CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Saint Louis University School of Law Research: Scholarship Commons Saint Louis University Law Journal Volume 57 Number 1 (Fall 2012) Article 7 2012 Deterring Opportunism Through Clawbacks: Lessons for Executive Compensation from Minor League Baseball Garrett R. Broshuis
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Garrett R. Broshuis, Deterring Opportunism Through Clawbacks: Lessons for Executive Compensation from Minor League Baseball, 57 St. Louis U. L.J. (2012). Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol57/iss1/7 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact Susie Lee. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW DETERRING OPPORTUNISM THROUGH CLAWBACKS: LESSONS FOR EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION FROM MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL INTRODUCTION Highly talented baseball players are scarce commodities. For this reason, they often command large sums of money prior to ever stepping on a major league baseball field, as teams annually pay large bonuses to the most talented players drafted in Major League Baseball’s (“MLB”) amateur draft. Combined, the thirty MLB teams awarded $228,009,050 in signing bonuses to 2011 draftees.1 The most talented individuals—the first-round draftees—received on average $2,653,375 per player in 2011.2 Both numbers set records for spending, as did the $8 million bonus given to the number one overall pick, Gerrit Cole.3 These sums of money are not given for performance but are given simply as an incentive to sign with the team.