International Dimensions of the Korean War
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1 International Dimensions of the Korean War Youngho Kim (Department of Political Science, Sungshin Women's University) Introduction The Korean War was the disaster unprecedented in the modern history of the Korean nation. The opening of the Soviet and Chinese archives enables us to reevaluate the international dimensions of the origins and development of this tragic war.1) The intensity of the war and the enormous suffering of the nation cannot be adequately explained without due regard to the international dimensions of the war. Yet International dimensions have been eclipsed by civil war theories which find the locus of the war in domestic factors such as border clashes between North and South Korea. Civil war theories were first advanced by I. F. Stone and D. F. Flemming in hypothetical forms.2) They were elaborated by Bruce 1) Russian President Boris Yeltsin handed over Soviet archival documents on the Korean War to President Kim Young Sam of the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the latter's visit to Moscow in June 1994. The collection of Soviet documents includes 216 previously classified documents, dated 1949 to 1953, totaling 548 pages. The summarized version of the Korean translation of the collection was released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROK in July 1994. The Korean translation will be hereafter called the Soviet Documents. The Soviet Documents will be cited in English from translation of the Korean version with the date of the documents. Most of the Soviet archival documents have been translated into English by Kathryn Weathersby. If the documents are quoted from her translation, they will be specified. For her translation, see Kathryn Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Winter 1993), pp. 425-58; also Weathersby, "To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1-9 (hereafter cited as CWIHP Bulletin); also Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin, Nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995-1996), pp. 30-84. For Soviet documents on Chinese intervention, see Alexander Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim and Chinas Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," CWIHP Bulletin, Nos. 6-7, pp. 94-119. One of the most important Chinese sources is a collection of Mao Zedong's manuscript entitled Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengo (Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the Founding of the Republic) which has been translated into English. See Li Ziaobing, Wang Xi, and Chen Jian, "Mao's Dispatch of Chinese Troops to Korea: Forty-Six Telegrams, July-October 1950," Chinese Historians, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 63-86; also Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 229-291. 2 Cumings, most notably in his "second mosaic" thesis which finds the origins of the war in the South's provocation of the border conflict and the counterattack by the North along the 38th parallel.3) Cumings greatly benifited from the declassification of US official documents in the 1970s. In contrast, the traditional theories which emphasize the international dimensions of the war cannot provide solid evidence because of the inaccessibility of Soviet documentary sources. With the opening of the Soviet and Chinese archives it is possible to critically evaluate civil war theories and to shed new light on the international dimensions of the war. This essay has two objectives. The first objective is to critically analyze civil war theories. Analysis will focus on Cumings's civil war theory, the most systematic of the genre. New Soviet documents show that the border conflicts on the 38th parallel constitued the focal point around which the strategic calculations of Stalin and Kim Il Sung revolved before the decision on the North's invasion was made. This essay will demonstrate that Stalin put tight reins on the major border conflicts which might escalate into a general war between the North and South. Thus Cumings's claim that the origins of the war can be found in the extension of the border clashes cannot be substantiated. Despite Kim's repeated requests Stalin did not allow Kim to invade the South until there emerged an advantageous strategic environment to advance Soviet national interests in the Cold War struggle with the United States. The second objective of this essay is to explain when Stalin decided to allow Kim to invade the South. The timing of Stalin's decision has been an unresolved question before the declassification of the Soviet documents. New 2) I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), p. 44; D. F. Flemming, The Cold War and its Origins, Vol. II, 1950-1960 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), p. 606. Stone's book, originally published by the Monthly Review Press in 1951, was reprinted with a new preface by Cumings in 1988. 3) Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 568-621. 3 evidence shows that Stalin expressed his intention to approve Kim's invasion on January 30, 1950, just after the agreement on the new Sino-Soviet alliance treaty had been striken. During the meeting with Mao on January 22, 1950, Stalin announced his decision to throw away the Yalta agreement signed with the US and asked Mao to join with him in the struggle with the US.4) This essay will demonstrate that Stalin's Korea decision was made as part of his global Cold War strategy. Stalin sought to deal a severe blow to the prestige of the US by removing the South from the US sphere of influence. He also sought to weaken US capabilities in Korea by using Communist Chinese forces and Soviet air force when the US intervened in the war. A Critique of Cumings's Civil War Theory Civil war theories explain the origins of the Korean War in terms of the issue of land reform and border conflicts. The prominent civil war theorist is Bruce Cumings. He emphasizes the influence of the legacies of the Japanese colonial era on the outbreak of the war. The division of Korea after the liberation hindered the Korean nation from solving the negative colonial legacies. Cumings cites land reform as one of the most important issues. Yet he claims that there appeared a great difference in the resolution of the issue in the two Koreas. The North which accomplished a successful land reform in 1946 decided to occupy the South and undertake the land reform in the South. Thus the Korean War can be construed as a civil war which occurred to solve the land reform. To support his view, Cumings claims that "it is generally thought that land reform began to be implemented before June 1950, but in fact not a single acre had changed hands by June 25."5) Yet a captured North Korean document during the Korean War shows that land reform in the South had been fully accomplished before the outbreak of 4) "Conversation between Stalin and Mao," January 22, 1950, CWIHP Bulletin, Vols. 6-7, pp. 7-9. 5) Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, p. 455. 4 the war. The document is a survey report on the status of the land reform in the South written by the officials of the North who occupied the Bo-Eun Kun area.6) This report confirms that lands were successfully distributed to farmers in the area. In other areas in the South land reform had already been accomplished before June 1950. Thus Cuming's civil war theory which finds the war's origin in land reform cannot be substantiated. Cumings also tries to explain the origins of the war in terms of the extension of the border clashes along the 38th parallel between the North and South. His civil war theory is presented in the form of the "second mosaic thesis." The essence of the second mosaic is that the war was sparked by the South's provocation on the Onjin peninsula, and quickly spread to the 38th parallel with the mobilization of Northern troops.7) There were no inland roads to the peninsula from the South, thus Ongjin was cut off from the rest of South Korea. The South's provocation ignited the war with the chain reaction by the North. Cumings concludes that "the war began in the same, remote locus of much of the 1949 fighting, the Ongjin peninsula, and some hours later spread along the parallel westward, to Kaesong, Chunchon, and the East Coast."8) Cumings's claim that the South provoked a border conflict in the night of June 24-25, 1950 was dismissed by the South Korean official history as "a completely exaggerated false report contrary to the facts."9) Moreover, new Soviet documents show that Stalin dispatched Soviet Lieutenant General Vasiliev, a hero of the German-Soviet conflict in World War II, to prepare the invasion plan just after he decided to approve the North Korean invasion.10) Vasiliev completed the plan with General Kang Kon, the Chief of Staff of North 6) "Tonggye Bogo e Kwanhayo - Bo-Eun Kun Tojigaehyuk e Kwanhan Tonggye," ("On the Report of the Statistics - the Statistics on the Land Reform of Bo-Eun Kun," Item 4/87, SA 2010, Record Group (RG) 242, Washington National Records Center. 7) Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol.