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Stalingrad: an Examination of Hitler's Decision to Airlift

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Stalingrad: an Examination of Hitler's Decision to Airlift Stalingrad An Examination of Hitler's Decision to Airlift JOEL S. A. HAYWARD AF TER FEBRUARY 1943, the cap tiv ity, 91,000 in the battle's last three shadow of Stalin grad ever days alone. (Although Hitler never learned lengthened ahead of Adolf of their fate, only six tho u s and ever re- Hitler. The battle for that turned to Germany.) city had ended in disas­ The battle has attracted consid er able schol­ trous defeat, shatter ing the arly and journalis tic atten tion. Liter ally scores myth of his military “Midas touch,” ending of books and arti cles on Stalin grad have ap­ his chances of defeat ing the Red Army, peared during the 50 years since Stalin's ar­ per ma nently damaging rela tions with Italy, mies bulldozed into Berlin, bringing the war Ruma nia, Hungary, and other allied na tions,1 in Europe to a close. Most have been pub­ and, of course, inflict ing heavy losses on his lished in Germany and, to a lesser degree, east ern armies. More than 150,000 Axis sol­ Rus sia, where the name “Stalin grad” still diers, most of them German, had been killed con jures up power ful and emotional im- or wounded in the city's approaches or ru­ agery.2 Compara tively few have been pub­ ins; 108,000 others stumbled into Soviet lished in the English-- speaking world, and 21 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997 which Stalin grad was the climax—and it alone was respon si ble for the mainte nance of Sixth Army after Marshal G. K. Zhukov's forces severed it from all but radio contact with other German army forma tions. Even fewer works—and none in English—have analyzed in depth Hitler's decision to supply the forces trapped at Stalin grad from the air, even though this deci sion led to the destruc­ tion of those forces after the Luftwaffe failed to keep them adequately supplied. Of course, most writers on the Battle of Stal in grad do briefly touch on the decisio n to airlift before launching into their de­ scriptions of Sixth Army's suffer ing or the Luft waffe's poor perform ance. Their treat­ ment of the decision-- making process, how- ever, is invaria bly weak and unper suasive . Al most all blame Hermann Göring, the Luft waffe's in ef fec tual commander in chief. When Hitler asked him what the air force could do, they claim, Göring made rash promises of an airlift, hoping its suc­ cess would restore his flagging prestige. Gen er al leut nant Martin Fiebig, in charge of the air corps Lacking dissenting voices and trusting Gör­ given the task of keeping Sixth Army alive, repeatedl y in sisted it was an impos si ble mission. His views were ing, Hitler went ahead and or dered the air- ig nored. lift. Typif y ing this line of ar gu ment, Gen er al feld mar schall Erich von Man stein wrote: “I am unsure whether Göring's this is under stand able. Because no British, frivo lous assur ances to Hitler were due to a Com mon wealth, or American forces took false appre cia tion of exist ing capabilities, or part in the battle, they can number none of of a desper ate need for admi ra tion. What ever their own among its many heroes, martyrs, the cause, Göring was respon si ble.”3 pris on ers, and victims. Moreover, although Many early writers on Stalin grad (includ­ the German defeat at Stalin grad was imme­ ing von Manstein), it should be noted, were di ate ly seen in the West as a turning point, partici pants in the events. Their biases and its effects were not directly felt by the pre con cep tions are evident in their self-­ Anglo- - American nations. serving, blame-- shifting accounts. However, The main focus of Stalingrad histo ri­ their works were influen tial in shaping ography, includ ing the dozen books pub­ schol arly opin ion in the first decades after lished in 1992 and 1993 to commemorat e the war, and their descrip tions and expla na­ the battle's 50th anni ver sary, has been the tions have been, with a few excep tions,4 fight ing, encir clem ent, suffer ing, and de­ ac cepted uncriti cally to the present day. In struc tion of Gener al feldmar schall Friedrich a recent work on Stalin grad, for exam ple, Paulus's Sixth Army. Few books and arti cles Franz Kurowski repeats many errors and have devoted adequate attention to the ac­ con cludes: “What had moved Hitler to give tivi ties of the Luftwaffe, although it made this death or der to Sixth Army? During a sub stan tial contri bu tions to all battles tele phone con ver sa tion on 23 Novem ber through out the 1942 summer campaign—of 1942, he asked Göring directly whether the STALINGRAD 23 sup ply of Stal in grad by air was possi ble. fensive operations within Stalin grad and Gör ing replied, `The thing appears feasi­ trans fer forces from the city to the broken ble.'”5 Likewise, Samuel Mitcham writes in flank. his own book on the Luftwaffe: When the Soviet Southwest ern Front breached the Axis flank south of Stalin grad The only way the Reichsmarschall could redeem himself in the Führer's eyes was to the next day, Hitler real ized that his Fourth score a spectacular military victory. Stalingrad Panzer and Sixth Armies were in grave dan­ seemed to be his ticket. He promised Hitler ger of encir clem ent by the two great pin­ that the Luftwaffe would resupply Stalingrad cers. He imme di ate ly contacted by air . It was the major turning point of Gen er al feld mar schall von Manstein, whom the war.6 he considered his best army operational com­ Gör ing was certainly among those re­ mander. He ordered him to abandon the sponsi ble for one of the war's most ill-­ planned attack at Velikiye Luki in the far considered decisions, but he does not de- north of Russia and to take charge of a newly created command, Army Group serve sole blame, as this study tries to dem­ 8 on strate. It attempts to recre ate the Don, in the Stalin grad sector. Von Manstein decision- - making process from surviv ing was ideal for the job because of his fine stra­ sources—in cluding the diaries of Luftwaffe tegic mind and unpar alleled experience with com mand ers in the Stalin grad sector, who Ruma nian units. Although delighted by Hit­ found their opposi tion to the airlift ignored ler's trust, the field marshal was initially dis­ by their army counterparts and by the High cour aged to learn the compo si tion of his Com mand—and tries to deter mine culpa bil­ new army group: Ru manian Third Army, ity in a more evenhanded, dispas sionat e which had crumbled wherever struck; Fourth manner than previ ously attempted. Panzer Army, a large portion of which (in­ When the Soviet Fifth Tank and Twenty-­ cluding most of its tanks) lay trapped be- tween the quickly closing Soviet pincers; first Armies launched their massive coun­ and Sixth Army, completely bottled up. The terof fen sive northwest of Stalin grad (code-­ named Ura nus) on 19 November, an ex­ lat ter was also worn down after months of hausted Hitler was enjoying a brief holiday constant action, with all battal ions far below at the Berghof, his mountain retreat in strength. Hitler did tell the field marshal to Berchtesgaden, southern Ba varia. His relaxa­ expect rein forcements total ing six infan try tion came to an abrupt end that after noon and four panzer divi sions, a Luftwaffe field when he took a telephone call from his head­ di vi sion, and some flak units. Of these quarters in East Prussia. Clearly agitated, forma tions, however, only two infan try di­ Kurt Zeitzler, chief of the Army General vision s were at hand. The others would not arrive until early in Decem ber. Staff, shouted down the line that hundreds of Soviet tanks had shattered the Rumanian front exactly where Hitler had earlier pre­ dicted and that the Ruma nian formation s Göring was certainly among those were in full flight.7 Repeated updates through out the after noon convinced Hitler re sponsi ble for one of the war's that the situation was seri ous, although he most ill-- considered deci sions, but still felt that General ma jor Ferdinand he does not deserve sole blame. Heim's LXVIII Panzer Corps could, if prop­ erly deployed, contain the enemy break- through. He promptly ordered Genera loberst Gen era loberst Hans Jeschonnek, chief of Maximil ian von Weichs, commander of the Luftwaffe General Staff, arrived at the Army Group B, to abandon all further of- Berg hof that same day (20 Novem ber). 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997 Hit ler had summoned him from his head­ com mit almost five hundred Junkers Ju--52 s quar ters in East Prussia to discuss the air to the airlift in order to ensure that suffi cient force's role in any attempted breakout or re- planes—around 150—could carry that ton­ lief operations .9 Göring was “too busy” to nage each day.11 Further, the presence of the attend; he was presid ing over an oil con­ VVS (Voyenno-- vozdushnyye sily, the Soviet ference at Karin hall, his country estate in Ber­ Air Force) at Demyansk had been negligible , lin.
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