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Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988

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Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 NOTE TO USERS This reproduction is the best copy available. ® UMI u Ottawa l.'Universilc cnnnrficnne Ginadn's university FACULTE DES ETUDES SUPERIEURES l==l FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND ET POSTOCTORALES U Ottawa POSDOCTORAL STUDIES I/Universittf canadienne Canada's university Bryan Gibson "^EUlMIJTHiS^UTHOR'orfHESrs" M.A. (History) GRADE/DEGREE Department of History TAClTfOr6Ll7DlEPWE¥^ Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 TITRE DE LA THESE / TITLE OF THESIS Dr. Galen Perras DIRECTEUR (DIRECTRICE) DE LA THESE / THESIS SUPERVISOR „„„„„______ EXAMINATEURS (EXAMINATRICES) DE LA THESE / THESIS EXAMINERS Dr. Ryme Seferdjeli Dr. Lotfi Ben Rejeb Gary W. Slater Le Doyen de la Faculte des etudes superieures et postdoctorales / Dean of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies COVERT RELATIONSHIP: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 By Bryan Gibson 2643170 Submitted to The School of Graduate Studies University of Ottawa In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts (History) August 21, 2007 © Bryan R. Gibson, Ottawa, Canada, 2007 Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-49206-2 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-49206-2 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privee, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont ete enleves de cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. Canada Table of Contents Abstract pg Acknowledgements pg Introduction pg Chapter One: The War of Subversion pg Chapter Two: The Right Reaction pg Chapter Three: Strict Neutrality? pg Chapter Four: The Tilt pg Chapter Five: The Internationalization of the War pg Chapter Six: The Iran Imbroglio pg Chapter Seven: Forcing an End to the War pg Conclusion pg Appendix A pg Appendix B pg Appendix C pg List of Works Cited Abstract Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iraq invaded Iran resulting in a costly war from 1980 to 1988, which threatened American interests in the Persian Gulf. From the outset, the stated official American policy was strict neutrality, but this was not the case. The war had provided the United States with an opportunity to improve relations with Iraq, particularly after Iran reversed the Iraqi invasion in the summer of 1982. Because the Reagan administration could not let Iraq collapse, the United States tilted heavily towards Iraq in defiance of its stated policy. Interestingly, the tilt towards Iraq did not stop the Reagan administration from secretly dealing with Iran in 1985. Consequently, the disclosure of these dealings resulted in the buildup of American naval forces in the region to protect the shipment of oil, and eventually the use of force to end the conflict in 1988. i Acknowledgements First and foremost, I need to thank my parents Marlene and Glenn Gibson. Without their never-ending support, I do not believe that I would have been able to accomplish the quality of work that this work provides. My thanks for their thoughtful insight and guidance throughout the lengthy process of researching and writing this work cannot be described properly in words. I also need to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. Galen Perras, who served as an excellent mentor, providing valuable expertise on the subject, while helping me improve my writing, grammar, and the clarity of my work. For that, I am truly thankful. I must also thank Dr. Brian Loring Villa for giving me the confidence to not only apply for the Master's program, but also for encouraging me to dig deeper into the Iran- Iraq War. Had it not been for his early support in my studies, I cannot say with certainty that I would have written this study. Another source of support came from Dr. Donald Davis, who I served as a teaching assistant throughout my MA. Working for Dr. Davis taught me a great deal about writing and about thinking outside of the box. Although we did not see eye-to-eye on everything, for the last two years he served as an excellent source of intellectual debate. In the early stages of my writing, a colleague of mine recommended that I speak with Dr. James Gould, a former DFAIT official who was stationed in Iraq during the mid-1980s. Dr. Gould provided valuable insight into the political dynamics of the region, the context of the war, and the role of foreign intelligence agencies in Iraq. I would also like to thank my fellow MA colleague Jeffery ii Brideau. Jeff always made himself available to debate ideas and arguments, providing excellent insight that might not have become known without his support. Finally, I need to thank Gary Sick for providing valuable advice on the subject, including an important refutation of a number of arguments. In the early stages of this work, Mr. Sick pointed me in the direction of a number of important articles that would have otherwise gone unnoticed. In the end, one cannot thank these five individuals enough for their support for my work. A number of institutions and libraries were also very helpful. Notably, the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan Presidential Libraries provided incredible information on my subject. In particular, I recognize the help of Keith Shuler at the Jimmy Carter Library, Jennifer Mandel at the Reagan Library, and James Yancy at the National Archives (NARA). Another incredibly helpful institution was the National Security Archive at George Washington University, which provided me with an early glimpse at the formulation of the American policy towards the war. Particularly helpful at the NSA were Joyce Battle and Malcolm Byrne. I also have to thank the University of Ottawa for providing me the opportunity to engage this important subject. Without the support of the University, I do not believe this work would have been accomplished. Finally, I need to thank Erin Walker at Gale-Thomson for her help locating a number of documents that I used a number of years before deciding to write my thesis. As such, I am indebted to her and cannot thank her enough. - Bryan Gibson, May 4, 2007. in Introduction No event since the detonation of a Soviet nuclear weapon in 1949 affected American strategic perceptions more than the Iranian Revolution in 1979. While the Korean War (1950-1953), Cuban Missile Crisis (1963) and the Vietnam War (1954- 1975) were very important, at no point did any of these Cold War conflicts alter the strategic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The main difference between these events and the Iranian Revolution was that Iran was of great strategic significance to the United States. After all, Iran is the largest state in the Persian Gulf region, it shared a long border with the Soviet Union, possessed the fourth largest oil and second largest natural gas reserves in the world, and was a crucial American ally in the Cold War. The Islamic Revolution occurred at time when American policymakers had become increasingly concerned about access to foreign oil, thereby amplifying the importance of the petroleum rich Persian Gulf. A decade earlier economist E. Wayne Brown had warned the American government that petroleum producers in the United States would not be able to meet the public demand in the 1970s, leading to the importation of foreign oil.1 As American demands for access to foreign sources of oil increased, so did the Persian Gulfs strategic importance. In 1973, the Arab States imposed an oil embargo on the United States during the Yom Kipper War. The resulting economic crisis underlined a number of new realities to American policymakers. First, it 1 John M. Blair, The Control of Oil (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), pg. 4. IV elevated access to oil as the number two priority of the government next to countering the Soviet Union; second, it convinced Washington that the Arab states were unreliable; and third, it cemented the American relationship with Iran, which did not participate in the embargo. Throughout the 1970s, the security relationship between the United States and Iran became closely intertwined as Washington increasingly relied upon Iran to 'police' the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, American policymakers failed to adequately address a significant question: what would happen if Iran collapsed? The Iranian Revolution caught the United States completely off guard, leaving it unable to formulate an effective response to the threat posed by Iran's radical brand of Islamic fundamentalism and the war that ensued between Iran and Iraq.
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