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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 2 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh

summarySummary

Enemy preparations for the long expected offen­offen- sive at Khe Sanh appear at an advanced stage, and a major attack could be launched at any time.

Two full Communis:tCommunist divisions--comprisingdivisions~~comprising at least six infantry regiments with artillery support-­support—— are emplaced within striking distance of the outpost. In addition, at least two infantry regiments of the North Vietnamese 320th Division have been deployed to an area in the north-central DMZ from where they could move to interdict and harass allied reinforce­reinforce- ments moving from the east toward Khe Sanh.

During the last two weeks enemy forces near Khe Sanh have continued to build up their supply caches and strengthen their fortified positions in the area. They have also bolstered their antiaircraft (AAA) defenses in the area, adding a number of heavy machine guns and possibly 37-mrn.37—mm. and 57-mm.57—mm. AAA.

Having launched-theirlaunched their major offensive against th8the urban areas in South Vietnam, the Communists prob-prob­ ably now view the Khe Sanh front as a major new pres—pres­ sure point with which to help overextend and weaken the allied militarymilitar positionosition in South Vietnam. There is evidence inin[:yg]that I I that they hope to coordinate 3.3(h)(2)3£t2) their offensive in the Khe Sanh area with a general push against va~iousvarious allied strongpoints along the DMZ, in the central highlands, and in northwestern III Corps.

Note: This memora:ndum,memorandum, an update of~------~of‘ :iof of 3.5(c)555“» the same title issued on 10 January, was produced solelysoleiy by CIA. It was prepared jointly by the Office of Current IntelligenceIntelZigence and the Vietnamese Affairs Staff.

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The Build-up

. 1.l. Developments in recent weeks strongly sug­sug— gest that the Vietnamese Communists intend once again to increaseincreas~ military pressure against the strategically * placed outpost at Khe Sanh, on Route 9 in Quang Tri Province.

2. The post, approximately nine miles from the Laotian border, is used as a base for observation and interdiction of enemy infiltration activities in the area. It was last besieged in the winter of 1967, following the movement of the North Vietnamese 325C Division into the western DMZ area. This division has again moved into the region, after a oeriodperiod of _ rest and refitting in North Vietnam. ~I------~I ‘ 3.3(h)(2)3£XhX2) I I\indicates indicates that its three regiments-- the 95C, the 101D, and the 29th--along29th—-along with elements from the 324B Division, have conducted extensive re­re- supply and reconnaissance activities near Khe Sanh during December and January.

3. The units mentioned above probably would take the primary role in any Communist effort to step up action at Khe SanhSanh. .. Recent Communist deployments have also put the enemy in a position to throw in the bulk of the North Vietnamese 304th JivisionDivision in any major assault. This division had been located near ~V' in North Vietnam. I‘ ‘ 3.3(h)(2)3£MhX2) KJDLJitL__J it began to move so~u~t~h-~in--N~o_v_e_m~b_e_r-.--T~h_r_e_e_i~·n---~south in November. Three in- fantry regiments and one artillery regiment were in­in- volved. At the same time, the North Vietnamese 320th Division, which had been stationed in the Hanoi area, also began to move south. At present the 320th Division is located in the north central DMZ area, above Camp Carroll. At least two regiments and the headquartersheadquarter3 element of this division are in the area. The 320th's role appears to be that of interdicting, harassing, and neutralizing the allied positions at the Rockpile and Camp Carroll. This would dilute allied capability to reinforce or relieve the gar­gar— rison at Khe Sanh.

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The Current SituationSituation_

4. Since the outbreak of major enemy activity on 30 January, the military situation in the Demili­Demili- tarized Zone/western Quang Tri Province ar3a--thearea-—the anticipated focal point of a Communist offensive-­offensive—— has remained unusuallunusually quiet.

5. The Communists' timetable for major attacks in this sector, presumably in concert with the wide­wide- spread attacks elsewhere, is believed to have been delayed in part at least by the unusually heavy allied aerial bombardment against North Vietnamese positions threatening Khe Sanh and the network of allied strong points just below the zone. The Com­Com- munists may also be waiting for the most advantageous weather conditions.

6. There are indicationsindications‘ I , l3.3(h)(2)l3.3(h)(2) ~~------~recent_ Jrecent US B-52 strikes may have seriously disrupted the command and control facilities of the so­so- called "Khe Sanh Front," th,.:!the major new North Vietnamese Army headquarters located northwest of Khe Sanh in Laos. This front headquarters is believed to be the senior command authority responsible for controlling enemy tactical operations in the Khe Sanh area.

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9. Meanwhile, regimental strength elements of the North Vietnamese 325 "C" and 304th Divisions have continued to maneuver into battle positions to the north, west, and south of Khe Sanh. Sharply intensi­intensi- fied aerial photoreconnaissance of the Khe Sanh area has provided tentative indications of a major at­at— tempt by the North Vietnamese to dig their way toward the strategic US combat base--an "encroachment with fortifications" reminiscent of the Dien Bien Phu tactics. PhotographyPhotOgraphy indicates that the Communists have been preparing positions ever closer to the Marine garrison but not occupying them. Should the North Vietnamese begin to construct communications trenches leading forward from these positions, the parallel to Dien Bien Phu would become even stronger.

10. Moreover,MoreOVer,'US US aircraft during late January reported the presence ofof1rrqmm.and/or 37-mm. and/or 57-mm. enemy antiaircraft artillery weapons in the hills north and west of Khe Sanh. In addition, a recent Communist defector reported that some 20 field artillery pieces were being towed by vehicles through Laos to firing positions near Khe Sanh. The introduction of these weapons would significantly enhance the enemy's fire­fire- power capability against both the Khe Sanh garrison and allied aerial resupply and reinforcement efforts in the area.

11.ll. To the east of Khe Sanh, regimental-size elements of the North Vietnamese 320th Division, supported by reconnaissance and artillery/rocket units, have concentrated near Camp Carroll and the Rockpile. Two additionaladditional.North North Vietnamese regiments-­regiments-- the 803rd and the 270th--pose a continuing threat to the area between Con Thien and Gio Linh. The North Vietnamese 324 "B" Division's 90th Regiment continues to engage in extensive food and ammuni- tion resupply movements to forces in the west-cen­west-cen— tral part of the Demilitarized Zone. The division's 812th Regiment is located southwest of Quang Tri city.

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Enemy Objectives

12. The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the build-up around Khe Sanh is that the enemy may hope to wipe out the US garrison there and the Civilian Ir:r.Irregular ,~gular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at Lang Vei, about five miles to the southwest on Route 9. The Communists have long regarded Khe Sanh, located near the infiltration corridors in Laos, as a thorn in theirtheir' side. According.According to the latest available information, the garrison at Khe Sanh is defended by four infantry battalions, and an artil­artil— lery ~attalionbattalion of the 26th Marine Regiment. In addition, an ARVN ranger battalion is deployed along the garrison's outer defense perimeter. The CIDG camp at Lang Vei has about 320 men,men.

13. The Communists, however, do not need a force of upwards of 20,000 men to overrun Kht:'!Khe Sanh and Lang Vei. If the build—upbuild-up is ~sas extensive as suspected, and all of these units are rlestineddestined to be committed to an offensive in the area, the pri­pri- mary purpose of the Communists may prove to be much broader. By attacking Khe Sanh, they would hopehOpe to draw US reinforcements into the area, tie them down to static defensive positions, and inflict maximum casualties on US forces over a protracted time period. By occupyingOCCUpying the high ground around Khe Sanh and setting up ambushes along Route 9, the onJ.yonly overland route into the area, the enemy could make resupply and reinforcement a difficult and costly proposition, especially if he has de­de- veloped an effective antiaircraft capability. Mon­Mon- soon rains have closed large portions of Route 9, compounding the problem and making resupply largely dependent on airlift.

14. Allied reinforcement difficulties would be increased if the enemy managed to sustain his current offensive a.roundaround and in the urban areas of the country. ReactionReaction.to to this thrust has so far tied down numerous allied maneuver battalions and reserve forces.

15. A final objective of the Khe Sanh build-upbuild—up would be to harass and foil the strong-point barrier system which is being implemented in the DMZ north of Khe Sanh and in the infiltration corridors of Laos.

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16. Enemy strategy as outlined above fits in with the enemy's efforts during 1967 in fighting the main force war partly from peripheral areas adjacent to border sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. By positioning his forces in these areas, the enemy sought to lure US units away fromfrom.p0pulated populated areas, disperse them, and inflict a maximummaximum.number number of cas­cas- ualties in the process. This relieves pressure on main force units operating in populated areas and enables them to coordinate with local force units to disrupt the pacification program and attack allied outposts and base camps around urban areas. Since the start of the "winter-spring"winter—spring campaign" in October, the enemy has P-mployedemployed this strategy in II Corps and III Corps.

17. The next few days are expected to bring poor flying weather to the Khe Sanh/DMZ area, thereby seriously restric~ingrestricting allied tactical air support and resupply efforts. Moreover, sizable numbers of allied forces who otherwise would be available as reinforcement to positions under siege in northern and western Quang Tri Province have been diverted to clearing and securing the many areas recently attacked from Quang Tri city southward to Hue. These factors weigh heavily in favor of possibly imminent offensive activity at Khe Sanh, probably in coordi­coordi— nation with major thrusts against allied positions along the central and eastern portions of the DMZ.

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