International Politics, 2007, 44, (531–551) r 2007 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 1384-5748/07 $30.00 www.palgrave-journals.com/ip

Humanity or Enmity? Carl Schmitt on International Politics Roland Axtmann Department of Politics and International Relations, School of Humanities, Swansea University, Wales, Singleton Park, Swansea SA2 8PP, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

This article reviews Schmitt’s analysis of international politics from the period of the Weimar Republic to the early years of the German Federal Republic. It highlights the importance of Schmitt’s opposition to Woodrow Wilson’s policies and ‘liberal’ universalism more generally for his understanding of and engagement with international politics. Confronted with the decline of the state (the Ende der Staatlichkeit), Schmitt develops a concept of the political that is not tied in with the existence of the state. Schmitt embraces the fascist stato totalitario as a model for a ‘qualitatively’ strong state and the distribution of the earth into hegemonic Grossra¨ume as the new nomos. International Politics (2007) 44, 531–551. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800213

Keywords: Carl Schmitt; humanity; enmity; the political; war; state; universalism

Introduction: Carl Schmitt in his Time Still not a widely known figure in international relations theory, Carl Schmitt has come to be recognized as one of the most controversial as well as most influential political thinkers of the 20th century.1 Many political and intellectual critics and opponents of democracy in Germany tooktheir arguments from Carl Schmitt. But as Jan-Werner Mu¨ ller (2003) has recently shown, Schmitt has been a towering intellectual presence in post-war European thought as well. Schmitt’s voluminous writings have produced thousands of items of interpretative literature, most of them in German, but also in Italian, Spanish and French — with Anglo-American scholarship on Schmitt catching up at great pace over the last two decades or so (Bendersky, 1983; Caldwell, 1997; Dyzenhaus, 1997; McCormick, 1997; Cristi, 1998; Dyzenhaus, 1998; Mouffe, 1999; Scheuerman, 1999; Balakrishnan, 2000; Mu¨ ller, 2003; Kennedy, 2004). While there is no arguing about Schmitt’s centrality in conservative- nationalist and authoritarian-fascist thought past and present, the degree to which his thinking has also influenced the democratic left, and the question as to the legitimacy of any incorporation of Schmitt’s thought into any ‘left’ Roland Axtmann Carl Schmitt on International Politics 532 theory and politics, are highly controversial. Schmitt has rightly been perceived to be one of the 20th century most profound critics of liberalism, and the liberal notions of democracy and of politics in particular. Since liberalism as an ideology, theory and practice has been the beˆte noir of conservatism and socialism alike since the 19th century and well into the second half of the 20th century, the endeavour of either side to draw on Schmitt’s arguments is understandable. A lively scholarly debate about the validity and merits of Schmitt’s critique of liberalism should therefore be no surprise. What has caused disquiet, consternation and recrimination within the scholarly commu- nity is the fact that Schmitt developed his critique not from a position of dispassionate scholarly disengagement, as an intellectual endeavour of showing up the shortcomings of a particular theory, but as a committed political intellectual who did not only wish to critique liberalism but demolish the political and social system to which it has given rise and bestowed legitimacy — and who did not shy away to consort with the Nazis after 1933. It is the situatedness of Schmitt the man and thinker in a concrete historical time and place, the way in which he gave meaning to ‘his’ world, the political consequences that for him followed from his critique, and the anxious question of those who find much to applaud in this critique as to whether it can be utilized for developing a non-authoritarian alternative to ‘liberal’ society and democracy, that fan the heated debate. How best to deal with the ambiguous legacy of this ‘dangerous mind’ (Mu¨ ller, 2003) exercises both politically engaged intellectuals and scholars. Born in 1888 and died in 1985, Schmitt’s life spanned four different political regimes in Germany, the Wilhelminian Reich, the Weimar Republic, National Socialism and the Federal Republic. In the Weimar Republic he moved within the horizon of political Catholicism and supported the policies of Heinrich Bru¨ ning, the leader of the Catholic Centre party. In the later years of the Weimar Republic, he argued for the parliamentary system to be replaced by a presidential system, advocating the use of presidential discretionary powers in cases of emergency to protect the constitution against its critics. Once the Nazi had come to power, he accommodated himself with the new regime quickly, publishing an infamous article in 1934 under the title ‘The Fu¨ hrer protects the Law’ (Fu¨ hrer, 1934).2 His fall from favour in 1936 brought to an end eventful 3 years in which Schmitt had moved into influential positions within higher education and the legal profession. Arrested in 1945 by the Allies but released without charge, he was not allowed to return to academia, but remained influential among the generation of legal scholars who had been socialized into the profession in the late 1920s and during the Nazi years as well as among a new post-war generation of law, political science and philosophy students, some of whom would achieve high positions within West German society’ in the universities and in the legal profession, including judge in the Constitutional Court (Laak, 2002).

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The title Schmitt gave to a collection of his essays in 1940 indicates the concrete historical situations to whose challenges he wanted to face up, ‘Positions and Concepts in the Struggle with Weimar, Geneva, and Versailles’. ‘Weimar’ stood for the new liberal-parliamentary regime whose fundamental problems of constitutional and political order, the problems of sovereignty, legality and legitimacy had not been satisfactorily addressed and whose ambiguous embrace of liberalism had led to a misapprehension of the true character of ‘the political’. ‘Versailles’ signified the defeat in the First World War and the collapse of the Hohenzollern Empire, the ascription of war guilt to the German people and the imposition of reparation payments, the occupation of the Rhineland and revisionism. ‘Geneva’ signified the rise of idealism in international politics and its concomitant moralization, the decisive ultimate step away from the ius publicum Europaeum that had regulated the interaction of states for the last four hundred years or so to a new order whose contours were not yet clearly discernible. The emerg- ing new global constellation as a result of Germany’s defeat in the Second World War became a central concern in Schmitt’s writings after 1945. If we wish to identify the focal point of reference for Schmitt’s thought, then it would be the experience and fate of the ‘vanquished’ of 1918 and 1945 (Willms, 1991).

‘Just War’ or ‘Just Peace’: Schmitt’s Critical Engagement with Wilsonian Universalism

My desire is y that America will come into the full light of the day when all know that she puts human rights above all other rights and that her flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states. The readers of this journal are likely to know whose words have just been quoted. The first quotation is taken from President Woodrow Wilson’s Address on Independence Day in 1914. The second quote is a passage from Wilson’s Address of 2 April 1917 in which he recommended the declaration of a state of war between the United States and the Imperial German government. At stake in this war, Wilson proclaimed, was ‘the ultimate peace of the world’,

International Politics 2007 44 Roland Axtmann Carl Schmitt on International Politics 534 a world that had to be ‘made safe for democracy’. Clearly, a principle was at stake as well, namely, that ‘the right is more precious than peace’ (in Scott, 1918, 65, 281, 284, 287). Wilson asserted in his Address on the Conditions of Peace on 8 January 1918 that this ‘final war for human liberty’ had its only justification in upholding ‘the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak’. Upon this principle, ‘the structure of international justice’ was founded. According to Wilson’s 14 Points, acting on this principle required the acceptance of the principle of national self-determination, and hence the territorial reconfiguration of Europe (and the colonial world). It also required that a general association of nations ‘be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike’ (in Scott, 1918, 354–363). To the extent that Wilson endorsed the notion of human rights, he embraced the idea of an abstract humanity. To the extent that he argued for a ‘league of nations’ whose members would be states ‘great or small’, Wilson accepted, rhetorically, the reality of a pluriverse of sovereign and hence, in legal terms, equal states and thus the reality of a politically differentiated humanity. To the extent that Wilson adhered to the idea that the only justification for war is its service to ‘mankind’ or ‘humanity’, to ‘democracy and human rights’, to ‘freedom and justice and self-government’, Wilson, in effect, upheld the notion that a distinction must be made between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars (in Scott, 1918, 40, 50, 288, 316). In such ‘just wars’, remaining neutral was not an option. While, after a century of bloody wars, one may feel — almost intuitively — inclined to applaud these principles and the sentiments they express, this enthusiasm may be somewhat dampened once one realizes that Wilson spoke about this service to mankind and humanity also in connection with the deployment of American troops in Mexico during the civil war situation in 1914. Carl Schmitt’s reflections on international politics tookshape in his confrontation with Wilsonian ideology and the reality of Germany’s defeat in the First World War. These writings on international politics entwined polemical political commentary published in newspapers with scholarly historical analysis, concept formation and theory building. In the following presentation of Schmitt’s thinking on international politics, his scholarly endeavours will be stressed. But the reader should be aware that Schmitt understood these scholarly writings as contributions to political debate and mobilization. This becomes immediately clear when we reconstruct Schmitt’s discontent with the notion of ‘humanity’ and ‘universalism’, as it was, for example, deployed by Wilson, at the level of conceptual analysis. ‘Humanity’, Schmitt asserted, ‘is not a political concept’ (Concept, 1932, 55). Let us reconstruct Schmitt’s concept of ‘the political’ in order to understand this statement.

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In 1927, Schmitt published an essay with the title ‘The concept of the political’. In 1932, he published a much revised version of that essay. In response to political developments and criticisms of this essay — in particular, the criticism of Leo Strauss — Schmitt put out a third edition in 1933 — an edition which, later on, he pretended did not exist.3 ‘The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy’ (Concept, 1932, 25–26). This distinction ‘denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation’ (Concept, 1932, 25–26). The political can derive its energy from the most varied human endeavours, from the religious, economic, moral, ethical and other antitheses. Every antithesis transforms itself into a political one ‘if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy’ (Concept, 1932, 37). The quality of the political resides in the decision through which the ‘other’, the stranger or alien, is declared to negate one’s own existence and is thus defined as being — in a particularly intense way — existentially different, and hence an enemy against whom battle must be waged, which may — rightly and justifiably — lead to the enemy’s extermination. After all, the political receives its real meaning precisely because it refers to the real possibility of physical killing. In the West, so Schmitt asserts, the state had become the bearer of the monopoly of political decision, the decision on who should be considered friend, who enemy. ‘The state as the decisive political entity possesses an enormous power: the possibility of waging war and thereby publicly disposing of the lives of men. The jus belli [in the sense of jus ad bellum, RA] contains such a disposition. It implies a double possibility: the right to demand from its own members the readiness to die and unhesitatingly to kill enemies’ (Concept, 1932, 46). War follows from enmity. It is ‘the existential negation of the enemy’ (Concept, 1932, 33). We shall see later how Schmitt defined the ‘quality’ of ‘the enemy’ in the context of the bracketing of war in the ius publicum Europaeum as a hostis iustus and why he felt that this understanding had been finally abandoned in the early 20th century. For our current concern, which rehearses Schmitt’s argument about ‘humanity’ as a non-political concept, one consequence of his conceptualization of ‘the political’ must be stressed. Manifestly, for Schmitt, a people which exists politically cannot renounce the right to determine by itself and at its own riskwho is friend and who enemy. It cannot hand over this decision to a third party, nor may it allow itself to be bound in its decisions by ethical considerations that may take the form of ‘just war’ arguments. For Schmitt, war can only have an ‘existential meaning’: If physical destruction of human life does not occur out of the existential assertion of one’s own form of existence against an equally existential negation of this form, then it can simply not be justified. No war can be

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justified by ethical and juristic norms. If there really are enemies in the existential sense as meant here, then it makes sense, but only political sense, to repel them physically and fight them if necessary. (Concept, 1932, 49; altered translation of German original [Begriff] on p. 50]) According to Schmitt, the notions that postulate a ‘just war’ usually serve a political purpose; indeed, following Hobbes, Schmitt suggested that ‘the conviction of each side to possess the truth, the good, and the just bring about the worst enmities’ (Concept, 1932, 65). One must not forget, Schmitt urged, that there ‘always are concrete human groupings which fight other human groupings in the name of justice, humanity, order, or peace. When being reproached for immorality and cynicism, the spectator of political phenomena can always recognize in such reproaches a political weapon used in actual combat’ (Concept, 1932, 67).4 ‘Humanity’ is best understood as a political weapon — so at least Schmitt argued. Of the Wilsonian rhetoric of ‘humanity’, Schmitt was witheringly scathing: When a state fights its political enemies in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress, and civilization in order to claim these as one’s own and deny the same to the enemy. The concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism. Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified expression of Proudhon’s, whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat. To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity, and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity (Concept, 1932, 54). ‘War’ in the name of humanity does no longer know of an enemy, but only of a ‘disturber of the peace’ and hence an outlaw of humanity. War is not perceived as war, but as ‘executions, sanction, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, and measures to ensure peace remain’ (Concept, 1932, 79). ‘Humanity’, for Schmitt, was thus seen as an ‘asymmetrical concept’ since it contains the possibility of the ‘deepest inequality’: since everyone belongs to humanity, any discrimination within humanity by denying the quality of being human to a disturber or destroyer of peace means turning the negatively valued person into an unperson whose life is no longer the highest value but becomes worthless and must be destroyed

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(Legal Revolution, 1987, 88). It is this asymmetry that makes ‘bestiality’ the flip-side of ‘humanity’. The reason why ‘humanity’ is not a ‘political’ concept for Schmitt will now be clear. Conceptually, ‘the political’ is defined by the distinction of friend and enemy; the ‘political’ character of an association presupposes the real existence of an enemy and hence, of necessity, the coexistence of another political entity. The political world is thus a pluriverse, not a universe: ‘A world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist’ (Concept, 1932, 53). The concept of humanity, furthermore, excludes the concept of the enemy yet, the ‘enemy’ does not cease to be a human being. Without this specific differentiation, ‘humanity’ cannot acquire ‘political’ qualities. After all, ‘humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no enemy’ (Concept, 1932, 54). The ‘political’ nature of Schmitt’s definition of ‘the political’ is apparent: the ‘other’ is ‘liberalism’. He charged liberalism with evading or ignoring state and politics in a very systematic fashion, endeavouring to tie the political to the ethical and subjugating it to economics. For liberalism, to whom the individual must remain terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, the demand by the political entity that in case of need the individual must sacrifice his (or her) life is unconscionable: the individual as such has no enemy with whom he (or she) must enter into a life-and-death combat if he (or she) does not want to do so. What we therefore find in liberal thought, Schmitt asserted, is an entire system of demilitarized and depoliticalized concepts. For example, ‘political’ combat and battle becomes competition in the domain of economics and discussion in the intellectual realm. The liberal denial of ‘the political’ manifests itself in the international realm in the ideological conception of ‘humanity’ (Concept, 1932, 70–72).5

‘Ius Belli’ and the Juridification of International Politics Schmitt situated his critique of the idea of ‘just war’ and its resurgence in the early 20th century within both a historical and systematic context. The resurgence of the ‘just war’ notion signified for him the end of the period of the ius publicum Europaeum. Since the 16th century, this new ius inter gentes had gradually replaced the medieval ius gentium of Latin Christendom as a result of a spatial revolution that came about through the formation of sovereign territorial states in Europe and the colonial conquests of the European powers (Nomos, 1950, Part III). From Hobbes to Kant, the theorists of this new European public law conceived of states as ‘moral persons’ who among each other live in the state of nature with each of them possessing the ius belli and without an institutional common supreme authority, a common legislator or

International Politics 2007 44 Roland Axtmann Carl Schmitt on International Politics 538 common judge, but as sovereign entities which face each others as equals. This sovereign equality is the core of the ‘fundamental rights’ that states possess, an equal right of all states to self-determination, a right to existence and thus both a right to self-defence against attackers and a right to territorial integrity as well as a right of liberium commercium (Nomos, 1950, Part III, chapter 1; Repetitorium, 1948/50, 728–730). This ius inter gentes recognizes that the ius supremae decisionis regarding war lies with the independent states. They decide by and for themselves whether to conduct war and whether to remain neutral as a ‘third party’ in wars fought between other states. According to Schmitt, war in this legal order has its justice in the fact that the combatants are states which exercise their rights as sovereign political entities. When they fight each other, they view each other as ‘just enemies’ (iusti hostes), not as perpetrators of crimes ‘against humanity’ or ‘outlaws’ who must be destroyed (Neutralisierun- gen, 1939, 324). Wars needed no longer to be justified through iusta causa arguments as part of the (medieval) ‘just war’ tradition; but enemies had to be treated justly and as equals. Schmitt asserts that conceptualizing the friend– enemy distinction without any recourse to ethical theories of ‘just war’ was the prerequisite for the bracketing, and thus ‘civilizing’, of war. This ius publicum Europaeum was in the process of being dismantled, and with it its ‘civilizational’ advances (Nomos, 1950, Part IV). The rhetoric of ‘humanity’, particularly when deployed in connection with the notion of ‘just war’, tends to define the ‘other’ as an enemy of humankind and as such ‘evil’, against whom the use of violence is ultimately ‘just’. The moral evaluations of combatants result in distinguishing between violent actions that are deemed to be criminal and inhumane in some instances, whereas in other instances they are seen as expressions of legality and legitimate punishment meted out in an international ‘police action’. According to Schmitt, this discriminatory concept of war leads, of necessity, to the destruction of the institution of neutrality. It is held that a state cannot be ‘friendly’ to a state which is condemned as a disturber of the peace and at the same time have ‘friendly’ relations with the state which pursues military sanctions against that disturber in the name of world peace and humanity (Wendung/Kriegsbegriff, 1937/38). The ‘peace- restoring’ state then has a legitimate claim to demand an answer to the question: ‘Are you with us or are you against us?’. Because ‘just war’ arguments delegitimize neutrality, they result, according to Schmitt, in ‘total war’ (Vae Neutris, 1938; Neutralisierungen, 1939, 323–331; Neutralita¨ t, 1938; Totaler Feind, 1937). Furthermore, the juridification of international politics had a detrimental impact. The Wilsonian idea that, just as in the domestic arena the rule of law had overcome the state of nature, so a universally binding system of enforceable legal norms would regulate international conflicts and thus end the international state of nature, was fundamentally flawed. The political world

International Politics 2007 44 Roland Axtmann Carl Schmitt on International Politics 539 was a pluriverse of heterogeneous and antagonistic political entities which (potentially) posed existential challenges to each other. Existential life-and- death conflicts are not amenable to legal containment — or at least so Schmitt argued. Juridification of international politics is unlikely ultimately to lead out of the ‘state of nature’ or to contain ‘the political’. The Covenant of the League of Nations did not eliminate the possibilities for war; indeed, it did sanction certain types of wars, such as coalition wars, against those ‘enemies’ who attempt to bring about changes to the territorial status quo (Art. 10). The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, too, renounced war as an instrument of national policy and commits the signatories to settle all international disputes by peaceful means (USA/Imperialismus, 1932/33, 362–365; Nomos, 1950, Part IV, chapter 4b). But war as an instrument of international politics against those powers that disturb the status quo was permitted. War cannot altogether be outlawed. What is being outlawed are ‘specific individuals, peoples, states, classes, religions etc., which, by being outlawed, are declared to be the enemy’ (Concept, 1932, 50–51). The friend–enemy distinction is thus not abolished, but the decision on the distinction has acquired a specific kind of legitimacy, grounded, as it apparently is, in ‘international law’. Indeed, juridification is not limited to the elaboration of norms and attempts to ensure their validity. Juridification must also have an answer to the question, Quis judicabit? Who decides on whether a war is just or not; whether certain types of actions involving the use of violence or force are to be defined as ‘war’ or are better understood as means to safeguard and secure international peace? If an international organization such as the League of Nations is designated to monopolize this decision, surely, Schmitt suggested, we all realize that the great powers, while proclaiming respect for the law on all occasions, will no doubt decide for themselves what is to be considered law in a concrete instance? Schmitt did not doubt that the great powers will either exercise hegemonic control over the international system with its legal order or establish a parallel, particularistic system of international law. Schmitt was adamant that experience showed that every great power resisted the charge of any of its actions being understood as an attack, a threat to or a disturbance of peace. It was likely that a great power would either insist that its actions were an ‘internal matter’ in which one rejected any attempts of outside intervention or that its actions were the opposite of attacks and threat, namely the execution of international law to safeguard peace (Kernfrage, 1924, 6–7, 13). In the case of the League of Nations, Schmitt identified a specific problem (Kernfrage, 1924, 1926; Vo¨ lkerbund, 1930/31; Nomos, 1950, Part IV, chapter 3). With its legal foundation in the Peace Treaties of 1918, the League of Nations was charged to ensure the stability of the international order in line with the provisions of those treaties (e.g., Art. 10 of the Covenant). The juridification of interstate relations — partly due to the legal conclusion of

International Politics 2007 44 Roland Axtmann Carl Schmitt on International Politics 540 warfare through formal peace treaties, partly as the result of an endeavour for a positivistic-legal definition of ‘just war’ — privileges the legally defined status quo. The logical consequence for Schmitt was a situation where everyone who wishes to change the status quo — possibly because this status quo is not perceived to constitute a ‘just peace’ — is considered as a disturber of the peace and an enemy against whom any punitive action is not war but legal execution (Status quo, 1925, 58–59). The ‘revisionist’ twist in Schmitt’s argument of 1925 was, of course, that he defined those powers which wished to uphold (or entrench) the status quo as it was defined in the Peace Treaties as threats to peace rather than Germany. Yet there is the more general point to which Schmitt alerts us: law is a political tool and presupposes a situation of normalcy which is often, however, contested. The juridification of international relations cannot eliminate or replace ‘the political’ with its distinction of friend and enemy.

The End of the State and the Grossraum: Towards a New ‘Nomos’ of the Earth? If war is inevitable in human history — and, hence, eternal peace is a pipe- dream — how can it be limited? For Schmitt, this was the overriding problem of international politics — as he claimed at least in the preface to the new edition of Der Begriff des Politischen in 1963 (Begriff, 1963, 19). The sovereign equality of states was essential in this regard since it ensured the relativization of enmity and guarded against a discriminatory concept of war that would distinguish between ‘just wars’, and thus ‘just enemies’, and ‘unjust wars’, and thus ‘unjust enemies’ who should better be called ‘criminals’. Clearly, the political background for this argument is Versailles and war guilt, and later on, Nuremberg and Tokyo and the war crimes tribunals. And to the extent that Schmitt argued that the principle of sovereign equality had been violated in the Versailles ‘dictate’, he could use a principle of the ius publicum Europaeum (as he understood it) to argue the case for a revision of a treaty through which, according to Schmitt, Germany had suffered a wrong. Yet, for Schmitt, the invocation of the ‘sovereign equality’ of states as a solution to the problem of limiting war became increasingly unconvincing. This was for the simple reason that Schmitt thought that the era of the state was coming to an end. As we saw before, for Schmitt the state was the monopolist of political decision. The state as political entity was the highest entity because it prevented all antagonistic groupings from developing the most extreme enmity, that is, from confronting each other in a civil war (Staatsethik, 1930, 155, 160). However, for Schmitt the state had become the captive of social groups, a fact well understood in the pluralist theories of the state which were developed since the late 19th century mainly in England by Maitland, Cole,

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Laski and others (Concept, 1932, 39–45). In those theories, the state was perceived as one association among other associations, rather than as the one association above all the other associations. Without a clear supremacy there was also no hierarchy of duties and a concurrent plurality of loyalties for individuals. The societalization of the state was the result of democratization. The distinctions between state and economy, state and civil society withered away since political will formation had been appropriated by political parties whose interests and motives were essentially derived from economic needs and concerns. All areas of life had become politicized, a ‘total state’ had emerged that could no longer discriminate and concerned itself with all kinds of affairs. But this state, of which the German state was a prime example, was ‘total’ in a purely ‘quantitative’ sense, in the sense of pure volume. This type of state must clearly be set apart from the ‘qualitatively total state’. For Schmitt, writing in 1932, Mussolini’s fascist ‘stato totalitario’ was the shining example of the ‘qualitatively total state’. According to Schmitt, this state can still discern between friends and enemies and does not allow forces inimical to it, or those that limit or divide it, to develop within its interior. This state is ‘total’ in the sense of intensity and political energy, not, as the quantitatively total state, in the sense of incapacity to resist social groupings. The ‘total state’ thus exists in two distinct forms, as ‘total state’ out of weakness, a state that has lost its monopoly of decision under the onslaught of parties and organized interests. This is the state of bourgeois-capitalist liberal society. The other kind of total state, exemplified in fascist Italy, is the total state out of strength, a state in tune with the potentialities of modernity: Every state is anxious to acquire the power needed to exercise its political domination y Every state expanded its power by technological means, more precisely, by the technomilitary instruments of power y old notions concerning state power and the possibility of resisting it fade away y The proliferation of technical means also allows for the possibility of mass propaganda y No state can afford to yield these new technical means of mass control, mass suggestion and the formation of public opinion to an opponent. The formula ‘total state’ accurately describes the contemporary state’s undreamt-of new means of coercion and possibilities of the greatest intensity (Strong State, 1932, 216–217). It needed the fascist victory in Italy to establish the ‘qualitatively total state’ as both reality and ideal — or so, at least, Schmitt argued in 1932 (Strong State (1932); see also, Wendung/Staat (1931) and Weiterentwicklung/Staat (1933); for fascism, Wesen/Werden, 1929). According to Schmitt, ‘liberal’ universalism complemented from without what democratization had accomplished from within, the wholesale attackon

International Politics 2007 44 Roland Axtmann Carl Schmitt on International Politics 542 state sovereignty. The crisis of the German state, for Schmitt, was fundamentally linked to its position under the Versailles Treaty. The treaty had turned Germany into a ‘debtor nation’ and an ‘outlaw state’. Its sovereignty had been limited and parts of it had become an ‘object of international politics’, demilitarized and subject to external intervention, such as the Rhineland (Objekt, 1925; Politische Lage, 1930). The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control (Arts. 203—206) for demilitarization and the Reparation Commission (Art. 233) exercised key ‘sovereign’ rights; and in Art. 213, a permanent right of investigation into German affairs was established for the Council of the League of Nations. ‘National self- determination’, the mantra of Wilsonian rhetoric, clearly was not meant to apply to Germany. Rather than the German people being (or remaining) subject of its own political existence as a state, it had been turned into the exact opposite, an object (Objekt, 1925, 27). Schmitt suggested that, in the light of Britain’s policies towards Egypt, the United States’ towards the Caribbean, and France’s in the Middle East, Germany’s treatment should be considered not just within the context of defeat in war, but as an element within the developing system of liberal imperialism. Schmitt analysed the US-American foreign policy as paradigmatic. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 possessed a genuine political character (Kernfrage, 1926, 121–126; USA/Imperialismus, 1932/33, 351–355; Grossraum/Universa- lismus, 1939; Grossraumordnung, 1941; Nomos, 1950, Part IV, chapter 5). It grew out of a concern in both the United States and Britain that the European continental monarchical powers of the Holy Alliance would attempt to restore Spain’s former colonies in Latin America, many of which had become newly independent states. The Doctrine rested on the ‘political’ idea that the Old World and New World had different systems and had to remain distinct spheres. While recognizing existing colonies and dependencies in the ‘Western Hemisphere’, it declared that the United States would resist any future colonization in this sphere and would view any attempt by a European power to oppress or control any state in the Western Hemisphere as a hostile act. In return for the non-intervention of non-American powers in this space, the United States itself would abstain from any intervention outside this space. For Schmitt, the Monroe Doctrine, in perceiving the world as being divided between continents and hemispheres, each with its own political order, for the first time expressed the idea of the Grossraum, a large territorial expanse in which ‘alien’ powers had no right to intervene. This idea appealed to Schmitt, and he compared it favourably to the British Empire, a hotchpotch of heterogeneous possessions strewn over the surface of the world and without a coherent principle of political legitimacy (Balakrishnan, 2000, 238). This Doctrine legitimized the hegemonic control of the United States over the American subcontinent. The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 then claimed

International Politics 2007 44 Roland Axtmann Carl Schmitt on International Politics 543 hemispheric police power by stating that, in cases of flagrant and chronic wrongdoing by a state within the space of the Western Hemisphere, the United States could intervene in the internal affairs of that state. This was a position already clearly articulated in the Platt Amendment of 1901 according to which Cuba had granted the United States the right to intervene — to safeguard the independence of Cuba and to keep in power a government that was capable of protecting life, property and personal freedoms and upholding public order as well as ensuring that foreign financial demands would be met. Cuba was just one of a number of countries with which the United States concluded such intervention treaties. The principle of non-intervention and hence the sovereignty of those states was, as a result, dislodged; the sovereign decision as to whether there were grounds for intervention rested with the United States (Kernfrage, 1926, 122–124). As a consequence of Woodrow Wilson’s policy the spatialized system of non-intervention, that had been given justification in the Monroe Doctrine, was transformed into a universal, as it were, ‘uprooted’ or ‘de-localized’, system of interventions [raumlos allgemeines Einmischungssystem]. The ideology of liberal democracy and the related ideas of ‘free’ world trade and a ‘free’ world market now replaced the geopolitical principle of the Monroe Doctrine, ‘The Monroe Doctrine as a genuine doctrine of space is the explicit opposite to a space-neglecting transformation of the earth into an abstract world and capital market’ (Grossraum/Universalismus, 1939, 336). By declaring the compatibility of the Monroe Doctrine with the Covenant of the League of Nations (Art. 21), the universalist objectives of the United States became enshrined in international law. The League handed over de facto political sovereignty in the Americas to the United States, while allowing the United States an active role in shaping European politics, since the dependence of the Latin American member states on the United States allowed it to exercise indirect influence without itself being a member of the League. When President Coolidge said in 1928, the year of the Kellogg-Briand-Pact, that ‘an act of war in any part of the world is an act that injures the interests of my country’, the universalistic interventionist orientation of the United States was made quite explicit. The Stimson Doctrine of 1932 articulated the principle of non-recognition by the United States of international territorial changes effected by force. Intend on continuing with the ‘open door’ policy in China, the United States informed the Japanese after their military occupation of Manchuria, that it would not ‘recognize any treaty or agreement y which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy to China, commonly known as the open door policy’. The door had now been opened for US-American interventions around the globe.

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For Schmitt, writing in 1942, the reasons behind this development were clear, the interests of world capitalism. These interests compel to pursue a policy of ever present, ubiquitous intervention and non- recognition, which presumes that Washington is entitled to approve or disapprove of changes in any part of the world. The traditional distinction between trade and politics — as much trade as possible, as little politics as possible — has become inherently untrue because in the long run there can be no world trade without world politics (Beschleuniger, 1942, 434). What had come to an end was a particular spatial order of the world, a particular ‘nomos’ of the earth. What we were witnessing, according to Schmitt, was a new spatial revolution. The ‘nomos’ of the earth — its appropriation, distribution and utilization since the age of ‘discovery’ and European colonization — was structured around global lines (Globale Linie, 1943; Nomos, 1950, Part II, chapter 1). The ‘raya’ was a distributional line that divided the newly ‘discovered’ world on the basis of Pope Alexander Inter caetera divinae of 1494 between the Spanish and Portuguese. The ‘amity’ line on the basis of the Peace of Cateau-Cambre´ sis of 1559 was an agonal line that divided the earth in a space in which the ius publicum Europaeum obtained and intercourse between the European states was rule- governed and a space ‘beyond the line’ where international law was suspended and a kind of ‘state of nature’ obtained. The Monroe Doctrine established a line of self-isolation in the notion of the Western Hemisphere. The endeavours to ground the spatial order of the earth tookplace just at the time when the formation of the state in Europe had ushered in a spatial revolution in Europe. For Schmitt, it was historically significant that this emerging European world order immediately broke up into land and sea (Land/Meer, 1981). The land was divided into closed territories of sovereign states, whereas the sea remained free of state or territorial sovereignty. This was the basic spatial premise out of which grew the ius publicum Europaeum. It meant that two distinct types of war could be distinguished. On the one hand, land war between states was conducted by, and between, regular armies with a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants as well as with the protection of private property. Out of these land wars arose the bracketing of war on the basis of a clear friend–enemy distinction. War at sea, on the other hand, did not recognize the distinction between combatants and civil population. It knew the ‘total enemy’: the subjects of an enemy state as well as everyone who engages in trade with the enemy and strengthens its economy are considered as enemies whose life, liberty and property are not protected (Souvera¨ nita¨ t/Meer, 1941, 407). The nomos of the earth since the 16th century was thus global but knew the dichotomy of land and sea. It was believed initially to have its legitimacy in the

International Politics 2007 44 Roland Axtmann Carl Schmitt on International Politics 545 distinction between Christian and non-Christian peoples. Since the 18th century its legitimacy was grounded in the distinction between civilized and uncivilized peoples. While this distinction lost much of its force in the course of the 19th century — despite the civilizational and racial (racist) notions of ‘the White man’s burden’ — the idea of stages of civilizational development still informed the mandate system of the League of Nations (Art. 22). For Schmitt, the nomos of the ius publicum Europaeum had come to an end. The technological revolution of the means of transport and communication had shrunkthe earth (Raumrevolution, 1940, 388). The conquest of air space has ushered in a new view of the earth, which overcomes the distinction between land and sea and necessitates a new concept of space. Warfare in the air, and from the air, leads to a complete re-evaluation of land war and war at sea. It is in its very nature that warfare from the air can no longer distinguish between combatant and non-combatant (and may even find it difficult to separate friend from enemy) and hence accelerates the trend towards ‘total war’, which is in any case propelled forward by the development of weapons of mass destruction. Ever more states, in the past the subjects of the ius publicum Europaeum, lose their sovereignty as they become domestically captives of organized social interests and externally find themselves in manifold relation- ships of political and economic dependency (Kernfrage, 1926, 78–79). For Schmitt, US-American and British endeavours of world control and world domination, the welding together of global capitalism and global intervention, aims for global unity. The Soviet Union’s design for world revolution is but an alternative form of planetary imperialism, not its potential nemesis. In either case, its legitimacy is seen to be grounded in the idea of humanity (Strukturwandel, 1943, 670). The situation that has arisen is characterized by a diremption of international law into two poles, ‘a universalistic-imperialist, space-transcend- ing global law’ on the one side, and ‘a pathetically state-fixated law of a space- constricting nature bound to small territorial spaces’, on the other side. Seen from one pole, ‘humanitarian interventions’ are considered legal in interna- tional law, but from the other pole, even the most minute ‘intervention’ is considered a breach of international law (Raum/Grossraum, 1940, 251). The pluriverse world of the modern territorial state, however, is irretrievably lost. A balkanized continental Europe, divided into micro-states or states without sovereignty cannot counter-balance the universalistic-imperialist powers (Raumrevolution, 1940, 390). If there was to be not just one ‘master of the universe’, then more was required than a revolt of the masters of the past, that is, the states. Genuine large territorial spaces [Grossra¨ume] alone would be capable of confronting the global powers. What was required, in a sense, was the embrace around the world of the idea of the Monroe Doctrine, the creation of large spatial expanses dominated by a regional hegemon which uphold the

International Politics 2007 44 Roland Axtmann Carl Schmitt on International Politics 546 notion of non-intervention into its territory. Such Grossra¨ume, whose historical, economic and cultural substance — frequently, though not exclusively of a vo¨lkisch nature — amounts to a veritable degree of homogeneity, are truly in accordance with the new spatial dimensions and the economic structure of the current age and are thus the carriers of real sovereignty (Kernfrage, 1926, 79; Probleme/Rheingebiet, 1928, 264; Raumre- volution, 1940, 390; Grossraumordnung, 1941; Strukturwandel, 1943). In his writings about Grossraum during the Second World War, Schmitt put forward the idea that there was, of necessity, a leading, hegemonic power, a Reich, whose ‘political idea’ radiated throughout the Grossraum and which would have the taskto repel any intervention into that territorial space by outside powers (Grossraumordnung, 1941, Sections V and VI). But on the territory of the Grossraum, one would still find peoples organized in states but also peoples which did not any longer have the organizational capacity for building a state. However, the Reich ultimately dissolves the ‘sovereignty’ of the states in concentrating the ius ad bellum in its hands and by enforcing homogeneity as the prerequisite for a substantively grounded ‘genuine’ Grossraum. The idea of an equality of sovereign states has been left behind and the argument has moved on to the idea of a pluriverse of sovereign Grossra¨ume and their equality as a prerequisite of stable peace (Ordnung, 1962, 607). After the Second World War, Schmitt held fast to the idea of Grossra¨ume, but in his publications did no longer pursue the idea of a necessary hegemon in the form of a Reich. He queried the notion that technical and economic developments would ultimately result in world unity. Neither did he accept, writing in 1951, that the bipolar division of the world in the cold war (but also manifested in a series of ‘hot’ wars) would either continue to exist interminably or result in an ultimate unity as one side defeats the other. Rather, he saw the very real possibility of the emergence of an international balance of several Grossra¨ume (Einheit, 1951). Yet, in what the homogeneity of these Grossra¨ume should be grounded, he would not spell out in his published work.6

Conclusion War and justice; peace and humanity: how to understand these concepts, their relationships and the ‘reality’ they conceive has been at the centre of Schmitt’s critical engagement with liberal universalism. The invocation of ‘humanity’, Schmitt argues, is an ideological cover for power politics, while ‘humanity’ cannot be a ‘political’ concept in Schmitt’s definition of the political: the uses to which the concept is put are deeply ‘political’. Crusades in the name of ‘humanity’ still remain wars, even if one prefers to speakof ‘humanitarian

International Politics 2007 44 Roland Axtmann Carl Schmitt on International Politics 547 interventions’. To speakof ‘justice’, ‘humanity’ and the shared interests of ‘humankind’ opens up the possibility for an ethical discourse, which allows for the moral damnation of the enemy as ‘evil’ and, in extremis, its annihilation. The enemy becomes foe. In the mortal struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, there can be no neutral third. A just war is a ‘total war’, everyone is party, no one bystander; and the just cause ‘justifies’ use of whatever means must be deployed to eradicate ‘evil’. If one wishes to accept Schmitt’s theses and the arguments he offers in support, then one should be clear as to what it is one adopts, namely, a particular kind of critique of the ideology of humanity and related concepts. However, one does not gain an armoury of arguments for peace. Rather, one is fortified for conducting war ‘for the right reasons’ (as spelled out by Schmitt). After all, 9/11 ‘and all that’ was a supremely Schmittian ‘political’ moment, a clear distinction between friend and enemy and the actualized possibility of the physical killing of ‘the other’. The ensuing ‘total’ struggle against ‘terrorists’ and ‘partisans’ (or ‘insurgents’) abroad and the identification of the ‘enemy’ at home (‘homeland security’) epitomize ‘the political’. Arguing from a Schmittian position against the NATO intervention in the Kosovo, for example, make it well-nigh impossible to argue against the war in Afghanistan or in Iraq.7 We encounter a similar dilemma with regard to Schmitt’s idea of the Grossraum. One may buy into the argument — living, after all, one may believe, ‘in the age of globalization’ — about the end of the modern state and the need for spatially larger territorial political entities, based on expansive social, economic and technological interdependencies and driven by a political will. But the Schmittian concept of the Grossraum carries clear ‘qualitative’ connotations; the Grossraum is grounded in homogeneity – a unity in diversity, constructed, controlled and maintained by a hegemon. Hence, it needs hierarchy and dominance within as well as military vigilance, the willingness to use violence, vis-a`-vis the outside world. It thus needs the political will to define ‘the other’. The ‘new right’ in Europe has shown much willingness to elaborate the logic of a Schmittian Grossraum (Holmes, 2000; Mu¨ ller, 2003). It is quite clear that a Schmittian Grossraum is not a ‘zone of peace’. Hitler, so Schmitt thought, had got this right, too.

Notes

1 For a discussion of Carl Schmitt with reference to international relations, see, inter alia, Scheuerman (1999, chapters 6 and 9) and Pichler (1998). For two early discussions of Schmitt’s writings on international politics, see Preuss (1935) and Herz (1939). Stirk(1999, 2003) puts Schmitt’s contributions to international law in the context of the intellectual debate and politics of the Nazi era. For recent discussions of Schmitt’s opus magnum on international law and international politics, The Nomos of the Earth, see, for example, Antaki (2004), Koskenniemi

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(2004), Marramao (2000) and Scheuerman (2004). An interesting German study of Schmitt’s writings on Grossraum is Blindow (1999). See also: Kerve´ gan, 1999. 2 References in the text to Schmitt’s writings are made in the form of abbreviated titles that are listed in Part 1 of the bibliography with full bibliographical data. 3 The first version of Der Begriff des Politischen has recently been reprinted in (Schmitt) ‘Frieden’ (pp. 194–239). For an excellent discussion of the substantial changes that Schmitt made to this text in 1932, and those he made to the 1932 edition a year later, as well as the reasons for these changes, see Meier (1995). Unless otherwise noted, in this article, reference is made to the 1932 edition (either in the German original or the English translation). 4 Not much comfort here for ‘just war’ philosophers. But if one wishes to find an intellectual lineage for George W. Bush and his ‘war on terror’, we should lookprimarily to Carl Schmitt — and not to Leo Strauss. 5 Schmitt’s concept of the political is not limited in its application to international politics. This becomes obvious when we observe what he has to say about democracy. Every actual democracy, he asserts, ‘rests on the principle that not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally. Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and second — if the need arises — elimination or eradication of heterogeneity.’ (Crisis, 1926, 9) And for Schmitt, ‘homogeneity’ refers above all to ‘national homogeneity’. The extermination and annihilation of the internal enemy in the interest of homogeneity and order is as important as combating the external enemy; indeed, without homogeneity the political unit will lose the capacity to make a sovereign decision on who its enemies are and whether an existential threat obtains that needs to be fought. 6 Over the last 20 years or so, Carl Schmitt has increasingly been discussed as a political theologian. Heinrich Meier (1995, 2004) has been the most vociferous and thoughtful advocate for a reading of Schmitt’s texts as political theology (but see, e.g., the critical assessment of Manemann, 2002). It would be a worthwhile endeavour to review Schmitt’s analyses of international politics on the basis of the ‘political theology’ hypothesis. In a letter to A´ lvaro d’Ors in September 1951, Schmitt refers to his lecture on the ‘Unity of the World’ and remarks: ‘Anything but the Christian unity of the world would be the workof the Anti-Christ’. As his references to the Anti-Christ and the Kat- echon, which one finds scattered throughout his work, indicate, Schmitt writes within the horizon of (an idiosyncratic) Christian eschatology (Briefwechsel, 2004, 119–123). 7 For a flavour of the debate on military intervention, and Kosovo and Iraq in particular, that refers to Schmitt’s position, see, for example, Ananiadis (2002); Chandler (2002); Rasch (2000); Stirk(2004); and Zolo (2002). See Habermas (2004) for a pronounced anti-Schmittian argument.

References I. Books and Articles by Carl Schmitt:

Articles. (1999) Four Articles, Edited, translated and with a Preface by Simona Draghici, Corvallis, OR: Plutarch Press. Begriff. (1963) Der Begriff des Politischen, (1932) Sixth edition of the text of 1932 with a preface and three corollaries, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Beschleuniger. (1942) ‘Beschleuniger wider Willen oder: Problematikder westlichen Hemispha¨ re’, in SGN, pp. 431–440. Briefwechsel. (2004) Carl Schmitt und A´lvaro d’Ors, Briefwechsel, edited by M. Herrero, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004. Concept. (1932) The Concept of the Political, Translated and with an Introduction by George Schwab, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

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Crisis. (1926) The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. E. Kennedy, (trans.) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992. Einheit. (1951) ‘Die Einheit der Welt’, in Frieden, pp. 841–871. Frieden. (2005) Frieden oder Pazifismus? Arbeiten zum Vo¨lkerrecht und zur internationalen Politik, 1924–1978, Edited and with a preface and notes by Gu¨ nter Maschke, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005. Fu¨ hrer. (1934) ‘Der Fu¨ hrer schu¨ tzt das Recht’, in PuB, pp. 227–232. Globale Linie. (1943) ‘Die letzte globale Linie’, in SGN, pp. 441–452. Grossraumordnung. (1941) ‘Vo¨ lkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot fu¨ r raumfremde Ma¨ chte. Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Vo¨ lkerrecht’, in SGN, 4th edn., pp. 269–371. Grossraum/Universalismus. (1939) ‘Grossraum gegen Universalismus’, in PuB, pp. 335–343. Holmes, D.R. (2000) Integral Europe. Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kernfrage. (1924) ‘Die Kernfrage des Vo¨ lkerbundes’, in Frieden, pp. 1–25. Kernfrage. (1926) ‘Die Kernfrage des Vo¨ lkerbundes’, in Frieden, pp. 73–193. Land/Meer. (1981) Land und Meer. Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung, Hohenheim: Edition Maschke (English edition: Land and Sea. Translated and with a foreword by Simona Draghici, Corvallis, OR: Plutarch Press, 1997). Legal Revolution. (1987) ‘The Legal World Revolution’, Telos 72: 73–90. Neutralita¨ t. (1938) ‘Vo¨ lkerrechtliche Neutralita¨ t und vo¨ lkische Totalita¨ t’, in Frieden, pp. 617–628 (English text in Articles, pp. 37–45.). Neutralisierungen. (1939) ‘Neutralita¨ t und Neutralisierungen’, in PuB, pp. 309–334. Nomos. (1950) Der Nomos der Erde im Vo¨lkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum, 4th edn., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997 (English edition: Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum, New York: Telos Press, 2003). Objekt. (1925) ‘Die Rheinlande als Objekt internationaler Politik’, in Frieden, pp. 26–50. Ordnung. (1962) ‘Die Ordnung der Welt nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in SGN, pp. 592–618. Politische Lage. (1930) ‘Die politische Lage der entmilitarisierten Rheinlande’, in Frieden, pp. 274–280. Probleme/Rheingebiet. (1928) ‘Vo¨ lkerrechtliche Probleme im Rheingebiet’, in Frieden, pp. 255–273. PuB. (1940) Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar — Genf — Versailles, 1923–1939, 3rd edn., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988. Raum/Grossraum. (1940) ‘Raum und Grossraum im Vo¨ lkerrecht’, in SGN, pp. 234–268. Raumrevolution. (1940) ‘Die Raumrevolution. Durch den totalen Krieg zu einem totalen Frieden’, in SGN, pp. 388–394. Repetitorium. (1948/50) ‘Vo¨ lkerrecht [Ein juristische Repetitorium]’, in Frieden, pp. 701–840. SGN. Staat, Grossraum, Nomos. Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916–1969, Edited and with a preface and notes by Gu¨ nter Maschke, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Souvera¨ nita¨ t/Meer. (1941) ‘Staatliche Souvera¨ nita¨ t und freies Meer. U¨ ber den Gegensatz von Land und See im Vo¨ lkerrecht der Neuzeit, in SGN, pp. 401–430. Staatsethik. (1930) ‘Staatsethik und pluralistischer Staat’, in PuB, pp. 151–165 (English text: ‘Ethic of State and Pluralistic State’ in C. Mouffe (ed.), The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, London: Verso, 1999). Status quo. (1925) ‘Der Status quo und der Friede’, in Frieden, pp. 51–72. Strong state. (1932) ‘Strong State and Sound Economy: An Address to Business Leaders’, in R. Cristi (ed.) Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998, pp. 212–232 (German original text with the title: ‘Starker Staat und gesunde Wirtschaft’ in SGN, pp. 71–91).

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Strukturwandel. (1943) ‘Strukturwandel des International Rechts’, in Frieden, pp. 652–700. Totaler Feind. (1937) ‘Totaler Feind, totaler Krieg, totaler Staat’, in Frieden, pp. 481–507 (English text: ‘Total Enemy, Total War and Total State’ in Articles, pp. 28–36.). USA/Imperialismus. (1932/33) ‘USA und die vo¨ lkerrechtlichen Formen des modernen Imper- ialismus’, in Frieden, pp. 349–377. Vae Neutris. (1938) ‘Das neue Vae Neutris!’, in Frieden, pp. 612–616. Vo¨ lkerbund. (1930/31) ‘Der Vo¨ lkerbund’, in Frieden, pp. 333–348. Weiterentwicklung/Staat. (1933) ‘Weiterentwicklung des totalen Staates in Deutschland’, in PuB, pp. 211–216 (English text: ‘Further Development of the Total State in Germany’, in Articles, pp. 19–27). Wendung/Kriegsbegriff. (1937/38) ‘Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff’, in Frieden, pp. 518–597 (English edition: War/Non-War? — A Dilemma, ed. and translated by Simona Draghici, Corvallis, OR: Plutarch Press, 2004). Wendung/Staat. (1931) ‘Die Wendung zum totalen Staat’, in PuB, pp. 166–178 (English text: ‘The Way to the Total State’, in Articles, pp. 1–18). Wesen/Werden. (1929) ‘Wesen und Werden des faschistischen Staates’, in PuB, pp. 124–130.

II. Secondary Literature

Ananiadis, G. (2002) ‘Carl Schmitt on Kosovo, or, Taking War Seriously’, in D.I. Bjelic´ and O. Savic´ (eds.) Balkan as Metaphor. Between Globalization and Fragmentation, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 117–161. Antaki, M. (2004) ‘Carl Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal 42(2): 317–334. Balakrishnan, G. (2000) The Enemy. An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt, London: Verso. Bendersky, J. (1983) Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Blindow, F. (1999) Carl Schmitts Reichsgru¨ndung: Strategie fu¨r einen europa¨ischen Grossraum, Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Caldwell, P.C. (1997) Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law. The Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism, Durham and London: Duke University Press. Chandler, D. (2002) From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention, London: Pluto Press. Cristi, R. (1998) Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism, Cardiff: University of Wales Press. Dyzenhaus, D. (1997) Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Dyzenhaus, D. (ed.) (1998) Law as Politics. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, Durham and London: Duke University Press. Habermas, J. (2004) ‘Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Vo¨ lkerrechts noch eine Chance?’, in J. Habermas (id.) Der gespaltene Westen, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, pp. 113–193. Herz, J.H. (1939) ‘The National Socialist Doctrine of International Law and the Problem of International Organization’, Political Science Quarterly 54(4): 536–554. Kerve´ gan, J.-F. (1999) ‘Carl Schmitt and ‘‘World Unity’’’, in C. Mouffe (ed.) The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, London: Verso, pp. 54–73. Kennedy, E. (2004) Constitutional Failure. Carl Schmitt in Weimar, Durham and London: Duke University Press. Koskenniemi, M. (2004) ‘International Law as Political Theology: How to Read Nomos der Erde?’ Constellations 11(4): 492–511. Laak, Dirk van (2002) Gespra¨che in der Sicherheit des Schweigens. Carl Schmitt in der politischen Geistesgeschichte der fru¨hen Bundesrepublik, Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Manemann, J. (2002) Carl Schmitt und die Politische Theologie. Politischer Anti-Monotheismus, Mu¨ nster: Aschendorff Verlag.

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