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Antitrust Division Manual | Fifth Edition Chapter III

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Antitrust Division Manual | Fifth Edition Chapter III Antitrust Division Manual | Fifth Edition Chapter III. Investigation and Case Development Chapter III. Investigation and Case Development A. Finding and Evaluating Antitrust Complaints ................................................................................ III-6 B. Recommending a Preliminary Investigation ................................................................................. III-7 1. Standards for Approving a Preliminary Investigation ............................................................... III-7 2. Making a Request for Preliminary Investigation Authority ...................................................... III-8 3. FTC Clearance Procedure and the Short Form Preliminary Investigation Memo ................... III-10 4. Referral of a Matter to Another Prosecutorial Agency ........................................................... III-11 C. Conducting the Preliminary Investigation ................................................................................... III-11 1. Standards for Determining Whether to Proceed by Civil or Criminal Investigation ............... III-12 2. Planning the Investigation ...................................................................................................... III-13 3. Obtaining Assistance ............................................................................................................... III-15 a. Federal Agencies ................................................................................................................. III-15 i. Federal Bureau of Investigation ...................................................................................... III-15 ii. Other Federal Agencies ................................................................................................... III-16 b. Non-Federal Agencies and Other Entities ........................................................................... III-17 4. Obtaining Information by Voluntary Requests ....................................................................... III-17 a. Voluntary Requests and the Merger Review Process Initiative .......................................... III-17 b. Considerations in Using Voluntary Information Requests .................................................. III-18 c. Confidentiality Considerations ............................................................................................ III-18 5. Status Reports on Investigations ............................................................................................ III-20 6. Evaluating the Results of a Preliminary Investigation ............................................................. III-20 7. Closing an Investigation .......................................................................................................... III-20 D. Conducting a Merger Investigation ............................................................................................. III-21 1. A Basic Guide to the Premerger Notification Statute and Rules ............................................ III-22 a. Determining Whether the Act Applies ................................................................................ III-23 i. Tests ................................................................................................................................. III-23 ii. Definitions ....................................................................................................................... III-23 iii. Calculating Whether the Thresholds Are Met ................................................................. III-24 iv. Special Types of Transactions .......................................................................................... III-24 b. Exemptions to the Reporting Requirements ....................................................................... III-25 c. Filing Mechanics .................................................................................................................. III-26 d. Waiting Period ..................................................................................................................... III-26 e. Early Termination of the Waiting Period ............................................................................. III-27 f. Request for Additional Information .................................................................................... III-28 g. Other Provisions of the Act and the Rules .......................................................................... III-29 i. Preliminary Injunction; Hearings ..................................................................................... III-29 ii. Enforcement of the Act ................................................................................................... III-30 iii. Confidentiality of HSR Materials ..................................................................................... III-30 iv. Relationship of Premerger Notification to Other Statutes .............................................. III-32 2. Reviewing Premerger Filings ................................................................................................... III-33 a. Procedures for Getting Premerger Filings to Staff for Review ............................................ III-33 b. Substantive Review of the Filing ......................................................................................... III-33 i. Contents of the Form ...................................................................................................... III-33 ii. Other Sources of Information ......................................................................................... III-35 c. Assessing the Completeness of the Filing ........................................................................... III-35 U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Page III-1 Antitrust Division Manual | Fifth Edition Chapter III. Investigation and Case Development d. Recommendation to Open or Not Open an Investigation .................................................. III-36 i. The No-Interest Memorandum ....................................................................................... III-36 ii. Opening a Preliminary Investigation ............................................................................... III-36 e. Clearance Procedure ........................................................................................................... III-36 f. Preclearance Contacts with the Parties .............................................................................. III-37 g. Maintaining the Filings ........................................................................................................ III-38 h. The Preliminary Investigation .............................................................................................. III-38 i. CIDs ...................................................................................................................................... III-38 j. Second Requests ................................................................................................................. III-39 i. Model Second Requests .................................................................................................. III-40 ii. Procedures for Issuing Second Requests ......................................................................... III-40 iii. Negotiating Modifications ............................................................................................... III-41 iv. Compliance with the Second Request ............................................................................. III-42 k. After the Second Request Is Issued ..................................................................................... III-43 l. Timing Agreements ............................................................................................................. III-43 m. After the Parties Are in Substantial Compliance ................................................................. III-44 3. Procedures for Recommending Suit ....................................................................................... III-44 E. Issuing Civil Investigative Demands ............................................................................................ III-45 1. Function of Civil Investigative Demands ................................................................................. III-45 a. Where CIDs Can Be Used ..................................................................................................... III-45 b. Criminal Investigations ........................................................................................................ III-46 c. Other Matters Wherein CID Use Is Not Authorized ............................................................ III-47 d. Basic Characteristics of CIDs ................................................................................................ III-47 2. Legislative History of the Antitrust Civil Process Act and Amendments ................................. III-48 a. 1962 Act ............................................................................................................................... III-48 b. 1976 Amendments .............................................................................................................. III-49 c. 1980 Amendments .............................................................................................................. III-49 d. 1994 Amendments .............................................................................................................
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