Sample Complexity of Hidden Subgroup Problem
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A Note on the Security of CSIDH
A note on the security of CSIDH Jean-Fran¸cois Biasse1, Annamaria Iezzi1, and Michael J. Jacobson, Jr.2 1 Department of Mathematics and Statistics University of South Florida biasse,aiezzi @usf.edu 2 { } Department of Computer Science University of Calgary [email protected] Abstract. We propose an algorithm for computing an isogeny between two elliptic curves E1,E2 defined over a finite field such that there is an imaginary quadratic order satisfying End(Ei) for i = 1, 2. This O O ≃ concerns ordinary curves and supersingular curves defined over Fp (the latter used in the recent CSIDH proposal). Our algorithm has heuris- tic asymptotic run time eO√log(|∆|) and requires polynomial quantum memory and eO√log(|∆|) classical memory, where ∆ is the discriminant of . This asymptotic complexity outperforms all other available method O for computing isogenies. We also show that a variant of our method has asymptotic run time ˜ eO√log(|∆|) while requesting only polynomial memory (both quantum and classical). 1 Introduction Given two elliptic curves E1, E2 defined over a finite field Fq, the isogeny prob- lem is to compute an isogeny φ : E E , i.e. a non-constant morphism that 1 → 2 maps the identity point on E1 to the identity point on E2. There are two dif- ferent types of elliptic curves: ordinary and supersingular. The latter have very particular properties that impact the resolution of the isogeny problem. The first instance of a cryptosystem based on the hardness of computing isogenies arXiv:1806.03656v4 [cs.CR] 1 Aug 2018 was due to Couveignes [12], and its concept was independently rediscovered by Stolbunov [31]. -
Ph 219B/CS 219B
1 Ph 219b/CS 219b Exercises Due: Wednesday 22 February 2006 6.1 Estimating the trace of a unitary matrix Recall that using an oracle that applies the conditional unitary Λ(U), Λ(U): |0i⊗|ψi7→|0i⊗|ψi , |1i⊗|ψi7→|1i⊗U|ψi (1) (where U is a unitary transformation acting on n qubits), we can measure the eigenvalues of U. If the state |ψi is the eigenstate |λi of U with eigenvalue λ = exp(2πiφ), then√ by querying the oracle k times, we can determine φ to accuracy O(1/ k). But suppose that we replace the pure state |ψi in eq. (1) by the max- imally mixed state of n qubits, ρ = I/2n. a) Show that, with k queries, we can estimate both the real part and n the imaginary√ part of tr (U) /2 , the normalized trace of U,to accuracy O(1/ k). b) Given a polynomial-size quantum circuit, the problem of estimat- ing to fixed accuracy the normalized trace of the unitary trans- formation realized by the circuit is believed to be a hard problem classically. Explain how this problem can be solved efficiently with a quantum computer. The initial state needed for each query consists of one qubit in the pure state |0i and n qubits in the maximally mixed state. Surprisingly, then, the initial state of the computer that we require to run this (apparently) powerful quantum algorithm contains only a constant number of “clean” qubits, and O(n) very noisy qubits. 6.2 A generalization of Simon’s problem n Simon’s problem is a hidden subgroup problem with G = Z2 and k H = Z2 = {0,a}. -
Hidden Shift Attacks on Isogeny-Based Protocols
One-way functions and malleability oracles: Hidden shift attacks on isogeny-based protocols P´eterKutas1, Simon-Philipp Merz2, Christophe Petit3;1, and Charlotte Weitk¨amper1 1 University of Birmingham, UK 2 Royal Holloway, University of London, UK 3 Universit´elibre de Bruxelles, Belgium Abstract. Supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman key exchange (SIDH) is a post-quantum protocol based on the presumed hardness of com- puting an isogeny between two supersingular elliptic curves given some additional torsion point information. Unlike other isogeny-based proto- cols, SIDH has been widely believed to be immune to subexponential quantum attacks because of the non-commutative structure of the endo- morphism rings of supersingular curves. We contradict this commonly believed misconception in this paper. More precisely, we highlight the existence of an abelian group action on the SIDH key space, and we show that for sufficiently unbalanced and over- stretched SIDH parameters, this action can be efficiently computed (heuris- tically) using the torsion point information revealed in the protocol. This reduces the underlying hardness assumption to a hidden shift problem instance which can be solved in quantum subexponential time. We formulate our attack in a new framework allowing the inversion of one-way functions in quantum subexponential time provided a malleabil- ity oracle with respect to some commutative group action. This frame- work unifies our new attack with earlier subexponential quantum attacks on isogeny-based protocols, and it may be of further interest for crypt- analysis. 1 Introduction The hardness of solving mathematical problems such as integer factorization or the computation of discrete logarithms in finite fields and elliptic curve groups guarantees the security of most currently deployed cryptographic protocols. -
On the Tightness of the Buhrman-Cleve-Wigderson Simulation
On the tightness of the Buhrman-Cleve-Wigderson simulation Shengyu Zhang Department of Computer Science and Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. [email protected] Abstract. Buhrman, Cleve and Wigderson gave a general communica- 1 1 n n tion protocol for block-composed functions f(g1(x ; y ); ··· ; gn(x ; y )) by simulating a decision tree computation for f [3]. It is also well-known that this simulation can be very inefficient for some functions f and (g1; ··· ; gn). In this paper we show that the simulation is actually poly- nomially tight up to the choice of (g1; ··· ; gn). This also implies that the classical and quantum communication complexities of certain block- composed functions are polynomially related. 1 Introduction Decision tree complexity [4] and communication complexity [7] are two concrete models for studying computational complexity. In [3], Buhrman, Cleve and Wigderson gave a general method to design communication 1 1 n n protocol for block-composed functions f(g1(x ; y ); ··· ; gn(x ; y )). The basic idea is to simulate the decision tree computation for f, with queries i i of the i-th variable answered by a communication protocol for gi(x ; y ). In the language of complexity measures, this result gives CC(f(g1; ··· ; gn)) = O~(DT(f) · max CC(gi)) (1) i where CC and DT are the communication complexity and the decision tree complexity, respectively. This simulation holds for all the models: deterministic, randomized and quantum1. It is also well known that the communication protocol by the above simulation can be very inefficient. -
Thesis Is Owed to Him, Either Directly Or Indirectly
UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Quantum Computing and Communication Complexity de Wolf, R.M. Publication date 2001 Document Version Final published version Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): de Wolf, R. M. (2001). Quantum Computing and Communication Complexity. Institute for Logic, Language and Computation. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:30 Sep 2021 Quantum Computing and Communication Complexity Ronald de Wolf Quantum Computing and Communication Complexity ILLC Dissertation Series 2001-06 For further information about ILLC-publications, please contact Institute for Logic, Language and Computation Universiteit van Amsterdam Plantage Muidergracht 24 1018 TV Amsterdam phone: +31-20-525 6051 fax: +31-20-525 5206 e-mail: [email protected] homepage: http://www.illc.uva.nl/ Quantum Computing and Communication Complexity Academisch Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magni¯cus prof.dr. -
Arxiv:1805.04179V2
The Hidden Subgroup Problem and Post-quantum Group-based Cryptography Kelsey Horan1 and Delaram Kahrobaei2,3 1 The Graduate Center, CUNY, USA [email protected] 2 The Graduate Center and NYCCT, CUNY 3 New York University, USA [email protected] ⋆ Abstract. In this paper we discuss the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP) in relation to post-quantum cryptography. We review the relationship between HSP and other computational problems discuss an optimal so- lution method, and review the known results about the quantum com- plexity of HSP. We also overview some platforms for group-based cryp- tosystems. Notably, efficient algorithms for solving HSP in the proposed infinite group platforms are not yet known. Keywords: Hidden Subgroup Problem, Quantum Computation, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Group-based Cryptography 1 Introduction In August 2015 the National Security Agency (NSA) announced plans to upgrade security standards; the goal is to replace all deployed cryptographic protocols with quantum secure protocols. This transition requires a new security standard to be accepted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Proposals for quantum secure cryptosystems and protocols have been submitted for the standardization process. There are six main primitives currently pro- posed to be quantum-safe: (1) lattice-based (2) code-based (3) isogeny-based (4) multivariate-based (5) hash-based, and (6) group-based cryptographic schemes. arXiv:1805.04179v2 [cs.CR] 21 May 2018 One goal of cryptography, as it relates to complexity theory, is to analyze the complexity assumptions used as the basis for various cryptographic protocols and schemes. A central question is determining how to generate intractible instances of these problems upon which to implement an actual cryptographic scheme. -
Fully Graphical Treatment of the Quantum Algorithm for the Hidden Subgroup Problem
FULLY GRAPHICAL TREATMENT OF THE QUANTUM ALGORITHM FOR THE HIDDEN SUBGROUP PROBLEM STEFANO GOGIOSO AND ALEKS KISSINGER Quantum Group, University of Oxford, UK iCIS, Radboud University. Nijmegen, Netherlands Abstract. The abelian Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP) is extremely general, and many problems with known quantum exponential speed-up (such as integers factorisation, the discrete logarithm and Simon's problem) can be seen as specific instances of it. The traditional presentation of the quantum protocol for the abelian HSP is low-level, and relies heavily on the the interplay between classical group theory and complex vector spaces. Instead, we give a high-level diagrammatic presentation which showcases the quantum structures truly at play. Specifically, we provide the first fully diagrammatic proof of correctness for the abelian HSP protocol, showing that strongly complementary observables are the key ingredient to its success. Being fully diagrammatic, our proof extends beyond the traditional case of finite-dimensional quantum theory: for example, we can use it to show that Simon's problem can be efficiently solved in real quantum theory, and to obtain a protocol that solves the HSP for certain infinite abelian groups. 1. Introduction The advent of quantum computing promises to solve a number number of problems which have until now proven intractable for classical computers. Amongst these, one of the most famous is Shor's algorithm [Sho95, EJ96]: it allows for an efficient solution of the integer factorisation problem and the discrete logarithm problem, the hardness of which underlies many of the cryptographic algorithms which we currently entrust with our digital security (such as RSA and DHKE). -
Quantum Factoring, Discrete Logarithms, and the Hidden Subgroup Problem
Q UANTUM C OMPUTATION QUANTUM FACTORING, DISCRETE LOGARITHMS, AND THE HIDDEN SUBGROUP PROBLEM Among the most remarkable successes of quantum computation are Shor’s efficient quantum algorithms for the computational tasks of integer factorization and the evaluation of discrete logarithms. This article reviews the essential ingredients of these algorithms and draws out the unifying generalization of the so-called hidden subgroup problem. uantum algorithms exploit quantum- these issues, including further applications such physical effects to provide new modes as the evaluation of discrete logarithms. I will of computation that are not available outline a unifying generalization of these ideas: Qto “conventional” (classical) comput- the so-called hidden subgroup problem, which is ers. In some cases, these modes provide efficient just a natural group-theoretic generalization of algorithms for computational tasks for which no the periodicity determination problem. Finally, efficient classical algorithm is known. The most we’ll examine some interesting open questions celebrated quantum algorithm to date is Shor’s related to the hidden subgroup problem for non- algorithm for integer factorization.1–3 It provides commutative groups, where future quantum al- a method for factoring any integer of n digits in gorithms might have a substantial impact. an amount of time (for example, in a number of computational steps), whose length grows less rapidly than O(n3). Thus, it is a polynomial time Periodicity algorithm in contrast to the best-known classi- Think of periodicity determination as a par- cal algorithm for this fundamental problem, ticular kind of pattern recognition. Quantum which runs in superpolynomial time of order computers can store and process a large volume exp(n1/3(log n)2/3). -
Efficient Quantum Algorithms for Simulating Lindblad Evolution
Efficient Quantum Algorithms for Simulating Lindblad Evolution∗ Richard Cleveyzx Chunhao Wangyz Abstract We consider the natural generalization of the Schr¨odingerequation to Markovian open system dynamics: the so-called the Lindblad equation. We give a quantum algorithm for simulating the evolution of an n-qubit system for time t within precision . If the Lindbladian consists of poly(n) operators that can each be expressed as a linear combination of poly(n) tensor products of Pauli operators then the gate cost of our algorithm is O(t polylog(t/)poly(n)). We also obtain similar bounds for the cases where the Lindbladian consists of local operators, and where the Lindbladian consists of sparse operators. This is remarkable in light of evidence that we provide indicating that the above efficiency is impossible to attain by first expressing Lindblad evolution as Schr¨odingerevolution on a larger system and tracing out the ancillary system: the cost of such a reduction incurs an efficiency overhead of O(t2/) even before the Hamiltonian evolution simulation begins. Instead, the approach of our algorithm is to use a novel variation of the \linear combinations of unitaries" construction that pertains to channels. 1 Introduction The problem of simulating the evolution of closed systems (captured by the Schr¨odingerequation) was proposed by Feynman [11] in 1982 as a motivation for building quantum computers. Since then, several quantum algorithms have appeared for this problem (see subsection 1.1 for references to these algorithms). However, many quantum systems of interest are not closed but are well-captured by the Lindblad Master equation [20, 12]. -
Arxiv:1611.07995V1 [Quant-Ph] 23 Nov 2016
Factoring using 2n + 2 qubits with Toffoli based modular multiplication Thomas H¨aner∗ Station Q Quantum Architectures and Computation Group, Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA 98052, USA and Institute for Theoretical Physics, ETH Zurich, 8093 Zurich, Switzerland Martin Roettelery and Krysta M. Svorez Station Q Quantum Architectures and Computation Group, Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA 98052, USA We describe an implementation of Shor's quantum algorithm to factor n-bit integers using only 2n+2 qubits. In contrast to previous space-optimized implementations, ours features a purely Toffoli based modular multiplication circuit. The circuit depth and the overall gate count are in (n3) and (n3 log n), respectively. We thus achieve the same space and time costs as TakahashiO et al. [1], Owhile using a purely classical modular multiplication circuit. As a consequence, our approach evades most of the cost overheads originating from rotation synthesis and enables testing and localization of faults in both, the logical level circuit and an actual quantum hardware implementation. Our new (in-place) constant-adder, which is used to construct the modular multiplication circuit, uses only dirty ancilla qubits and features a circuit size and depth in (n log n) and (n), respectively. O O I. INTRODUCTION Cuccaro [5] Takahashi [6] Draper [4] Our adder Size Θ(n) Θ(n) Θ(n2) Θ(n log n) Quantum computers offer an exponential speedup over Depth Θ(n) Θ(n) Θ(n) Θ(n) their classical counterparts for solving certain problems, n the most famous of which is Shor's algorithm [2] for fac- Ancillas n+1 (clean) n (clean) 0 2 (dirty) toring a large number N | an algorithm that enables the breaking of many popular encryption schemes including Table I. -
The Hidden Subgroup Problem for Infinite Groups
The hidden subgroup problem for infinite groups Greg Kuperberg, UC Davis We consider the hidden subgroup problem for infinite groups, beyond the celebrated original cases estab- lished by Shor and Kitaev. 1 Motivation and main results Some of the most important quantum algorithms solve rigorously stated computational problems and are superpolynomially faster than classical alternatives. This includes Shor’s algorithm for period finding [13]. The hidden subgroup problem is a popular framework for many such algorithms [10]. If G is a discrete group and X is an unstructured set, a function f : G ! X hides a subgroup H ≤ G means that f (x) = f (y) if and only if y = xh for some h 2 H. In other words, f is a hiding function for the hidden subgroup H when it is right H-periodic and otherwise injective, as summarized in this commutative diagram: f G X G=H The hidden subgroup problem (HSP) is then the problem of calculating H from arithmetic in G and efficient access to f . The computational complexity of HSP depends greatly on the ambient group G, as well as other criteria such as that H is normal or lies in a specific conjugacy class of subgroups. The happiest cases of HSP are those that both have an efficient quantum algorithm, and an unconditional proof that HSP is classically intractable when f is given by an oracle. Shor’s algorithm solves HSP when G = Z, the group of integers under addition. Even though Z is infinite and Shor’s algorithm is a major motivation for HSP, many of the results since then have been about HSP for finite groups [2, Ch. -
THE HIDDEN SUBGROUP PROBLEM by ANALES DEBHAUMIK A
THE HIDDEN SUBGROUP PROBLEM By ANALES DEBHAUMIK A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2010 c 2010 Anales Debhaumik 2 I dedicate this to everyone who helped me in my research. 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my advisor Dr Alexandre Turull. Without his guidance and persistent help this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank sincerely my committee members for their help and constant encouragement. Finally I would like to thank my wife Manisha Brahmachary for her love and constant support. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................. 4 ABSTRACT ......................................... 6 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................... 8 1.1 Preliminaries .................................. 8 1.2 Quantum Computing .............................. 11 1.3 Quantum Fourier Transform .......................... 12 1.4 Hidden Subgroup Problem .......................... 14 1.5 Distinguishability ................................ 18 2 HIDDEN SUBGROUPS FOR ALMOST ABELIAN GROUPS ........... 20 2.1 Algorithm to find the hidden subgroups .................... 20 2.2 An Almost Abelian Group of Order 3 2n ................... 22 · 3 KEMPE-SHALEV DISTINGUISHABLITY ..................... 33 4 ALGORITHMIC DISTINGUISHABILITY ...................... 43 4.1 An algorithm for distinguishability ......................