Stalingrad: an Examination of Hitler's Decision to Airlift

Stalingrad

An Examination of Hitler's Decision to Airlift

JOEL S. A. HAYWARD

AFTER FEBRUARY 1943, the captiv it y, 91,000 in the battle's last three shadow of Stalingrad ever days alone. (Although Hitler never learned lengthened ahead of Adolf of their fate, only six thou s a nd ever re- Hitler. The battle for that turned to Germany.) city had ended in disas The battle has attracted consider able schol trous defeat, shattering the arly and journalis tic attention. Literally scores myth of his military “Midas touch,” ending of books and articles on Stalingrad have ap his chances of defeat ing the Red Army, peared during the 50 years since Stalin's ar per ma nently damaging relations with Italy, mies bulldozed into Berlin, bringing the war Ruma nia, Hungary, and other allied nations ,1 in Europe to a close. Most have been pub and, of course, inflicting heavy losses on his lished in Germany and, to a lesser degree, eastern armies. More than 150,000 Axis sol Russia, where the name “Stalingrad” still diers, most of them German, had been killed conjures up powerful and emotional im- or wounded in the city's approaches or ru agery.2 Comparatively few have been pub ins; 108,000 others stumbled into Soviet lished in the English--speaking world, and

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which Stalingrad was the climax—and it alone was responsi ble for the maintenanc e of Sixth Army after Marshal G. K. Zhukov's forces severed it from all but radio contact with other German army formations. Even fewer works—and none in English—have analyzed in depth Hitler's decision to supply the forces trapped at Stalingrad from the air, even though this decision led to the destruc tion of those forces after the Luftwaffe failed to keep them adequately supplied. Of course, most writers on the Battle of Stalin grad do briefly touch on the decisio n to airlift before launching into their de scriptions of Sixth Army's suffering or the Luft waffe's poor performance. Their treat ment of the decision--making process, however, is invariably weak and unpersua sive . Almost all blame Hermann Göring, the Luft waffe's in ef fec tual commander in chief. When Hitler asked him what the air force could do, they claim, Göring made rash promises of an airlift, hoping its suc cess would restore his flagging prestige. Gener al leut nant Martin Fiebig, in charge of the air corps Lacking dissenting voices and trusting Gör given the task of keeping Sixth Army alive, repeatedl y insisted it was an impossi ble mission. His views were ing, Hitler went ahead and or dered the air- ignored . lift. Typif y ing this line of argu ment, Gener al feld mar schall Erich von Man stein wrote: “I am unsure whether Göring's this is understand able. Because no British, frivolous assurances to Hitler were due to a Common wealth, or American forces took false apprecia tion of existing capabilities, or part in the battle, they can number none of of a desperate need for admira tion . Whatever their own among its many heroes, martyrs, the cause, Göring was responsi ble. ”3 prison ers, and victims. Moreover, although Many early writers on Stalingrad (includ the German defeat at Stalingrad was imme ing von Manstein), it should be noted, were diate ly seen in the West as a turning point, partici pants in the events. Their biases and its effects were not directly felt by the precon cep tions are evident in their self- Anglo-- American nations. serving, blame--shifting accounts. However, The main focus of Stalingrad histori their works were influen tial in shaping ography, including the dozen books pub scholarly opinion in the first decades after lished in 1992 and 1993 to commemorat e the war, and their descriptions and explana the battle's 50th anniver sary, has been the tions have been, with a few exceptions, 4 fighting, encirclem ent, suffering, and de accepted uncriti cally to the present day. In struction of Gener al feld mar schall Friedrich a recent work on Stalin grad, for example , Paulus's Sixth Army. Few books and article s Franz Kurowski repeats many errors and have devoted adequate attention to the ac concludes: “What had moved Hitler to give tivities of the Luftwaffe, although it made this death or der to Sixth Army? During a substan tial contribu tions to all battles telephon e con ver sa tion on 23 Novem ber throughout the 1942 summer campaign—of 1942, he asked Göring directly whether the STALINGRAD 23 supply of Stalin grad by air was possible . fensive operations within Stalingrad and Göring replied, `The thing appears feasi transfer forces from the city to the broken ble.'”5 Likewise, Samuel Mitcham writes in flank. his own book on the Luftwaffe: When the Soviet Southwestern Front breached the Axis flank south of Stalingra d The only way the Reichsmarschall could redeem himself in the Führer's eyes was to the next day, Hitler realized that his Fourth score a spectacular military victory. Stalingrad Panzer and Sixth Armies were in grave dan seemed to be his ticket. He promised Hitler ger of encirclem ent by the two great pin that the Luftwaffe would resupply Stalingrad cers. He immedi ate ly contacted by air . . . . It was the major turning point of Gener al feld mar schall von Manstein, whom the war.6 he considered his best army operational com Göring was certainly among those re mander. He ordered him to abandon the sponsi ble for one of the war's most ill- planned attack at Velikiye Luki in the far considered decisions, but he does not de- north of Russia and to take charge of a newly created command, Army Group serve sole blame, as this study tries to dem 8 onstrate. It attempts to recreate the Don, in the Stalingrad sector. Von Manstein decision-- making process from survivin g was ideal for the job because of his fine stra sources—includ ing the diaries of Luftwaffe tegic mind and unparal leled experience with command ers in the Stalin grad sector, who Ruma nian units. Although delighted by Hit found their opposi tion to the airlift ignored ler's trust, the field marshal was initially dis by their army counterparts and by the High couraged to learn the composi tion of his Command—and tries to determine culpabil new army group: Ruma nian Third Army, ity in a more evenhanded, dispassion at e which had crumbled wherever struck; Fourth manner than previousl y attempted. Panzer Army, a large portion of which (in When the Soviet Fifth Tank and Twenty- cluding most of its tanks) lay trapped between the quickly closing Soviet pincers; first Armies launched their massive coun and Sixth Army, completely bottled up. The teroffen sive northwest of Stalingrad (code- named Uranus) on 19 November, an ex latter was also worn down after months of hausted Hitler was enjoying a brief holiday constant action, with all battalions far below at the Berghof, his mountain retreat in strength. Hitler did tell the field marshal to Berchtesgaden, southern Bavaria. His relaxa expect reinforce ments totaling six infantr y tion came to an abrupt end that afternoon and four panzer divi sions, a Luftwaffe field when he took a telephone call from his head divi sion, and some flak units. Of these quarters in East Prussia. Clearly agitated, formations, however, only two infan try di Kurt Zeitzler, chief of the Army General vision s were at hand. The others would not arrive until early in December . Staff, shouted down the line that hundreds of Soviet tanks had shattered the Rumanian front exactly where Hitler had earlier pre dicted and that the Rumanian formation s Göring was certainly among those were in full flight.7 Repeated updates throughout the afternoon convinced Hitler respon si ble for one of the war's that the situation was serious, although he most ill--considered decisions, but still felt that General ma jor Ferdinand he does not deserve sole blame. Heim's LXVIII Panzer Corps could, if prop erly deployed, contain the enemy break- through. He promptly ordered Generaloberst Genera loberst Hans Jeschonnek, chief of Maximil ian von Weichs, commander of the Luftwaffe General Staff, arrived at the Army Group B, to abandon all further of- Berghof that same day (20 November) . 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997

Hitler had summoned him from his head commit almost five hundred Junkers Ju--52 s quarters in East Prussia to discuss the air to the airlift in order to ensure that sufficient force's role in any attempted breakout or re- planes—around 150—could carry that ton lief operations .9 Göring was “too busy” to nage each day.11 Further, the presence of the attend; he was presiding over an oil con VVS (Voyenno-- vozdushnyye sily, the Soviet ference at Karinhall, his country estate in Ber Air Force) at Demyansk had been negligible , lin. No verbatim records of Hitler's conver allow ing almost uninter rupted German air sation with Jeschonnek have surfaced, but opera tions with low losses.12 The situation the basic facts are known: Hitler explained at Stalingrad was very different. First, almost that Sixth Army would probably be totally three times as many men were encircle d cut off within days, that he had organize d there than had been at Demyansk. If one a new army group under von Manstein, and hundred thou s a nd men had needed three that it would launch a relief effort as hundred tons of supplies per day, then, logi soon as possible . He hoped not only to cally, 250,000 men would need around 750 free Sixth Army within a short time, but tons, an almost impossible tonnage to de- also to regain lost territory and rebuild a liver (as calcula tions made at Hitler's head strong defensive line. Apparently under- quarters a few days later confirmed).13 standing Sixth Army's encir clem ent to be Second, the Luftwaffe did not possess any- tempo rary, Jeschonnek assured Hitler that where near enough transport aircraft and if both transport planes and bombers were avail able bombers to deliver such used, and if adequate airfields inside and tonnages. Third, VVS forces at Stalingra d outside the pocket could be maintained, the were now far stronger than they had been at Luftwaffe could airlift sufficient supplies to Demyansk. They would greatly hamper airlift the army. After all, he pointed out, the air opera tions and inflict high losses. force had successfully sustained one hun Jeschonnek's spontane ous and ill- dred thou s a nd men in the Demyansk pocket considered assurance that the air force could for several months during the previous win sustai n Sixth Army at Stalingrad pleased Hit ter. ler. He could hardly allow the army to aban don that city after he had proclaimed to the entire German nation in Septembe r that “you can be certain no one will get us The [Luftwaffe ] had sucessfully sus away from there!” 14 and, only two weeks tained one hundred thou s a nd men earlier, had trumpeted in the Munich Löwen in the Demyansk pocket for several bräukeller that his forces had taken that months during the previous winter. “vitally-- importan t city . . . with Stalin's name,” where the “real” war was being fought.15 Unable to eat his words, Hitler The comparison with Demyansk was now found himself committed to holding specious, as Jeschonnek himself probably real Stalin grad. On the afternoon of the 21st, ized as soon as he had time to think through therefore, he sent a message directly to Pau the issues (seldom possible when dealing lus, ordering him to stand firm “despite the with Hitler , who always wanted immedi ate danger of temporary encirclem ent.” He was answers to his questions). The one hundred to hold open the rail link as long as possi ble. “As to airlift,” he added, “orders will tho u s a n d men of II Army Corps trapped at 16 Demyansk had required no less than three follow.” hundred tons of supplies per day.10 Because Neither Hitler nor Jeschonnek envisage d of low operational rates caused by winter an airlift of the Demyansk scale or duration. condi tions, the Luftwaffe had been forced to They still thought that von Manstein would soon break the encirclem ent and restore the STALINGRAD 25

A cautious commander with little tactical imagination, Friedrich Paulus (center) lacked the strength of character and deci sive ness needed to state dissenting views to Hitler. His failure to do so was taken by Hitler as support for his de cisions . southern front. Sixth Army would only need sector, telephoned Gener al ma jor Schmidt, to be supplied by air in the meantime. Yet Sixth Army's chief of staff, to discuss the that is clearly not the way army commanders army's intention s. Paulus listened on an- in the field, faced with the grim realities of other phone. Fiebig's report on this conver their predicament, interpreted Hitler's ref sation reveals the tension that quickly erences to an airlift. Sixth Army's senior offi devel oped between army and air force com cers felt that unless they broke out immedi manders when the former readily embraced ately (which they unsuccess fully advocated), Hitler's suggestion that the air force would their army would have to be supplied by keep alive the trapped army: air for weeks, if not months. They stated In response to my questions about Sixth that it would need 750 tons of supplies per Army's intentions, General Schmidt replied day (reducing this figure to five hundred tons that the army commander proposed to deploy within a few days). Their statements to this his army in a hedgehog [that is, all--around] effect horri fied local Luftwaffe commanders , defense of Stalingrad . . . . Regarding the whose depleted units would have to carry possibilities of this hedgehog defense, I asked out the airlift. how they planned to keep Sixth Army Later that day (21 November), Gen supplied, especially when the supply line from eralleutnant Martin Fiebig, commander of the rear looked certain to be cut very soon. Fliegerkorps VIII, the Luftwaffe corps respon General Schmidt replied that supplies would sible for all air operations in the Stalingra d have to be carried in by air. I replied that 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997

Hit ler shaking hands with Generaloberst Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen in Russia, mid-1942. The two got on fa mously, although Hitler never learned until much later that von Richthofen strenuously opposed the decision to airlift.

supplying an entire army by air was impossible, mea, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and, of particularly when our transport aircraft were course, the Stalingrad sector). Von already heavily committed in North Africa. I Richthofen's views carried far more weight warned him against exaggerated expectations. than those of Fiebig, his subordinate. Not Generaloberst Paulus entered the conversation only was he considered to be Germany' s occasionally on his other telephone line. Next morning, at 0700, I telephoned General Schmidt leading operational air commander, but he again, telling him that he was counting too was also liked and respected by the perso n strongly on air supply. I stressed to him again who mattered most: Hitler himself. In that, after long deliberations, based on my fact, Hitler admired von Richthofen, a experience and knowledge of the [limited] means commit ted National Socialist, aggressiv e available, supplying Sixth Army by air was commander, inspiring leader, forthright ad simply not feasible. Further, the weather and viser, and loyal follower. enemy situations were completely unpredictable Von Richthofen considered it sheer mad factors.17 ness for Paulus and his staff to plan an all- Another prominent air leader shared Fie- around defense at Stalingrad and pin their big's view: the highly decorated Genera hopes on the Luftwaffe to sustain their loberst Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, army. The air force simply lacked the abil commande r of Luftflotte 4, the air fleet in ity to keep it supplied, he frantically warned charge of all Luftwaffe operations in south- every one who would listen. “Sixth Army ern Russia (including the Ukraine, the Cri believes that it will be supplied by the air STALINGRAD 27

the pocket, echoed these sentiments to Paulus and Schmidt during a conference in Nizhne -Chirskaya, attended by these generals and Genera loberst Hermann Hoth, Fourth Panzer Army's commander. According to Pickert's subse quent version of what transpired (the only surviving account), Schmidt asked him at one point what he thought should be done. “I would gather together all the forces I could and break out to the southwest,” the flak general bluntly replied. Schmidt ex plained that Hitler had expressly ordered Sixth Army to stand fast at Stalingrad, that the army lacked sufficient fuel for a proper breakout attempt, and that the terrain itself com pli cated matters. The Sovi ets held higher ground to the west, meaning that Sixth Army would be exposed to their guns if it attempted to break out. Such an attempt would have to be made without heavy weapons, in any event, because of the fuel shortages. Moreover, it would be neces sary to leave 15,000 sick and wounded sol diers to their fate. For these reasons, Schmidt added, a breakout would probably Von Richthofen repeatedly insisted to senior army com turn into a “Napole onic catastro phe.” 20 manders and the High Command that his air fleet could Pickert rejected this as “nonsense,” insist not possi bly sustain Sixth Army by airlift. His warnings fell on deaf ears. ing that a breakout was the only solution. His flak forces could help considera bly, he fleet in its hedgehog positions,” he com added. He had numerous heavy batteries for plained in his diary on the 21st.18 “I make cov er ing fire, and his men could carry his every effort to convince it that this cannot be 20 mm flak guns (160 of them) and their am- accom plished , because the necessary trans- muni tion across the steppes. “No,” Schmidt port resources are not available.” During concluded, “the army has been ordered to “dreadfully many telephone calls . . . until stand fast at Stalingrad. As a result, we shall late in the night,” he emphatically insisted form hedgehog defenses and expect supplies to almost every relevant air force and army from the air.” The flak commander, who leader—includ ing Göring in Berlin, Zeitzler apparently had no knowledge of Fiebig's pre in East Prussia, Jeschonnek at Berchtesgaden, vious debate with the army on the matter, was and von Weichs at Army Group B headquar flabber gasted. “Supply an entire army from ters—that he lacked the means to supply Pau the air?—absolutely impossi ble! It simply can- lus's army. It should imme di ately attempt not be done, especially in this weather.” De- to break out.19 His protests fell on deaf spite repeatedly pleading with the Sixth Army ears and, despite several requests, no one to break out and explaining at length the rea would put his call through to Hitler. sons why the Luftwaffe could not keep it sup- The following day, General ma jor Wolfgang plied, Pickert was unable to persuade the Pickert, commander of the 9th Flak Division army. Paulus had remained silent throughout and the senior Luftwaffe officer trapped in the discussion , but finally told the airman the two most important things in his 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997 mind: that Hitler had ordered him to stand Several of the army corps commander s fast, and that a breakout attempt with the bottled up in Stalingrad also agreed that the means available would probably only end in war was over for them if the High Command disas ter. Schmidt remained adamant about refused a breakout and ordered an airlift. the airlift. “It simply has to be done,” he On 22 November, while Pickert was battling stated, adding that his men would do their Paulus and Schmidt in Nizhne--Chirskaya, a bit to cut down the supply level by eating the meeting between corps commanders took thousands of horses within the pocket.21 place at Gumrak, within the pocket.23 Acting Thus, Luftwaffe commanders in the field on his own initiative, Walther von Seydlitz, were unanimous both in their belief that the commander of LI Army Corps, summoned air force could not supply the entire Sixth the other corps commanders—Gen er als Erwin Army and in their condemna tion of the idea Jaenicke of IV Army Corps, Walter Heitz of to local army commanders and to the High IV Army Corps, Karl Strecker of XI Army Command itself. They eventually made sev Corps, and Hans Hube of XIV Panzer eral converts, most notably Zeitzler (as will Corps—to discuss the situation. They all soon be shown) and Generaloberst von agreed that they must gather all their Weichs, commander of Army Group B. The strength for an attempt to break through the latter had listened carefully to von Richtho encir clem ent. They scheduled their attack fen's arguments. Persuaded, he sent a tele for the 25th and, in agreement with von typed message to the High Command on 22 Weichs (but not with Paulus, who had no Novem ber .22 The prompt withdrawal of knowledge of their plans at that stage), be Sixth Army was essential, he said, especiall y gan regrouping for the operation . because “the supply by air of the twenty divi However, Paulus—like his chief of sions that constitute this army is not possi staff—was apparently not persuaded by the air- ble. With the air transport available, and in men's warnings. He vacillated throughout favor able weather conditions, it is possibl e the 22d and 23d, afraid to contradict Hit to carry in only one--tenth of their essential ler's order to stand fast even though he daily requirements.” Von Weichs added that knew his opportu ni ties for a successfu l although a breakout would “entail heavy breakout were disappearing with every losses, especially in materiel,” it was the passing hour. On the 22d, he did request only viable option and would, if successful , “freedom of decision in the event of failure “resul t in favorable develop ments in the to construct southern defensive positions.” situatio n as a whole.” Yet, totally ignoring von Richthofen's, Fie- big's, and Pickert's logical argument s against an airlift, he stated that as long as he could close his exposed southern front “and Von Richthofen considered it sheer receive ample airborne supplies,” he in- madness for Paulus and his staff to tended to hold the area still in his posses- plan an all--around defense at sion.24 Next evening, in response to Stalin grad and pin their hopes on Hitler' s fresh order to construct all- around defen sive posi tions and await relief the Luftwaffe to sustain their army. from outside, the general replied with an- The air force simply lacked the abil other teletype message. This time he did ity to keep it supplied, he allude to mounting opposi tion to the pro- frantic ally warned everyone who posed airlift, but said only that “timely and would listen. adequate supply has been ruled out.”25 His army must break through the encirclem ent to the southwest, he stated, because it was now suffering acute fuel and ammuni tio n STALINGRAD 29 shortages and increasing enemy attack s almost everyone else that they lacked the against certain sectors. As the army could means to sustain Sixth Army. Nor did he not hold out for long, he again requested commu ni cate with von Weichs, who shared “freedom of decision.” His five corps com their view and advocated an immedi at e manders, he added, shared his views on breakout. Hitler learned of their views from the situation. Zeitzler, who had finally “come around” and Hitler's ears were now deaf to such pleas. now defended their assessment. Yet, be- His mind was firmly made up. After arriving cause their warnings were not delivered per- back at his East Prussian headquarters on the sonally, but only passed on by the army's 23d, he replied to Paulus by radio in the “overanx ious” chief of staff, they carried lit early hours of the 24th. Sixth Army (which tle weight. Hitler merely accused Zeitzler of he now designated “Fortress Stalingrad”) being too pessimis tic and advised him to would stay and defend itself vigorously . stop paying heed to “defeatist” commander s “Air supply by a hundred more Junkers is who couldn't see the forest for the trees. getting under way,” he said, trying to reas The military advis ers accom pa ny ing sure the frantic army commander.26 By Hitler —his faithful paladins, Wilhelm Keitel now, Hitler's notion of an airlift operatio n and Alfred Jodl, and their skeleton had changed consid era bly since Jeschonnek staffs—were in no position to make detailed had first assured him that Sixth Army asses sments or of fer in formed advice. could be supplied by air. He had then de- The syco phan tic Keitel, who seldom ex- scribed the army's encir clem ent as tem pressed views contrary to Hitler's, acted po rary, and Jeschonnek had made his rash true to form throughout this crucial period. assur ance with that in mind. Now he clearly “The Volga must be held! . . . Sixth Army envis aged a Demyansk--style airlift, only even must hold out!” he repeatedly told Hitler. larger and longer lasting. “Sixth Army will Althoug h Jodl was no lackey, despite the stay where it is,” he yelled at Zeitzler in the efforts of many postwar writers to paint evening of the 23d, according to the latter's him as one, he was still smarting from the postwar account. “It is the garrison of a for- rough treatment Hitler had dished out when tress, and the duty of fortress troops is to he sided with Gener al feld mar schal l Wil withstand sieges. If necessary they will hold helm List against him in September. He out all winter, and I shall relieve them by a was not yet ready to receive more. He spring offensive.” 27 therefore gave Hitler far more cautious but The firmness of Hitler's conviction that still agreeable advice: although Sixth Army the “fortress” should stand fast and that the was certainly in a predicament, he argued, Luftwaffe could keep it adequately supplied and its destruction looked certain if relief had grown considera bly in the two days since was not forthcoming, the vast territo ria l Jeschonnek had first mentioned it. One of gains made during the summer campaign the main reasons for his increased conviction should not be abandoned before von Man- was the almost unanimous support for the stein's relief operation was attempted. In deci sion expressed by those around him. At the meantime, the Luftwaffe should keep Berchtesgaden, and during his long train the army supplied. journey to East Prussia on the 23d, Hitler Aside from Zeitzler's, the only dissentin g had no contact—personal or telegraphic—with voice Hitler heard during his last two days the army and air force commanders at the in Berchtesgaden and his long journey north front. During that critical decision--making to East Prussia belonged to Jeschonnek, peri od, he did not speak to von Richthofen, who had abandoned his earlier position and Fiebig, or Pickert, whose air forces would now meekly suggested that Sixth Army have to carry out the massive supply opera should break out.28 He regretted his ear tion and who were now frantically warning lier assurances to Hitler. Almost as soon as 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997 the words were out of his mouth, he wished mitted to von Richthofen that Göring was he could swallow them again. After having not entirely to blame for the failed airlift; he his staff check his figures and after talking had himself promised Sixth Army that it with von Richthofen several times by tele would be supplied by air, “without the phone, he quickly realized that nothing Reichsmarschall's knowledge.”30 close to adequate logisti cal support of Sixth When Göring first discussed an airlift Army by air would be possible, even with with Hitler on 21 November, he lacked up- consis tently favorable weather and taking no to-- the- - minute informa tion on Sixth account of VVS action. He and von Richtho Army's encirclem ent and statisti cal data fen were close friends, but the latter clearly with which to make air supply calcula tions. dominated their relation ship and, when they He therefore gave no specific assurance s disagreed on matters, usually managed to about his force's airlift tonnage capabili ties, win Jeschonnek over. This was clearly one insist ing instead that Sixth Army should such case. However, although Jeschonnek stand fast and that, as Jeschonnek had said the noti fied Hitler that he might have been too previou s day, the Luftwaffe would do all in hasty when he made his earlier assessment , its power to meet the army's needs. As soon his retraction carried no weight. Not only as he got off the phone, he summoned his did Keitel and Jodl believe Sixth Army quarter mas ter staff and ordered every should stay, Hitler retorted, but Jeschon availabl e transport plane—including his own nek's own superio r, Reichsmarschall Gör courier flight—to be mobilized for the op ing, had now given his personal assuranc e eration. Göring's actions are remarkable , that the air force could fully meet the consid er ing that he had not yet studied de- army's supply needs. tailed data or consulted air supply experts. He later told von Richthofen that at the very begin ning of the Stalingrad episode, he had played the optimist and supported Hitler in Respon si bil ity for the decision to his decision to stand fast there.31 At that supply Sixth Army . . . rests with point, von Richthofen added, Göring had three individu als: Jeschonnek, Hit still believed Sixth Army's encirclem ent to ler, and Göring. be temporar y. Göring's assurances became much stronger on the following day (22 November), when Deter min ing when Göring first specifi he arrived in Berchtesgaden. Hitler asked cally assured Hitler that the Luftwaffe could his bulky deputy whether he still supported supply the army is difficult because of the the air--supply proposal. Göring replied paucity of reliable and detailed sources. confi dently, “Ja, it can be done.” He could However, David Irving, who has recon give no other answer, he later told Genera structed Göring's movements in this period, loberst Bruno Lörzer, his close friend, be- believes that Hitler had first phoned him on cause the Nazi leader used the worst kind of 21 November, a full day after Jeschonnek emotional blackmail: had made his rash promise and shortly after Hitler said to me: “Listen here, Göring. If the Hitler had first mentioned the airlift to Pau- Luftwaffe cannot carry this through, then lus.29 This view gains support from von Sixth Army is lost!” He had me firmly by the Richthofen's diary description of a discus sword--knot. I could do nothing but agree, sion he had with Hitler at the “Wolf's Lair” otherwise the air force and I would be left on 11 February 1943, almost two weeks after with the blame for the loss of the army. So I had to reply: “Mein Führer, we'll do the Paulus surrendered and his surviving troops job!”32 staggered into Soviet captivity. Hitler ad STALINGRAD 31

He could hardly have rejected the airlift tail, the conclusion is inescap able: it is not proposal anyway, he lamely explained after- possi ble to keep the Sixth Army supplied wards to Paul Körner (undersec re tary of state by air.”36 Hitler remained outwardly calm, for the Four Year Plan), because his own but, with annoyance evident in his voice, chief of staff had already convinced Hitler stated, “The Reichsmarschall has assured that the air force could supply the encircle d me that it is possible.” When Zeitzler stood forces. “Hitler already had Jeschonnek's pa his ground, Hitler sent for the air force pers before I set eyes on them,” he told Kör chief. “Göring,” he asked, “can you keep the ner, doubtless trying to shift some blame to Sixth Army supplied by air?” The airman his chief of staff. “I could only say, `Mein raised his right arm and said, “Mein Führer, Führer, you have all the figures. If they are I assure you that the Luftwaffe can keep the correct, then I place myself at your dis Sixth Army supplied.” Hitler cast Zeitzler a posal.'”33 trium phant glance, but the general refused Jeschonnek's original figures were not ac to back down. “The Luftwaffe certainly can- curate, however, as Göring learned just not,” he insisted, to which Göring angrily re hours later. Oberst Eschenauer, Jeschonnek's torted, “You are not in a position to give an supply officer, informed his boss that the opinion on that.” Hitler was surprised by the standard “250 kg” and “1,000 kg” air- undis guised hostility between his com supply contain ers on which he based his cal manders, but granted Zeitzler permission cula tions actually carried only around two- to challenge Göring's promises. “Herr thirds of those loads.34 Their names derived Reichsmarschall,” he said. “Do you know solely from the size of the bombs they re- what tonnage has to be flown in every day?” placed on bomb racks. Jeschonnek, an hon Caught off--guard, the embarrassed air est man who admitted his mistakes, leader spat back, “I don't, but my staff offi imme di ate ly told Göring, and asked him to cers do.” Zeitzler had come armed. His own warn Hitler that their calcula tions were staff had made detailed calcula tions , which based on incorrect data. Göring winced he immedi ate ly summarized : when his young chief of staff confessed to Allowing for all the stocks at present with this error, but, believing it was “too late Sixth Army, allowing for absolute minimum now,” expressly forbade him to tell Hitler. In- needs and the taking of all possible emergency stead, he phoned Hitler, repeated his uncon measures, the Sixth Army will require delivery ditional assurances that the Luftwaffe could of three hundred tons per day. But since not do the job and invited him to phone Gener every day is suitable for flying, as I myself alfeld mar schall Erhard Milch, his deputy learned at the front last winter, this means and Air Inspector-- General, if he still felt that about five hundred tons will have to be unsure. When Milch finally learned of this carried to Sixth Army on each and every in 1946, he angrily scrawled in his diary: “De flying day if the irreducible minimum ceit plus incompe tence equals one average is to be maintained. Reichsmarschall! I guessed it already, but “I can do that,” Göring shot back. Losing his now I get proof of it, it makes me want to temper, Zeitzler shouted: “Mein Führer! throw up all over again.”35 That is a lie!” Hitler thought for a minute Accord ing to Zeitzler's postwar claims, after before replying: “The Reichsmarschall has Hitler arrived back in East Prussia late next made his report to me, which I have no evening—23 November—he vigorously choice but to believe. I therefore abide by tried to persuade Hitler that Göring's prom my original decision [to supply the army by ises were impossi ble to keep. After explain air].” ing at length the tonnages required and the Zeitzler's frequently cited description of lack of aircraft to carry them, Zeitzler told this argument with Göring should not be Hitler that “having examined the facts in de- treated as a verbatim record because it is 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997

shortly before he issued his fateful order to Paulus that his army must stand fast, that a relief operation was being launched, and that the Luftwaffe, bolstered by “a hundred more Junkers,” would keep the army supplied.38 If the argument did occur at that point, then it represents the last major ap peal to Hitler to change his mind and the most weighty challenge to Göring's uncon ditional assurances that his air force would meet the trapped army's supply needs. It shows not only that Hitler had already firmly made up his mind before he arrived back in East Prussia, but that his deputy's embar rass ing unfamili ar ity with the ton nages he had promised to supply should have raised grave doubts in his mind about the reliabil ity of those promises. Before it was too late, Hitler should have reexam ine d the tables and graphs drawn up by Jeschonnek, Zeitzler, and the army quartermaster- general; and he should have spoken to von Richthofen , whose air fleet was to carry out the air supply operation . However, the argument with Zeitzler did not take place on the 24th, before the air- Gener al leut nant Erich von Manstein initially thought lift began. It could not have. After Göring Sixth Army should remain at Stalingrad, supported by the Luftwaffe, until he could mount a relief operation . visited Hitler at the Berghof on the 22d, he His report to this effect hardened Hitler's resolve that departed for Paris in “Asia,” his luxurious the Luftwaffe would have to keep Sixth Army alive and command train. He spent the next four opera tional . days—when he should have been organiz in g the airlift—visit ing Parisian art dealers and based on his subjective recollec tion of the galler ies. 39 Von Richthofen was appalled. “I exchange and was apparently not written urge Jeschonnek and Zeitzler to report my down until the following day. However, the views to the Führer,” he wrote in his diary account is almost certainly an honest attempt on the 25th, “and to harness the Reichsmar at reconstruct ing the event. Zeitzler's open schall, but he's in Paris!”40 Göring arrived oppo si tion to the airlift is mentioned in sev back at Hitler's headquarters in Rastenburg eral reliable sources, including von Richtho on the 27th, and his heated exchange with fen's diary, as is his courage to express Zeitzler probably took place at that point; opinions contrary to Hitler's. But placing this that is, three days after Hitler had given the account chronologically within this crucial final go--ahead for the airlift. Despite the deci sion-- making period poses problems. claims of numerous writers, therefore, the Zeitzler himself could not remember the argu ment played no part in the decision- date, noting only that it took place “be- making process. The die had already been tween 22 and 26 November. ”37 cast. Most writers place the argument in the Hitler's decision to keep Sixth Army at early hours of 24 November—that is, shortly Stalin grad and support it from the air until after Hitler arrived from Berchtesgaden and a relief operation could break its encirclem - STALINGRAD 33 ent was poorly received by the commanders eral direction of Kotelnikov o or face destruc in the field. Von Richthofen again tried des tion within days.”43 The army's supply perately to convince everyone who would situation, he insisted, would decide the mat listen that Hitler must be given an honest ter. To believe the Luftwaffe could keep the appraisal of the facts. He phoned Jeschon army supplied was grasping at straws, espe nek (three times), von Weichs, and Zeitzler, cially since only 30 Ju--52s were at hand once more pleading with them to have his and, even if the other hundred aircraft Hit views made known to Hitler (which they ler promised actually materi al ized, they did, to no avail).41 He was disappointed by could still not meet the army's needs in what he correctly perceived to be Jeschon full. Unfortu nately, von Seydlitz's report nek's lack of courage in Hitler's presence, contained several careless inaccu ra cie s noting that “Weichs and Zeitzler share my which robbed it of its persuasive ness. He view. Jeschonnek has no view at all.” He stated, for example, that even one thou s a n d was most upset the next day to learn that the tons of supplies per day would not be suffi airlift would proceed, despite their warn cient, whereas Sixth Army's own quarter- ings: master had just reported that the army could survive if the Luftwaffe carried in five hun The Führer heard everything we had to say, but decides against it because he believes the dred tons each day (three hundred cubic army can hold on and he does not think we meters of fuel and two hundred tons of am- 44 could reach Stalingrad again. I stand by my muni tion) . Schmidt and Paulus still sent own opinion. Still, orders are orders and the report to von Manstein, adding that, al everything will be done pursuant to the orders though they disagreed with many of von received. It is tragic that none of the locally- Seydlitz's reasons, they shared his view that responsible commanders, although purportedly the army should break out immedi ate ly . possessing [the Führer's] confidence, has any Unfor tu nately for all those opposed to influence at all now. . . . As things are at present, Hitler's “stand fast” and airlift decisions , operationally speaking, we are nothing more von Manstein made his own thorough assess than highly--paid non--commissioned officers.42 ment of the situation and sent the High Command a far more optimis tic appraisal.45 Von Richthofen was stunned that the His position was similar to Jodl's: while he High Command expected him to fly in at agreed that a breakout was the safest least three hundred tons per day. “We sup- course, and that the army remained in dan ply [the pocket today] with all our Ju--52s, ger if it stayed in its present positions, he was but we only have 30 available for that.” He not convinced by Army Group B's insistence added in his diary on the 25th: on an immedi ate breakout. If a relief opera Of yesterday's 47 Ju 52s, 22 made sorties [into tion could start in early December, he ar the pocket]; of today's 30, 9 made sorties. gued, and if the promised reinforce ments We flew in 75 tons today, instead of the 300 arrived in time, it was still possible to save tons ordered by the High Command, which is the army. Of course, he cautioned, if it not possible with the few Ju 52s available. I proved impossi ble to launch the relief opera report[ed] this to the Reichsmarschall. tion or meet the army's supply needs by air, Von Seydlitz, commander of LI Army then it should break out. Hitler felt vindi Corps, also complained that Hitler's or cated. He highly valued von Manstein' s der was impos si ble to fulfill. He sent Pau opinions (as did most of his senior officers) , lus a lengthy report, which warned that and proudly informed Zeitzler and his other there could be no question of standing firm: advis ers that the field marshal's assessment “The army has a clear choice: it must was far more in keeping with his own views break through to the southwest in the gen than those of his “defeatist” generals. The debate was over; he had won—for now. 34 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997

Thus, responsi bil ity for the decision to air, one should note that he was unable to supply Sixth Army—one of the most fateful focus solely on that matter. He had to di de ci sions of the war—rests with three in vide his atten tion between events at Stalingrad di vidu als: Jeschonnek, Hitler, and Gör and what he mistakenly perceived to be the ing. Jeschonnek rashly made the first equally critical situation in North Africa. assur ances that the Luftwaffe was capabl e Only a fortnight after Gen Bernard Mont of meeting the army's logisti cal needs bef gom ery launched his offensive against Erwin ore he had consulted air transport experts, Rommel's positions at El Alamein and four made detailed calcula tions of his own, or days after his army captured them (which sought the views of von Richthofen and the threw Hitler into a fit of rage), major other air force and army commanders at Anglo-- America n landings took place in the front. Their evaluations of the situa Morocco and Algeria on 8 November . tion and the capabili ties of their respective French resistance quickly collapsed, and sub forces would have been far more detailed sequent events forced Hitler to launch Opera and reliable than the situation assessment s tion Anton, the occupa tion of Vichy France, made by Hitler and his entourage (thou- on the 11th. To make matters worse, he felt sands of kilometers away in Hitler's alpine he needed to pour scores of thousands of retreat in southern Bavaria), whose main troops into Tunisia to counter the advance source of informa tion was Zeitzler's telephon e of Anglo--American forces pushing eastward “updates.” Jeschonnek should have requested towards Rommel's Afrika Korps, still falling a little time to do homework before present back westward before Montgomery's Eighth ing an opinion on the matter. Army. Anton quickly reached its success When Jeschonnek gave his initial as ful conclusion. Yet, when Stalin launched surances to Hitler, however, he believed that Opera tion Uranus on 19 November , events the army's encirclem ent would be tempo were still going very poorly for German rary and, therefore, that its long--term sur troops in North Africa and Hitler's mind vival did not depend on the air force's was focused on their survival and, he hoped, ability to keep it supplied. Had he known on operations to restore the situation. Thus, then that Sixth Army would need supply dis tracted by events in the Mediterranean, ing for several weeks, if not several Hitler was unable to focus his attentio n months, he certainly would not have solely on the grave situation in the east. promised Hitler anything with out exten Had he chosen to concentrate on Stalingra d sive research. To his credit, when he did and the security of the Don/Donets region, learn that Sixth Army's encirclem en t would strate gi cally more important than Tunisia, he last longer than originally claimed, that von may have made different choices than the Richthofen and Fiebig forcefully opposed ones that eventually led to the loss of an en- the airlift, and that his own hasty calcula tire army. tions were inaccu rate, he immedi ate ly ad Deciding to supply Sixth Army by air was mitted his mistakes and tried to dissuade not Hitler's only mistake. His decision to Hitler and Göring. He lacked both a force pour men and equipment into Tuni sia dur ful personal ity and the respect of his bosses, ing this critical period rates as one of the so, as a result, they simply ignored his warn worst he ever made. As historian Vincent ings. Jeschonnek's culpabil it y, then, stems Orange noted, “The campaign, however pro- from rashness, a faulty original assessmen t longed, could have only one result: an Axis of the situa tion, and an inability to stand defeat.” 46 The Allies, he explained, “enjoyed up to stronger personali ties. It does not command of the sea, the air and an enormous stem from dishonesty or incompe tence . advan tage on land in numbers of troops, When consider ing Hitler's responsi bil tanks, guns and supplies of all kind (especiall y ity for the decision to supply Sixth Army by fuel).” Thus, the 81,000 German troops STALINGRAD 35 landed in Tunisia between November 1942 Stalin grad, had evidently made no real effort and January 1943,47 plus the 250 Ju--52s used to familiar ize himself with the issues in to transport them, were wasted in a campaign volved. Lastly, he did not sack Göring and with little strategic value and no chance of replace him with someone competent, or success. Those men and aircraft could have even demand that he act responsi bly in this made a crucial difference to German for- critical period. He should at least have for- tunes in the far more importan t bidden him (in von Richthofen's words) “to Don/Donets region had they been sent to swan off to Paris to plunder art galleries ” von Manstein and von Richthofen instead. and ordered him to stay in Rastenburg to or Hitler's responsi bil ity for the airlift out- ganize and oversee the Stalingrad airlift, the weighs Jeschonnek's. First, his own initial largest in military history, upon which hung percep tions about the develop ing encir the lives of a quarter of a million men. clement and the fate of Sixth Army were not Göring's responsi bil ity for the airlift de based on rational ity, but egotism. His “iron cision equals Hitler's. When the Nazi leader will” alone had saved his eastern armies first asked him whether the Luftwaffe could, during the previous winter, he believed. It as Jeschonnek had promised, fully meet would do so again. This explains his com Sixth Army's logisti cal needs, he should not ment to Zeitzler on the first night after he have given an immedi ate answer. He should returned to East Prussia. “We must show first have consulted his air transport experts, firmness of character in misfortune,” he lec studied all available informa tion on the tured. “We must remember Frederick the situation at Stalingrad (enemy strengths and Great.”48 Second, he also considered it es activi ties, the size and state of trapped sential to stand fast at Stalingrad because he forces, the condition and capabili ties of Luft could not withdraw, without losing face, flotte 4, weather patterns and projections, from the “strategically--important” city that and so on) and sought the opinions of von he had publicly vowed several times to keep. Richthofen and the Fliegerkorps command Third, because Jeschonnek's assurance s ers involved. Remarkably, Göring failed to supported his own preconcep tions, he uncriti do this, not only before making his first as cally accepted them, although the airman surances, but also before making his final had clearly not reflected or conducted re- promises prior to leaving for Paris. search before making them. Fourth, from Göring aggressively dominated his own the moment he received those assurances , staff, driving two of his senior officers to which suited his own views so well, Hitler suicide (Ernst Udet in November 1941 and closed his mind to alterna tive strategies. Jeschonnek in August 1943). Yet, he proved Fifth, he totally ignored the repeated ap inca pa ble of standing up to Hitler. He rarely peals and warnings of his frontline army even expressed views contrary to Hitler's (at and air force commanders, unfairly calling least in the latter's presence), especially after them “defeatists” because they challenged his obvious failure to defeat Britain from the inflexible, “stand fast” formula that he the air and to defend Germany's cities from had elevated to the status of doctrine. ever--incre asing Allied air attacks. These fail Sixth, he accepted Göring's promises and ures had steadily reduced his standing in reas sur ances as uncriti cally as he had ac Hitler's eyes throughout 1941 and 1942. In- cepted Jeschonnek's, de spite the fact that stead, he lapsed into subservi ence, hoping Reichsmar schall Göring had a poor track his slavish loyalty would repair their rela record, had exercised only nominal com tionship. It is probable, then, that Göring's mand of the Luftwaffe during the last year, uncon di tional assurances that his air force instead delegating the force's day--to- - da y could maintain Sixth Army stem from his running to his subordi nates, and, despite inabil ity to resist Hitler or challenge his the crucial nature of the present situation at views (“I gained the impression that he was 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997 afraid of Hitler,” Milch once wrote49) and trapped in Stalingrad with the Luftwaffe from his intense desire to restore his tat supply ing it un til a rescue attempt could tered prestige. be launched is more complex than pre Hermann Plocher argued that Göring “may sented in books on these events. First, also have sincerely believed that he could more people were involved in the decision- accom plish the airlift operation to satisfac making process than just Göring and Hitler, tion, just as he had done in some instances and the final decision itself was not sponta in the past, by combining the influ ences neously made during the first discussion be- of his several offices and adding his own tween those two. It evolved during several brutal energy.”50 Plocher was wrong. Gör discus sions between Hitler and his closest ing did not “sincerely” believe that he could military advisers, several of whom gave poor do the job, otherwise no sense can be made counsel and prevented Hitler from hearing of his comments to Lörzer that Hitler had person ally from those with dissenting views, him “by the sword--knot” and that he could espe cially von Richthofen, clearly the per- “do nothing but agree” because he did not son best informed about Luftwaffe capabili want to “be left with the blame.” Also, his ties in the Stalingrad sector. Contrary to refusal to inform Hitler that Jeschonnek's popular claims, the decisio n was not original calcula tions were based on false reached after Göring “duped” Hitler. No, premises and informa tion removes any sug thanks to Jeschonnek and the useless advice gestion of “sincerit y.” He deliber ately with- of Keitel and Jodl, Hitler already had it firmly held embarrass ing but important in mind before he even spoke to the bulky infor ma tion from Hitler. Addition ally, at no demagogue. His fear of public humiliation, point during the course of the airlift did he coupled with his stubborn inflexibil ity throw his “brutal energy” into making sure it (which he called his “iron will”) quickly succeeded. On the contrary, rather than transformed the airlift—really only one of stay and organ ize and oversee the crucial several alterna tive strategies that he should op era tion himself, he disappeared to Paris have explored properly—into the only course on a shopping trip and then, on his return, of action. Those same subjective factors led only rarely attempted to involve himself in him to ignore the dissenting voices of com its progress. manders he ordinar ily trusted and to listen To sum up, then, this article shows that to those of men he held in low regard. Hitler's decision to leave Sixth Army

Notes 1. For the effect of the defeat on Hitler's allies, see Jürgen Richthofen, Fiebig, and Pickert, all used in the present study. Förster's Stalin grad: Risse im Bundnis 1942/43 Einzelschriften zur David Irving's works on the Luftwaffe deal only briefly with militäris chen Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Freiburg: Rom the decision to airlift, but contain many valuable insights and bach, 1957), 16. place blame fairly. 2. An excellent treatment of Stalingrad histori og ra phy and 5. Franz Kurowski, Stal in grad: die Schlacht, die Hitlers Mythos the lasting effects of that battle on the collective memory of zerstörte (Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Lübbe, 1992), 298. See Ku Germans and Russians is W. Wette and G. R. Ueberschär , eds., rowski's earlier Luftbrücke Stalingrad: Die Tragödie der Luftwaffe Stalin grad: Mythos und Wirklichkeit einer Schlacht (Frankfurt am und der 6. Armee (Berg am See: Kurt Vowinckel, 1983), 32–37, and Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1992); also see Jürgen Förster, ed., Balkenk reuz und Roter Stern: Der Luftkrieg über Russland Stalin grad: Ereignis--Wirkung- - Symbo l (Munich: Piper, 1992). 1941–1944 (Friedberg: Podzun-- Pallas), 310; and Williamson Mur 3. Erich von Manstein, Ver lorene Siege (Bonn: Athenäum, ray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933–1945 (Maxwell Air 1955), 347. Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1983), 151. 4. J. Fischer's “Über den Entschluss zur Luftversorgung 6. Samuel W. Mitcham, Men of the Luftwaffe (Novato, Calif.: Stalin grads: Ein Beitrag zur militärischen Führung im Dritten Presidio Press, 1988), 184. Reich,” Militär geschicht li che Mitteilun ge n 2 (1969): 7–67, is the 7. Fischer, 10. best published study of the “decision to supply Stalingrad by 8. Manstein, 326. air,” although it makes no use of the diaries of Milch, von STALINGRAD 37

9. For Jeschonnek's meeting with Hitler, see postwar state 26. Führerentscheid vom 24.11.1942, betr. Halten der Stel ments by the airman's staff—especially “Frau Lotte Kersten, da lungen der 6. Armee und Ensatzstoss. FS OKH GenStdH/Op. mals Sekretärin bei Generaloberst Jeschonnek” and Abt. (I/SB) Nr. 420 960/42 gKdos Chefs. vom 24.11.1942, 0140 “Oberstleut nant Leuchtenberg, damals Adjutant des Genera Uhr, aufgenom men bei AOK 6 um 0830 Uhr, published as Doc. loberst Jeschonnek”—in Aussage n zum Problem der Luftver 11, ibid., 562. sorgung von Stalingra d, United States Air Force Historica l 27. K. Zeitzler, “Stalingrad,” in W. Kreipe, G. Blumentritt et Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (hereafter al., The Fatal Deci sions: Six Decisive Battles of the Second World cited as USAFHRA), file no. K113.106–153. War from the Viewpoint of the Vanquished (London: Michael Jo 10. Fritz Morzik, German Air Force Airlift Operations , USAF seph, 1956), 142. Histori cal Study 167 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Divi 28. David Irving, Hitler's War (London: Papermac, 1977), sion, Air University, 1961), 145. 456; and Göring: A Biogra phy (London: Macmillan, 1989), 369. 11. Ibid., 150. 29. Ibid., 367. 12. Ibid., 157–60. 30. Von Richthofen, Persönliches Kriegstagebuch, Band 13. P. E. Schramm, ed., Kriegstage buch des Oberkomman dos 10, 1.1.--31.12.1943, 11 February 1943 . BA/MA N671/10. der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab), 1940–1945 (Frankfurt 31. Ibid., 10 February 1943. am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1961), vol. 2, 25 November 1942, 32. Bericht über eine Auskunft über Görings Stalin grader Zusage 1019; Cajus Bekker, Angriff shöhe 4000: Ein Kriegstagebuch der durch Generaloberst Lörzer (Befragung Hamburg-- deutschen Luftwaffe, 1939–1945 (Gräfelfing vor München: Urbes Othmarschen, 16 April 1956, durch Prof. Dr. Richard Suchen Ver lag Hans Jürgen Hansen, 1964), 363. wirth, Karlsruhe). USAFHRA file no. K113.309--3. 14. M. Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamatione n, 33. Staatssekretär a.D. Paul Körner über Jeschonnek (Befra 1932–1945 (1965; reprint, Leonberg: Pammin ger, 1988). The gung am 19.9.1955 in München), USAFHRA file no. K113.309-- speech of 28 Septembe r 1942 is in vol. 4, 1912–14, of the re- 3, vol. 9. print edition. 34. Milch Taschenkalender, 21 May 1946, part of the Irving 15. Ibid., 1933–44, esp. 1937 (speech of 9 November 1942). micro film series Records and Documents Relating to the Third 16. Manfred Kehrig, Stalingrad: Analyse und Dokumen ta tion Reich , distributed by Microform (Wakefield) Ltd., microfilm DJ eine r Schlacht: Beiträge zur Militär- - und Kriegsgeschichte, Band -57 . 15 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags--Anstalt, 1974), 163. 35. Ibid. 17. Feldgericht des VIII. Fliegerkorps, Br. B. Nr. 7143, gKdos, 36. Generaloberst Zeitzler über das Zustande kom men des Im Felde, den 26.1.1943, gez. Fiebig, appended to Tagebuch-- Entschlusses, Stalingrad aus der Luft zu versorgen (Briefliche Generalleutnant Fiebig (Stalingrad), 25.11.1942– 22.2.1943, in Beantwor tung vom 11.3.1955 folgender von Prof. Suchenwirt h USAF HRA, file no.168.7158--335 . mit Brief vom 3.3.1955 gestellter Fragen); Zeitzler, “Stalingrad,” 18. Dr. Wolfram Frhr. von Richthofen, Persönliches Kriegstage USAF HRA file no. K113.309--3, vol. 9, 144–45. buch, Band 9, 1.1.—31.12.1942, 21 November 1942, in Bundesarchiv-- 37. Ibid. Militärarchiv (Federal Military Archives), Freiburg, Germany, N671/9. 38. For Hitler's instruction to Paulus, see note 26. For the Hereaf ter cited as BA/MA. placing of the Zeitzler--Göring confronta tion on 24 November , 19. Ibid. see Matthew Cooper, The German Air Force, 1933–1945: An Anat 20. My description of the conference is drawn from Pickert's omy of Failure (London: Jane's, 1981), 251; Bekker, 363; Paul notes (“Aufzeichnungen aus meinem Tagebuch und von Besprechun Carell, Stalin grad: The Defeat of the German 6th Army (Atglen, gen über operative ünd taktische Gedanken und Massnahmen der Pa.: Schiffer, 1993), 170. 6. Armee”), appended to his diary, USAFHRA file no. 168.7158-- 39. Irving, Göring, 369–71. 338: Aufzeichnungen des General ma jor Pickert, Kommandeurs der 40. Von Richthofen, Personli ches Kriegstagebuch, Band 9: 9. Flak--Division und Generals der Luftwaffe bei der 6. Armee, aus 1.I.--31.12.1942, 25 November 1942, BA/MA N671/9. der Zeit vom 25.6.42–23.1.43) as well as from later correspon 41. Ibid., 24 November 1942. dence between Pickert and Hans Doerr, USAFHRA file no. 42. Ibid., 25 November 1942. K113.309--3 , vol. 9; and from an essay written by Pickert to Her 43. Gen d. Art. v. Seydlitz--Kurzbach, HG des LI. AK, an den mann Plocher in 1956 (same source). OB der 6. Armee vom 25.11.1942, betr. Stellungnahme zum 21. Ibid. Armeebe fehl vom 24.11.1942. Abschrift des AOK 6 für ObKdo 22. OB HGr B an OKH/Chef GenStdH vom 23.11.1942, betr. HGr Don: Der KG des LI. AK Nr. 603/42 gKdos vom 25.11.1942, Zurücknahme der 6. Armee, gez. von Weichs, published as Doc. 9 bei HGr Don 28.11.1942, published as Doc. 15 in Kehrig, in Kehrig, 561. 564–67. 23. H. Schröter, Stalin grad: “. . . bis zur letzten Patrone” 44. AOK 6/OQu vom 24.11. an OKH/GenQu, HGr B/OQu, (Lengerich: Kleins Druck-- und Verlagsan stalt, n.d.), 85. und vom 25.11.1942 an HGr Don, betr. Bedarfsan for derung für 24. AOK 6/Ia an HGr B vom 22.11.1942, 1900 Uhr, betr. Luftver sorgungsgüter, published as Doc. 16, ibid., 567. Lage und Absicht der Armee, published as Doc. 6 in Kehrig, 45. Manstein an OKH/Op Abt vom 24.11.1942, betr. Beur 559–60. teilung der Lage der 6. Armee. FS (Abschrift) ObKdo der HGr 25. Paulus an Hitler vom 23.11.1942, betr. Notwendig kei t Don/Ia Nr. 4580/42 gKdos Chefs. vom 24. 11.1942, ca. 1300 des Ausbruches der 6. Armee, FuSpr (Entwurf) OB 6. Armee, Uhr, published as Doc. 14, ibid., 564. gKdos Chefs. an OKH, nachr. HGr. B, vom 23.11.1942, 2130 Uhr, 46. Vincent Orange, Coning ham: A Biogra phy of Air Marshal published as Doc. 10, ibid., 562. Sir Arthur Coning ham (1990; reprint, Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1992), 128 (also see 127). 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997

47. George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiativ e 50. Hermann Plocher, The German Air Force versus Russia, in the West (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military 1942, USAF Historical Study 154 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF His- History, Department of the Army, 1957), 683. torical Division, Air University, 1966), 276. Although dated, 48. Zeitzler, “Stalingrad,” 132. mud dled, and inaccu rate in places, Plocher's discussion of these 49. Irving, Göring, 381. mat ters is among the best in English.

Sit down before a fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every precon ceived notion, follow humbly wherever and to whatever abyss nature leads or you shall learn nothing.

—T. H. Huxley