FROM POLITICAL PROTEST TO BUREAUCRATIC SERVICE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF

HOMELESS ADVOCACY IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

AND THE ECLIPSE OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE

By

Christine Marie Elwell

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of Doctor of Philosophy

In

Anthropology

Chair:

~~ "2-- /()~ ;2&pt? Date

2008

American University

Washington, D.C. 20016

ftMER!CAN UNIVERSLiY LIBRt'\RY C\ 'b \ 0 UMI Number: 3338297

Copyright 2008 by Elwell, Christine Marie

All rights reserved.

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by

Christine Marie Elwell

2008

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED To Bill, Fred, Curtis and others whom have paid the ultimate price FROM POLITICAL PROTEST TO BUREAUCRATIC SERVICE: THE

TRANSFORMATION OF HOMELESS ADVOCACY IN THE

NATION'S CAPITAL AND THE ECLIPSE OF

POLITICAL DISCOURSE

BY

Christine Elwell

ABSTRACT

This research project is an ethnohistorical account of the development and retrenchment of advocacy and social service efforts around homelessness in Washington,

D.C. between 1970 and 2006. These historical struggles are comprehended through the perspectives of homeless men and women, their advocates, professional providers, volunteers, congregations, clergy, public employees, and political leaders. Not surprisingly, the movement and its many campaigns bring into relief the persistent struggle around strategy, representation, and authority over homeless issues.

In the span of almost four decades, radical civil disobedience expanded and contracted dramatically as a result of government outsourcing, official retaliation, industry professionalization, and the retirement of many of the movement's dynamic leaders. Nonprofit contracting has not only obscured the ways that well meaning communities have subsidized poverty, but has also deflected the political energy of activists and compromised broad based grassroots political activism. Consequently,

11 collective interest organizing and expansive coalition building have been undermined by special interest politics both within the homeless community and between other classes of poor. Broad based advocacy has been replaced by strategic, individualized and programmatic advocacy that has made building alliances that much more difficult.

Homeless relief has shifted from emergency, volunteer, ad hoc efforts, to formalized nonprofit programs managed by professionals and organized by funding priorities. After being such a critical part of homeless relief, political involvement has become less of a priority, to be substituted by a clearer delineation of advocacy and social service roles.

Even volunteers, once the core of resistance efforts and ad hoc emergency assistance, have been largely corralled into direct service roles. Commitments to prevent and eliminate homelessness have given way to managing the problem. Advocates' petitions have shifted from demanding homeless resources to improving existing service networks while neglecting systemic issues that could make a lasting difference for poor and homeless folks.

This paper concludes that homelessness will only be resolved through major structural change, made possible through a strong, broad based social justice network that incorporates a range of strategies and popular support, offering creative solutions and given by leadership that offers both compromise and pressure when appropriate.

lll TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2. GRASSROOTS MOBILIZATION: CHARITY AND JUSTICE DURING THE 1970's ...... ; ...... 38

3. THE HOMELESS WARS: PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY AND OFFICIAL RELUCTANCE IN THE 1980's ...... 76

4. RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION IN THE 1990's: WASHINGTON'S PROPERTIED CITIZEN'S PUSH BACK ...... 183

5. DEMOBILIZATION AND DEPOLITICIZATION: PROGRESS, COMPLACENCY AND "BUREAUCRATIC" ADVOCACY IN THE NEW MILLENIUM ...... 287

6. CONCLUSION ...... 335

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 348

IV CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In.many ways, this study of protest and advocacy around the homeless poor is a biography of a social movement that spans nearly forty years, as seen through the eyes of the many actors that made the movement thrive, change, fragment, and dissolve.

However, this is not a simple progression of historical details that neatly inform the present. It is rather, an ethnohistorical account of the development and retrenchment of advocacy efforts between 1970 and 2006. These historical struggles are comprehended through the perspectives of homeless men and women, their advocates, professional providers, volunteers, congregations, clergy, public employees, and political leaders. Not surprisingly, the movement and its many campaigns bring into relief the persistent struggle around strategy, representation, and authority over homeless issues. For the many volunteers, citizens, leaders and service providers in Washington, D.C., what does advocacy mean and what socio-political and economic structures have shaped political attitudes and involvement over time? How have activist efforts evolved and taken shape over the last four decades? And most importantly, what are the implications of these changes for people who find themselves homeless? The following chapters are a critical documentation of the history of activism surrounding homelessness and social services in

Washington, D.C. Through an examination of historical processes that have shaped the 2

current activist context, I explore how the focus of socio-political change within the anti- homeless movement has narrowed significantly in the last few decades. As disenfranchisement and disempowerment remain key challenges for citizens of all classes in the 21 51 century, the following study examines what implications this may have for building coalitions and effecting broad based social change.

Each chapter follows themes in the city, social service providers, advocates, political activism and coalitions as they relate to homeless advocacy. Fragmentation and depoliticization are major threads that run throughout this work, encompassing city and federal bureaucracies, social service provision, as well as advocacy efforts. It traces the conflicting visions of community, charity and service, justice, advocacy and political engagement, as well as volunteerism. This research also documents locally specific as well as national trends and their implications for Washington, D.C.

According to nonprofit scholar Pablo Eisenberg, between the 1960' s and the mid-

1980' s, advocacy movements achieved major victories, an illustration of how socially concerned organizing peaked and then waned at the end of the century. 1 Washington,

D.C. too was once home to a vibrant activist network that coalesced around poverty and homeless social justice issues. Organizing began with a core group of religiously motivated individuals who were dedicated to the biblical focus of meeting people's needs. But many were equally committed to social justice and social change. Often stirring people's conscience and sometimes crossing the line, these advocates initiated a movement that brought attention and legitimacy to homelessness. This period of intense

1 Pablo Eisenberg. Challenges for Nonprofits and Philanthropy: The Courage to Change, ed. Stacy Palmer (Medford, MA: Tufts University Press, 2004), 4-5. 3

1 social activism in the latter part of the 20 h century departs significantly from preceding decades, owing in large part to local organizations providing assistance and the unprecedented numbers of individuals willing to donate time and money.2 Why then, rather than reach its full potential, did the movement suffer a premature decline? And how do we account for what motivated or (dis)empowered people? Eisenberg points to the conservative revolution that beginning in the 1980' s, which dampened creative political mobilization. At the same time, antipoverty efforts were on the decline, which had previously electrified so many. Finally, he points to the magnificent growth of nonprofit social service organizations who became increasingly dependent on public funds, foundation money or corporate grants, most of which could not be used for political purposes.

During this time, passionate supporters in the metro area thrived and fed off their opposition to official callousness in a highly charged environment. The struggle even galvanized massive amounts of public sympathy and support. But while this catalyzed the movement, and ultimately resulted in both local and federal emergency relief, the movement failed to capitalize on that momentum. In 1987, Congress passed the

McKinney Act, which provided unprecedented amounts of funding for homeless services and was the federal government's first outright commitment to this social issue.

Ironically, it was one of the biggest accomplishments of anti-homeless efforts that was also one of the most significant factors in destabilizing activist networks.

2 Kenneth L. Kusmer, Down and Out, On the Road: The Homeless in American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 4

The availability of public money meant that governments were getting out of the business of direct services and creating a privatized social safety net based on professional contractors and charitable ministries, which was a key component of neoliberal political change.3 Neoliberalism has meant state-funded social service assistance is at an all time minimum while essential services are decentralized and parceled out to contracted agencies. Relying on free market solutions for poor communities displaces tension, shifts civic activism, and pits communities against each other.4 This too is related to the neoliberal machine:

Neoliberalism opposes the New Deal-Keynesian model of direct government intervention in job creation, human service provision and community empowerment. Instead it advocates a market-based program of deregulation, investment tax credits, downsizing, and outsourcing of public services, and up-by­ the-bootstraps philosophy. Rejecting the libertarianism and hard-line laissez-faire ideology of the right, neoliberalism embraces efficiency and 'good government' by shifting public resources away from the promotion of social equality and toward the promotion of targeted economic growth. 5

Just like globalization, poverty and inequality are not inevitable and yet, advocates appear to be immobilized with the magnitude of these issues and have instead focused on

3 Jennifer R. Wolch, The Shadow State: Government and the Voluntary Sector in Transition (New York: The Foundation Center, I 990); Karen Curtis, "Urban Poverty and the Social Consequences of Privatized Food Assistance," Journal of Urban Affairs I 9, no. 2 (I 997): 224. h ttp://prox y au. wrl c .org/lo gin ?url=:ohttp ://search. ebscohost .com/I ogi n.aspx ?d irect=true&d b=aph&AN=97 090 83864&site=ehost-live (accessed 12 May 2008); Judith Goode and JeffMaskovsky, eds., The New Poverty Studies: The Ethnography of Power, Politics, and Impoverished People in the United States, (New York: New York University Press, 2001).

4 Janet Poppendieck, Sweet Charity? Emergency Food and the End of Entitlement (New York: Viking, I 998).

5 Matthew Ruben, "Suburbanization and Urban Poverty Under Neoliberalism," in The New Poverty Studies: The Ethnography of Power, Politics, and Impoverished People in the United States," eds. Judith Goode and JeffMaskovsky (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 436. 5

smaller, "winnable" tactics.6 In the following chapters, I explore how resistance and political change have been conditioned by the neoliberal social, political and economic context. Importantly, this research demystifies major neoliberal market changes and state policies that reproduce poverty and push poor people to the margins of the city. What we will see, is that the neoliberal model fails to significantly decrease homelessness and instead institutionalizes charity, homelessness and inequality.

In this framework, not only was the free market assumed to be an appropriate solution to poverty but it underscored the ideology of pathology - that the problem lies within the individual while simultaneously masking the ways that the state sponsors inequality. As a result, poverty remains invisible, individual and private.7 Poverty and homelessness have continued to be internalized by individuals who are overwhelmed at the prospect of effecting systemic level change. In D.C, social services are structured, particularly as a result of funding streams, to address individual "pathologies." Statistical record keeping methods, required by funding sources, have only served to reinforce that mentality. Lyon-Callo argues that this produces complicity within the homeless population itself, and at least partially explains why shelter residents seem to "choose" self-reform over political resistance.8

The availability of public resources for homeless services in Washington, D.C. has had other depoliticizing implications and leads to questions about the state's role in

0 Susan Brin Hyatt and Vincent Lyon-Callo, "Introduction: Anthropology and Political Engagement." Urban Anthropology 32, no. 2 (2003): 135.

7 See Poppendieck, Sweet Charity?

8 Vincent Lyon-Callo, inequality, Poverty, and Neoliberal Governance: Activist Ethnography in the Homeless Sheltering industry (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 2004). 6

squashing resistance. Contracts come with explicit and implicit rules. Grants and contract funding have had the impact of changing priorities that emphasize service delivery and dependence over advocating for systemic changes. This in turn has created an institutionalized social service system whereby individual agencies are reticent to speak out about systemic issues or criticize funders. Individuals who value job security. have become overly cautious, particularly in a quasi-repressive political climate that punishes those who speak out. Those who have challenged the state on a regular basis have been gradually marginalized. Dr. Robert Keisling and Mary Ann Luby are outspoken and unwavering in their commitment to the homeless mentally ill:

On one occasion, I was sitting on some partnership council with Mary Ann Luby and two or three other people. Eventually we were uninvited because we raised concerns with the bureaucrats. They wanted a dog and pony show. There is a tendency to label us as discontents, ne'er-do-wells, troublemakers .... For years they insisted that all was fine and that the rest of us were alarmist.

And yet, one mental health provider remarked: "No one else is saying these things out loud," a recognition that some are still willing to say what needs to be said and raise issues that others are reluctant to press. This has resulted in a bifurcated homeless assistance network of social service providers and advocates, and effectively stifles political dissent.

Early charitable efforts did not distinguish between acts of mercy and acts of justice - these were concomitant ideas. The result has been an enormous shift in focus - towards service provision that, while in most cases significantly improved services, also diverted attention away from the deeper political questions. Caring for people's immediate needs is essential but by itself does not challenge the system that has created 7

the conditions of poverty in the first place. Rosenthal's conclusions are amplified in this research:

On a national level, the very success of the politics of compassion, exemplified by the passage and progressively larger reauthorizations of the McKinney Act. .. , arguably has led to a dissipation of energy among activists, a redefinition of the problem within public discourse, which avoids discussion of poverty's structural roots, and an institutionalization of "emergency" aid, which now constitutes most of the societal response to homelessness.9

Over several decades, especially as a consequence to public service retrenchment, the responsibility for human services has shifted from the federal government, to the states, and finally to the private sector. Private social service networks have been augmented considerably as a result of public outsourcing. There is a lot of potential with nonprofit groups, including innovation, flexibility, and smaller, qualitative services.

However, in many cases, as with the city shelters in particular, contracts have been under-funded and have not provided sufficiently for human services needs. This raises the question of the appropriate role of the nonprofit sector. The privatization of essential services has impacted whole communities as strapped agencies measure who was worthy of the investment of their resources. In a decentralized system lacking serious accountability, do providers take their responsibility seriously when considering funding cutbacks and withdrawal of essential services that people have come to count on? Curtis points out that the private sector has not been really well equipped to handle the need with adequate resources. 10 Therefore, in response to fiscal pressures, agencies "chose to

9 Rob Rosenthal, "Dilemmas of Local Anti-homeless Movements," in Homelessness in America, ed. Jim Baumohl (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1996), 211.

10 Curtis, "Urban Poverty and the Social Consequences of Privatized Food Assistance." 8

eliminate programs, reduce levels of service, and tighten eligibility standards." 11 Curtis further argues that the reliance on public funds has blurred the distinctions between public and private organizations, which had previously made private voluntary sector services more attractive alternatives. Therefore, cost-containing measures have resulted in centralized and bureaucratized programs, rendering services that are '"increasingly incapable of meeting client needs.'" 12

Non-profits, in an effort to cut expenses while still providing critical services, have relied heavily on volunteers. What are the consequences of utilizing service corps and volunteer labor for the delivery of essential services? By creating a "moral safety valve," Poppendieck argues that it displaces citizen action and attention from more fundamental solutions to poverty. 13 The irony is that in D.C., it was the volunteer and congregation based groups that were originally the most politically active. And while this has the potential to educate and sensitize many generations of individuals, it remains unclear how effective agencies have been.

By funneling money through quasi-governmental organizations, is the government backdooring assistance to avoid an outright commitment and remove what should be a right of citizenship? Charitable services are not guaranteed and individuals do not have the same rights with regard to government entitlements. Therefore, it has not been possible to hold contracted groups accountable in the same way. Everyone is doing the best that they can with their given resources. At the same time, providers are all

11 Ibid. Citing Fabricant and Burghardt 1992.

12 Ibid., 222.

13 Poppendieck, Sweet Charity? 9

competing for the same piece of the pie. Funding disputes have also created turf battles as each agency competes for their own little niche, arguing that they alone can do it better. Nonprofit social service organizations dedicated to social change are left already under-funded with tight budgets that do not provide much flexibility for advocacy or even allow for much community dialogue. Consequently, providers work behind the scenes and target specific initiatives and key issues that have meaning to people they serve. A negotiated solution for one agency might be worked out and only sometimes shared with the broader community. 14

Each year the numbers of homeless have continued to go up. Service industries have burgeoned only to replace or shadow government resources and focus on those whom they can help while making a small dent in the overall numbers of individuals suffering each day. Government has avoided direct responsibility for providing meaningful solutions to poverty at the same time appearing to be responsive to the huge need. Service providers have become community intermediaries and develop creative partnerships and strategies meant to fill the gap left by state retrenchment. Too often service providers have become buffers between clients and community pushbacks who do not want to have to confront this issue. Incarceration has become one such strategy to deal with a problem that communities cannot handle. Public-private partnerships have provided alternate sources of funding and can provide valuable terrain in which to interact with and educate the larger community but some argue that there have been costs

14 See also Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, Off the Books: The Underground Economy of the Urban Poor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). JO

to urban democracy and the declining power of civic groups that are associated with the

increasing power of development interests. 15

In the following chapters, we will see how advocacy, as it waffled through four

decades, has lost its political edge and the major socio-political shifts that facilitated the

current context. In the span of four decades, radical civil disobedience grew

dramatically, and was then stifled by retaliation, to be replaced with conciliation and

conservatism. The momentum and energy that dominated earlier efforts was replaced by

compassion fatigue and burnout as advocacy took its toll. Homeless relief has shifted

from emergency, volunteer, ad hoc efforts, to formalized nonprofit programs managed by

professionals and organized by funding contracts. Commitments to prevent and eliminate

homelessness gave way to managing the problem. Broad based advocacy has been

replaced by strategic and individual or programmatic advocacy. Advocates' petitions

shifted from demands for homeless resources to improving existing service networks.

Volunteers, once the core of resistance efforts and emergency services have been largely

corralled into direct service roles. These trends are underscored by the fact that overall,

power and authority have been decentralized and fragmented.

During its peak, mobilizing strategies included litigation and legislative reform,

. , lobbying and testifying, as well as implementing and monitoring legal and legislative mandates. 16 They also incorporated efforts towards political recognition that included

15 Neil Smith, The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City (London: Routledge, 1996). See also Ruben.

16 Maria Foscarinis, "Homelessness, Litigation and Law Reform Strategies: A United States Perspective,'" Australian Journal of Human Rights JO, no. 2 (2004) [e-journal] http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ AJHR/2004/6.html (accessed 19 February 2008). 11

establishing and protecting civil rights of disenfranchised individuals, especially around the right to safe and sanitary shelter, 17 as well as political street theater, civil disobedience, and creative, disruptive tactics. Finally, activists involved themselves in research, education, volunteering and coalition building. 18 And yet, after four decades of struggle, advocacy has shifted focus towards defending programs and agencies.

Increasingly, nonprofits have been reluctant to engage in civic advocacy or legislative influence, complacent with direct service. After being such a critical part of homeless relief, in time, political involvement has become less of a priority, as social service with social justice commitments have been substituted by a clearer delineation between the two. Clearly, successful strategic efforts encompassed a broad range of macro and micro level activities that extended beyond simply nonviolent resistance and public protests.

But a healthy social service system requires not only a broad range of services to meet people's needs but also a broad based movement capable of taking a stand when necessary - and scrap the nai"ve assumption that systems and structures will reform themselves. In D.C., while there have been many efforts to be lauded, it appears now that we are complicit and lack the political will to push for major systemic change.

The major consequence of these changes is that social justice efforts have contracted significantly and undermined the potential for building broad alliances.

Furthermore, it seems that the momentum has shifted towards managing the homeless problem instead of eliminating or preventing it. I suspect that homelessness and poverty

17 Mary Ellen Hombs, "Reversals ofForJune: America's Homeless Poor and Their Advocates in the 1990's," New Formations 17 (1992).

18 Kim Hopper, Reckoning with Homelessness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). 12

are not the emergency that they were once thought to be, as they have gradually become a permanent backdrop to urban life in Washington, D.C. Between 1970 and 1988 alone, poverty increased a whopping 26%. 19 Michael Stoops of The National Coalition for the

Homeless remarks:

Today the movement is more professionalized. CCNV and The National Coalition did a good job with leadership, recruiting, training and supporting activists who were young adults and homeless individuals themselves. Because of the shift to a professionalized staff, we need to let people know about the history of the movement. There is a big shift in seeing your role as a job or a paycheck. They're not willing to risk their reputation, their lives, or go to jail. There's a different group now who advocate for homeless folks. People are talking about ending homelessness from a bureaucratic standpoint. But we can get energized by including homeless folks.

If true, we have sacrificed comprehensive political change in order to focus on bio- medicalized models of treatment as well as bureaucratic efforts to improve or expand existing services. The absence of broad based coalition building stands in stark contrast to the potential power of non-profits unifying toward a common goal. As Eisenberg has argued, the voluntary sector has grown phenomenally in the last few decades and given birth to many social movements that have bettered the lives of countless Americans.

However, his praise gives way to critical pragmatism and speaks to the potential for reform:

The extraordinary proliferation of issues, causes, social needs, and specialized interest groups has diffused the focus of the nonprofit sector, scattering its priorities and activities over a wide range of issues and concerns. Our nonprofit organizations are more fragmented than ever before, making it difficult for them to unite for collective action on serious matters of national significance. The vast number of one-issue or special interest organizations ... have boards of directors that are passionate about the institution's one or two priorities, not about a broader

19 Paul Koegel, Audrey Burnam and Jim Baumohl, "The Causes of Homelessness," in Homelessness in America, ed. Jim Baumohl (Phoenix: Oryx Press, 1996), 27. 13

agenda ... .It is little wonder, then, that organizational vision is often supplanted by organizational mission.20

Over the last four decades, relatively conservative coalitions surfaced and initially attempted to work with the government. They eventually became strong, radical voices in the community that thrived off other activist networks. Over time, they fell victim to divisiveness and their own passion, which dissolved more radical groups. There is now a huge vacuum for a coalition that not only cuts across class lines but also circumvents special interests in an attempt to advocate for broad based social change. My premise is that the large numbers of homeless individuals filling the ranks on the street and living on the edge of poverty can only be tackled by major structural change that addresses whole urban economies. And only a strong social justice network can accomplish this.

Literature Review

There are extensive sociological and anthropological reviews of homelessness, which provide comprehensive statistical and cultural analyses of people's lives on the street and in shelters. Academic scholarship has examined various subpopulations, the challenges they face, their histories, coping and survival strategies as well as popular stereotypes. The rise of homelessness and its different phases, relevant scholarly debates and its root causes will be explored in detail in the following chapters but several key points that inform this research project are worth mentioning here.

While a good deal of the literature deals with the homeless themselves, few scholars examine homeless advocates or advocacy struggles, except as they involve

20 Eisenberg, Challenges for Nonprofits and Philanthropy, 4-5. 14

indigenous movements.21 Still fewer look at service providers and program volunteers, with the exception of mental health providers and street outreach workers. Robertson agrees in his analysis of faith-based programs in New Mexico, concluding that there is little information on "the socio-cultural context surrounding the homeless, that is on the community that interacts directly with homeless individuals and provides them with services."22 Other research that dots the academic record includes Blau, who assesses advantages and disadvantages of nonprofits and homeless services on the macro level23 and Wolch, who has written a comprehensive analysis on the impact of government outsourcing of human services to private nonprofits.24 Curtis extends Wolch's analysis to emergency food assistance programs and arrives at similar conclusions presented here.25

More specifically, Jeff Maskovsky challenges academics to explore the implications of privatization:

As public institutions are scaled back and the role of private entities, corporate or otherwise, expands, many researchers have ignored the question of whether this shift is beneficial in a broad sense to poor communities. Instead, they confine themselves to research focusing on the best ways to improve what is already assumed to be the dominant organization of poor relief, work opportunity, and

21 Baum and Burnes worked at Samaritan Ministry in Washington during the late J 980's and offer a contrasting conclusion about how disabled the homeless population is. They offer a pretty harsh critique of activists, whom they argue mistakenly focus on housing issues as the root cause of the problem, rather than mental illness and addictions. Alice S. Baum and Donald W. Burnes, A Nation in Denial: The Truth About Homelessness (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

22 Michael Owen Robertson, "Piety and Poverty: The Religious Response to the Homeless in Albuquerque, New Mexico," in There's No Place Like Home: Anthropological Perspectives on Housing and Homelessness in the United States, ed. Anna Lou Dchavenon (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1999), 106.

23 Joel Blau, The Visible Poor: Homelessness in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

24 W olch, The Shadow State.

25 Curtis, "Urban Poverty and the Social Consequences of Privatized Food Assistance." 15

"empowerment" for the poor. This research, whatever its specific programmatic contributions, reinforces the retrograde idea that self-help is the only legitimate way for the poor to pull themselves out of poverty, and that state action cannot be relied upon to provide long-term solutions to imrniseration and impoverishment.26

These authors all conclude that further academic attention needs to address the relationship between the state and voluntary sector.

Secondly, for all the dynamic research on urban political economies and urban ethnographies, so very little attention is given to Washington, D.C. that its absence in the literature is striking. More than 30 years ago, Elliot Liebow studied male street comer life in Talley's Comer and Ulf Hannerz wrote about "ghetto culture" two years later in his Soulside. Both D.C. neighborhood ethnographies sought to dispel myths about the culture of poverty.27 Sam Smith offered a historical review and cultural critique of D.C. in Captive Capital.28 Later ethnographies have addressed different neighborhoods and cultural issues in the District, including Nelson Kofie' s discussion of a housing project and the consequence of urban decay and segregation, Braman's examination of the implications of incarceration in the District, and most recently with Turf Wars, which examines the complications of race, ethnicity and immigration in Mount Pleasant.29 Brett

26 Jeff Maskovsky, "Afterward: Beyond the Privatist Consensus," in The New Poverty Studies: The Ethnography of Power, Politics, and Impoverished People in the United States, eds. Judith Goode and Jeff Maskovsky (New York: New York University Press, 200 I a), 473.

27 Elliot Liebow, Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Ulf Hannerz, Sou/side: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

28 Sam Smith, Captive Capital. Colonial Life in Modern Washington (Bloomington, IN: University Press, 1974).

29 Nelson Kofie, Race, Class, and the Struggle for Neighborhood in Washington, D.C. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999); Donald Braman, Doing Time on the Outside: Incarceration and Family Life in Urban America (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Gabriella Gahlia Modan, Tuif Wars: Discourse, Diversity and the Politics of Place (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007). 16

Williams seems like a lone voice on behalf of the District, having written extensively on

Washington D.C. and arguing about the city's unique significance, beginning with

Upscaling Downtown.30

This leads us to another key contextual point. Poverty historian Michael Katz reminds us of the importance of the historical context for framing major political responses to poverty and yet, many scholars have neglected to adequately situate research within the historical context.31 Poverty is not a moral condition but one that is a

"dynamic historically and geographically contingent process."32 Consequently, the communities we study cannot be conceptualized apart from the multiple historic and political forces that created them. "Like work situated in colonial and post-colonial settings, ethnographic research on poverty in the U.S., particularly that on Black poverty, also has a long history of creating portraits of bounded communities populated by colorful and exoticized others."33 Building on Eric Wolf's work, William Roseberry argues for a politically engaged examination of the intersection of culture and history.

Within the context of both local and global "transformations," Wolf entwines history,

30 Bretl Williams, Upscaling Downtown: Stalled Gentrification in Washington, D.C. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

31 Michael B. Katz, ed. The Underclass Debate: Views From History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, I 982); William Roseberry, Anthropologies and Histories: Essays in Culture, History, and Political Economy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989); William Roseberry, "Marx and Anthropology." Annual Review ofAnthropology 26 ( 1997): 25-46. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/2952513 (accessed 20 October 2008).

32 Judith Goode and Jeff Maskovsky. Introduction to The New Poverty Studies: The Ethnography of Power, Politics, and Impoverished People in the United States, eds. Judith Goode and Jeff Maskovsky (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 16.

33 Susan Brin Hyatt and Vincent Lyon-Callo, 135. 17

material social process and hegemonic political-economic dislocations. In describing

Wolf's approach, Roseberry writes that his research focus

sees the Other as different but connected, a product of a particular history that is itself intertwined with a larger set of economic, political, social, and cultural processes to such an extent that analytical separation of "our" history and "their" history is impossible. In this view, there are no cultures-outside-of-history to be reconstructed, no culture without history, no culture or society "with its own structure and history" to which world-historical forces arrive.34

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for this work, a good deal of academic literature misses the opportunity to raise the larger, critical, political questions, or examine the applied anthropological implications of research. Clearly, both anthropology and sociology have demonstrated the challenges faced by individuals, families and communities in poverty and homelessness. But the cumulative impact of decades of research is unsettling. U.S. social policy, mirrored by academic studies, continues to be pre-occupied with moralism while avoiding discussions of state, class and power dynamics. Political remedies perpetuate urban marginality while urban nostalgia casts the city as the icon of disorder and immorality.35 It is my hope that this study avoids the pitfalls of earlier urban ethnographies that exoticized, racialized and pathologized the inner city and instead follows Brett Williams, who correctly argued for the need to examine cities as "political and economic wholes connected to global processes."36

34 Roseberry, Anthropologies and Histories, 13.

35 Loic Wacquant, "Scrutinizing the Street: Poverty, Morality and the Pitfalls of Urban Ethnography," The American Journal of Sociology 107 (May 2002): 1468-1556. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/3081457 (accessed 20 September 2005).

36 Brett Williams, "Poverty Among African Americans in the Urban United States," Human Organization 51(1992):165. 18

Large scale disenfranchisement and immobilization are now key challenges for social activists.37 In the area of poverty research, anthropology's contribution has been to illuminate the political economic conditions that underscore people's circumstances, as well as how folks perceive a problem and why they respond to it in particular ways. But why are conditions accepted (or not) and why is one course of action chosen over a multitude of others? How does the dominant power structure make some choices appear more normal, natural, or possible? Anthropology, through examining the process of how subjectivities are reproduced, internalized and understood can have a powerful role in the revolution of normalized systemic inequality.

The present study illuminates opportunities for political mobilization and promoting community empowerment. Several researchers have advocated for

"ethnography from below" that engages communities in the process of social change. 38

Lyon-Callo describes this as "interventionist and activist ethnography" that includes not only advocacy, but participation alongside the population being studied.39 The goal is to engage in dialogue with people to create space for alternative understandings that make new actions and realities possible while making visible the contradictory public attitudes towards the poor that in turn, inform public policy .4° For the above anthropologists,

37 Kim Hopper, Ezra Susser and Sarah Conover, "Economies of Makeshift: Deindustrialization and Homelessness in New York City," Urban Anthropology 14, no. 1-3 (1985); Goode and Maskovsky.

38 Hyall and Lyon-Callo.

39 Lyon-Callo, Inequality, Poverty, and Neoliberal Governance.

4° Karen Curtis, "'Bottom-Up' Poverty and Welfare Policy Disclosure: Ethnography to the Rescue?" Urban Anthropology 28, no. 2 (1999): 132; See also Dana-Ain Davis, "What Did You Do Today?: Notes From A Politically Engaged Anthropologist," Urban Anthropology 32, no. 2 (2003): 147- 173. 19

researchers in our discipline have a special responsibility to collaborate, incorporate and advocate alongside the people we study. Indeed, participant observation is the hallmark of anthropological study. However, it is no longer sufficient to only document people's suffering and the impacts of profound inequality. Instead, we have an obligation to examine the political implications of our work and promote democratic grass roots activism. Hyatt and Lyon-Callo, in encouraging research that "demystifies" the nature of the neoliberal state, point out that our research may impact broad based political social change, and could also illuminate for activists potential opportunities for action. By identifying the local decisions that have limited the potential for activism, we have the opportunity to engage in "enfranchising marginalized people."41

Local and Historical Context of Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C. is emblematic of the historic consequences of extreme racial

1 divisions and economic polarization. In the middle of the 20 h century, community areas east of the Anacostia River were 82% white. By 1967, neighborhoods east of the river were 66% black. In less than two decades, they had seven housing projects, seven landfills, an interstate, a major parkway, and were dumping 400 tons of incinerator ash at

St. Elizabeth's hospital annually.42 Many families in those areas were victims of segregation and racism that eliminated whole communities elsewhere in the city.

Several factors facilitated the segregation and migration of black families to the

Southeast quadrant throughout history, including pre- and post-civil war migration of

41 Hyatt and Lyon-Callo,198.

42 Brett Williams, "Gentrifying Water and Selling Jim Crow," Urban Anthropology 31, no. I (2002): 96. Citing Dale. 20

freed slaves, the 201h century development of the monumental core, and the post WW II development of shoddy public housing. Despite the concentration of the slave trade in the region, a small, stable black community existed in Washington, D.C. before the civil war, enjoying relative freedom and employment opportunities, particularly with the legislature in session only a few months of the year. After abolishing public slave auctions many runaway or former slaves flooded the city and continued to do so well in the Civil War era, making riverside squatter settlements and alley communities their home. Many were crammed into converted carriage houses on the back of property owner's lots as they found employment as domestics, the Navy Yard, or the federal government. Black migration swelled over the decades as those fleeing economic oppression of the South migrated to D.C. from North Carolina to take small government and service industry jobs.43 Post-Civil War victories were short lived though, ending in the 1870's and lasting well into the 20th century.

Jim Crow era racial divisions reinstated legal segregation and made possible large-scale removal of communities of color in the middle of the 20th century. City officials created public housing complexes in preparation for the razing and urban renewal of the Southwest quadrant and other parts of the downtown monumental core.

Throughout history, neighborhoods where black native Washingtonians settled were quickly identified as blight areas and targeted for redevelopment. Decaying buildings were viewed as evidence of lack of concern for material property and the natural consequence of generational poverty as opposed to being the result of racist practices and

43 Williams, "Gentrifying Water and Selling Jim Crow;" Sherri Lawson Clark, "Where the Poor Live: How Federal Housing Policy Shapes Residential Communities," Urban Anthropology 31, no. I (2002): 69-92. 21

high-level political economic decisions.44 Brett Williams writes that during this time, the government liberally utilized their powers of eminent domain, rezoning, fire codes and condemnation.

To demobilize a vibrant urban civil rights movement, and to cleanse the city's core, the commissioners mobilized the power of the state in a massive relocation, that also stigmatized the people who were forced out. In the process, the commissioners created a city that would serve big government and suburban commuters, but could not function as a home where people could live and work. The Anacostia River emerged as a literal barrier between the city of culture, politics, and wealth, and the area east of the river residents believed to be contaminated by the very processes that had displaced them.45

Banking and other forms of financial prejudice kept blacks for the most part south of

Florida Avenue well into the 1960's. Racist policies, restrictive covenants, blockbusting and redlining all served to segregate the city - with Rock Creek Park remaining as the literal divider. This simultaneously pushed many poor and black residents to the outskirts of the city, isolated by the river and later by the freeways and highways. It would be easy to assume that the neighborhoods in Ward 7 and 8 experiencing the highest rates of poverty in the city were a consequence of crime, teenage, out-of-wedlock pregnancies, or even welfare-induced laziness. However, these communities did not evolve randomly because of the immoral choices of its largely African American residents. These neighborhoods were created as a consequence of District initiatives that made poverty more isolated and concentrated.

Other factors contributed to the structure of D.C. 's segregation. The white exodus to the suburbs began with the desegregation of city schools in 1954 and accelerated with

44 Clark.

45 Brett Williams, "A River Runs Through Us." American Anthropologist 103, no. 2 (June 200 I): 422. 22

racist policies. At the same time white residents were fleeing to the suburbs in the l 950's and 1960' s, black rural families came from poor communities in the south. Middle class black residents soon followed: those who did not move to areas east of Rock Creek Park moved to the Maryland border east of the D.C. line.46 In 1950, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that white residents represented 64.6% of the population of Washington with black residents making up the difference. By 1960, the percentage dropped to 45.2 and by 1970, it dropped astonishingly to 27.7% ! Anti-war protesters flooded the city and drove many residents out until the l 970's when urban professionals began to desire to live in the city and recolonized it.

The lack of home rule has had a significant impact on the makeup and management of the city, which is dominated by its relationship to the federal government and by its segregation. Congressional representation is essentially nonexistent as the federal government maintains a neo-colonial relationship with D.C., which significantly impacts local efforts to effect progressive social change.

The District became a territorial government in 1871 with a governor appointed by the U.S. president, but this was removed by an act of Congress in 1874 after the governor put the city in huge debt. Congress replaced the territorial government with a three-man board of commissioners, whom were also appointed by the president.47 At that time, half of the District's budget was provided by Congress. Price notes that not only was the city ruled by corrupt commissioners, but also by the Board of Trade and the

46 Tanya Y. Price, "White Public Spaces In Black Places: The Social Reconstruction of Whiteness in Washington, D.C.," Urban Anthropology 27, no. 3-4 (1998): 301-344.

47 Ibid. 23

Congressional House District Committee as well. Limited home rule was established nearly one hundred years later in 1974.

It is only since 1964 that D.C. residents have voted for the president of the United

States. While residents have been able to elect a delegate to Congress since 1970, the delegate does not have a vote on any legislation. For a brief time, during Clinton's first year in office, the District's Congressional representative was granted the ability to vote but it was revoked as unconstitutional within two years.48 Today, residents can vote for mayor and a 13 member City Council but Congress retains the power to veto any locally established laws as well as any budget appropriations, and the president can unilaterally veto City Council legislation.

By repealing District laws, manipulating the annual federal payment and intervening in local District affairs, Congress exercises a direct colonial rule which nullifies any attempt on the part of District residents to exercise political control over their own lives - the 'illusion' of limited self-rule gives Congress the justification to tighten its grip on the capitol city, due to the appearance that District residents are incapable of ruling themselves.49

Price concludes that within several years of extremely conservative leadership in

Congress, many of the small victories accomplished through limited home rule and the

D.C. Committee eroded. Brett Williams pointedly wrote that Washington is "a place where the state lies massively on the land."5° Clearly then, Washington's mayors inherited a government that was not only early in its development, but it came with a long history of segregation, corruption, and abuse.

48 Ibid., 336-7.

49 Ibid., 334-5.

50 Williams, "Gentrifying Water and Selling Jim Crow," 95. 24

The District of Columbia remains the invisible backdrop to the national debate on growing inequality between the seriously wealthy and the most destitute. In the nation's capital, nearly twenty percent of residents live below the poverty line and more than three percent of the total resident population is homeless over the course of a twelve month period.51 Tragically, this is one of the highest rates in the country and yet D.C. is rarely talked about in either academic literature or political debates centering on homelessness and poverty. Washington has the widest income gap between the rich and poor of any city in the country - the wealthiest residents earn 31 times as much as the poorest residents. 52 According to a report issued by the Fannie Mae Foundation, the number of residents living in extreme poverty has more than tripled in the last decade while there is a marked increase in the concentration of poverty.53 Fannie Mae notes an expansion of high poverty tracts, an increase in the percentage of the population experiencing poverty, and an overall deepening poverty in the city. Moreover, the Metropolitan Washington

Council of Governments reports that the numbers of chronic homelessness have increased a whopping 26% between 2004 and 2006.54 To say that there are large pockets of deep poverty in the city only underscores the severity of the problem.

51 The Community Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness, "Homelessness in Washington, D.C.," http://community-partnership.org/tcp_facts.html (accessed 9 September 2006).

52 Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, "Facts on Homelessness," (Washington, D.C.: Washington Legal Clinic For The Homeless, 12 January 2006), 2.

53 Fannie Mae Foundation, The Poorest Become Poorer. A Report on Patterns of Concentrated Neighborhood Poverty in Washington, D.C. Excerpted Findings from the Fannie Mae Foundation's Housing in the Nation's Capital 2003 (Washington, D.C.: Fannie Mae Foundation, 2003), 1,3. http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/pdf/Housing_in_the_Nation_2003_ch7 .pdf (accessed 14 October 2006).

54 Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, Homeless Services Planning and Coordinating Committee, Homeless Enumeration For the Washington Metropolitan Region 2006 25

In Washington, the boundaries are blurred between the poor and homeless. A significant portion of the homeless population in D.C. area are native Washingtonians, and utilize the resources and generosity of extended kin networks in already impoverished areas of far northeast and southeast D.C. Those who straddle the line of homelessness often have family and other relationships around the city that can support them at different, albeit limited times. The majority of these folks are African American men.55 There are many individuals living on the streets of D.C. that come from impoverished communities in neighborhoods east of the Anacostia River, particularly in

Wards 7 and 8 where the population of people living in severe poverty is growing significantly. Many of these neighborhoods remain largely African American and maintain 40-50% poverty rates. 56 Those few individuals who make it out are heralded as heroes, become the epitome of the "American dream," and appear to prove that anyone can pull themselves up by their bootstraps. Such success stories are pitted against those who are thought to choose to do nothing to help themselves, promoting the American mythology that anyone can make it.

There is intense pressure to find good jobs with security that pay decent wages and provide health care. Today's economy leaves declining opportunities particularly for its young African American residents. Brett Williams writes that residents east of the

Anacostia River function much like a reserve army working cheaper than union labor and

(Washington, D.C.: Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, 14 June 2006), 6. http://www.mwcog.org/uploads/pub-documents/8FltV g200606 I 9091558.pdf (accessed 4 March 2007).

55 A much smaller group of homeless people in downtown areas are comprised of women and people of various ethnic and national backgrounds, though there are pockets of neighborhoods where women and Latinos in particular are more prominently found on the street.

56 Fannie Mae Foundation. 3. 26

forced to put their lives together with various piecemeal jobs: "warehoused without employment for 40 years, they are called forth now to work more cheaply than union labor, already suffering from the decline of public sector jobs and the rise of freelancing, commissioned, tip-driven jobs."57 The service economy jobs that dominate Washington are notoriously non-union, at-will, part time, and seasonal positions that do not sustain families and rarely provide a livable wage for individuals. At the same time residents face high rates of unemployment (which reached a high of 6.4% in August of 2005), Fair

Market Rents (FMR) continue to grow exponentially.58 Therefore, two adults earning minimum wage must work nearly four jobs between them in order to afford a two bedroom apartment at FMR.

A large part of the employment predicament now lies with the outsourcing of government and private sector jobs to surrounding suburban areas, sometimes referred to as the suburbanization of government. Relocating these jobs where there is no public transportation means that many D.C. residents more often lose these employment opportunities. Other, less scrupulous businesses are burgeoning in the District, including pawnshops, liquor stores, agencies offering loans and cash grants at high interest rates, and the entire predatory lending industry that has a strong foothold in the poorest areas of the city.59 Not surprisingly, the eviction companies are also highly profitable in the

57 Williams, "Gentrifying Water and Selling Jim Crow," 114. Citing Dale.

58 Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, "Facts on Homelessness," 2.

59 See for example Brett Williams, "Babies and Banks," in Race, eds. Roger Sanjek and Steven Gregory, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994); Brett Williams, "What's Debt Got to Do With It?" in The New Poverty Studies. The Ethnography of Power, Politics, and Impoverished People in the United States, eds. Judith Goode and JeffMaskovsky, (New York: New York University Press, 2001). 27

region as they have resorted to hirign homeless individuals at less than minimum wage to remove evictee' s belongings.

Despite the realities of housing and employment in D.C., it appears that the city prefers to focus on removal, relocation and "rehabilitation" of the city's poorest residents.

Incarceration wreaks havoc on families and whole communities. According to Donald

Braman, in Washington, D.C., 1in10 black males have been in prison and half of black men between the ages of 18 and 35 are under correctional supervision.60 Many of these individuals are byproducts of the infamous drug wars, from which stiff penalties plague those in possession of crack (as opposed to straight cocaine).

Increasingly, homeless and mentally ill individuals find themselves locked up as a result of the poor state of the District's mental health system, especially St. Elizabeth's hospital for the mentally ill. Arrested for petty crimes or conditions that are more appropriately served in a hospital, jails absorb much of the need for residential mental health care. More and more of those arrested come from the communities in the poorest of conditions. Inmates are regularly released from prison with nowhere to go but homeless shelters. No belongings, no transportation, no material items to care for themselves and routinely no medications to continue the limited treatment they were given while in jail, ex-offenders are left to find their way on their own with the hope that they will stay out of trouble to avoid getting sent back to jail. Moreover, a felony conviction a11 but guarantees a future of crime or a life on the street because employer screening severely hampers legitimate employment opportunities.

60 Donald Braman, Doing Time on the Outside: Incarceration and Family life in Urban America (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 3. 28

In some respects, D.C. provides generous services for the needs of its homeless and poor residents. Consequently, it bears the region's burden for social services as people flock to the city to receive care that is nonexistent or difficult to obtain in surrounding jurisdictions. And yet, there are ideological battles that result in what Neil

Smith calls a revanchist backlash. Revanchist public policies declare war on the poor, continuing a decades long trend of blaming poor people for their predicament and failing to recognize the seriously constrained options available to individuals living in poverty and on the street.61 Public parks and business districts install sleep proof benches while national parks refuse to stock bathrooms or close restrooms altogether to discourage the homeless. Homeless men and women are picked up for petty crimes in an effort to resolve the problem through the criminal justice system. Holders of housing vouchers have a fixed period of time to locate housing and when there are no landlords accepting them, they are told that they have exhausted the time limits. Families who find themselves suddenly homeless have to pull strings to get D.C. government to locate shelter for them. The ongoing assault on the poor and the nation's most disenfranchised citizens is nothing short of tragic.

Taken in its context, Washington, D.C. is a place full of enormous contradictions.

The District continues to maintain astounding rates of poverty and one of the highest rates homelessness in the country. Every year the number of individuals living on the street increases and we know this despite the fact that official counts are so low. And every year, neighborhoods scramble to find creative ways to address these problems.

61 Smith, The New Urban Frontier. 29

Washington, D.C. is both representative and unique in ways that make this project interesting. The city is unlike other jurisdictions like New York City where there was a strong pre-existing network of services and an extensive social safety net. If we exclude for a moment the local faith based missions, homeless services in Washington are only decades in the mix.

There are other significant factors as well. The capital has been the center of activism for all kinds of causes, that political activists are attracted to the capital city for its access to the federal government and the opportunity to make a very large and public statement about some issue. It is true that during the last four decades, many socially minded individuals came from all over to join local and national anti-homeless efforts.

D.C. of course offered the opportunity to work on both. Especially today, the city is the headquarters for countless national nonprofits working on a variety of aspects of homelessness. For all the same reasons Washington continues to draw promising young folks to the region for the chance to work on progressive issues.

There is also the added layer of bureaucracy that the White House and Congress present for local politics. It is worth noting that in all of the interviews I have conducted exploring the socio-political context of homeless advocacy in D.C., virtually no one felt that the lack of home rule had a significant impact on local struggles. Instead, advocates tended to view the local administration as the primary source of contention, perhaps rightly for the history of gross mismanagement of District affairs. Certainly, there is enough evidence in the pages that follow, but looking at this perspective more critically, it is a great deal more complicated. Both city officials and advocates have manipulated federal relationships to their advantage. There are two documented instances in which 30

advocates sought to influence local politics by taking advantage of the federal government's proximate role: once during CCNV's battle over the Federal City College

Shelter and later during the legal disputes in the Dixon case (over St. Elizabeth's

Hospital). Mayor Marion Barry was also quick to scapegoat the federal government for a variety of the city's woes, especially the inadequate revenue from the federal payment.

But for all of Barry's (and other's) complaints about the colonial status of Washington, he also deferred to them for responsibility in bailing the city out of its financial crisis.

Organization of the Chapters

I have selected a time frame that encompasses roughly 1970 until the middle of

2000's for several reasons. As homelessness was just beginning to become a major problem in the 1970' s, social ministries began to emerge, and this coalesced with other progressive social justice movements at a time in Washington when the attention shifted towards local domestic issues. The 1970's are a also useful starting point because of the historical precedent set by the federal government when they had decided to experiment with limited home rule, giving the District limited authority over its own affairs for the first time in history. This review concludes with the election of a new mayor for the city in 2006 and homeless resistance efforts involving the closure of a local shelter. This entire period in Washington was such a vibrant and active period in the city's history that it is hard not to be captured by its significance.

The remainder of this project is divided chronologically into four chapters that cover each of the decades between I 970 and the present, along with concluding thoughts about where to go from here. Chapter 2, Grassroots Mobilization establishes the context 31

and foundation for this work. I raise the question of what made this time ripe and how local interest was uniquely positioned to incubate the beginnings of a movement in D.C. around the issues of homelessness and poverty. I argue that a core of spiritually motivated activists, who were broadly committed to social justice, and the poor specifically, began mobilizing around these issues, giving birth to an anti-homeless movement in Washington, D.C. Broad alliances of faith-based activists, many of whom were radical Catholics, mobilized large groups of volunteers to press for reform and social change. In this chapter, we see how congregational ministries creatively filled the gap in services and, how political activism went hand in hand with service to the poor.

Outraged by official callousness and fueled by government denial about the extent of the problem, committed advocates incorporated nonviolent protest, street theater, and civil disobedience to prompt a more appropriate government response. They volunteered their time, risked arrest or ridicule and often put their lives on the line to bring attention and a compassionate response to men and women confined to the streets of Washington, D.C.

In chapter 3, The Homeless Wars, I explore the crescendo of militancy in the

1980's that attracted progressive activists to D.C. from all over, which also propelled the movement onto the national stage and deeply polarized the city. I argue that city officials adopted a policy of official indifference and at times, obstructionism, volleying over responsibility that fueled the height of organized resistance. As the movement evolved and groups experimented with different strategies, a broad contingent of concerned activists emerged. Through the range of opposition strategies advocates used, it became clear how the different factions built upon, and even played off of one another.

However, coordinated advocacy and coalition building, while a priority, proved difficult 32

with the number of divisions developing. Consumed with the magnitude of need, concerned activists also organized massive emergency relief efforts on the local level.

Organized efforts shifted to the national level, focusing on federal emergency aid and homeless prevention. Their hard work culminated in federal recognition of the problem and financial relief through the McKinney Act.

One point of clarification is worth mentioning here. Though I often refer to "the anti-homeless movement," this should not suggest that the massive effort was ever unified by a single group or purpose. As will become clear in the following pages, no single homeless movement emerged during these last four decades. Nor do I intend to romanticize this period of creative civil disobedience in homeless organizing either. In the face of such a challenging environment, there were plenty of opportunities to work together, and many more when people chose not to. Though the late 1980' s and early

1990' s were particularly energizing as resistance and coordination grew, there was still a lot of divisiveness. The campaigns yielded many strategies and passionate opinions about what was needed and the best way to accomplish it. These times came at enormous personal cost to those who were committed to the campaign. Despite the potential, especially with national efforts converging on local ones, and the connections between local movements around the country, those committed to the cause never did fully capitalize on the momentum by creating a broad based social movement committed to eliminating homelessness and poverty.

In chapter 4, Resistance and Retaliation, there is a noticeable shift in sympathies during the 1990's. Increasing frustration with the growing homeless problem led to community opposition to neighborhood social services and providers felt squeezed on all 33

sides. In this chapter, I trace the evolution of coordinated advocacy and coalition building that peaked early in the decade, coupled with how advocacy efforts were sharply curtailed. Here, I argue that several major neoliberal changes had consequences for public advocacy and resulted in advocates and providers taking on a narrow and safe policy agenda. New federal funding initiatives meant that for the first time, providers could pull together an ad hoc social service system into a comprehensive one, which greatly enhanced the quality of services. It also meant increasing professionalization and specialization, both for human services and for political activists. This shifted the political platform away from grassroots mobilization. Program managers instead focused internally, on programs and budgets, articulating client needs as opposed to larger, systemic issues. The emotionally charged environment was replaced by more conciliatory efforts, although the city's fiscal crisis did little to ameliorate faith in public officials. Finally, retaliatory measures abruptly ended creative confrontational advocacy.

On the whole, concerned advocates failed to translate homeless needs to a broader constituency and appeal to the public at large.

In chapter 5, Demobilization and Depoliticization, I explore the context of widespread demobilization and depoliticization, examining why the pendulum has shifted so far in the direction of managing homelessness and the institutionalization of homeless services. Social service providers and the government have invested heavily in programs and services, creating not only a homeless service industry, but increasing specialization within homeless services that simultaneously deflects political energy and obscures the underlying political economic causes of homelessness and poverty. Meanwhile, gentrification and pro-development, neoliberal policies have steadily eroded progressive 34

accomplishments over the last four decades. Advocacy shifted focus inward and became bureaucratically focused - on programs, clients, agencies, missions and even defending budgets. Political and service roles grew distinct, and the changing nature of volunteerism and service corps programs underscored the depoliticization of the movement. The result was the decentralization of power and authority, the decline of political activism, and the absence of broad coalition building. The consequence is that we have neglected efforts towards systemic change and our commitment to eliminate homelessness.

I conclude with a challenge to social service providers and committed advocates, to take on available opportunities to create a vastly different environment - by making those connections clear to the broader public and move beyond special interest politics in order to establish a collective stake in ending homelessness and poverty. Such radical social change is possible by prioritizing coalition building and reaching out beyond strictly anti-homeless coalitions, as well as being willing to engage in political activity.

Research Methodology and Credits

I am especially fortunate to have had more than seven years in the field as a professional, working with and supervising homeless outreach teams in the city, as an intern, a student, a volunteer, and even as an unaffiliated homeless advocate (for lack of a better description). I have been involved in many of the present day struggles over homeless people who call D.C. their home. In my capacity, I have spoken in depth with hundreds of individuals who have both lived on the streets for many years and those who have experienced intermittent homelessness as they move in and out of precarious living 35

arrangements. This foundation has provided a magnificent background to appreciate the magnitude and complexities of poverty and homelessness in D.C.

Ethnographic field methods in anthropology are more than just "thick description." Anthropologists are careful to document, analyze, and theorize the full context of field study through in depth interviews, rich historical study and participant observation. Such an approach is essential to grasp the broader social, political and historical factors impacting individuals and communities, while looking for patterns, conflicts, and contradictions. Therefore, I have extensively reviewed historical and archival material, countless newspaper reports, legal decisions, legislation, and even personal correspondence. I am especially grateful to Luther Place Memorial Church for allowing me to freely access their extensive church archives, which provided thorough background and detail on the many church ministries that have both come directly out of the church as well as through their partnerships. I am especially indebted to Pastor John

Steinbruck, Brian Carome, and Steve Cleghorn who, in addition to their terrific hospitality, provided me with their extensive personal records of coalitions, lawsuits, and political struggles that enrich the detail here.

This is in part, a history of the people and organizations that have cared for the region's poorest and those who have organized on their behalf - be they volunteers, service providers, clergy, or the homeless themselves. For this reason, I have chosen to use real names and places in hopes of making this a lasting contribution to the historical record. Much of the following details are a matter of public record already, although no one has taken the time to document at length, such a rich history for public access and review. 36

In the course of this research, I have met with many extraordinary people, conducting 54 interviews in all. Several folks have been kind enough to grant me multiple opportunities to ask questions, explore ideas and test theories. This is as much their work as it is mine, helping me to gain perspective and reformulate my analysis over the course of this project. Though interview quotes and other attributions were generously given to me, I obtained the informed consent of all participants, and requests for anonymity were respectfully granted.

If you have been involved in this work at all, then you know the energy, sacrifice and toll that it takes to stay committed over the long haul. So I am appreciative for the time that people took out of their busy schedules and extremely important work to talk with me. I am especially touched by the warm reception I received from all of the individuals whom I interviewed. I was invited into people's homes, viewed original media footage, documentation, and had the privilege of "touring" personal media collages.

Many were honored and eager to speak about this time in their lives. Some even expressed the regret that they had not taken the time to write it down before now. For others, the memories were painful and difficult to talk about to this day. I am enormously thankful to them for having the courage to share their stories. This period was contentious and difficult, but time has afforded these committed individuals the opportunity for reflection and peace. I have been given the privilege of documenting their history and seeing inside someone else's sometimes-messy and complicated world.

And, with a unique understanding of the impassioned perspectives of the struggles that follow, they granted me permission to not "get it right." Though I did not take the task 37

lightly, I am nevertheless grateful for the freedom with which I was given, recognizing that nothing could adequately represent the historical record as people experienced it. So, their stories stand but I acknowledge full responsibility for the arguments and analyses presented below. Of this much I am sure: were it not for the sacrifices and struggles of these committed people, we would not have the extensive resources that exist today.

I would like to credit Craig Keller for suggesting an appropriate title of this manuscript. Finally, I wish to thank my advisor, Brett Williams, who patiently reviewed many earlier drafts of this work and rooted me on. And of course, to Jarrod and Justin for their personal sacrifices that made this possible for me. CHAPTER2

GRASSROOTS MOBILIZATION: CHARITY

AND JUSTICE DURING THE 1970'S

No one has a right to sit down and.feel hopeless. There's too much work to do. -Dorothy Da/

The 1970's in Washington, D.C. were tumultuous times. It was the center of massive resistance and organized civil disorder since the 1960's and the capitol city was also a hotbed of political activity. Washington was still recovering from the riots in

1968, following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. Though years had passed, whole city blocks remained burned out rubble. The beginning of limited home rule was still just an experiment, formalized only in 197 4. That year, Commissioner Walter

Washington was elected the city's first mayor and four years later, a new political leader would emerge to assume responsibility for the city: Marion Barry, Jr. Following his election, municipal jobs expanded dramatically and offered economic opportunity for native Washingtonians, just as the expanding federal government attracted many others to the region.

Washington was also a place of extreme social, political and economic polarization. D.C. was still plagued by post civil rights era disappointments and lasting

1 Colman McCarthy, "CU Students Make Room for Homeless," Washington Post 28 December 1993.

38 39

racial inequality, despite formal equality under the law. Following desegregation of the public schools in the 1950's, "white flight" had been in effect for nearly two decades.

Still, segregated pockets of the city offered a measure of "protection" for wealthy, and largely white enclaves. In his ethnography of the city, Hannerz identifies a theme that has so often defined the political culture in Washington.2 With the riots, for the first time in Washington's history, organized political resistance incorporated the city's

African American residents. Older African Americans were conflicted and voiced skepticism about the rebelliousness displayed by youth. Such a strong dichotomy, which mixed a culture of silence with resistance, would continue to be prevalent for decades.

Impressive social movements that propelled native residents and transplants to action have coexisted alongside complicit inhabitants and bureaucrats of all backgrounds.

The nation's capitol was host to the seriously wealthy and arguably some of the most powerful individuals in the world, who coexisted beside the severely destitute. By the end of the decade, a new phenomenon would have to be grappled with: Washington was home to a growing number of homeless men and women. For the first time since the widespread destitution of the Depression, homeless individuals began appearing on the street in the late 1970' s. Largely invisible up until this point, the homeless quickly overran the area's meager social support structure. Although it had been part of

American history for the better part of two centuries, homelessness had faded from public consciousness following post World War II prosperity, and aided by skid row containment.3 Federal statute changes decriminalized alcoholism and public drunkenness

2 Hannerz.

3 Kusmer. 40

in the early l 970's. Addicted homeless men could no longer be randomly swept off the streets and placed in public "drunk tanks," a situation that enabled more humane responses, but also sparked a rise in visible homelessness and sadly, hypothermia deaths.4

Homeless men, women and families took to the streets for a variety of reasons but braving the outdoors or the shelters was always a last resort of every available housing alternative. Discrimination, gentrification and displacement stemming from the elimination of affordable housing contributed to the sudden appearance of large numbers of street dwellers, especially in D.C. 5 Doubling up was often a last option before homelessness until household economies could no longer support the additional burdens of extended family. 6 Around the country, dislocations in unemployment, underemployment, falling wages, union busting, corporate profiteering, educational poverty, institutionalization, addictions, gentrification, lack of affordable childcare, and declining public benefits also caused widespread homelessness during this period.7 The move to seasonal, part time and temporary work undermined the power of organized

4 Koegel, et al. Three decades later, Mayor Anthony Williams would attempt to rectify this problem by authorizing police officers to transport intoxicated individuals on hypothermic nights to nearby hospitals or detox facilities.

5 See Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1993); Williams, Upscaling Downtown; Smith, The New Urban Frontier.

6 See Peter Henry Rossi, Down and Out in America: The Origins of Homelessness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Anna Lou Dehavenon, "Doubling-Up and New York City's Policies for Sheltering Homeless Families," in There's No Place Like Home: Anthropological Perspectives on Housing and Homelessness in the United States, ed. Anna Lou Dehavenon (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1999).

7 Rossi; Bristow Hardin, "Why the Road Off The Street Is Not Paved With Jobs," in Homelessness in America, ed. Jim Baumohl (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1996); Kim Hopper and Norweeta G. Milburn, "Homelessness Among African Americans: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective," in Homelessness in America, ed. Jim Baumohl (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1996). 41

labor8 while the practice of hiring only part time workers without benefits and forced to be on call resulted in "managed unemployment" for large classes of workers.9

Not surprisingly, there is a historic correlation between economic dislocations and severe homelessness 10 and at the time homelessness appeared to be a major issue, the country was in the midst of .a major recession. Major economic changes may impact who ends up on the street - but not uniformly. Given the right historical and economic conditions, certain people are at greater risk as a result of a "bundle" of factors, which could only partially be explained by personal limitations and disabilities. 11 Koegel et al. argue that there are particular "vulnerabilities that leave certain individuals at risk for homelessness" and "structural conditions that differently distribute such vulnerabilities and make their consequences more serious." 12 However, the "precipitating causes" that may immediately precede someone's shelter stay are often confused with ultimate causes, even though in many cases, these factors existed for some time before homelessness occurred. The presence of such issues does require assistance (and often represents the simplest and most targeted ways to immediately address the crisis) but do not really explain the underlying conditions that have generated such widespread, visible poverty. 13

8 See Hardin.

9 Lyon-Callo, "Inequality, Poverty, and Neoliberal Governance;" See also Mercer Sullivan, Getting Paid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).

1° Kusmcr.

11 Koegel et al.

12 Koegel, et al., 33; See also Kim Hopper, et al., "Economies of Makeshift: Deindustrialization and Homelessness in New York City;" Rossi.

13 Hopper, Reckoning with Homelessness. 42

At one time, it was possible for local economies to incorporate and accommodate people's different strengths and abilities. Since the decline of casual labor markets and industrial areas relative to the expansion of U.S. infrastructure, many jobs that supported less rooted individuals have disappeared. 14 Moreover, there are limited opportunities for

District graduates of a failing school system, in an economy that is increasingly service based. Combined, these factors presented significant obstacles for individuals and families to overcome.

As the United States withdrew from Vietnam, the draft was eliminated and the anti-war movement died down. Peace activists turned their attention toward domestic social justice causes, giving birth to a wide range of progressive social movements, including environmentalism, feminism, and nuclear opposition. Charismatic personalities organized thousands of people around conscience-raising issues. Holdouts from the counterculture youth movement, they were decidedly anti-establishment and non-doctrinaire who encouraged people to act according to their conscience. Broad coalitions formed to press for reform and social change, especially in the areas of hunger, poverty and homelessness. Radical activists regarded their causes not categorically but as fundamental moral issues rooted in systemic concerns. For many, viewed through the lens of indignation, protest, and resistance, these causes were a matter of life and death.

Uncompromising and unapologetic, their efforts challenged established relief measures, struck deep chords and evinced profound guilt from the public.

14 See Rossi; Kusmer. 43

A tight core of activists informed and inspired each other that went beyond participation in any particular group or issue area. Celeste Valente was once active with

CCNV:

A lot of people had a religious motivation in the sense that it was our job to change things and not just our job to give bread. This came from our religious sense of justice. We had other advocacy models and the Civil Rights movement had a religious base that was very powerful... [but] there was also the labor movement with Cesar Chavez and also Dorothy Day. There was a lot of back and forth, informing each other. We were aware of each other's struggles and connected to other social justice movements.

Victoria Rader wrote, "The social justice movements in the nation - and in the world- are not separate and autonomous; they tend to bunch up into progressive eras and get passed along. In the late 1960's they were running together torrentially, borrowing inspiration, tactics, ideology and even personnel from one another." 15

In Washington, faith based alliances coalesced around homelessness and poverty, and liberally borrowed from other social movements. Activists brought attention and concern to the numbers of men and women living on the streets of D.C., numbers that were increasing exponentially each year. They did this through non-violent resistance, political street theater and media capitalization. Local and federal officials callously denied the problem and further fueled protests. While there was very little government attention to the growing need, churches and loosely organized political groups provided much needed relief assistance.

So what drew people to organize around local homelessness at this time in

Washington, D.C.? Why were advocates willing to risk so much for a social cause?

15Victoria Rader, Signal Through the Flames: Mitch Snyder and America's Homeless (Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward, 1986), 53. 44

Activists experimenting with locally focused confrontational strategies legitimized homelessness as an issue and created momentum for an entire movement. By the new millennium, their efforts resulted in a broad range of homeless specific services.

Therefore, how did they approach the conflicting tendencies of service and political engagement? And while the movement evolved to incorporate different factions and tactics, how did they choose to implement such strategies and why were some more successful than others? What becomes clear through this decade is that crude initial organizing efforts created the foundation for coalition building in later decades, but also presented a contradictory pattern of self destructive tendencies emanating from within the movement.

Radical Clergy and Neighborhood Ministries to the Poor

The nation's needy have traditionally been served by religious and charitable organizations throughout history, mostly as a result of inadequate government provision. 16 Local governments did not typically get involved until the late 1970's17 and this is certainly the case in D.C. as well. But Washington was unique in that it had relatively scant social services with more than a few years of experience. Unlike

16 Kusmcr; Kim Hopper and Jim Baumohl, "Held in Abeyance: Rethinking Homelessness and Advocacy," American Behavioral Scientist 37 (1994): 522-52. http ://proxy au. wrlc .org/Jogi n ?ur l=http ://search .e bscohost .com/I ogin .aspx ?direct=true&db=aph &AN =9406 I 3 I 802&site=ehost-live (accessed I May 2003).

17 Mary Anderson Cooper. "The Role of Religious and Nonprofit Organizations in Combating Homelessness," in The Homeless in Contemporary Society, eds. Richard Bingham, Roy E. Green, and Sammis B. White, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1987). 45

municipalities like New York City, the District did not have a long history of offering comprehensive social services or creating a wide safety net for local residents.

At the beginning of the l 970's, there were no city run shelters; only a handful of century old missions providing shelter in the District along with several community mental health centers. There was not even a city agency with responsibility for providing. relief to the destitute and homeless. However, a small number of early ministries had begun to develop in order to assist the poor throughout D.C. Between 1967 and 1969,

Capitol Hill Group Ministries, Community Family Life Services, and Loaves and Fishes quietly formed, mostly as congregational ministries serving the needs of the city's poor and dispossessed. The Archdiocese founded the Spanish Catholic Center during this time as well, in an effort to provide support and services to newly arriving immigrants.

Monsignor John Kuhn, who, with several other clergymen, opened up his own home for this purpose, creating Anchor Mental Health as a day program for mentally ill. 18

Catholics have a particularly active tradition in Washington, supporting different

1 ministry opportunities throughout the 20 h century. In the 1930's and 40's, social activists from Catholic University began opening Settlement Houses in neighborhoods surrounding the university. Faculty members from sociology and nursing established these community houses with the financial support of the Archbishop to provide medical care and other assistance to African American alley residents in the northwest quadrant of

18 Brendan J. Reed, The Soul of Justice; 75 Years of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Washington (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Washington, 2004). It was only after Archbishop Hickey assumed leadership in I 980 thal Catholic Charities moved towards homeless services. Prior to this time, Catholic Charities had focused most of their efforts on children's homes and schools, resettlement programs for refugees, and parish support. 46

the city. 19 Committed to reducing poverty and racial segregation, these women believed in living in the community and being good neighbors, and would assist families when an emergency occurred. When a family member was evicted or someone was in trouble with the police, the settlement house residents were there to offer aid. They were even known to provide day camps, language classes and field trips.

During the decade of the 70's, several ministries formed out of St. Aloysius

Church on North Capitol Street, under the leadership of Father Horace McKenna. Father

McKenna was a progressive parish priest who dedicated his life to racial unity and service to the poor in his neighborhood. Given leadership responsibilities for the St.

Vincent de Paul Society, in 1968 he began to distribute leftover sandwiches every day that were donated by Winnie's Chuck Wagons.20 But without formal structure and organization, the St. Vincent feeding program had been struggling. Father McKenna soon joined with Veronica Maz, a sociologist from Georgetown University referred by

Father Dick McSorley to provide administrative support to the food program. With

Maz's assistance, they brought together several area religious leaders and formalized the neighborhood food program as So Others Might Eat (SOME) in 1970. Together with

Father Ralph Kuehner, Reverend Griffin Smith of Efforts for Ex-Offenders, Father Roger

19 Information on the Settlement House movement in Washington, D.C. was taken from Jenell Lora Williams Paris, "African-American Women's Activism and Ghetto Formation in a Washington, D.C. neighborhood" (Ph.D. diss., American University, 1998). http://proquest.umi.com.prox yau. wrlc.org/pqdweb?did=73445890 I &sid=2&Fmt=2&clientld=3 I 806&RQT =309&VName=PQD (accessed I August 2008).

20 John S. Monagan, Horace: Priest of the Poor (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1985), 117. 47

Gallagher and Father James Casey of St. Joseph's Church on Capitol Hill, Maz and

McKenna began serving hot meals to local residents in need.21

Father McKenna also set his sight on developing housing in the area, as he was concerned about the city pushing its poor into remote parts of Southwest Washington when the first public housing project was built. He intended to build a safe, secure, and comfortable low income housing community right in his neighborhood on North Capitol

Street. With the help of a local attorney and with the formal sponsorship of Gonzaga

College High School, Father McKenna established a housing project along North Capitol

Street in the 1970's. Father Geno Baroni added weight to the project and secured

Archdiocese support through Cardinal O'Boyle. Father Baroni also used his contacts on

Capitol Hill to obtain HUD approval for grants and loans to fund the project. Originally referred to as Northwest One, Father Baroni later gave it the name of Sursum Corda.22

To meet the needs of large local Catholic families, nearly half of the units were built with four to six bedrooms.23

Father McKenna continued to support and work with Maz throughout the decade, who handled the operations of their multiple ministry and nonprofit programs. McKenna also supplied vision and inspiration as Maz started Shalom House and the House of Ruth, which provided housing and shelter for homeless women.24 At the same time, McKenna

21 Ibid., 120-1.

22 Lawrence O'Rourke, Geno: the Life and Mission of Geno Baroni (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press. 1991 ). Father Baroni was later promoted to Monsignor.

23 Monagan, 114-15. Father McKenna was soft hearted and refused to turn anyone away or evict current residents. Not surprisingly, he had difficulty managing the project.

24 Ibid., 127-8. 48

continued his focus on the St. Vincent de Paul ministry in the basement of St. Aloysius

Church, providing emergency assistance and social space to people who were struggling in the neighborhood.

The Community for Creative Nonviolence Birth's A Movement

While parish ministries were forming and expanding around the city, The

Community for Creative Nonviolence (CCNV) pursued major political campaigns alongside its own services to the poor and homeless. Founded in 1970 by Father Ed

Guinan who was a Paulist Priest, CCNV soon became well known for its energetic and prophetic protests. Their organized struggles provided an outlet for hundreds of individuals to express their frustrations and concerns in creative ways. Born out of the activism and momentum of the anti-war movement and counterculture of the 1960' s,

CCNV members honed their skills and developed their style through initial efforts focused on the war and nuclear opposition. Father Guinan's early statement of purpose expressed his commitment: "to resist the violent; the gather the gentle; to help free compassion and mercy and truth from the stockades of our empire."25

Father Jack Wintermyer26 was the Chaplain at George Washington University

Newman Center and hired Ed Guinan as his assistant. Father Guinan had become active in the peace and justice movement and in a rented house near the university, the idea was

25 Rader, 56.

26 Interestingly, after Father Guinan opened a medical clinic on N Street and Father Wintermyer completed a PA program, Wintermyer went on to be a regular volunteer at that clinic in the late 1970's. Even though not a doctor, he would eventually become a medical outreach worker for Unity Healthcare and become affectionately known around the city as Dr. Jack. 49

formed that gave birth to CCNV. Guinan wrote the Paulist Council to establish a

"planned community," based on a poor and simple alternative lifestyle of service to others.27 Wintermyer recalled, "When Guinan wanted to move, I found them a house on

23rd street, where the new George Washington University Hospital now stands. They created a community house in that building." Guinan remembers a strong relationship to local college students: "We relied heavily on George Washington University for people and resources. We built CCNV around community values and nonviolence, with an educational thrust." After he received approval and "put the call out," Guinan was joined by six committed people from George Washington University. When activists met at the

Newman Center on campus and planned numerous protests, they attracted progressive radicals from all over the city. Some activities even drew the attention of the FBI, according to Wintermyer. There were rumors of a strategy discussion involving Phil

Berrigan and Liz McAlister of Jonah House, where members were discussing blowing up the steam lines at the Rock Creek heating plant at Virginia A venue and Beach Drive.

The plant supplied the government buildings downtown with heat. Guinan elaborates on political advocacy at that time: "You have to understand that wild ideas got discussed whether or not they were even plausible."

Radical Catholic clergymen were an important influence on the early development of CCNV. Fathers Dan and Phil Berrigan often protested alongside CCNV members as part of Jonah House, especially early in their history. Father Phil Berrigan started Jonah House with Liz McAlister, who was a Catholic nun at the time.28 Based in

27 Ibid. 28 Liz McAJister would eventually marry Phil Berrigan, after he left the priesthood. 50

Baltimore, they were a nonviolent community that emphasized peaceful political resistance. Both groups were committed to the same outcomes, though Jonah House focused more explicitly on international peace and nuclear disarmament.29 Despite disagreements over philosophy and practice, both groups "continued to offer political, personal, and even financial support to one another."30

Father Dick McSorley, a Jesuit from Georgetown University who served with

Father Horace McKenna for a time in rural Maryland, joined CCNV in 1970 and would often participate in CCNV protests. He was intimate with other activist priests, including

Father Guinan and the Berrigan brothers, who were well known for their anti-war protests and jailing after the Catonsville 9 incident. When Father McSorley requested that his superiors withhold his salary from the Jesuit community's annual gift to the University as long as ROTC was on campus, they responded angrily. Offended, they suggested he leave the Jesuit community. McSorley explained, "I wrote the provincial, Jim Connors, to ask if he would allow me to live outside the community, to send him my paycheck, and in return receive what I needed each month."31 He agreed and McSorley quickly became an active part of CCNV, remaining closely involved with them throughout the decade.

Father Guinan traveled often and spoke on peace and justice issues. Guinan was well read and familiar with peace and justice teachings from around the world. He was influenced by Dorothy Day and the radical Catholic Worker movement that promoted

29 While Jonah House did participate in actions centering on hunger and poverty, they preferred the Catholic Worker model for addressing these issues by bringing people into their community and Jiving together.

30 Ibid., 69.

31 Richard T. McSorley, My Path to Peace and Justice: An Autobiography (Marion, SD: Fort Kamp Publishing, 1996), 247. 51

social change through nonviolent resistance and communal living. Dorothy Day's hospitality houses placed a special emphasis on shared experiences, service and kindness to the poor. He was especially inspired by the radical stands taken by fellow activist priests, and even had connections to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

In 1972, the CCNV "community" rented a second house and others moved in.

This was attractive to socially concerned Catholics, though not all community members were Catholic or even Christian. Mary Ellen Hombs, a George Washington University student at the time, joined soon after participating in one of their weekly study groups. 32

Guinan, Hombs and others organized a summer retreat for religious activists at the Paulist

Retreat Center in Oakridge, New Jersey and invited many to join the CCNV community down in Washington, D.C. Guinan explains, "Young political activists stayed days or weeks. Liberal magazines covered the summer workshops and we got so much promotion that attracted droves of people. Young politically active people read about

CCNV. Others came internationally even, from Denmark, Sweden, and Germany." The movement gathered steam with their study groups, retreats, and invitations to live communally with like-minded social activists. Members gave up middle class privileges in exchange for an alternative, yet simple lifestyle. Eventually, there would be six core members of CCNV who contributed monumentally to its mission, and hundreds of others who contributed significantly through protest actions and service efforts. The core included Ed Guinan, Mary Ellen Hombs, Kathleen Thorsby, Harold Moss, Carol

Fennelly and Mitch Snyder.

32 Rader, 36. 52

Guinan and others were enriched by the best of liberal Catholic theology and progressive thinkers at that time. Guinan was moved toward local poverty issues after being inspired by activists he met at the Oakridge retreat center and after a stint in D.C. jail following an action of civil disobedience:

We held classes, workshops, and sessions on values. That's when we really started questioning. We were not really doing anything about poverty and misery in DC ... We would not be credible if we were not really doing the work to alleviate that misery. You can't be an advocate otherwise. Within two years we made a dramatic development towards core poverty issues in Washington.

Much of CCNV' s initial efforts focused on peace activism, nuclear disarmament and nonviolent education. However, the dramatic development in CCNV history came with

1 the establishment of Zacchaeus Soup Kitchen, a meal program on 9 h and New York

A venue that opened in 1972. Guinan invited others, including Kathleen Thorsby33 and

Claire Carmody to help get Zacchaeus Kitchen started. Thorsby saw an article in the

Catholic Worker News advertising for a "summer of peace" and was intrigued by the many well-known speakers who were planning to be there.

At the same time, Guinan also went to progressive Pastor John Steinbruck of

Luther Place Memorial Church to ask for space for their ministries on N Street, where the church held several properties. The church properties housed seedy commercial ventures that had become an embarrassment to the congregation. One year earlier, the Luther

Place Memorial Church Council had voted to tum the block of row houses they owned over to social justice and service ministries. Both Guinan and Steinbruck shared a commitment to what they considered a radical interpretation of the Gospel. Based on the

33 Kathleen Thorsby would eventually marry Ed Guinan after he left the priesthood and became known as Kathleen Guinan. 53

biblical mandate to provide hospitality, Luther Place was looking for a way to make use of one of its key resources, in this case property, to meet this mandate. According to

Steinbruck, "Programs qualified in three ways: it had to be a Gospel ministry, nonviolent, and it had to be accountable in a way that respected all. We brought the block together in the spirit of Matthew: 25 and CCNV fit in nicely." Father Guinan submitted requests for

Zacchaeus medical clinic, Zacchaeus hospitality residence for community members, a

CCNV office, and later Barabbas House, which was a community pretrial house for third party prisoner release while offenders awaited trial in D.C. All three proposals were approved by the church congregation.

Luther Place Memorial Church also gave space to Lutheran Social Services, the

Church World Service CROP campaign (Communities Responding to Overcome

Poverty), and established some of its own programs as well. Deborah's Place was a homegrown ministry that became a residential transitional program for homeless women sponsored by area congregations. Pastor Steinbruck and his wife Erna had such a strong commitment to collaboration that initially, referrals to Deborah's Place were only taken from a coalition of churches and admission was determined by the Board of Directors, which was made up of representatives of the seven member churches. Replicating a program he began in Pennsylvania, Pastor Steinbruck also established ProJeCt

(Protestant, Jewish Catholic), an interfaith coalition that provided emergency assistance to neighborhood residents and initiated a telephone social service referral program.

ProJeCt's programs eventually became Bread for the City and the DC Hotline 54

respectively.34 The church run ministry programs incorporated in 1974 as N Street

Village.

Renovation of the church-owned row houses occurred one by one, with work done by church volunteers, CCNV members and even the Seabees. Ministries that were given space at Luther Place paid rent at first but the fee was soon eliminated altogether.

Guinan went to a local church service and shared his plans for a medical clinic. Dr. Jack

Brezette contacted him the next day and agreed to provide medical services for his clinic.

Through a web of volunteers, particularly through George Washington University, they staffed the rest of the clinic and served the homeless and poor in the neighborhood.

Equipment was donated from a clinic that was closing in Newark so members drove all the way to New Jersey to pick up the items.

CCNV continued to grow exponentially in both mission and human resources.

According to Guinan:

Within a short period of time, we had 40 volunteer staff living with us, hundreds of regular volunteers and we were serving more than 300 individuals [daily]. Maybe one year later, we had another critical development. It was obvious that [the homeless] had no resources .... They were not heard. We thought our advocacy needed to develop for these folks because they don't have a voice. That became kind of our hallmark. That's when the rubber hit the road and sparks flew - when we criticized or made demands of the government.

It became obvious as they were moving in this direction, that people really needed a place to live, so taking people in became a common practice. Guinan believed that it was

34 The DC Hotline was originally named the ProJeCt Aid and Referral Center. It would eventually incorporate separately and transition over into a city-operated referral hotline. After relocating their offices to the United Planning Organization, they eventually became the city's shelter hotline, where people called in to report people in need of sheller or blankets or arrange for transportation to the city's shelters. Likewise, Bread for the City broke from ProJeCt, to be supported by another coalition of religious organizations called Emmaus. It eventually incorporated as its own agency, after merging with Zacchaeus Free Clinic, the medical ministry originally started by CCNV. 55

fundamental to take anyone, exactly as they were, wherever they were at emotionaJJy and psychologicaJJy. CCNV members discovered service needs while providing hospitality and Jiving in community with the people they served. An important part of CCNV' s organizing philosophy was integrating their commitment with the needs of the community without imposing their vision of.what people needed. At the same time, members were relating to two other influential individuals doing similar work in their neighborhood: Father Horace McKenna and Father Manny Moore. Father Moore ran a group home for boys in the area and Father McKenna would bring Pepperidge Farm bread over to CCNV from his own food distribution program. These radical religious activists shared services and networks with each other. But members like Kathleen

Guinan saw themselves as community organizers as opposed to social workers.

The CCNV community core continued to grow and their activities were situated within the context of the broader social justice movement around the country. People came from aJJ over, especiaJJy the War Resisters League in New York. Mitch Snyder was serving time in a Danbury prison for theft but was deeply touched by the Berrigan brothers, who encountered Snyder while they were incarcerated at the same time for the

Catonsville 9 incident. Together they organized a prison rebellion and anti-war marches in New York after Snyder's release. Snyder was then invited to join CCNV in 1973 by

Tom Ireland, who was also a fellow ex-offender from Danbury, to help with the Barabbas

Pre-trial House. The press that CCNV received for their activities and protests drew many new community members, like Carol FenneJJy. FenneJJy came from the Sojourners

Catholic Worker community and was writing for their magazine when she read of CCNV 56

actions. Harold Moss, like others, started as a volunteer with CCNV's service efforts and subsequently left a lucrative job at NIH to join the community.

CCNV formed around the concept of creating community, convinced that relationships were the only way to foster progressive social change. And when CCNV eventually took homeless individuals into their residences, the philosophy of living in community with others and establishing relationships translated well to helping individuals in need. Community living, while not always easy, was an important part the process of engagement and dialogue. It was fraught with tension but members believed it was essential. Harold Moss explains: "We share consciousness when we live together and struggle together. We develop creative ways of challenging the status quo and lovingly change the world." Education, reflection and action were integral to the philosophy of CCNV and woven throughout life within the community as well as through their involvement in political protests. Their unconventional philosophy also encouraged members to take action on their own set of values and at least in theory, respected the process of individual inquiry and growth. Doctrinaire politics were despised and by rejecting authority and organization, their anarchist attitudes created some dysfunctional consequences as well. Consensus was more of an ideal rather than a practice as each member was authorized to act as they saw fit.

Community living was not nearly as idyllic as committed members set out to create. As the movement had grown, it encountered internal problems. The splintering and tension between the different communities was sometimes evidence of their impractical structure. Community life was extremely fluid: people moved in and out, created new houses, closed residences, and began and ended campaigns almost at whim, 57

since there was a lack of clear authority and representation. Members recalled a lot of tension and splitting within the community to accommodate strong personalities and various factions. For some time, Snyder wanted to continue his anti-war activities and focus on international issues. Guinan continued his efforts on service, particularly as the war ended and also focused his efforts on domestic political campaigns. Snyder resisted this and was concerned that it would be even more difficult to promote social justice with the war ending if they moved toward charitable service.35 Guinan on the other hand, believed that prayer, service and resistance were essential to community viability and accordingly focused his political actions on domestic injustices. Consequently, the group decided they would start another house on Euclid Street in 1974, while the Guinan's remained on N Street. Fennelly, Moss, Snyder and Hombs moved to Euclid Street and would become the core leadership of that community house.

Though this created some confusion, for the most part both houses maintained an active community base of volunteers and financial support. At times both houses worked together and continued to go about business as usual. The N Street branch maintained a strong advocacy and political base even with the focus on services. Guinan engaged in civil disobedience over hunger issues with his "supermarket eat-ins" and describes the fun and creativity that became the hallmark of CCNV protests:

We called ahead and said we're on our way. [The supermarket] called the police, and the cameras were already there. We gave them a press release [explaining what we were doing.] We picked up the bread and served it out. They charged us with petty larceny but the juries in all 30 or 40 trials acquitted us all. It was kind of fun and it was the big bang that folks enjoyed.

3 ~ Rader, 65. 58

Meanwhile, Snyder became increasingly involved in high stakes protests. Though they had essentially become two different communities, they still operated under the same name and respected each other's differences. Snyder and Euclid House members started a painting company to support themselves while the N Street members initiated a print shop, which also helped those who were unemployed. The Collective Impressions print shop obtained contracts from groups like Eritrea Human Rights and even the Iranian

Student Association, which influenced N Street members' involvement in the global human rights movement.

CCNV and Euclid House Political Mobilization

After the Vietnam War ended, Snyder and Euclid House members continued to focus on other international causes until their lease expired on Euclid House and they believed they were going to have to move. For the first time they became aware of the lack of affordable housing and the huge percentage of boarded up properties. For this political community, such a reality prompted a shift in focus towards local issues, and homelessness in particular. Harold Moss states it this way:

I don't think that we were really passionate about helping the homeless. We were certainly compassionate about people suffering. But homelessness was the clearest leverage that led to dealing with more concrete problems like housing­ space that belongs to all of us. This came out of a real effort to change the society we live in. We rejected the pathological arguments [about the homeless]. Giving of myself and not my money was the closest way for me to not be a terrorist.

Political action emanated out of study groups and community debate. Each summer

Euclid House members planned a winter campaign, with established goals and strategies.

During the seasonal campaigns, fasting and media attention were a major strategic weapon. Participants conducted research on the tight housing market, the shortage of 59

affordable housing, the huge number of boarded up city owned properties, and the increasing number of evictions taking place. They reported that in 1975, an astounding

2300 family evictions took place.36

Prompted by this reality, the Euclid House community of CCNV initiated a campaign in 1977 to occupy and renovate an abandoned building to be used as a shelter.

They selected a boarded up city property nearby on Fairmont Street. The city relented, reluctantly and allowed the renovation by community members to begin on the abandoned house. One year later, in a dispute with CCNV, the city issued a stop work order and demolished the building for safety reasons. In the meantime, they opened up their living room on Euclid Street to homeless individuals and stepped in to stop city evictions when they could. The conflict with the city highlighted tensions within the community due in part to their loose structure and philosophy. Race and class were constant issues of turmoil for residents of the community, particularly after the community accepted homeless guests in its house and opened a Drop In Center nearby.

Recalls Moss, "Some others in the community couldn't deal with the pain and [people from] different worlds. This created problems. The community sowed the seeds of its own demise."

A ware of the growing need for shelter, especially during the winter months,

CCNV began to work on different levels to provide adequate shelter for the District's homeless residents. During the winter of 1977 and 1978, CCNV at Euclid House sent out letters and called 1100 religious institutions but only one agreed to open its doors to the homeless. It was Luther Place Memorial Church, where Ed Guinan and CCNV's service

36 Rader, 70. 60

ministries had already been given space. Luther Place opened up basement space in their church for an emergency shelter and CCNV helped staff the shelter. CCNV's commitment and involvement in Luther Place was the start of Luther Place's extensive social service ministry and continuum of services. During the next winter, CCNV repeated their requests to churches and congregations around the city and again Luther

1 Place responded along with St. Stephen's of the Incarnation, another church on 16 h street. Carol Fennelly and CCNV member Lin Romano helped run The Refuge, the women's shelter at Luther Place, and others ran the men's shelter at St. Stephen's.

Guinan was also working with Community Action Coalition, an organization in which students from Georgetown University volunteer to work with the poor in DC. The students had a van and began hypothermia outreach, checking public spaces around town for homeless men and women. Guinan recalls how they were received by people who lived outside: "Those that used to stay on the street would ask us, 'Are you one of the paid lovers? You know the ones they pay to love us?' Well, we knew we weren't getting paid a salary so we had a lot of credibility. They asked us if we were going home to the suburbs but we lived in the community." Guinan's engagement with street bound homeless individuals illustrates the significance of community relationships and living simply for CCNV members who were involved this work.

CCNV initiated a major campaign against Holy Trinity Catholic Church in

Georgetown, which was embarking upon a major $450,000 renovation. Snyder and

Fennelly were invited by Colman McCarthy, a parishioner and Washington Post columnist, to attend mass at Holy Trinity. He introduced them to Father James English, who welcomed them and praised their work at the mass. When they heard about the 61

renovation campaign, Snyder felt strongly that there were more important and appropriate things to spend the congregation's money on. CCNV appealed to them with vague demands to designate a significant amount of renovation funds to serve the homeless and also to donate to CCNV specifically. The church leadership would not budge, arguing that they were already generous to homeless causes and that they were being blackmailed by Snyder. Snyder, Fennelly, and others met with the clergy, had people appeal on their behalf and attended multiple church meetings to resolve the dispute. Finally, they leafleted the congregation and disrupted services to bring attention to the issue and pressure the church to concede. In a letter to the congregation, CCNV responded to claims that they were overly manipulative and confrontational, illustrating their poetic gift to dramatize the plight of the poor:

Our impatience is a product of or proximity to those in need. Their voices are urgent, harsh, abrasive, demanding. The voice of the poor is as urgent as an empty stomach, as immediate as the need for shelter on a cold winter's night. The voice which you hear coming from s may not be pleasing to your ears, but it is authentic. You can continue to listen to each other, or you can listen to the voice of need. The choice is yours. 37

Though construed as manipulative, CCNV tactics did stimulate contemplation and dialogue amongst the congregation and surrounding community. People tried to respond thoughtfully, but were deeply conflicted with CCNV's approach. In a letter regarding

Snyder's total fast on Christmas Eve, CCNV wrote: "While we realize that not all of our friends are in complete agreement with the course of action that we have chosen as a community, we believe that everyone has a responsibility to act on this issue in the way

37 Colman McCarthy, "A Bitter Church Conflict on Help to Poor," Washington Post, 20 August 1978,CI. 62

that their conscience leads them."38 After long discussions and negotiations, the Parish

Council declined to modify their plans any further, despite a well-publicized fast by the community and a second total fast by Mitch Snyder. For CCNV, this was a costly campaign that lost them local and internal support. Many left the community while tensions between N Street and Euclid House members worsened. Former member Steve

Cleghorn objected to the secretive tactics of the group's inner circle, who in the case of the Holy Trinity fast hid Snyder away from public view. Members also suspected that this was a coercive effort to obtain a large sum of money in response to the failure of the

Fairmont Street renovation. But with Colman McCarthy writing about this issue in the

Post, this was CCNV's first major publicity campaign and offered a certain amount of credibility. Through this effort, Snyder established fasting as a major political strategy, and one that earned a fair amount of public attention. Fennelly commented on this tactic:

"You use your body as a prayer for interventions ....We always called that equalizing the dialogue. On the other side of the table is money, power, the police. On our side we have our freedom, our health and our lives, and we have to put all of that on the table if we hope to equalize the dialogue."39

Emergency Shelter and the Politics of Prophetic Protest

Community fracturing did not slow Snyder down. In an effort to publicize the homeless predicament and to bring attention to the need for better quality shelters with increased capacity in the city, Snyder and a wheelchair bound community member named

38 CCNV leaflet, 28 December 1978. 39 David Montgomery, "A Protestor's Precarious But Firm Stand; Activist Goes Out on a Ledge for New Homeless Shelter," Washington Post, 24 December 2004, CJ. LexisNexis [database onlineJ. 63

Anne Splaine moved to the street for a few weeks. This too became a strategic tactic for

Snyder, but one that also earned him a fair degree of credibility amongst both the homeless and their advocates. This move generated further sympathy and media attention while it signaled a political turn towards organizing around emergency provisions for the city's most needy. Seizing the opportunity, Snyder set his sites on the newly renovated National Visitor's Center. CCNV contacted the Department of the

Interior for permission to use the Center as a shelter. Surprisingly, they were given tacit permission to occupy the National Visitor's Center for demonstration purposes but without a guarantee of how long the homeless guests would be tolerated.40 Meanwhile, city officials remained quiet as Mayor Marion Barry was preparing to take office for the first time and behind the scenes, established dialogue with CCNV to find alternative sites.

By this time, there were a handful of small, private shelters and the city-run Blair shelter. Blair had been recently opened by the Department of Human Resources after it closed a smaller shelter on C Street in order to accommodate twice as many men. CCNV staged the occupation of the National Visitor's Center for media purposes in November

1978 and vowed to stay until the city relieved the overcrowding in the shelters. The numbers of homeless guests never reached the thousands that CCNV hoped for and illuminated the risk of such highly controversial measures. The Post reported that several regular residents at Blair Shelter, which was only a few blocks away, went to the

Visitor's Center because of the relaxed admission requirements while others left Blair

40 Rader, 1 16. 64

because they were told that the city shelter closed when the Visitor's Center opened.41 In fact, Pastor Steinbruck of Luther Place accused members of trying to shut down Luther

Place's Refuge shelter in an attempt to force women to go to the National Visitor's

Center.42 A media battle ensued between public officials and CCNV over the growing concern with the occupation. After 10 days, CCNV and its guests were locked out of the

Visitor's Center, spurring civil unrest amongst community members and outside supporters. Both contingents of CCNV participated. After blocking access to the building and offering to transport homeless individuals free of charge to other city run shelters, the dispute ended in the arrests of CCNV members insistent on making their point.

Conceding, the city negotiated with CCNV members and agreed to a 30-day experiment whereby the city shelters would relax their restrictions in hopes of coaxing more homeless individuals into shelter and tum over shelter operations to the private sector, which would be supported by the city with food and other supplies. The newly elected Mayor Barry also appointed twenty-seven church and community activists to serve on an oversight committee to monitor problems in the city's shelters. Chaired by

Reverend Don Bruce Lowe, it included members of CCNV and the larger community of advocates.43 When House of Ruth refused to negotiate changes to their admission policy, the city also decided to open up a women's shelter on C Street. CCNV reluctantly

41 Paul W. Valentine, "Street People in Visitor's Center Vex U.S.; Street People in Center Have Interior Dept. Upset," Washington Post, 7 December 1978, BI. LexisNexis [database online].

42 Pastor John Steinbruck to Lin Romano, 20 March 1980, courtesy of Luther Place Memorial Church archives.

43 Paul W. Valentine, "Barry Backs Small Shelters, Centers for Street People," Washington Post, 15 February 1979, B4. LexisNexis [database online]. 65

agreed to operate the women's shelter in exchange for the city providing food and supplies. The thirty-day experimental period ended with cordial negotiations between the city and homeless activists. The oversight committee recommended a comprehensive, decentralized and smaller shelter program for the entire city, focusing on opening shelters in downtown areas where people congregated already. The city agreed to keep Blair

Shelter at a maximum of 150 residents and open Pierce School as an overflow shelter.

They also committed to opening up the former shelter on C Street as a central pickup point for transportation to other shelters in the city.44 Finally, they agreed to eliminate screening procedures in order to attract more to shelter.45 In the Mayor's announcement, he declared that the same twenty-seven members of the oversight committee would be appointed to a new advisory commission, which would implement the decentralized shelter program.46 The Mayor surprised CCNV members when he announced that the city would also turn over staffing Pierce shelter to CCNV, once again promising material assistance in exchange for shelter management.47 In the same speech, Mayor Barry declared shelter a basic right and acknowledged the city's responsibility in providing this for its residents.

Shelter management was tough for the community to take on. Snyder was combative towards providers and often confronted them about taking a paycheck for

44 Paul W. Valentine, "City Agrees to Provide More Homeless Shelters; City to Ease Shelter Restrictions," Washington Post, 16 December 1978, DI. LexisNcxis [database online].

45 Mandatory screening procedures included giving one's name and social security number, as well as de-lousing and showers. Lessening the requirements was not without controversy however, as several providers explained that some of those procedures were in place for the safety of all of their overnight guests. Even the homeless complained about the conditions in the shellers otherwise.

46 Valentine, "Barry Backs Small Shelters, Centers for Street People," B4.

47 Mary Ellen Hombs to supporters, undated, courtesy of Luther Place Memorial Church archives. 66

doing their work. In principle, CCNV did not accept government money; nor did it partner with government agencies. They resisted bureaucratization and structure due to their anarchist philosophy. Though they stated outright that it was never their intention to work with the city in any way, nevertheless, they ended up doing so when they committed to make.Pierce a model shelter. Because of overcrowding and inadequate resources at Pierce, after about one month, CCNV took over the nearby Lenox School to supplant the space shortage. Overwhelmed and burnt out, CCNV quickly turned both operations over to homeless residents themselves. Ending the partnership, the city promptly took back control of the shelters. Meanwhile, at the C street shelter, CCNV staff were told that residents would have to leave. The city had plans to demolish the building and build an embassy at that location. CCNV subsequently moved the women to a small row house on M Street. Threatened with eviction yet again because of conditions at the M street shelter house, the community engaged in another series of civil disobedience actions. The city relented and agreed to renovate the house but turned it over to private operation.

1 By 1980 there were several large District run shelters, including Blair at 6 h and I

1 Streets, NE and Pierce Shelter at 14 h and G Streets, NE, which were both for men. In addition, House of Ruth ran a women's shelter under contract with the city at 1O'h and G

Streets, NE and there was a family shelter at Hartford Street, SE. The homeless found that they were refused shelter if they were intoxicated, or oftentimes just for being mentally ill. The smaller women's shelters generally offered better conditions and the low barrier city shelters would accept those who could survive in them. Despite plans to tum over operations to private organizations and decentralize the city's shelters into 67

smaller, humane operations, implementation of these ideas never materialized. When the city finally tried to close several large shelters without suitable replacements, CCNV protested. As a result of the city's budget crisis, Mayor Barry announced plans to close the shelters at Blair and Pierce with only 48 hours notice.48 He had already closed a family shelter in Southeast while.another residence for homeless families, the Parkside

Hotel, was largely vacant due to renovations to bring it up to code. CCNV took the city to court with the help of National Housing Law Project attorneys Florence Roisman and

Ilene Jacobs, filing on behalf of the men who stayed in the shelters. While CCNV activists were hardly cooperative with the city, this would only be the beginning of a long period of poisoned relations. They broke up one of Mayor Barry's news conference by reminding him of his broken promises. In retaliation, their Drop In Center was raided, alleging that the community was harboring criminals.49 Shortly thereafter, journalist Neil

Henry came out with a series in the Post detailing the brutal treatment of homeless individuals in city run shelters.50 The CCNV case against the city, Williams v. Barry meant that the shelters stayed open for two more years by court order, until ultimately, it was decided that "if the men had an opportunity to submit written comments before the closing, the requirements of due process would be met."51 By the time the case was

48 See Rader, 134; Mary Ellen Hombs, "Reversals of Fortune: America's Homeless Poor and Their Advocates in the 1990' s," 115. Rader reported notice to be 72 hours.

49 Rader, 135.

50 Neil Henry, "In D.C., Raw and Threatening Things; Some Derelicts Spurn the Popcorn Found in D.C. Shelters; A Bum in Washington Had to Learn Quickly to Beware of Popcorn," Washington Post, 4 May 1980, Al. LexisNexis [database online].

51 Hombs, "Reversals of Fortune: America's Homeless Poor and Their Advocates in the J 990's," 115. 68

resolved, both shelters remained open anyway because of the enormous need for shelter beds.

CCNV Regroups

As a whole, the community was stretched very thin and lacked the support it once had since the first Holy Trinity campaign but membership and support would wax and wane throughout their existence. The Euclid House contingent of CCNV was in total chaos after several months of huge losses: their Fairmont Street Shelter was destroyed, they occupied and were locked out of the National Visitor's Center, they lost the Holy

Trinity Campaign, and they took control and then ceded operation of several city shelters to homeless residents. Euclid house was barely managing to run the drop in center, hospitality house, and soup kitchen.

Even the N Street branch was facing a controversial eviction for their ministries by Luther Place Memorial Church. By the end of the decade, tensions between Ed

Guinan, CCNV residents, Pastor Steinbruck and the Luther Place congregation were insurmountable. The Pastor felt he had to answer the concerns of the congregation but

CCNV refused all requests for documentation of their programs:

Ed saw us as the Christian establishment. He felt he was doing us a favor but we felt we were doing him a favor too by providing the property and support.

CCNV held internal meetings and it was clear that it was no longer a democracy. Ed had that kind of control. [Members] started questioning the responsible use of funds. They would make public appeals and get large sums of money. But they weren't a non-profit so there was no accountability with the money. Ed was controlling it all and there was no accountability, no records and he never had to report on anything. We felt this thing was going to blow up. 69

When the church suggested that they leave, CCNV was not happy. They said 'If you want us out, then sue us.' We thought we were being generous and decent - and to get that kind of a response? Finally we had to get a lawyer.

The church moved to formally sever relations in 1977, but conceded several times to negotiate with CCNV in order to continue valuable services to the community. They did not want to displace homeless residents or risk the potential media backlash if they evicted CCNV. In fact, lawyers warned the church of the likelihood of a protracted media battle and theatrical protests if they went to court to legally remove CCNV. Two years later, both sides had vacillated on multiple occasions in the negotiations. Luther

Place Memorial Church was willing to permit the legal and medical clinics to stay but argued that they needed use of the building that Ed Guinan was staying. The church suggested the other remaining programs submit separate proposals for approval but not under CCNV's name. Guinan refused to participate in the negotiations, feeling personally attacked and instead began issuing press releases critical of the church. Father

McSorley wrote of the dispute, "Consensus had broken down. Most of the community members were in favor of staying even if Ed and his family had to leave. The division showed itself in many forms. People from each one of the three houses tried to meet the mail carrier first with the hope that there might be checks in the mail that they could cash."52 Ed Guinan felt differently:

It was obvious from the beginning that the church pretty much wanted to take control of operations, of our thrust. It was a control issue. Another Lutheran pastor said to me, 'Don't have any confusion about their agenda. They're going to take credit for the program.'

52 McSorley, 251. 70

At one point, [a prominent] foundation called and stated that they were giving us $25,000 for [CCNV's programs]. The church was getting money for this but never put it into the program. We told them we don't want and don't need it. These things kept happening.

At the same time, the medical clinic that began as a ministry program of CCNV was concerned that they would be evicted along with the rest of the community and was in their own dispute with Guinan. He refused to let Zacchaeus Medical Clinic incorporate under a separate name, citing their founding and obligations to CCNV. The doctors and nurses operating the clinic sent a letter to the Pastor for consideration and eventually, direction of Zacchaeus Medical Clinic was turned over to the volunteer doctors and nurses. In a letter to Pastor Steinbruck, they requested that the staff govern the operations of the clinic and to be able to fundraise for the clinic.53 The church subsequently welcomed them to stay.

A year and a half after initiating official court proceedings, Ed Guinan and the

CCNV community on N Street agreed to move out. Four months later, Guinan was still dragging his feet and the remaining programs on N Street felt he was intentionally holding up the property. In May 1979, the combined ministries of N street, including the

CCNV programs, sent an appeal to Guinan to follow through on his word to vacate in order to free up much needed space for other services. The church subsequently learned that the Guinan's had moved out a month earlier without notifying anyone. The N Street

53 Zacchaeus Free Clinic medical staff to Pastor John Steinbruck, 30 July 1977, courtesy of Luther Place Memorial Church Archives. 71

branch of CCNV dissolved after the Guinan's left and started St. James House, providing hospitality to homeless seniors.54

Conclusion

Throughout the city, there was a generation of radical priests, clergy and activists formalizing their efforts to promote fundamental social change, many of whom went to jail, risked their lives and made significant sacrifices for their faith and commitment to

social justice. They participated actively in other movements, demonstrating and living

out their conviction and conscience regardless of the issue. They saw the necessity of

enlightening others, shocking people from their comfort zones and pressing for major

social change. They were fiercely committed and uncompromising, abrasive and

unapologetic, whether orientated towards social service, social change or both. Many felt

like Harold Moss, that charity without justice was oppression, and actively lived out that

philosophy every day.

CCNV organized protests were a natural outpouring of generational discontent

and concern for growing poverty and homelessness. During CCNV's much publicized

campaigns they brought attention, concern and legitimacy to the plight of homeless

individuals. While the homeless movement grew and new services formed, CCNV was

also becoming more internally divisive and fractured. Experiments with homeless

resident leadership failed repeatedly. Despite such setbacks, some tangible results were

54 Staff members of the D.C. Hotline. Zacchaeus Hospitality House. Barabbas House, Luther Place Memorial Church, WISH, Bonhoeffer House, Bread for the City, Corner House, Deborah's Place, and Emmaus Services for the Aging to Ed Guinan, I May 1979, courtesy of Luther Place Memorial Church Archives. Though the N Street branch of CCNV dissolved and most of its members moved on, Ed Guinan would continue to use the CCNV name congruently with Euclid House for four years until he closed St. James House. 72

accomplished. They set the stage for a new kind of activism in Washington and through their fracturing, they also created room for a broad range of mobilization efforts. CCNV grew more sophisticated and confrontational in strategy and yet, had vast levels of support, despite how conflicted people felt about their tactics. Perhaps most importantly,

CCNV proved that they could mobilize massive amounts of people for their causes and fostered a model of organizing based on volunteer advocates, many of whom were students. They sought inspiration and guidance through navigating local and national radical catholic activist networks as well as tapping into progressive political thinkers, all of which influenced their service, politics and protests actions.

CCNV was not the only group committed to these issues but they cannot be discounted from the influence that they wielded on the larger community during this decade. People were impacted through direct participation in collective actions and were encouraged by the growing momentum surrounding the issue of homelessness. CCNV' s radicalism left little room for complicity with the government; they were fundamentally anti-establishment. They saw their role explicitly in terms of pushing the government, private organizations and individuals to do something. Others were much less confrontational and preferred a more reasoned and measured approach to social change.

Regardless of which angle they came from, pious advocates had little to fear; they had

God on their side.

Outside of a couple of organizations contracted by the city, most agencies relied upon the generosity of their volunteers and constituent donors. Services were entirely based on volunteer labor, whether congregants, faithful community members, committed social justice types, or leftovers from the 1960' s. There were no budgets for 73

professionals or paid staff, so groups made creative arrangements to cover such things as room and board for volunteers. Volunteer "houses" were an interesting development during this decade. In 1973, Luther Place Memorial Church opened one of the properties they owned to house long-term volunteers in exchange for their service. This was the start of what would become formally known as the Lutheran Volunteer Corps. Two years later, Mount Olivet Church opened up a similar residence for Jesuit Volunteers.

Thus, the movement fulfilled the immediate needs of homeless men and women, while offering a progressive outlet for socially committed individuals.

Throughout the decade, other organizations spawned out of church based ministries to offer a hodge-podge of services: the DC Hotline for emergency referrals,

Deborah's Place and N Street Village were housing and social service ministries of

Luther Place Memorial Church; Community of Hope was a medical ministry of

Washington First Church of the Nazarene; Bread for the City was a clothing and food ministry supported by a coalition of five area churches known as Emmaus Fellowship

(which included Luther Place Memorial Church); Hannah House offered housing run by a Catholic order of Carmelite nuns; and the Dinner Program for Homeless Women was meal program begun with primary support of the First Congregational Church. As programs expanded at Luther Place Memorial Church and moved out in search of larger space, the church experimented with other ministries, including Isaiah Hospitality House, which provided refuge for prostitutes as well as Abraham House, which provided housing for Indochinese refugees. Ed Guinan left CCNV and started St. James House, another hospitality house modeled after the Catholic Worker Houses that supported many elderly and disabled homeless. Finally, with the help of Post columnist Colman McCarthy's 74

wife Mavourneen McCarthy, Kathleen Guinan opened a day program for homeless women called Rachel's Women's Center. In response to the influx of Spanish speaking residents into the District, several programs formed to meet Latino-specific needs, including Andromeda for medical services, Ayuda for legal assistance, the Latin

American Youth Center and Eofula Spanish Senior Center. Eventually, these would become staples in the social service system for the growing population of Spanish speaking homeless. All told, these were mostly crisis driven services that met the immediate needs of those on the street. Ideas about eliminating the crisis altogether were still in their infancy and leaders began to emerge, but there was little organization or city­ wide leadership.

Little by little, the District's religious community filled the great material needs for its homeless and poor residents in the biblical spirit of caring for the stranger.

According to Ed Guinan, "The religious community was pretty dormant in the beginning but would become a huge factor as it was drawn in. It took on a significant role. This was only a handful of years after MLK passed. This had an incredible influence on our lives." Though there were a lot of religiously oriented people involved, some say that not everyone was doing it out of an explicit sense of spiritual commitments or spontaneous religious conviction. Pastor John Wimberly concurred: "Churches had a spontaneous response to the problems and needs of the city. Churches kind of got it together eventually. We had 30 people a day asking for money for food and we wanted a more comprehensive response. There were so many homeless ... Most churches closed doors, but a few did respond." Select pastoral leaders, clergy and congregations were struck by the severity of need and the incapacity of the government to respond accordingly. Thus, 75

the homeless movement was born out of pioneers and charismatic leaders like the

Steinbrucks and McKenna who graciously filled the gap alongside their congregations.

Leadership from area congregations added legitimacy and credibility to anti-homeless efforts, in addition to adding local level pressure for more comprehensive assistance.

The city for its part was doing very little except to deny the claims of homeless advocates that there were individuals staying outside. Later, they resolutely insisted that the few city-run shelters created towards the end of the decade were not dangerous and overcrowded in contrast to what was being reported in the community. But homelessness wasn't going away, and this only fueled the expansion of dramatic protests in the next decade. CHAPTER 3

THE HOMELESS WARS: PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY AND OFFICIAL

RELUCTANCE IN THE 1980'S

One problem is that even in the best of times, and that is the people who are sleeping on the grates, the homeless who are homeless you might say, by choice. - President Ronald Reagan1

"We hire everybody who complains about the city. There are no independent advocacy groups in this city." - City Council Finance Committee Chair John Wilson 2

After Ronald Reagan's presidential election and the conservative leadership takeover in Congress, major social service cuts impacted local jurisdictions across the nation. Communities and their leaders were forced to come up with their own solutions and protests escalated as the country reacted to draconian federal policies. Because of both local and federal intransigence towards escalating social problems, private non- profits developed an extensive homeless service system and shadow industry to address the growing need. Local providers worked creatively to fill the void left behind shrinking federal and local budget cuts. Meanwhile, government officials debated first about whether there was actually a significant homeless problem and second about whose responsibility it was to provide for their care. The numbers of homeless men and women

1 Mary McGrory, "Praying for Victory; RELIGIOUS," Washington Post, 5 February 1984, DI. LexisNexis !database online].

2 Harry S. Jaffe and Tom Sherwood, Dream City: Race, Power, and the Decline of Washington, D. C. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994 ), 181.

76 77

were always a subject of significant controversy, and before official enumeration

attempts, population estimates were wildly disputed.

Locally, Washington was averaging one dozen hypothermia deaths each winter

season. People were outraged by the sudden numbers of homeless individuals on the

street and the horrific deaths that resulted. And yet, both President Reagan and D.C.

.. Mayor Marion Barry volleyed over responsibility, officially denying homelessness was a

problem and insisting that those who stayed outside were there by choice. By the time

the problem could no longer be ignored, Reagan refuted advocates claims that it required

national attention and spumed Mayor Barry, who also denied local responsibility for the

growing number of individuals on the street. Barry would invoke D.C.'s colonial

political status under partial home rule and the racial politics between D.C.' s black

administration and the white federal government as justification for his intransigence on

this and other issues. It was the beginning of a political power struggle between local and

federal officials in which each would eventually flip positions on multiple occasions,

according to what was the most politically expedient at that time. Finally, even when

federal aid was forthcoming, Washington and other localities around the country still

struggled with human needs that far outstripped federal assistance levels.

Though homelessness has been part of American history for more than two

centuries and it has changed form over time, Kusmer reminds us that such severe and

visible destitution has never really gone away.3 Following post-World War II economic

expansion and prosperity, homeless had retreated from public view and had been largely

3 Kusmer. 78

contained to skid row neighborhoods of municipalities. Even if contemporary estimates seemed unfathomable, they did not compare to the widespread post-industrial homelessness that Americans experienced at the turn of the century. Concern mounted when, for the first time since the Depression, homeless individuals began appearing on the street in large numbers in the late 1970' s, and ballooned during the recession of .

1981/1982. The problem continued to grow, despite the economic recovery period that followed. 4 Kusmer's research confirms this trend, that once homelessness becomes an issue, the numbers of individuals experiencing homelessness do not go down over time, even during periods of economic recovery.

It is important to note that historically, the characteristics of the homeless population have not been all that different from both the homeless and the general population during other historical periods. 5 Their presence and visibility following the unprecedented destruction of SRO' s, "skid rows," and other forms of urban renewal though left many feeling uneasy. The numbers of severe mentally ill and addicted suddenly appearing on the street and in the shelters certainly shocked community residents and providers. De-institutionalization was nearly complete at St. Elizabeth's

Hospital in D.C. and severely impaired men and women began appearing on the street in new proportions. Initially, shelters had been serving predominantly single, middle aged

1 men and women. For example, when the Evangeline Hotel was sold at 14 h and K

4 Blau.

5 Kusmer. 79

Streets, NW, women who had stayed there most of their lives were suddenly forced out.6

The Evangeline was a boarding house for young, single women just out of school, many of whom came at the tail end of the Roosevelt administration from small towns just west of D.C. Excited about the opportunity to work, they were recruited by the federal government as low-level clerks. The Evangeline existed to preserve the virtue of young women and the night manager insured that men were excluded from the premises, which was the only way that parents would consent to letting their daughters come to

Washington. A number of these women stayed for decades and were ill prepared to start over or to return home after being in Washington for most of their lives. After the hotel was sold, the small women's shelters were serving some of these women who were displaced. In the small network of shelters, they had to share space with those who were recently discharged from St. Elizabeth's Hospital for the mentally ill. By the end of the decade, homeless providers started seeing a greater percentage of folks who were mentally ill, especially young people who had never been institutionalized but were still very vulnerable. More than likely, these folks would have been hospitalized if the former mental health system were replicated. Finally, a new epidemic hit the streets: crack cocaine was becoming increasingly popular, and it did not spare the people living outside. These historic changes in the homeless population resulted in the beginning of a professionalized service industry as providers and volunteers tried to address peoples' very real and significant needs. Eventually, this would significantly enhance the quality of services that programs offered.

6 I am grateful to Diane Doherty for graciously providing me with these little known details about the Evangeline Hotel. 80

During the decade, the response to the homeless crisis was primarily at the local level and faith based. It took the form of mostly emergency assistance at the behest of desperate advocates from the religious and non-profit communities. Cities responded by opening large barracks like warehouses for the poor and in D.C., these shelters were mostly located in old schools.7 Hopper summarizes homelessness in this time period:

Appearances may have suggested otherwise, but what the country glimpsed on the streets and in the shelters in the l 980's was not some new species of disorder, but the usually hidden face of poverty, ripped from its customary habitat. 8

Thanks in part to the seclusion of seedy skid rows in cities around the country, Americans were spared daily interactions with the severely poor until those areas were demolished to make way for gentrified development. Their sudden and inescapable visibility once again put communities on alert. Activists accepted the challenge and organized political resistance expanded tremendously during this decade. Initial advocacy efforts around the country and in D.C. focused particularly on the right to shelter9 but also included community integration efforts, and the fight for affordable housing.

Legal advocacy and political street theatre were major strategies during this time but far from the only tactics. Advocacy efforts spanned a wide spectrum, from disruptive measures like mass demonstrations, protests and marches to education in the form of documentation, research and publishing. There was more than enough room in the agenda to accommodate different styles, strategies and issues as public officials at all

7 Talmadge Wright, Out of Place: Homeless Mobilizations, Subcities and Contested Landscapes (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).

8 Kim Hopper, Reckoning with Homelessness, 176.

9 Maria Foscarinis, "Homelessness, Litigation and Law Reform Strategies: A United States Perspective;" Hopper, Reckoning with Homelessness. 81

levels mostly resisted advocates' demands. Concerned activists, many of whom were students, volunteered in droves, and even drafted legislation, lobbied, and testified on behalf of the homeless poor. 10 According to Mary Ellen Rombs, early legal advocacy

around the country focused on recognition of the problem and reform measures. 11 It included efforts to restore rights and insured that the rights of the homeless were employed consistently, applied existing laws and government commitments to new

classes of people (i.e. homeless individuals), and created alternative services for the

homeless outside of the mainstream social service system. This last effort was

particularly endemic in Washington, as volunteer advocates mixed politics with service to

the poor and created a vast social assistance structure. Around the country, advocates

were taking up the call to establish and protect services for homeless individuals. Rombs

wrote "legal strategies covered everything from a right to shelter claim to challenges to

intake requirements, due process, shelter standards, status offenses, a right to treatment

with housing as a component and homeless prevention as a basis for action." 12

Later in the decade, local level advocacy shifted to the national level through

litigation and legislation demanding federal action on homelessness. 13 With the passage

of the McKinney Act in 1987, federal money was set aside for homeless services,

bolstering private nonprofit programs in D.C and resulting in the incorporation of

volunteer and congregation-based programs. A byproduct of privatization and

0 ' Hopper, Reckoning with Homelessness, 111.

11 Hombs, "Reversals of Fortune."

12 Hombs, "Reversals of Fortune," 115.

13 Foscarinis, "Homelessness, Litigation and Law Reform Strategies: A United States Perspective." 82

government outsourcing was the professionalization of the industry beginning in the

1980's and extending into the 90's, which greatly expanded quality and niche services for a population with increasingly specialized needs. For the first time though, programs began to rely on grants and contracts for operations. Those two changes signified the beginning of the institutionalization of homelessness as agency managers began to be very attached to their programs and missions, investing heavily in both. Activists focused on political advocacy balanced with charitable service, and by the end of the decade, many core members of CCNV moved on to experiment with creating their own organizations. For many involved, no matter what level you were at, it was clear that direct service had to be balanced by political activism and everyone needed to be a part of producing solutions in some way.

Pressure for greater services and professional expertise continued to emanate from the spiritual, service, and volunteer communities as people looked for effective and creative ways to manage the crisis. Early advocacy and social service networks spawned local coalitions addressing homeless issues around the country as well as efforts to document and educate the public and officials about the nature of the problem. 14 In D.C., multiple advocacy coalitions formed, the largest of which were the National Coalition for the Homeless, the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless and the Women's Shelter Providers, to improve coordination and address city-wide needs, either by creating new programs or through direct political action. There were even commissions on "homelessness" at both the local and federal level of government and there were two Congressional hearings on

14 Hombs, "Reversals of Fortune," 113. 83

the subject, and indicator of the issue's increasing political significance. 15 Broad coalitions grew and coordinated advocacy meant that there were strong, diverse voices in the community. On the other hand, the result was a patchwork of services and platforms that lacked the benefits of a uniform, broad based policy agenda that could comprehensively address the city's needs. Consequently, coalition building was often subject to factionalization and fragmentation.

CCNV weaved in and out of these campaigns, bringing others in as necessary and collaborating on major local and national political campaigns. Masters at political mobilization, they were able to involve major national figures and rely upon a national network of activists in addition to a large local volunteer base who were willing to do just about anything. What is unique about Washington is that D.C. was such a hotbed of activism that it attracted socially concerned activists from around the country and the

CCNV community in particular was a huge draw. By partnering with other advocates,

CCNV succeeded in prompting both the local and federal governments to act, first with a

Right to Shelter law and later with several major pieces of federal legislation. CCNV could be polarizing and divisive at times, and their involvement was often far from seamless. Members found balance difficult between personal, political and public service as they went through many internal growing pains. But by the end of the decade, CCNV and others lost a major battle in the homeless war: Washington would also have the reputation of being the first jurisdiction to have the right to shelter overturned in a second referendum as public support waned and the cost of sheltering the homeless skyrocketed.

15 The First Congressional Hearing on Homelessness in America was held in December of 1982 and the Second Congressional Hearing on Homelessness in America was held two years later, in January of 1984. 84

The expansion of homeless movements around the country was not uniform, but what conditions made this period ripe for widespread social unrest? Given the historical context, what made homeless activism thrive, fragment and change during this time?

Coordinated advocacy and coalition building was a priority during this decade, but in the end proved difficult with the number of divisions developing. How did the various political groups evolve and what made them (individually or collectively) choose to cooperate and comply or confront and disrupt? And finally, what motivated or demobilized activism and coalition building?

Local Service Providers Build a Service Network

Following the national trend, response to the homeless crisis was primarily met by private, nonprofit philanthropic organizations, especially religious groups. Historically, this has always been the case, with the exception of the New Deal and War on Poverty programs. 16 But public policies beginning in the l 980's encouraged the expansion of charitable groups and nonprofits dedicated to direct service. 17 Consequently, the l 980's brought a major growth of assistance programs in the District as new agencies emerged or expanded to fill the void of services to the homeless poor. These new programs significantly enhanced the sparse social service system that existed and bolstered publicly funded resources. Recent research notes that the private social service sector has the advantage in initiating new ideas and processes, birthing movements, providing research

16 Cooper.

17 Robertson, "Piety and Poverty: The Religious Response to the Homeless in Albuquerque, New Mexico;" Walch, The Shadow State; Rebecca Anne Allayhari, Visions of Charity: Volunteer Workers and the Moral Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Martha Burl, Laudan Aron and Edgar Lee with Jesse Valente, Helping America's Homeless: Emergency Shelter or Affordable Housing? (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 2001). 85

and analysis, and even developing public policy. Evidence also suggests that non-profits tend to support local interests, monitor government activities and coordinate different sectors towards common goals. 18 In addition to these benefits, private groups have saved the District government billions while carrying out government-mandated functions.

In contrast to prior historical periods, aid to the homeless took on a much more humane and less punitive form. Between severe municipal policies and private charities oriented towards reform and punishment, the contemporary network of groups stood out in contrast. 19 Local homeless services grew from narrowly providing emergency food and shelter to spanning a wide spectrum of services including transitional housing, respite care as well as medical and mental health care. Concerned advocates understood that there were few places for people to go in order to break an addiction or maintain recovery afterwards. They also understood that it was difficult to escape street life without supportive and flexible services, like laundry, showers, and transportation assistance.

Others recognized that some people would only come inside if safe and dignified settings were available. Therefore, homeless services evolved to meet a broader array of needs.

But perhaps most importantly, it became clear that a one-size-fits-all approach would be inadequate and inappropriate.

During this decade, the homeless and poor populations of D.C. began to change in other ways and the community responded accordingly. Civil wars in Central America in particular prompted a growth in the number of refugees in the area, and the need for bilingual services became apparent. The Council of Latino Agencies (CLA) was created

18 Cooper, 131-2.

19 Kusmer. 86

when the executive directors of several Latino social service organizations got together and established CLA as an umbrella group to address the comprehensive needs of Latinos living in D.C. The Central American Resource Center (CARECEN) joined Ayuda in providing direct legal assistance to Latinos in transition with a special emphasis on protecting the rights of refugees from the Central American wars. La Clinica del Pueblo was established to provide bilingual medical care and Mary Center offered services to

Latina pregnant women and their infants. There existed in D.C. an array of social services for Spanish speaking individuals, including medical and mental health care, legal assistance, youth programs, and even a senior center.

The community continued to establish traditional services to meet the basic needs of Washington's poor and homeless alongside more creative ventures. With the influence of Father Horace McKenna, Veronica Maz opened Martha's Table to serve meals and after school snacks to neighborhood youth who were struggling. Martha's

Table eventually began a mobile a street side meal service for homeless around the city and named the program McKenna's Wagon after the inspiration of Father McKenna.

Salvation Army began a late evening meal distribution program called the "Grate Patrol."

D.C. Central Kitchen offered their own creative solution for hunger relief: nutritious meals prepared by formerly homeless culinary students using recovered food from local political events. In fact, they gained notoriety for recovering food from the presidential inaugurations. For several years, the Salvation Army also operated a 24-hour hospitality and social service center for the homeless. Hannah House opened first as an emergency shelter and later as a transitional housing program for women. People responded to the 87

city's needs as they presented themselves, doing their best to fulfill their roles thoughtfully and empathically.

Progressive Catholics called to serve the poor and dispossessed supported the movement in a variety of ways. Continuing the strong Catholic Worker tradition in D.C.,

Michael Kirwan founded.several new Catholic Worker Houses in the area during the

1980's.20 The national Catholic Worker movement was founded in part by Dorothy Day decades earlier and Catholic activists were regularly visited by Ms. Day when she was in the area. Members agreed to take a voluntary vow of poverty while living in close proximity to the poor. Early in the decade, Kirwan first opened up a house on 4th and

Florida A venues, NW and later moved to 1305 T Street, NW as the Llewellyn Scott

Catholic Worker House of Hospitality.21 He also founded the Mary Harris Catholic

Worker House of Hospitality for Women at 939 T Street and was able to purchase a farm in West Virginia to be used it as a place for rest and recovery for D.C.'s homeless, though it had no formal "program."22 As a result, there were extensive opportunities for the larger Catholic community to put their faith into practice either through direct service, political action, or through financial support.

Hospitality houses in the Catholic Worker tradition and formal Catholic Worker houses remained popular for community activists seeking ways to balance their politics with meaningful opportunities to impact individuals in need. Kathleen Guinan opened up

20 Colman McCarthy, "He Daily Served A Disguised God," National Catholic Reporter, 24 December 1999. Kirwan was a pacifist who linked militarism to poverty and went to the Pentagon weekly to pray the Rosary.

21 The Llewellyn Scott Hospitality house opened in 1986 and existed up until a few years ago.

22 Colman McCarthy, "Michael Kirwan Dies; Catholic Worker for Washington's Poor," Washington Post 13 November 1999. 88

Rachael's Women's Center as a hospitality house after both she and Ed Guinan left

CCNV. This began with an invitation into her home for women living on the street for a nightly meal and then inviting pregnant women who were homeless to stay with her.

Guinan secured a group home formerly operated by House of Ruth at 11th and R Streets and transitioned this house into a day program for women. At the time, there were no places for women to spend the day, much less find therapeutic space. When Bill and

Sharon Murphy left the N Street CCNV community, they opened Mary's House for homeless Latino families in Washington, D.C.

Medical and mental health services developed steadily during this time as well, in an effort to meet the complex needs of people living on the street. Community

Connections was founded as a community mental health clinic while So Others Might

Eat (SOME) opened a medical clinic that included psychiatric services, as well as showers and clothing assistance. In 1985, Christ House opened a residential medical program modeled as an intentional Christian community, serving the medical needs of the homeless in D.C. CCNV also expanded their services to the street bound in their neighborhood. They opened the Victor Howell Infirmary across the street from Euclid

House for individuals to stay while they recovered from major illnesses and minor surgeries.

Building on the success of Luther Place and their residential programs for homeless women, other organizations began to experiment with various forms of

"transitional" housing as well. Salvation Army opened Turning Point, a small four unit transitional housing program for homeless families. New Wave Recovery opened its 89

doors in 1987 in the CCNV shelter as a residential recovery program for men.23

Recognizing the need for flexible arrangements while people got back on their feet, agencies often provided rooms rent-free or at significantly reduced levels. Transitional housing would eventually frontline as a major social service strategy for homeless assistance. Physically, the layout was often in the style of Single Room Occupancy

(SRO) housing with private rooms and shared common areas that offered some measure of privacy in addition to aspects of communal living. Gradually, these replaced the notorious skid row housing units that fell victim to urban renewal at record numbers, but were never restored at the levels that predominated in earlier decades.

SOME experienced tremendous growth during this time, adapting their specialized services to address specific needs of the poor and homeless as they changed over the decade. Homeless men and women needed places to go not only at night but also during the day, particularly during severe weather. Consequently, specialized housing that targeted specific subpopulations expanded alongside drop in centers. Over time, the drop-in centers evolved into formal day programs with therapeutic components and supportive services. SOME's Dwelling Place began first for as a residence for low- income working women, and then reopened as a senior center and a shelter for abused elderly. Isaiah House offered a day program for mentally ill, while Joshua House was created as a transitional employment residential facility. Finally, Shalom House opened as a Single Room Occupancy (SRO) residence. Their commitment to filling in gaps in

23 The space was donated by the District government. New Wave Recovery would later become Clean and Sober Streets. 90

services was self-evident as their mission blossomed under the guidance of Father

Adams.

Catholic Charities adapted to the changing times under Archbishop Hickey's leadership, shifting towards specialized services for the region's immigrants, refugees and poor residents. They began offering a range of services to the city.' s needy through the Refugee Services Center, the Archdiocese Legal Network, McKenna House

(transitional housing for men), Mount Carmel Place (for homeless pregnant women in recovery), the Missionaries of Charity Gift of Peace (for HN/AIDS victims), and the

Martin Luther King men's trailer shelter that opened at the end of the decade in Southeast

D.C.24

The faith community continued to be active in providing for the city's residents, as this decade became the pinnacle of progressive faith based involvement. Samaritan

Inns was founded out of members of the Church of the Saviour for housing and recovery.

They established Mozart Place and Fuller Street Transitional Housing, which were both for homeless men recovering from addictions. Later, they launched the Harvard Street

Inn, a transitional housing program for pregnant women. Samaritan Ministries was created out of St. Stephen and the Incarnation church as well as eleven other Episcopal

Churches to provide a range of supportive services to those in need. On the other side of the city, Georgetown University and the Georgetown Clergy Association established the

Georgetown Ministry Center to provide social services to homeless individuals in their neighborhoods.

24 Reed, The Soul of Justice. 91

Churches who were active in the homeless movement received an unexpected benefit from their efforts by reviving congregation membership and attracting a new base of volunteers. This in turn expanded support for their growing ministries. Pastor John

Steinbruck explained: "The homeless saved Luther Place. It gave them a reason to be.

House by house, we developed N Street as a statement with a biblical theological rationale to welcome the stranger. This made Luther Place a light to the city so that you can see visually the difference that faith makes." Pastor John Wimberly shared Western

Presbyterian Church's similar experience:

Four months after I got here, in fall of 1983, we began serving meals out of an old 1 church nearby on 20 h Street. I spent 3 three months preaching from passages about hunger. The congregation cautiously supported this effort. We would prep the meals at Western Presbyterian, put them in styrofoam containers and distribute food from that old church. This bought us time to display the model and prove that the homeless would not destroy the building, and also create buy-in [amongst church members]. But we knew it would stop if we didn't run the breakfast program out of our own church. After the demonstration project, we voted at a congregation meeting to make plans to move it [back to Western Presbyterian]. With the feeding program, our church started to grow, especially with younger members. Luther place had exactly same experience.

Father John Adams was at SOME and encouraged Pastor Wimberly to open up Miriam's

Kitchen breakfast program while Cooperative Urban Ministries provided an evening complement in the form of a mobile dinner service in the area. In the Foggy Bottom area of the city where the church was located, there were a high percentage of people sleeping on the street and the congregation wanted to provide space for people to go first thing in t h e mommg. to warm up an d eat a nutritious . . mea I .25 -

25 Miriam's Kitchen takes 1hat responsibility seriously and provides a complete nutritious breakfast for the homeless in the Distric1 with an all-star chef and a solid core of volunteers. 92

Luther Place was busy growing their ministries during this time as well. During the decade, they expanded and refined their ministries to the homeless and poor in their own neighborhood. After parting with CCNV, they used the space of row houses to experiment with other ministry programs, adapting to the changing needs of the community over time. They opened Sarah's House and Carol Holmes House to house homeless women, Abraham and Wallenberg Houses for Indochinese refugees, and later reopened Wallenberg as a shelter for mentally ill women. Through their networks with other clergy and congregations, they expanded shelter beds for women around the city as well. They opened up a shelter in northeast D.C. at St. Peter's Church and even negotiated with the city to provide transportation to the shelter from the Dinner Program for Homeless Women. Local synagogues, though not publicly recognized, were intimately involved in the development of residential homeless services, particularly through their relationships with Pastor Steinbruck and Luther Place Memorial Church.

Luther Place Memorial Church also opened the parish hall for a daytime Senior Center, called Oasis, in conjunction with Emmaus Services for the Elderly and the Washington

Urban League. Bread for the City's services grew to be so vital when their clientele tripled. As a result, they were overwhelmed and needed more space to keep up. During this time, they opened several satellite distribution centers in other parts of the city for food and clothing assistance.

Ema Steinbruck, Pastor Steinbruck's wife, opened Bethany's Women's Center in

Mount Vernon Methodist Church as a day program for women. But the church only hosted them for about a year before the congregation rebelled. Pastor Steinbruck recalled

Ema's return from the contentious meeting with the church: 93

The president stated, 'We have a problem. Our women have to walk around the homeless people on their way to work. Do we need to continue to cast our pearls before swine?' Ema was so upset. She felt it was such a perversion of biblical text. So she just stood up and said 'I take back our request to house the homeless here,' and she left.

Luther Place Memorial Church committed to find space and Bethany's moved to the corner house, where Father McSorely had been operating St. Gregory Catholic Worker house. The row house was small and not ideal but it would be home to the women needing a place to stay during the day until the church would be able to renovate their program space. Father McSorely left soon after to start another local Catholic Worker

House in Rock Creek.

Such extensive operations required massive amounts of volunteer labor, especially during the formative years for local nonprofits. The ranks of volunteers were bolstered by active student groups at local university campuses as well as various service corps organizations such as the Lutheran Volunteer Corps, the Jesuit Volunteer Corps, and the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA). Especially during this time, they provided countless hours of assistance and invaluable services that would otherwise not have been an available. At the same time, sole reliance on charity and volunteers can also be problematic.

Historically, charity has been understood in the context of a gift relationship that reaffirms the virtuous positions of giver.26 According to Stern, the welfare rights movement of the 1970' s inverted the nature of the charitable relationship once welfare advocates demanded rights. The massive volunteer response to homelessness, with its

26 Mark J. Stem, "The Emergence of the Homeless as a Public Problem," Social Service Review 58, no. 2 (June 1984): 291-301. 94

emphasis on direct service effectively re-established the gift relationship, with gratitude, docility, and comportment as a measure of worth. According to Curtis, social and cultural tensions between volunteers and clients get amplified in voluntary organizations.27 Stein takes the culture of charity a step further and argues that gratitude becomes a form of currency in exchange for charitable services that are not really free at all.28 Poppendieck too asserts that the "ideology of volunteerism obscures the fundamental destruction of rights."29 Charitable efforts confirm the "moral order of society" and keep people in their place. Stein suggests that this cancels one's right to protest as complaints are routinely translated into ingratitude. This is especially problematic .because charity already creates the ideal that people "get something for nothing."30 Thus, the swelling popularity of volunteer efforts during this time was fueled in part by changing perceptions about charity and aid to the less fortunate, though many volunteers during this time also engaged in direct political actions and protests. Local universities with strong activist traditions were an easily tapped into resource and substantially supported social justice activism.

With the changes in the homeless population and their attendant needs, so too did the providers' response to the problem. Gradually, volunteers began to be replaced by paid staff, who would eventually be replaced by specially trained professionals - and this

27 Curtis, "Urban Poverty and the Social Consequences of Privatized Food Assistance."

28 Michael Stein, "Gratitude and Attitude: A Note on Emotional Welfare," Social Psychology Quarterly 52, no. 3 (1989): 246. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/2786719 (accessed 13 February 2002).

29 Poppendieck.

30 Stein. 95

too would significantly impact services to the homeless as well as the activist movement.

As we will see, neither model was without its attendant challenges. The trend to replace volunteers and activists with trained specialists resulted in narrower, more specialized organization missions that did not always support the broader social justice focus. It also fueled misconceptions about the causes of homelessness as providers moved in the direction of treating the individual problems they found in the homeless population.

What on the one hand seemed like a natural and welcomed direction, would later make a significant difference between eradicating homelessness and managing it. In fact, Baum and Burnes argued that advocates were manipulating the homeless agenda by inappropriately focusing on housing instead of the debilitating conditions that many homeless face - based on their experience as local service providers in Washington,

D.C.31 However, while the former is more significant in preventing homelessness, both have to be addressed in order to alleviate existing homelessness.

Academic Attention to Homelessness

The sheer numbers of homeless and their visibility on the streets in the 1980 prompted research that explored various themes and theories. Academics contributed to the trend in focusing on the characteristics of homelessness as research expanded during this time in order to illuminate the nature of homelessness and sensitize the larger public about the challenges facing individuals living on the street. Ethnographic scholars who did not situate their analyses within larger political economic questions of homelessness did not necessarily emphasize individual pathologies but nevertheless left the impression

31 Baum and Burnes. 96

that it was these conditions which were the sole cause of people's homelessness. Early anthropological and sociological literature explored what it meant to be poor and living on the streets, how people define and distinguish, or categorize themselves, how they cope, survive, adapt and resist their circumstances, and included rich histories of individual journeys into homelessness.

Discussions of unattached men ushered in dynamic research on homelessness. 32

James Spradley lets "insiders" speak for themselves in his epic work on alcoholic men in the 1960's.33 He describes in intricate detail the rite of passage "tramps" pass through when "making the bucket" (i.e. incarceration) and also creates a typology of the different kinds of tramps. Spradley points out that repeated institutionalization changed individual self-perceptions and affiliations and that it was not the drinking that was threatening the public but the rejection of middle class norms that was most alarming for the community.

Spradley concludes that the criminalization of public drunkenness was taking a huge toll on the community that was worthy of re-examination.

Similarly, Snow and Anderson create a typology of street people, beginning to examine street life in the 1980' s from the perspective of the homeless themselves, distinguishing for instance, the "recently dislocated" from the "traditional tramps" or

"bums."34 Snow and Anderson document these self-ascribed categories to better

32 See for example Liebow, Tally's Corner.

33 James Spradley, You Owe Yourself A Drunk: An Ethnography of Urban Nomads (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).

34 David A. Snow and Leon Anderson, "Identity Work Among the Homeless: The Verbal Construction and Avowal of Personal Identities," American Journal of Sociology 92, no. 6 (May 1987): I 336-1371. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/2779840(accessed I March 2003); David Snow 97

understand survival mechanisms and patterns of adaptation. In so doing, we glimpse their creativity and resourcefulness and how individual decisions are organized by the social order people live in.

Successive ethnographies built on this foundation, documenting the nature of homelessness and people's experiences, and exploring specialized populations within the homeless community, thus adding analytical depth and reminding us that these individuals are not a homogeneous group of alien "other." Unfortunately, despite efforts to the contrary, many scholars still left the impression that these individuals were in fact wholly apart from the rest of humanity, indistinguishable by their localities or from other homeless communities. While Jennifer Toth's Mole People contributes to our understanding of underground communities of homeless people living in the subway tunnels of New York City, it lacks the critical analysis that would have propelled it beyond "thick description."35 Journalistic in its enterprise, it provides an incredulous and almost voyeuristic look at how people survive in a way that is easily construed as inhumane.

Addictions research often focusing on youth drug culture and street life, began with Michael Agar's Ripping and Running.36 Later ethnographies authored by Williams,

Anderson and Bourgois contributed to subcultural studies involving young minority

and Leon Anderson, Down on their Luck: A Study of Homeless Street People (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

35 Jennifer Toth, The Mole People: Life in the Tunnels Beneath New York City (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 1993).

36 Michael Agar, Ripping and Running: A Formal Ethnography of Urban Heroin Addicts (New York: Seminar Press, 1973 ). 98

males, crime and race. 37 Each includes critical analysis of the dynamics of social marginalization and exclusion. These works explore the consequences of political and cultural disinvestment in inner cities and yet present a somewhat sensational or stereotypical account of urban street life. Anderson sets out to illuminate street life in two large urban centers, often involving the drug trade and poor, young black males but effectively contributes to the perception of this population as a culture apart from human society. Differences in location, race and even gender become superficial and easily transferable labels. Readers are thus left with the notion of the city as the center of moral decay and pathology. Alternatively, scholars have argued that the very situation of homelessness creates "underclass" institutions and fosters the pathologies of addictions and violence. 38 While the homeless have conditions that need to be treated, these pathologizing labels can be deceptively distracting.

Much research during the initial phase of homeless scholarship focused on what was considered the "new homeless" or women, children and large numbers of individuals with physical or mental disabilities.39 Rachel and Her Children presents a bleak look at homeless families in New York and the extreme bureaucracies that women with children endure in order to receive services. Kozol highlights the frequency with which children

37 Terry Williams, The Cocaine Kids: The Inside Story of a Teenage Drug Ring (Massachusetts: Addison- Wesley, 1989); Elijah Anderson Anderson, Streetwise: Race, Class and Change in an Urban Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Elijah Anderson, Code of the Street: Decency, Violence and Moral Life of the Inner City (New York: WW Norton, 1999); Phillipe Bourgois, In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

38 See for example Jonathan Kozol, Rachel and Her Children (New York: Crown, 1988).

39 For an examination of female homelessness throughout history, see Kusmer; J. Passaro, Men on the Street, Women in Their Place: Homelessness, Race and Family Values (New York: Routledge, 1996); Stephanie Golden, The Women Outside: The Meanings and Myths of Homelessness (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). In fact, homeless women are not a new phenomenon. 99

are removed from homeless parents, the traumatizing, dehumanizing institutions families are forced to confront that he argues make well people sick, as well as the impossible chances of making it out successfully because of daunting institutional barriers. Citing

New York as his example, Kozol critiques the cold callousness of policies and practices that imperil children in what he describes as the game of human pinball.

Similarly, Liebow examines how women remain "human" in the face of inhuman conditions and portrays the difficult life women have on the street, as well as the strength they demonstrate to survive.40 The theme of dehumanization and stigmatization runs throughout research in the latter part of the twentieth century. Waterston investigates single, mentally ill women in a New York City housing project, highlighting the impacts and experiences of poverty, race, institutionalization, work and personal choices.41

Through life histories, or "historias," she critiques the mental health system and provides some insight into the ways in which we distinguish ourselves from individuals whom we consider culturally or morally bereft. Waterston argues that the very conditions of homelessness exacerbates the experience of suffering. Further, she argues that while necessary, "treatment" does not address the political economic causes of their suffering - it only serves to further pathologize their condition and stigmatize them.

Traditionally, ethnography has focused on thorough characterizations of homeless life, in part to contradict negative stereotypes and generate community understanding for the challenges one may face while living on the street. Leaving larger analytical

40 Liebow, Tell Them Who I Am.

41 Alisse Waterston, Love, Sorrow, and Rage: Destitute Women in a Manhattan Residence (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999). 100

questions unanswered, overly romanticized scholarship in effect contributed to the public perception of disability and vice. Consequently, many are left with the conclusion that it is the disabling condition (mental illness, drugs, promiscuity, etc) that in fact perpetuates poverty and creates the homeless condition. Golden adds that the "pathological behaviors" that so many are concerned with today have in fact been present throughout history in American communities (except perhaps for drug use) and so argues that medicalization theories cannot fully explain the large numbers on the street during this time period.42 Subsequent ethnographies written in response to this trend point out that these ethnographies only reinforced stereotypes, increased public discomfort and unnecessarily exacerbated safety concerns. Probably most significantly, the focus on disabling characteristics draws attention away from broader systemic issues and elides opportunities for communities to effectively combat homelessness.

Early Coalition Building

In 1980, an ad hoc coalition that included the Interfaith Conference (IFC), the

United Planning Organization (UPO), and several Hunger Task Force members worked to bring the Women, Infant Children (WIC) program to Washington, D.C. WIC was identified as a solution to high rates of infant deaths and was one of the first priorities to come out of a hearing that group members participated in. This was a time of major federal social service cuts and Congress had also cut the federal Food Stamp program drastically. Under Reverend Dr. Clark Lobenstine's leadership, the IFC pushed hard for the District government to submit a suitable application for the federal WIC grant and

42 Golden. 101

even helped the city write it. When the federal government was prepared to give the city money for the program and added some stipulations, the city balked. Unfortunately, federal officials were not budging either. Coalition members capitalized on the clout of religious leaders, recognizing that their influence on government officials made a real difference. The IFC brought both local and federal members of the government together to resolve their differences and succeeded in bringing WIC to Washington, D.C. Four months later, the group launched the Capital Area Food Bank with forty sponsoring organizations who all committed to the nutritional health of low-income residents in the region. Based on similar models around the country, founding members recognized that such a program was invaluable in D.C.

This would be the first of several major efforts of the Interfaith Conference, which was established just a few years earlier to bring faith communities together towards building a more just community. Their reputation and ability to generate results through trust, cooperation and dialogue made them a respected partner in the homeless movement, particularly as relations between people involved in the activist community soured over time. Through several decades, the IFC and Reverend Lobenstine in particular, established their role as a neutral, but committed partner, able to bring parties to the table when people were not willing or not able to talk to each other.

Given their reputation, it is not surprising that in 1979 Ema Steinbruck and several other providers approached Reverend Lobenstine about developing a coalition of homeless service providers. Ema was concerned that there was not enough trust amongst the group to establish cooperation on their own. Homeless supporters maintained very strong opinions of what was wrong and what was needed to resolve the situation, which 102

did not lend itself well to cooperation. Reverend Lobenstine agreed to take the project on and secured funding to hire two people to survey providers and develop the alliance. The

IFC held a conference to launch the idea after 18 months of preliminary work leading up to the establishment of the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless.43 The D.C. Coalition was an association of emergency shelters, service providers, community organizations, religious congregations and concerned individuals "working to secure adequate human services ... to the homeless population and break the cycle of homelessness."44 More than half of all homeless providers at that time attended and participated. Support was forthcoming from those who were not involved, except perhaps for Mitch Snyder, who attended only to decry their efforts since they did not start with homeless people first.

Through research conducted by IFC staff with all 61 homeless providers in existence at the time, they found that there were several issues of potential collaboration, including volunteers, advocacy, public education, and dialogue. The D.C. Coalition included in their priorities public and non-profit advocacy, research, and coordination of programs.

The IFC continued to provide staffing and fundraising support for six months until the organization spun off on its own. For four years, until the group became a direct service provider, most providers and volunteers involved in homeless services participated. The

43 The D.C. Coalition for the Homeless is not affiliated with the National Coalition for the Homeless or the New York Coalition for the Homeless. Coalitions of providers, advocates and officials formed around the country under the same name and took on various functions according to locally specific needs.

44 John Hannay to Pastor John Steinbruck, 23 January 1983, courtesy of Luther Place Memorial Church Archives. 103

D.C. Coalition even spawned a women's shelter in December 1983, and after operating it for nine months, they convinced Calvary Baptist Church to take over the program.45

One of the most significant accomplishments of Reverend Lobenstine' s efforts was the establishment of a healthcare network. Healthcare providers saw the need to collaborate about patients in order to arrange follow up or referrals for specialized care and also to pool resources in order to coordinate mass donations of supplies. The IFC hired a nurse intern from the Cathedral Volunteer Corps and together with Dr. Janelle

Goetcheus, a well-respected healthcare advocate, they organized the network of doctors willing to service the needs of the poor and homeless. Local clinics serving the uninsured collaborated around patient advocacy and patient referrals. At the same time, Cardinal

Hickey from Catholic Charities was starting the Catholic Healthcare Network (CHCN), and was even more successful getting Catholic doctors in the Archdiocese to sign up.

But because they would not work with clinics that had anything to do with abortions or birth control, both referral networks existed in tandem for a brief period. After two years, the Catholic Healthcare Network agreed to work with all clinics in the District, and the

CHCN assumed leadership of both networks under the leadership of Catholic Charities.

Organizers even collaborated with several hospitals in the area that agreed to accept patient referrals from the Network for major medical procedures.46 Little by little, community leaders filled the vacuum left by the lack of government leadership and publicly funded resources.

45 It subsequently became an independent non-profit under Calvary Women's Shelter.

46 History of the Archdiocese Healthcare Network taken from Brendan Reed The Soul of Justice: 75 Years of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Washington. 104

Pastor John Steinbruck was also committed to building broad, interfaith coalitions to address social justice issues as much as his wife Ema was. ProJeCt, which brought together Protestant, Jewish and Catholic congregations to provide assistance to the poor, was just one example of his interfaith efforts. He believed passionately in what he too called the "synergistic effect" of collaboration, networking and building relationships ..

"We would pull congregations in here, there and everywhere to get these things accomplished." His early commitments to persecuted Soviet Jews and human rights causes earned him respect in the Jewish community and also opened the door for collaboration on local poverty issues. Pastor would participate daily in vigils at the

Soviet Embassy, and stand in for Jewish protestors on religious days to draw attention to persecuted Jewish prisoners. As a result of cultivating these relationships, many Jewish congregations were active participants and financial supporters of Luther Place ministries, sharing Pastor's profound commitment to social justice.

Building on momentum from the 1970's and concern for a broad range of social justice issues, the Luther Place congregation was active in a wide range of causes under

Steinbruck's leadership. Local leaders like Steinbruck worked hard to make Washington a place of refuge for all people, especially society's cast-a-ways. A founding member of the Sanctuary Movement, the church was one of only five founding churches in the nation to provide sanctuary to Central American refugees, particularly from El Salvador.

Refugees were kept inside the church, near the sanctuary so that if they were raided by

INS, church officials could be there with them in support. Pastor's commitment to peace and social justice extended in other ways. He was even arrested for entering an arms fair held at a Washington hotel and refusing to leave, in protest of the nuclear arms buildup 105

and U.S. military policies. Gaining access using his Navy identification card from his

Chaplain days, Steinbruck "went booth to booth asking how many people does this kill?"47

For many of these organizations, advocacy was part of everyone's responsibility,

and it was incorporated into roles at all levels, particularly for those programs that

evolved organically out of the homeless movement. Brian Carome remembered writing

his own job description for the position of the Director of Advocacy, a job created for

him at the Mc Kenna Center. Michele May started in the small women's shelter opened

by the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless: "In the decade that I spent at Calvary [Women's

Shelter], it was always part of the organization's mission to do advocacy. It was

personality based, coming out of the leadership at the shelter. I was supported well in my

many roles there and had a lot of time to do it." Many religious traditions supported

organizing around social justice issues but it typically depended on where the emphasis

was within the church. Mt. Carmel House women's shelter was founded in 1981 by two

Carmelite Sisters of Charity, Sister Maria Mairlot and Sister Rosa Alvarez. Celeste

Valente was a former staff member at their women's shelter:

Mt. Carmel very much encouraged advocacy. These Carmelite women religious were from Spain and came to work with Hispanic immigrants here in the U.S. They were protesting and getting arrested at the Capital around the Central American wars. It is a very active tradition. They became involved in homeless issues [by volunteering at Luther Place]. This was not just charity but justice for them. They went directly to the Bishop and asked for the building ... for the shelter. You just didn't say no to those women religious.

47 Judith Rosenfeld, "John Steinbruck: The Shepherd in Combat," Washington Post Magazine, 15 December 1985, 11. 106

The building was a former convent at St. Mary's Church in Chinatown. Sister Rosa and

Sister Maria would talk women into staying at the shelter who were living on the street, taking in women that other shelters might not. They engaged these isolated women patiently but persistently, and Mt. Carmel House became a reputable place of sincere dignity and respect.

Perhaps the most extraordinary part of this model program was their commitment to social justice and political advocacy, balanced by their commitment to acts of service.

Not only did the nuns at Mt. Carmel House strongly encouraged advocacy, but they engaged in it themselves while running the shelter. In the beginning of her career, Linda

Kaufman volunteered at St. Stephen's Church, where one of the original congregation based shelters was created. She explains how she came to appreciate the significance of incorporating both service and advocacy:

When I was at St. Stephens, we were very committed to these "acts of mercy" but one congregant approached me one day and asked "what about social justice so you don't need acts of mercy? What are you going to do to change it so that acts of mercy are no longer necessary?"

People were thus compelled in various ways to think beyond their experiences about the larger context of what they were doing. At that time, there were no professional advocate positions. In fact, it was expected that volunteers and providers would participate in the networks of coalitions and political campaigns as an important part of their social service responsibilities.

During this time, the women's providers in particular were very active. Around

1983, the heads of seven local shelter providers got together with Erna Steinbruck and 107

organized a coalition they called the Women's Shelter Providers (WSP).48 The shelters were already in communication with each other regarding specific client issues and so it seemed natural to develop a group forum to discuss broader concerns, but in a focused setting. Their intention was not only to coordinate assistance but also advocate for the city to expand and improve its services. Sister Maria Mairlot, one of the founders of Mt.

Carmel Place chaired the Women's Shelter Providers and noted the supportive aspect of these coalitions:

We had to get together as advocates. The work was so intense. Night after night we weren't getting anywhere. Just giving them shelter didn't solve their problems. And we were just living their problems. Through shared experiences, we helped each other. We were involved in protests and contacted the newspapers .... That's the only way we could tell the government how bad the situation was. But they knew it was a problem.

The Women's Shelter Providers efforts focused on the things that made a difference to shelter residents, particularly mental health care in the District, hypothermia risks, and social service entitlements. They also focused more broadly on improving the quality of services and getting the city to respond to service needs in general. Interestingly, several advocates recalled that the men's shelter providers did not participate in these coalitions.

"Women were focused on quality services. The men's providers were not in the same place," recalled Celeste Valente. Michele May elaborates on a possible cause:

There weren't as many advocates among the men's providers. There tended to be a smaller number of larger providers who relied on big government contracts. They were contractors like the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless that served a large

48 As best as can be determined, the founding members included Calvary Baptist Women's Shelter, Sarah's House and Bethany's Women's Center at Luther Place Memorial Church, Miriam's Place, Mount Carmel House, Hannah House, and Rachael's Women's Center. Sometime in the mid-1990's the Women's Shelter Providers changed their name to the Women's Service Providers be more representative of its membership. 108

number of people for the cost.49 The staff had limited expertise or training. These contractors were not as mission driven to link people to services as they were to shelter large numbers of people.

Those that did participate valued what Sister Maria reiterated as the "synergistic strength" of working together but there were detractors like Mitch Snyder who was more known to blow up at these meetings "rather than suffer through the solutions."50 However, although advocates knew that they had to work together if they were going to get anything accomplished in Washington, there was never quite consensus on what approach to take or ultimately, who should bear responsibility for the needs of the homeless and poor.

Advocates involved with the Women's Shelter Providers (WSP) at the time felt that the group was successful in enhancing services for women in particular. They were active in generating new ideas and programs to meet the service needs of the District's homeless women. Once the Mayor's Commission on Homelessness was chartered by

Mayor Marion Barry, the Women's Shelter Providers proposed to the Commission that members of WSP administer a year round shelter at the Bundy School (at 4th and 0

Streets) and that the board for that new organization come out of their group. They tried to work with the city and pressed the Office of Emergency Shelter and Support Services

(OESSS) to provide transport between the scattered site shelters and the meal programs for women. WSP participants developed a thoughtful plan that addressed major service

49 The D.C. Coalition for the Homeless became a shelter provider after about four years, ceasing its function as a coalition for advocates and providers.

50 Pastor John Steinbruck, interview. 109

gaps in the city titled the "Comprehensive Approach to the Problem of Homelessness."51

The plan called for the use of the Perry School for entry-level shelter and maintenance care for older mental ill homeless individuals, a day program for women, as well as intermediate level shelter and secondary housing. Through a proposal they submitted to the Board of Education, WSP actually secured the Perry School but discovered that it required substantial renovations. In addition, in order to implement the program there, they would need the city to pay for the rent of the building through federal reimbursements, which proved difficult.

The Women's Shelter Providers were successful in establishing two new programs for women: New Endeavors By Women (NEW) and Housing Opportunities for Women (HOW). Members realized that there were key gaps in the system of services and were concerned about vulnerable women who could so easily be victimized. HOW created permanent housing for mentally ill and dually diagnosed women that got off the ground through the efforts of WSP members Diane Doherty and Cathy St. Claire. At the time, St. Clair came from N Street Village at Luther Place Memorial Church while

Doherty worked at Mt. Carmel House. HOW offered women who had been homeless for many years their own room and amenities with some support through a live-in resident manager while these women got back on their feet.

Doherty was a friend of Father John Adams at SOME and he offered her a 6- bedroom house on Abbey Place, NE to start the new housing program. At that point, it was still illegal to have more than six unrelated individuals living together and WSP

51 Women's Service Providers to Audrey Rowe, 15 July 1983, courtesy of Luther Place Memorial Church Archives. 110

members hoped to house five formerly homeless women with a live-in house manager.

The group was reluctant to accept Father Adam's offer because the house was located in

the heart of a dangerous part of the city and a central congregating place for heroin

addicts. Doherty tried to secure an apartment that was for rent in her Catholic University

neighborhood, but nearby residents complained to the local priest at St. Anthony's

Catholic Church and he went public with his opposition, stating that there were already a

disproportionate number of "group houses" in the neighborhood. 52 Resistance escalated

and eventually the idea for the residential program backfired. Doherty returned to Father

Adams and arranged to take the house on Abbey Place. She also approached Father

Healy, the president of Georgetown University about getting a university student to live

in the house for a small stipend and miraculously, he agreed. Community Action was a

floor of undergraduate students committed to social justice that had a long, active

tradition at Georgetown and they could easily identify a willing volunteer for the

program. It was a novel idea and Father Healy supported it so much that he spent one

evening a week at the house with the women, reportedly bringing a bucket of chicken

with him!

Similarly, WSP members realized the grave situation in the District for poor and

low-income folks who needed housing and were seeking ways to provide additional,

creative programs to meet the need. Doherty was active at the time with the Coalition for

52 The realtor was willing to work with them once they shared their plans. Doherty and others canvassed the neighborhood before moving forward to insure community support. They asked neighbors to look out for these vulnerable women and even to visit and spend time with them. 111

Financial Accountability53 and intimately aware of the problems with public housing.54

WSP members Sister Mary Ann Luby and Sister Nancy Conley started demonstrating at

the Department of Human Services (DHS) office around the need for transitional

housing, recognizing that people needed a place to go other than shelter, but who may not

have been ready to live independently. As a result of their agitation, DHS Secretary

Audrey Rowe promised them a building for another new program but dragged her feet in

delivering. WSP eventually took over her office in a sit-in and participants had to be

removed by the police. Mary McGrory editorialized the conflict for the Post that was

read by Jack Kemp, who was then secretary of HUD. Kemp offered his assistance to the

group and subsequently contacted Mayor Barry to request a building downtown for the

transitional housing program that was promised by Rowe. The city offered the old detox

building at 611 N Street, horrifying WSP members because the building was falling

apart. However, both Diane Doherty and Elizabeth Beck from CCNV wrote a grant

application and secured sufficient money to renovate the donated building to suit the

program. Board members for the new program were pulled from the Women's Shelter

Providers and it was named appropriately New Endeavors By Women (NEW). Doherty

describes the thought that went into building NEW:

We got an architect from Howard [University] to help. So many women had children and had been separated that we wanted them to have the experience of recreating family and reuniting with their families. NEW was intended to give

53 Diane Doherty was a member of the Coalition on Financial Accountability (CFA), a coalition advocating on behalf of the low-income community and monitoring the use of public funds. Though the group was housed within the Legal Council for the Elderly (and eventually absorbed by AARP) they were particularly concerned with the District's fiscal responsibility, especially as it concerned the family shelters. They also successfully advocated for a COLA for AFDC recipients.

54 As an example, in public housing, people paying excessive costs for utilities because appliances as well as heating and cooling units were breaking down. The CFA discovered that there was a warehouse full of brand new refrigerators meant for public housing residents that were never distributed! 112

women the opportunity to have a communal experience. The architect just asked for our vision. We had no idea how to translate our ideas into building plans. We wanted [residents] to have their own space but also have the family atmosphere and shared space as well.

In the end, the building was designed so that each woman had her own room situated in a semicircle alongside the other rooms. The concept of community was achieved through a family lounge with a communal kitchen.

In an attempt to improve his public image and to assuage activist complaints,

Mayor Barry announced the creation of the Commission on Homelessness and named

Pastor John Steinbruck as its chair in 1982. The Commission was a 23 member advisory board that gathered information and made recommendations about homeless services and social policy. It was reformulated later in the decade as the Mayor's Coordinating

Council on the Homelessness under local developer Oliver Carr's leadership, expanding the group's role and increasing membership to 73 individuals, along with private sector involvement. This group was expected to take a more active advocacy role and even coordinate homeless service programs but like its predecessor, this advisory board proved relatively ineffective. Publicly, Barry and his administration appeared responsive. As

Steven Gregory notes, localities also used these counter strategies to undermine progressive efforts. Officials are often tempted to incorporate activists into state bureaucracies in an implicit attempt to redirect political anger, but this typically leads to frustration and political dead ends for concerned proponents. Gregory describes similar efforts to co-opt activist networks in New York:

Through public hearings, community meetings, the media, and an assortment of newly formed and state sponsored citizen's advisory boards, federal and local officials disseminated and legitimated bureaucratic formulations of neighborhood 113

problems while enlisting the participation of local activists in 'top down' urban . 55 d eve l opment strategies. ·

Involving outspoken and active individuals in bureaucratic problem solving without actually delivering meaningful solutions proved to be an effective strategy for the various mayors in Washington over the years. Mayors successfully channeled discontent into a variety of mainstream political activities and bureaucratic service efforts. Like the efforts of the Women's Shelter Providers before them, Commission members worked hard to draft proposals for the city to improve services, but the mayors virtually ignored their work. However, Mayor Barry was called on it. In a letter from Luther Place Memorial

Church President Charles Solem to Chairman Carr, Solem was critical of what he called

"the Mayor's silence and lack of seriousness" in not being willing to address homeless issues more comprehensively and with some urgency. In the letter, he detailed his priorities for the Coordinating Council on the Homelessness: that they press Mayor

Barry to move people out of deplorable for-profit welfare motels (the Pitts Hotel and

Capitol City Inn), address the serious conditions in the city run shelters (i.e. Pierce and

Blair), renew the rent subsidy program (TAP), renovate unused public housing units, turn over property to area churches for social service uses, provide an accounting of federal money that was spent for local homeless programs as well as calling on the city to apply for available federal funds for homeless programs.56 When the Coordinating Council did

55 Steven Gregory, Black Corona: Race and the Politics of Place in an Urban Community (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 92.

56 Charles Solem to Oliver Carr, I 0 January 1989, courtesy of Luther Place Memorial Church Archives. 114

come up with a concrete plan to address the needs of the city's homeless, there were reports that the Mayor never even looked at it.

Mobilizing on Behalf of the Mentally Ill

Mental health services were a key concern for advocates and their alliances at the time and groups organized spontaneously around specific issues or broad concerns.· An informal group of activists formed several years after the Women's Shelter Providers, and identified themselves as the D.C. Advocates for the Mentally Ill Homeless.

According to Celeste Valente, it was prompted by the need for direct political action to pressure the city:

One night, it was extremely cold. I don't think I'm exaggerating when I say it was 30 below. A woman showed up with an ax. One of the women religious came to me and asked me to handle this and I did, with much trepidation. I asked [the woman] to leave the ax outside. She came in and I talked to her -she was a very troubled woman. I called EPRD [Emergency Psychiatric Response Division] and they refused to come out. I was told to call the police. This was the thing that turned me into a flaming advocate. From then on, whenever EPRD would not show, we would send post cards and flood them. We cc' d the Post, the Dixon Committee. As a result, Brian Carome and I formed D.C. Advocates for the Mentally Ill Homeless.

In the Spring of 1986, Carome and Valente invited every provider in the city to a meeting to discuss concerns with the mental health system. The group became a coalition of more than 20 shelter providers who challenged the D.C. government's response to homeless mentally ill. They distributed a report in 1989 detailing their recommendations for a viable mental health system.57 Carome was working at the McKenna Center58 and

57 "Toward An Effective Mental Health System. A Perspective of Service Providers to the Homeless." 711989. Courtesy of Steve Cleghorn archives.

58 McKenna Center was the emergency assistance and drop in center started by Father Horace McKenna at St. Aloysius Church. 115

Valente was still at Mt. Carmel House while they served as co-chairs for three years.

According to Carome,

We had well thought out demands and a detailed structure of the mental health system at all levels. We were well organized. I remember, I picked up 1000 pre­ stamped post cards on McKenna Center's dime. Every time there was a failure of the mental health system to deliver individual services, we flooded the Mental Health office with complaints. We went back to the local churches and then they bombarded the office as well.

Political actions developed organically, emanating out of providers experience in direct service where urgent client needs came into relief. Diane Doherty recalls women who were discharged from St. Elizabeth's Hospital showing up at Mt. Carmel Place shelter, inappropriately clothed for the weather, with only a one day supply of medications and a piece of paper with the shelter's address on it. The group wrote numerous editorial pieces in the paper, spoke on radio talk shows and were fierce, public advocates for the homeless mentally ill.

During this time, the numbers of mentally ill homeless had spiked after the majority of federally sponsored deinstitutionalization had occurred at St. Elizabeth's

Hospital. The hospital was handed over to the D.C. government in 1985, finalizing local responsibility for the District's mentally ill. Patients who were released from the hospital were subject to an inadequate community mental health system. Jencks notes the distinct periods of deinstitutionalization that began in the late l 940' s, which were largely successful prior to 1975.59 However, the last wave to leave the hospital in the late 1970's were the most ill-prepared to care for themselves, which corresponds to what occurred in

59 Christopher Jencks, The Homeless (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 116

D.C., where officials were under the pressure of shrinking budgets and a legal mandate to reduce the inpatient population even further. St. Elizabeth's reported a population of

8000 at its peak in 1950' s and was down to about fourteen hundred by the end of the

1980's.60 The Community Mental Health Act had failed to result in the wrap around services that individuals needed upon release and consequently, patients were discharged to the street with little resources to survive on their own. As a result of the federal mandate, these individuals were callously released even though they had been institutionalized for much of their lives, regardless of individual preference or even whether they had a place to return to. Jencks concedes that some were able to live more independently, especially during the earlier periods of discharge but the burden of care for those least able to care for selves was transferred to communities who were ill equipped with the resources or even tolerance to handle such changes.

Major medical and political transformations made outpatient mental health care possible in ideal circumstances.61 Improved psychopharmacology in the 1950' s mitigated the symptoms of psychosis and improved patient functionality. Medicaid was created in 1965 to assist the disabled poor obtain medical care but was then restricted to individuals who were not residing in state mental hospitals because the federal government did not want to cover what states were already paying for. In an effort to avoid a massive transfer from state hospitals to nursing homes (which would have been covered under Medicaid and therefore paid by the federal government), Congress

60 Megan O'Matz, "Capital Mental Hospital at Core of Strained System," The New York Times, 11 September 1988. LexisNexis [database online]. Dr. Robert Keisling stated that the population at St. E's is now just several hundred. According to plans reported in The New York Times, the population at the hospital was expected to be merely 800 by 1991, when federal subsidies are discontinued.

61 Jencks. 117

restricted funds to nursing homes that were providing mental health care. Jencks also notes changing professional attitudes about the impact of locking people up for life and promoting the benefits of outpatient care. Gradual increases in public assistance benefits in the 1960' s, coupled with the establishment of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in

1972 (eligibility began once someone was discharged) made it more likely that an individual could live independently and provided support for families who were caring for ill relatives. Legal challenges to involuntary commitment statutes resulted in subsequent changes to the law so that someone could no longer be committed unless they broke the law, endangered themselves or threatened someone else. Finally, the patient rights movement meant that patients had the right to treatment in the least restrictive environment and that one could refuse treatment or break off clinical and familial relationships when they deteriorated. Jencks concludes that while improving the basic liberties of the mentally ill, these factors contributed to the present situation with individuals cycling in and out of hospitals and made stabilization all that more difficult. 62

State pressure to restrict admissions, discharge patients and cut budgets meant closing down wards and insufficient staff to meet the needs of patients, even for those that wanted to return. Jencks notes that states could have merged or closed hospitals and transferred their budgets to outpatient care but this did not happen - leaving outpatient care dramatically under-funded. Subsequent federal and state cutbacks in SSI and SSI subsidies in the early 1980's under Reagan meant tightening eligibility standards, and

62 See also Baum and Burnes. 118

public officials began purging the disability assistance roles for individuals thought to be able to work. 63

Jencks argues that the main contribution to the problem of homeless mentally ill was the result of overly liberal policies, perhaps well-intentioned, that increased personal liberty and restricted involuntary commitment, coupled with conservative efforts to limit

government spending. Qualifying Jencks' thesis, Kim Hopper concludes that the

medicalization of the homeless (or the shift in characterization from deviant criminal to

mentally-ill patient) "is both an exercise in social control - policing the streets of

unwanted 'litter' ... and a structural attempt to resolve the standing cultural ambivalence

toward the dependent poor in general."64 He cites the time lag between

deinstitutionalization and the large numbers observed on the street in the 1980' s to

critique the idea that either disability or deviance lead to homeless housing status.

Hopper writes that changes in both the economy and the city "lowers the threshold by

which impairment translates into social handicap."65 Historically, declining benefits,

housing supports and affordable housing first affected individuals who were the most

precariously housed - but also those who were most disabled.66 Similarly, Rossi

predicted that those who would be pushed into homelessness in the coming decades were

more likely to have disabilities because of the burden these individuals place on already

63 See Jencks. These efforts were suspended in 1983 as a result of significant legal pressure.

64 Kim Hopper, "More Than Passing Strange: Homelessness and Mental Illness in New York City," American Ethnologist 15, no. l (February 1988): 163.

65 Ibid., l 60. See also Koegel et al., "The Causes of Homelessness."

66 Hopper, et al., "Economies of Makeshift." 119

strained support networks in tough economic times. 67 Community mental health centers failed to materialize into a comprehensive system of care, at the same time that affordable and congregate housing were being destroyed in record numbers. These conditions spelled disaster for many of the city's neediest individuals. For Hopper, the spike in homeless mentally ill is not simply about deinstitutionalization but more importantly tied to the reconfiguration of urban space, the depletion of low income housing stock and shrinking incomes. Therefore, individuals suffering with various conditions are perhaps the most expendable because they are the least able to handle life's difficulties and social structures.

Local communities and service providers were extremely concerned about patients' welfare and the city's reluctance to provide sufficiently for care. The Friends of

St. Elizabeth's were particularly active following the transfer of hospital operations from the federal government to the District of Columbia in October of 1987. According to the

Congressional law that stipulated the transfer, the city was mandated to have developed a comprehensive community based mental health system by 1991. The Friends fought for better outpatient services and the restoration of staffing levels and hospital programs.

They were opposed to the transfer of operations to the city, as well as the city's plans to sell off part of the West Campus to developers and battled most about the lack of adequate discharge planning for patients leaving the hospital. They hoped that the West

Campus would be set aside as backup housing for individuals who were released from the hospital. Led by staff members, community activists and patient's relatives, the Friends of St. Elizabeth's even initiated a lawsuit against the District, citing the poor nutritional

67 Rossi. 120

meals and the elimination of therapeutic programs at the hospital. But not all advocates sided against the city though. Lawyers with the Mental Health Law Project publicly opposed to congregate housing, especially on the grounds of St. Elizabeth's, called

Friend's plan "ghettoization."68 However, all agreed on their concerns about inadequate discharge planning and insufficient community resources to serve patients outside of the hospital setting. Despite their best efforts, long-term resident patients continued to be discharged inappropriately at record levels, and the hospital went through several extended periods where emergency admissions into the hospital were restricted.

The Dixon Commission was established to address these concerns in part. The

Commission was created out of a 1974 class action lawsuit on behalf of residents of St.

Elizabeth's that challenged the federal and city governments' noncompliance with

District law - which required the city to develop alternatives to hospitalization.69 They

navigated the competing interests of patients, government officials, community residents

and independent advocates and set out to ensure the smooth transition from federal to

local control of the hospital. The final plan in 1980 launched the Commission "to

oversee and report on the progress of the federal government's efforts to identify and

place class members in settings less restrictive than St. Elizabeth's and the District's

efforts to develop community based housing, treatment, rehabilitation and support

68 Hanna Schussheim, "Disturbing Changes at St. E's; 'The Strong hospital. .. is Being Dismantled,"' Washington Post 29 May 1988, C8. LexisNexis [database online].

6 '> Originally, this case was filed as Robinson v. Weinberger, as it was a federally run institution when the class action was filed in 1974. The names that this case has been filed under have changed over the last three decades several times. 121

services."70 The D.C. Advocates for the Mentally Ill had several key allies serving on the commission. Robert Washington was a newly appointed Commissioner for the

Commission on Mental Health Services, which oversaw the hospital, and commission members encouraged him to reach out to the advocate community. Washington did so but was soon overwhelmed with dissention among the advocate groups and District officials about the plans for the hospital grounds. The D.C. Advocates for the Mentally

Ill Homeless had taken a position early on in his tenure that was opposed to the turnover of St. Elizabeth's to the city. Washington expressed concern that advocates might bypass the Commission on Mental Health Services and if they directed their concerns to the federal government, this might prompt Congress to "disapprove the city's plan if the dispute lingers, forcing the issue back to federal court, where the city had been threatened with court appointment of a special master to oversee release of St. Elizabeth's patients to community-based facilities."71 Commissioner Washington's tenuous relationship with advocates soured quickly. He shocked Carome and Valente at his public introduction to the city's clergy when, according to Carome, he made a statement about their activism:

"In a packed room, he said to everyone that 'there are advocates here amongst us and they cannot be trusted.'"

While Barry and others celebrated the transfer and planned release of nearly one thousand more patients into the community, advocates detailed their concerns with the

70 Elizabeth M. Brown and Anne R. Bowden, "Mental Health: Dixon v. Kelly," in Cold, Harsh, and Unending Resistance: The District of Columbia Government's Hidden War Against Its Poor and Its Homeless, eds. Michael I. Greenberger, Elizabeth M. Brown and Anne R. Bowden (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, 22 November 1993), 242.

71 Ed Bruske, "New Official Warns Groups St. E's Plan Could Fail," Washington Post, 25 April I 987, C4. LexisNexis [database online]. 122

District's history in not dealing with the mentally ill homeless and the private organizations that had to fill the gaps in providing critical services. During a celebration ceremony, protestors disrupted the flag raising services, including one individual dressed

1 72 in 19 h century costume depicting Dorothea Dix. Within six months after the transfer was final, the hospital's accreditation was in jeopardy and consequently their eligibility for federal reimbursement funds when they received negative evaluations for care quality.73

Meanwhile, the District was repeatedly held in contempt for its failure to comply with each subsequent consent decree negotiated out of the 1974 Dixon class action lawsuit. Following the third consent decree in 1989, the District was commended for making some progress in improving emergency psychiatric services by establishing an outreach program for the homeless, but it still failed on all other commitments it agreed to.74 Official reluctance to work with advocates and repeated failures to honor judicial decrees only fueled hostilities and protests. Meanwhile, men and women with severe mental illness continued to swell the ranks of the homeless.

Radical Coalitions and Confrontational Advocacy

CCNV's radical spirit influenced other committed agitators in the area. When the newspaper published reports that the Barry administration was going to shut down the

72 Karlyn Barker, "St. E's Patients Share the Dream; 132-YearOJd Hospital Transferred to District." Washington Post, 2 October 1987, B 1. LexisNexis [database online].

73 In fact, conditions have not improved significantly since that time. The Department of Justice has recently been involved with the city over conditions at St. Elizabeth's hospital.

74 Details in this section are drawn from Brown and Bowden, "Mental Health: Dixon v. Kelly." 123

Tenant Assistance Program (TAP) after only one year of operation, within hours, people poured into the District building to protest the decision. TAP was a locally funded rent assistance program that was widely considered to be successful in preventing homelessness for at least some families. When it began in 1986, ten thousand people applied. Its closure sparked several weeks of demonstrations and spurned local advocates to mobilize by creating another group called Housing Action!75 This association evolved organically out of mutual concern for TAP' s closure as well as housing issues more generally. People who were at the District building protesting, responded immediately to the request for an organizing meeting to plan the next steps. The city eventually stopped approving new applications but the group continued to be a radical force in the homeless movement.

Coalition building and organized advocacy really expanded during this time. The

Women's Shelter Providers and even the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless were generally seen as more conservatively oriented groups, with Erna Steinbruck taking the position of compromise and mediation. At times, this frustrated more radical advocates who pressed for stronger activism and were not averse to embarrassing officials. Diane Doherty participated in most of the advocacy groups that formed during this time and did not shy away from civil protest or disruptive tactics. The following recollection from Doherty illustrates the tension between participants:

Ema [Steinbruck] said to me once "I really like you a lot but you're really too radical." We didn't want to do [confrontational advocacy]. If we had to resort to

75 According to Nancy Conley, organizing members included Hannah House, Mount Carmel House, Mount Carmel Place, Neighborhood Legal Services, Rachel's Women's Center, New Endeavors By Women, Housing Opportunities for Women, Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, McKenna Center, Calvary Women's Center, as well as a handful of independent activists. 124

that level then we would. The D.C. Coalition and others felt that there's a line you don't cross. But you have to use different strategies.

In many ways, the movement really accommodated varying philosophies of advocacy.

But the lines were being drawn around those who believed it was possible to work with the city and those who did not. Neither strategy proved more effective than the other though. Though they did not always· agree on strategy or desire to participate in various levels of civil disobedience, the groups did find ways to work together, especially around major campaigns. And when circumstances warranted escalating an issue, there was always a contingent of individuals willing to take it to that level. While Steinbruck was very politically active at the time, she believed in more conventional approaches to problem solving. Still, some valued the range of activities taken on by advocates and their place within the social movement even if they did not engage in them personally.

For example, one of the Directors of the D.C. Coalition, Jerry Corsey, was known to be sympathetic and open to aggressive strategies even though he did not employ them.

There was certainly overlap between the group participants and their issues, and not surprisingly a significant amount of splitting. What is interesting is that while the WSP exclusively represented shelter providers, all of the WSP members participated in the

D.C. Advocates for the Mentally Ill Homeless. The D.C. Advocates allowed a broader contingent of interested individuals to participate but members were expected to be willing act on their concerns. According to Brian Carome, co-founder of several radical issue groups, the Women's Shelter Providers were not aggressive enough and concerned advocates did not want the WSP to control the activism agenda for the city. The tension came to a head when Luther Place Memorial Church stopped paying dues to the D.C. 125

Advocates for the Mentally Ill Homeless. They reported to Luther Place Memorial

Church that the group was becoming too militant in their approach to D.C. government agencies such as EPRD (Emergency Psychiatric Response Division) but agreed to consider support on an issue-by-issue basis.76 The various coalitions not only debated specific issues and strategies but also how to best deliver services. Celeste Valente reflects on her experience with the various coalitions:

From my perspective, Luther Place had a different approach to advocacy. Some of it boils down to philosophy about social change. I came from a generation of protestors. I would argue a lot with Ema. Ema wanted to create her own system. I believed that we needed to change the system and the way government was responding. Others felt it would be better to create their own services.

The different factions were more or less successful depending on their ability to retain committed participants or volunteers as well as their willingness to employ a range of approaches, whether that meant flooding the city with post cards of protest, developing strategic plans for reluctant government agencies, or even obstructing traffic on

Pennsylvania Avenue. The alliances weaved in and around each other, and played off one another. Success, whatever the goal, required a lot of patience, persistence, and a long-term perspective. All of the groups were successful in their own ways at accomplishing targeted outcomes but perhaps not as successful at bridging the gaps between the different groups.

CCNV and National Coalition Building

National trends continued to play out on the streets of Washington. CCNV was unrelenting in bringing attention to homelessness with their characteristic style of

76 Women's Shelter Committee to the Church Council, report [16 December 1987], courtesy Luther Place Memorial Church Archives, Washington, D.C. 126

"symbolic protest." Mary Ellen Hombs remained a core member of CCNV for nearly two decades and wrote that "confrontational politics" were characteristic of the times:

"We were operating in an environment where both government and churches had been reluctant to respond, indeed had been dragged every step of the way to responding humanely to the needs of homeless people ....We were experiencing a true dichotomy of people and their govemment."77 At its peak, CCNV had a 30,000 piece mailing list that they mobilized to action as needed. Carol Fennelly noted that each year there were seasonal campaigns: "There was a rhythm to the campaign. In July, we planned the winter campaign. We were not disorganized but organized anarchists." Locally CCNV spent the better part of the decade pressing the city to open up unoccupied schools for shelter and forcing the city to set poverty alleviation goals. Harold Moss and Mitch

Snyder would take to the streets and spend the winter outside in protest to the city's policies. They even slept in cardboard boxes in front of City Hall for dramatic effect.

Hombs wrote, "Drama of statement and form was an important element for effectiveness in forcing the simple fact of homeless people's existence into the average person's awareness."78 CCNV members were masters at making the homeless crisis visible, creating newsworthy events, capitalizing on sympathies, and gaining people's attention to issues they felt the public was reticent to face. With little information available at the time, they also sought to educate the public with statistical data and studies to expand awareness about the growing problem. Hombs and Snyder released a publication in 1982

77 Hombs, "Reversals of Fortune," 119.

78 Ibid., 111. 127

titled A Forced March to Nowhere to coincide with the first Congressional hearings on the issue since the Depression.79

Community members also had a lot of fun. One of their more creative stunts involved a political rally held by Ronald Reagan to celebrate his tax cuts with an enormous 17 foot wide baked apple pie, which .was supposed to be symbolic of everyone getting "a piece of the pie." To protest Reagan's budget cuts, CCNV members dressed as

Reagan's "fat cats" wearing placards of Reagan's friends. They wore donated business suits that were several sizes too big and stuffed them with pillows and whatever else they could find. Carol Fennelly dressed as Marie Antoinette. Attendees were shocked when the costumed protestors jumped into the pie and the only way to remove them was to have the police jump into the pie with them to drag them out. Masters at mobilizing large groups of people, their symbolic activities often included the homeless themselves.

CCNV held a Christmas party at the Convention Center one year and had celebrities flown in to celebrate with the homeless community. Three thousand people were in attendance while CCNV friends like Cher served mashed potatoes, and the Fabulous

Thunderbirds provided entertainment.

Like the Steinbrucks, the CCNV community was part of a broad network of activists around the country and willing to mobilize in support of another's efforts wherever needed. They were well informed and actively supported nationwide social justice causes, often maintaining a dual focus on national and local issues. This awareness contextualized and inspired their brand of creative activism. In fact, when a

79 Mary Ellen Hombs and Mitch Snyder, Homelessness in America: A Forced March to Nowhere, (Washington, D.C.: Community for Creative Non-Violence, 1982). 128

battle over anti-sleeping laws loomed over the city of Santa Barbara in California, Snyder offered his assistance to the local Coalition for the Homeless, threatening to overrun the city with protesters. This transformed the Santa Barbara negotiations and resulted in a much more cooperative city government eager to resolve the issue and soften the laws - all without Snyder's presence.8° CCNV was but one local mo.vement of many around the nation organizing around homeless issues.81 While some have argued that Snyder and

CCNV led the national homeless movement, they were encouraged by other movements around the country just as much as their well-publicized efforts inspired others to take up the cause. However, while many groups were affiliated at various times and supported each other in various issues, it would be an overstatement to suggest that they were well coordinated or even unified.

The CCNV community mobilized around a range of anti-poverty issues both locally and nationally. In her history of CCNV's early campaigns, Victoria Rader describes how they took on a nationwide food waste campaign. They documented widespread hunger as the food lines grew following Reagan's cuts to the food stamp program. At the same time, the government began handing out surplus cheese and butter until the industry protested, claiming that their sales were down. 82 Meanwhile, CCNV members created an encampment in the center of Kansas City to publicize the

so Rob Rosenthal, Homeless in Paradise: A Map of the Terrain (Temple University Press, Philadelphia. 1994).

81 Daniel M. Cress, review of At Risk of Homelessness by Karin Ringheim and Gimme Shelter by Gregg Barak, Contemporary Sociology, 21, no. 3 (May 1992), 356-357. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/2076279 (accessed 2 October 2007).

82 Rader, 171. 129

underground caves where the federal government rented space to store excess food from around the country. The irony was striking: the federal government was paying for food surplus storage while they simultaneously cut aid to hunger relief programs around the country. Protestors received the support of local residents who joined their fast until

Congress agreed to release a small percentage of the surplus food. The food.waste campaign helped increase national attention about hunger issues, which resonated with many families who were themselves struggling with the recession. Capitalizing on their characteristic flair for the dramatic, they toured Washington area supermarket dumpsters with media and Congressmen in tow and targeted a campaign against Giant Food to get them to donate supplies and excess food to homeless service programs in the city. Giant finally bowed to the pressure following a sit-in at their headquarters, agreeing to donate surplus food that was being discarded. Finally, CCNV gained significant press when they hosted a Congressional luncheon made entirely from scraps of recovered food from their dumpster recovery efforts, alerting attendees only after they began eating. Out of this effort, CCNV helped pass resolutions in nearly all fifty states to protect donor groups from liability lawsuits and worked on getting federal agencies to give surplus food to charities. 83

Emergency Shelter and the "Welfare Motels"

Pastor Steinbruck began the decade in protest, writing to the director of the

Department of Human Resources (DHR)84 to notify them that the N Street Village shelter

83 Carol Fennelly, Interview 26 February 2008.

84 The Department of Human Resources was eventually renamed the Department of Human Services. 130

would refuse to accept DHR referrals or referrals from any other agency of the D.C. government. Citing the city's abdication of responsibility for the homeless and that the

shelters were regularly overcrowded, the Steinbrucks hoped that DHR would open more

shelters to meet the overwhelming need. 85 So began a long decade of protest around the lack of shelter available in the city.

CCNV for its part engaged in high stakes protests, challenging people and

institutions at all levels. After a series of high profile hypothermia deaths, CCNV made a

point of targeting the Catholic Church for what they perceived as religious indifference.

Protestors poured blood on the altar at St. Matthew's Cathedral during a mass and blamed

the church for not permitting the homeless to use their building as shelter. This left many

questioning whether CCNV's tactics were indeed nonviolent after all.

Snyder also challenged the mayor as well. CCNV organized a week long vigil in

front of the district building and poured blood on the building.86 Harold Moss and Mitch

Snyder moved out onto the heating grates for the winter, even as the Mayor promised

more shelters but delivered none. Living outside for the winter drew more attention from

the media during these events. The Mayor retaliated with his own grate tour and invited

the homeless into the District's shelters. When they refused, he publicly argued that the

homeless were living outside by choice.87

85 Pastor John Steinbruck to James M. Gay, 3 December I 979, courtesy of Luther Place Memorial Church Archives.

86 Rader, I 36.

87 Colman McCarthy, "Shelter for the Poor We Cannot See," Washington Post, JO January 1981, A I 7. LexisNexis [database on line). 131

The city was slow to respond to the growing need for emergency shelter but officials did not ignore the problem entirely. Under Mayor Barry's leadership, the city was busy awarding multimillion-dollar contracts to Barry's close political supporters for housing homeless families in dilapidated hotels and run down apartment buildings. This was not unique to D.C. and developers around the country were capitalizing on potential profits to be made in the homeless industry.88 Barry was well known for his corruption and the sweetheart deals that fattened the bank accounts of his closest friends. Journalists

Jaffe and Sherwood chronicled the Barry administration and his controversial shelter contracts. Jeffrey Cohen was a close Barry friend who purchased the dilapidated

Parkside Hotel at 141h and I Streets in 1979. Cohen was awarded a $507,000 contract to shelter homeless families in the Parkside Hotel, despite complaints from residents and advocates that it lacked drinking water and was filled with pests. Further, even though it lacked fire escapes, the city granted the occupancy permit anyway. Barry rewarded his friend for his financial support with nearly $30,000 more the following year, which was more than enough to cover Cohen's mortgage. 89

In 1982, the city put out bids for housing homeless families. Cornelius Pitts, owner and operator of the Pitts Motor Hotel on Belmont and 15•h Streets, won a $1 million contract to provide room and board to 48 families in that hotel even though he was not the lowest bidder.90 Jaffe and Sherwood wrote that the following year, without

88 For a discussion of New York, see also Kozol, Rachel and Her Children.

89 Jaffe and Sherwood, 146.

90 Trevor Armbrister and Jack Cloherty, "The Shame of Our Nation's Capitol," unpublished, undated manuscript, courtesy of Luther Place Memorial Church Archives. 132

another competitive bid, Pitts renewed the contract for $1.4 million to supply the same services for fewer families. Two years later, the contract was bumped up to $1.5 million for room and board. This did not include the salaries that the city paid Pitts and his wife.

This meant that the city was paying $3,000 a month, per family for the rooms and nearly

$13 a person, per day for meals.91 Perhaps most galling was the fact that the city leased space on the ground floor of the Pitts Hotel for nearly quadruple what the prime real estate rate was downtown. Therefore, it cost the city $7,000 per month for temporary space in order to house the city's Central Intake Office where social workers assessed homeless families need for shelter.92

In further examples of city mismanagement, in 1987, Roy Littlejohn received

$2800 per month per apartment to provide a room with at most, metal folding chairs and a table for R Street Shelter and Urban Shelters. At the same time, a member of Barry's finance committee Earnest Green received a $4.5 million contract to provide meals to homeless shelters. There were no competitive bids and Green was not even experienced in the food service industry.93 Others benefited from the windfall profits. The District paid $50/night to house people at the Budget Inn, amounting to nearly $1500 a month for a room that they had to leave during the day and remove their belongings from. 94 James

Griffin received $2800/unit for two 45-unit apartments on Chapin and Park Streets, NW

91 Jaffe and Sherwood, 154.

92 Nathan McCall, and Kent Jenkins, Jr., "DC Votes to Limit Aid to Homeless. Hill Hears Testimony on Overpriced Shelter," Washington Post, 13 June 1990, Al. LexisNexis [database online].

93 Jaffe and Sherwood, 155.

94 "Is this Any Way to Help Homeless Families?" Washington Post Magazine, 29 May 1988, W16. LexisNexis [database online]. 133

to house homeless families and provide counseling. Though they were decent quality apartments, the leases for his building typically went for $400.95

While the city was rushing to open up new welfare motels for families, it may have appeared that they were responding compassionately to the needs of the homeless but the worsening economy meant that the need far outstripped any effort to provide relief. Other than small efforts by volunteer groups and nonprofits, there were also no new shelters for homeless singles, many of whom just languished on the street. During this time, the city began experimenting with "trailers" as shelters. In 1987, they contracted with House of Ruth to open three trailers for homeless women and initiated a six-week demonstration project for trailers at Mount Vernon Square for men. The men's trailers were staffed by Central Union Mission that winter, a faith based shelter in the tradition of the Salvation Army.

In an effort to dramatize the numbers of homeless and appeal to public consciousness, CCNV planned to stage a protest in Lafayette Park across from the White

House in 1982. The Department of Interior refused CCNV a permit to occupy Lafayette

Park and though the community took it to court, they lost on appeal. Members staged a homeless camp anyway and dubbed it "Reaganville." "Reaganville was reminiscent of the Hooverville settlements from the Depression era. On Thanksgiving, six hundred homeless individuals arrived for a traditional dinner and while they were eating, the tents were erected for the overnight camp. Both community members and homeless individuals stayed in the tents for the night but at dawn the next morning, the Park Police

95 Nathan McCall and Kent Jenkins, Jr., "DC Votes to Limit Aid to Homeless. Hill Hears Testimony on Overpriced Shelter," Washington Post, 13 June 1990, Al. LexisNexis [database online]. 134

arrested them.96 CCNV resurrected the tents days later and pending the outcome of a second judicial appeal, the tents were permitted to remain, only without the protestors.

Confronted with waning media coverage, they also erected a symbolic graveyard with 45 crosses and names of homeless individuals who had passed away in prior years.97

Advocates from around the country came and planted their own crosses to recognize homeless deaths in other cities.98 In a shocking reversal, the same judge that ruled against CCNV earlier permitted the symbolic action to continue.99 This gained national media attention and over the next two months, CCNV filled the 14 tents with both homeless men and women. This effort was strategically successful in bringing attention to homelessness as a major issue and refuted national claims otherwise. Unfortunately, within a year, the Department of Interior enacted new rules to prevent further encampments on national parkland.100

When Nancy Reagan was reported to have ordered thousand dollar plates of china, reporters captured the irony of so many destitute people living in "Reaganville," in the shadows of White House conspicuous affluence. D.C. Central Kitchen president

Robert Egger put it this way:

96 Rader, 150.

97 Ibid., 130. CCNV claimed the bodies of homeless individuals with no known next of kin at the medical examiners office. They would attempt to identify individuals and try to locate family. Fennelly remembers combing the streets with pictures to help identify unclaimed victims of homelessness. CCNV also held public funerals. In their first reported action, they had a John Doe in a horse drawn carriage brought throughout the streets of D .C.

98 Ibid., 150; Hombs, "Reversals of Fortune," 118.

99 Rader, 151.

100 Though CCNV took that decision all the way to the Supreme Court, they lost. 135

Mitch [Snyder] mined a rich public vein of pubic emotional gold. In the 1980' s, with the anti-Reagan movements, activism exploded. And there was a renaissance of civil resistance with Mitch. White kids from the suburbs were angry and pissed off about everything. It was a public zeitgeist and Reagan spurned Mitch. With Nancy Reagan's china, it was as if they said 'Your invited to create a whole social unrest movement in America.' They gave it to him and [CCNV] took it.

CCNV was opportunistic around such events, but always for the benefit of the people they advoc·ated for.

Like other groups, CCNV balanced their political activism with service to the poor. In 1983, CCNV worked on locating a shelter for Spanish speaking individuals around Columbia Road, in a neighborhood where Latinos predominated. They also convinced the Georgetown Civic Association to open a shelter in that neighborhood, to be run by CCNV. Along with Georgetown clergy members, the Civic Association leased three trailers from the Department of Defense on a lot owned by a Holy Trinity member. 101

The follow year, CCNV activists worked on Initiative 17, a major campaign to bring a ballot initiative that would guarantee shelter as a basic human right. The Mayor launched a counter-campaign warning the city that it would go bankrupt if the referendum passed and that Washington would become a magnet for people from other jurisdictions. In spite of the Mayor, Diane Doherty and other advocates invested heavily in this campaign by speaking to the city's churches and other groups to encourage support. Doherty's car was ticketed repeatedly, despite claims to have parked legally.

There were other hints of retaliation, including being asked to resign from her post on the

Mayor's Commission on Homelessness because of Doherty' s support of the referendum.

JOI Ibid., 203. 136

Mayor Barry had Larry Guyot acting as his representative while on the government's payroll, reportedly promising the shelters big contracts if they organized against the Right to Shelter Initiative. According to legal advocate Lois Williams, "A court later found that the District had illegally spent nearly $7 ,000 of taxpayer funds campaigning to defeat the

Initiative. It had printed campaign materials and distributed them on Election Day using

District of Columbia employees."102 Not all community leaders were behind the

referendum, an indication of the splitting that occurred between the different alliances.

Pastor Steinbruck publicly expressed his opposition to the referendum in a Post article

citing his concerns that the city might become a magnet and that his fears that it would

create "mammoth squalid shelters similar to the one CCNV operates at 425 2"d Street."103

Even Dennis Bethea with the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless, publicly opposed

Initiative 17. 104 While some were concerned that once the shelter doors were open,

people would just take advantage of the city's provision of services, most advocates knew

otherwise, that there was no draw to stay in a city shelter unless there were literally no

other options. Bethea was as controversial a force on the D.C. Coalition as was Snyder at

CCNV. In addition, there was certainly no love lost between Snyder and Reverend

102 Lois G. Williams, "Emergency Shelter: Atchison v. Barry," in Cold, Harsh, and Unending Resistance: The District of Columbia Government's Hidden War Against Its Poor and Its Homeless, eds. Michael Greenberger, Elizabeth Brown, and Anne Bowden (Washington, D.C.: Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, 22 November 1992). The case was filed under District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia.

103 Sandra G. Boodman, "City Softens Opposition to Shelter Initiative," Washington Post, 8 November 1984, A58. LexisNexis [database online]. Steinbruck was a close spiritual advisor to the Mayor and represented the city in the editorial, signing off as the Chair of the Mayor's Commission on Homelessness.

104 One plausible explanation for the D.C. Coalition's opposition was that they were receiving city funds by this point and potentially indebted to the Mayor. On the other hand, they could have hoped for additional grant money from the city to open more shelters. 137

Steinbruck or even between Snyder and the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless. But D.C.

Coalition members also resented that Bethea played the race card when he argued that the homeless movement was hijacked by "white liberals" who were not really helping him and other "poor black folks." Regardless of the city's counter-strategies, D.C. residents passed Initiative 17 by an overwhelming 72% majority. The Right to Overnight Shelter

Act of 1984 "guaranteed 'safe, sanitary, and accessible shelter space, offered in an atmosphere of reasonable dignity. "'105 Dennis Bethea was rewarded for his opposition to the Referendum when Mayor Barry announced the creation of the Mayor's Office of

Emergency Shelter and Support Services (OESSS) and named Bethea head of that office.

Barry did not rest though once the Initiative passed. He retaliated by challenging the Right to Shelter Law in court, arguing that there was no way to distinguish between the "free loader" and the "truly needy." Reports Rader:

The city sued the Board of Elections, charging that Initiative 17 was illegal because it required city appropriations which were not allowed. After claiming for years that there were no more than a couple of hundred homeless in town, city officials began warning citizens that there were so many street people in the nation's capital, that it would cost the taxpayers 60 million dollars a year to shelter them! Moreover, D.C. would become a magnet for homeless from all over the world. 106

Though this proved far from accurate, unfortunately, the city continued to defy the mandatory shelter law and was subject to countless legal actions after its passage. Shelter expenses did rise but it was not the cost of sheltering the homeless that was responsible.

In fact, it was a combination of the Mayor's corrupt contract deals and the legal fines for

105 Foscarinis, "Homelessness, Litigation and Law Reform Strategies: A United States Perspective."

106 Rader, 223. The case was filed under D. C. Board of Elections and Ethics v. District of Columbia. 138

failing to comply with the law. The Mayor's central argument surrounding his opposition was the cost to shelter everyone. But while Barry was busy fighting with the feds over whose responsibility the District's homeless were, the city lost federal money it was entitled to in housing rehabilitation funds because the city administration was such a mess that they failed to file the paperwork on time. Journalists Jaffe and Sherwood explain:

Barry blamed the problem on the Reagan administration's cutback in funds, but as in other cases, the city had plenty of money. The city had allocated $100 million for maintenance in 1987; the money simply wasn't well spent. Federal funds earmarked for the housing department languished so long that deadlines passed and the funds had to be turned back. 107

Therefore, public housing units and city owned properties remained vacant while people suffered in the shelters and on the street. They also lost the federal reimbursement money for homeless programs, starting a long trend of fiscal irresponsibility in the city's government. 108 According to Jaffe and Sherwood, the city misspent funds and bloated its workforce to the point where they were reputed to have one city employee for every thirteen residents, greater than any other city or state government! "Delivering a welfare check in the District consistently cost twice the national average .... The District's child support collection agency had the rare distinction of being the only one in the nation to repeatedly spend more than it collected." 109 The city's residents responded by challenging Barry's commitment to the poor, whose support had been largely responsible for electing him.

JO? Jaffe and Sherwood, I 88.

rns Ibid., 155.

109 Ibid., 186. 139

CCNV continued to press the shelter issue at all levels. Towards the end of the decade, they battled with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority over the enclosure of the downtown metro stations, which had been functioning as de facto shelters for the homeless. Former community member Craig Keller recalls the details of

CCNV's "Gates of Shame" campaign:

Metro authorities were placing gates at the entrances to the escalators, thereby preventing homeless individuals from using those enclosed spaces for shelter. Metro authorities complained about the trash, urine, and feces that accompanied the presence of the homeless, but CCNV argued that it was inhumane to lock them out. CCNV first started a public information campaign, including an op­ editorial in the Washington Post by Mitch Snyder. It was then followed by a prayer vigil and eventually direct action where various CCNV members were arrested for refusing to leave the site in the evening. In fact, this was the occasion when actor Martin Sheen joined the protest and was arrested along with Mitch Snyder.

Martin Sheen was a close friend of CCNV following the making of a TV movie about

Snyder's life. Both Sheen and Mitch Snyder were arrested after protesting at the Farragut

West metro station. Snyder also initiated a fast in response to Metro's reluctance to cooperate. When Metro finally agreed to work out a solution, the negotiated compromise resulted in two donated metro buses to be used as overnight shelter and located at

Farragut Square. 110 Developer Oliver Carr paid for the buses to be refurbished while

Christ House operated the "shelter." Unfortunately, the buses only existed for one season and were not replaced the following winter, in part because the city had made trailer shelters available elsewhere the city.

IJO Nell Henderson, "Metro to Donate Bus for Shelter at Farragut West," Washington Post, 11 December 1987, B 1. LexisNexis [database online]. 140

Litigation On Behalf of Families and Official Intransigence

If CCNV's activism did not spark enough controversy, then the Right to Shelter

Law certainly did. The new law offered another angle from which to pursue justice concerns for homeless men and women. Several gr.oups formed around litigation issues with the District's homeless services and major law firms eagerly took on pro bono cases to protect the civil rights of the homeless. Legal advocates actively participated in the coalition meetings and had first hand accounts of the struggles that the homeless were facing. However, legal advocacy was only the beginning of the homeless wars and the city was repeatedly held in contempt for violating the shelter law.

Advocates and providers were noticing a significant spike in the numbers of homeless families. Families that had only been coming in for a short period to apply for emergency assistance at the McKenna Center were suddenly staying for the day, and those who applied for the city's emergency shelter program reported not being able to get in. Families were being asked to provide notarized letters from landlords proving their evictions or overcrowded living situation, notarization on proof of guardianship papers, certification that they were living with an abusive spouse, receipts proving that they spent all but $50 of their income on housing, or doctor's statements certifying that their living situation was harmful to their children. 111 Sometimes, families were told that they could stay overnight in the lobby of the Pitts Hotel to await an opening. More often they were told to return to the living arrangements that had preceded their episode of homelessness.

111 "Deposition of Father McKenna Center through Brian C. Carome," Clara Russell, et al., v. Marion Barry, et al., C.A. No. 87-2072 JGP, 4 Septemberl983, 106-7. 141

Dehavenon details how similar circumstances played out in New York City, whereby officials employed a range of "diversion tactics" to encourage shelter applicants to return to the doubled up situation they just left. 112 Like D.C., the New York City government was required by state law to provide shelter to families requesting it, and found it advantageous to discourage applicants through inhospitable barracks-like shelters and forcing families to spend their nights at welfare offices. People in D.C. were lining up outside the intake office for days in order to get assistance and Brian Carome remembers security guards running people out of the courtyard. Providers and advocates, including

Carome resorted to accompanying families to the Central Intake office and advocating on their behalf after they were turned down for shelter. While he found that the city was more responsive at first, eventually client advocates were refused entry into the office with families who were applying for shelter.

Even more insidious were reports that women were being encouraged to give up custody of their children. When they were told that there was no room in the family shelters, they were swayed to sign their children over to foster care while they stayed at the House of Ruth Women's Shelter and then seek to obtain custody of their children later. When Carome was at the Pitts Hotel Central Intake Office one evening, an announcement was made that none of the remaining families would be housed that night.

He approached a supervisor and asked her what could be done for these families. "She said 'there is always Child Protective Services as an option,' meaning she was saying in the middle of this crisis that the children ... [could be] taken away from their parents."113

112 Dehavenon. 113 "Deposition of Father McKenna Center through Brian C. Carome." 142

Of course the city vigorously denied this was occurring but advocates who witnessed it happening felt that thousands had entered foster care in this manner.

In response to the crisis, the McKenna Center opened up the city's first ever church-based emergency shelter for families. Borrowing the "Glean Machine" from

Luther Place Memorial Church, a vehicle that the church used to transport donated food, they found families sleeping outside in the courtyard of the Pitts Hotel, who had been waiting to get into shelter for days or weeks in some cases. Brian Carome recalls, "I remember scooping kids off the pavement of the courtyard at the Pitts Hotel at midnight, only to sleep on the floor of McKenna Center. It was horrible conditions - sleeping outside in the middle of a heat wave with several days in a row of 100 plus temperatures."

Maria Foscarinis from The National Coalition for the Homeless had just opened up an office in Washington and in 1987 and agreed to sue the District for violating the

Right to Shelter Law and denying families safe housing. Foscarinis was supported by a wider legal team, including Susie Sinclair - Smith, who was part of the newly formed

Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless. 114 Clara Russell and Evangeline Seabrook had been on the subsidized housing waiting list for years and found that there was an equally long wait list for District sponsored rental assistance. They were subsequently named plaintiffs in the case Russell v. Barry. At the same time, public housing had an

114 The Washington Legal Clinic was formed by Georgetown law students, who had a particularly active tradition and volunteered at CCNV. The Clinic was supported by the D.C. Bar, the Mental Health Law Project (now the Bazelon Center), and District judges. In partnership with the Father McKenna Center, several of these families were eventually placed in hotels, paid for by the National Coalition. 143

incredibly high vacancy rate. 115 The lawyer for the Barry administration approached

Brian Carome and asked "What can we do for those homeless folks?" Within days of

being named in the case, their housing certifications were processed and delivered to the

McKenna Center. During the course of the discussions, Carome, Doherty and Foscarinis

were meeting officials from the District's Department of Human Services when the issue

of forcing women to sign their children over to foster care came up again. The official

responded that the City did not condone it but that maybe they should start, because if a

few more lost custody of their kids, then they might stop having so many babies. Carome

responded: "For the first time the thought crystallized in me that these people hate the

poor." They eventually settled the case and the city agreed to produce an intake manual

revising their procedures and removing their most egregious intake standards.

Additional landmark legislation in the District codified the rights of families

seeking shelter and provided further ammunition for legal advocates frustrated with the

slow pace of change in the District's homeless services. The passage of the Emergency

Family Shelter Act of 198?1 16 clarified the rights of homeless families and mandated that

homeless families be placed in apartment style housing rather than hotels. The city

announced the following year that they would be closing the Capital City Inn Shelter on

New York A venue. In Barry's press conference, he announced the transfer of the

families to stable housing, but CCNV staged a "laugh-in" demonstration, citing his

115 Andrew H. Maxwell, "A Home By Any Means Necessary: Government Policy on Squatting in the Public Housing of a Large Mid-Atlantic City," in There's No Place Like Home: Anthropological Perspectives on Housing and Homelessness in the United States, ed. Anna Lou Dehavenon (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, I 999). Maxwell documents one city's policies that provided fiscal incentives to landlords to keep subsidized public housing units vacant and unmaintained.

116 This was also known as the "Crawford legislation." 144

unfulfilled promise to close the Pitts Hotel and the city's reliance on for-profit contractors to provide homeless services. Pitts Hotel residents were bused three times a day to

Mount Zion Baptist Church for meals, precluding them from accomplishing anything else if they were to eat or feed their children for the day. 117 In a later suit, D.C. Superior

Court Judge Levie ordered improved conditions in the family shelters and that families be moved out of run down welfare motels and into apartment style housing. But this too would take multiple court orders to bring the city into compliance. 118 Eventually, the city did close the Pitts and Capitol City Inn but continued to use other motels and for-profit entities to provide shelter for families well into the 1990' s, such as the Budget Motor Inn

(on NY A venue, NE), the Braxton Motel and General Scott Inn (both on Rhode Island

A venue, NW).

In a final suit concerning families, Neighborhood Legal Services took the city to court over families having 24-hour access to their rooms in Walls v. Barry. 119 When the judge granted a temporary injunction, the city responded by moving all families out of the Budget Motel and into the gymnasium at Randall School shelter, mixing women and children with single adult males. While the city claimed this was only a temporary move, they refused to disclose permanent plans for placement of these families. The court then

117 Barton Gellman, "DC Ordered to Provide Better Shelter. Families Must Be Moved Out of Hotels," Washington Post, 13 October 1990, B 1. LexisNexis [database online].

118 Ibid. The judge ordered this in spite of District efforts to repeal the right to shelter law. Judge Levie argued that repeal efforts had no bearing on the deplorable conditions in the shelters. This suit, Fountain v. Kelly will be discussed in the next chapter. Eventually though, the court order was vacated because of the repeal of the Right to Shelter law.

119 The details of this section are taken from Lynn E. Cunningham, "Emergency Shelter: Walls v. Barry," in Cold, Harsh, and Unending Resistance: The District of Columbia Government's Hidden War Against Its Poor and Its Homeless, eds. Michael Greenberger, Elizabeth Brown, and Anne Bowden (Washington, D.C.: Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless 22 November 1993). 145

ordered the Barry administration to develop a humane plan for these families but they continued to ignore court orders and use various legal maneuvers to delay proceedings.

On the eve of the trial, the city summarily moved all of the families out of Randall School and into a motel style shelter with 24-hour access, prompting the judge to dismiss the case, despite objections and a request for a definitive ruling on the access issue.

Concerned about the conditions and treatment in the city-run shelters for singles,

Mitch Snyder contacted a private law firm to investigate. 120 Homeless advocates maintained close relationships with various socially concerned lawyers and law firms, relying on legal resources as necessary. After they collected evidence of overcrowding,

sleeping on tables or floors, rodents and vermin, clogged toilets, infested and

contaminated bedding, and abuse at the hands of security guards, the firm initiated a class

action against the city in Atchison v Barry. Moreover, despite such awful conditions, in

their desperation, people were being turned away in large numbers. Father Jack

Wintermyer was a medical volunteer at the time and explained the deplorable conditions

in the men's shelters:

At some point, many of the security guards worked in the jails during the day would then work security at night in the shelters and often just sleep on the job. They would be terrible - just mean and nasty. They had a jail mentality. This included Blair, Emery, Pierce and Randall too.

In 1989, during the preliminary injunction hearing, the court "found the shelters to be

'horrendous' and 'virtual hell-holes'" and that District efforts to comply with the 1984

Right to Shelter law were "'executed so slowly and/or ineptly that they create problems at

120 The details of this section are taken from Lois G. Williams, "Emergency Shelter: Atchison v. Barry," in Cold, Harsh, and Unending Resistance: The District of Columbia Government's Hidden War Against Its Poor and Its Homeless, eds. Michael Greenberger, Elizabeth Brown, and Anne Bowden (Washington, D.C.: Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, 22 November 1993). 146

least as bad as those they were meant to resolve."' 121 D.C. Superior Court ordered that the District provide an adequate number of shelters and keep others open until further court order. They were also required to bring the shelters up to code, offer standardized hours and permit access for court monitors to check if court conditions were being met.

During the trial for a permanent injunction, the city negotiated a settlement in a detailed consent decree meant to bring the city into compliance with Initiative 17. It included measurable standards as well as other procedural improvements to shelter operations and required that the city keep open its eleven shelters, adding more as needed. Finally, it required that shelters be geographically dispersed throughout the

District to enable access to homeless individuals in each community.

The city was repeatedly held in contempt of court for conditions in the shelters, and in five months, the plaintiffs filed five separate contempt motions. At Blair, the city ordered cosmetic repairs and then stopped feeding residents the one meal a day they had been providing. CCNV responded with another lawsuit, Community for Creative Non-

Violence v. Barry but was only able to delay the decision to cut meals temporarily until the city satisfied due process requirements of providing sufficient notice to residents.

Returning to court under the Atchison case, the judge held that the city had violated the

1989 Consent order in "virtually every respect." Compliance

has been sporadic and tardy - frequently coerced under threat of contempt or other court action. Its violations of that Order are flagrant and inexcusable. Each such violation threatens the health and safety of homeless citizens of the District of Columbia; in conjunction with each other and with unquestionably foreseeable natural forces, the violations constitute an imminent danger to those citizens' very 1ives.. s trong measures are reqmre. d . 122

121 Ibid., 50 and 51.

122 Ibid., 53. 147

The judge ordered $30,000 a day fines, agreeing to reduce them if the city complied with any part of the order. Amazingly, the District still refused to comply, paying the full

amount of the fines for a period of time and $5-10,000 per day for more than 1.5 years,

for a total of $1.4 million! 123

Barry's administration was less concerned with complying with the law, or the

numerous court orders than with his efforts to repeal the laws that stood in his way. The

city repeatedly used legal strategies to delay and blockade court orders. They even

attempted to use the legal fines as evidence that they were unable to comply with the law,

arguing that previous court fines carried too much of a financial burden to permit further

compliance, thereby blaming the lawyers and courts officials for its problems. Again and

again, the Department of Human Services and the Office of Emergency Shelter and

Support Services failed to comply with consent decrees, the legal orders or court

determinations, oftentimes becoming outright obstructionist. The legal proceedings were

lengthy, costly and draining - embittering many. Moreover, the incessant litigation really

soured attitudes on all sides. The Barry Administration's attempts to stonewall advocates

both in and out of the courtroom left many feeling that it was impossible to work with the

city and that public officials could not be trusted.

The decade closed with private shelters rebuffing city efforts to restrict both

emergency shelter and transitional shelter operations, and even preparing to refuse

123 This continued until the Jaw was eventually repealed. The funds from the fines were used to create a Trust for Affordable Housing in the District - providing Joans and grants to agencies that created Single Room Occupancy housing. 148

government funds. Luther Place had been receiving a small amount of funds from the

Department of Human Services (DHS) 124 for the operation of Sarah's House for several years. The city suddenly required that residents in transitional facilities must be D.C.

residents and be approved by DHS within 48 hours of staying in the shelter. They also

limited stays to 90 days unless they had approval from DHS to extend the time limit.

Finally, they required that facilities have 24-hour operations. Faced with city

bureaucracy, Luther Place was prepared to refuse city funds as an "unacceptable

interference in our shelter program" until the City Council stepped in and revised the

rules. 125 Given these circumstances, it was easy to question whose interests were really

being served.

What is interesting about the public debates over the Right to Shelter Law is that

the Mayor claimed there were skyrocketing costs associated with its implementation.

The city's expenditures for homeless services were around 10 million in 1985. Budget

costs had reached 27 million by 1988 and were projected to reach 40 million by 1990. 126

In reality, the mounting costs were connected to Barry's corruption and the mounting

legal fees that resulted from the government's refusal to implement Initiative 17- not of

the number of families suddenly seeking due process under the new law. According to

Susie Sinclair-Smith, the director of the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless at the

time, 75% of the homeless services budget went toward family hotels, which indicated "a

124 DHS replaced the Department of Human Resources.

125Dick Portvedt, Women's Shelter Committee, to the Church Council, report [ 19 April 1989), courtesy Luther Place Memorial Church Archives, Washington, D.C.

126 McCall, Nathan and Kent Jenkins Jr., "DC Votes to Limit Aid to Homeless. Hill Hears Testimony on Overpriced Shelter," Washington Post, 13 June, 1990, Al. LexisNexis [database online]. 149

blanket mismanagement of the program." 127 But Barry succeeded in swaying public opinion and even secured the support of the D.C. City Council for the repeal of Initiative

17. By the end of the decade, the city was in the midst of a major fiscal crisis, due in part to the Mayor's overall mismanagement of public funds. That financial reality contributed to public concerns over continuing to fund the mandatory shelter initiative. In June of

1990, the D.C. City Council voted to end unlimited shelter for the homeless and authorized the city to restrict spending for homeless shelters. The Council also voted that maximum stays for singles could be no longer than 30 days and 90 days for families, while anyone who was employed or held public benefits would have to put aside 30% of their income into an escrow account. 128 Activists marched into Council chambers alongside homeless families but were unsuccessful in dissuading the elected body to reconsider. They pressed forward by collecting enough signatures to force a second referendum during the general election, known as Referendum 5. But in 1989, public sympathy had waned and voters overturned the Right to Shelter law by a narrow margin.

It is important to note here that the city government that Barry inherited was still in its infancy. It was only in 1974 that the District had been granted limited home rule and Barry was only the second elected black Mayor when local politics were still controlled in large part by Congress and the federal administration in the White House.

Speaking on Barry's reelection in 1986 and why there were no serious challengers, Jaffe and Sherwood wrote, "the answer is that the District's twelve-year old political system

127 Barton Gellman, "DC Ordered to Provide Better Shelter. Families Must Be Moved Out of Hotels," Washington Post, 13 October 1990, BI. LexisNexis [database online].

128 Nathan McCall and Kent Jenkins Jr., "DC Votes to Limit Aid to Homeless. Hill Hears Testimony on Overpriced Shelter," Washington Post, 13 June 1990, Al. LexisNexis [database online]. 150

was a democratic disaster. The city had virtually none of the checks and balances fundamental to a democracy. It had become a one-party, one-man rule that allowed

Barry to become the boss in the crippled experiment of limited home rule."129 Adolph

Reed argues that "black urban regimes" often inherit municipal cores that have been

abandoned by industry and experienced losses in population, income, and employment. 130

So when they assume leadership, they are already governing the most depressed

economies. Not only was Washington, D.C. struggling with establishing itself, but it was

also trying to rebound from over a century of corrupt federal leadership. Undeniably,

Barry may have inherited a dysfunctional government but he did little to reform the

government during his tenure. Few would dispute that D.C. government was incredibly

corrupt and inept during his administration. Marion Barry saw himself in a battle with a

white society around him and advocates could not escape the irony of it all. Tensions

between CCNV and Mayor Barry were often so severe because they did not hesitate to

attack his leadership or call into question his commitment to the poor. They reminded

him that he had turned his back on the people who had once supported him the most.

The White House and the Model Shelter

Probably the most widely publicized struggle for CCNV was their campaign for a

federally funded model shelter in the heart of Washington, D.C. In January of 1983, they

engaged in civil disobedience by taking over the Capital rotunda to protest the lack of

129 Jaffe and Sherwood, 180.

130 Adolph Reed Jr., Stirrings in the Jug: Black Politics in the Post-Segregation Era (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 151

shelter. 131 Two months later, the Reagan administration announced that under-utilized or unused HUD, DOD, or GSA buildings could be borrowed by city governments for use as emergency shelters. 132 Congress followed suit by offering money to renovate those buildings.

CCNV member Justin Brown set his sights on the old Federal City College building at Second and D Streets, NW. With the help of Susan Baker, the White House

Chief of Staff James Baker's wife, they secured the building which was vacant and for sale. Mrs. Baker was a key supporter who created the federal Task Force on Homeless.

Under her leadership, the task force was charged with distributing federal properties to cities for the purpose of opening shelters. 133 However, the Health and Human Services

Administration (HHS) refused to lease the building directly to a private group and requested that the city lease it and make it available to CCNV for a shelter. Mayor

Barry's relationships with both the federal government and CCNV were at best antagonistic. Barry insisted that since it was an agreement between the federal government and CCNV and that he was not going to assume responsibility. Though

CCNV was successful in the end, the federal administration felt Barry's government was being obstructionist during the negotiations by refusing to take financial control of the building. They secured the building late in 1983 but they discovered it needed major repairs and renovations in order to move in, despite initial assessments otherwise.

CCNV needed a place to house the homeless over the holidays while the building was

131 Hopper, Reckoning With Homelessness.

132 Rader, 200.

133 Ibid., 204. 152

repaired. Miraculously, Oliver and Phil Carr offered the presidential hotel that was slated

for redevelopment and happened to be vacant at the time. Carr managed to have blankets

and fuel delivered and utilities turned on in within one day. 134 CCNV stayed for three

weeks until they were able to move into the Federal City Shelter.

However, not everyone was comfortable with such a dramatic shift in focus for

the CCNV political community. Members and supporters were concerned about

Snyder's complicity with the federal government, the city and with major developer

Oliver Carr. A friend of CCNV quoted by Victoria Rader was concerned that Snyder had

been co-opted:

Of course, what he's allowed Reagan to do here is appear concerned. After all the massive cut-backs that have devastated hundreds of thousands of poor people, how is giving Mitch a building for a couple of months an indication of genuine concern for the poor? It's Reagan who won this one, a token gesture that confuses the public and obfuscates the truth. Mitch is being used, and he should know better. 135

Some advocates and supporters felt that smaller shelters were more appropriate and

humane, though they recognized the importance of providing a low barrier shelter.

According to Fennelly, homeless were routinely removed from shelters when they were

intoxicated. Pastor John Steinbruck wrote an editorial to the Post disputing the funds

given to CCNV for the operation of a large barracks-like shelter. Steinbruck was

dismayed that efforts by other advocates to develop smaller shelters were ignored during

these negotiations:

The White House decision preempted the work of the Health and Human Services task force that was created to find solutions to the problem of homelessness. House District Committee officials have also expressed shock; they had been

134 Ibid., 207.

135 Ibid., 210. Emphasis in original. 153

striving for a comprehesive [sic] four-year agreement for $4 million to $6 million a year to provide small, manageable shelters and had already identified three suitable buildings. 136

Instead, Steinbruck pressed the administration to work with smaller providers and open up shelters that were more humane for the homeless.

By the spring, the CCNV community was tom internally and exhausted from running the Second Street shelter. The shelter became a permanent part of the community and members who were burnt out could not see a way out of what was really only supposed to be an emergency relief measure. Running the shelter, the Drop In, the

Infirmary, and the soup kitchen, while sorting and distributing tons of donations, all took its toll. When Harold Moss and Justin Brown, who were two crucial members, left the community it was devastating. However, political activism continued during this time, as

CCNV was extensively involved in securing the passage of Initiative 17 at the same time they were working with government officials around the issue of the federal shelter.

Snyder was unfazed and proposed another major political campaign and fast to protest Reagan's re-election, while pressing the federal government to renovate the

Second Street building as a model shelter. Rader documented a contentious community meeting in which Snyder snapped at weary members:

"Fine. What would you recommend? Choose 20 of our favorite people and set up an intimate little shelter somewhere? We'd all like to do that, but it can't be done. We've got 1000 people counting on our place as their home!"137

"We can't get 10 or 15 small shelters going ....Think about it - how many would it take, for that many people? ... And how would we staff them all, and get food

136 John F. Steinbruck, "Is the $5 Million the Real Solution?" Washington Post, 23 March 1986, F8. LexisNexis [database online].

137 Rader, 219. 154

around? A centralized shelter is the only way to provide all the services this many people need." 138

When he encountered a lot of resistance within the community, he threatened to leave

CCNV if members did not capitulate. Finally, the community relented and agreed to hold

both a fast and demonstrations to apply the maximum pressure on the Reagan

Administration. With the elections and the impending cold weather, in the fall of 1984

CCNV staged five weeks of demonstrations, titled the "Harvest of Shame"139 to protest a

hodgepodge of Reagan policies, including nuclear weapons, state sponsored torture in

Central America as well as the homeless problem. Modeled after a Catholic Bishop

paper entitled the "Seamless Garment," protestors understood the social justice

connections between international policy and domestic injustices. Post columnist

Michel Marriott quoted the following about the demonstrations: 'The protesters charged

that Reagan's programs and policies are moving the world closer to nuclear destruction,

dismantling social programs that large numbers of women and children depend upon and

threatening women's quest for justice and equality."14° CCNV members and supporters

were being arrested daily, including Catholic nuns who supported their efforts. CCNV

Community members were very sensitive to media coverage and savvy about garnering

public attention. Once the fast and protests were underway but receiving little press,

Snyder proposed a pray in at the White House. 141 The five-week demonstration ended

138 Ibid., 220.

139 Hombs, "Reversals of Fortune," 118.

140 Michel Marriott, "Anti-Reagan Rally Starts Protest Month," Washington Post, 2 October 1984, C3. LexisNexis [database online].

141 Rader, 224. CCNV press was very focused on Initiative 17 at the time. 155

with a finale of 74 arrests on the last day. After getting into through a White House tour, members attempted to walk out on the White House lawn and police responded violently.

Protestors were carted off to jail but succeeded in drawing sufficient attention to their cause. With so much national media attention a few days before the election, Reagan

relented and agreed to pay for the renovations to create a model shelter, ending Mitch

Snyder's much-publicized 51 day fast.

As before, victory was fleeting. Reagan's reelection did nothing to smooth the

renovation plans. There were reports though that the White House Administration was

looking for someone else to run the model shelter but could not locate anyone. The

Administration dragged its feet for months, past the date set for renovations to begin and

began backpedaling on its agreement with Snyder. The negotiations reached an impasse

during June of 1985, when the government finally stated that they would do small-scale

repairs that would help only in the short term and not the model permanent shelter

Reagan signed off on. CCNV was committed to housing five separate sub-shelters,

which would serve about 200 individuals each. They also planned to have medical

facilities, a central kitchen, laundry and shower facilities as well as staff offices. On the

other hand, the government was stuck on funding large amounts of open areas with

barracks style bunk beds. 142 The Administration stated outright that it was not willing to

spend anywhere near the $5-10 million that CCNV felt was necessary and in the end,

federal officials withdrew their offer. Under the surface, there was concern about the

precedent of a federal shelter and what that could mean if other cities made similar

142 Promises to Keep, VHS, Washington. D.C., Durrin Productions, 1988. According to Fennelly, this was a fairly accurate documentary about the shelter standoff. 156

requests. 143 CCNV countered that homelessness was everyone's responsibility to deal with and pressed for a strong federal commitment. The dispute dragged on for months after they took the federal government to court, and the judge ruled that though the government had made a "binding commitment," it did not have to work with CCNV to fulfill it. 144 One year after Reagan's re-election, the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless agreed to provide 780 additional shelter beds in the city using federal money and the judge approved this. The D.C. Coalition consisted of representatives of various church and private organizations who objected to CCNV' s confrontational style, so the move was not surprising given the group's position. Following the judge's decision, the White

House Administration announced plans to close the Second Street building and evict

CCNV, but Mayor Barry countered that they should not count on D.C. Police for help if they wanted the homeless removed from the building.

The battle for the model shelter continued through the end of the year and into the winter. The D.C. Coalition was offered money by the federal government to cover the costs of renovations and purchase for temporary shelter until April 1 of the follow year, while the Administration searched for smaller, more permanent shelter locations throughout the city. Behind the scenes, tensions escalated between the federal government and the city. Rader writes, "Federal officials were furious with city officials.

The city refused to cooperate when the federal government attempted to replace 2"d Street with an alternative shelter. The Mayor went so far as to personaJJy block the federal use

143 Rader, 234.

144 Ibid., 235. 157

of any city buildings, a rebellious act which federal officials would not soon forgive or forget."145

The D.C. Coalition made plans to renovate a large vacant building in Anacostia to shelter men and purchased two townhouses for women, which were slated to open in the fall of 1985. Anacostia was a neighborhood in Southeast D.C. and community members attended public hearings en masse to object to the location of this "replacement" shelter in their neighborhood in order to house men from downtown. Snyder accused the government and the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless of moving homeless people around as if they were a commodity while Anacostia residents accused the government of using their community as a dumping ground. 146 When the Anacostia shelter opened in

November of 1985, officials expected that the homeless residents of CCNV would move across town to the Anacostia shelter and even provided transportation to assist them.

However, CCNV residents refused to relocate and consequently, both shelters filled up.

Even with the utilities turned off, CCNV appealed and temporarily blocked their eviction from the Second Street shelter. 147 A further judicial appeal was turned down but CCNV planned to remain in the building until forcibly removed. Meanwhile, the D.C. Coalition assured the public that there was enough shelter space for the homeless in the city without the 2"d Street building.

145 Ibid., 243.

146 Promises to Keep.

147 Rader, 235. 158

David Mehl, a CCNV volunteer and aid to Republican Senator Mark Andrews, asked the Senator to intervene. 148 During this time, the city had considered a proposal to winterize the shelter, coming up with $250,000 if the Administration postponed the eviction. 149 By the end of the day, with mounting pressure from Congress, Reagan announced a halt to the eviction until the spring. While the battle between CCNV and the federal government continued, Barry committed to provide funds to get them through the next winter. In January of 1986, the city government gave CCNV 250,000 to make emergency winterization repairs, including repairing the roof. 150 It seemed that overnight, Mayor Barry changed his position on the shelter, perhaps fearing responsibility for all the people residing in the 2nd Street building. In fact, city officials were highly concerned about the prospect of having to shelter 800 residents from CCNV if it were closed, particularly in light of the Right to Shelter Law.

As the winter season ended and the potential arose again for eviction, Snyder began another fast to press the White House Administration once again to renovate the building. The CBS filming of Samaritan starring Martin Sheen brought additional pressure on the federal government and Reagan once again agreed to renovate the building. They settled on a $5 million price tag after another contentious round of negotiations and the dispute almost continued as Reagan later decided that the money would have to come from Congress. After another 4-day total fast, pressure from

148 Ibid., 242.

149Washington Post, 17 March 1986, A6. LexisNexis [database online]. In a strange twist of philosophy, the city also considered a proposal to force reluctant homeless individuals into shelter.

150 Ibid. 159

Congress and negative publicity, the administration agreed to cut a check for $1 million while Congress appropriated the rest. 151 Reagan's appropriations ended a four year struggle for CCNV to build its model federal shelter.

In 1986, the Anacostia shelter ran by the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless closed.

That same year, the D.C. Coalition was investigated for fraud over the use of the federal funds. Perhaps more importantly, the D.C. Coalition ceased to function as an advocacy directed organization or a true coalition of homeless service providers. Following the federal contract, the D.C. Coalition became a shelter contractor for the city. Terry Lynch, a former D.C. Coalition employee felt that they had become co-opted by its city contracts: "Their ability to be independent advocates diminished because the city held it as leverage." Clearly this had an impact on the Right to Shelter campaign.

The same could be said of CCNV and their pursuit of the mammoth shelter building at Second and D Streets. The energy that was absorbed by shelter operations really took a toll on the political community. Rader writes, "Ironically, a more subtle threat to CCNV's political agenda was the ability of government, by offering buildings and resources, to tie Community members down to service work, using up their time and energy." 152

National Legal Advocacy

Throughout most of history, it has been local charities that have responded to the needs of the poor. It was not until the Great Depression that the federal government

151 Rader, 244-5.

152 Ibid., 248. 160

provided emergency relief for its citizens, in part because local and state governments as well as charities collapsed. 153 Since FDR's New Deal and Johnson's War on Poverty programs, federal responsibility has gone through a slow retrenchment and worsened with the 1970' s recession. Nonprofit groups have since filled the gap in services, whether because of religious tradition or because of sheer need. By mid decade, advocates around the country realized that homelessness was growing nationally and they began clamoring for a federal level response to what was considered as a major crisis.

In the early 1980's, local coalitions fighting homelessness began appearing around the country, 154 leaving a void for a national level advocacy organization until an effort was made to organize the National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH) in 1982.

Local level politics encompassed much of the earlier part of the movement's energy but advocates realized that in order to produce sweeping structural change, something must be done at the national level. 155 Founding board member Michael Stoops elaborates:

At that time, there were no national organizations working on these issues. Mitch was local, radical, civil disobedience. The shelter providers were not like that. We needed a voice and style like Mitch but also needed a more traditional advocacy organization.

Going national signified a profound change in approach to homeless advocacy and produced significant results. Headquartered at first with the New York Coalition for the

Homeless, they legally incorporated two years later and for several years, NCH was the only organization explicitly working on national level policy issues and political

153 Cooper.

154 Hopper, Reckoning With Homelessness, 179.

155 Rob Rosenthal, "Dilemmas of Local Anti-homelessness Movements," in Homelessness in America, ed. Jim Baumohl (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1996). 161

mobilization. 156 Legal advocacy staff in New York decided that a field office in

Washington, D.C. was necessary in order to facilitate access the federal government.

Uniquely, D.C. is considered a place that attracts socially concerned activists and people that seek to influence national level politics. It presents an exceptional forum to work on both national and local level political reform and as such, it is an interesting microcosm of larger national trends. Robert Hayes headed up the National Coalition's New York office and Maria Foscarinis opened the D.C. office. 157

With a coalition of other national advocacy groups, NCH first drafted the

Homeless Person's Survival Act. Small pieces of this legislation were passed in 1986 as the Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act (HECA). 158 Foscarinis attributes part of their success in this effort to CCNV' s groundwork in Congress prior to opening the D.C. office

156 The Committee for Food and Shelter opened its doors in 1984 and was renamed in the early 1990' s as the National Alliance to End Homelessness, now widely known as a powerful national advocate for the homeless. According to Michael Stoops, they were widely regarded and effective at the time but with conservative leadership like Susan Baker, it shied away from advocacy and was therefore seen as part of the Reagan administration. The Alliance really changed when Nan Roman took over and it became more involved in lobbying and national advocacy. While the National Coalition perhaps takes on more radical positions, both groups work together on different policy issues. The National Low Income Housing Coalition, another widely regarded national level advocacy group was established several years later, in approximately 1988.

157 The NCH headquarters remained in New York through the late 1980's. According to Michael Stoops, the Executive Director for the National Coalition for the Homeless, The New York Coalition was well funded and had the resources to support a national presence. They had New York City contracts to provide case management, which was revolutionary for the time. Eventually, the New York office and the D.C. office split and the New York office ceased to exist. Robert Hayes went into private practice and Maria Foscarinis left the National Coalition in 1989 to found the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty. According to those close to the National Coalition, The National Coalition office in D.C. decided that a change in leadership was appropriate but supported Foscarinis' new program for the first year. The D.C. office of the National Coalition operated with a sizeable staff for a number of years, and even successfully unionized but has since had funding problems. Michael Stoops is now the only full time person left in that office.

158 Cooper. One of the first significant pieces of legislation that affected people who were homeless was the Emergency Jobs Appropriation Act of 1983, which provided for emergency food and shelter under FEMA. It was the first national program specifically aimed at aiding the homeless. Until then, there were only piecemeal efforts to provide shelter money through a variety of federal programs but never in a coordinated way. 162

of the National Coalition. 159 After the passage of HECA, Snyder approached Foscarinis

and other collaborating advocacy groups to work together on a much more comprehensive piece of legislation. Not surprisingly, Snyder proposed an all or nothing

approach for a $500 million emergency relief package to address the homeless crisis,

capitalizing on the prevailing opinion that homelessness was but a temporary crisis.

While some favored a more conservative, incremental approach, the collaborative

partners reluctantly agreed.

Mitch Snyder and homeless advocate Michael Stoops160 attracted media attention

to the issue by utilizing one of Snyder's key strategies: moving outside onto the steam

grates for the winter. Many others joined them for a few nights or a few weeks to add

pressure to Congress. In 1987, Martin Sheen even helped them organize the "Grate

American Sleepout" to drum up support for emergency aid to the homeless. Actors and

lawmakers who took the plunge included Dennis Quaid, Brian Dennehy, Representatives

Joe Kennedy II, John Conyers Jr., Mickey Leland, and even former adversary Mayor

Marion Barry. The late Representative Stewart B. McKinney, of whom the final bill was

named after, came out that evening to support the action. Although unknown at the time,

Representative McKinney was suffering from AIDS and reportedly contracted

pneumonia after participating in the action that evening, which ultimately resulted in his

death. While Snyder worked the media, Carol Fennelly called every member of

159 This is not to be confused with the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless, which was primarily a local alliance that focused on District issues. As noted in this chapter, the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless later became a large shelter provider for the District. Foscarinis explained that groups got together all over the country and called themselves "Coalitions for the Homeless" but were not necessarily affiliated with each other or the National Coalition for the Homeless. To add to the confusion, the name for the New York Coalition for the Homeless has been shortened to The Coalition for the Homeless.

160 Michael Stoops is not only a founding board member of the National Coalition, but worked tirelessly as a community organizer alongside CCNV and is now the Coalition's Executive Director. 163

Congress to request meetings with the organizers of this bill and galvanize support.

Together, they reintroduced legislation containing Title 1 of the Homeless Person's

Survival Act, the original legislation drafted by Foscarinis and other advocates. The new bill was titled Urgent Relief for the Homeless Act and was passed that year by large bipartisan majorities. After the death of its chief Republican sponsor, Representative

Stewart B. McKinney, it was renamed the McKinney- Vento Homeless Assistance Act and reluctantly signed into law by President Reagan.

The McKinney Act was a huge victory. The legislation "recognized homelessness as 'an immediate and unprecedented crisis' requiring a federal response 'to meet the critically urgent needs of the homeless of the Nation. "'161 It created over a dozen federal programs that comprised emergency relief for food, shelter and health care; it created the US Interagency Council on Homelessness162 and was authorized for two years at $1 billion, with $500 million earmarked for the first year. 163 Homeless assistance went from a patchwork of programs and services to a major comprehensive plan to address the issue, albeit through emergency aid. Over the next decade, the McKinney

Act provided a vehicle for a major infusion of money into local communities around the country; in D.C., it resulted in an explosion of homeless assistance programs within a few short years. Homelessness had finally gained legitimacy, as did its advocates.

161 Foscarinis, ''Homelessness, Litigation and Law Reform Strategies: A United States Perspective."

162 Interestingly, Mary Ellen Hombs went on to work as the Deputy Director for the U.S. Interagency Council on the Homeless.

163 Since being reauthorized, it has expanded significantly, creating the Continuum of Care model of programs serving the homeless, discussed in the next chapter. 164

Only five years after its passage, Foscarinis wrote a critical perspective on the

McKinney Act, concerned with the institutionalization of homelessness. The Act's focus on the emergency nature of the problem created some challenges for the advocacy community. "With the cry for shelters no longer heard - or believable as a cry for emergency aid - the movement lost its sense of potency."164 Hombs concurs:

The moral outrage relied on in the beginning to legitimize demands is swallowed up in the politics of access, the inadequate half-measures and constant undertow that define the federal legislative, regulatory and budgetary processes. Vision defects. When advocates no longer write the agenda, they become marginalized in their own right. ...

In the case of homelessness, a flood of shelter workers, social workers, researchers and more have now populated the horizon and rely on local and federal funds to support their work. All of these developments tend to have the sedating effect on the urgency and scope of goals, as well as on the choice of process. 165

Prior to the legislation's passage, the primary focus for providers had been managing homelessness and dealing with constant overwhelm from the lack of sufficient resources.

But instead of shifting the focus towards homeless eradication, the McKinney Act reinforced just the opposite. Moreover, according to Foscarinis, the McKinney Act had the unintended consequence of censuring some advocates who were reluctant or prohibited from criticizing government policies. The McKinney Act was never intended to be a long-term solution but prior to the federal legislation, homelessness was not even considered an issue, much less one warranting federal attention. Moreover, Titles II and

III of the Homeless Person's Survival Act, which addressed homeless prevention and

164 Maria Foscarinis, "Beyond Homelessness: Ethics, Advocacy and Strategy," Saint Louis University Public Law Review 12 (1993): 57.

165 Hombs, "Reversals of Fortune," 121. 165

long term solutions, were never enacted. However, Foscarinis cautions against concluding that it was the McKinney Act that caused the institutionalization of homelessness. She reminds readers that emergency aid was woefully inadequate if not essential at that time, and suggests that perhaps not having a follow up plan to press for more permanent solutions after the passage of the McKinney Act may have resulted in the problems we see today. 166 Unfortunately, as services expanded, advocacy efforts focused instead on litigation aimed at implementation and monitoring of McKinney

programs. 167

Over the course of the next two years, national attention shifted focus toward the

need for affordable housing, which built momentum and led up to a national housing

march in October of 1989. The National Union of the Homeless made a brief effort to

organize in D.C. and co-sponsored events with CCNV and others in the area, including

plans for a national march. The National Union sought to empower homeless men and

women in their struggle for "decent and humane living." 168 The loosely organized group

was a nontraditional union that emerged out of the Kensington Welfare Rights movement

in Philadelphia. Founder Chris Sprowal collaborated with the Hospital Workers 1199,

who suggested the union structure and was given some seed money to start the union by

the Local 1199 in 1985. The union went national and affiliated with the Hospital

166 Foscarinis, "Beyond Homelessness: Ethics, Advocacy and Strategy," 58.

167 Foscarinis, "Homelessness, Litigation and Law Reform Strategies: A United States Perspective."

168 Gregg Barak, Gimme Shelter: A Social History of Homelessness in Contemporary America (New York: Praeger, 1991), 141. 166

Workers 1199, growing the National Union's membership to 18,000 in three years. 169

Local chapters were established in cities around the nation. When a meeting was held in

D.C. to form a chapter, nearly 100 homeless individuals showed up. The group organized their focus around immediate change and direct action that included occupying both public and private vacant properties.

Local union organizer Victoria Luna organized a group of about 40 homeless squatters to take over a boarded up apartment building on the 1300 block of Riggs Street,

NW and managed a standoff for several weeks in spring of 1988. This was an effort to dramatize the lack of affordable housing in D.C.170 Most of her efforts in the few years that the Union existed in D.C. were directed towards building takeovers, a strategy which had been moderately successful around the country in getting jurisdictions to tum over those properties to homeless protestors for productive use. In July of 1988, 61 cities around the country demonstrated for affordable housing, including the National Union of the Homeless. People questioned the "radical" and "illegal" tactics of the National Union and Chris Sprowal objected: "Do you think it's radical to want a job and a home for your family? We're as American as apple pie."171

Early in 1988, CCNV went to a march in Atlanta on Super Tuesday before the presidential race. In the first of many marches for homeless issues, the national march involving thousands of homeless poor as well as advocates was co-sponsored by CCNV

169 Ibid.

170 The group also prolesled alongside members of Housing Action! when the city ran out of TAP money two months into the fiscal year. Luna was even arrested after trying to gather people at the Capital City Inn family shelter to attend a briefing on the program.

171 Ibid., 142. 167

and the National Coalition for the Homeless, in conjunction with the Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless. 172 Incredibly, all the democratic candidates for that election showed

up in support. According to Kim Hopper, "campaigns were mounted in Washington,

Atlanta, Boston, Cincinnati, San Francisco, and other cities to "take off the boards" and

reclaim the unoccupied space of abandoned housing."173 In the weeks leading up to the

elections of 1988, once again CCNV members engaged in many acts of civil

disobedience and even another highly publicized fast to continue bearing down on public

consciousness around homeless and housing issues. After a day of housing related

demonstrations that October, protestor Wayne Vorhees released a Housing Now! banner

off of a TV tower on Georgia A venue to bring attention to the need for affordable

housing. The Washington Post reported that several residents of CCNV occupied the

offices of one Senator and tried to "evict" Senator Jesse Helms from his office chambers

by removing his furniture and belongings. 174 Their highly publicized protests drew

activists from around the country and contrasted with their local efforts for emergency

aid. CCNV even erected tarpaper shacks and chicken coops on the Capitol lawn in

protest over lack of decent housing and the number of children residing in unsanitary

shelters. 175

172 Hopper, Reckoning With Homelessness.

173 Ibid., 179.

174 Lynne Duke, "A Campaign of Civil Disobedience; Until Nov. 8, Activists for the Homeless Fast, Face Daily Arrest," Washington Post, 16 October 1988, Bl. LexisNexis [database online].

175 "Capitol Shacks Protest Homelessness," Washington Post, 14 July 1988, B6. LexisNexis [database online]. 168

CCNV staged a local Affordable Housing March from the Capitol City Inn to

CCNV as the finale of six weeks of daily protests at the Capitol and fasts by community members. During this event, Cher was in town to promote her new perfume at the former

Hecht's department store. She saw a feature on Carol Fennelly's fast for affordable housing and contacted her to see what she could do. Fennelly asked if she could march.

for her that day in the Affordable Housing March because she was fasting and too weak

to walk. They started the march at the reputed welfare hotel on New York A venue and

marched right past Hecht's. Cher reportedly concluded her press conference abruptly to join the marchers.

The national focus on affordable housing culminated in a multi-state Housing

Now! march on Washington in 1989. The event was co-sponsored by CCNV in

conjunction with cities around the country to protest the lack of decent affordable

housing and to gather support for the National Affordable Housing Act. March

organizers included CCNV, National Low Income Housing Coalition, the National

Coalition for the Homeless, and the National Union of Homeless, 176 but many more

groups provided support and formed a national coalition called Housing Now! It even

had the political support of Congressional and local leaders. The idea for a mass rally

was born out of a national conference in Atlanta nearly one year earlier in which groups

from around the country (including CCNV) participated in developing a strategy for a

national homeless agenda. Snyder approached the Board of Directors for the National

Coalition for the Homeless about the idea. Support was tenuous but he convinced

enough board members to gain their blessing. Snyder, Hombs and Fennelly were the

176 The National Union of Homeless is no longer in existence. 169

main organizers and arranged for many celebrities to join the event, including actor Jon

Voight, Valerie Harper, Dionne Warwick and Linda Evans. It also included performances by Stevie Wonder and Jefferson Airplane, Los Lobos and Tracey

Chapman. It culminated in a beautifully orchestrated children's event, in which young children pulled little red wagons with thousands of letters from youth around the country about housing issues to deliver to the House Speaker Tom Foley.

However, the march was also fraught with problems. Groups from all over the eastern seaboard marched to Washington in time to join the main march in D.C. One contingent marched from Roanoke to Washington. A second contingent marched from

New York to D.C. John Stewart, from Massachusetts led the northern Housing Now! march. Fennelly reported that Stewart blamed Snyder because he promised the marchers sneakers and other material items that Snyder could not possibly provide. He denied making these promises, asserting that there was no way that CCNV could deliver on those commitments. At the very least, marchers were promised food and shelter when they arrived. Tensions and disputes arose though when out-of-state participants, many of whom were homeless, were offered sleeping space on the CCNV basement floor and only

given peanut butter and jelly sandwiches to eat. In addition, coalition members in D.C.

were also not prepared for participants to arrive sick and needing emergency medications,

which ate into organizational budgets as they scrambled to take care of people's medical

needs.

In a partial victory for such extensive demonstrations, the National Affordable

Housing Act was passed in 1990 but funds were never appropriated to the degree

necessary to support its mandates. The Act was created to set aside affordable housing 170

units, expand federal rental assistance programs, and assist prospective homeowners with saving money for down payments.

Conclusion

The decade ended with success, setback, and controversy. CCNV members pressed in vain for a national monument of a homeless family standing over a heating grate to be erected on the Ellipse. By the end of the decade, there were some 1400 men and women staying at their newly renovated model shelter, due solely to the persistence of the CCNV community. Clearly not everyone regarded this as success but regardless, it was a widely celebrated victory. When the federal government agreed to include homeless individuals in the 1990 Census count for the first time, Snyder and CCNV members refused to participate or even allow the forms in the building. Snyder felt the process was fundamentally flawed and opted out. Homeless counts were hotly contested and especially at that time, no one really had good numbers. Consequently, Snyder and

Hombs were widely criticized for overinflating statistics published in A Forced March to

Nowhere and their refusal to participate in the census renewed criticisms and controversy surrounding homeless counts.

In conjunction with the NY Coalition for the Homeless, CCNV arranged to hold

Congressional hearings on homelessness in the basement of Second Street shelter. But other than drawing federal attention to the issue, it is not clear whether the hearing resulted in tangible benefits for homeless men and women around the country. In a hurry to get to a Redskins game, Mayor Barry briefly promoted D.C. government efforts to meet the needs of its citizens (utilizing statistics from private nonprofits) and neglected to 171

suggest any concrete resolutions. 177 While Mayors from around the country pressed the federal government for assistance with homeless issues, Barry asked the federal government to expand food and nutritional programs.

By the end of the decade, Mayor Marion Barry was embroiled in multiple scandals for his political decisions and personal indiscretions. A Congressional House

Government Operations subcommittee panel took testimony on the millions of dollars the city spent in overpriced and dilapidated temporary shelter for people with personal or political ties to Mayor Barry. 178 The D.C. City Council even held hearings on

Department of Human Services (DHS) contracting fraud while the Department's director was facing trial for corruption charges. During one two-year period, there were four different department heads at DHS. Given these circumstances, it was no surprise that publicly run homeless services were minimal at best. The city's final defeat came with

Mayor's embarrassing arrest in 1990.

In the midst of the city's corruption scandals, CCNV had their own share of controversy. While the City Council was investigating the DHS fraud, they also raised concerns about how taxpayer money was subsidizing CCNV operations. For nearly two

177 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs; Subcommittee on 1 Housing and Community Development, Second Congressional Hearings on Homelessness in America, 98 h Cong., 2"d sess., 24 January 1984, 67-8. http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxyau. wrlc.org/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING-ID=HRG-1984-BFU-0002 (accessed 4 March 2008). Barry was representing the U.S. Conference of Mayors. In Barry's prepared testimony that he submitted but did not have time to read, he is quoted "There must be a solution to this dilemma. It is our hope to coordinate the expertise and availability of resources to those in the public and private sectors who provide housing, employment, mental health, medical care, and other services needed by the homeless, to come up with an answer." Barry's statements to the Congressional Committee mentioned the federal government taking the lead but that it was a shared responsibility amongst government and non-profit organizations. He also cites the Districts expenditures for the year prior for emergency assistance (for food and shelter) had increased 77%.

178 Nathan McCall and Kent Jenkins, Jr., "DC Votes to Limit Aid to Homeless. Hill Hears Testimony on Overpriced Shelter," Washington Post, 13 June 1990, AL LexisNexis [database online]. 172

years, concern had been mounting over CCNV's use of charitable and city funds as well

as the lack of accountability, given that the group was not incorporated as a nonprofit at

the time. Not surprisingly, the activist community was not even submitting tax returns,

despite that they were receiving nearly $400,000 annual subsidies for trash and utilities at

the Second Street shelter. But Snyder would often taunt officials with his claims that it

would take the city millions to run the shelter that CCNV does for "free." Of course

"free" did not exactly mean free. "Free" included the city subsidies as well as an

undisclosed amount of private donations. Snyder often cited $200, 000 as the cost of

running the shelter annually, which was solely operated by resident volunteers, even

though CCNV submitted records to the city indicating that the actual figure was nearly

double that. 179 The vague expenditure reports raised more than a few eyebrows but the

fear of having responsibility for 1400 CCNV residents was often enough to quiet

anyone's dissent. Still, some members of the D.C. Council were concerned that the city

was funding advocacy with taxpayer monies, and that there was no accountability with

the DHS contracts. The battle came to a head when city officials attempted to apply for

federal reimbursement for its annual expenditures for shelter operations but discovered

that this was only possible if CCNV was a tax-exempt organization.180 Snyder and

Fennelly publicly refused to apply for tax-exempt status, citing their Catholic Worker

anti-establishment tradition and philosophical opposition. Fennelly wrote in an editorial:

179 Nadine P. Winter, " ... And Accounts," Washington Post, 15 April 1990, D8. LexisNexis [database online].

180 Ibid. 173

"Real change occurs for everyone only when we give of our substance rather that [sic] our excess, or m. or d er to receive . a tax wnte . off"l81 .

Meanwhile, the IRS had been investigating CCNV for about a year. They raised questions about the $150,000 Mitch received from the proceeds from his 1986 TV movie

The Samaritan. Carol Fennelly recalls what precipitated CCNV's federal tax scandal:

Mitch testified before a Congressional committee and boasted that [CCNV] was not tax exempt. [Representative] Delay reported CCNV to the IRS. The IRS wanted us to pay payroll taxes or we had to become tax-exempt. They billed Mitch for $80,000 for monies he received after the CBS film [The Samaritan]. Mitch turned that money over to CCNV of course.

Eventually CCNV did agree to pursue tax-exempt status and enlisted a pro bono legal firm to help with both issues. But this was just the beginning of the city's accountability issues and was a consequence of not having effective government oversight. Not only was the city refusing to provide leadership, but by not acknowledging that this is the city's problem, it also avoided responsibility altogether. For advocates, this meant that the city did not have a stake in resolving the problem and would therefore require continued action to prod the government to respond effectively.

Within the CCNV community, relations were fraught with tension. Consensus decision-making was an important ideal but older members effectively maintained control and charted the direction of the group. As a former CCNV member, Craig Keller considered this contradiction:

Mitch emerged as the unofficial leader, because of his personal charisma and cultural authority. This authority was based on one's time spent on the cause and the extremes to which one would go in the various campaigns. There were many others without this type of authority, and their opinions were not as valued. This

181 Carol Fennelly, "CCNV Clears Some Inaccuracies," Washington Times, 26 October 1989, F2. LexisNexis [database online]. Interestingly, independent Catholic Worker houses around the country do not accept federal funds; nor do they seek tax exempt status. 174

was accentuated by the huge turnover of the staff, who were often physically and emotionally drained and lacking a clear, coherent vision. In short, cultural currency was based on one's commitment. Moreover, the currency was not always about shared beliefs or values; rather, there was a false sense of non­ hierarchical structure and counter-cultural tendencies.

Members agreed that the intense publicity was tearing the community apart while taking

on the shelter signaled the beginning of the end of the CCNV political community.

Harold Moss stated:

In some ways, when we created the shelter it was an accomplishment. But it failed to create a community of spiritual force because of our profound differences. And the national focus that Mitch got really destroyed the community. I loved and respected Mitch. Unfortunately, he became too controlled by his identity, which was empowered by the media and society. He became a leader instead of part of the community.

The fasts were particularly divisive for CCNV supporters and challengers. It did not help

that opponents characterized Snyder as a child who stops eating until he gets his way. 182

Tensions escalated between members and once the shelter operation was underway,

CCNV operations elsewhere were scaled back significantly. Carol Fennelly worked

intensively on bringing in services to meet the immense needs of the shelter residents.

Fennelly pointed to the shifting dynamics within the community as newer members

joined and operations focused on running the shelter.

We still had to do sustaining work of organizing. The shelter was overwhelming. We operated with the best use of our resources and kept it all going. But we grew too fast and had too much responsibility. The downfall of the community was taking on Second and D [Street shelter]. Our radical community was so overwhelmed with running the place that politics took second place.

The political community remained active for some time in the late 1980' s, but then

dissipated once all members were required to move into the shelter to help staff the

182 Chris Spolar, "Could Tide Be Turning Against Mitch Snyder?; Recent Tactics Leave Even Allies Puzzled," Washington Post, 26 March 1990, El. LexisNexis [database online]. Comments of Council member H.R. Crawford. 175

programs. Those who had recently joined the community did not have any experience working with the homeless shelter residents and so struggled with providing both compassion and structure. "Our weaknesses magnified when we were running the shelter," said Harold Moss. Core member Mary Ellen Hombs left when the remaining

CCNV community houses closed. In practice, balancing service with political advocacy proved difficult. Within a few years, CCNV would come full circle: from their beginnings as a fledgling political community, to the experimentation with direct service mixed with advocacy, to its final role as a shelter provider.

Their collective sacrifices took a toll on everyone who participated. Advocacy work strained relationships and the personal drain proved enormous and costly. Between losing the second shelter referendum, tensions within CCNV, and problems with his long time companion Carol Fennelly, Mitch Snyder endured a lot of emotional trauma. Those close to him knew too that he had suffered the effects of drugs and mental illness and the strain of advocacy work added enormous additional pressure. Fennelly described

Snyder's turmoil:

There was a lot of fracturing within CCNV. Mitch was on the road for one year, and Harold [Moss] tried to take over CCNV and kick both of us out. Mitch was devastated. Mitch mounted a counter attack and then Harold left to go to Europe .... He was devastated when the homeless movement turned on him. Then I left him and he was falling apart. This all fed into [him feeling that everyone was] abandoning him.

Sadly, in July of 1990, Mitch Snyder committed suicide. After Mitch's death, Harold

Moss returned from Europe and tried to rejoin the community but he and Fennelly struggled over control of the group. Eventually, Moss was forcibly removed and barred from the premises while Fennelly assumed responsibility for the CCNV shelter. In 176

retrospect, Fennelly would have liked to work with Moss, citing that his skills complemented hers but felt that he wanted to assume Snyder's authority within the

organization. Moss too felt betrayed and did not agree with what he called Fennelly's

"institutionalization" of the shelter.

Many factors augmented the development of homeless movements in the city.

Throughout the decade, concern mounted over the number of high profile hypothermia

deaths and the sudden spike in visible homelessness. What appeared to be a new

epidemic, at least for this generation, required intense urgency that was only fueled by

official reluctance and what some considered callousness. The Mayor's counter

strategies- whether through parking enforcement harassment, denying entry to public

assistance centers, or even threatening arrest - smacked of retaliation. Though

frustrating, it only spurned further activism. In fact, finding creative ways to get arrested

was an important element of strategy. It wasn't until the following decade that

intimidation and threats of lost funding more effectively demobilized people. Advocates

responded accordingly to the crisis by employing a range of tactics to accomplish

progressive social change that really energized the movement and attracted diverse

characters. While divisive at times, this made room for a lot of different personalities to

contribute in meaningful ways, to make a difference in the lives of homeless poor and

wield political influence. People like Hombs, Moss, Fennelly and Snyder were

enormously invested in the cause and communities around the country turned out in

record numbers on behalf of a host of poverty issues, risking their reputations and putting

their lives on the line. In D.C., a rich political community drew activists from around the

country, creating a massive volunteer base to draw from and whom were willing to do 177

just about anything to forward specific causes. What made D.C. unique was the

opportunity to work on homelessness at both the local and national level and even while

working strictly on locally specific issues, advocates had the benefit of seeing their

struggle played out in the national arena in a way that impacted other homeless

movements around the country. The city's public scandals left many feeling like there

were few other options other than disruptive confrontations, but there was also a

generation who were profoundly influenced by the civil unrest of the 60's and 70's who

found an equally compelling cause to dedicate their efforts towards. For some, this was

further evidence of a corrupt, dissolving civil society that was controlled by a powerful

elite and responsible for disenfranchising large majorities of citizens.

It was a movement led by charismatic personalities that wielded great influence

and garnered a lot of respect. The movement's leadership was capable of simplifying the

issue into easily consumable 30-second sound bites, capturing the struggle so well in a

morally compelling way. "Mitch was a lone ranger but he knew what would draw

people's attention," recalled homeless advocate Sister Mary Ann Luby. Snyder often

invoked the media for coverage of their campaigns and by capitalizing on the public

venue, he succeeded in raising the issue both locally and nationally. Mitch Snyder could

be controversial and divisive but nevertheless, as the public face of this radical group of

activists, he was incredibly successful in both increasing public awareness and mobilizing

on behalf of the cause. Celeste Valente' s views signify the delicate balance that Snyder

portrayed in the public eye:

Mitch made a lot of mistakes, like most of us but I think that he was very effective in touching people's conscience by making [homelessness] a moral question. 178

This issue can be hidden and can be easy to ignore. Mitch made it a legitimate issue and had lots of energy.

Perhaps most importantly, activists like Snyder perpetuated the idea that "there but for the grace of God" anyone could end up on the street, which also elicited a significant amount of public sympathy. If true, this was an important harbinger of social and economic issues to come - a point which deeply engaged activists to grasp the connections between public policy and homelessness.

Journalist and educator Colman McCarthy remarked that one of Snyder's best skills was his ability to "arrange conflict" and then offer a solution that just happened to coincide with what he wanted. Mitch did what he felt was best on behalf of poor people he felt he represented exclusively. He was a skilled communicator that could instantly bring an issue home, but was often accused of emotional blackmail. High stakes protests were moderately successful but enormously costly in the liberal way that CCNV utilized it. It was true that manipulation of the media often forced public officials to negotiate with Snyder. Activists used negative publicity as a weapon to their advantage but this would eventually become a double-edged tool of repression in the future. It also alienated both internal and external supporters while costing the community its financial and volunteer base. On the other hand, others played off of Snyder's "all or nothing" unreasonableness. According to Pastor John Wimberley, "Mitch's hard edge made it easier for those with a more pastoral approach to make progress. We seemed reasonable in comparison to Mitch's demands." Rosenthal argues that this dialectic can be an important part of the development of social movements and that disruptive tactics are one 179

of the few weapons of indigenous homeless alliances. 183 Wimberley's sentiment illustrates the implicit value of utilizing a range of political approaches. Organizers incorporated a range of political efforts as the times and circumstances called for different types of actions. Activists during this time liberally incorporated the politics of civil disobedience, disruptive and confrontational tactics as well as legislative and litigation strategies. But they also worked on non-confrontational measures. Committed activists willingly participated in government commissions, even as they were well aware when they were being manipulated, in hopes of generating productive results.

Participatory actions like the Housing Now! March drew together a huge contingent of committed individuals in peaceful demonstrations, lending credibility to the call for further action. It even gained support of public officials but with largely symbolic results.

As divisive as Snyder was, he was not combative towards all providers and

CCNV in fact collaborated on numerous occasions over mass campaigns. They may not always have agreed on philosophy or tactics but Snyder had a way of mobilizing enormous groups of individuals, both housed and homeless. CCNV relied heavily on

Georgetown University as well as students from other campuses in the area to assist in their campaigns. In this way, literally thousands of individuals were impacted by their experiences CCNV. Certainly, CCNV members accomplished some amazing feats during this time. With the aid of several other key organizations, CCNV propelled homelessness on the national agenda, mobilizing people around the country to action.

The McKinney Act was the first federal acknowledgement of responsibility for the

183 Rosenthal, Homeless in Paradise: A Map of the Terrain. 180

national crisis and in subsequent years, it would be reauthorized with record funding. But

CCNV's success was not without sacrifice or controversy. Residents struggled with the aftermath of Snyder's death and as political momentum began to shift against the homeless, CCNV was not as organized. Carol Fennelly reflects on the time period and what she feels was lost:

The movement was creative. We've lost our sense of humor. There was humor in much of what we did and we had the ability to poke fun at ourselves or make fools of ourselves. We always did what we dreamed. When you are caught up in your own agendas and your own budget that stops the dream. Were we arrogant? Maybe we were. But we got the job done. We were busy changing the world.

And momentum began to shift ever so slowly as the movement professionalized and providers seemed less willing to stake their programs or their reputations taking unpopular stands.

For the better part of a decade, advocacy focused on the emergency nature of homelessness, especially the need for emergency shelter. For many, it really was a life and death issue - people were dying of hypothermia in unprecedented numbers during cold weather months. Overwhelmingly, providers sought ways to manage the crisis of the homeless. Activists demanded additional government-sponsored and private services, improvements to existing services, as well as establishing or protecting the rights of the disenfranchised. Homeless advocates were all over the place though, seeking ways to address individual needs as well as fighting for systemic level change. They needed a coordinated policy and comprehensive approach but instead, as problems arose, or a need presented itself, different factions found some creative way to fulfill it. The result was a fragmented approach to homeless advocacy and services. Government officials who avoided responsibility and dug their heals in only made the political climate worse and 181

spurned further activist resistance and mobilization. As the end of the decade neared, mobilizing shifted away from crisis intervention and charity towards grassroots organizing, empowerment and homeless prevention. The idea of eliminating homelessness was still in its infancy but it was growing.

Advocacy strove to find an immediate resolution to the crisis - but people's

perspective on that crisis varied as much as their approach to solving it did. Groups

experimented with different strategies and alliances to address homelessness, and not

surprisingly, there was no cohesive plan of action. The broad range of strategies and

different factions generated a lot of tension and dissention between group members.

Because of the polarizing politics of the time, it was also relatively easy to pit advocates

against each other. Utilizing the legal system to the extent that it was used during this

decade also proved divisive, even among the advocates themselves who understood the

importance of government involvement. Litigation and legislation efforts proved to be a

mixed bag: they produced tangible results but were easily overturned and difficult to

enforce, leaving some questioning the benefits of such long, contentious struggles. The

crushing defeat of the Right to Shelter Initiative not only revoked a key tool in the

homeless wars, but it also invalidated multiple legal orders that had already been

rendered to protect the rights of homeless individuals and guarantee basic levels of care.

The national homeless movement peaked during this decade with some moderate

success on several national issues, but also lacked appeal to a broader contingent of

activists. The National Housing Now! effort perhaps came the closest but even still, did

not involve other anti-poverty coalitions outside of homeless services and advocates.

When the issue of homelessness was on the national agenda, it was primarily organized 182

by small, local coalitions like CCNV around a particular issue or cause and therefore lacked broader appeal, or perhaps more importantly, a plan for what would come next.

The local alliances that were particularly active during this time period contributed significantly to the movement and its expansion. Coalition building was perhaps most

successful at yielding results, both in the way of program development and legislative change. By incorporating religious leadership and working cooperatively when they

could, it insured that individuals were not picked off by retaliatory measures. And yet,

there was still little structure or unified agenda to speak of. There was enormous

potential for a broader based advocacy movement as they moved into the next decade.

For now, advocates missed the opportunity to expand the agenda by creating a justice

movement through broad alliances. CHAPTER4

RESISTANCE AND RETALIATION IN THE 1990'S: WASHINGTON'S

PROPERTIED CITIZEN'S PUSH BACK

Jesus Said, Foggy Bottom Citizens Respond (a memo re: the closing of a homeless shelter)

Jesus said: "The poor you shall have with you always."

"Not so," responds the Foggy Bottom Citizens Association. "We have our lawyers working on that. Zoning regulations, property values, and police powers are on our side. The rule of law shall prevail. Very soon only well-dressed Christians with fat wallets will be allowed in our beautiful neighborhood."

Jesus said: "Whatsoever you do to these, the least of my people, you do also to me."

"On the contrary," responds the Foggy Bottom Citizens Association. "Our lawyers assure us that we are fully indemnified against third party claims, Jesus included. Our liability re: treatment of the poor remains a matter between ourselves and them alone."

Jesus said: "Woe to you rich. It shall be harder for you to enter the kingdom of heaven than for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle."

"Were sorry," responds the Foggy Bottom Citizens Association. "We outlawed camels in our neighborhood years ago. Your point may be relevant to a zoo keeper, but exclusion of camels and poor people, in our view, makes the problem as you've stated it altogether irrelevant."

Jesus said: "God is love, and they who abide in love abide also in God."

183 184

"Excuse us," responds the Foggy Bottom Citizens Association. "But are you saying that love must abide with us as well? That sounds like love is threatening to move into our neighborhood. We posit that there is no zoning category for that. Our lawyers will check on it, and get back to you, but we're pretty sure that love won't be allowed."

- J. Stephen Cleghorn -November 1992

The previous decade was a contentious time with people readily mobilizing around poverty and homeless social justice issues. 1990 however, set a different tone.

Over the next ten years, public outrage about people living on the street dissipated in cities across the nation. "Compassion fatigue" and cynicism set in as public sympathy for the homeless waned significantly. Short-term volunteers, without the ability to properly contextualize their experiences, found the reality of homelessness confronted their romanticized images that had been so popular. No longer considered sympathetic victims, destitute men and women were considered undeserving of aid. There was no shortage of homeless stereotypes to choose from and the prevailing feeling about the street bound homeless was that they were there by choice. Increasing vi~bility and providers' failure to make a substantial difference in the numbers on the street left communities increasingly uncomfortable. By now, it was clear that the homeless were suffering from what Willa Morris called the "poverty of relationships," whereby people have been stripped of everything positive and the inability to move forward or have faith, which was compounded by real issues of poverty. But there was also a profound lack of tolerance and the expectation that people should just get their act together. By the end of the decade, frustrations remained and resignation set in. The homeless were here to stay. 185

The programmatic solutions that citizen's tax dollars and private donations were supporting were not easing the numbers of homeless either. With shrinking incomes for those at the lowest end of the economic ladder and the declining availability of affordable housing, the ranks of the homeless continued to grow. Two trends in particular impacted the growing visibility of street homelessness: a two decade decline in affordable housing and an increase in the number of poor people competing for fewer housing units. 1 In fact, before Reagan left office he managed to cut the Department of Housing and Urban

Development's budget by three quarters - which was the largest source of support for subsidized housing in the country. Unemployment rates at 6.1 % and underemployment rates at 12.6%, on top of declining wages (adjusted for inflation) made life in poor communities very precarious.2 The absorptive mechanisms that existed in previous economies could no longer support people living on the edge and emergency shelters seemed to fill the gap. Such economic realities reverberated in communities around the nation. For those few who did move on, there was no shortage of replacements, in spite of the growing economy.

The intrusive presence of homeless individuals led to increasing conflicts between municipalities and advocates.3 Moral outrage gave way to frustration of a different kind, with cities around the country going on the offensive: enacting ordinances against

1 Koegel, et al., "The Causes of Homelessness."

2 Hardin.

3 Hopper and Milburn. 186

sleeping, begging, and even criminalizing food handouts to folks who are hungry.4 Many communities also began to fight back against shelters and social service facilities expanding in their neighborhoods. The 1990's saw an increase in aggressive quality of life policing and regulation of space that continued well into the next decade.

Homelessness was now a routine fixture on the urban landscape and confronting such daily visibility of extreme poverty wore on communities. Ideological battles resulted in

what Neil Smith called a revanchist backlash - declaring war on the poor and continuing

a decades long trend of blaming poor people for their predicament. 5 In the District,

public parks and business districts installed sleep proof benches while national parks

refused to stock bathrooms with soap or toilet paper to discourage homeless bathing, or

closed restrooms altogether. It seemed that the homeless were also picked up for petty

crimes in an attempt to resolve the problem through the criminal justice system.

Interestingly, the period in which residents fought back with quality of life

concerns and Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) politics coincided with a period of

unparalleled economic expansion. Social historian Kenneth Kusmer hints as to the cause

of people's negativity towards the destitute:

Like the tramps of the industrial age, the homeless of the postmodern era are an embarrassing reminder that economic growth has not benefited all. Few are willing to contemplate the idea that the homeless represent only the most extreme case of inequality in the United States, the growth of which has forced many of the working poor into circumstances only a few steps removed from

4 Maria Foscarinis and Richard Herz, The Criminalization of Homelessness, (Washington, D.C.: National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, 1 December 1995). An updated report is published every two years and is co-sponsored by The National Coalition for the Homeless and the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty.

5 Smith, The New Urban Frontier. 187

homelessness. It is much easier to support policies that soothe the conscience of the middle class while keeping the homeless out of sight as much as possible.6

Homeless advocates also discovered that shelters were not the panacea that they thought they would be - just stopgaps and abeyance mechanisms to displace such visible displays of poverty. According to Hopper and Baumohl, homelessness and shelters stays are more typic·ally "one of chronically makeshift ways of life that occasionally 'fail' and spill over into the pool of 'official' homelessness."7 The crucial difference in the 1990's was that communities could no longer continue to view and react to homelessness as an

"emergency" or even "crisis driven dispossession" but rather "standing patterns of residential instability."8 These authors argue that homelessness was a recurring problem of surplus or redundant populations who ended up warehoused in shelters. What was assumed to be a temporary crisis was confronted by a reality that could, and should have transformed the advocacy platform into real and substantive systemic reform, including not only affordable housing, but quality health care, decent jobs, and income supports.

While programmatic gains occurred in these areas to assist individuals who were thought to need a helping hand to get back on their feet, broad scale reform proved illusive.

Instead, neo-conservative political reform resulted in "shunting off unneeded but potentially troublesome people into various forms of substitute livelihood, thereby neutralizing the threat that they might otherwise pose."9

6 Kusmer, 247.

7 Hopper and Baumohl.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., 3. 188

Cultural versus structural debates continued unabated, and people committed to these issues began to look deeper at the underlying causes of poverty and homelessness.

Advocates and providers quickly discovered that "absent an adequate supply of affordable housing-and the jobs and income supports needed to sustain households once relocated - remedial efforts are doomed to an endless round of musical chairs." 10 But as services evolved to meet specific and increasingly destructive behaviors, it became easier to focus solely on the characteristic needs of the homeless population that could be satisfied by immediate services. Funding streams moved in this direction too, as did statistical documentation and reporting requirements, both of which served to justify the need for continuing services to address the individual, disabling conditions of the homeless population. 11 Lyon-Callo notes that researchers document individual causes of homelessness because granting agencies focus on these issues. 12 Similarly, non-profit data tracking methods document such characteristics as required by funders, which

"provides data to reinforce the assumptions upon which the grants are based."13 Further, despite adequate research and even common knowledge otherwise, he found that most

agency practices focused on documenting, diagnosing and resolving deviancy rather than

addressing the systemic causes of homelessness. Similarly, Curtis concludes that the

10 Hopper, Reckoning with Homelessness, 183-4.

11 Michael Owen Robertson, "Interpreting Homelessness: The Influence of Professional And Non­ Professional Service Providers," Urban Anthropology 20, no. 2 (1991):141-153; Lyon-Callo, Inequality, Poverty, and Neoliberal Governance.

12 Vincent Lyon-Callo, "Constraining Responses to Homelessness: An Ethnographic Exploration of the Impact of Funding Concerns on Resistance," Human Organization 57, no. 1 (1998): 2. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=REJTPTE3MjErMysxNmJjJkJOVDOwJIZFUj0y&clie ntld=3 I 806&cfc= I (accessed 1 November 2007). Citing Wright.

13 Ibid. 189

growth of emergency food and shelter services has emphasized theoretical arguments that poverty is a moral condition. 14 Blaming the poor for their predicament was not really new - it had just evolved over the last century and appeared then as a more nuanced version of contemporary "culture of poverty" arguments. 15

More than perhaps any other decade, this was a struggle for authority over homelessness. How was the struggle conceived and contested, and in what ways was the terrain constantly shifting? What made advocates choose to work with or against the city? Several major changes narrowed the political field for homeless advocates and constricted activism. How did shifting conceptions of advocacy and the changing makeup of the movement impact the movement's broader appeal as well as its internal cohesiveness during this decade?

Snyder's death left a vacuum in the advocacy movement that would never quite be replaced, especially for a movement so dependent upon its charismatic leaders. His presence was still felt strongly amongst those who were involved or committed to the same causes, and his memory would continue to be recreated and revised. At times, it has seemed that Snyder has become a saint like figure, based more on folklore than fact.

While creative political and confrontational advocacy was largely personality driven in previous decades, in the 1990' s, leadership moved in the direction of the professionalization, becoming more conservative and operating out of a different agenda.

14 Curtis, "Urban Poverty and the Social Consequences of Privatized Food Assistance."

15 See for example Oscar Lewis, La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty- San Juan and New York (New York: Random House, 1966); U.S. Department of labor, Office of Planning and Research, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Washington, D .C.: U.S. Department of Labor, March 1965, http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history /webid­ meynihan.htm (accessed J October 2008; Charles A. Valentine, Culture and Poverty: Critique and Counter-Proposals, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). 190

In contrast, the roots of Snyder's activism were grounded in the peace movement:

philosophically anti-establishment and anarchist, coupled with the ideology of the

Catholic Worker tradition. Traditionally, activists and nonprofits felt a strong

humanitarian commitment and did what they felt needed to be done, whatever the risks or

cost. In contrast, nonprofit leadership brought a business sense to running charitable

organizations and delivering services. Graduates of social work and non-profit

management programs joined the ranks of homeless providers, either replacing leadership

or starting their own organizations. During this time, many advocates retired or moved

on and successive leadership has been less proactive about raising systemic issues.

When the federal government made major investments in the city's social service

system, both through McKinney funds and through the D.C. Initiative, the infusion of

money greatly expanded services, improving quality as well. Neoliberal changes began

to take hold, with the local government outsourcing essential public services to private

non-profit agencies, signaling a change in governance as well as public relations.

Advocates wanted desperately to believe that it was possible to work within the system to

promote systemic change, but remained disappointed time and again. Organized

resistance continued for about two more years into the l 990's before advocates staged

one final protest that had disastrous consequences. Coordinated advocacy continued

afterward, but took on a somewhat muted tone, particularly as fear of government

retaliation silenced some of the most vocal critics. Legal advocates became the forefront

of the movement and remained highly critical and skeptical of the local government's

ability to act in good faith. Splintering amongst the various advocacy factions also

limited the effectiveness of advocacy and created a vacuum of coordination among 191

providers. Unfortunately, the consequence was a bifurcated system in which the roles advocates were eventually demarcated from the service providers.

Following Barry's highly publicized arrest, Sharon Pratt Dixon 16 was elected

Mayor of the District of Columbia in 1990 and at first, the city responded hopefully.

Barry's public scandals tainted the city's reputation and his inept city administration was

known for not being able to deliver basic services for its residents. Dixon campaigned on

a commitment to "take the boards off' many of the abandoned houses and even promised

to locate a shelter in affluent Ward 3 of the city. Shelter capacity had expanded as a

result of the legal requirements of the Right To Shelter law, but once it was overturned in

1990, the city set about the task of scaling back the limited progress it made. Within a

year of her election, the new Mayor began to cut emergency shelter beds by the hundreds,

eliminating for example the House of Ruth trailers for women and beds available at the

Department of Employment Services. CCNV responded in characteristic style: they

rented billboard space on Kenilworth Avenue on the edge of D.C. beckoning visitors:

"Welcome to Washington, D.C. Where Homeless People Die." Each month a list of

names of people who passed away were added to the billboard. Mayor Dixon's

campaign symbol was the shovel, signifying her intention to "clean house" after the

Barry scandals but her term was a disappointment for many. After she began to shut

down the shelters, they developed a black and white poster with a red high heel and a

shovel, stating, "Mayor Dixon will bury the homeless." CCNV plastered the city with

these posters and shocked the Mayor at one of her news conferences by releasing a

16 Sharon Pratt Dixon was later known as Sharon Pratt Kelly following her divorce and second marriage in 1991. 192

banner in the same likeness off of the Marriott Hotel. It had been hard enough to work with city officials and these actions only exacerbated tense relations.

Mayor Dixon remained disconnected from the voters, resulting in only one term

of office followed by the stunning re-election of Marion Barry as Mayor. By the end of

the decade, a new face held the office of the Mayor, who was the city's Chief Financial

Officer under the control board, Anthony Williams. The constant turnover in

administrations took its toll on the city. The city's Housing Authority and the

Department of Mental health were placed under court ordered-receivership, and in 1995,

Congress put the city under the authority of a financial control board because public

finances were in such disarray. 17

With the election of President Bill Clinton, District residents were once again

hopeful. Carol Fennelly summed up that optimism: "Clinton brought the illusion of

social justice. We believed he was a big savior for everything that Reagan broke."

Following the election, CCNV held the "Other Inauguration Ball" for homeless residents

in the city at the Department of Human Services (DHS) headquarters during Bill

Clinton's inauguration. This was the first ever event political celebration specifically for

people who were homeless and those who were invited wore their "Sunday best." The

highlight was having The Fabulous Thunderbirds perform at the event before they were

scheduled to perform at Clinton's official inauguration.

17 The official title of the federally authorized financial control board was the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility Management Assistance Authority. 193

Clinton immediately recognized the problem of homelessness and drafted a federal plan on homelessness as part of his Executive Order. 18 He requested additional funding for McKinney programs but was repeatedly stymied by a conservative

Congress. 19 Secretary of HUD Henry Cisneros declared homelessness their number one priority and for the most part, delivered on his promise, althuugh state and local control over how federal dollars would be spent impacted HUD's vision.20 In the end, hope quickly turned into disillusionment once again as Clinton enacted once of the most regressive welfare reform bills in US history.

Coordinated Advocacy and Service Collaboration through COHHO

Early in the decade, advocates were focused on coalition building, coordinated services and unified advocacy. Concerned individuals came from diverse origins: spiritual, student, volunteer, radical, social work, nonprofit management and increasingly the legal profession. Once again, Erna Steinbruck approached Reverend Clark

Lobenstine about forming another collaborative group, particularly since the D.C.

Coalition for the Homeless had ceased to be an advocacy organization and was now solely a direct service provider. Still at the Interfaith Conference, Reverend Lobenstine agreed to help establish the coalition, and identified themselves as the Coalition of

Homeless and Housing Organizations (COHHO). This time around, there was no staff member dedicated solely to this project and it took nearly two years to form. Participants

18 Mary Ellen Hombs, American Homelessness: A Reference Handbook, 2°d ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1994).

19 Burt, et al., Helping America's Homeless.

2° Kusmer, 245. 194

developed an organizational structure, bylaws, and a mission statement that illustrated the level of investment and commitment that members had. An initial mission statement included the following:

The Coalition of Homeless and Housing Organizations (COHHO) is a broad­ based community-wide coalition of some fifty shelter and low income housing providers and advocate organizations convened to study the District's unmet needs for shelter, transitional and permanent housing, and medical/mental health delivery systems, including substance abuse treatment programs, for those who find themselves homeless (or near homeless).21

A revised mission statement in 1995 removed advocates from the description but added homeless people:

COHHO is a diverse group of nonprofit organizations and homeless individuals who have a common goal of ending homelessness. Toward that end, COHHO seeks to improve housing and suy portive services for all homeless and nearly homeless people in the District.2

As their purpose evolved, they identified their primary functions to include policy development, community education, resource coordination, mutual support, networking, program monitoring and advocacy. Philosophically, they identified themselves as an action oriented, diversely composed group that offered a stable forum from which all organizations could share information, express their opinions and build on commonalities in a way that respected differences.23

COHHO was fairly well established for the first few years and made a significant difference with the federally funded D.C. Initiative, as providers had a strong role in

21 "Draft for Proposed Structure of Coalition of Homeless and Housing Organizations," 1 November 1991, courtesy of Steve Cleghorn personal archives.

22 Coalition of Homeless and Housing Organizations, minutes, November 1995, courtesy of Steve Cleghorn personal archives.

23 Ibid. 195

assessing the plans and evaluating progress. Their meetings addressed issues affecting all homeless providers and participants generated action plans, addressing the availability of women's shelters, health services, and even licensing and code issues that NIMBY activists were plaguing nonprofits with at the time. They made recommendations to

Mayor Kelly about such things as what steps to take before closing more shelters and were heavily invested in the Foggy Bottom Trailers standoff.

Despite a nearly universal commitment to work collaboratively, there was still a

significant amount of tension over the direction of the group and the strategies they intended to employ. When asked about the relations between the various providers and

advocates, Reverend Lobenstine remarked:

Ema [Steinbruck] helped a lot [getting COHHO established] but some people saw the Steinbruck's as the solution and others saw them as the problem. We had to be careful not to promote this as Ema's thing.

This stemmed from people's different perspectives on how best to accomplish change.

According to Brian Carome, people were extremely passionate and there were fierce

arguments about tactics and strategy. One of the central issues was whether the group

would work with the city or not but in the spirit of true cooperation, Lobenstine insisted

that they must. The city proved to be a difficult partner to work with and the first few

years of the decade were incredibly contentious, with the Washington Legal Clinic and

other legal activists repeatedly suing the city over civil rights violations for the homeless

and over the chaotic management of public social services. There was a Jot of frustration

with the lawsuits that seemed to suck a lot of energy from advocates and proved slow to

produce any results, even amongst providers who understood the issues and knew that

they had more than enough legal grounds to press for reform. Perhaps more importantly, 196

judicial victories raised hopes, which were the constantly dashed by city obstruction. As a result, many wondered if there was really any way to work in partnership with the city.

The various coalitions that existed during this decade focused on a variety of specific issues and formed in response to the perceived willingness or unwillingness of other groups to work with the city administration. All of these alliances created space for a broad contingent of activists to act on their concerns with varying methods or political stances but it also heightened internal fracturing. On the other hand, there were times when splintering was actively cultivated by members who desired a more hard line approach for some coalition. In March of 1992, Housing Action! members met with the new administrator of OESSS over family shelter intake procedures. At the next COHHO meeting, Erna Steinbruck wanted to know why neither she, nor the chair of the Family

Task Force (which was a committee of COHHO) were invited to attend the meeting.

According to Carome's statements in the meeting minutes, Housing Action! did not agree with COHHO strategy and "would continue to seek people agreeing with Housing

Action." CCNV member Cliff Newman added that Housing Action! efforts "involved potential civil disobedience, so it was logical to include only people willing to participate at that level."24 COHHO had an antagonistic relationship with Housing Action!, a group that was more radically oriented and prone to protest and civil disobedience. COHHO was broader in membership and though many Housing Action! members participated in the larger body, they pushed COHHO to take tougher stands. Carome, who had been a lead organizer of Housing Action!, reported that whenever an issue did not go their way,

24 Coalition of Homeless and Housing Organizations, minutes, 12 March 1992, courtesy of Steve Cleghorn personal archives. 197

he offered to have Housing Action! take action on the issue instead, which often prompted a less conservative stand for COHHO. According to Carome,

COHHO was the catchall and unifier [in homeless advocacy]. Housing Action, D.C. Advocates, and the Women's Service Providers were smaller and more agile. By design, Housing Action! included like-minded folks and had no tolerance for people who were not action oriented. There was always so much energy expended to try to get COHHO involved. There was a lot of resistance and a small contingent participated. Days ahead of meetings, I would be on the phone lobbying people for votes. Ema created COHHO to be a conciliatory group to work in partnership with D.C. government and not be at war. Lobenstine was a very middle of the road guy and he was Ema's choice [to facilitate the group].

Clearly, COHHO was perhaps the most expansive alliance, but also one of the most conventional. What is interesting is that COHHO took a highly controversial and

confrontational position on the issue of the Foggy Bottom Trailers, as we will see later in

the chapter, which probably made their more conservative membership very

uncomfortable. At the same time, things were so sour with city officials that dire

circumstances probably pushed typically moderate individuals to engage in or support

radical stands. Rosenthal reminds us that diverse tactics make sense for each group and

that they are not mutually exclusive .25 Often in fact, different strategic coalitions will

benefit from each other, as both radical and conciliatory alliances are needed to propel

government action and work through systems issues.

Though there was significant overlap, each coalition maintained its own identity

and approach to social justice and problem solving. All were very engaged with the press

and were highly media savvy. But not everyone participated who might have. Reverend

John Wimberley, who formed Miriam's Kitchen felt that the coordinating bodies were

25 Rosenthal, "Dilemmas of Local Anti-Homelessness Movements." 198

tortuous to attend and that protest actions were usually crisis-driven and therefore not proactive. According to Reverend Wimberley, political action was not part of their

approach to homeless services, which at this time, were still largely run by volunteer

congregants and other committed volunteers.26 Clearly, the balkanization of the

coalitions working on specific issues and piecemeal projects, alongside the periodic

infighting, would have also turned people away from wanting to participate. At the same

time, it becomes easy for providers to become caught up in the life of their clients who

always seemed to be hedging one crisis or another.

By the end of the decade, Housing Action! had dissipated, particularly as

COHHO peaked in strength and legitimacy. The D.C. Advocates for the Mentally Ill

dissipated for several years as a result of the momentum shift towards shelters (as

opposed to mental health) that began at the end of the 1980's and continued into the

1990's. The D.C. Advocates for the Mentally Ill remained dormant until it was brought

back years later by several remaining advocates.27 COHHO proved to be a useful forum

for processing issues and taking public stands but over time, its broad base of support too

petered out.

26 More recently, Miriam's Kitchen has participated in different coalitions for several years. Most recently, an advocacy component was added to Miriam's Kitchen's strategic plan.

27 Following the creation of the Outreach Focus Group, an active contingent of COHHO, the D.C. Advocates have merged and split several times with the Outreach Focus group. Presently, they exist as one entity, under the name of the Outreach Focus Group, owing to their shared concerns and overlapping participants. 199

Homeless Providers and D.C. Initiative

At the end of Mayor Marion Barry's first term, the Mayor's Homeless

Coordinating Council asked the consulting firm McKinsey and Company to make recommendations for leveraging both public and private resources in order to better address homelessness in the District. The firm recommended the formation of a public private partnership and encouraged a more pro-active commitment to ending homelessness beyond the hotel shelters that the District had been investing heavily in.

The Community Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness (TCP) was subsequently created in 1989 by Sue Marshall with the help of Oliver Carr, as an independent nonprofit corporation dedicated to improve and coordinate services in the District. Marshall was the DHS Chief of Staff and the Homeless Coordinator in the Barry Administration before initiating TCP. She had worked for the city under Barry for many years and had been on the tough end of negotiations with homeless providers until she left to found The

Community Partnership. It was originally conceived to be an equal partnership between city government and private entities, with Oliver Carr and Mayor Barry jointly raising money for homeless initiatives, although Barry never came through with promised funds.

Consequently, TCP was largely supported by Oliver Carr until 1993, at which point federal funds began to be funneled through the public-private entity.

Prior to homelessness reaching national level attention, very few non-profit organizations received government funds and those that did for the most part were not receiving a substantial portion of their budget from these contracts.28 That changed with

28 The exceptions in D.C. were the major nonprofit government contractors that operated the singles emergency shelters, such as House of Ruth, Catholic Charities, and the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless. 200

the McKinney Act and the federally sponsored D.C. Initiative, both of which funded local social service providers and would significantly change the nature of advocacy.

Following Bill Clinton's election in 1993, the Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) under Secretary Henry Cisneros and Assistant Secretary Andrew

Cuomo made homelessness a top priority. Secretary Cisneros chose Washington, D.C. to launch a model demonstration program called the D.C. Initiative to End Homelessness and piloted the Continuum of Care model in twenty other cities. Federal funds were designated in hopes of stimulating local change and generating a novel way of thinking about homeless solutions that let localities determine how to address its homeless problem in the most comprehensive manner. No longer would local programs compete individually on the national level for federal funding either. Rather, funding would now be granted to whole jurisdictions, which was predicated upon regional cooperation.29 The

D.C. Initiative presented a great opportunity for the federal government to partner with the local administration and get past the negative and debilitating kind of advocacy that had predominated the city's relationship with advocates up to that point. Further, the federal funds could mean a complete overhaul of homeless services in the District, although it sill left ultimate responsibility for homeless relief to localities. Prior to the federal initiative, the city invested heavily in the emergency shelter system, whose budget, in 1989, had reached an astounding $40 million.30 Martha Burt actually characterized homeless services in D.C. as a "non-system."

29 Burt, et al., Helping America's Homeless.

30 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, The D.C. Initiative: Working Together to Solve Homelessness, Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1993), 10. 201

The services purchased by the District, while running over-budget year after year and absorbing at least $22 million in the last year before the D.C. Initiative, were virtually all emergency units. Many described the approach as "warehousing," a continuing crisis response, providing a bed for the night but no hope, no direction, no motivation, and no route to follow to move beyond emergency shelter toward leaving homelessness.31

Burt notes that private non-profits doubled the city's emergency bed capacity and private transitional housing was more than tenfold what the city provided.

The D.C. Initiative provided money for three levels of services that would

establish the Continuum of Care, including outreach and assessment, transitional housing

and supportive services, as well as permanent housing. The federal government

identified $20 million in startup funds for Continuum of Care programs to be spread out

over three years, on top of any McKinney Act funds secured through outside grants. But

HUD would not give the money directly to the city because of its history of gross

mismanagement and the large number of D.C. agencies in receivership. HUD preferred a

nongovernmental organization to implement the plan while the D.C. government held out

for a "quasi-governmental board."32 When they selected The Community Partnership for

the Prevention of Homelessness as the entity to manage and distribute the funds, they had

to restructure the board to incorporate both local and federal officials. In addition, TCP

would assume all the responsibilities of the Office of Emergency Shelter and Support

Services (OESSS). The transfer of authority was far from seamless though, and

advocates felt conflicted about the potential implications of a private entity making public

policy. More skeptical advocates insisted that the government assume primary

31 Martha R. Burt, Assessment of the D.C. Initiative's "First" Year (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, I November 1995), iii.

32 Ibid., 12. 202

responsibility for homeless resolutions even as they recognized the history of corruption and fiscal mismanagement in the District. No other lead agencies were poised to take on such a role at that time and TCP seemed like the logical choice. Local bureaucrats were resistant to closing offices, losing their jobs and control over federal funding streams.

The.D.C. Department of Human Services felt its role and authority were being usurped by TCP and this created some tension between the two agencies, but the District was also eager to get out from under the crippling burden of funding homeless shelters. Steve

Cleghorn worked at The Community Partnership during this period of transition:

There was a lot of understandable tension and professional competition between TCP and DHS in the beginning because of the turf battles. But TCP was not in a position to take this on frontally. We were trying to work with them in winding down OESSS. But we also recognized that our small staff of less than 15 or so people was taking the place of an OESSS staff more than five times that size. But we had to work around stuff like that. ... TCP often played the role of the "good wife" who comes up with a change in how things are done, but makes sure to credit her husband as the one who thought up the idea But, really, we were okay with the city taking credit for the good changes we were able to make happen.

The federal initiative was designed to stimulate local development of

comprehensive solutions, not to supplant them. Consequently, the transfer of funds was

contingent upon the local government meeting a minimum financial commitment, which

would better position the city to assume full responsibility, once the D.C. Initiative was

over after three years and federal funds were depleted. HUD stipulated that the money

for the D.C. Initiative could not be used to fund existing services, which meant that the

District would have to continue to support the programs that were publicly funded before

that time. TCP also had to achieve minimum benchmarks in order to continue receiving

funds for the city's programs. If implemented successfully, the homeless service system

would be qualitatively redesigned and able to leverage funds more effectively with the 203

ultimate goal of resolving homelessness. The hope was that once the system demonstrated workability, it would be easier to request continued funding for existing services out of the McKinney Act money and other federal programs. Additionally, TCP committed to leverage local funds in order to obtain additional federal matching grants.

The federal initiative created a plan to develop and implement a coordinated system of services, as well as integrating community partners. Up until this point, a major source of contention had been local officials' resistance to provide sufficiently for its residents in need and the over-reliance on the private programs to bear the burden of services. The new entity was designed to cut through the bureaucratic system to coordinate and contract with private services. Partnering with all levels of government and private groups of providers and community stakeholders, TCP would channel funding to various programs, something sorely needed in D.C. The plan even called for a

"cease fire" in the homeless war, a reference to the combative relationship amongst providers and government officials. The Community Partnership stood by that commitment and worked hard to ameliorate citywide relations.

A significant amount of planning and community input went into the details of the plan's operation. It involved local coalitions, various Mayor's commissions, and provider focus groups to determine how to best serve various homeless populations. The larger community was charged with responsibility for the plan's success and the process produced new opportunities for coIIaboration and coordination between providers. One particular group, the Coalition of Homeless and Housing Organizations (COHHO) helped chart the plan for the city. While The Community Partnership was charged with administering the money, it had become a formal, dues paying member of COHHO and 204

involved co-members in the implementation of the D.C. Initiative. COHHO's assessment of the initial plan proposed a more client-centered system of services that incorporated six service levels instead of three, to include outreach, drop-ins, safe havens, emergency shelter, transitional housing, permanent housing with supportive services and a second tier of fully independent permanent housing. The model for COHHO's continuum was much more complex than a simple succession of services and was underscored by the necessity of prevention efforts. In addition to proposing revisions to the plan for the D.C.

Initiative, COHHO members also raised several concerns. They called upon the city and

TCP to work towards addressing systemic issues leading to homelessness. The original plan made mention of the complex issues underlying homelessness:

However, no system designed to address the individual needs of the homeless can eradicate poverty and other social conditions that allow homelessness to develop. Education and vocational training, for example, can do only so much if an economy does not produce jobs. Ultimately, society must look to economic development, adequate wages, the end of racial and economic segregation, and welfare reform to improve the overall climate which has allowed homelessness to take root and choke off the aspirations of so many of our fellow citizens.33

Despite the acknowledgement, the original report goes on to focus on the individual services that can only serve to address one aspect of homelessness, and while participants recognized the limitations of the D.C. Initiative, they also knew that services would carry folks only so far. Because of its history of poor management, they also recommended that the city get out of direct service as quickly as possible, particularly with regard to sheltering families. They requested additional consideration be given to problems with

D.C.'s zoning administrator who had been ruling unfavorably on many social service

33 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, The D.C. Initiative: Working Together to Solve Homelessness. Executive Summary (Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1993), 3. 205

projects. Many felt that zoning board decisions were impeding meaningful collaboration between neighborhoods, the city and homeless providers. While members ultimately agreed with the recommendation to move away from an emergency based system towards a balanced system of services and housing components, they cautioned against eliminating emergency beds altogether before sufficient alternatives existed to replace them. They raised the issue of the city scaling back its financial commitment in the wake of availability of federal money and requested further planning around the transition after the money from HUD's three-year commitment ran out. Most importantly, COHHO members called upon the city government to shoulder main responsibility for the plan, but in cooperation with private partners.

The work surrounding the D.C. Initiative was based on a philosophy of integrating services for homeless into a patchwork of existing social services in the

District rather than creating a separate homeless service system. This was contingent upon all involved working cooperatively and declaring what the operational plan called

"a peace accord in the homeless war: the end of adversarial relations between government and advocates." Steve Cleghorn discusses this aspect of the plan:

$20 million from the feds is an important thing to articulate. There was a ten-year legacy of much mistrust and negative, unproductive relations between homeless providers and the D.C. government, which was why one of the four objectives of the D.C. Initiative was "A Peace Accord in the Homeless War," an objective the legal advocates immediately challenged. But most nonprofits wanted a less contentious, more professional relationship with the city.

Reconciliation was described in the following way in the plan: "This is at heart a plan for creating a qualitatively new support system for homeless people ... yet ultimately dependent upon healthier relationships among all those who consider themselves to have 206

a stake in this problem, and that is most of us.''34 It went on to suggest that collaboration would require the focus tum toward the needs of the homeless and less about the people who serve them. The goal of replacing a dysfunctional system with a more thoughtful, rational, and humane one would certainly require a very different approach.

In light of poor relations with local Advisory Neighborhood.Commission's

(ANC), TCP was willing to fund demonstration projects for ANC's willing to work creatively with existing nonprofits towards community building priorities.35 In fact, all proposals submitted for D.C. Initiative funding were required to meet regulations that stipulated neighborhood ANC's had to be informed and involved in the planning process, in hopes of reducing NIMBY antagonisms and generating community support. Likewise, all applicants were expected to "constructively" engage the D.C. government, with a commitment on The Community Partnership's part to intervene when appropriate. Out of this, a whole network of services were established, expanded, and enhanced, but it did not come seamlessly.

Service providers were rightly concerned that despite assurances otherwise, existing programs which received public funds might be defunded once federal dollars came in and the District cut its homeless service budget, leaving large gaps in the new system. It seemed as if the District called everyone's bluff when a critical program was suddenly defunded. Christ House was a special program that provided respite and medical care to homeless individuals who were suffering from a medical illness or

34 The Community Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness, The D. C. Initiative on Homelessness. Better Services, Better Lives through a Continuum of Care. Operational Pan Year One ( 1994-1995) (Washington, D.C.: The Community Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness, 29 August 1994), 6.

35 Ibid., 41. 207

recovering from a medical procedure. Dr. Janelle Goetcheus, the Director of Christ

House who was working with Healthcare for the Homeless at the time, had publicly advocated for medical follow up that was not being done in the shelters. Almost overnight, their funding from the city was yanked and the agency had to let staff go.

Prior to the D.C. Initiative, Christ House received money from the D.C. Department of

Health. When the District decided that it would no longer fund this vital program, this meant that the program was not eligible for funding through the D.C. Initiative because it was pre-existing and had been supported by local dollars. Fortunately, HUD bent the rules to accommodate this unique program, fearing the loss of vital services. The

Department of Health's action communicated to others the city's apparent resistance to

work cooperatively with homeless advocates and providers.

Transferring authority for homeless services to The Community Partnership,

without a concomitant transfer of funds to support homeless initiatives, could spell

disaster for the programs and clients who relied upon them. Therefore, HUD explicitly

defined what they considered the District's "maintenance of effort," which after much

negotiation, was set at $14.8 million per year. In exchange, HUD would provide about

$7 million per year for three years, building the continuum and creating new programs

with enough time for the Partnership to identify future sources of funds for when the

initiative ended. The "maintenance of effort" was intended to be the District's annual

budget for homeless services, but was still down substantially from what the city was

spending presently on homeless services at $22 million. However, the city was in the

midst of a fiscal crisis and, in 1995, Congress responded with a financial control board to

take over the city's finances. In the end, the city did reduce its financial commitment 208

considerably - by 35% - which meant that The Community Partnership was forced to revise its goals and plans. But this had to be approved by HUD officials. After the city indicated it would only give $8.6 million, HUD countered by insisting on $10.6 million,

which still represented a significant shortfall when combined with the matching federal

dollars that would be lost. In the end, The Community Partnership received much less,

because the final transfer of OESSS functions was delayed for so long and the city

subtracted a large portion of the budget to continue their shelter operations during the

transition. Cisneros was sympathetic to the situation and was committed to having the

initiative to succeed (it was after all a model demonstration program) and TCP was able

to make substantial progress towards establishing the Continuum of Care even with

diminished resources. Sue Marshall's commitment to the goals set forth in the D.C.

Initiative plan and the Partnership's ability to creatively resolve the budget shortfall was

acknowledged by HUD.36 The budget crisis lasted two years before the District was able

to commit to the full amount of the original agreement. However, local public funds

were essential to keep programs running after the federal initiative funding expired and

the anticipation of that final transition made many anxious.

The actual implementation of the D.C. Initiative took significantly longer than

three years and was prolonged by several factors. The first involved extended

negotiations over which entity would administer the D.C. Initiative funds and how much

money the District would contribute to the effort once federal money was transferred.

The second factor involved the transfer of responsibility for homeless services over to

36 Jacquie M. Lawing to Sue Marshall, 18 September 1996. 209

TCP once it was selected, and final factor involved the District's fiscal crisis that created a major budget shortfall.37 There were other challenges as well. Continuing a strategy of forgoing federal money because of restrictions or requirements to provide matching funds, District officials passed up additional funds that were already designated to support parts of the continuum in the form of Shelter Plus Care grants for permanent housing. Burt elaborates:

The Department of Human Services missed a deadline for application for, and therefore lost, another round of federal SAF AH funds; The Department of Housing and Community Development did not draw down HOME funds already allocated to the District; and the Department of Health Services, which was the official applicant for 1993 Shelter Plus Care funds, was reluctant either to draw down the funds or to facilitate the transfer of authority to TCP.38

In response, TCP negotiated to take over these aspects of D.C. homeless services.

Despite such setbacks, TCP was praised for bringing some measure of stability and financial accountability to District services and its contracts. Prior to the D.C. Initiative, there had been virtually no oversight from the city with its contract providers. According to John Shetterly of New Hope Ministries,

With The Community Partnership, the flow of money has been a major improvement. Under DHS [Department of Human Services], no one even visited the shelter from OESSS and now there are program monitors under TCP and common standards have established some standard ground. 39

In her analysis of the D.C. Initiative, Burt concurs:

37 Burt, "Assessment of the D.C. Initiative's 'First' Year," iv.

38 Ibid., I 5.

39 Today, there is a complicated ranking system for evaluating providers' funding requests, in which TCP ranks agency's funding applications based on their measured objectives from the previous year. They also developed a system to determine an agency's risk for meeting its objectives and will conduct closer oversight based on that estimate of risk. Those in jeopardy will be subjected to more frequent audits and site visits from the Partnership. 210

Everyone mentioned the distrust prevailing between providers and the District, and that people had to watch what they said as some providers felt they had been defunded for voicing criticisms. In addition, some felt the District officials in charge of homeless programs really did not know much about the needs and realities of the population for which they had responsibility.40

Working with an organization like The Community Partnership who could coordinate federal funding applications also made sense because prior to that, only a handful of organizations received funding directly from HUD. HUD held an annual competition and funded the best applications on paper from around the country, without really understanding how communities worked or how the organizations they funded fit within the community. Because of their coordinating role, TCP was able to group applications

and contextualize their role within the broader continuum of services. No single agency had the ability to handle such massive funding applications but TCP could capitalize on the SuperNOFA (Notice of Funding Availability) grants and apply for funding for all

agencies in the continuum.

This was a politically charged environment to work in, given the poisoned

relations among various participants in the process and the difficulty that providers had

working with the city. Given these conditions, it is not surprising that providers once

again focused on coalition building and reconciliation. On the other hand, many

providers were tired of fighting with the city and interested in the possibilities of working

through the system to resolve problems.

Over time, pieces of the Continuum of Care were established to fill gaps in

services. During the five years that the initiative was implemented, there was a

concomitant expansion into street outreach, addictions treatment, health and respite care,

40 Ibid., 26. 211

as well as permanent and supportive housing. Additional investments into transitional

and single room occupancy (SRO) housing41 were possible as a result of the Trust for

Affordable Housing that was established in 1991. The city had accrued nearly $4 million

in fines stemming from contempt judgments in a court case involving Right to Shelter

violations. Carol Fennelly of CCNV convinced a judge to create the Trust for Affordable

Housing with the compounding fines. The trust fund supported 350 additional units of

SRO's in the city and was used to fund mortgage loans to create permanent housing for

homeless and formerly homeless folks.

The Trust for Affordable Housing partnered with SOME, Samaritan Inns and

others in order to develop properties for homeless residents. Transitional and supportive

housing, often in the form of Single Room Occupancy (SRO) rooms, became

increasingly important as men and women would relapse after treatment if they had no

where to go but back to the streets, shelters, or the neighborhoods in which they came

from. SRO housing had been popular since the 1980's, but this modern form skid row

housing evolved long after those seedy neighborhoods disappeared and with them, the

run down apartments that provided an affordable alternative to sleeping on the street.

Therefore, SRO's were a form of subsidized housing that could be used for individuals

transitioning to independent living.

During the decade, SOME began operating transitional housing programs for men

and women seeking employment (Mickey Leland Place and Harvest House), women with

children and families (Thea Bowman House and newly renovated townhouses), as well as

41 SRO's were a form of subsidized housing that could be used for individuals transitioning to independent living. Residents in SRO's usually pay a percentage of their income to rent a room (usually 30%) and share common areas like bathrooms and kitchens with other building residents. 212

standard SRO housing (Anna Cooper House and Jeremiah House). SOME's senior program was renamed Shalom House Senior Center and Harvest House became a transitional program for women. Samaritan Inns began offering transitional housing in the l 980's and expanded their programs with Ontario Road and Fairmont Street Inns,

which served both men and women. The network of Catholic Charities housing expanded

dramatically as well: St. Martin's House for pregnant or postpartum women in recovery,

Tenants Empowerment Network transitional housing program for families, and the St.

Matthias Mulumba transitional house for men in recovery.

One transitional program that was not in the congregate SRO style was the Latino

Transitional Housing Partnership (LTHP).42 Leaders from the Latino community in

Columbia Heights/Mount Pleasant areas, including Mary's Center for Maternal and Child

Care, the Latin American Youth Center (LA YC) and the Council of Latino Agencies

(CLA) presented a proposal to The Community Partnership that was approved in 1997.

CLA fiscally sponsored LTHP, creating a legacy of developing programs and building

the capacity of existing organizations. LTHP offered scattered site housing units to

mostly immigrant single women and families who were homeless. They offered highly

specialized services to meet the needs of people traumatized and coming from war torn

countries, especially in Central and South America.

Specialized, affordable housing became increasingly popular during the 1990's

and the Affordable Housing Act made more than $I 23 million available in 199 I for

Shelter Plus Care programs.43 In line with plans for the Continuum of Care, New Hope

42 The Latino Transitional Housing Partnership is now known as HOGARES.

43 Hombs, American Homelessness: A Reference Handbook. 213

Ministries opened two "safe havens" for both men and women. Safe havens were established to provide small scale, low barrier residential settings which offered a measure of privacy for hard to reach individuals suffering from mental illness. They presented a safe and highly supportive environment for individuals to develop a level of comfort with traditional or permanent services at their own pace. Similarly, Kairos

House was launched by Christ House, as a long-term supportive housing program for individuals with chronic health needs. In addition to formalizing their alternative treatment program, Samaritan Inns opened long-term affordable housing for residents recovering from addictions (Lazarus House, Tabitha House and Elisha House).

Residential treatment options for the addicted poor had become scarce once the public "drunk tanks" closed in the 1970's. Federal statutes had provided for publicly funded detoxification facilities instead. Despite these efforts, public treatment beds decreased while private facilities increased, resulting in a "gentrified treatment system that street bound individuals could not access."44 As a result, non-profit, private drug and alcohol residential treatment programs serving the poor and homeless expanded dramatically during the decade, especially following the crack epidemic with its acute impact on street folks. Salvation Army opened Harbor Lights Treatment Center for long- term residential drug and alcohol treatment. Gospel Rescue Mission created a year-long program, which was called the Transforming Lives Ministry and even opened up its own transitional housing program (Barnabas House). SOME also began providing substance

44 Baum and Burnes. This situation mirrored that of the federally sponsored mental health program in which homeless mentally ill were considered Jess than ideal patients for community mental health clinics. 214

abuse treatment, bringing people out of the city to Exodus House and Maya Angelou

House in a rural part of West Virginia.

An important programmatic addition to homeless services was street outreach. In the 1990' s, street outreach was gaining national attention as a best practice to meeting homeless men and women wherever they were at emotionally, psychologically and cognitively. HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros was also deeply moved by the hypothermic death of a woman by the name of Yetta Adams, who passed away in a bus shelter in front of HUD' s offices. The same winter that the D.C. Initiative was announced, HUD dedicated additional funds to expand hypothermia outreach in the city. In D.C., it was received as a promising new initiative and several agencies were given grants for one or two outreach workers to cover high areas of concentration around the city. Outreach expanded to the street bound Latino Community when Neighbor's Consejo opened their doors in Mount Pleasant and Columbia Heights. Covenant House City opened up a program in D.C. specifically for outreach to runaway and homeless youth and even the

Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless began street outreach.

Others expanded specialized services for the homeless. Neighbor's Consejo was created to provide an array of services to the underserved Latino community in the neighborhoods of Mount Pleasant and Columbia Heights. This included meals (in partnership with Martha's Table), case management, and ESL classes. Catholic Charities offered new programs for homeless men and women during this decade, particularly transitional and treatment services for specific subpopulations. They also created the

Immigration Legal Services Program, the Share Food Network for low cost food 215

distribution, a Parent Education Program as well as the Downtown Family Center.45

SOME opened the Center for Employment Training to provide basic education, training

and skill development for the community. Gospel Rescue Mission began an adult

educational program of their own, called School of Tomorrow. For several years, Anna

Center was a joint venture of the Luther Place Memorial Church and Healthcare for the

Homeless to provide respite from major illnesses and operations. After sharing space for

years in the same row house at N Street Village, Bread for the City merged with

Zacchaeus Medical Clinic, settling on Bread for the City's name for the new

organization, and providing comprehensive medical, legal and social services, as well as

food and clothing. Once Luther Place Memorial Church underwent renovations, Bread

for the City purchased a warehouse on 7th Street to relocate the newly merged programs

and opened another center in Southeast D.C.

Other programs were busy expanding as well. Father Gilchrist of St. Margaret's

Church near Dupont Circle opened up Charlie's Place, serving a Spanish style breakfast

to nearby homeless folks two mornings a week. Rachael's Women's Center, the

women's program founded by Kathleen Guinan, purchased a nearby row house and

moved to a permanent location on 11th Street. Meanwhile, Hannah House and Capitol

Hill Group Ministries established an emergency shelter program for families. While

Covenant House started as a street outreach program for homeless teens, they eventually

created an emergency shelter and transitional living residences for youth as well. Finally,

the Dinner Program for Homeless Women (DPHW) created a formal partnership with

Zacchaeus Kitchen, the food program that was originally based out of the CCNV

45 Reed, The Soul of Justice: 75 Years of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Washington. 216

community and had the ongoing support of Ed Guinan. Zacchaeus Kitchen moved to the

First Congregational Church in the Downtown Services Center, which was established to bring multiple services together under one roof and was operated by DPHW.

By the beginning of the decade, the Luther Place Congregation was extensively involved in congregation ministries at N Street Village as they grew and refined their

purpose. Pastor Steinbruck personally ran the Glean Machine - a pick up truck that

gleaned food from supermarkets in one ministry program that delivered food to nearby

poor and hungry residents. At the same time, area churches that were involved in

programs to serve the poorest of the poor felt unsupported and even harassed by the D.C.

government on many levels. Steinbruck recalled one incident while delivering food. The

Glean Machine was booted and towed to the Breezewood facility during a food run. He

felt it was a great photo opportunity so he called the news media and spent the day there

while the food he picked up was rotting in the back of the truck. Many times, they were

able to capitalize on their media relationships and build public sympathy in their favor

but public support did not always translate into good public policy.

The church's expansion and progressive activities were also subject to

government hostility, as we will see later in this chapter. In response to major opposition

from the community, the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA)

began harassing the program with minor violations and then the Zoning Board suddenly

revoked their occupancy permits. The nearby Logan Circle Community Association and

local Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) were at the source of neighborhood

opposition and pressed the administration with complaints. While unsuccessful in halting

operations, the community did forestall the completion of a planned renovation and 217

expansion, adding millions to the cost once they succeeded in obtaining historic designation for the entire neighborhood. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade, Luther

Place celebrated the completion of the renovations. They modified the church to include an additional floor for the shelter, as well as small apartments for volunteer groups to stay in. Redevelopment of the N Street Village row houses across the street made Eden Place possible, which now housed group homes, a treatment program, a wellness center and 51 affordable housing units. Finally, N Street Village had a new building suitable to meet the needs of its various programs and services, including Bethany's Women's Center.

Throughout much of the decade, progressive Pastor Steinbruck worked on a number of city issues that addressed the needs of the poor and looked for opportunities to

bring other congregations in. While Steinbruck is critical of governmental waste, he is equally critical of religious complacency:

Seizing such an opportunity [like the Glean Machine incident] - that's advocacy. It is painful to see churches locked up tighter than a mausoleum. They just sit there and do nothing, but we have an obligation to mobilize that institution called the church. Instead, it sits there almost suffering laryngitis.

Not surprisingly, Luther Place was involved in the founding of the Washington Interfaith

Network (WIN) in 1996, which organized the political clout of area congregations for

work on behalf of the poor.46 A chief organizer from the Industrial Areas Foundation

approached Pastor Steinbruck and other key leaders in the religious community in

Washington about founding a coalition. Grounded in democratic principles, they

organized each congregation by enlisting people one on one until they had a sufficient

number of parishioners to hold a plenary meeting. Out of those "house meetings," WIN

46 Based on the Industrial Areas Foundation model of organizing, they adopted their famous mantra that there are only issues - no permanent allies or enemies. Today they are one of 60 IAF affiliates. 218

developed a comprehensive agenda to create a platform for the founding meeting. Luther

Place gave Washington Interfaith Network free space in their church. Since then, WIN has worked on a range of progressive community initiatives through grassroots mobilizing and local leadership development. They have focused their actions around affordable housing, public safety, education, living wage, voter registration, and

Congressional representation for District residents. They have significant influence because of their extensive politically savvy membership, and when several thousand voters participate in anything, politicians tend to listen.

While WIN has earned the respect of many political leaders, it has not gained the involvement of many anti-homeless advocates in the last ten years. Such broader movements like WIN have been eschewed by activists in favor of issue-specific advocacy.47 At times, there is coincidental overlap on issues with a lack of coordination.

Short on time and energy, those who do get involved in political campaigns opt to focus their efforts on initiatives that have direct bearing on either their program or their clientele. There is also the recognition that housing justice, broadly defined, does little to ameliorate the condition of those who are homeless right now. Consequently, programs strive to maintain integrity to the people relying on their services. As we will see, over time, numerous factors have discouraged political involvement for social service providers, a fact signified by the recent cultural shift towards conciliation. Many key leaders moved on or retired and one of the greatest losses for the movement has been the absence of public figures who, fiercely committed to political activism, held the ability to

47 Empower DC is perhaps an exception. Founded in 2003, the group has included the issue of shelters and the private development of public property as one of its major campaign issues. While the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless remains connected to their advocacy campaigns, most provider groups are rather uninvolved in their efforts. 219

mobilize large groups of people. In prior decades, advocates not only struggled for political recognition, but also with the overwhelming needs of homeless individuals.

Once legitimacy had been achieved, they missed a crucial opportunity to appeal to the broader public and mobilize around an anti-poverty platform.

Certainly, there are crucial and pressing needs that homeless-specific social

services are perhaps best poised to handle, and we need to be real about the destructive

life-challenges facing the homeless. Wright and Rossi make this point: "Homeless

advocates, and, to a lesser extent, social researchers, have tended to downplay the

importance of mental illness and substance abuse among the homeless. Leaning over

backward to avoid blaming the victim, it is easy to lose one's balance. "48 Yet, there are

many issues which affect us all that could also have a long-term impact on reducing

homeless poverty in the future, but this requires a long range perspective.49 This includes

union busting that destabilizes employment, quality public education that produces

literate graduates, locally based jobs that have been transplanted to other jurisdictions, as

well as living wage campaigns. And yet, many of these issues are taken on by specific

constituencies that fail to translate the broader significance of these issues to the

American public. Such alliances that bridge multiple social issues offer more than just

band aids for a specific segment of the population. Eliminating homelessness requires

attention to both urgent, individual needs as well as the larger systemic ones and the key

will be how effectively advocates are able to appeal to a broader constituency. Frankly,

48 James D. Wright and Peter H. Rossi, review of A Nation in Denial, by Alice Baum and Donald Burnes, Contemporary Sociology, 23, no. I (January 1994): 42. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/2074853 (accessed 2 October 2007).

49 Katz, ed., The Underclass Debate: Views from History. 220

without that level of commitment, we are just dooming ourselves to managing homelessness; doing the same things over and over, perhaps slightly better, and hoping for different results will not produce anything but incremental change.

In Washington, the infusion of federal and local government money greatly expanded services and quality programs but it also represented the city govemment'.s retreat from providing what little critical services it had been supporting. In her detailed analysis of the explosion of the nonprofit sector funded by grants, subsidies, and contracts, Wolch argues the voluntary sector has become a "shadow state:" "a para-state apparatus comprised of multiple voluntary sector organizations, administered outside of traditional democratic politics - charged with major collective service responsibilities

previously shouldered by the public sector, yet remaining within the purview of state control."50 Privatization and outsourcing were national trends that followed federal welfare retrenchment and ultimately shifted responsibility to nonprofits to fill gaps in essential services.

Privatization of social services is a trend characteristic of major neoliberal

political-economic changes that have occurred at the national level as well as in the

District. According to Maskovsky, neoliberalism is characterized by:

the post-Keynesian model of the social order that champions unhindered market forces as the most effective means toward achieving economic growth and guaranteeing social welfare .... [I]t has involved a retreat from and privatization of the welfare state, and the invocation by the post-welfare state of matching consumers and producers in the private marketplace for goods and service

50 Wolch, xvi. See also Curtis, "Urban Poverty and the Social Consequences of Privatized Food Assistance." 221

prov1s1on. This has involved the concomitant conversion of all subjects into either consumers or producers/providers. 51

Maskovsky continues:

Once government gets out of the way of "opportunity," the logic goes, progress will take care of itself. Accordingly, no specific measures need to be taken to address the problems of poverty and inequality, since these will eventually be solved by the natural working of the "free" market.52

By investing so heavily into the social service sector, the government is not readily

addressing the underlying causes of poverty and certainly not working towards proactive

solutions that eliminate the need for social services in the first place. But it appears that

the government is responsibly addressing the problem.53 In fact, during this time,

officials were looking to more effectively manage the problem posed by such visible

destitution. Providers followed suit, looking for creative ways to handle homelessness

and its attendant issues, perhaps unconsciously abandoning their earlier commitments to

find solutions to end such severe destitution. Some even argued that the expansion of

services was in fact an effort to reduce homelessness. This too was a legacy of decades

of crisis driven advocacy and academic research that underscored the incapacities of

various segments of the homeless population. Such a focus might ameliorate existing

homelessness but deeper reforms are essential for a lasting impact. True reform would

51 JeffMaskovsky, "The Other War At Home: The Geopolitics of U.S. Poverty," Urban Anthropology, 30, no.2-3 (200lb): 219-220. The basis of his argument is similar lo the "deserving and undeserving poor" debate, by splitting individuals into classes of productive and unproductive citizens. In fact, agencies are now frequently referred to as service "providers" and the Department of Mental Health in the District has changed their terminology to refer to all outpatient participants as "consumers."

52 Ibid., 220.

53 Curtis, "Urban Poverty and the Social Consequences of Privatized Food Assistance." 222

require a dual perspective that included both rehabilitative and economic solutions, but the latter was not as easy to grapple with.54

D.C. is unique in that homeless services are almost entirely handled by private nonprofits and church ministries. Social services have historically been provided by charitable groups, though they have not always been the social service arm of the state, subject to the controlling influence wielded by government officials.55 Private non­ profits offer many advantages to large, intransigent, state bureaucracies but the benefits are highly contingent upon the context.56 In D.C., this trend has expanded the range and quality of homeless services, offering a progressive voice for change and bringing humanity to an otherwise sterile service delivery system. On the other hand, local reliance on government contracts has resulted in a fragmented and decentralized social service delivery system that Maskovsky argues is a major factor in disempowering poor people who have to navigate such convoluted systems.57 Further, Goode and Maskovsky write: "Privatization removes the poor from a direct relationship with the state, a relationship that historically has been essential to the expression of collective agency for poor communities."58 Importantly, it has also stifled political dissent in such a contentious environment, as we will see below. In the District, once The Community

Partnership assumed responsibility for homeless services, the city government substantially reduced its financial commitment. By withdrawing public services and

54 Koegel, et al.

55 Wolch.

56 See Cooper; Wolch.

57 Maskovsky, "Afterward: Beyond the Privatist Consensus."

58 Goode and Maskovsky, "Introduction," 9. 223

benefits at both levels and then contracting with private nonprofits, the state has initiated a new, perhaps more insidious way to exercise control and minimize dissent. The

Community Partnership, with its mediating role, has mitigated this trend, though in their role, they cannot be the outspoken public advocates that some expect them to be.

Legal Advocacy and Receivership

The new decade did little to abate the acrimonious relationship between the city,

social service providers and advocates, despite the change in mayoral administrations.

The city continued to be embroiled in multiple lawsuits stemming from the arbitrary and bureaucratic procedures many believed were meant to discourage homeless applicants.

Legal advocates attempted to get underneath core issues that were contributing to

homelessness in the District and ameliorate conditions that were keeping people

homeless. Ultimately, litigation efforts successfully established minimum standards so

that homeless services no longer had the excessive abuses seen in prior decades. Public

leaders claimed that the lack of financial resources in the District hampered progress efforts but city agencies opted out of federal funds in order to avoid public scrutiny and

lost funds designated for public services as a result of gross mismanagement. The

Mayor's administration stonewalled judges and lawyers for months with legal

maneuverings - going to extraordinary measures to buy time and avoid judicial

mandates. Mayor Kelly even initiated a public relations campaign that blamed the judges, the plaintiffs and their lawyers.59 However, suing the city backfired when the

59 Michael I. Greenberger, Elizabeth M. Brown and Anne R. Bowden, eds., introduction and summary to Cold, Harsh, and Unending Resistance: The District of Columbia Government's Hidden War Against Its Poor and Its Homeless (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, 22 November I 993), 11. 224

City Council voted to overturn the right to shelter, later affirmed by a narrow public referendum, eliminating one of the major contestable grounds for legal action and overturning scores of previous decisions based on the shelter mandate. Well-meaning judicial decrees proved virtually unenforceable and left organizers feeling like they were spinning their wheels.60

Nevertheless, litigation continued unabated around the right to safe, sanitary shelter facilities for singles and families. In 1990, the Washington Legal Clinic for the

Homeless (WLCH) took Mayor Kelly to court based on the city's continued use of squalid hotels for family shelters in Fountain v. Kelly. 61 Despite a D.C. City Council law requiring the Office of Emergency Shelter and Support Services (OESSS) to house families in apartment style units with separate sleeping quarters, kitchen facilities and outdoor play areas for youth (based on the Emergency Family Shelter Act of 1987), the city continued to rely on five substandard hotels for family shelters.62 All families were bused to the Pitts Hotel for food, forcing people to wait outside for transportation and to choose between taking their children to school and feeding them each day.

The city's legal defense in the case centered around the fact that they were overwhelmed with consent decrees and injunctions in other litigation and that compliance

would be extremely costly. Yet, at the same time the District was years behind in

securing matching funds for the operation of its family shelters, and in 1992 they stood to

60 See Hopper, Reckoning With Homelessness.

61 This discussion draws on Thomas J. Karr and Steven J. Harburg, "Emergency Shelter: Fountain v. Kelly." in Cold, Harsh, and Unending Resistance: The District of Columbia Government's Hidden War Against Its Poor and Its Homeless, eds. Michael I. Greenberger, Elizabeth M. Brown and Anne R. Bowden (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, 22 November 1993): 73-88.

62 These were the Pitts Hotel, General Scott Inn, Braxton, Budget Motel and Walter Reed. 225

lose $2.4 million for not properly documenting family shelter program. They were also in jeopardy of losing the right to apply altogether for matching funds as a result of the

1987 family shelter law violation. Meanwhile, several plaintiffs in the case were placed rather quickly in apartments in an effort to stymie the court negotiations. Sister Eileen

Breen who was a nurse for the Health Care for the Homeless (HCH) project testified on the poor conditions at Pitts and its impact on families and children. City officials, who

were in the process of reviewing the HCH contract, complained to HCH officials about

her involvement in the suit. In response, HCH submitted that Sister Breen's views did

not represent HCH and consequently, their letter was submitted as evidence that the

problems she noted were not widespread. Since then, healthcare providers with first hand

knowledge of the conditions in the shelters have been reluctant to come forward for fear

of retaliation. Moreover, attorneys representing families in the case were barred and

threatened with arrest for meeting clients in city shelters.

Unfortunately, before a final decision was rendered, the City Council amended

the Right to Shelter law to clarify that "nothing in the 1987 Emergency Family Shelter

Act shall be construed to create an entitlement to shelter or support services."63 Over the

course of several years that this case ran its course, the city gradually stopped using most

of the hotel shelters and increased apartment style rooms for families, but the overall

number of beds for families declined.

A second case filed in 1991 on behalf of CCNV was Johnson v. Dixon, objecting

to the closure of the Trust Clinic Shelter and Pierce Shelter, which had been open nearly

63 Ibid., 79. 226

13 years.64 Pierce was located at 13th and G Streets, NE while Trust Clinic was located at

14th and Q Streets, NW, prompting the Logan Circle Community Association to retain its own lawyer in support of the city's action to close the Trust Clinic. Following the repeal of the District's Right to Shelter law, the Department of Human Services posted closings of both shelters one month later.65 Advocates claimed the postings were confusing and that many residents left right away - denying them the ability to have assistance in locating alternative housing. Lawyers tried the case on the grounds that it violated Fair

Housing laws (that disabled residents were discriminated against) as well as D.C. code violations requiring that the city place former St. Elizabeth's patients into proper accommodations, but lost on the Fair Housing grounds.

In what would become a sign of the times, employees of Catholic Charities and the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless who were contracted to operate both shelters "feared that the District would retaliate against them, or their employees, and deprive them of employment or future contracts"66 and therefore would not testify on behalf of the case.

Until the case was before the judge, the District had no clue that the federal money it received for the operation of the closed shelters included a stipulation that the shelters

remain open for a period of several years. It was only after the plaintiffs notified them of

this requirement that OESSS subsequently arranged to have the funds transferred to

64 This discussion draws on Drew Fossum and Tamar Snyder, "Emergency Shelter: Johnson v. Dixon," in Cold, Harsh, and Unending Resistance: The District of Columbia Government's Hidden War Against Its Poor and Its Homeless, eds. Michael I. Greenberger, Elizabeth M. Brown and Anne R. Bowden (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, 22 November 1993): 99-110.

65 The Department of Human Services replaced OESSS during this decade. Both names are referenced throughout this chapter according to the time period referred to.

66 Ibid., 108. 227

support other programs. As a result of the litigation, the city did agree to create a task force that included activists if they dismissed their case. The task force's goal was to

conduct "an internal policy review reexamining how many shelter beds were actually

needed and the appropriate procedures to follow when, and if, additional shelters were

closed in the future."67 As a result, the Mayor's Advisory Task Force on Homelessness

replaced the Homeless Coordinating Council with a smaller, 33 member advisory task

force to analyze homeless in the District and find ways to meet the shelter needs. This

plan satisfied the concerns of CCNV and other advocates. Yet, the following year when

the task force published its fifty recommendations, all but a handful were dismissed by

Mayor Kelly and none implemented. In fact, Steve Cleghorn offered to work on the few

recommendations adopted by Kelly, calling her bluff even though she declined to accept

his offer.

In 1993, WLCH took the Kelly administration to court over the operation of its

emergency shelter program for families in WLCH v. Kelly. 68 Volunteers, lawyers and

advocates objected to the arbitrary application of rules for families and the bureaucratic

nightmare that they were subjected to. Families were flatly turned away because there

were no shelter spaces available, which in this case violated federal laws.

In a press release submitted by Housing Action! in support of the case, Brian Carome

stated:

67 Ibid., 107.

68 This discussion draws on Katherine D. McManus, "Emergency Shelter: Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Kelly." in Cold, Harsh, and Unending Resistance: The District of Columbia Government's Hidden War Against Its Poor and Its Homeless, eds. Michael I. Greenberger, Elizabeth M. Brown and Anne R. Bowden (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, 22 November 1993): 57-71. 228

When a child becomes homeless, that is an emergency. When that homeless child is denied shelter that is simply a disaster. This administration needs to be more honest about what it is willing to do. Their failure to be honest makes it next to impossible to get the private help needed to fill the enormous gaps in this shelter system.69

The press release goes on to accuse DHS of threatening that further pressure from homeless advocates would result in families being evicted from shelter after 90 days.

The standoff resulted in a demonstration at the family intake center at 25 M Street, SW that involved 50 members of Housing Action! as well as other advocates. Volunteers

began accompanying families to the shelter intake office to assist them and were horrified

at what they heard. "In at least one instance, an applicant who had been threatened with

rape by her landlord was told to obtain a notarized letter from that landlord stating that

she could no longer stay in the apartment."70 Volunteers were harassed, threatened and

finally banned from the OESSS intake office, despite the fact that applicants were legally

entitled to assistance. Applicants were berated by OESSS staff for speaking to their

volunteer advocates. WLCH even documented the case of a manager at a DHS hotel who

intimidated families if they spoke to the press.71 These combined actions prevented the

city's homeless services administration from being subject to public scrutiny.

69 Housing Action!, "Families Being Denied Shelter; Father McKenna Center Opens Emergency Shelter for Families in Central Intake Center at 25 M," press release, 9 March 1992, courtesy of Steve Cleghorn personal archives.

7° Katherine D. McManus, "Emergency Shelter: Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Kelly." in Cold, Harsh, and Unending Resistance: The District of Columbia Government's Hidden War Against Its Poor and Its Homeless, eds. Michael I. Greenberger, Elizabeth M. Brown and Anne R. Bowden (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, 22 November 1993): 60-1.

71 DHS refused to disavow these statements or assure families that they would be protected in such instances. Instead, they insisted that the hotel manager was entitled to his own views, quite contrary to their position in other confrontations in which agency's funding was jeopardized or taken away when leadership "expressed their own views." 229

After press coverage of families sleeping on the street outside the OESSS office building waiting to apply for shelter, families were further intimidated when they were told that staff would report them to Child Protective Services if they continued to sleep there with their children. McManus concludes, "It appears ... that the District is refusing to shelter families who have no alternative but to sleep on the streets, and is informing those families that if they sleep on the streets with their children, the District may institute neglect proceedings and take the children away."72

Amazingly, on the day before a preliminary injunction hearing in the case, the

District pulled out of the federal Emergency Assistance program retroactively and claimed that it no longer had to comply with federal regulations, eliminating the legal grounds of the case. Rather than operating the programs within the law, the city gave up an estimated $1.4 million federal reimbursement money that it was entitled to (and desperately needed). Even though D.C. law required the city to apply for federal money when it was available, DHS used this legal maneuvering to avoid public scrutiny and undermine the grounds for the case. As the case dragged on, the homeless plaintiffs were

granted class certification status and the court agreed that due to the city's own

regulations, Mayor Kelly must apply for federal emergency assistance funds.

Anti-poverty advocacy focused on these and other issues because they understood

the complexity of issues leading to homelessness. Incarceration, drugs, alcohol and

systems failures in public schools, foster care, medical and mental health have all lead to

increasing numbers of individuals calling the streets of D.C. home. Legal advocates were

72 Ibid., 68. 230

at the forefront of these concerns and grasped the significance of housing and mental health care in particular. They were gravely concerned about the provision of mental health care in the District as they threatened the city with contempt again for violating the latest consent decree negotiated in Dixon v. Kelly. 73

The original case began nearly twentJ! years earlier and involved the transfer of the federally operated St. Elizabeth's Hospital to the city and the establishment of community-based mental health services. It had dragged on because of the city's resistance and apparent incompetence. A report distributed by the D.C. Advocates for the

Mentally Ill citing Torrey, et al. noted that the District's mental health authority spends

4.5 times the national average on mental health care but ranks 49th in the country in quality care provision.74 Advocates questioned the rationale that allocated most of the funds toward the operation of St. Elizabeth's hospital, despite the fact that most individuals resided in the community. At the same time, like DHS, this agency was also losing millions in federal reimbursement payments because of inadequate administrative tracking and reporting mechanisms.75 The system was in such a state of disarray that case managers in the community mental health centers were averaging caseloads of 80

73 This case was originally filed as Robinson v. Weinberger in 1974 and was amended following the transfer of St. Elizabeth's hospital to the District. Because the lead plaintiff was William Dixon, the case is referred to as the "Dixon case." Between the original lawsuit and its subsequent motions, the city had negotiated at least five consent decrees with binding commitments and timetables, most of which it was disregarded.

74 "Toward An Effective Mental Health System. A Perspective of Service Providers to the Homeless." 7/1989. Courtesy of Steve Cleghorn personal archives. Citing E. Fuller Torrey, Sidney M. Wolfe and Laurie M. Flynn, Care of the Seriously Mentally Ill: A Rating ofState Programs (Washington, D.C.: Public Citizen Health Research Group: National Alliance for the Mentally III, 1988), 2"d Edition.

75 In fact, in 2003, the D.C. auditor reported that the Department of Mental Health had lost $153 million over the previous 7 years because they could not provide sufficient documentation to obtain Medicaid, Medicare, and other federal payments. 231

individuals, while it was costing the District $80,000 per person residing in the hospital.

Federal subsidies for the hospital were set to end in 1991, when the inpatient population was down to 800 individuals at St. Elizabeth's Hospital. And the city had yet to create a comprehensive mental health program that could serve the needs of all its mentally ill residents.

The 1989 consent order set a two-year time table to reduce the number of hospital beds, increase resources for community based mental health services, and develop community living facilities. After the third decree, the District did improve its emergency psychiatric and outreach services. But following the negotiation of a fourth legal order, advocates were frustrated with minimal progress being made on the part of the city and were asking for a new Special Master with binding authority to oversee the court orders. Rather than comply with the court, Mayor Kelly sought to overturn the

1964 District law that the original suit was based upon, although she eventually withdrew the legislation because of the lack of support for the measure. Dr. Robert Washington, the new commissioner who had served for only a few years, resigned and Mayor Kelly never replaced him, rendering the court agreements ineffective without sufficient leadership to implement them. The judge responded by appointing a Special Master to oversee and report on the District's compliance with the 1992 Consent Order and all previous orders. But by 1996, the Dixon plaintiffs filed another motion in the U.S.

District Court, requesting the appointment of a receiver to operate the District's public mental health system. This motion as well was granted in 1997.76 The Receiver was

76 Department of Mental Health, "Dixon Case," http://dmh.dc.gov/dmh/cwp/view,a,3,q,639222,dmhNav, % 7C3 l 262% 7C.asp (accessed l August 2008). In May 2002, the U.S. District Court terminated the receivership, appointed a Court Monitor and adopted 232

given responsibility to overhaul the District's mental health program and charged with creating a cabinet level Department of Mental Health, with complete responsibility over legal, financial and employment matters. Further, the appointee was charged with developing "an integrated and comprehensive community-based mental health system.

The resulting system shall provide all class members with timely and accessible care and shall serve class members in the least restrictive setting commensurate with their individual needs."77

The city's housing administration was also struggling along with several other agencies in the District government. Mayor Kelly's election promise to "take the boards off' nearly 2400 vacant and dilapidated public housing units proved daunting for yet another administration. During this time period, HOPE VI became an increasingly popular option for struggling housing authorities around the nation. Beginning in 1993,

HUD offered money as part of the Homeownership and Opportunity for People

Everywhere (HOPE VI) program to rehab and replace public housing complexes with

scattered site or less dense residences and District residents took advantage of opportunities to tum around blighted housing units.78 Participants were given housing vouchers that could be used in the free market but unfortunately, they found fewer and fewer landlords willing to accept them. The neoliberal ideology of free market laissez faire had failed yet again. There was a net decline in the number of subsidized units once

agreed upon "exit criteria." The May 2002 Consent Order requires the Court Monitor to prepare and submit an annual monitoring plan and is required to submit bi-annual reports on monitoring activities to the Court.

77 William Dixon, et al. v. Marion Barry Jr. et al, no. 74-285 (AER) (U.S. District Court 13 June 1997), 2.

78 For an extended analysis of HOPE VI in Washington, D.C., see Clark. 233

public housing complexes were replaced with mixed income residential units. The Ellen

Wilson Dwellings on Capitol Hill for example, were bulldozed in 1995 and reopened in

1999 (as the Townhomes on Capitol Hill) with far fewer affordable units. This coincided with gentrification in the area and replicated a decades-long trend of renewal and displacement for the city's poorest African American residents. Where did former residents move to? The Prince George's County Executive in Maryland that neighbored the District complained that D.C.'s displaced outcasts were invading his county's

suburban neighborhoods.79 Meanwhile, public housing waiting lists in the District grew longer. With nearly 15,000 people on the waiting list and a 20% vacancy rate, there were

still millions in federal renovation dollars that went unspent. As of 1994, the D.C.

Department of Public and Assisted Housing had 13 directors in 15 years and had been on

HUD's list of troubled housing authorities since 1979.80 As a result of a lawsuit brought

on by the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, Pearson v. Kelly, the city's housing

department was eventually placed into receivership and the city had to relinquish control.

Interestingly, throughout the debates about affordable housing and other systemic

issues, anti-homeless advocates grew increasingly silent. Outside of the Washington

Legal Clinic's efforts to reform city services, other activists were absent from these larger

disputes, a further indication of the factionalization within the homeless movement. The

Legal Clinic was concerned about the gross mismanagement of the local housing

79 Ibid. County Executive Wayne Curry's comments are interesting considering that Prince George's County openly welcomed the District's upwardly mobile black residents 20 and 30 years earlier as the county became known as a prosperous black enclave.

80 "U.S. Capital Loses Control of Its Agency for Housing," The New York Times, 21 August 1994, 33. LexisNexis [database online}. 234

program, but no one within the provider community was publicly taking on the displacement resulting from the HOPE VI program, or other complex issues contributing to homelessness. 81

NIMBY Backlash in Foggy Bottom

Mayor Kelly's administration did little to resist local resident pushbacks against

shelters and homeless services programs. Urban neighborhoods seemed to grow weary

of the homeless in their backyards. By the time Mayor Kelly took office, Barry had cut

the homeless services budget by $19 million following the repeal of the Right to Shelter

law, which was more than half of the previous year's budget. Mayor Kelly continued by

slashing the number of shelter beds around the city and closing shelters in order to stay

within the budget, which only exacerbated the ranks of the homeless. At the same time,

Kelly's administration renegotiated contracts with for-profit shelter providers who were

providing family shelter for more than $2500 per month per family. 82 Not surprisingly,

homeless activists charged Mayor Kelly with horribly mismanaging critical funds.

In 1992, community resistance escalated in response to a shelter located in the

posh Foggy Bottom neighborhood in front of the historic Watergate, at 27•h and I Streets,

NW. The shelter included eight trailers that had been operated by a private non-profit

called Seed Ministries for the last two years, and held a little more than 100 men and

81 What makes HOPE VI in D.C. an even tougher target is the fact that at first, local public housing residents supported the conversion for the most part. With the example of the Ellen Wilson dwellings, residents spearheaded the HOPE VI application but only a handful were able to be located after construction was completed. See Clark for extended discussion and critique.

82 "Shelters for Profit," Washington Post, 3 December 1991, A20. LexisNexis [database onlineJ. Urban Shelters received a$2812 monthly contract for each family, Metropolitan Health Services received $2767 monthly and Temporary Living Communities was paid $2546 monthly. These details were released in a report issued by Representative Ted Weiss' House Subcommittee. 235

women. The Foggy Bottom trailers were part of four scattered trailers sites around the city operated by Seed Ministries that resulted from another lawsuit over the city's failure to comply with mandatory shelter laws. At the time that the trailers were brought in, the city was looking for ways to get out of court-imposed fines for violating the Right to

Shelter Law. In partnership with a local philanthropist and a bank, the city created a six- week demonstration project by opening one trailer shelter in Mount Vernon Square but it had no plans to follow through after that. The following year, Sue Marshall, who was still working at OESSS, approached John Shetterly about operating a larger trailer project. Shetterly had worked for the bank that funded the original demonstration project and was intricately involved with the trailer program. Seed Ministries was born out of this and eventually operated trailers at Mount Vernon Square, Foggy Bottom, at Kendall and Oakie Streets, NE (Crummel), and Martin Luther King A venue, SE. The trailers were a quick solution to provide relief in areas around the city where homeless already congregated and were widely regarded as a successful temporary solution to the need for emergency shelter.

Opposition to the trailers in Foggy Bottom emanated out of Mayor Kelly's office,

D.C. Councilmember Jack Evans' office, the local Advisory Neighborhood Commission

(ANC)83 and the Foggy Bottom I West End Citizen's Association. The Foggy Bottom

ANC voted in February of that year to oppose the city's plan to renew the organization's

83 Sam Smith, "Birth of the Neighborhood Commissions," The Progressive Review, http://www.prorev.com/anc.htm (accessed 30 July 2008). Advisory Neighborhood Commissions (ANC's) are neighborhood elected councils with limited authority that came to be as a result of the D.C. Statehood party platform that secured passage of the Home Rule Bill in the 1970's. Part of that bill included a city wide referendum approving ANC's, which was easily approved. ANC's were intended to be a functioning part of government that recognized decentralized community power but their authority has been largely defined by the courts and local politicians. For the most part, these local bodies are largely advisory with significant influence over local issues. 236

contract to provide shelter in their neighborhood. The ANC commissioners reported that the shelter has "not been keeping regular hours or maintaining the property."84 Residents also complained of increasing crime and vandalism as well as verbal harassment since the shelter began operating there. Not surprisingly, "plummeting property values" became a rallying cry for a group of residents to mobilize around this shelter issue. But residents at the shelter were determined to do what they could to be good neighbors. Maskovsky captures the irony of one Philadelphia shelter's efforts to encourage its residents to participate in community activities and monitor themselves in order to avoid

antagonizing their neighbors: "Ironically, here we can see how the homeless shelter

disciplines homeless men to act in accordance with definitions of citizenship that are

based on property ownership, without, of course, actually giving them property .... [The

shelter] is making sure that all residents of the city embrace neoliberal subjectivity."85 In

other words, the expectation that the disenfranchised poor would conduct themselves

according to propertied middle class values is almost absurd, given their abject status and

their struggle with severe structural and material violence. However, all too often,

community values are defined by the fault line between protecting propertied investments

and preserving community relationships that are inclusive of all its residents.

Shelter staff also worked hard to cultivate community relationships and local

goodwill with regular outreach to area residents, businesses and neighborhood police

officers. They would also regularly attend the local ANC meetings to address concerns

proactively. Staff liberally circulated their contact information to be of assistance with a

84 Shaun Sutner, "News Near You," Washington Post, 12 March 1992, 14. LexisNexis [database online].

85 Maskovsky, "The Other War At Home: The Geopolitics of U.S. Poverty," 231. 237

shelter resident who was of concern and whenever there were nuisance issues involving homeless residents. As a result, the shelter staff members were regarded as a valuable resource. According to shelter supporter Steve Cleghorn, "The irony was that a lot of people in the neighborhood supported the shelter." In fact, as the conflict with the city and the neighborhood groups unfolded, staff at the nearby Howard Johnson's Hotel offered a room to hold meetings and ancillary support so that homeless advocates could counter-strategize. A lawyer who lived at the Watergate even hung a banner out of his room in support of the trailer residents.

Councilmember Jack Evans championed the shelter closings, citing the unfair burden of homeless programs in Ward 2, which was the district he represented. Evans promoted reducing the number of social services in his ward because he felt it contained more than its fair share of the city's burden for homeless shelters and was being overrun by homeless folks. 86 But Evans' district included most of downtown and neighboring

residential areas, which had by far the largest concentration of homeless individuals even

before the assistance programs were established. Concern about the hyper-concentration

of the city's undesirables stemmed largely from academic theories made popular by

William Julius Wilson. Wilson proffered a geographic spatial theory about the oyer-

concentration of people in poverty. 87 Constricted within poor neighborhoods, the

economic poor, as well as those who were "poorly behaved," lacked the benefit of white

86 Ruben Castaneda and Debbi Wilgoren, "Kelly Postpones Closing Foggy Bottom Shelter; 40 Vow to Fight Homeless Facility's Foes," Washington Post, 7 August 1992, B3. LexisNexis [database online].

87 William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987). 238

middle class role models to arrest the perpetual cycle of generations of dysfunction and pathology.

In July, the Department of Human Services (DHS) published a 30 day closure notice indicating plans to close the shelter the following month. Publicly, the city cited the planned federal freeway construction as the cause for the closure but when pressed, they were evasive about the details. Steve Cleghorn recounts the politics behind the

Kelly Administration's decision:

As a pretext for having to move, we were told the spur of the Whitehurst freeway would come down on [the shelter]. I knew it was BS but DHS told us they would have to leave. We knew the scheduled timetable for the freeway. [Mayor Kelly] promised to move the [Foggy Bottom] shelter if they would vote for her. I happened to be at a meeting when Mayor Kelly released her homeless task force report, where Mayor Kelly went over to Barbara Kahlow. I overheard her say [to Kahl ow] that the trailers would be gone soon.

Kahlow was a vocal leader in both citizen's groups and spearheaded community opposition to the shelter, which put pressure on the Mayor's administration to deliver on her promise. It would seem that additional pressure was not needed; Mayor Kelly was intent on delivering.

Advocates heard of the impending plans at a Coalition of Homeless and Housing

Organizations (COHHO) meeting and were furious, especially after the city had already lost so many other shelter beds. Coalition members made this a central issue in their meetings and resolved to work on insuring that there was a place in the neighborhood for homeless residents of Foggy Bottom to go. DHS cited their intention to look for

alternatives for the shelter residents. Under court order, the city was already required to locate housing for residents staying in the Foggy Bottom shelter who were identified as having a severe and persistent mental illness. City officials argued that there were 239

already enough shelter beds elsewhere in the city for the remaining residents who did not meet that threshold. What was unique about this shelter was the large number of individuals with mental illness who spent the majority of their time in that neighborhood.

This was a low barrier haven in a "safe" neighborhood and many of these shelter residents had been kicked out of other shelters in the city. And as the smallest of Seed's

shelters with the greatest demands of staff time, it was operating at a loss. John Shetterly,

the Director of Seed Ministries confronted the Office of Emergency Shelter and Support

Services to determine if they were serious about moving people into housing because he

was fearful about building up people's expectations without any intention to follow

through. Shetterly recounted the point at which he learned of the city's real intentions:

"I ended up going early to a meeting and heard that there was no intention to relocate our

site at all. They had represented that the plan was to relocate people to another site in

that area of the city. At that point, things fell apart."

COHHO members felt the Mayor was "stonewalling" them, with city officials

offering different answers, depending on whom it was coming from at the time. 88 Once

talks broke down, a group of residents at the shelter made it known to staff that they

would refuse to leave. Dizzy Rosales, Tyrone Saunders and another person known as

Sleepy emerged as leaders of the campaign to save the shelter and COHHO members

were heavily involved in a supportive role. The only agreement that homeless organizers

had with Seed Ministries was that there would not be any violence. Four weeks later,

protestors camped out in front of the trailers, staging a sit-in with shelter residents and

88 Christine Spolar, "Homeless Advocates Protest in DC," Washington Post, 15 July 1992, B3. LexisNexis [database online]. 240

refusing to leave until the city either re-opened the shelters or found a suitable alternative.

Mayor Kelly stalled the closure by citing plans for the Mayor's Advisory Task Force on

Homelessness to release a report.

Organized resistance to the shelter closings took on new momentum. The series of actions that emanated out of concern for these residents and the trailers they called home involved an incredible number of people. Independent advocates, individuals from

other agencies and students all rallied in support of the shelter residents. Organizers and

committed supporters went beyond those who had direct ties to the shelter.89 According

to Carome, who was a lead supporter, the beauty of this movement was that for the first

time, "middle class elite folks were following the lead of those who were very, very

poor." Advocates set up what they hoped would be a supportive and effective structure

that was fair and equitable to the resident leadership.

The day the temporary agreement to hold off on closing the shelter was set to

expire again, Mayor Kelly postponed its closing once again, extending the contract with

Seed Ministries for another six months.90 What she did not share until several weeks

later was that her plans were to close the shelter the following spring and that only

residents with severe and persistent mental illness would be permitted to stay in the

89 Brian Carome worked at Sasha Bruce Youthwork, and remembers trying to justify to his employer the increasing amount of time he spent al the trailers. Others who got involved as well did not have direct ties the shelter: Steven Cleghorn worked at Jobs for Homeless People (JHP), Diane Doherty was a member of the Coalition for Financial Accountability, while Cliff Newman and Carol Fennelly were members of CCNV.

90 Ruben Castaneda, "District Postpones Closing Shelter in Foggy Bottom for Second Time; Facility's Contract with City Extended 6 Months, Operator Says," Washington Post, 30 September 1992, D6. LexisNexis [database online]. 241

shelter past December 1.91 As city deadlines came and went, protestors organized nightly vigils in front of the trailers, beginning with several dozen individuals but growing significantly in size over the course of the dispute. George Washington University was part of that neighborhood, so supporters reached out to students and gained their assistance, which was a key addition in terms of numbers. Momentum grew quickly as people began showing up in support seven days a week. Members of city council spoke at some rallies and even former Mayor Marion Barry, upon being released from jail, showed up one evening to speak at one of the vigils.

Strategy evolved from peaceful vigils to creative acts of civil disobedience.

Supporters did not anticipate that the Mayor would hang on for long and believed that militant action would result in a positive outcome for the homeless. At one point, the group decided to "take the show on the road," and protested in front of Councilman

Evans' office. Another time, they protested in front of Mayor Kelly's residence. Despite issuing a press release indicating their intentions, the group made it all the way up to

Kelly's front yard without a police presence, "sending shock waves to administration"

according to Carome. Shortly thereafter, Vincent Gray, the Director of DHS showed up

after the vigil to evaluate the situation and the potential for violence. He was heard bawling out his staff: "Which one of you ... who the hell told me that these folks have

Uzi's? I don't see any weapons." Three weeks into the protests, the group got word that

President Clinton was going to be at a local McDonalds. Three shelter residents showed

up and asked Clinton if he knew of the situation at Foggy Bottom, wanting him to look

91 "Shelter Closing Protested; Homeless Refuse to Leave Trailer," Washington Post 18 November 1992, D4. LexisNexis [database online]. 242

into the matter. Their exchange electrified the media. Following that event, National

Public Radio even showed up one Saturday morning to report about what was going on.

The Monday morning before Thanksgiving, advocates were convinced the city would not risk the potential media nightmare by closing the shelter before the holiday and thought they had a reprieve until after Thanksgiving. But thus far, activist challenges had gone unanswered and people were prepared just in case. Carome created a phone tree so that everyone could be mobilized in a split second if the city moved to shut down the facility as planned, but advocates were bolstered by the extensive outside support. They assumed the worst-case scenario meant that the city would relocate the shelter. In the process of being given his review at Sasha Bruce that Monday before the holiday,

Carome's supervisor received an urgent call from Diane Doherty. The police scanner

reported that the Metropolitan Police Department was on their way and Carome left his

supervisor, not sure he would have a job to return to. Amazingly, some 200 individuals materialized immediately in support of the resistance efforts. Those willing to be arrested remained on the premises while others remained outside in show of support. John

Shetterly recalled the scene:

When it became apparent that the police were arriving, [a staff member] called and told me the site was surrounded by a police force that went all out. I went down to make sure about what was going to happen and that residents were clear about the possibility of arrest. Steve [Cleghorn] was rallying the troops from on top of trailers. It was weird but it kind of needed to happen. It was not like we were going to win.

By noon, many protesters were arrested and in Cleghorn's case, literally dragged away.

After being released, a small handful returned later that evening but several shelter

residents remained in jail because they had either prior offenses or no identification. 243

Vincent Gray was there as they put the chains around the gates and the situation turned ugly when someone started shouting racial epithets at him. Several days later, the city hauled away three of the trailers.

The last stand in confrontational advocacy had ultimately backfired. It was clear following the arrests that the demonstrations would no longer go unanswered.

Retaliation against the protestors ensued. Vincent Gray ordered Debi Shore, Sasha

Bruce's founder and Executive Director to fire Carome after his arrest or risk losing their contract with DHS. Shore held her ground and somehow retained her funding but others were not so fortunate. The protests culminated in the city revoking all four of Seed

Ministries' contracts for emergency shelter.92 John Shetterly had already resigned in protest but the rest of his staff all lost their jobs. In a final defeat, DHS brought in

Catholic Charities, a major city shelter contractor for the sole purpose of shutting the shelter down and to run Seed's remaining programs.

Lyon-Callo documents a similar occurrence in a shelter in Northampton,

Massachusetts. As shelter staff and residents experimented with alternative resistance strategies, they soon discovered that their funding was in jeopardy. When former shelter staff and residents attempted to organize a nearby building takeover in response to a chronic shortage of shelter beds, they received significant support from shelter residents.

While they were permitted to hold organizing meetings, they were cautioned:

92 Seed was operating trailers at Foggy Bottom, Martin Luther King A venue, Crummel, and Mt. Vernon. John Shetterly formed a new organization with many of his former staff members called New Hope Ministries, based in Northern Virginia. Following the change in Mayoral administrations and the D.C. Initiative money, New Hope Ministries was invited back to D.C. to provide shelter services once again for the city. 244

Shelter administrators stressed that staff who participated in the action could not do so during work hours, play a lead role in public, or convey a message of official support from the shelter. These administrators were very concerned about the potential for straining relations with funders and local politicians if the shelters were seen as the impetus behind the takeover. It was agreed that coalition building would need to take place prior to any action.93

Like the Foggy Bottom protests, local politicians reacted swiftly and angrily, blaming the

shelter staff for "stirring up trouble." Later, when the Northampton winter emergency cot

program closed two weeks after the building takeover, staff members decided to offer

tents and blankets to people they had to tum away. The media suggested they were

trying to organize a tent city and the group received explicit threats that their funding

would be cut. Local officials took the actions as a personal affront to their commitment

which implicitly called into question whether they were doing enough to help the

homeless.

Lyon-Callo raises questions about the perception of not being appropriately

grateful to funders, politicians, and supporters when engaging in these activities.

Consequently, the shelter program's funding was cut 20% the following year. Probably

most significantly, this changed their outlook for the future as staff members were

disciplined and, heeding warnings, "silenced themselves" from addressing further

political activity, which parallels what happened in Washington, D.C. Because of the

extensive outside support, the Mayor's protest crackdown and funding retaliation had

wide-ranging impacts on leaders, providers, and activists around the city. Even people

that were not directly involved in the events recalled the devastating impact of the city's

decision many years later.

93 Lyon-Callo, "Constraining Responses to Homelessness: An Ethnographic Exploration of the Impact of Funding Concerns on Resistance," 5. 245

In this context, it is easy to grasp Wolch's point about the shadow state compromising social change advocacy, but it is more complicated that explicit retaliation at the local level. Politically active organizations, especially those whose agenda's conflict with the government, have historically been marginalized in the United States.94

Federal attempts to encroach upon nonprofits through legislating changes to tax- exemption rules have served to discipline non-profit providers. In addition, the lure of public funding can provide a measure of temperance for groups. Agencies are brought into the fold with offers of grants and contracts as a public service extension of the state:

Freedom to act collectively, on a voluntary basis, is at the core of democratic ideology. But the threat of excessive [demonstration] against the state is ever present. Unconstrained resource-rich voluntary organizations can limit the state's relative autonomy. This potentially leads the state to circumscribe voluntarism and to incorporate voluntary groups within the state apparatus.95

Through the mediating function of state contracts, Wolch argues that more militant groups risk being demobilized by converting groups into direct service providers with an exclusive focus on service delivery. In fact, scholars have pointed to examples in the

Great Society efforts, War on Poverty programs, and the Women's movement during the

1960's, where the U.S. government created grants in an explicit attempt to weaken radical groups while generating new organizations that might direct discontent into more

traditional service-oriented activities.96 Nancy Matthews argues convincingly that public

94 For an analysis of Comprehensive Community Initiatives in Chicago see also Venkatcsh, Off the Books: The Underground Economy of the Urban Poor. The community grants bolstered some grassroots community organizations that espoused sterile social service delivery and marginalized those who maintained overtly political agendas.

95 Wolch, 32.

96 See for example Wolch; Gregory. 246

funding for rape crisis centers explicitly channeled two decades of anti-rape activism into rape crisis intervention and sterile service delivery, effectively eliminating the feminist political agenda and prevention efforts from the grassroots anti-rape movement.97 State support solely for the therapeutic aspects of service provision in rape crisis centers undermined feminist political activism that aimed at transforming gender relations.

W olch suggests direct service efforts managed social unrest and provided an outlet for political energy by increasing services towards groups demanding social change while obscuring the underlying sources of urban poverty, thus radically transforming dissenting politics.98 What's more, support has increasingly gone to professional advocates who were considered "responsible militants."99 In this case, that would be Catholic Charities, who were chosen to replace Seed Ministries and already noted for their aversion to making public stands against their funder. The largest government service providers in the District have been agencies who historically, were reticent to take controversial political stands regarding homelessness and public policy.

The following week after Thanksgiving, COHHO met and emotions surrounding the arrests were raw. Advocates felt disillusioned and their spirits crushed. It was a tense meeting with disputes about the exchange of racial remarks. The tension escalated as homeless advocates accused a black administration of waging war on the poor. Some felt apologies were appropriate and that it may not be prudent to antagonize the Mayor if

97 Nancy A. Matthews, Confronting Rape: The Feminist Anti-Rape Movement and the State (London: Routledge, 1994).

98 For an interesting analysis of how direct service volunteering has the same impact on the larger populace, see Poppendieck, Sweet Charity?

99 Wolch, 74. 247

she was going to crack down on people. Regena Thomas of the Mayor's Office of

Constituent Services did not help antagonisms when she was quoted making claims that white suburban activists were trying to speak for the District's black residents in the dispute. 100 Even within the coalitions, there was the sense that white middle class

activists were more willing to be involved in confrontations with the city while people of color tended to respond more cautiously. On the other hand, there was also the

predominant feeling that the administration was moving homeless people out of white

areas and into poor black neighborhoods.

The shelter residents also struggled to control the future of the campaign. There

was a strong sentiment to continue the effort as a political statement and insist on a trial

or even jail time for those who were arrested. Steve Cleghorn explained, "We wanted to

prove that the notice of the freeway ramp was a lie. We wanted to get arrested and have

our day in court." But others felt that taking such a stand was a privileged position for

those who could afford those risks and the financial burden. Pleading out might not help

their cause in the long term but could make sense for the homeless struggling to get their

lives back on track. Not everyone felt that those concerns were being heard or that the

homeless shelter leaders were still in charge of the group's political direction. The

tension illustrates Rosenthal's point that people involved in homeless resistance want

long-term structural change but the homeless prefer immediate assistance and sometimes

feel manipulated by advocates over the political agenda. 101 The movement has yet to

100 COHHO, "Vincent Gray, Director of DHS, Visits Foggy Bottom Shelter to Hear Demands of 'Foggy Bottom Family': No Progress," press release, 24 November 1992, courtesy Steve Cleghorn personal archives.

101 Rosenthal, "Dilemmas of Local Anti-homelessness Movements." 248

resolve this contradiction. Ultimately, in this case, individuals would decide for themselves if pursuing trial and jail time were the most appropriate response. Six months later, DHS dropped the charges against everyone, deflating the attempts of some advocates who were committed to making this a larger political issue.

In the end, Mayor Kelly took the homeless leaders of the shelter standoff to a

Clinton inaugural event. The roadwork that required the shelters to be closed never happened, but the city did store some construction materials on the site five years later.

Eventually, the trailers were moved to Mount Pleasant where the D.C. Coalition for the

Homeless ran a makeshift shelter for an increasing number of homeless Latinos in that neighborhood. Once the trailers closed, the women who stayed at the Foggy Bottom trailers were expected to travel across the city to the Crummel trailers in northeast D.C.

Advocates protested because of safety issues and the Mount Vernon Square trailers were subsequently converted into a women's shelter. After the trailers at Foggy Bottom were removed, there were a tremendous number of folks who moved into nearby encampments. For many involved in the vigils and the protests that followed, Foggy

Bottom culminated in the ultimate defeat of the political anti-homeless movement. It was emblematic of the last large-scale effort using CCNV style political street theater and signaled a more conciliatory - and to some degree silent - era.

Foggy Bottom Redux: NIMBY and Miriam's Kitchen

In the 1990's, NIMBY activism seemed to take on a life of its own and there were winners and losers on both sides of the gentrification coin. It seemed that community activists gathered steam as the decade wore on, illuminating neighborhood residents' low 249

tolerance for society's outcasts. Zoning ordinances and historic preservation became the main vehicle for the development agenda, and for the removal of the unsightly, unseemly, exiled poor. As NIMBY activism continued unabated, providers fought back. Social service leaders were frustrated that the homeless were targeted by District officials who many felt had not only abandoned their responsibility to provide adequately for people in need, but also for government counter-efforts that made it difficult for providers to fill in the gaps left by official negligence. These political skirmishes occurred in affluent northwest neighborhoods, although other Wards took a cue from their northwest neighbors and attempted to resist what Neil Smith calls displacement to "reservations on the urban edge."102

Following their victory in the dispute over the shelter trailers, the Foggy Bottom

ANC quickly targeted another program to focus their opposition: the Western

Presbyterian Church and its breakfast program, Miriam's Kitchen. Western Presbyterian

1 Church was originally located on valuable property at l 9 h and Pennsylvania A venue,

NW that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had sought to acquire since 1970.

During initial discussions, the Diocese agreed to the sale but the congregation strongly

opposed it. After Pastor John Wimberly was asked to pastor the church, he negotiated

the church's stipulations with the IMF for the sale of the property. IMF agreed to find

property for the church in Foggy Bottom, to rebuild the sanctuary, since older members

were very attached to it, design a large program area and community kitchen for

102 Smith, The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City, 28. 250

Miriam's Kitchen breakfast program, install underground parking, and create an endowment to keep the church running.

1 When they settled on a site on 24 h Street, the surrounding community was glad to have them. The building the church would replace was a six story eyesore and the community welcomed the change. But there was significant opposition to relocating the church's feeding program, Miriam's Kitchen only five blocks to the west. 103 By this time, Miriam's Kitchen had been in existence for nearly ten years and the church was very committed to the ministry. The Foggy Bottom residential area bordered a business district and the former church property straddled that area. When the church proceeded with plans to relocate its entire operation, local residents and the ANC tried to get the church declared a historic building so it could not move locations, but the D.C. Historic

Preservation Review Board narrowly voted down the proposal by a margin of one vote.

John Ray, who was a mayoral candidate at the time, voted for a second hearing of case.

In an unscrupulous move, two people resigned from the Review Board and were replaced by unsupportive candidates who had to agree to vote in favor of the landmark issue before being sworn in. If Western Presbyterian Church was declared a landmark then the church could not relocate. Neil Smith asserts that historic preservation efforts are part of the suburbanization of the city where a powerful elite attempts to reclaim or reinvent a sanitized past. 104 Only that past in not an inclusive past, but rather one that necessitates the recolonization of a city where racial and class divides stand in stark contrast.

Displacing the homeless and other undesirables effectively sanitize the cityscape,

103 The original location of the church was 1906 H Street, NW and they moved to 2401 Virginia Avenue, NW, which was located on the corner of241h and G Streets, NW.

104 Smith, The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City. 251

utilizing the bourgeois tools of historic preservation and zoning ordinances. Though the church won the second time around, it was quickly faced with another tool in the community's arsenal: outdated zoning statutes.

The ANC pressured the Zoning Administrator to determine that feeding the homeless is inconsistent with the operations of a church, requiring a zoning variance that could not be obtained with community opposition. This time, the Zoning Administrator ruled against the church continuing the breakfast program and required that they obtain a special permit. On appeal, Western Presbyterian argued that churches had been feeding people for some 2,000 years. The D.C. Board of Zoning Adjustment ruled and upheld the decision, disappointing the clients and volunteers who staffed Miriam's Kitchen.

In response, the church mobilized in opposition to the Zoning Board's decisions, using their extended base of support. Pastor John Steinbruck of Luther Place Memorial

Church organized a coalition of churches and synagogues to protest the conservative community opposition in Foggy Bottom. The Reverend Jesse Jackson added his backing to the cause and major media outlets reported on the story around the country.

Initial plans to take the case to the D.C. Court of Appeals were scrapped because

Reverend Wimberly feared the likelihood that the local level courts could be unscrupulously influenced behind the scenes, and the church did not want to risk losing the legal challenge. The church appealed to the U.S. District Court on the grounds of

First and Fifth Amendments, the Civil Rights Act as well as other local and federal laws.

At the same time, the congregation agreed to open up the breakfast program and run the risk of arrest if necessary. The U.S. District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin was renowned for chewing lawyers up. Lawyers from Corporation Counsel argued for the District that 252

churches could only run soup kitchens in certain areas of the city, like downtown. Even the judge was appalled at the comparison to "pornographers" and other undesirable activities. For the church and its congregation, the Judge's comment symbolized the humiliation they felt about their treatment. Judge Sporkin mentioned his own synagogue, which fed congregants in upper northwest, and he challenged the city to attempt to close their activities. He eventually granted a permanent injunction against the city, ruling that the city cannot impede church activities with zoning rules.

Noting that "the concept of acts of charity as an essential part of religious worship is a central tenet of all major religions," Judge Sporkin ruled that the zoning requirement constitutes a "substantial burden" on the Constitution's right to free exercise of religion. In addition, Judge Sporkin commented that, since the local and federal governments have not been able to alleviate the suffering of the homeless, "It is paradoxical that local authorities would attempt to impede such a worthwhile effort." 105

This was a sure victory for Western Presbyterian, Miriam's Kitchen and the homeless individuals who lived in that community. It seemed like the church and its breakfast program would be allowed to operate peacefully in the Foggy Bottom community. But neighborhood resisters were not through yet. The Foggy Bottom Association attempted to lure individuals away from Miriam's Kitchen by establishing a competing feeding site

near where the church was formerly located, just five blocks away.

When the IMF reached an agreement with the church and made plans to develop

the space vacated by Western Presbyterian, they needed to close a public alleyway. Late

in 1994, the City Council, the Mayor's Office, the Foggy Bottom I West End ANC and

pro bono legal representation arranged by D.C. Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton,

ws Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, "Food Program Remains Open," Home Front 5, no. 6 (November/December 1994 ). 253

negotiated a deal with the IMF and local residents. They agreed that $356,000 would be

given to Cooperative Urban Ministry Center (CUMC) 106 from the IMF to run a breakfast

program on Pennsylvania Avenue just five blocks away from Miriam's Kitchen, but they

were required to operate at the same times and days as Miriam's Kitchen for a period of

.three years! With the D.C. Council's blessing, the Foggy Bottom ANC essentially

extorted money from the IMF in exchange for construction that would eliminate a public,

city owned alley. They received the money to cover food, social services staff and were

given a retrofitted RV, called "Care-A-Van" to provide mobile social services. D.C.

Central Kitchen was approached by CUMC to provide donated food, but initially refused

because of the controversy. Instead, CUMC resorted to purchasing food and beverages.

Barbara Kahlow, Sara Maddux and other community leaders argued that their

efforts were benevolent: they only intended to replace the services formerly provided by

Miriam's Kitchen, which had been displaced from its downtown location. They were

very serious when they stated publicly that they were concerned about the homeless

having to walk the additional five blocks to receive services, as they believed that people

were already coming from across town to receive a hot meal at the former site of

Miriam's Kitchen. They refused to acknowledge that there were a significant number of

homeless men and women already in the area, which is why several programs based their

operations in that neighborhood. Even if the programs were shut down, the homeless

were not going to go away or remain contained in set aside locations.

6 !0 CUMC had been operating a dinner program and drop in center at 9th and P streets, and was affiliated with Grace Church in Georgetown. Interestingly, Barbara Kahlow, the former vice president of the Foggy Bottom Association was on the board of CUMC. Pat Makin was the Executive Director of CUMC and before that, was reportedly ousted from D.C. Coalition for the Homeless in the midst of the Anacostia Shelter fraud investigation. 254

For a brief period, CUMC served a street side meal on Pennsylvania A venue in the morning but this did not impact the numbers attending Miriam's Kitchen. One year after it started operations, CUMC went bankrupt, leading people to question how the money was spent. The program had no funding structure and was not able to secure additional money to support its operations. A year after it ceased serving meals it was clear that CUMC was not going to resume operations, so the Foggy Bottom ANC approached D.C. Central Kitchen to continue serving meals in CUMC's absence. D.C.

Central Kitchen had already been serving meals in other areas of the city and knew they could utilize the vehicle for all of their other mobile meal operations. Robert Egger, D.C.

Central Kitchen's Executive Director, moved forward with the deal but only after receiving Reverend Wimberly' s blessing. The ANC arranged for title of the vehicle to be transferred to D.C. Central Kitchen, citing that the CUMC was unable to fulfill its obligations. They were given the vehicle and some funds in April of 1997, but agreed to run the breakfast program at the same site on Pennsylvania Avenue for a period of two years. 107 In this case, the lure of funding pit programs against each other over a miniscule piece of the pie. CUMC allowed themselves to be manipulated into trying to undo a very effective and well-established program, which ultimately contributed to their own demise when there was not sufficient funding to continue operations. Community residents may have been unsuccessful but the incessant disputes and legal battles really wore people down.

07 ' Interestingly, this breakfast site continued at that location for a couple of years before the Golden Triangle Business Improvement District pressured the Kitchen to relocate outside of the BID boundaries. It continues lo serve meals several blocks to the south, at its present location at 19th and E Streets. 255

The Leadership Crisis and the Financial Control Board

Sharon Pratt Kelly, the Mayor who ran on a platform of sweeping reform, had alienated her voters over the course of her term, and was largely considered aloof and out of touch with city affairs. During the Democratic primary in 1994, she came in a distant third to Marion Barry, Jr., who decided to run for a fourth mayoral terni. After four years in office, Kelly's term was over, leaving the District saddled with a major deficit, the federal control board, and a half dozen city agencies under court ordered receivership.

Defying the odds and proving his resilience yet again, "Mayor-for-Life" Marion Barry was elected again as Mayor. In his signature style, he campaigned as a champion of the poor and the savior of the city.

Advocates views of the city were complicated by the role of the federal control board, congressional meddling, the role of big money behind the scenes, the "hangover" from Commissioner days, what Sam Smith referred to as "anticipatory colonialism" on behalf of local officials trying to avoid federal control and veto of local legislation or budgets - all of which served to impact what city residents were facing at any given time. 108 However, few of these factors were recognized as the city absorbed the brunt of resistance from homeless advocates. Barry and Kelly were not simply poor civil managers, unencumbered by the historical circumstances of the time. In fact, there were many historical factors that made the mess in the city likely.

Adolph Reed takes a critical look at what he calls "Black Urban Regimes" and the quandary they face while in office. He argues that many Black mayoral candidates run

108 Brett Williams, personal correspondence. 256

on a platform of redistributing resources but that the tension with the governing elite mean pro-growth compromises are likely, which often run counter to the needs of the city's disenfranchised constituency. Reed reasons:

The dynamics that make possible the empowerment of black regimes are the same as those that produce the deepening marginalization and dispossession of a substantial segment of the urban black population. Second, the logic of pro­ growth politics, in which black officialdom is incorporated, denies broad progressive redistribution as a policy option and thereby prohibits direct confrontation of the problem of dispossession among the black constituency. Third, the nature of polities that black regimes govern is such that the relation between the main components of their electoral and governing coalitions is often zero-sum; gains for the predominantly black electoral constituency are experienced as losses by the corporate led governing coalition, and vice versa." 109

He concludes that black officials with their growth policies end up exacerbating the marginalization experienced by residents in depressed areas of the city. Therefore, it is not surprising that Barry had not been able to deliver on his promises to the poor residents of D.C. But given that reality, what may be astonishing is the amount of

popular support he continued to enjoy. On the other hand, the city's African American

voters credited him with expanding municipal functions and the huge growth of the

public sector, which was a major source of upward mobility for aspiring residents and

those trying to escape poverty in the District. A huge sector of the city was indebted to

Barry for prioritizing hiring black residents and contractors for the city .110 Barry often

played the race card, and he had a way of convincing voters that he would represent and

109 Reed, Stirrings in the Jug: Black Politics in the Post-Segregation Era, 88.

110 See Jaffe and Sherwood, Dream City for Washington, D.C. specifically and Reed, Stirrings in the Jug on the expansion of patronage politics more generally. Jaffe and Sherwood argue that while Barry promoted "minority partners and black entrepreneurs," this really only benefited a small handful of elite residents with social and political ties to Barry, despite the perception that he was creating widespread wealth. 257

advocate for their interests well. At the same time, while the population had been declining in D.C. during the previous decade, in the 1990's it was accelerated- only this time it was mostly black flight. 111 This hastened the city's declining tax base. Therefore,

public relations between local officials and homeless advocates were complicated by

inevitable conflicts that result when cities have a rising black middle class and

intellectual elite.

By this time in D.C., elected officials had limited authority because the city's

finances were under the federally authorized control board. Real political authority

continued to lie outside the boundaries of the city, with private developers from the

suburbs, out of state and in other countries, while explicit power was exercised by larger

state entities. In the mid-1980' s, a wave of foreign and out of state investors capitalized

on the major land grab of downtown property that was given away at fire sale prices

during Barry's first stint in office. In exchange, developers contributed heavily to the

Mayor's re-election campaign. Developers replaced antiquated storefront designs with

big box office buildings, fueling gentrification and the commercial development boom in

downtown. Eventually this gave way to corporate activism and Business Improvement

Districts (BID's). Frustrated by the lack of quality services and resources provided by

the city, corporate executives elected to tax themselves and supplement city

responsibilities. Whatever could not be accomplished independently, was left to

"professional advocates" hired to resolve streetscape, public safety, sanitation, or other

issues specific to commercial districts through the city machine. The philosophy of

111 Jaffe and Sherwood, 309. 258

Barry's first planning director, James Gibson was to let the developers build and use the tax revenues for social programs. 112 But at that time, those revenues were lining the pockets of for-profit shelter providers who were personal friends of Marion Barry. By

1990, journalists Jaffe and Sherwood conclude that the city, already a political colony of the federal government, was becoming an economic one. Locally owned banks, retail establishments and real estate was bought up by out-of-town and foreign conglomerates.

"Real estate development was one of the last purely local businesses, controlled by native

Washingtonians, financed by local banks, built by homegrown construction companies.

The depression knocked out many of the local players and replaced them with Texans,

Canadians, and foreigners." 113

Progressive critic Sam Smith referred to the District as the heaviest city government- in 1974 - but at no time was this more apparent than with the multiple layers of government during the 1990' s. In addition to locally elected and appointed government officials, there were the court ordered receivers, the financial control board officers, and even Congress and the White House. Even the D.C. Initiative money given by HUD and the negotiated transfer of an entire District agency to a private entity thwarted the city's authority. Antagonisms between the federal government probably fueled local resistance to securing federal funds and matching grants. Providers and advocates willfully exploited those antagonisms when it suited their purpose. Barry was

stripped of his executive powers in 1997 and City Council authority was limited by

Congressional action in 1997 when Congress released millions in federal aid to bail out

112 Ibid., 148.

113 Ibid., 306. 259

the city. The control board maintained the power to make personnel, budgetary, and contract decisions as well as restructure the local government. By this time, there was little that Barry or any mayor for that matter, could do.

Logan Circle NIMBY Activism and Luther Place Memorial Church

The next Congress shows little promise of wanting to take on human destitution. Charities should do that, according to the Newt World Order. We 're willing, says Pastor Steinbruck and his flock .... The government's response? Pay that $2,500 fine. Which way does Caesar want it? -Colman McCarthy on the District's use of outdated zoning codes to harass private nonprofit services for the homeless. 114

As Luther Place Memorial Church made plans to expand and renovate its buildings, the local community in Logan Circle retaliated as well, using strategies from the Foggy Bottom ANC and capitalizing on a complicit D.C. government. The church

was able to secure pro bono legal assistance from a prominent D.C. law firm but the legal

battle was costly. Neighborhood residents were represented by the Logan Circle ANC

and the Logan Circle Community Association (LCCA), which shared leadership and

membership. Logan Circle was a neighborhood in transition, and as more affluent

newcomers bought up housing stock, conflicts over gentrified space were inevitable. 115

The community waged a battle on three fronts: one against the church's existing

programs, a second against the expansion of the church's building, and the last against

the planned building of affordable housing adjacent to the homeless service programs.

114 Colman McCarthy, "Law vs. the Homeless," Washington Post, 17 December 1994.

115 For an extended analysis of gentrification in one D.C. neighborhood and of conflicting views over space, culture and tradition, see Williams, Upscaling Downtown; Brett Williams, "'There Goes the Neighborhood:' Gentrification, Displacement, and Homelessness in Washington, D.C." in There's No Place Like Home: Anthropological Perspectives on Housing and Homelessness in the United States, ed. Anna Lou Dehavenon (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1999). 260

In response to community opposition, the Department of Consumer and Regulatory

Affairs (DCRA) and the Board of Zoning Adjustment stepped up occupancy and code enforcement, suddenly invalidating the certificate of occupancy for the church's homeless programs and beginning what was to become a protracted legal battle between the church and community. The city suddenly began inspecting the church properties and issuing reports of code violations, literally nickel and

Not surprisingly, zoning, and even historic preservation regulations became tools that gentrifying communities could use to resist social services and other less desirable activities in their neighborhoods, and at the same time, bust the budgets of nonprofits or in this case, the church. According to Logan and Molotch, gentrifiers, defined as young, urban pioneers, who displace less affluent community members block by block because they cannot afford to buy real estate in more affluent areas, strive to make their new

neighborhoods closely resemble their own way of life. 116 Young pioneers had rediscovered this city neighborhood and attempted to encroach on church programs that had been in existence for more than two decades. Zoning laws "are the mild sticks of

government" that succeeded early nuisance laws as a way of safeguarding and increasing

propertied investments.117 The authors also point out that implementation of zoning laws

116 John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Space (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); see also Smith, The New Urban Frontier; Williams, Upscaling Downtown; Williams, '"There Goes the Neighborhood."'

117 Logan and Molotch, 155. 261

were often done without integrity, aligned with the "growth machine" in response to entrepreneurial pressures. Citing Fogelson, Logan and Molotch conclude:

Originally conceived as a means of sound and strong land-use regulation, it was compromised in its formulation and emasculated in its implementation .. .it was changed into a method of promoting property interests through political influence .... Far from guiding the expansion of the metropolis, [zoning] merely sanctione. d t h e pre f erences o f pnvate . enterpnse.. 118

Many agreed that the zoning regulations were severely outdated and the city only enforced the laws following community complaints. Church leaders and congregations organized themselves around this emerging city-wide problem. Luther Place Pastor John

Steinbruck called on all clergy to challenge the city to fine them for their "illegal" activities that help the homeless poor. Faith based activism resulted in an amendment to the city's master plan, which barred the city from interfering in church ministries unless the government finds a compelling reason to do so. The D.C. City Council approved the resolution in 1994. 119

When Luther Place made plans to expand their church several floors to better accommodate the women's shelter and affordable housing, LCCA was at the DCRA office to advocate against it. According to Steinbruck, D.C. bureaucracy was extremely challenging to deal with and big developers had full time staff members hired for the sole purpose of greasing building permits through government channels. Connie Sharp was the parish administrator who went to great lengths to secure the permits for the church's

activities. On the day that the decision was to be made, someone from the community

118 Ibid., 156.

119 The city's master plan is really the only legal tool for influencing zoning issues. It is used as a legal guide when the Zoning Commissioner makes decisions. 262

was spotted taking composed pictures of the Luther Place properties, with individuals posing as "drunks" sprawled out on the property. These pictures were submitted as evidence of community problems that would grow if the church were allowed to expand operations. According to Pastor, the LCCA was masterful at generating hysteria and fear through unscrupulous tactics. One day before a historic landmark preservation decision redefined the area as a historic district, DCRA approved the building permit, but only with one additional floor, which would accommodate the shelter but nothing further.

This meant that the plans would have to be redrawn, at a huge expense to the church.

Steinbruck approached Mayor Barry for assistance in recovering a large sum of tax money that the church had paid in error, since all of its properties were designated tax­ exempt. The Mayor agreed to look into it and by evening, the church had a reimbursement check. At the time, the city had real financial troubles and obtaining money from the city, especially that quickly, was unheard of unless of course you were a friend of Barry's.

The Logan Circle Community Association (LCCA) then tried to label the ministries as Community Based Residential Facilities (CBRF), which would have meant all sorts of restrictions if they succeeded with the designation. D.C. code prohibited locating CBRF's within 500 feet of each other, but the transitional housing programs did not neatly fit into any designation. Instead, the church applied for room and boarding permits. Finally, the Board of Zoning Adjustment decided to allow the church to 263

continue its homeless ministries by granting a special exception to the zoning regulations. 120

Almost in spite of the Zoning Board's decision to restrict the church building to four floors, Pastor Steinbruck proposed an even larger project with its properties across the street. He planned to build 51 units of affordable housing as a result of their compromised plans at Luther Place Memorial Church. They received a quarter million dollars from the owner of Jewish Week to help fund the project and later secured a $5 million grant from Congress to complete the renovations. Once they secured the large

grant, LCCA and the Logan Circle ANC pressed for the historic preservation designation.

Incredibly, the D.C. Historic Preservation Review Board voted in favor of giving a huge

1 area surrounding the 14 h Street corridor an historic designation. Critics complained that

the arbitrary boundaries excluded an upscale condominium planned just one block away

from the church. 121 The LCCA succeeded in the landmark issue, requiring Luther Place

to go through added zoning hurdles while adding a historical preservation review to the

construction process. Blanket historic preservation designations have an unspoken effect

on lower income residents residing in the neighborhood (and non-profits for that matter)

who are subject to higher rents and taxes. Sharon Zukin writes, "Some local residents,

usually homeowners, pursue a landmark designation that privileges the look of place over

such other sources of community identity as social class, ethnicity, and residential

120 Hamil R. Harris, "Celebrating Victory," Washington Post, 7 November 1994, B4. LexisNexis [database online].

121 Liz Spayd, "D.C. Gets New Historic District; Charities in Area Near Logan Circle Fear Move May Hurt Programs," Washington Post, 27 May 1994, C3. LexisNexis [database online]. 264

stability."122 In other words, the prize is an exclusive neighborhood that is perhaps intended to force some out while ignoring the social consequences. This was a frequent strategy of NIMBY activists that under normal circumstances would bankrupt any project. In fact, during the process, Luther Place lost their low-income housing tax credits the first year because of the legal battles and resultant construction delays. After review, the church was required to keep the fa<;ade and two thirds of the building structure of the row houses facing N Street at a huge cost. In the end, Pastor Steinbruck was grateful to then Mayor Marion Barry for also helping to secure the occupancy permits necessary to complete those renovations as well.

However, neighborhood residents refused to walk away as the battle continued.

They argued that Luther Place's ministry was incompatible with a residential neighborhood and tried to have the existing social service programs shut down. In response, the church was required by the Zoning Board to meet with the community quarterly. They continued to oppose the church's plans to build a 51 unit affordable housing complex. They ardently claimed that the church intended to construct a 10 story shelter even though that was never the plan for this space. The church worked out a compromise for an eight story apartment complex that only partially satisfied neighborhood concerns.

Construction on the affordable housing complex commenced in 1995 and was completed in 1997.123 By the time the project was completed and Eden House/Promise

122 Sharon Zukin, The Cultures of Cities (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995), 124. Emphasis in original.

123Completion was delayed in part as a result of shoddy work done by one of the small business, minority contractors that the Barry administration required be hired. 265

Place dedicated, the Logan Circle Community Association had succeeded in reducing the size of the plan by a third and restricting the church renovations. The Pastor was vocal about his feeling that the church was impacted significantly by the area's gentrification and that the community was placing restrictions on their expression of faith under the guise of historic preservation.

NIMBY Activism in Friendship Heights

On this evening, with the prospect-or threat-of 50 homeless citizens disturbing the Friendship peace, the prevailing stonewall was yes, yes, let's help the homeless- but from a distance. A safe and secure distance. -Colman McCarthy on resistance in Friendship Heights to a proposed shelter124

When she was elected, Mayor Kelly committed to put a shelter in Ward 3, in one of the most affluent parts of northwest Washington, following a 1988 consent decree that obligated the District to provide shelter in all wards. At the time, Ward 3 was the only ward in the city without shelter, galling residents other wards. Ward 3 residents angrily opposed the proposal and dragged out the search for a suitable location for more than two years.

The Mayor first proposed a site on the 2800 block of Wisconsin A venue, near the

Washington National Cathedral but abandoned this in the face of major opposition and zoning issues. 125 Kelly next proposed a site at a former police station, off Wisconsin

Avenue (42"d and Albermarle Streets). This second proposal created an even greater furor as it was located across the street from an elementary school. Seeming to test the

124 Colman McCarthy, "Fear and Loathing in Friendship Heights," Washington Post, 9 March 1991.

125 Linda Wheeler, "DC Explores Trailer Shelter for Ward 3; Nathanson Calls Plan Tied to Referendum," Washington Post, 6 November I 990, B2. LexisNexis [database online). 266

community's resolve again, the Mayor floated two subsequent ideas for the shelter -the

Guy Mason Recreation Center on the comer of Calvert and Wisconsin and another site next to a police station on Idaho and Newark Street. 126 She settled on the Guy Mason

Recreation Center and residents reacted to this by gathering donations in preparation for a legal defense.

Community Council for the Homeless (CCH) formed at this time in response to the Mayor's proposals to build a shelter in their neighborhood. This was a group of

churches, community groups, and neighbors both opposed to and supportive of the shelter

plans in Ward 3 but they all agreed that something needed to be done. CCH received an

outreach grant and hired one person to do a census in upper northwest, comprised mostly

of Ward 3, to document the extent of homelessness in the area. They documented

between 50 and 100 individuals congregating in the area near Guy Mason in the evening

and submitted their own proposal to the mayor for smaller church-based shelters. 127 She

was resistant to their proposals and insisted that Guy Mason would open. Even though

the recreation center was slated to open December of 1992 and CCNV staged a sit-in at

the Center to bring attention to the need for shelter in the area, the facility actually never

opened. The City committed to use it only when all 1400 regular shelter beds at three

126 Vincent McGraw and Pamela McClintock, "Mayor Faces Heat from Other Wards for Halting Shelter," Washington Times, 26 February, 1991, B8. LexisNexis [database online].

127 Ruben Castaneda, "Mayor to open Ward 3's First Homeless Shelter," Washington Post, 3 November 1993, B5. LexisNexis [database online]. 267

other hypothermia shelters were full, and consequently, Guy Mason was never "needed" and the neighborhood was still left without suitable shelter.128

Eventually, Community Council for the Homeless did manage to open a network of church based shelters in the community, intimately serving between four and eight

individuals at each shelter per night. The shelters were volunteer run and serviced by one outreach worker provided by CCH. Washington City Paper editor Bill Gifford describes the community's "mixed motives:"

St. Luke's [shelter] was opened in part to head off Guy Mason, which is right across Calvert Street. City law forbids opening a homeless shelter within 500 feet of an existing shelter. Guy Mason neighbors commonly split their donations between St. Luke's shelter and the legal defense fund -- which has spent enough on legal fees to open three shelters like St. Luke's.

Adding impetus to the shelter movement is a zoning board decision shrinking a Guy Mason shelter by however many private beds the ward can provide. (So far, about two dozen, though only St. Luke's is open year-round.)129

CCH also opened Friendship Place, a social service center that provided medical, legal

and social services to the homeless, and eventually became known as the Community

Council for the Homeless at Friendship Place. Despite its homegrown roots, the

community did not welcome Friendship Place at first either and businesses accused the

group of trying to back door another shelter in the ward. 130

128 Brooke Masters, "DC Still Has Eye on NW Site for Shelter," Washington Post, 6 September 1993, B4. LexisNexis [database on line).

129 Bill Gifford, "Getting By With a Little Help From Your Enemies; Have Ward 3's Bitterest Shelter Foes Come up with A Compassionate Alternative?" Washington Post, 27 December 1992, C4. LexisNexis [database online].

130 Hamil R. Harris, "Plan to Aid Homeless Causes Split; Merchants Oppose NW Service Center," Washington Post, 7 October 1993, JI. LexisNexis [database online]. 268

Churches and agencies around the city encountered community resistance to social service programs with outcomes frequently battled out in the courts. Samaritan

Inns experienced opposition in the northwest neighborhood of Brightwood when trying to renovate one of its transitional homes, Tabitha House. In this case, U.S. District Judge

Ricardo Urbina ordered the District to pay $2.4 million for "discriminating" against

Samaritan Inns by blocking the opening of Tabitha's House. It was so blatant that the

Judge "required the city to reimburse the charity for estimated contributions it lost because of the controversy. He also ordered two high-ranking city officials to pay $500 each for trying to derail the project."131

Service providers even resorted to utilizing the Fair Housing Act to support claims of discrimination. DCRA ruled that Oxford Houses (independent living for individuals in recovery) violated city zoning regulations after residents of Columbia

1 Heights complained about an Oxford House on 13 h Street, NW. The Justice Department intervened and charged the District with discrimination against individuals with disabilities, which was a violation of the Fair Housing Act when it refused to grant the zoning exception. The case eventually settled with minor compromise on the part of

Oxford House. 132

In an explicit effort to restrict transitional housing for formerly homeless and disabled, the City Council proposed the Rooming House Licensing Amendment Act of

1993, which would have prohibited six or more unrelated individuals to live in a

131 Toni Locy, "D.C.'s loss is Gain for Nonprofits Facing Community Resistance," Washington Post, I 3 July I 995, B6. LexisNexis [database online].

132 Michael Isikoff, "District Accused Of Violating Fair Housing Act; Bias Alleged in Zoning Ruling Against Drug Treatment Facility," Washington Post, 3 June 1993, Bl. LexisNexis [database online]. 269

household unless special occupancy permits with stringent compliance requirements were obtained. Homeless advocates testified before City Council to block the law, as did

several churches who maintained residential ministries as an affordable alternative to

shelters and the streets. It was clear from the ongoing struggles that wealthy, politically

savvy, and gentrified communities went to great lengths.to resist church ministries and

social service programs in their neighborhoods. Homeless service providers were not as

well organized to resist attacks by such powerful elite but fought the legal battles

nonetheless. At the same time, they also had little support from District officials who

frequently found ways to obstruct program plans, which suggested to some, a level of

retaliation as a result of the constant criticism the city received from providers.

CCNV's Leadership Crisis

Following Snyder's suicide, Carol Fennelly moved around the CCNV shelter in

different capacities attempting to keep things running smoothly and at the same time,

trying to maintain her commitment to political organizing. It was not long after Snyder's

death that the most of the political community dissolved at CCNV. Many had in fact

moved on when CCNV consolidated operations and closed down the resident volunteer

houses. Cliff Newman and Carol Fennelly remained and provided the organizational

structure that was desperately needed to keep shelter operations running effectively.

Fennelly struggled with managing shelter and the challenges of developing leadership out

of the resident homeless population. Each time she reorganized a part of the shelter,

difficulty erupted somewhere else and she was constantly "putting out fires."

Consequently, she was not popular with many residents or staff. 270

At the beginning of the decade, Fennelly brought in other partners to help run the multiple programs that had been established at the shelter.133 She knew the kitchen in particular was badly in need of reorganization and that people were stealing food.

Fennelly had heard about Robert Egger and the D.C. Central Kitchen (DCCK) operating out of a small row house on Florida A venue. They were invited to take.over kitchen operations at CCNV in 1991, freeing CCNV staff and stopping the flow of food out the door. With CCNV running the kitchen, they were only able to serve one meal each day and they had hoped that the space would be used more effectively. DCCK was eager for the additional space that could be used to expand their programs. It was a great partnership and for a while, CCNV was providing funds DCCK to prepare meals for the shelter. DCCK continued to provide meals free of charge for other organizations serving the homeless and at the same time, developed a culinary training program for formerly homeless men and women.

Fennelly also recruited a nurse who was teaching at Howard to work at the clinic and medical infirmary. The idea for a professionally staffed clinic crystallized and

CCNV secured a grant from the Kellogg Foundation to fund the Howard Clinic in the shelter.134 This brought medical staff from the hospital into the community based nursing. CCNV still needed to help staff the clinic but as with many of the ancillary programs that required some CCNV support, Fennelly felt that some of the residential staff members were being obstructionist.

rn At some point later in the decade, New Hope Ministries and Catholic Charities were brought into the CCNV shelter by the Community Partnership as shelter providers.

134 After the grant ended, Healthcare for the Homeless was brought in to continue providing medical services to the sheller. 271

Fennelly dealt with staff conflicts as best she could but felt that drugs and alcohol were adding to the shelter's difficulty. CCNV had always been philosophically opposed to shelter requirements and barriers to access. Their anarchist tradition transferred over to the staffing side as well but made it practically impossible to run things smoothly.

Without a structure for individuals to support and sustain themselves, it is perhaps not. surprising that so many turned to unscrupulous ways to make money. Resident staff were not paid and therefore had little to support more than the most basic of needs. Ideals do not always transcend neatly into practice and this reality forced Fennelly to take drastic action. She tried to reduce the amount of drugs in the shelter by installing two way windows and even drug testing the staff, which made her even less popular. Reflecting on the turmoil within the shelter at the time she said:

We couldn't see how we could change [homelessness] anymore. If you want to solve a problem, you need to feel effective. You can't chase effectiveness. But we've gone too far around the bend. People had been left outside for so long and fewer and fewer people were leaving. The drug stuff was a problem. And let's be real - when it's a white girl who's dealing with it - people didn't like it.

Working with the police, she had pictures of the drug deals, staff carrying guns, and evidence of gang activity. Fennelly estimated that 300 to 400 individuals were removed in the early years after Snyder's passing. But her commitment to CCNV would

ultimately be very costly. Two "60 Minutes" reports aired in December of 1993, only a couple of months before Fennelly would eventually leave, which leveled harsh

accusations about her management of the shelter. The reporters scathingly accused her of running a "drug cartel" out of the shelter and claimed that her anti-drug campaign in the

shelter was a sham to protect herself. They aired footage of staff selling donated food and 272

clothing to add credibility to the report's claims. For Fennelly, the reports were devastating and added to the already tense relations within CCNV.

During the controversy, Keith Mitchell was positioning himself to take over responsibility for the CCNV shelter. He was a politically savvy resident at CCNV who was reported to be homeless and dealing drugs prior to coming to live at the shelter. He even managed to be elected to the local ANC and had convinced enough CCNV residents to vote Fennelly out of office on the grounds that she had not been homeless. In the midst of the heated debate, Fennelly explained that she would leave the community if she was voted out. Though she did not vocalize her concerns, she felt that Mitchell was attempting to get complete control of the program's finances and did not want to be part of any scandal if Mitchell were elected. Following Snyder's death, she was committed to making CCNV financially solvent and reestablished their fundraising base. For the first time, she had set aside more than $100,000 in CCNV's account. Still, there was a lot of unrest surrounding her leadership role in the shelter. Her threat to leave was not taken seriously and the community voted her out of office anyway. After months of difficulty, stress and tension this was really the final straw for Fennelly. The political community had dissolved by this point and the few who were left, moved on with her.

In retrospect, Fennelly considered the takeover of CCNV by homeless residents a victory of sorts. As hard as it was for her in the moment, she was proud to witness the empowerment of homeless men and women. "This was what CCNV was about all along anyway." But the model was far from ideal and lacked the structural support to see

CCNV succeed in the long run. After she left, CCNV as a political community ceased to exist. According to Craig Keller, who was a CCNV member at one time, "CCNV 273

engaged in militant radical civil disobedience with a prophetic vision and became an organization where residents were running the shelter with limited capacity and resources." Even though it was widely promoted as a shelter that was run by homeless residents, and to some degree it was, the original members of the political community were really behind the structural organization of the shelter.

Keith Mitchell was elected to replace Fennelly as president and he appointed his wife Lois as the treasurer, fueling suspicions about his true intentions. During his tenure,

CCNV was awarded a $1.2 million three-year contract from The Community Partnership

(TCP) to establish a computerized case management system as part of the D.C. Initiative.

Outside social service providers had repeatedly raised concerns that CCNV was becoming a dead-end warehouse for the homeless. The shelter had gained a reputation of being chaotic and violent, with little control over the residents or the staff. Moreover, homeless men and women who stayed at the shelter did not have access to the resources that they needed to regain independence. There were no case management services and people stayed for years without any assistance. As many as 1400 individuals stayed in the shelter each night and for many, resignation about their circumstances set in. Thus, community leaders were concerned about the lack of structure and resources for the huge numbers of homeless staying at CCNV. The grant from TCP was intended to rectify those concerns.

Outside observers concluded that Fennelly was really the glue holding the organization together and predicted that things would disintegrate after her departure.

The problems that CCNV was experiencing highlight the problem with the lack of true

oversight or checks and balances. Though the city provided modest funds, mostly for 274

maintenance and utilities, there was still little public accountability. After Snyder's tax scandal, CCNV had been required to incorporate and created a board of directors, so there was some level of responsibility but board members grew frustrated with management practices within the shelter and consequently, board turnover was high.

So it was not surprising when one of the program's case managers filed a complaint with

HUD about CCNV's abuse of the case management grant funds. Despite grant requirements, CCNV did not automate the case management system, frequently bounced paychecks of its case management staff and neglected to pay payroll taxes. 135 Mitchell had assumed all responsibility for the shelter's finances, controlling grant funds, purchases, and checking accounts with little or no oversight by CCNV's Board of

Directors. Unaccounted for monies included $120,000 for a fundraiser that never happened, more than $100,000 in bank withdrawals, and over $90,000 in checks made out to cash that were signed by Mitchell. He also established a credit card in his name and made rent payments for his apartment in Washington, D.C. - all with CCNV and

TCP funds. 136 Mitchell argued that he needed the funds to run the shelter and would not hire case managers if it meant that the shelter had to close down. Though the federal government cancelled the remainder of the contract and mandated that $400,000 of the

$630,000 in expenses paid out by the contract be returned, the $100,000 that was in

CCNV's bank account when Fennelly left went unaccounted for.

135 As a result of the grant for case management, professional case managers that were hired for these services were paid staff. However, in keeping with CCNV' s philosophy, resident staff members were not paid.

136 David J. Niemiec, District Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, memo to Fred Kamas, Acting Director for the lnteragency Council for the Prevention of Homelessness, 17 December 1996. 275

There was a significant amount of tension between Mitchell and the directors of other agencies in the building who depended on the smooth operation of the facility for the management of their own programs. As the shelter was struggling financially in the midst of the scandal, CCNV could no longer afford to pay D.C. Central Kitchen for the meals to its residents. The Kitchen absorbed the cost of feeding those in the shelter but also convinced the Board, in conjunction with the other service providers in the building, to let Mitchell go as a result of his fiscal mismanagement. In the end, Keith Mitchell was convicted but served no jail time except for a brief stint in a half way house. In return for embezzling nearly three quarters of a million dollars, he was given a sentence of community service while CCNV is still no longer eligible to receive federal contracts.

As a result, HUD required The Community Partnership and the federal government to put controls in place to avoid such missteps in the future.

Over the years, CCNV has survived on the generosity of its supporters. Many have called for the city to take over responsibility or permit other providers under contract with the city to run the shelter. However, local officials have come to the aid of the shelter, who in all likelihood fear the huge financial burden for the shelter operations.

In 1996, it would have cost the District an estimated $12 million to operate CCNV, at the rate of other publicly funded 24-hour shelters.137 During the decade, the District

government invested $25,000 in roof repairs and in 1996, paid $500,000 for a new roof at

CCNV. The Washington Wizards owner gave another $50,000 to repair the heating

system the following year and yet the building continues to fall apart. In 1999, there was

137 The Community Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness, Common Ground (Washington, D.C.: The Community Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness, Summer 1996). 276

another round of renovations paid for by the city and Mayor Williams planned to spend another $5.6 million in repairs for CCNV over following six years. In addition to financially supporting the infrastructure of the shelter, the city continued to pay utilities as well.

National Advocacy and Homeless Voting Rights

One of the most successful and long-standing campaigns that the National

Coalition for the Homeless took on was the issue of voting rights for homeless citizens, self-titled the "You Don't Need a Home to Vote" campaign. Voter registration efforts began in the 1980' s around major election cycles and incorporated other coalition groups like the National Rainbow Coalition. In 1992, NCH took the campaign to the national level and began registering homeless individuals to vote around the country. They organized political rallies and registration events that included presidential candidates while they took individual states to court over voting rights violations, in hopes of establishing uniform voter registration protections for homeless men and women. The

National Coalition established that state requirements for individuals to reside in

traditional dwellings place an unconstitutional burden on the voting rights of homeless

citizens138 and that shelters, parks or even street corners are adequate for proof of residency. Still, many states still require that a mailing address be provided at the time of

application.

Locally, the National Coalition organized voter registration drives in conjunction

with ice cream socials to entice people to register. While still at CCNV, Carol Fennelly

138 Coalition for the Homeless v. Jensen, 187 A.D.2d 582 (N. Y. App. Div. 1992). 277

teamed up with Michael Stoops of NCH to organize voter registration drives around

Washington, D.C., and held candidate forums and concerts in support of empowering homeless individuals. Even the Ben and Jerry's foundation supported their voting campaigns and gave thousands of coupons for free ice cream. Luther Place Memorial

Church held a July 4th Register to Vote BBQ in 1992, celebrating the holiday with a symbolic gesture to include homeless individuals in one of the most sacred American privileges. They closed the women's center and enrolled homeless individuals to vote, giving them the church's address.

After several decades of organizing around this issue, NCH has had mixed success. Homeless individuals have a constitutional right to vote but the registration requirements still vary from state to state. The National Coalition took up this legal issue

at the federal level and attempted to create national clarification and uniformity.

Congressman John Lewis of Georgia introduced a bill to amend the Voting Rights Act that insured the rights of homeless people to vote. Seventy members of Congress co­

sponsored the bill but it got caught up in partisan politics. While they still support

national legislation, NCH has since gone state to state with this issue because each state can still make its own registration requirements. They have introduced state legislation to

clarify registration laws and ten states have passed laws clarifying state elections policy,

permitting nontraditional dwelling residents to register. Ten other states have written

directives from the Attorney General or the Secretary of State to get all counties to

operate in same way. Still, while others have nothing in writing, at minimum there is at

least a verbal understanding between NCH and the remaining state governments so that 278

each state has some level of guarantee that a homeless individual can register to vote regardless of their living circumstances.

By the 1990' s, national level advocacy was in full swing, with more federal policy lobbying groups on the horizon. During this time, grassroots mobilizing became increasingly less influential as professionalized special interest lobbying groups dominated nonprofit political involvement, primarily through lawyers and lobbyists at the national level. 139 Nowhere is this more evident than with national anti-homelessness campaigns. The National Coalition for Homeless Vets and the National Association for the Education of Homeless Children and Youth are examples of the increasing centralization and specialization of lobbying groups dedicated to specific homeless causes. Grassroots organizing began to be dominated by quick, easily consumable action alerts, which limited local level involvement, awareness, passion or talent. The result is that, much like social service providers, advocacy has been professionalized, dominated now by political scientists, public policy experts and legal analysts. While the focus is often on national level legislation and enforcement, over time, these organizations expanded their focus to provide resources to state level agencies but have had limited direct impact on local level issues. The movement still lacks a national organizing entity that is empowered to define the homeless agenda broadly. NCH has attempted to do this but lacks the authority it once had to speak for diverse groups now involved in service or politics. When Maria Foscarinis left the National Coalition for the Homeless to form the

National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, the National Coalition ceased to be

139 See also Eisenberg, Challenges for Nonprofits and Philanthropy. 279

at the forefront of homeless advocacy and their grassroots program became a sheJJ of what it once was.

Conclusion

The 1990' s were a decade of major change for anti-homeless organizers.

Unfortunately, it was not always the kind of progressive change that advocates hoped for.

The changing makeup of the movement impacted political activity, coalition building and broader alliances. Neighborhood conflicts and battles with the city, alongside development and gentrification pressures left homeless service providers feeling drained

and squeezed on all sides. The sites of contestation seemed to literally shift daily. The confrontation involving Seed Ministries and the Foggy Bottom trailers left an indelible impression on homeless providers, impacting people's willingness to engage in future

political action. Following the protests, confrontational advocacy ceased to be an

important group tactic. So many vividly recalled the incident and the fact that Seed

Ministries lost all of their funding that it is hard not to conclude that public funding and

the fear of retaliation have compromised resistance efforts. Once it was firmly

entrenched, neoliberal ideology drove the shift towards government outsourcing, which

many viewed as a positive development but failed to see the long term consequences.

About D.C., Michael Stoops remarked, "Providers in D.C. have a plantation mentality.

Public funding is in jeopardy as soon as you move into advocacy."

Contract funding can also fragment services and obscure overall responsibility.

Celeste Valente elaborates:

Erna [Steinbruck] wanted us to create our own system. [Luther Place Memorial Church] went after government contracts earlier than others. This had a good 280

effect. But you'll never be able to create enough private funding to provide sufficient capacity. Really, it's the government's responsibility and they have all the money. I believed we needed to change the system and the way the government was responding. Others felt it was better to create their own services. The truth is now somewhere in the middle.

Private, nonprofit providers have been at the source of many exciting local developments.

However, contracted agencies. that rely on political good will to get their contracts renewed are also less prone to public advocacy or to create enemies. According to Willa

Morris, the shift towards government funds changed the tenor of activism: "Advocacy went from getting in your face and screaming to a more rote kind of control - like a playbook."

Coordinated advocacy continued, but once muted, it had significantly less impact.

COHHO played a prominent role in the D.C. Initiative but following the protests at

Foggy Bottom, they would be largely relegated to making public policy recommendations. When it was formed in 1991, COHHO represented more than 30 organization members. By the following year, membership had doubled with a majority of participants regularly attending. They published a newsletter and maintained seven different active committees throughout the decade. At its peak, it was probably the most comprehensive group ever pulled together to address homeless issues in the District. But by the end of the decade, there were only 19 COHHO member organizations and they were having difficulty filling executive positions. Consequently, they had to amend their structure to eliminate some executive roles and reduce the number of committees. On the other hand, the focus groups that came out of COHHO really had the power to talk about collective issues of concern and served as a crude organizing forum in which individuals could present grievances on a lower level. Unfortunately, they have had limited capacity 281

to transform the system as it was. Lacking a range of resistance strategies, the coalitions ceased to be a powerful force in maintaining a balanced service delivery system that moved beyond immediate solutions to address prevention measures. Even as they acknowledged the deeper systemic issues that were important to resolving homelessness, providers focused their energy on managing homelessness and on the systems issues that could be resolved through services. Things like mental health care for the poor, medical care for the uninsured and job training programs certainly made a difference in the lives of their clients and providers took on a very narrow policy agenda that overlooked

potentially broader issues like meaningful job creation or universal healthcare.

As political strategies shifted towards legal advocacy, splintering also deepened.

According to Hopper, advocates have since resorted to single issue incrementalism and

"beltway lobbying:" "drafting legislation, lining up allies, educating (harrying is more

accurate) congressional aides, rounding up supporters, negotiating compromises,

summoning the grass roots for concerted pressure, reworking regulations." 140 He

continues: "Beltway labor amounts to sustained campaigns for 'programs,' initially to get

them instituted and then, at appointed intervals, to defend them against budget - cutters

and opponents caught sleeping the first time around."141 With providers competing for

the same piece of the pie, special interest advocacy "pits potential allies against one

another" and sacrifices broader based coalition building. 142 Legal advocacy can be an

effective tool for advocates if balanced by other strategies, but is limited by the individual

140 Hopper, Reckoning With Homelessness, 196.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid. 282

participants and their opinions, as well as comprising a slow and oftentimes, painful process. The legacy of this approach has been the creation of a separate, non-mainstream homeless service system with subclasses of homeless men and women who have legally enforceable rights. Certainly, it cannot be overlooked that this has had a huge impact on

ameliorating individual suffering. On the other hand, although important in protecting the collective liberties of stigmatized individuals, this has also contributed to the

fragmentation that exists in the industry and made collective interests all the more

obscure.

As the decade wore on, advocates and providers became less politically engaged

and more conciliatory toward state entities. There were exceptions at the grassroots level,

but this was mostly in the form of legal specialists and public policy professionals.

Dedicated leaders like the Steinbrucks retired or moved on, as did Carol Fennelly.

Devoted advocates took positions elsewhere and moved on to government positions but

some, like Michele May, found that agencies did not replace advocacy positions or

prioritize that part of their role. For some, political opposition continued but burnout and

complacency set in.

Changes within the city itself urged restraint. For years, city leaders and officials

at best were seen as uncooperative. During Mayor Kelly and Mayor Barry's terms,

Washington's administration was so poorly managed that the District was heavily

controlled by legal decrees, court orders and receivers. Public interest lawsuits became

so influential that the courts became just another layer of local government. In a report

summarizing major legal actions taken in the District on behalf of poor and homeless

residents, the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless harshly concludes, "through 283

gross maladministration, there has been a complete breakdown in the District's provision of social services, the result of which is the dehumanization and degradation of thousands of District residents ... In sum, the 'core' is thoroughly 'rotten. "'143 But all this would change when "Mayor-for-Life" Barry decided not to run for a fifth term. In 1999,

Anthony Williams succeeded Barry and the new Mayor transformed the city, ushering in a new era of government relations. Williams had been the city's Chief Financial Officer and had been responsible for quickly stabilizing municipal finances. But while he restored city agencies to functionability, he was not widely regarded as an advocate for the poor, much less the homeless.

TCP's leadership in the homeless arena signaled the start of a major change in relations amongst homeless advocates, providers and government bureaucrats, in spite of disappointment over the city's fiscal problems. Given the history of acrimonious nature of relations, it is nothing short of a miracle that the D.C. Initiative succeeded in putting together a comprehensive plan to address homelessness in the District and revamped the entire social service system. Seven years after the D.C. Initiative was announced, TCP

was again selected as the entity to oversee homeless services in the District and they

negotiated a new strategic plan to address homelessness. This time, they were able to

secure McKinney Act funds to replace some federal D.C. Initiative funds and integrate a

broader array of District funds to assist the homeless. In this second round of planning,

advocates and the Legal Clinic specifically requested that TCP play a greater advocacy

role on behalf of clients and provide greater oversight of providers through the

143 Michael I. Greenberger, Elizabeth M. Brown and Anne R. Bowden, eds., introduction and summary to Cold, Harsh, and Unending Resistance: The District of Columbia Government's Hidden War Against Its Poor and Its Homeless (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, 22 November 1993). 284

implementation of standards. The community also requested sensitivity training as well as professional skills training for providers at large. In time, program staff have developed a more personal relationship with TCP than they had previously with the city and have even sat on their Board of Directors, but this has also made criticism on either side that much more complicated. Their commitment to maintain a lean staff has meant that at times, there is insufficient oversight of publicly funded social service programs.

The 1990's represented a significant change in non-profit operations, as more professionally trained and paid staff took the place of volunteers. 144 Homelessness became more institutionalized and providers came to see themselves less as advocates and more as professionals. There has been a gradual progression away from political activity since the 1970's when volunteers functioned in both political and service capacities. Increasingly, volunteer responsibilities were limited to direct service, which restricted deeper understandings of the complex causes of poverty and homelessness.

Funding streams based on grants came with bureaucratic requirements, which meant increasing professional standards - and this too changed the face of advocacy. As an example, Miriam's Kitchen, the breakfast ministry that was run out of Western

Presbyterian, operated entirely with volunteers at first and later with one part time position for the first nine years. It now has about ten full time staff people running the program, which is actually quite small given the number of individuals served and the

144 For an extended analysis of both types of service providers in Albuquerque, New Mexico, see Robertson, "Interpreting Homelessness: The Influence of Professional And Non-Professional Service Providers." There are two types of social service providers: early career professionals with higher education and specialized credentials who are contrasted with more seasoned, traditional staff, who typically hold religious convictions. Robertson notes the tension and antagonism between the two groups in New Mexico but the history of D.C. suggests a slightly more complicated situation. 285

range of services provided. For the congregation, the shift to professionalized staff was also a controversial one, as many were sensitive to the perception that paid staff were going to "get rich" off of the homeless poor. Though many organizations offered professional services due to the specialized legal, medical and social service needs of the homeless population, for Pastor Wimberly, it was not an issue of skills but rather a desire for consistent services that drove the decision to replace volunteers with paid staff. But as Wolch points out, increasing state penetration into affairs on private nonprofit agencies with regulations, reports, monitoring and auditing demands have promoted a professionalized service delivery staff. 145 The has meant an almost exclusive focus on service delivery as opposed to advocacy for systemic change.

Unfortunately, programs increasingly devoted their energies towards contract management and away from political involvement. Robertson critiques the role that professional providers played in New Mexico, arguing that they had "strong formal ties to government and large foundation funding sources."146 They became sort of "homeless information specialists" whose data collection methods lent authority and legitimacy to their programs. What's concerning about this trend is that the way that information is gathered justifies, and all but guarantees future funds because their assessed needs match the provided services. Consequently, the issues get framed in terms of an aggregation of characteristics instead of underlying systemic causes. This is the case especially in

Washington, where the "needs of a balkanized homeless population justify specialized or

145 Wolch.

146 Robertson, "Interpreting Homelessness: The Influence of Professional And Non-Professional Service Providers," 148. 286

professional responses."147 Homeless providers are in a powerful position to articulate the problems differently, to the community and to the media, but the temptation remains to "promote a sense of control over the situation by reducing the problem to one of mere

management."148 Unfortunately, coordinated advocacy peaked and then waned during

this decade. People ceased being the good agitators that they once were and coalitions

seemed to have become rubber stamps for government-sponsored efforts or worse,

simply venting sessions about all that is wrong with the system.

By the end of the decade, resignation about homelessness had taken hold and in

many ways, homeless poor retreated from public consciousness. They were still a visible

part of the city landscape but invisible to its residents and public officials. The struggle

was no longer conceived in terms of moral outrage and collective responsibility to act on

spiritual grounds. Instead, the movement was conceived in terms of managing the

problem so that it would go away. In that brush, we forgot that homelessness is just one

visible symbol of larger problems in the American economy, much like the dead canary

is the harbinger of danger for coal miners. Across the nation, homeless issues were no

longer on the radar. They ceased to be part of election platforms, signaling a defeat for

many activists who argued we're not done yet!

147 Ibid., 150.

148 Ibid. CHAPTERS

DEMOBILIZATION AND DEPOLITICIZA TION: PROGRESS, COMPLACENCY

AND "BUREAUCRATIC" ADVOCACY IN THE NEW MILLENIUM

"Advocacy's task, as simple to state as it was to prove elusive to accomplish, was to capitalize on the urgency to 'do something' about the spectacle of homelessness, while not forgetting that the more difficult and essential target of redress was the durable stage of inequality and all its props. " -Kim Hoppe/

Homelessness was still a visible and growing problem in urban cores around the country in the new millennium. But not for their continued downtown presence, the homeless had retreated to the back of people's consciousness and seemed to appear more alien than ever. In Washington too, the homelessness had become a routine part of urban life. Public outrage that had previously been reserved for bureaucratic indifference had shifted towards the homeless, as the challenge of providing lasting solutions to the crisis

appeared to be daunting. Now viewed through the lens of pop culture and the media, with regular portrayals on TV and in the movies, it seemed as if it was no longer so

shocking or problematic to see so many individuals on the street. Many repeated the

assumption that most homeless folks probably wanted to be that way anyway. But communities were also growing frustrated, particularly in commercial districts with

increasing land pressures and competing perspectives around space issues.

1 Hopper, Reckoning With Homelessness, 176.

287 288

Homelessness ceased to be a major political liability as well. Steve Cleghorn remarked:

"Thirty years ago politicians didn't campaign without mentioning homelessness. Now it's off the radar. Most politicians manage homelessness now so as not to hurt them. If simply opening a shelter will help, then it's OK." Mayor Anthony Williams' term typified that attitude. Utilizing a strategy of his predecessors, Mayor Williams instituted a Homeless Advisory Group early in his term and withheld any real political authority.

He reconstituted the advisory group twice in three years. After abandoning the first advisory group, the group was reformed as the Continuum of Care Workgroup, only to be formed again later as the Focus Group on Access to Housing for Homeless and Very Low

Income Residents. These groups served to appease some advocates who held out hope for these boards, but their work was largely ignored by the Mayor. Williams' administration continued to be obliging towards advocates and providers, marking an end to hostile relations, but his pro-growth policies quietly undermined anti-homeless and

anti-poverty efforts. His administration often favored development interests over the

needs of low- and no-income Washingtonians, and as a result of the real estate

investment boom, gentrification went unchecked alongside massive development

projects.

Overall, the Mayor's administration had a more balanced record during this

decade, with some major victories as well as setbacks. Homeless services continued to

expand across the board and hypothermia deaths, once commonplace, were now more

rare. The District put together a comprehensive Ten Year Plan to End Homelessness,

Homeless No More, which was authored by The Community Partnership. Cities around

the country were part of this federal initiative that established strategic plans to end 289

homelessness in one decade. Before the creation of the Ten Year Plan, there were different generations of strategic plans that emerged out of the various Mayors'

Commissions over the previous twenty years, but few of the recommendations were ever implemented. Progress on the Ten Year Plan has been slow though, and many still feel that the city lacks the political will necessary to follow through on the plan's recommendations or to create the necessary funding streams to move it forward.

For the average resident, the new millennium was better on most counts. Not only had the city's relationship with social service providers improved, but relations had improved between Congress as well. Mayor Williams ended the tenure of the financial control board two years ahead of schedule and restored the city's solvency, primarily as a result of his strong financial background. In addition, the Housing Authority came out of receivership, and the Department of Mental Health (DMH) entered into a court monitoring stage, an indication of its improved efforts to fulfill its obligations under the

Dixon case. New leadership within DMH meant that the agency engaged the public in planning, which also provided more opportunities for the community to have a voice. 2

Still, DMH has yet to create a publicly funded community health program that serves its residents thoroughly, perhaps a legacy of official intransigence in the face of advocates' demands. Dr. Robert Keisling, a well-respected psychiatrist in the homeless community argues that the street population is sicker now than they ever were and turning that around depends on creating a system truly designed for the people it is intended to serve. According to Keisling, "Ten or twenty years ago, people were

2 For example, the new director of DMH brought together a workgroup to review and recommend a coordinated system of emergency mental health care for the District and has already begun implementing some of its recommendations. 290

functioning enough to get services. Now they're so impaired that they cannot get by."

The result has been increasing crisis intervention and involuntary hospitalization for the homeless - a situation that has exacerbated tensions between District mental health officials on the one side who were committed to reducing the population at St.

Elizabeth's and providers on the other, who were increasingly concerned about the folks who were discharged without adequate planning or community support.

Major problems remained at St. Elizabeth's hospital, the District's only publicly funded mental health hospital. The Washington Examiner reported an astonishing 11 deaths at the hospital in 2007 ,3 attributable to the chronic problems of major lapses in care at the hospital. University Legal Services (ULS) published a report titled Patients in

Peril that detailed chronic clinical staffing shortages, overcrowded wards, inappropriate

discharges, and inadequate medical care, all of which resulted in an overall unstable and

unsafe patient environment.4 Combined with physical plant problems, rodents, and the

lack of basic hygiene supplies, the hospital was an unbearable place to remain, even for

staff. Furthermore, understaffing led to a more frequent use of seclusion and sedation,

violating not only hospital policy but also District law. According to the report, in six

instances over the course of a twelve month period, individuals were subject to seclusion

or sedation for a period of longer than one month. Because of care deficiencies, the

hospital also jeopardized their federal reimbursements for Medicaid and Medicare. Even

3 Bill Myers and Michael Neibauer, "Report: St. Elizabeths patients in peril" (sic), Washington Examiner, 9 January 2008, www.examiner.com (Accessed 8/J 8/08). LexisNexis [database online].

4 Robin Thorner, Andrea Procaccino, Celeste Valente and Mary Nell Clark, Patients in Peril: A Report on the Dangerous Conditions and Substandard Care at St. Elizabeth's Hospital (Washington, D.C.: University Legal Services, 4 November 2004). 291

the Department of Justice got involved in these issues. The Department of Mental

Health's response to the investigations was extraordinary:

The hospital initiated a dramatic reorganization of the patients, dividing them between paying and non-paying wards. In other words, those patients for whom St. Elizabeths (sic) Hospital can receive reimbursement, and for whom CMS [Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services] will continue to exercise oversight, have been grouped together on four wards, while the non-paying patients, or those whose care the District of Columbia is wholly financially responsible for, are on separate wards. 5

In response to the allegations, the city refused to negotiate and consequently, ULS filed a lawsuit. With detailed information from ULS, the Department of Justice also went after the city, though they negotiated a private settlement in the case.6

Proactive organizing by SOME and the Legal Clinic resulted in the establishment

of a new, creative program entitled Interim Disability Assistance (IDA). Through IDA,

the District provided disability applicants with partial payments while their federal

disability cases were pending approval, which typically took many months. The

Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless and SOME were also at the forefront of

crafting and passing the Human Services Reform Act (HSRA), which was the first major

piece of legislative reform for local homeless services since Initiative 17 established the

right to shelter. HSRA created common standards for the delivery of services, eligibility

criteria for continuum of care programs, consistency in resolving disputes between clients

and program providers, and established clients' rights and responsibilities for accessing

services within the continuum of care. It also established limits on individual program

rules. Finally, it prohibited the use of public money to fund agencies that violate the act's

5 Ibid., 13. CMS is the federal agency with oversight over the federal insurance programs.

6 As of September 2008, the ULS case remained in court, pending resolution of issues that were not resolved with the Department of Justice case. 292

standards and procedures. As important as the legislation was to protect the basic civil rights of homeless individuals, non-profit programs were conflicted about HSRA' s reform measures and the challenges it posed for some program operations.

A key part of HSRA was creating the local Interagency Council on Homelessness, bringing together cabinet level city administrators to quickly resolve systems issues in the delivery of homeless services. It was intended to create department level coordination and a unified approach to homelessness in the District. However, only a couple of agency heads have been in attendance at the few public meetings that have take place, out of twelve different agencies who have responsibilities on ICH. Representation has been strongest from the Department of Human Services who have had the most significant responsibilities for homeless programs in the District. Even Mayor Adrian Fenty's team has largely ignored the ICH, though he was a major proponent of the legislation while he served on the City Council. Furthermore, the Interagency Council has no paid staff or mechanism for making it work - a factor that was explicitly discussed when the law was passed, but overlooked. It remains to be seen what role ICH will play in the future.

Downtown Organizes

Mayor Williams' election solidified the power shift towards wealthy real estate developers who invested heavily in land speculation both before and after the 1968 riots.

Their risky investments finally yielded major returns. Ruben's description of postindustrial cities and the oligarchy of control could have been written specifically for

D.C.:

Today's city fathers belong to the expanded "FIRE" sector: finance, insurance, and real estate; some high-tech and pharmaceutical; and a smattering of hospital 293

systems and universities thrown in for good measure. The urban economy over which they preside is decidedly postindustrial, based more on selling services and images than on making products. The new development model that sustains this economy relies on trickle-down strategies of privatization, marketization, and consumerism to promote urban economic revitalization. Rather than targeting investment to stabilize neighborhoods and raise living standards, it redevelops the city as a "growth machine" (Logan and Molotch 1987), creating landscapes of cultural consumption for suburbanites and visitors. Patronized by locally headquartered corporations and accompanied by pockets of residential gentrification, the new model channels municipal resources into high-profile shopping and entertainment centers (including sports stadiums), tourist attractions, and convention facilities, all concentrated in downtown districts.7

Ruben's explanation of the neoliberal development model rests on the premise is that poverty, incongruent with cultural consumption, needs to be managed. Therefore, in the new millennium, cities looked for solutions to "disappear" large numbers of street bound people so as not to interfere with postmodern "landscapes of consumption."8 Nearly ten years earlier, during the homeless conflicts in Foggy Bottom, Councilmember Jack Evans had argued that homeless services were incompatible with residential areas and were more appropriately suited for commercial districts. Evans represented both residential and commercial areas of Ward 2. Now, after residential pressure to isolate homeless individuals in downtown areas, businesses pushed back as, once again, competing visions of space lead to escalating tensions and the increasing criminalization of homelessness.

"Contained" in downtown business areas, homeless spaces were thus subjected to intense redevelopment pressure.9

7 Ruben, "Suburbanization of Urban Poverty Under Neoliberalism," 435-6.

8 See also Wright.

9 Ibid. 294

The downtown development model "runs on public subsidies, realigning resources away from poor and working class neighborhoods of disinvestment." 10

"Productive spaces" are thus privileged for their potential reinvestment, such as tourist attractions and entertainment districts. This model is reproduced in other parts of the city as "dependent place~" are transformed into "investment spaces." Unfortunately, this model pits residents and grass roots activists against each other as poor communities are encouraged to purge its undeserving and unproductive poor to make it more attractive for private investment. This particular ideology of capital investment is grounded in the theory of neoliberalism that requires a sanitized landscape to garner capital investment.

Competing perspectives of "productive space" rest on the belief that it will discourage the tourism economy, which is an integral part of Washington. And it reveals the intense pressures to do something about the homeless.

Commercial districts were more organized during this decade, especially since the incorporation of two large commercial zones into Business Improvement Districts

(BID's). BID's elected to tax themselves in order to provide amenities to retail stores and offices in their respective areas. Street cleaners took care of public maintenance, hospitality staff provided street side assistance, and BID' s even brought on homeless outreach providers. Recognizing the challenges of working with the people who were

street bound and that homeless issues were a major concern for businesses, and realizing

that in most cases their hands were tied, downtown communities opted for innovative and humanistic ways to deal with such concerns. Expanding on the trend in public I private

partnerships, BID's elected to work with area social service providers either formally or

IO Maskovsky, "The Other War at Home: The Geopolitics of U.S. Poverty," 221. 295

informally as a compassionate alternative to simply calling the police. On the other hand, the BID's knew there was little alternative or police enforcement given District laws that protected the homeless. Outreach teams contracted through local nonprofits provided mobile street outreach, information and intervention in times of crisis. Outreach providers also capitalized on a great opportunity to educate the wider community and sensitize them to the issues that the homeless face daily.

The partnerships were not without their complications though. First Helping operated a breakfast program on Pennsylvania A venue for several years on the southern fringe of the Golden Triangle Business Improvement District when they established a partnership with the BID to provide outreach services to the homeless in that area. But pressure from the BID resulted in the breakfast program moving four blocks to the south, outside of the BID's boundaries. There were also repeated debates about harm reduction techniques that were an important philosophical component of most outreach teams and the perception that such methods only encouraged people to remain homeless. Thus the

BID exerted pressure on the outreach provider, who were contracted to provide services, to cease distributing blankets and thermals in public view. The fear was that the BID would be perceived as being overly complicit. While such negotiations proved challenging, they also offered an opportunity to provide community education.

Public responses to the homeless were not uniformly negative. By now it was clear that the homeless were not going away. Even if the numbers were not increasing, there were always new men and women to replace the homeless that made it off the street. It seemed as if they were more visible and bold, particularly in the commercial districts of the city. Homeless men and women discovered a very sympathetic group in 296

tourists that visit the capital and congregated in areas where they were likely to get handouts. Religious and charitable groups come long distances from around the region to

distribute food and other essentials to Washington D.C.'s homeless poor, despite a fairly

extensive existing network of basic life support services. Homeless men and women who

grew accustomed to a particular spot downtown became close with nearby employers and

vendors, doing yard work in homes, staffing the food stands, running errands for small

businesses and conversing with passersby. It was not uncommon for people to have an

extended network of support in the business community- people to rely on in a pinch

when shoes are stolen, a wheelchair needed repair or recharging, or a security deposit had

to be paid on an apartment found. Often, sympathetic business employees provided an

"angel network" of sustenance that not only fostered a personal connection, but also

immediate gratification for those wanting to directly impact someone's life.

Still, community residents, employees, and officials and grew exasperated with

the concomitant begging, public urination, erratic behavior and public drunkenness that

seemed to accompany homelessness. In the postmodern landscape, police often

functioned to contain the homeless in anticipation of what they might do. But officers too

felt like the pawns though in an endless game of musical chairs. Petty quality of life

crimes may have resulted in fines or jail time for the homeless, but more often than not,

they were released after a brief jail stay, without assistance, only to return to the same

spaces that created conflict in the first place. The homeless were thus subject to

excessive surveillance from the police, business establishments, BID staff and even the

homeless outreach teams. Beyond their social service responsibilities, homeless outreach

teams were heavily relied upon to handle the inevitable conflicts over space and were 297

expected to act in a capacity that discouraged particular behaviors that were likely to lead to arrest or public conflict. Each played a role in the disciplining of the homeless, as there were few easy solutions to conflicting issues that arose. What reasonable solution could be offered to someone who was urinating outside when there were no publicly accessible restrooms, or to the community members responsible for cleaning behind that person?

During this period, the city continued its aggressive quality-of-life policing, but at the same time, new initiatives emerged to deal with the increasing numbers who ended up in jail, particularly the street-bound mentally ill and the addicted. Remedies included jail diversion programs that attempted to deal with the crisis of the numbers of homeless mentally ill being placed in jail. Mental health providers secured grants and contracts for jail liaisons to assist individuals secure mental health services during incarceration and after release. If possible, the goal was to avert incarceration altogether through incentives for treatment compliance. As intended, when arrested, if they conformed to court ordered treatment, then the charges would be dropped. In practice, these efforts have had limited impact. The bureaucracy of the local jail made it difficult for overwhelmed caseworkers to spend an entire day trying to access a client. Treatment systems within the jail also fell down; when released, clients were lucky to have a few days supply of medications. Most of the private mental health clinics who were contracted with the government were not

able to see recently released patients in less than several weeks, which made continuity of care more difficult. Many try to utilize the more flexible Unity Healthcare network to

receive on-demand mental health services but they only have a small handful of

psychiatrists and cannot handle the entire population of folks who don't function well in a 298

structured clinical setting. As a result, the community has had to deal with this reality in nonconventional ways.

In the midst of the constant back and forth over space issues, the homeless still had nowhere to go, especially during the day. It seemed as if some people just wished they would go away. Neighborhood gentrification and downtown development left people without affordable places to live and for the homeless, few spaces to spend their days. "Those sanctuaries for misfits that patches of the central business districts ... once provided for free," what Hopper calls "zones of discard" 11 and Wright refers to as "refuse spaces," have all but disappeared. 12 As communities became less tolerant, the homeless were being pushed out. In times of "polarized topographies,"13 there is also intense pressure to close centrally located services and relocate them to outer residential areas of the city. In Washington, this meant shuffling services to the city's outskirts, especially in

Wards 7 and 8, where the city's poorest already live. This development model separates

"the city" from the interests of its poor residents who are disenfranchised. Ironically, it was state sponsored segregation and isolation of the city's African American residents to these neighborhoods east of the Anacostia River that contributed heavily to homelessness

in the downtown areas. But there remains no context to explore the impact of these issues. In effect, homelessness has been successfully "managed" to become less visible for the benefit of private businesses, citizens and consumers.

11 Hopper, Reckoning With Homelessness, 191.

12 Wright.

13 Ibid. 299

The Institutionalization of Homeless Assistance

Homeless service providers continued to look to expand long term and permanent housing options in the District. A new program model called Housing First was gaining national prominence and providers welcomed the new approach to homelessness in the area. The Housing First model is based on placing homeless men and women with the most severe needs in immediate housing, in conjunction with intensive, but voluntary supportive services. The philosophy is premised on the understanding that there should be no prerequisites to housing and that once the housing crisis is removed, people are more readily able to address other core issues. Pathways to Housing had successfully implemented the Housing First model in New York, and Washington decided to pilot the program locally. Other programs experimented with longer-term and affordable housing, including Samaritan Inns' Elisha's House (for people in recovery) and Rachael's

Women's Center (for women), SOME's Independence Place (for families) and Joseph

Smith House (for those in recovery) and Freedom House (a Single Room Occupancy home for singles). Each year, SOME has continued to expand their permanent housing options.14 Miriam's Kitchen also offered transitional housing for men (Arnold's Place) while SOME established the Mary Claire transitional house (for individuals suffering with mental illness). Gradually, some area churches were drawn in to the service network by providing small-scale hypothermia shelters.

14 SOME has purchased and begun construction on three additional properties for permanent housing for families and an SRO for seniors. 300

SOME's commitment to extending their in-house continuum of care continued with the opening of Michael Kirwin House, 15 a place for individuals to stay while waiting to enter the treatment program in West Virginia. In addition, Jordan House became one of only two small crisis stabilization residences in the District. This was an innovative program for people in crisis to receive respite and support even though they did not meet the threshold for hospitalization. Combined with their other resources, these programs provided a nice wrap around network of services for the communities served by SOME.

Other programs expanded as well, enriching the network of existing programs. Salvation

Army began providing street outreach around the national mall in the evenings.

Meanwhile, Bread for the City opened a permanent service site in southeast, Capitol Hill

Group Ministries opened a day center for homeless families (Shirley's Place) and Gospel

Rescue Ministries established Fulton House of Hope (for women in treatment) as well as the Ready to Work employment program.

Street bound men and women suffered a significant setback with the loss of the

Downtown Services Center, which had provided a place for several hundred to spend the day in a central downtown location. Local businesses, congregations, and city officials have not succeeded in locating an alternative site, despite the enormous need. In another time, providers and advocates would have gotten together over such a significant loss, insisting that a reasonable solution be identified, but the community has been largely

silent.

15 Michael Kirwin house was originally called Jordan House until Jordan House became a crisis stabilization program and the new house was created to replace it. 301

As is clear above, there are many more services and programs than there was even twenty years earlier. By 2000, homeless services had become a significant, special interest industry and a broad system was in place to meet the needs of the homeless. But it lacked system-wide coordination, despite the best efforts of COHHO and The

Community Partnership. to create a true network out of the myriad organizations that had been providing services for decades. Private nonprofits sprang up because existing

services, like health care, mental health care and substance abuse recovery were

inadequate. Alternative services developed in order to compassionately fill the gap in resources and created a shadow system, especially in the medical care and mental health

arenas. In her analysis of anti-hunger programs in Delaware, Curtis concludes that in response to programmatic fiscal pressures, charitable and nonprofit services which

previously existed as an alternative to strict public service requirements, have now started

to mirror the rigidity and depersonalization usually reserved for government assistance

programs. 16

In this process, homeless services has become just another specialty group.

Though valuable services were being provided, at the same time, it became difficult for

agencies to see a way out of the quagmire to create a comprehensive system designed to

end homelessness. My own experience has revealed that there are significant

institutional barriers that prohibit many folks from obtaining services. And while there

are many individuals with significant needs, the system cannot accommodate another

paradigm other than the pathological model, which ignores a significant portion of the

poor and homeless population. The whole field of outreach, developed to reach the most

16 Curtis, "Urban Poverty and the Social Consequences of Privatized Food Assistance." 302

vulnerable and least amenable, has directed significant effort towards the coordination of services and the elimination of institutional barriers that would discourage the most able bodied of us all. This has diverted critical resources away from those most in need, as well as attention to broader, structural issues, in order to deal with the ongoing

"emergency" of homelessness.

Taking stock of the last quarter century of homeless advocacy, Hopper concluded that the lack of broad-based alliances in the movement has significantly hampered the anti-homeless agenda. 17 Drawing on the connections between anti-poverty agendas and anti-homelessness, advocates could have sustained the movement when it peaked in the early 90's and perhaps brought real systemic change to more than just one class of citizens. But the classification of the homeless as a "poor apart" does little to further that goal. The homeless poor are not a separate class of people but exist at one end of the

spectrum of poverty. As a result, shelters continue to warehouse the dispossessed while overwhelmed social service providers attempt to manage the homeless crisis, albeit much better than they did three decades ago. Can we ever depend on a system of services to

eliminate homelessness and poverty? The assumption that it can ignores research that

has underscored the parallel structural roots of homelessness. Through complacency and

resignation, as well as dependence on the homeless service industry, the commitment to

eliminate poverty and homelessness gets lost.

Clearly, changes in the economy and within the city have fostered these

developments and have impacted the dynamics of homeless advocacy. Outside of city

budget allocations and program funding, there was less to argue over. Once advocates

17 Hopper, Reckoning With Homelessness. 303

accomplished major legal and legislative reform, efforts shifted towards education and sensitivity training, particularly for law enforcement officials who became the public intermediaries in public or private space disputes. Committed activists also moved into the public policy arena, working on city budget initiatives and proactively crafting new legislation. Therefore, litigation efforts declined. Advocates also found that the roots of poverty, such as pro-development policies, proved to be a much more diffuse target than opposition to specific shelter closings. As important, advocates accepted positions within city government that further fostered collaboration. When long-time advocate Michele

May left the non-profit arena to work for the D.C. Department of Mental Health, she brought a collaborative commitment to the agency. May was part of a new generation of government officials committed to working closely with fellow advocates and providers,

and participating in the various coalition meetings as a government representative on

mental health issues. Though rarely effective at producing major social reform, such an

approach characterized a greater willingness to work together on all sides and offered

measured improvement.

In addition to the creation of a distinct homeless service industry, there were two

other developments that undermined coordinated advocacy and made it difficult to

establish a collective stake in eliminating homelessness during this decade. Those trends

included agency-focused activism in defense of programs and budgets, as well as

strategic, client-centered advocacy that removed negotiations from the systems-level.

These were set in motion in large part because of contract funding, professionalization,

and the increasing specialization of homeless services during the previous decade. These

changes were underscored by narrowly defined, mission-driven organizations that 304

worked with specific target populations. 18 Combined, these have hampered coalition building and encouraged increasing conservatism among service providers.

Agency Focused Advocacy and Nonprofit Contract Issues

For the most part, more money available through nonprofit contracts has provided a stable source of funding and supported an expanded service industry. However, Wolch raises concerns for the potential for agencies to plan reactively and determine priorities based on the available funding. 19 Planning around available funding streams has become a reality for all nonprofits. However, agencies have had a tendency to shrink or even eliminate services that are not financially supported, even for those that are essential to the community. Willa Morris articulates this concern with regard to street outreach:

[Contracts] can be really restrictive when you're trying to articulate a need. People are reluctant to give money for things - coffee for instance - that are essential for the small victories [with clients]. The relational aspect of the work is not fundable and you can't advocate for this. Grants haven't let us be as clinically flexible as we need to be. Depending on how you write it up, grants can be flexible. Most go after grants based on priorities but if you can't find a place to fund them, then the tendency is to limit priorities or just use general operating money. You can't serve those most in need because the current environment is driven by numbers and deliverables - and those on the bottom are not quantified very well.

Consequently, there are incentives to be "conservative and cautious rather than innovative and system challenging," particularly as organizations have professionalized.20

The upshot of privatization is that the contract state leads to advocacy focused on protecting or securing additional funding and an exclusive focus on individual

18 Eisenberg, Challenges for Nonprofits and Philanthropy.

19 Wolch.

20 Ibid., 206-7. 305

programs.21 Organizational leaders have grown reluctant to challenge conservative political will, and less flexible programs are not as likely to organize around a broad set of issues or venture out beyond their specific issue and mission.

For many years, D.C. Central Kitchen provided meals free of charge to area shelter, homeless service and general assistance programs. As a result of improved economic times in the city, District officials decided to fund better quality food services and a competitive grant was circulated for bid. When the city awarded the contract to another provider, Nutrition, Inc., the Kitchen's leadership appealed unsuccessfully to the city and then to The Community Partnership for reconsideration. Apparently, when the

Request for Proposals (RFP) went out, the Kitchen did not apply in time and was therefore not considered. In hopes of bringing the people to the negotiating table, they elected to initiate a very public fast while at the same time, eliminating meal services in the city's shelters. Robert Egger recounts the succession of events:

I conducted a fast with Mike Curtin when TCP and the city refused to economically participate in insuring that people have good nutrition. As the city grew [financially sound], they were providing new shelters but not willing to contribute to feeding the city. We gave them a deadline and plenty of notice but neither of them even responded. We picked the 151 of the month ... to strike for services and make them deal with us. We provided free food for 14 years. We fasted for 8 days in solidarity with those who were not getting meals at the shelters until TCP entered into negotiations. They provided $1.3 million, which still only accounts for 53% of the cost.

For their part, The Community Partnership consciously decided not to engage the media or respond negatively to the fast. They had been advocates for the Kitchen and remained committed to identifying additional sources of money to encourage their good work. To

21 Ibid., 21 I. 306

outsiders, the Kitchen was in a better financial position than it had ever been before. In the end, The Community Partnership and the city negotiated an agreement with D.C.

Central Kitchen to continue providing meals for the shelters in exchange for additional funding. Few would argue that the Kitchen provides an invaluable and underfunded service to homeless residents in the District. Yet, it is interesting to see how D.C. Central

Kitchen utilized methods of self-deprivation, borrowed from the Mitch Snyder era of advocacy, in order to secure funding for the benefit of their program and its clients.

Snyder had essentially done the same with the struggle over the CCNV shelter and the renovation money, although he would have argued that it was for the purposes of extending services to the homeless and not necessarily to specifically benefit CCNV's budget.

This kind of advocacy has become increasingly more typical. When the city

implemented a Medicaid funding model for community mental health providers, for a

year and a half, organizations were not receiving regular payments from the city for

services that were contracted by the District. They organized around this issue because it

affected their viability until the Department of Mental Health reformed its payment

structure. It was severe enough that several organizations folded in the process because

they could not maintain other sources of funds to keep them afloat. Pathways to

Housing, one of the major mental health and housing providers, joined various mental

health collaboratives for the sole purpose of getting this issue addressed.

Agency focused activism in itself is not problematic and in fact, is essential at

times if groups are going to stay viable and continue to provide critical services. The

point here is that it has often supplanted broader coalition building and displaced energy 307

that could be directed at major social reform. Imagine the collective power if agencies spoke as loud about socio-political injustice. Some coalitions do exist toward this end, though some are focused on broader concerns while others are very issue-focused. Non- profits have substantial bargaining power as a result of the extensive outsourcing of critical services -which remains to be capitalized on.22 The government may stimulate growth in particular service arenas and may define the limits of acceptable action, but the nonprofit sector is not a powerless player in political disputes, as evidenced by their success in the above funding disputes. Despite this potential untapped power, many agencies have instead opted to retreat inward.

By the year 2000, Washington, D.C. provided very few, if any direct social services to the homeless. Services had been parceled out and organizations either contracted directly with the city or with The Community Partnership. One benefit of this arrangement is that it removed the decision-making from an overtly political setting to a more professional one. On the other hand, the diffusion of authority made accountability difficult. 23 Both the Deputy Mayor and the Director of the Department of Human

Services (DHS) are important roles. The fragmented systems in place were, in part, a product of the frequent turnovers in both of those roles and this only underscored the decentralization of power. Without continuity, it is hard to navigate around an incoherent agenda from the various administrations. Agencies are thus forced to adjust reactively, at

22 Wolch.

23 See Brinton H. Milward, "Nonprofit Contracting and the Hollow State," Public Administration Review 54, no. 1, (January/February 1994): 73-77. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/976501 (accessed 27 November 2007). 308

the expense of long range planning. More importantly, the fragmentation in the system complicates advocacy even further. John Shetterly expands:

It makes it hard to know who the decision makers are and who to advocate to. Who do you go to in order to advocate? Sometimes it's DHS, TCP, or a City Council oversight committee. It discourages people whether it's their intent or not. One way [to discourage people] is to diffuse the decision making process so you don't know who to talk to. I've become a considerable cynic in the process. [Advocates] are just spitting in the wind with little steps forward. What's missing is the planning process with a commitment to implementing plans and multiple years' income streams. So each year is a brand new year. There have been years where the best we could hope for was to maintain the funding we've had in previous years and some contact with other social service programs. But these can disappear with change in leadership.

As a result of shelters opening and closing season to season and year to year, people get

shuffled around in an endless game of musical chairs. Similarly, when DMH made

public money available to private agencies willing to serve the city's uninsured and

homeless, there was a steady growth in small, clinical settings. But many agencies were

not prepared for the clientele they were contracted to serve. The opportunity to obtain

additional funding to support existing services proved too tempting to resist. As

homeless mentally ill signed up for mental health services at agencies like Planned

Parenthood, staff were overwhelmed with the challenges of meeting the need and quickly

folded their clinical operations. In many cases, the private practice model resulted in

very sick individuals falling through the cracks as they either disappeared or were

disenrolled. In the end, the result always seems to be that street people get shuffled

around and do not have the benefit of stable, consistent services - or providers. These

examples suggest that with greater involvement and coordination on behalf of providers,

resources could more closely approximate serving the needs of homeless individuals. 309

Contract issues consume an enormous amount of administrative time as well, which some argue has limited direct contact with clients and precluded involvement in advocacy. New Hope Ministries is a major shelter provider contracted with the city.

According to John Shetterly, New Hope's Director, in most years they start with no contract in place. With contracts structured on a cost reimbursement basis, it makes it difficult to cover unanticipated expenses, especially during severe hypothermic years.

The high demand for shelter can produce a major budget shortfall that agencies have to handle creatively. Similarly, when the D.C. Coalition for the Homeless was offered a contract to run D.C. Village family shelter, they had a long list of maintenance issues to deal with prior to moving in, and were faced with the unenviable task of immediately finding quality social workers who would agree to a five month contract. When those positions went unfulfilled, they were sharply criticized, but the contract structure is a recipe for failure.

This environment leaves some agencies constantly scrambling and reacting to

D.C. City Council or DHS impositions. In 2007, New Hope Ministries was given advance notice that a Request for Proposals (RFP) would be coming in October for an emergency hypothermia shelter, but they were not sure where it was going to be located or even if it would be housed in an existing building or if trailers would be used. In

October, they received the RFP but were told that it was due seven days later. On

1 October 24 \ staff members at New Hope were invited to D.C. General to survey the building that they city was proposing for the shelter, which had been uninhabited for

51 years. They still had scant details but were expected to open the facility by November 1 •

Though TCP administers these contracts, they cannot release the RFP until the funding is 310

secured, so their hands are tied as well. In January, New Hope Ministries was asked to apply for a day center proposal at the same location as the shelter. But the program was

5 not scheduled to continue beyond March 31 \ the same date that their hypothermia shelter was scheduled to close. It was reported that Councilman Tommy Wells did not want shelter residents wandering around the neighborhood. Recognizing that this proposal was not need-based, they decided to apply anyway, hoping that something positive would come out of it. The day center opened February 1st and they were remarkably successful linking people to supportive services. But when the closure neared, participants grew concerned about their future. One shelter resident who participated in the day program drafted a very flattering letter to the Mayor and to Councilman Wells appealing to them to keep the shelter and day program open. He obtained 73 other signatures of participants but despite their efforts, the shelter and day program closed as scheduled.

The city shelter contractors are in a difficult predicament. Faced with the financial scramble and budget inconsistencies, they opt to deal with the city in order to deliver basic services to the homeless in an environment that few would tolerate or could stay viable in, even if they chose to. If they did not, many homeless individuals might not have access to emergency shelters. On the one hand, the emergency shelter providers that are so dependent upon government contracts for their operations find it difficult to say no, and under pressure accept a less than feasible contract. But on the other hand, there is the potential to not hold these contractors to the same standards as other providers, because of the challenges involved in implementing the contracts. The city has not been particularly effective planning beyond the season at hand, and usually even that is late. 311

Strategic and Client - Centered Advocacy

Advocacy has taken an individual tum, focused on better meeting the needs of a particular program's population, and this has produced tangible benefits for homeless individuals. For those who are involved in the trenches of direct service, their roles do not allow much time for political organizing. Instead, efforts are focused on helping clients access services and removing institutional barriers. Mary Jordan works at Christ

House, a medical recovery facility for the homeless:

Medical issues are fairly complicated and it is not an easy system to navigate through. Years ago, individuals didn't have access to specialty care that they do now. They had to go through the Archdiocese Healthcare Network or rely on D.C. General but now the city has put forward an enormous commitment of funding that allows access through D.C. Alliance. Care is more available now but it is more fragmented. An individual goes to the hospital, is diagnosed, and receives surgery but is then discharged to the street. When they come to Christ House they can't access the same system for follow-up, in say oncology. They do not receive a referral for services. Christ House helps pull everything together.

Clearly homeless individuals in recovery need someone to assist them in navigating the convoluted healthcare system in the District. She continues:

We are all actively working in the area of reforming health care delivery. But direct advocacy takes form through patients - by getting them into clinics, hospitals, to appointments or at times, advocating for certain things.

Therefore, Christ House feels their impact is most effective with staff members being with the patient or in serving as the point of contact for area doctors and clinics.

On another level, providers go to the city individually to advocate for specific needs, which creates tension amongst providers in the competition for scarce resources and money. Faced with ongoing difficulty getting clients into the city's only publicly funded detoxification program, First Helping's street outreach program was able to negotiate a brief arrangement that facilitated speedy access and detox beds set aside for 312

their clients. While program staff were particularly effective in helping individual clients maintain their recovery following the completion of the detoxification program, this

"creative partnership" did nothing to reform the intake system as a whole. It further privileged some clients of one program over others. But providers are in the position to provide the best services for their clients. Craig Keller, a former director of the First

Helping's outreach program, explains this dialectic:

We do things to make things happen for our clients. Grandstanding wouldn't necessarily get that done. But that also doesn't mean that it does not need to happen. We have a commitment to the individuals we serve and people choose different roles .... Advocates can alienate the people who are trying to help us get things done for our clients.

I've always said that we were the mechanism or web that would push people up to the "safety net." You literally don't have enough time if you're spending your energy on broader advocacy. But, you'll be doing this forever if there's no advocacy. [In that environment] you're going to have to pick and choose which fights you're going to have.

It has been more effective to resolve issues behind the scenes and avoid publicly embarrassing the city, so providers play their cards very close to their chest. Many providers have embraced the spirit of cooperation in D.C. government and find officials

more accessible and amenable to negotiations. Consequently, program managers have cultivated personal relationships with government officials, which has enabled people to

advocate better for their clientele. Improvements are therefore personality-based and

have limited lasting impact. Negotiations conducted on an individual level and out of

public scrutiny may improve services for a particular agency's clientele, but it is also

difficult to improve system-wide services that would make a difference for all. It also

means that providers are necessarily cautious in their battles and reluctant to be overly

critical of the government for fear of alienating someone who could potentially help in 313

the future. With "smart" or "strategic" advocacy, providers are tom between what is best for their clients and what is important for broader social change. Here too, providers often resolve this dilemma by falling back on their organizational missions to define the limits of their activities.

Increasing specialization has extended beyond the creation of a homeless specific service system and has occurred within the industry itself, as homeless assistance organizations focus on specific subpopulations. Special interest advocacy and the emphasis on individual entitlement undermine collective action. It also pits committed advocates against each other and risks handicapping some people's needs against others.24 It is not surprising then, that the central focus for communities and service providers then becomes one of managing homelessness - determining who is worthy of time and effort (or most likely to be compliant and succeed) as opposed to eradicating homelessness. In the service community this practice of "creaming" becomes frustrating because so often people most in need of assistance rarely get it. As Lyon-Callo explains, since there are not enough beds to go around it becomes incumbent upon programs to take on who they can.25 Those individuals who are construed as too deviant or those who function at lower levels are typically underserved. This is perhaps the biggest consequence for the people the system is intended to serve.

24 Hopper, Reckoning With Homelessness.

25 Lyon-Callo, Inequality, Poverty, and Neoliberal Governance. 314

Local Level Alliances and Waning Activism

The new millennium was signified by its depoliticized and fragmented environment. By now, many radicals had become marginalized, which Stern predicted would occur in 1984 unless they appealed to a broader public sphere.26 Even though outspoken activists often prompted conflicted reactions, many still felt that, in the broader scheme, they filled an essential role. Despite the newfound cooperation between the government and social service programs, there was still plenty of work to be done. Once the focus shifted on how poverty and homelessness could be managed, the pressure for major reform was no longer there. Incrementalism took hold with the anti-homeless community addressing barriers to access and improving services. Local level organizing suffered as a result, and the various homeless-related coalitions grew stagnant.

The Coalition of Housing and Homeless Organizations (COHHO), once one of the broadest alliances, ceased to be advocacy-oriented in the way that it had been in the early 1990's. COHHO had a lot of clout when it made recommendations because of the number of organizations it represented and with the large number of actively participating members. But over time, it became focused on bureaucratic service improvements, with only pockets of representation from the provider community. The D.C. Advocates for the

Mentally Ill had already been defunct for some time and was then pulled together after several years by Michele May, who had an interest in improving mental health services and coordination once she worked for the D.C. Department of Mental Health. The group finally merged with the Outreach Focus Group, a small collaborative of street outreach

26 Mark J. Stern, "The Emergence of the Homeless as a Public Problem," Social Service Review 58, no. 2 (June 1984). 315

providers that had formed as a subcommittee of COHHO, because they shared many of the same concerns as the D.C. Advocates for the Mentally Ill.27 Interestingly, outreach providers remained more politically active than COHHO or any of the other homeless coalitions, perhaps because they were so intimately connected with individuals on the street and were more likely to confront front line service barriers. Still, it was easier for participants in the smaller alliances to get caught up in expressing their frustrations rather than finding productive ways to act on their concerns. As Hopper reminds us, it is not enough to examine reform measures critically. Proponents need to be prepared to propose via. bl e so l ut10ns. . 28

As agencies focused inward, coalition building in a depoliticized environment grew increasingly difficult. Providers ceased viewing themselves as advocates in the broader sense, preferring to leave the responsibility of political organizing to professional

"critics." An artificial dichotomy emerged between roles in service delivery and political activism. As more professionals assumed nonprofit leadership roles, they re-focused programmatic efforts on their individual agencies and providing services for target

populations. Providers limited their advocacy to public protests of funding shortfalls. At the same time, they worked strategically behind the scenes to advocate for client needs.

Increasingly, program providers became government contractors or relied on government

funds to extend operations, which made critical assessments of the government or The

Community Partnership more complicated. Political activities became pigeonholed into

27 Actually, the Outreach Focus Group and the D.C. Advocates for the Mentally Ill first split in the late 1990's and then after merging, split again in the early 2000's. Today, they exist concomitantly, largely in response to the overlapping issues and participants between the two groups.

28 Hopper, Reckoning With Homelessness. 316

specifically designated positions, of which, there were very few compared to the number of homeless assistance organizations. Individuals in those positions were easily marginalized because they were either seen as professional advocates with limited experience or chronic complainers who would not let go of the past. Even volunteer roles shifted exclusively towards service delivery.

As an example, both SOME and the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless continued to expand grassroots advocacy efforts, ~olidifying their reputation as outspoken advocates for the homeless. Funding for both of those groups was largely raised independently and they have brought on staff members who are dedicated solely to political work, although each continues to provide direct services. The Legal Clinic created the Welfare Advocacy Group to monitor welfare reform and instituted the

Affordable Housing Initiative to expand affordable housing to the lowest income individuals and families. SOME developed an Advocacy Network to inform supporters about important issues and created an entire Advocacy and Social Justice department, which houses four full time advocates. Both agencies participate in all of the major coalitions in D.C. that address poverty and homeless issues, and have been at the forefront of building new alliances. Individually though, they do not wield the same influence that a community-wide alliance would.

The combined shift towards professionalized staff members with its attendant

staff turnover has dealt a significant blow to social justice movements. At one point, there

was a commitment among the more established organizers to mentor younger volunteers

to take on leadership roles in advocacy. But organizations that were once highly active

have shifted almost entirely towards service delivery, leaving the larger, deeper, and 317

harder questions of social justice unanswered. Interest and efficacy in collaboration and broad coalition building waned as individuals hunkered down in their trenches. Dr.

Keisling talks about the tightrope:

We all need to be advocates if in business. Lots of folks have contracts with D.C. And there is a fear of speaking out about problems because of the history of retaliation. You are penalized if you go to City Council and testify about deficiencies in mental health. They buy people off when they give out contracts, and then they're less likely to create problems. But there is such a little amount of money dispersed to groups. And it's not really much when you consider the money wasted by the city. We need to move towards science-based, evidence­ based outcomes - and give funding towards those successes and move past having a friend in the mayor's office or by being the one who yells the loudest.

In D.C., there are several viable grassroots organizations that work on poverty and housing issues, namely WIN and Empower DC. Both present the opportunity for anti- homeless advocates to build broader alliances but the small homeless-specific coalitions remain largely unaware of their efforts.

The Fair Budget Coalition (FBC) is a notable exception. The Fair Budget

Coalition is a grassroots coalition formed in 1994 to fight for social and economic justice through advocacy around public policy and the city's budget. FBC built an alliance of advocates and grassroots organizations in the District from an array of special interest issues. Their website details their historical roots: We were born out of... the value that human needs must be addressed in a strategic and comprehensive way. Budget makers and policy setters must not be allowed to play 'divide and conquer,' or pit one vulnerable population or one special need against another."29 It uniquely joins organizations around

D.C. City Council budget initiatives that neither benefit specific agencies or specific

29 Fair Budget Coalition, "About Fair Budget Coalition," http://fairbudget.org/ (accessed 13 August 2008). 318

constituencies. In fact, only a handful of its 70+ members represent homeless services. It has been an effective, progressive voice in mobilizing around a broad anti-poverty agenda.

However, the bulk of anti-homeless advocacy has been consumed with expanding, improving and tailoring existing services to better meet the needs of the homeless poor. Interviews with providers confirmed this focus. Pathways to Housing gave the example of reforming State Optional Payments. These benefits offset housing costs for individuals receiving disability payments but can only be used for rent in a

Community Based Residential Facility. For "housing first" providers who place high­ risk individuals in independent housing, this source of funding is all but meaningless.

Similarly, community mental health programs are concerned with the Medicaid (MHRS) requirement for case managers to have 5.5 hours of face time with clients, which doesn't permit flexibility to locate more difficult or reticent individuals. This in tum encourages agencies to work only with more compliant people and ignore those who are hardest to serve or those who have the greatest needs. Dr. Keisling used this last point as an example of when services do not neatly fit into a package that the government wants to fund, so providers end up doing only what is paid for and eliminate the rest.

The focus on these issues are a reflection of the fact that systems are in place - much more so now than they have ever been. This focus made sense given that there are

now comprehensive programs in place that could finally be examined on a systems level,

but does not interrogate the underlying causes of people living on the street. But it is also

emblematic of the changing culture of contract relations. City contracts have functioned

as a nuanced way for the government to abdicate direct responsibility, and the heavy 319

investment in social services has made it appear that the city was being responsible.30

But the nonprofit community was still left in the unenviable position of explaining why it had not eradicated homeless, especially after such a substantial amount of federal money flowed into the District. Social service providers are perhaps in the best position to articulate the complex issues leading to homelessness. Instead, under increased pressure, they have functioned as public intermediaries who are expected to provide stopgap measures.

Public Shelters and Homeless Resistance

.WHhin a few of years of the new decade, the city closed four major shelters and opened two massive, and newly renovated buildings to take their place. Randall,

Crummell and Martin Luther King for men along with Gales School for women were all closed with very little resistance. In 2004, the D.C. City Council voted to close Randall

Shelter, declaring it as surplus property and of no government use. Small bands of independent advocates organized a sit-in, disrupted City Council hearings, and even scaled the atrium of the Wilson Building.31 But this was a small contingent of mostly young activists who were part of a splinter group of Olive Branch Community. Olive

Branch was a loosely organized radical resistance group affiliated with former CCNV member Harold Moss who were making attempts to revive dramatic protest efforts. The city did not budge, but to their credit, they planned to open two replacement shelters, one

3° Karen Curtis, '"Bottom-Up' Poverty and Welfare Policy Discourse: Ethnography to the Rescue?"

31 Theola S. Labbe and Yolanda Woodlee, "Panel Paves Way for Sale of Former Shelter; Police Remove Protesters From Room as Measure Moves Toward D.C. Council Hearing," Washington Post, 11 December 2004, B03. LexisNexis [database onlineJ. The Wilson Building is D.C.'s "City Hall." 320

of which eventually opened on NY A venue, Northeast and another in an abandoned building on the St. Elizabeth's campus in Southeast. Advocates were still disappointed with what became massive warehouses for nearly four hundred men. Moreover, Randall was not replaced with a shelter in that neighborhood. Though the city did agree to provide shuttle service to the nearest shelter in Southeast D.C., there have been numerous transportation problems since this arrangement began.

A second theatrical protest was organized around family shelter around the same time. Dramatizing the difficulty of finding emergency shelter if you were a family in

D.C., advocates led by Mamie Brady and Athena Viscusi of Neighbor's Consejo led a procession in southwest D.C. called "No Room At the Inn." Dressed as modem-day

Joseph and Mary atop a pony in Mexican and Ethiopian garb, protesters drew attention to the 300 families on the waiting list for shelter at the same time family apartment shelter units closed. Organizers reported that families were being routinely turned away from the overburdened emergency shelter system. The walk began at the Navy Yard and proceeded to the family shelter intake site at the Virginia Williams Family Resource

Center.32

Concern mounted as well over CCNV improperly housing homeless families in its large building, and not for the first time. Both the city and The Community

Partnership attempted to negotiate with CCNV staff to prohibit families from residing in the shelter. Intense traffic in and out of the building, combined with aging infrastructure meant that conditions inside the shelter were often hazardous. Community advocates felt

32 Sylvia Moreno, "In the District, No Room at the Shelter; Procession Points Up Shortage of Space for Homeless Families," Washington Post, 24 December 2003, B4. LexisNexis [database online]. 321

strongly that the chaotic and street like environment inside the shelter was an unsuitable location to have children, but CCNV staff members felt that it was inappropriate to turn families away. Concerns were heightened by the lack of professional case management for the large number of individuals staying in the building. To their credit, in 2005, the city insisted that families move out of CCNV and into more suitable housing. But as long as the family shelter system remains overwhelmed, families continued to utilize whatever resources were available to them.

In contrast to the small-scale resistance efforts above, when the city tried to close

Franklin School shelter they met with more organized opposition from homeless residents in that shelter. Franklin School Shelter was located on valuable property that was centrally located in a prime commercial district. The debate centered around pushing homeless people out of downtown versus making space available for homeless individuals where they lived. The latter was extremely unpopular with neighboring businesses. Few understood that eliminating shelters in areas where the homeless already reside does not eliminate homelessness; it only exacerbates conflicts over space and nuisance concerns when they have no place to go. The debate was further complicated by the fact that the Franklin School property had deteriorated to the point of being an eyesore and a persistent source of pests. Once the shelter closed, Franklin was slated for redevelopment by a developer who had already been identified.

After Mayor William's announcement to close the shelter in 2006, a group of four committed residents pulled together: Jesse Smith, David Pirtle, Eric Sheptock, and

Michael McFadden. The catalyst for the group came from Mary Ann Luby, of the

Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless and Rebecca Sambo, a social work student at 322

George Mason. When they approached the group of Franklin residents, they asked them what, if anything, they were going to do. Mary Ann Luby explains:

There is a critical mass- the 10% that can move a group. This happened with Franklin. It was so little effort. I just asked them, "What are you going to do?" They gave me hope that there was something that I could do. I had hope - like cinders in a fire that will catch - but you have to remember [homeless] people are very preoccupied with their survival.

Luby and Samba offered coffee and doughnuts to help recruit other members for meetings and marches, or provided metro fare cards so the group could attend the many meetings and events to publicize their cause. As predicted, organizing the remaining residents was difficult. They planned an initial march on the District Building in conjunction with Empower DC, the D.C. Tenants Advocacy Coalition (TENAC), and the

Gray Panthers, but they only had ten show up for the event. Though they tried to draw in other residents, the group's efforts were limited by the work schedules of homeless men and the pervasive sense of hopelessness felt by all to some degree. According to Smith, the majority of the residents had part time work here and there but nothing that allowed them to get out of the shelter, which only fed the overwhelming feeling of hopelessness.

It is not surprising that residents in the shelter system would have difficulty organizing themselves, given the conditions that have normalized complacency. Staff members within the shelter industry espouse the ideology of deviance and encourage residents to resolve their homelessness through individual reform rather than political resistance or alternative social action. Koegel, et al. concede that even the homeless tend to explain their circumstances in terms of specific events and individual causes.33

33 Koegel, et al. 323

Individuals who are homeless internalize personal responsibility as the source of their circumstances, as opposed to government, historical or structural sources and are consequently less likely to challenge the circumstances that have contributed to their situation. According to Lyon-Callo, shelter policies actually promote disempowered, disabled "others," reproduce inequality, and foster complicity on the part of the shelter residents.34 Resistance is therefore undermined when the context is perceived not as a crisis of resources, but a crisis of the self. This bio-medicalized framework serves to treat problems within the individual and focus on self-reform but also obscures alternative possibilities for collective action.35 Lyon-Callo even suggests that active forms of resistance are interpreted as breakdowns when the bio-medical model combines with more public displays of "deviance" and decreasing community tolerance. It is not that issues of addiction and disease are not real. But the key argument here is that the overt focus on the condition of disability depoliticizes conflict and restricts challenges to structural inequality - from all levels of the community. Despite evidence about program effectiveness, most strategies to eradicate homelessness do not address other core reasons that lead to the condition in the first place. Such a model fails to significantly decrease homelessness and instead institutionalizes charity, homelessness and social inequality.

The group at Franklin Shelter evolved organically without any real leadership or structure for a while. Luby and Sambo were committed to indigenous leadership and

34 Lyon-Callo, Inequality, Poverty, and Neoliberal Governance.

35 See Vincent Lyon-Callo, "Homelessness, Employment, and Structural Violence: Exploring Constraints on Collective Mobilizations against Systemic Inequality," in New Poverty Studies: The Ethnography of Power, Politics, and Impoverished People in the United States, eds. Judith Goode and Jeff Maskovsky (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Maskovsky, "Afterward;" Susan Brin Hyatt, "From Citizen to Volunteer: Neoliberal Governance and the Erasure of Poverty," in The New Poverty Studies: The Ethnography of Power, Politics, and Impoverished People in the United States, eds. Judith Goode and Jeff Maskovsky (New York: New York University Press, 200 J ). 324

offered support or information, but refrained from taking the lead. Eventually, the residents formalized their group as the Committee to Save Franklin Shelter and capitalized on the skills of the four original individuals. Eric Sheptock was a very public figure and enjoyed staging media events or capitalizing on available media attention. He was willing to walk across the city if needed to increase the Committee's presence.

Sheptock maintained the group's public presence and gave the illusion that they were

much larger than they were. Jesse Smith was gifted with writing and public speaking

skills. David Pirtle conducted research and, combined with his photographic memory,

provided the backbone of their efforts. Pirtle could tie in local issues or help provide

essential information. Michael McFadden handled the technical aspects of the campaign,

including web design. Together, they attended candidate forums, voter registration

drives, wrote articles in Street Sense, and obtained radio spots on WPFW.

It helped that it was an election year, and they received a commitment from the leading

mayoral candidate Adrian Fenty that if elected, he would not close Franklin. Eventually,

they won a concession from the outgoing Mayor Williams who rescinded the order to sell

the shelter, without a stipulation for it to be closed. As a result of their involvement,

members talked about "coming alive" through their organizing efforts, which Smith said

was so important after "the devastation of homelessness."

With the shelter dispute resolved, the group faced the inevitable question of what

was next? They thought about putting pressure on the next administration and had to

agree on a focus. According to Jesse Smith:

David [Pirtle] and I thought we could be more effective by representing all the shelters in some respect. It was not really about Franklin. It was about a facility in the downtown area that could facilitate the group working part time jobs. We 325

wanted to take our idea and use that as a model and move onto organizing all the shelters in a coalition.

The four men wanted to change the face of the organization and debated about

incorporating as a non-profit but there was not clear consensus about this or the group's

future focus. Eventually, they incorporated under the name "Until We're Home" but lost

direction and momentum. The group is n·ow defunct, in part because there was no

provision for someone else to take the mantle. 36 Most of the original participants have

since moved on, finding jobs and homes, and they found it increasingly difficult to stay

involved as they moved on with their lives.

Volunteerism and Service Corps

Volunteerism has spiked over the last few decades, promoted by people on both

sides of the political spectrum and it has proved an invaluable resource for anti-poverty

efforts. As non-profits voraciously sought help, even corporations turned to volunteering,

in part to boost their public relations. 37 Mandated community service hours in middle

schools, high schools, and colleges have created vast groups of willing and more

importantly, free labor. Service corps programs expanded and flourished during this time

36 The battle over Franklin actually continues as Mayor Fenty, going back on his election year promise, announced plans to close Franklin in conjunction with a new Housing First initiative that the city is implementing. This time around, Fenty assured everyone that this move was not development motivated. DHS Director Clarence Carter argued that it was in resident's best interest that they not stay there any longer, correctly pointing out that the facility was not fit for anyone to live in. Carter promised that the shelter's nearly 400 residents would be ranked and prioritized along with homeless elsewhere in the District and those with the greatest needs will be placed in available housing units through the new initiative. Though the October I deadline is approaching for Franklin to close, as of September I si, not a single person has yet to be placed in one of the newly available units. The remaining residents who are not placed in housing will be distributed amongst the rest of the city's shelters, most of which are on the perimeter of the city.

37 One unforeseen consequence of this arrangement is that as a result of heavy corporate involvement in non-profit agencies, many program providers opt to not engage overtly in political issues for fear of offending corporate sponsors and donors. 326

period as well. Service corps members receive a minimal stipend in exchange for a year long service commitment and have been an important part of non-profit programs as well as in the development of young leaders. These programs fostered personal sacrifice, service and intimate relationships with the poor. Significantly, several important activists have come from the tradition of volunteerism and became deeply involved in the anti­ homeless movement as a result. However, increasing political conservatism has impacted not only the nonprofit industry but also volunteer programs. Consequently, changes within the various volunteer programs have played a significant role in depoliticizing social issues and demobilizing alliances.

Clinton's presidency changed the face of Volunteers in Service to America

(VISTA), one of the longest standing service programs in the country. 38 VISTA has been in existence since 1965 and was entirely dedicated to eliminating poverty as part of

President Johnson's "War on Poverty." Politicians as far back as Ronald Reagan expressed concerns about VISTA' s radicalism and attempted to restrict its impact.

VISTA activities reportedly made Clinton nervous, as he felt they were too advocacy oriented. At the same time, he wanted to create his own stamp on volunteerism in the country and so created AmeriCorps, a broader, national community service program that expanded service opportunities beyond anti-poverty programs. In the process of creating the new volunteer program, Clinton rolled VISTA into AmeriCorps and stripped the anti­ poverty program of its strong advocacy components. In order to make the bill more amenable to conservatives in Congress, VISTA participants were mandated to engage in direct service only.

38 I am grateful to Pablo Eisenberg for providing the little known historical details in this section. 327

The homeless advocacy movement was born out of the social justice and gospel commitments of many concerned volunteers, which made the delineation of activities as a result of Clinton's proposal that much more regrettable. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, historically, there was no separation between social justice and direct service to the poor. To do political work without regard to the realities of survival on the street would do a severe disservice to those who need assistance and risk forwarding an exclusive agenda. But likewise, to do service without a political component risks institutionalizing a service delivery system ripped from its roots in social and political inequality. In the past, volunteerism and service corps have been intricately connected to political action. Brian Carome discusses his start in the Jesuit Volunteer Corps (JVC):

We had an open-ended commitment for how long we'd continue to do the work for next to nothing [in compensation]. This commitment was fueled by the volunteer corps and the Catholic Worker movement too. We could always count on them to do public acts of civil disobedience.

Carome goes on to compare CCNV volunteer experiences in the 1980' s with the volunteerism of today:

Volunteers were involved in CCNV politics. Mitch [Snyder] would have busloads of college students during spring break weeks. He would have them peel paint or do other work for CCNV, carry ashes around in demonstrations and then send folks out to the community inspired, empowered and informed. This has been sorely lacking for last fifteen years. CCNV was also committed to educating people. They had teach-in's at night.

Three decades later, service corps members and volunteers have been uniformly involved in fulfilling direct service roles, as opposed to engaging in the broader issues of political advocacy. In the depoliticized landscape of today, all too often volunteer experiences consist of a two hour shift preparing or serving sandwiches, which provides limited context for broader social justice efforts. Now there are numerous volunteer programs 328

that employ people in social service agencies for basic living stipends in hopes of trading valuable experiences for cheaper labor, including AVODAH, Ignatian Volunteer Corps,

Lutheran Volunteer Corps, VISTA, and even AmeriCorps. Many nonprofit agencies could not exist otherwise and have structure whole programs around them. At times though, it has compromised a program's ability to deliver services on a consistent basis, as there is typically a gap in between service terms in which programs struggle to meet client needs. 39

Two organizations have attempted to organize its volunteer and base of supporters, including the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless and SOME's Social

Justice and Advocacy Program. According to Mary Ann Luby:

The legal community has a commitment to pro-bono services. Some [cities] even compete for recognition [in that area]. When issues come up that are relevant to their work, the Legal Clinic calls on the legal volunteers for assistance -to pull them into the bigger picture for protests, calls to representatives, etc.

Some organizations incorporate volunteers in broader ways, such as at Friendship Place, where they enlist volunteers to serve as Representative Payees for individuals receiving disability payments. But these are the exception. For other agencies, the very large numbers of one-time volunteer groups contrast with the daily demands of agency operations and limit the effectiveness of the volunteer experience.

Service learning programs, which were based on the philosophy of building on classroom education through involvement in community service, were also an important

1 part of volunteerism in the latter part of the 20 h century. Though they date back to the

early part of the century with the cooperative education movement, service learning

39 This contributes to the high turnover in social services as these are typically ten month programs, with a two month gap before the next group comes through. Usually, participants are offered the option of extending the experience a second year. 329

really gained recognition in the 1970's when George Bush, Sr. signed the National and

Community Service Act of 1990, which provided grants to schools to support service learning programs. Talmadge Wright provides an insightful analysis of student service learning programs, which could easily be extended to other community service models and service corps experiences.40 Wright notes the value of such experiences when he writes that these programs foster personal reflection, interrogate personal perspectives and reduce cultural distance between the volunteers and those utilizing the program's services.41 But he raises the question of whether such experiences are critical enough. It is important that volunteers take their experiences to another level of political inquiry that examines not only their own perspective but also the system generating social inequality.

Clearly, it is a volunteer's responsibility to think critically about their experiences but there is a reciprocal responsibility on the part of the sponsoring agencies to engage individuals in that regard. Educating people about the challenges that poor people face and encouraging them to mobilize around important issues are integral to change systems, communities, and attitudes. Otherwise, Wright asks, is volunteerism another attempt to contain legitimate anger? "A noncritical service - learning, then, is one more tool to effectively socialize students, to assimilate students into solutions that do not disturb capital investment or the smooth functioning of city governments."42 Direct service volunteer experiences make people feel good and the hands-on experience leaves

40 Wright.

41 See Curtis, "Urban Poverty and the Social Consequences of Privatized Food Assistance" for a counter-perspective. Karen Curtis witnessed the normative judgments that result from shallow volunteer experiences.

42 wright, 31 1. 330

people feeling like they made a difference. But we risk giving volunteers "a false sense that they are doing something meaningful if the larger picture is not included in their education."43 As Wright suggests, it risks becoming volunteerism that deflects political

action instead of encouraging the building of a broader movement.

Careful responsibility comes with the role of being the de facto spokesperson for the homeless community. Robertson argues that service providers collect and dispense

information about the homeless (usually as required by funders) and this highlights the

power in the role of data collector and interpreter.44 In their mediating role, non-profits

need to expand the dialogue beyond individual pathologies to encourage investment in

the political agenda. Several organizations have taken this responsibility seriously.

Michael Stoops explains the significance of the National Coalition for the Homeless

political efforts:

The best thing the National Coalition did was develop leaders and advocates among young people and homeless people. In any given city, the core group of providers and advocates outlive public officials. Homeless people are better off in these cities.

Others have instituted orientations sessions for volunteers in part, to better prepare people

for their experience. These provide great venues for engaging volunteers in a broader

agenda. Willa Morris instituted what she calls "Homelessness 101" sessions while she

was at Friendship Place. Similarly, Miriam's Kitchen gathers new volunteers regularly to

discuss various aspects of their ongoing experience. Community education is an

important part of advocacy and can encourage people to become more invested in social

43 Ibid., 312.

44 Robertson, "Interpreting Homelessness: The Influence of Professional and Non-Professional Service Providers." 331

justice issues. But it can also be a drain on already stretched resources. D.C. Central

Kitchen modifies this model somewhat and has a volunteer coordinator go through the day with volunteer groups. Such a model is most effective at eliminating stereotypes, encouraging personal reflection and reducing cultural distance between groups.

According to Robert Egger, their volunteer coordinator

gets together with the volunteers in order to fight the stereotype. Volunteers are key, not as helpers in kitchen but as carriers of the 'social virus.' We facilitate that process so that people can come to own conclusions .... People leave with that experience and start campus kitchens. This might not create major social change but seeing the President [of the U.S.] taught by a [program participant] how to julienne carrots - you never know how that manifests. The seed is planted. That's advocacy. People walk away and say "Oh my God, I get it. We need a volunteer coordinator to talk to people about what we're trying to do. Not to see the world as it exists. To use resources in your communities and teach the brain to see things differently. Advocacy through action yields concrete things.

Yet, learning by "doing" is only a partial solution. "Urban plunge" experiences are the

new alternative spring break experience by simulating homelessness and letting students

fend for themselves for a period of time. Regardless of the model, engagement and

dialogue between those who are disempowered and student volunteers are key, as is

creating a platform for people to act on their concerns.

So is this new brand of volunteerism and charity going to solve destitution? Are

organizations complicit when they accept government contracts for less than needed and

therefore rely on volunteer labor to provide essential services? Volunteerism, without a

direct link to underlying political-economic concerns has had an unfortunate impact on

progressive change. Poppendieck argues that this too has contributed to managing social

problems instead of eliminating them:

The proliferation of charity contributes to our society's failure to grapple in meaningful ways with poverty ... This massive charitable endeavor serves to 332

relieve pressure for more fundamental solutions. It works pervasively on the cultural level by serving as a sort of "moral safety valve"; it reduces the discomfort evoked by visible destitution in our midst by creating the illusion of effective action and offering us myriad ways of participating in it. It creates a culture of charity that normalizes destitution and legitimates personal generosity as a response to major social and economic dislocation.45

Similarly, Hyatt argues that the ideology of volunteerism goes hand in hand with the neoliberal model that promotes cultural change as opposed to material change, with its focus on civic action and volunteerism.46

One consequence is that the focus on volunteerism obscures the active state role in reproducing inequality. Governments appear responsive despite "withdrawing from active engagement in the lives of the poor."47 Volunteering in its new form is not likely to fundamentally challenge poverty or homelessness. In this new model of civic engagement, we also find that the issues are disengaged from their broader political contexts. More importantly, volunteering "legitimates the dismantling of the formal structures of the welfare state that once served the needs not only of the poor but of all citizens."48

Conclusion

After four decades, anti-homeless advocacy has come full circle. It is now highly individualized, personalized and professionalized. Advocacy debates have become very bureaucratic, with plans and timelines that underscore the reality of incremental change

45 Poppendieck, 5. See also Curtis, "Urban Poverty and the Social Consequences of Privatized Food Assistance."

46 Hyatt, "From Citizen to Volunteer: Neoliberal Governance and the Erasure of Poverty."

47 Ibid., 206.

48 Ibid., 212. 333

in the new millennium. Though perhaps less emotionally charged, these struggles have also become less passionate. Likewise, urban political affairs have grown more fragmented and depoliticized, which has helped foster the illusion that the government is responsible and responsive to its citizenry. The fragmentation of power in urban areas, especially in D.C. where there are multiple layers of government bureaucracy, has had profound consequences for social justice activism and collective mobilization. Not only are power and decision-making decentralized, but targets of opposition have become more diffuse as well. More importantly, government outsourcing has effectively deflected political energy and obscured the ways that the state is fostering inequality and poverty.

Privatization and professionalization have created a shadow system of service providers who are politically cautious in light of funding and contract concerns. With an exclusive focus on program missions, services and clientele, combined with the overall devaluing of political roles and activities, social service needs have been divorced from their socio-economic roots while effectively demobilizing existing political networks. At the same time, increasing specialization within the provider community has made collective mobilization and broad-based alliances more difficult to achieve. Resignation and complacency have succeeded in replacing broader coalition building and efforts towards systemic reform. Instead, providers and advocates have shifted focus toward narrow policy debates and improving social supports - neglecting the more obtuse public policies that subsidize homelessness. In addition, the shift in volunteerism has grown increasingly conservative and apolitical, underscoring these socio-political trends. 334

Overall, with a highly constricted political environment, the result is large scale disenfranchisement and demobilization, which underscores the ways we are not working together on a systemic level or fulfilling our commitment to end homelessness.

Fortunately, this outcome is not inevitable. Political engagement and collective

mobilization, where the burdens and risks can be shared are the keys to effective,

progressive, social change. CHAPTER6

CONCLUSION

"Can we continue to improve our homeless system even as we and the mainstream poverty health and housing agencies act to reduce the need for it? Our answer to this question is transparent. 'We must. We simply must.'" The Community Partnership 2002 Report to the Community1

Contemporary Homeless Issues

Homeless providers and researchers have recently noted that the nature of homelessness has changed. Evidence suggests that there are two distinct populations with different histories and needs: the chronic homeless, who have typically been on the street for lengthy periods of time and those who are situationally homeless, who have used the shelter system for a brief period of time and usually in order to avert a crisis. By far, the largest numbers of homeless men using the emergency shelters in Washington,

D.C. fall into the latter category.2 Intervention, wrap-around services and case management may address chronic homelessness while appropriate prevention measures and community support could possibly address those suffering the effects of extreme poverty. This proves challenging for providers with the large numbers of individuals seeking assistance. Absent major structural changes, the quickest way for someone who

1 The Community Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness, 2002 Report to the Community (Washington, D.C.: The Community Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness, 2002), 17.

2 Martha Burt and Sam Hall, Major Recommendations: Summary Report of the Urban lnstitute's Assessment of the District of Columbia's Public Homeless Assistance System (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 2 June 2008).

335 336

is homeless to escape such circumstances appears to be finding ways to access social service networks, regardless of one's need for those services.

The data supports that most homeless people stay in shelters for a short while.

But evidence also suggests that the situation is a bit more complicated. Hopper, Susser, and Conover suggest that public shelter, rather than means of last resort actually became a routine survival strategy for poor individuals in New York City.3 Within the context of the economic restructuring of the city, one might expect poor urban males to encounter episodic homelessness. Most of the shelter population continues to experience permanent disenfranchisement from participation in the formal economy and many individuals resort to alternatives, so that shelter stays may be strategic and expected at various points in life.

As these authors point out, for those who fall victim to life's economic realities, homelessness has become an institutional adaptation and a routine urban survival strategy. Reliance on a family member, often, but not always a female, is employed at strategic times and is accepted only when resources can support the family as a residential unit. Otherwise, tolerance for particular behaviors may be low and resources may just not be sufficient. In cases where women moderate social capital, public benefits, and reciprocal relationships that mediate the blunt force of poverty, this does not bode well for young urban males of color who make up an increasing percentage of the shelter population.

So what does this mean for Washington, D.C.? With poverty rates above 20% in the city, there is enough of a base of poor people for the demand for shelter to continue unabated. And this means we are going to have to do something different if we are to

3 Hopper, et al., "Economies of Makeshift." 337

arrest this trend. According to Steve Cleghorn, there is still room for advocacy today, only the focus should be on developing permanent supportive housing and redesigning the emergency shelter system. Cleghorn argues that shelters are serving as a poor form of housing for people who are struggling with poverty who are not necessarily chronically homeless. And certainly, shelters should not become a permanent form of housing for the long term homeless either. Burt considers this challenging dichotomy:

However, there is reason to ask whether this amelioration of the homeless condition is what we as a society should be trying to do, and how much of the resources available to address homelessness should be directed toward these activities. The problem is that only resources devoted to permanent housing programs directly address the issue of ending homelessness.

There is no question that the expanded services of the network provide more, and more appropriate, assistance to people who are actually homeless. And there can be little question that this assistance is needed, is humane, and actually ameliorates, at least for a time, hunger, health problems, exposure to the elements, and so on. But by itself, it does not, and probably cannot, end homelessness. (emphasis in original).4

Utilizing Burt's data, The Community Partnership and the Department of Human

Services are responding by attempting to address the needs of the chronically homeless through permanent supportive housing and housing first initiatives. This new direction means phasing out emergency shelters, a goal that has actually been in place since the original plans for the D.C. Initiative. Therefore, the real challenge now is how to best address the needs of individuals who utilize the shelters as a "routine survival strategy."

If the permanent supportive housing plan serves to address the very significant needs of chronically homeless, then what do we do to eliminate future need for shelters used so frequently by the chronically poor? To this point, Burt cautions:

4 Burt et al., Helping America's Homeless: Emergency Shelter or Affordable Housing?, 263. 338

Most importantly, keep in mind that our society still produces, and maintains, enough people living in extreme poverty to keep the services of an emergency/homeless assistance network busy, even at double its present scope. Nothing we say ever should be taken to deny the existence of a basic level of unmet need, or to deny society's responsibility for meeting it.5

Hopper states that we need to be careful not to collapse advocacy issues into a single banner of "housing justice."6 As of yet, this conundrum about the future of the homeless service delivery system remains unanswered, but one thing is for certain: a comprehensive solution will require looking at the city as a "political and economic whole."7

Challenges for the Future

Historian Michael Katz notes that the conditions that preceded civil violence in the late 1960' s have only gotten worse in the last four decades and wonders what is significant about the present context that history has not repeated itself.8 So why haven't we erupted into massive protest over the conditions that have deteriorated the quality of life for all of us? And why are we living in such a depoliticized, disempowered environment? This is worth exploring in future research but several points are worth considering here.

Political activism was enormously costly and it took its toll on the most committed proponents who put their lives on the line and risked their reputations for a

5 Ibid., 264.

6 Hopper, Reckoning With Homelessness.

7 Williams, "Poverty Among African Americans in the Urban Unired States," 165.

8 Michael B. Katz, "Why Don't American Cities Burn Very Oflen?" Journal of Urban History 34, no. 2 (January 2008). http://juh.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/34/2/J 85 (accessed 6 August 2008). 339

profound sense of justice that only a select few shared. Raising the important question of sacrifice and struggle, Robert Egger asked, "Do baby boomers really appreciate where we've come from?" CCNV founder Ed Guinan also remarked on this sacrifice:

It is very, very costly to be an advocate. You have to travel pretty light, endure without a lot of financial support, without resources, or any kind of support. You shift from being a saint to being a trouble maker. CCNV did both [political action and direct service] but it was costly. We lived without resources that others took for granted. We had to have thick skins. We didn't care about criticism because we felt like we were doing the right thing.

Brian Carome concurs:

Coalition building was so easy. Housing Action! formed spontaneously. People found themselves at the District building and we said we need to meet again to do something about this. There was always a contingency willing to do civil disobedience -not so much [willingness] for hunger strikes. But there were these things like "justice cells." We didn't always see everything the same and not all of us got along. But there was always a core of individuals willing to take serious risks as well as willing to be ridiculed. We'd argue passionately and knew we were nothing close to mainstream.

Not only have we lost our sense of outrage over these things, but few individuals are willing to make such great sacrifices any longer. It is little wonder given the long history of struggle in the District.

This is also a byproduct of the privatized social safety net. Over the last forty years, we have transitioned homeless assistance away from its roots in grassroots volunteerism with profound implications for social justice concerns and the people served by these programs. Forty year later, we have come full circle. We have a fairly extensive, comprehensive system of services, mostly provided by private nonprofits and contractors. In her analysis of food assistance programs, Curtis arrives at similar conclusions: 340

(V)oluntary organizations (in this case food assistance providers) have been drawn into a growing institutionalized "shadow government" (Wolch 1990); (2) this newly institutionalized voluntary bureaucracy closely parallels the bureaucracy, the rigidity, and the depersonalization of government agencies; (3) willingly or not, this institutionalized food provision network contributes to the continued view of poverty in America as primarily the result of personal defects and temporary misfortunes requiring only an "emergency" - albeit virtually permanent - response from society; and (4) these changes have consequences for the transfer of responsibilit)l for assistance from the public to the private sector 9 under welfare reform. ·

Burt points out too, that communities are rather ambivalent about government assistance efforts and have internalized the charity and self-help rhetoric of the Reagan era, which

when combined, "do not form the basis of a strong commitment to sustained public

action."10 Instead, many programs seem to be content with addressing people's needs

through service networks, for which there seems to be a never-ending demand.

According to Brian Carome:

There's a separating line. My job was essentially to put McKenna [Center] out of business and be dedicated to eliminating homeless. Organizations should not be perpetual. But other groups like Coalition for the Homeless thrive on homeless and do it on the cheap ... .I refused to accept the status quo. People were in it as a result of their faith and social justice commitment - and usually both. There was an understanding amongst those people. It was the work of the gospel and there was a social justice component. There were horrible conditions ... and suffering on all levels.

It appears that we now approach homelessness very bureaucratically, focusing on

numbers, outcomes, etc. Removed and distant, the very real impact on human lives

oftentimes gets lost in the mix.

Cooperation between providers and even the government extends further than it

ever has. Additionally, the city has begun looking to resolve some of the more deeply

9 Curtis, "Urban Poverty and the Social Consequences of Privatized Food Assistance," 207.

10 Burt et al., Helping America's Homeless: Emergency Shelter or Affordable Housing?, 326. Summarizing Ellwood. 341

ingrained homeless issues through new initiatives. The dichotomy still exists between individuals who wish to work from within systems to effect change cooperatively and those who desire to press for more drastic social reform from the outside. Former CCNV member Craig Keller explains:

At the time [of Snyder's fast around metro: s decision to close off stations], I silently disagreed with Mitch that drastic actions needed to be taken. I consciously didn't want to believe that you couldn't work within the system. In hindsight, I believe I was wrong. It's still a question of whether or not drastic action is necessary, but now the issues are less clear and compelling. Working within the system is easier today, but it still needs a shove every now and then.

Most would now agree that conditions exist for cooperation and dialogue between local agencies that have responsibility for homeless services, and that dramatic pressure should be a last resort if at all. But we have seen the value of having a range of options available. This point is especially salient right now because homelessness and poverty issues are increasingly marginalized issues. Pablo Eisenberg states that poor people's movements have died off, citing the demise of welfare and tenants rights groups, legal services and public housing interest groups. 11 These movements at one point, held large support, authority, and legitimacy, which made them that much more successful at grassroots organizing. Moreover, organizations that once provided vital support to social and economic justice causes in the 1970' s and 1980' s have retreated.

In raising the opening question to this section, Katz examines several factors that have undermined the potential for collective protest and violence as a result of the declining social and economic urban conditions. Urban institutions have found better ways to "manage marginalization" by selectively incorporating African Americans into

11 Eisenberg, personal communication, 29 May 2008. 342

the workforce, into educational institutions, in the housing market, etc. But these represent limited and extremely fragile "ladders of mobility."12 Strategies of "mimetic reform" allow the state to appear responsive to social demands without giving up real power or significantly redistributing resources. Combined, these have absorbed the energy of resistors. 13 In addition to the startling impact of disillusionment for young

African Americans Jiving in areas of the city that have been turned into "reservations for the black poor," cut off from legitimate work and targeted for incarceration, disenfranchised residents Jack significant channels to express discontent or effect change.

The rhetoric of individual rights, equal access in public accommodations and consumption has effectively displaced the focus on economic justice concerns.

Furthermore, the potential for unrest has been increasingly managed by police force, a factor that is particularly relevant in D.C. post 9111. Perhaps most importantly for D.C.,

"selective incorporation" of upwardly mobile residents in metropolitan areas would mean that civil violence would be directed towards African American political leaders, prospects which left many feeling conflicted, especially in a city where local authority is tenuous at best.

In the course of the last forty years, the larger residential communities in

Washington seemed irrelevant to anti-homeless struggles, and one has to ask why. When

neighborhoods were not directly engaged in opposing social service programs, it seemed

as if they were immune to the movement. It is important to continue to explore the

unique ways that class and race dichotomies play out in Washington, D.C. Admittedly,

12 Katz, "Why Don't American Cities Burn Very Often?," 193.

13 Ibid. 343

this research insufficiently explores the impact of racial dynamics in the foregoing

struggle. It is striking that the discussion of race came about only peripherally at the end

of this research. But the racial subtext was unmistakable. It permeated relations between

advocates and city officials as well as within advocacy networks themselves. These

issues are especially relevant because of the large numbers of homeless individuals who

are native Washingtonians of color, coming from severely poor neighborhoods that have

been segregated east of the Anacostia River. For communities to work together, they are

going to need to bridge the boundaries of race, class and especially power.

Carol Fennelly reflects on how far we have come and what may have been lost:

Today, we don't have Mitch. He was unique, exceptional, audacious. CCNV was the catalyst to focus attention on issues that needed to be raised and then we had to move on. It was the evolution of a movement when we struggled to raise consciousness. You had to risk everything or you'd never get change. There's a whole lot more money now than there ever was, more programs - none of that existed. Homeless people were still "bums" 30 years ago. All that changed. We did our job, and now they're doing the job they are supposed to do .... We made breakthroughs and played our role brilliantly. And it cost us everything- our freedom, our health, and in some places our lives. But it was also the best time of our lives. We never did better work than we did then. The radical political agenda is no longer there. At the same time, we lost our edge as an organization. I don't know if that's a bad thing. CCNV was just a moment in time.

As advocates, we need to rethink how we might proactively and compassionately address

the long standing issue of homelessness. We need to think beyond asking for crumbs and

piecemeal improvements to existing programs. Collaboration needs to become a core

philosophy and not just an ideal that sometimes works its way into job descriptions and

the "scope of work" contract details.

How could the system of services be reorganized and sufficiently meet the needs

of such a diverse population? Hopper and Baumohl suggest a comprehensive approach: 344

"Demand for shelter is essentially defined by default: Who appears at the door and in what numbers depend chiefly on the state of the local labor market, the supply of cheap housing, welfare regulations and sufficiency, police practices, commitment laws and practices, and the tolerance and support capacity of kin."14 These authors urge policy makers to examine the absorptive capacity of shelters, nonhomeless institutions and practices such as doubling up, as well as underlying structural issues. In other words, if we approach the problem within the frame of "homeless services," we will do little to stem the tide of homeless poverty. This necessitates a look at the whole socio-economic context of homelessness and poverty.

Where Do We Go From Here?

In laying out his critique of nonprofits, Pablo Eisenberg offers us a platform to consider the future for reform in Washington. 15 The trend of outsourcing essential government services takes responsibility off the hands of the government, turns independent programs into quasi-governmental service providers, and does not leave committed advocates much time to do the work of organizing when necessary. While it may be appropriate that government funds are not directed towards advocacy work, there are painfully few alternative resources that will support that kind of work. In addition, providers have adopted an overly conservative interpretation of tax-exempt requirements.

Eisenberg suggests actively diversifying funding streams, and mounting pressure on

14 Hopper and Baumohl, 5.

15 Eisenberg, Pablo. "A Crisis in the Nonprofit Sector." National Civic Review 86, no. 4 (Winter 1997). http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/search?vid=2&hid=l l 3&sid=da9f4d72-e0b5-47ff-8f3f­ ae6732107b0e%40 sessionmgrl04 (accessed 7 May 2008). 345

foundations to support progressive causes. As we have seen, government investment in social assistance has significantly improved the quality of services, but providers need to reconsider their exclusive focus on funding, contracts and delivering services. Agencies will continue to argue over the same little piece of the pie because funding will never keep up with the high demand for services unless something is done to stop it at its sources. At the same time, the state is not really investing in things that could make a lasting difference for whole communities - and especially the poor. In the context of service provision, it is far too easy to slip into the trap of articulating people's needs while ignoring the systemic issues that advance the need for further assistance.

Another concern for Eisenberg, raised earlier in the context of this research, is that programs are increasingly focused on narrow missions that center around one or two issue areas rather than promoting a larger social agenda, which in effect build "program and policy silos."16 Such specialization results in fragmentation and leaves little incentive for coalition building or joining causes (beyond immediate self interest) that have the potential to extend one's influence beyond an issue area. Eisenberg argues for re-prioritizing "coalitioning" as well as collective strategies across the board. In advocating for a strong social justice network, Rosenthal adds, "Coalition politics offers a way for these movements to continue working on their own for the amelioration of current homelessness, while pressing for structural changes as members of coalitions dealing with basic economic and political justice.17 It also prevents individual agencies from "picked off." It is possible to diversify the roles of staff members to strike a balance

16 Eisenberg, Challenges for Nonprofits and Philanthropy, I 94.

17 Rosenthal, "Dilemmas of Local Anti-homeless Movements," 2 I I- I 2 346

between service delivery, advocacy and collective efforts. The value multiplies when communities maintain a range of resistance strategies (exercised with caution), and especially when they include the homeless themselves. In addition, advocates, providers and even researchers need to do a better job of translating these connections to the broader public in order to establish our collective stake in progressive reform. We have to reconnect social services to their political economic roots of suffering. And we have to continue to probe the ways that we have been complicit in demobilizing activist networks, subsidizing poverty, and contributing to inequality. Our only hope is to commit to mobilizing popular support, partnering with poor communities, and reversing the erosion of progressive measures.

Eisenberg is critical of progressive reform efforts that are increasingly dominated by federal lobbyists, a trend which mirrors the professional advocacy groups that dominate homeless scene. What are the implications of the increasing specialization of advocates and lobbyists at the national level? At the very least, this has not lent itself to expansive grassroots mobilization. The role of national level policy organizations, especially those that offer state level "technical assistance" and provide resources to local networks needs to be explored further. Clearly the movement in D.C. had an important impact upon the nation and indicates the potential significance of broadening the advocacy agenda. Perhaps most importantly, Eisenberg points out that successful social movements were organized by people who had something at stake, which means that to be successful, homeless organizations are going to have to rebuild grassroots efforts.

Too many agency heads, according to Eisenberg, have failed to develop young leaders. Disillusioned by the limited opportunities for mobility and corporatization 347

trends, they opt instead to leave the nonprofit sector. At the same time, Michael Stoops of the National Coalition for the Homeless raises the question about salary structures in nonprofits that pay young professionals well and yet compensate administrative support staff poorly, who have to then scramble to support their families. Eisenberg is similarly critical of the institutionalization of volunteerism, whereby the number of volunteer hours serves a measure of effectiveness for nonprofits - and stands as an alternative to measuring real impact. Rather, the focus should return to involving volunteers in meaningful political activity that makes a lasting impact on the population being served.

This means maintaining a commitment to educate volunteers, to incorporate outside support into broader social justice efforts, and to sustain the movement by training young leaders up.

The cost of doing nothing is the continuing social, political and economic isolation of the homeless poor as well as the marginalization of non-mainstream political advocacy. Urban democracy suffers as disenfranchisement and immobilization continue to feed complacency, constricting larger social justice efforts. And without a broader vision, poverty will continue to be individualized, private, and invisible. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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