striken. During the meeting with Mao on January 22, 1950, Stalin announced his decision to throw away the Yalta agreement signed with the US and asked Mao to join with him in the struggle with the US.4) This essay will demonstrate that Stalin's Korea decision was made as part of his global Cold War strategy. Stalin sought to deal a severe blow to the prestige of the US by removing the South from the US . He also sought to weaken US capabilities in Korea by using Communist Chinese forces and Soviet air force when the US intervened in the war.

A Critique of Cumings's Civil War Theory Civil war theories explain the origins of the Korean War in terms of the issue of land reform and border conflicts. The prominent civil war theorist is Bruce Cumings. He emphasizes the influence of the legacies of the Japanese colonial era on the outbreak of the war. The of Korea after the liberation hindered the Korean nation from solving the negative colonial legacies. Cumings cites land reform as one of the most important issues. Yet he claims that there appeared a great difference in the resolution of the issue in the two . The North which accomplished a successful land reform in 1946 decided to occupy the South and undertake the land reform in the South. Thus the Korean War can be construed as a civil war which occurred to solve the land reform. To support his view, Cumings claims that "it is generally thought that land reform began to be implemented before June 1950, but in fact not a single acre had changed hands by ."5) Yet a captured North Korean document during the Korean War shows that land reform in the South had been fully accomplished before the outbreak of

4) "Conversation between Stalin and Mao," January 22, 1950, CWIHP Bulletin, Vols. 6-7, pp. 7-9. 5) Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, p. 455. 4

the war. The document is a survey report on the status of the land reform in the South written by the officials of the North who occupied the Bo-Eun Kun area.6) This report confirms that lands were successfully distributed to farmers in the area. In other areas in the South land reform had already been accomplished before June 1950. Thus Cuming's civil war theory which finds the war's origin in land reform cannot be substantiated. Cumings also tries to explain the origins of the war in terms of the extension of the border clashes along the 38th parallel between the North and South. His civil war theory is presented in the form of the "second mosaic thesis." The essence of the second mosaic is that the war was sparked by the South's provocation on the Onjin peninsula, and quickly spread to the 38th parallel with the mobilization of Northern troops.7) There were no inland roads to the peninsula from the South, thus Ongjin was cut off from the rest of . The South's provocation ignited the war with the chain reaction by the North. Cumings concludes that "the war began in the same, remote locus of much of the 1949 fighting, the Ongjin peninsula, and some hours later spread along the parallel westward, to Kaesong, Chunchon, and the East Coast."8) Cumings's claim that the South provoked a border conflict in the night of June 24-25, 1950 was dismissed by the South Korean official history as "a completely exaggerated false report contrary to the facts."9) Moreover, new Soviet documents show that Stalin dispatched Soviet Lieutenant General Vasiliev, a hero of the German-Soviet conflict in World War II, to prepare the invasion plan just after he decided to approve the North Korean invasion.10) Vasiliev completed the plan with General , the Chief of Staff of North

6) "Tonggye Bogo e Kwanhayo - Bo-Eun Kun Tojigaehyuk e Kwanhan Tonggye," ("On the Report of the Statistics - the Statistics on the Land Reform of Bo-Eun Kun," Item 4/87, SA 2010, Record Group (RG) 242, Washington National Records Center. 7) Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, p. 617. 8) Ibid., p. 569. 9) Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Korea, Hanguk Chonjang-Sa (History of the Korean War), Vol. II (, 1969), p. 221. 10) Shtykov to Vasilevsky, February 23, 1950 in Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," p. 37. 5

Korea on May 29, 1950.11) Following this plan, on June 12, 1950, North Korean troops began to move and completed their concentration to the advance positions near the 38th parallel on June 23, 1950.12) On June 24, 1950, North Korean divisional commanders were given orders about the exact time and date of the invasion, 4:40 a.m. of June 25, 1950.13) The North Korean Defense Minister explained the invasion to North Korean soldiers in terms of "counter-attack" operations which resulted from the provocation of the South along the parallel. The emphasis on the civil nature of the war arising from the provocation of the South also became the official view of the Soviet government.14) Yet Cumings's argument that the origins of the war can be found in the South's provocation of the border conflict on the Ongjin peninsula clashes with the historical evidence. Another problem with Cumings's civil war theory becomes clear when we test a hypothesis which is logically derived from the "second mosaic thesis." Stalin would not have provided the North with the necessary weapons for the attack if the war had erupted as an extension of the sudden provocation by the South. Cumings raises the same question and seeks to prove it to maintain the deductive logical constiency of his theory.15) For example, he wonders why the had not supplied advanced weaponary such as the new Stalin . He does not exclude the possibility that the North could have acted independently in invading the South as a sudden reponse to the South's provocation. Yet the new Stalin tank with a listed weight of approximately 51 tons was far too heavy for bridges in Korea.16) General William L. , the

11) May 29, 1950, Soviet Documents. 12) Shtykov to Zakharov, June 26, 1950 in Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," p. 39. 13) Ibid. 14) Kirk to Acheson, , 1950, Foreign Relations of the (hereafter cited as FRUS), 1950, Vol. VII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 229. 15) Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, p. 446. 16) The 3 (JS-3) was the heaviest tank in the Soviet armored forces at the time. The latest JS-1 and JS-2 had the same tonnage as that of the JS-3. See "Sixty-Ton Tank in Korea," July 9, 1950, box 8, Intelligence Reports, Theater Intelligence, Command, RG 338. 6

Commander of the Korean Military Advisory Group(KMAG), raised the same doubt when the South requested a type of US weighing forty-six tons.17) Because of the limits on Korean bridge capacity, the Soviet Union helped the North to organize a tank brigade with T-34 medium tanks weighing 29 tons. The equippment of the North Korean Army with efficient Soviet weaponary can be cited as another evidence to disprove Cumings's civil war theory. There is further evidence from new Soviet documents that Stalin put tight reins on the North's provocation of the major border conflicts which might escalate into a general war betwen the North and South. The North launched a massive attack on strategic Unpa Mountain along the 38th parallel on October 14, 1949.18) Soviet advisors were directly involved in this border conflict.19) After this border incident, a proposal was made to the Politbureau of the Soviet Union to investigate whether T. F. Shtykov, Soviet Ambassador to the North, had faithfully carried out its decision of September 24, 1949, which prohibited the North from provoking a major border incident.20) Andrei Gromyko, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, repeated the Politbureau's warning to Shtykov: "It was forbidden to you to recommend to the government of that they carry out active operations against the South without approval of the Center, and it was indicated to you that it was necessary that you present to the Center timely reports on all actions which are being planned and events which are occurring along the 38th parallel."21) After the order was delivered to Shtykov and Kim Il Sung, no major border fighting along the 38th parallel occurred until the outbreak of the war in June 1950 except minor patrol skirmishes. This drop in major border incidents was noted in intelligence reports of the

17) Roberts to Bolte, September 13, 1949, box 548, P & O 091 Korea, RG 319. 18) KMAG G-2 Periodic Report No. 198, "P" File, RG 319. 19) October 24 and 27, 1949, Soviet Documents. 20) October 22, 1949, Soviet Documents. 21) Gromyko to Shtykov, October 27, 1949 in Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War," pp. 446-447. 7

Far East Command which Cumings calls "unimpeachable American archival documentation."22) From October 21, 1949 to February 14, 1950, the US intelligence reports recorded that "all incidents were of a minor nature."23) Despite these evidences Cumings argues that "attacks from both sides across the parallel on the Ongjin peninsula continued through the end of 1949."24) Yet he fails to specify whether these "attacks" represented major border conflicts or minor patrol skirmishes. Stalin's response to the major border incident of October 1948 and the decrease in Northern provocation demonstrate that Stalin sought to curtail border conflicts that might flare up into a general war between the North and South. These evidences disprove Cumings's civil war theory which finds the war's origins as an extension of the major border clashes. The Korean War would begin only when and where Stalin regarded it as contributing to the pursuit of his global Cold War strategy in the struggle with the US.

International Dimensions of the Korean War New Soviet documents show that Kim Il Sung asked Stalin to support the invasion plan on many occasions.25) Stalin rejected Kim's repeated requests for the invasion until the emergence of an auspicious strategic environment in the Far East. Kim did not have the means to achieve his goal without Stalin's assistance. Stalin was the only one with enough power and prestige to either give Kim the go-ahead or to make him wait. Kim recognized Stalin's dominant role in his conversation with Shtykov: "he[Kim] himself cannot begin an attack, because he is a communist, a disciplined person and for him the order of Comrade Stalin is law."26) Thus the transfer of the decision from Stalin to Kim

22) "Bruce Cumings's Letter to the Editor of the CWIHP Bulletin, Vols. 6-7," p. 120. 23) FEC Intelligence Summaries Nos. 2611, 2618, 2625, 2632, 2646, 2652, 2655, 2659, 2674, 2681, 2622, 2694, 2710, and 2715, KMAG File, RG 338. 24) "Cumings's Letter to the Editor of the CWIHP Bulletin, Vols. 6-7," p. 120. 25) March 5, , and September 12, 1949, January 19, 1950, Soviet Documents. 26) Shtykov to Vyshinsky, January 19, 1950 in Weathersby, "To Attack, or Not to Attack?" p. 8. 8 never happended. emphasized Kim Il Sung's intiative to launch the Korean War and interpreted Stalin's acquiescence to it in terms of the latter's ideological commitment to .27) Ye Stalin refused Kim's invasion plan despite Kim's repeated requests. Stalin was not an adventurous gambler unlike Hitler although both treated their citizens with utter brutality. Stalin's decision to approve and support the North Korean invasion did not represent his headlong and ideological approach. For Stalin, the moment of decision came in December 1949, when Mao visited Moscow to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Before this visit, two events occurred that influenced Stalin's calculations with respect to Korea. First, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in August 1949, ending America's nuclear monopoly. Despite the low stockpiles, Soviet nuclear capability may have emboldened Stalin. Next was the Communist victory in the which led to the establishment of the People's Republic of (PRC) in October 1949. The establishment of the PRC contributed to the emergence of a transnational network embracing North Korea, , and the Soviet Far East. Stalin sought to consolidate these regions into the "strategic complex."28) The consolidation of this complex was made possible through a secret protocol to the main Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty. The existence of the additional treaty was widely rumored, but not confirmed until 1989.29) The secret protocol stipulated that the citizens of third countries such as those of the US and Britain were not allowed to settle or carry out any industrial, financial, trade, or other related activities in Manchuria and Xinjiang,

27) Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 368. 28) The term was used in the US Defense Department draft of NSC 81/1 which authorized UN forces to cross the 38th parallel. See "U.S. Courses of Action," July 31, 1950, FRUS, 1950, VII, p. 506. 29) Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 121-122. 9

and the Soviet Union would impose comparable restrictions on the Soviet Far East and the Central Asian republics. The agreement cleared Manchuria of any outside interference. Stalin's attempt to consolidate the strategic complex before the Korean War demonstrates his careful attention to creating an advantageous strategic environment. The strategic complex would appear as a formidable threat when MacArthur demanded the expansion of hostilities into Manchuria after the defeat of the UN offensive of November 24, 1950. O. Edmund Clubb, a Chinese specialist of the US State Department, called the strategic complex "a trap vaster in scope than anything dreamed of by Machiavellian strategist of former eras."30) Thus the expansion of the war in Stalin's strategic complex meant "slowly sinking in the quagmire of that vast waste over which no victory could be anything but pyrrhic." Stalin's decision to approve Kim's plan was not "reckless war-making of the worst kind," but was a carefully-laid trap.31) As soon as the details of Sino-Soviet alliance treaties, including the secret protocol, were finalized at the end of January, Stalin expressed his desire to approve the North Korean invasion. On Janaury 30, 1950 he cabled Ambassador Shtykov: "He[Kim Il Sung] must understand that such a large matter in regard to South Korea such as he wants to undertake needs large preparations...I will always be ready to receive him and discuss with him. Transmit all this to Kim Il Sung and tell that I am ready to help him in this matter."32) In April 1950 the secret Stalin-Kim meeting was held in Moscow to discuss the invasion plan. In the meeting, Stalin approved the invasion with one condition: "the question[of the North Korean invasion] must be decided finally by the Chinese and Korean comrades together, and in case of a disagreement by the Chinese comrades, the resolution of the question must be

30) Clubb to Rusk, November 7, 1950, FRUS, 1950, VII, p. 1091. 31) For the view of interpreting Stalin's decision as reckless adventure, see Goncharov, et. al., ibid., p. 214. 32) Stalin to Shtykov, January 30, 1950 in Weathersby, "To Attack, or Not to Attack?" p. 9. 10

put off until there is a new discusssion."33) During the Sino-Soviet treaty meetings Stalin did not inform Mao of his decision to support the North Korean invasion.34) Yet Stalin made clear to Mao his intention to throw away the Yalta agreement signed with the US. The Yalta accord was an attempt to restore the postwar balance of power in the Far East by using the Nationalist China as a stabilizing power. Stalin agreed to the US to sign the old Sino-Soviet treaty with the Nationalist China in return for the Soviet annexation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Thus the signing of the new treaty with Mao meant changing the Yalta accord in legal and substantial terms. On the first meeting with Mao on December 16, 1949 in Moscow Stalin suggested that the old treaty is to be modified in effect while its provisions are formally maintained.35) Stalin's suggestions resulted from his concern about giving the US the legal pretext for modifying the provisions on Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Mao confessed that he did not take into account the fact that the signing of the new Sino-Soviet treaty would provide the US with the pretext for the changes of the legal status of Soviet territories in the Far East. Yet the deadlock on the issue of the new Sino-Soviet treaty did not last long. Stalin decided to change the old treaty and sign a new treaty on January 2, 1950.36) Stalin infomed Mao of his changed policy and agreed to bring in Zhou Eun-Lai to Moscow to finalize the details of the new treaty until the end of . It must be remembered that Stalin expressed his desire to support the invasion on January 30, 1950. During the meeting with Stalin on January 22, 1950 Mao raised the question of whether the new treaty contradicts the Yalta accord as Stalin suggested on December 16, 1950. Stalin

33) April 1950(undated), Soviet Documents. The English translation is from Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War," p. 430. 34) "Conversation between Stalin and Mao," January 22, 1950, CWIHP Bulletin, Vols. 6-7, pp. 7-9. 35) "Conversation between Stalin and Mao," December 16, 1949, CWIHP Bulletin, Vols. 6-7, p. 5. 36) Goncharov, et. al., ibid., p. 93. 11

answered that the new treaty went against the Yalta agreement. He announced that he decided to throw away the Yalta accord and to struggle against the US if the US raises questions on the legality of the new treaty. Stalin considered the Yalta agreement the crowing achievement of Soviet since the Soviet Union was internatinally recognized as a legitimate great power at Yalta and restored the territories which the tsarist lost to .37) Thus Stalin's decision signified a fundamental change in his Cold War strategy. Stalin's decision to support the North Korean invasion coincided with the abandonment of the Yalta accord with the US. Stalin's Korea decision can be construed as an aggressive policy to take the initiative in the Cold War struggle with the US by capitalizing on Kim's irredentistic zeal and the success of the Chinese Communist revolution. In pursuing this aggressive policy, Stalin also expected to drive a wedge between the US and the PRC by creating untenable politial and military environments in the Far East.38) The net result would be to make Mao dependent on the Soviet Union, thus preventing the emergence of a Tito in . For Stalin, this state of affairs occurred when the US 7th Fleet occupied the straight. Thus the Korean War resulted in the delay of normalization of relations between the US and the PRC for twenty years, and ushered in what is called the "golden age" in Sino-Soviet relations until 1958. After the Moscow meeting with Stalin, Kim went to Beijing to meet Mao on May 13, 1950.39) Kim conveyed Stalin's condition to Mao. Yet Mao wanted confirmation of Stalin-Kim agreements directly from Stalin. Thus on May 14, 1950, N. V. Roshchin, Soviet Ambassador to China, delivered Stalin's message in which Stalin repeated what he had given exactly same condition to Kim.

37) Vladislav Zubok, "'To Hell with Yalta' - Stalin Opts for a New Status Quo," CWIHP Bulletin, Vols. 6-7, p. 24. 38) Goncharov, et. al., ibid., pp. 187-192. 39) May 13, 1950, Soviet Documents. 12

After reviewing Stalin's telegram, Mao agreed to the North Korean invasion. Analysis of records of the meetings among Stalin, Mao, and Kim in April- demonstrates that Stalin did not discuss the Korean problem in detail with Mao during the Sino-Soviet treaty negotiations. In his conversation with P. F. Yudin, Soviet Ambassador to China on May 31, 1956, Mao stated that the problem of the North Korean invasion was not discussed during the Stalin-Mao treaty negotiations.40) Thus the Korean decision resulted from Stalin's deliberate maneuver to coordinate three Communist countries for the invasion of the South. Stalin accelerated the efforts to prepare for war in Korea even before the secret Stalin-Kim meetings were held. Stalin dispatched Lieutenant General Vashilev to help the North to reorganize the North Korean Army and prepare a detailed invasion plan.41) Stalin also approved the North Korean purchase of Soviet weapons and equipments. The North Korean divisions were deployed within 10-15km north of the parallel from June 12, 1950 and crossed the parallel in the early morning of June 25, 1950. While Kim Il Sung asserted that the invasion will not develop into a prolonged war and the victory will be swift,42) Stalin did not exclude the possibility of direct American intervention in the war. Stalin took every measure to conceal Soviet involvement in the planning and execution of the war so that direct confrontation with the US in Korea which might lead to a general war would not occur. The revelation of Soviet involvement could be used as the pretext for the US to hold the Soviet Union responsible for the war, thus greatly increasing the possibility of direct US-Soviet conflict on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, whenever Kim sought to embroil the Soviets in the war, Stalin rejected Kim's requests, wanting to limit the war inside the Korean peninsula.

40) For the summary of Mao's visit to China for the treaty negotiations, see December 16, 1950, Soviet Documents. 41) February 24, 1950, Soviet Documents. 42) September 3, 1949 and January 19, 1950, Soviet Documents. 13

For example, three days before the beginning of the war, Stalin issued orders to the Soviet embassy in that no coded telegrams should be exchanged between the Embassy and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.43) Stalin's prohibition of the exchange of coded telegrams reflected his concern about the revelation of direct Soviet involvement in the planning and execution of the war. Three days into the war with North Korean troops occupying Seoul, Kim asked Stalin to permit the group of Soviet advisors, including General Vashilev, to join the North Koran Army Headquarters in Seoul on July 4, 195 0.44) Because the stationing of Soviet advisors would have been construed as Stalin's determination to directly confront the US on the peninsula, Kim's request was rejected, and Vashilev was ordered to stay in Pyongyang.45) These examples show that Stalin did not approve Kim requests if they were not in the interest of the Soviet Union, and might spark a direct confrontation with the US. Nonetheless, Stalin did not exclude the direct confrontation with the US in Manchuria, the pivot of Stalin's strategic complex when the possibility of US crossing the was seriously raised after the successful MacArthur's Inchon landings. Stalin was determined to defend the Manchurian aerodom with the Soviet airforce from the beginning of the war. When Zhou Eun-Lai asked Stalin whether the Soviet could provide air cover for 9 Chinese divisions in Mukden when they cross the Yalu River.46) Stalin answered that the Chinese decision to concentrate these divisions for an emergency was correct and he was willing to support the Chinese with 124 Soviet aircrafts. The Soviet air force began to prepare for their operations for the Korean War in August 195 0.47)

43) June 22, 1950, Soviet Documents. 44) July 4, 1950, Soviet Documents. 45) July 6, 1950, Soviet Documents. 46) July 2, 1950, Soviet Documents. 47) Jon Halliday, "Air Operations in Korea," William J. Williams, ed., A Revolutionary War (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993), p. 150. 14

When the North Korean Army suffered a dismal setback after MacArthur's Inchon landings, Kim Il Sung sent a letter requesting direct Soviet military involvement in the war to save the North on September 30, 1950. On October 1, 1950 Stalin prodded Mao to send five or six divisions to Korea.48) Yet Mao was concerned about the direct conflict between the US and China as a result of Chinese intervention.49) He also argued that the Soviet Union could be dragged into the war, and the extension of the war would be an extremely serious matter for them. Stalin responded that "the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn into a big war out of [consideration of] prestige, which, in turn, would drag China into the war, and along with this draw into the war the Soviet Union, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact."50) Stalin was ready to directly engage the US by air force to help China when the US marched into Marchuria. New Soviet docuemnts show that Soviet air force destroyed 510 US planes from November 11, 1950 to December 6, 1951 and Soviet anti-aircraft artillery shut down 59 US aircraft.51) The Soviet Union lost 63 MIG-15s and MIG-15bs and 30 pilots. The direct confrontation between the US and Soviet air forces contradicts the myth of Soviet non-involvement in the war. Yet the direct clashes between ground forces did not occur since the two superpowers wanted to limit the scope of the war within Korea. Despite the geographical limits of the areas of hostilities, Stalin's Korea decision had international dimensions. The weakening of the US capabilities in Korea and the removal of the South from the US sphere of influence would have dealt a severe blow to American power and prestige. With regard to the extension of the hostilities there remains a conventional

48) October 1, 1950, Soviet Documents. 49) Mao to Stalin, October 2, 1950 in Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," p. 115. 50) Stalin to Kim Il Sung, 8[7] October, 1950 in Mansourov, ibid., p. 116. 51) Shtmenko to Poskrebyshev, December 9, 1951 in Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War," pp. 457-458. 15

wisdom to be critically evaluated in view of international dimensions of the war. It argues that the Korean nation would live under the unified democratic country if did not remove MacArthur from the UN commander which advocated the bombing of Manchuria and the expansion of the area of the war. Yet this conventoinal wisdom cannot be substantiated since the US might have been forced out of the Korean peninsula if US divisions were lured in Stalin's trap and some of them were annihilated in Manchuria. In March 1951 the US did not have extra divisions to be dispatched to Korea. The US defeat in Manchuria would heighten the US concern about the defense of Japan. New US divisions, if available, must be deployed in Japan. Thus the extension of the hostilities into Manchuria might result in the reunification of Korea under the communist regime. As a first step to expand the war into Manchuria MacArthur advocated doing away the Manchurian sanctuary created by the US government not to violate the Korean-Manchurian border. The term sanctuary denotes "an area or region enjoying specially favored treatment in view of the belligerent status of its occupiers."52) MacArthur's insistence on the withdrawal of the sanctuary privilege from the enemy was tantamount to spreading the area of hostilities into Manchuria by lifting the restrictions on the use of air force. He argued that the vulnerability of the Manchurian safe haven was greatly increased after Chinese intervention since a major concentration of Chinese forces took place in Manchuria.53) Yet MacArthur's argument that only the Chinese enjoyed the sanctuary privilege is not true. The US estimated that there were approximately 300 aircrafts in Manchuria, including 200 two-engine bombers, which could strike a severe blow to the crowded airfields in Korea and Japan.54) Moreover, the

52) Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 66. 53) MacArthur to the Department of the Army, November 30, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, p. 1631. 54) Memorandum of Conversation by Jessup, November 28, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, p. 1242. 16

Communist air attack on the city of Pusan, the well-illuminated supply center for UN forces, could cripple the UN's logistic capabilities. The US would be isolated in the war with China in the face of allied countries. Thus engaging in a general war with Manchuria with the Chinese Communists would be to fall into Stalin's trap. The success of the Chinese massive offensives and the removal of MacArthur did not ignite a general war among the US, the PRC, and the Soviet Union. Yet Truman was determined to deflate the exaggerated political and military prestige of the PRC. The US adopted a strategy of inflicting maximum destruction on Communist forces in North Korea through massive bombing campaigns.55) This strategy was necessary to get the Communist side to the negotiation table and to restore the along the parallel. The vicious cycle of growing violence did not stop until the armistice agreement was signed.

Conclusions Stalin, who had killed millions of innocent Soviet citizens, was unlikely to care much about the calamities visited on the Korean nation if the war served his objectives in the Cold War struggle with the US. Stalin capitalized on Kim Il Sung's irredentist zeal to reunify the nation by force to support his own political objectives of undermining the power and prestige of the United States.

The US, however, reponded to Stalin's provocation with its huge war-making capabilities to save South Korea. The intensity of the war and the enormous suffering of Koreans, both North and South, resulted because the Korean peninsula was turned into a battleground for the two superpowers. Stalin must have known how intense the war would be with US intervention and the subsequent mobilization of Communist Chinese forces when he maneuvered to coordinate three Communist countries for the war in Korea. Civil war theories

55) "Memorandum for the Record of a Department of State- Meeting, , 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol. VII, p. 175. 17

cannot adequately explain why the war resulted in the disaster of the Korean nation since it does not pay enough attention to the international dimenstions in the origins and development of the war. What Kim Il Sung perhaps did not foresee was the disastrous consequences of his reunification policy by the use of force. Stalin's cynical attitue and Kim's naviete' combined to bring the disaster unprecedented in the modern history of the Korean nation. As a result of the two devastating world on the European continent, Europe ceased to be a center of world politics and relegated the stage to the two superpowers. Depite the two world wars, European nations seek another "European miracle" through the European Union. Yet another war on the Korean peninsula would be a threat to the very existence of the Korean nation and the peace in the Far East which contributed to economic prosperity. It is incumbent on the leaders in Korea to prevent the outbreak of another war on the Korean peninsula. The Korean nation also has to learn to live with uncertainty and to make the best of the potentials of the nation under the imperfect reality of the division of the nation although the nation must not give up the aspiration of national reunification. The nation faces the financial crisis which is often regarded as another disaster since the end of the war. Despite the unprecedented destruction of Korean society, the nation succeeded in recovering from it. There is no doubt that the nation will overcome the current economic hardships and march toward the turn of the century as a democratic country with a prospering economy as demonstrated in the nation's efforts to rebuild after the end of the Korean War.