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Chronology January 1 - December 31, 19981

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Chronology January 1 - December 31, 19981 CHRONOLOGY JANUARY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 19981 CONTENTS I. GENERAL II. RELATİONS WITH THE EUROPEAN STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION III. RELATİONS WTTH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AM7mCtYA7V W. CYPRUS \SS13E V. RELATİONS WTTH GREECE AND OTHER B ALKAN STATES VI. RELATİONS WITHISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES VII. RELATİONS WITH IRAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS I. GENERAL January 06- Ahmet Necdet Sezer is elected as presiding judge of the Constitutional Court. January 16- The Constitutional Court outlaws the Welfare Party (RP) and bans its leader, former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, along with five other deputies from political activity for five years. "The court decided to close the Welfare Party because of evidence confirming its actions against the principles of the secular republic," Court Chief Justice Ahmet Necdet Sezer discloses. Reacting to the court decision, Erbakan calls on his follovvers to remain calm, and vows to take the case to the European Court of Justice. February 03- Turkey's annual inflation pasts the 100 percent barrier for the first time in three years. Consumer price inflation rose 101.6 percent in January compared vvith the same month in 1997, the State Institute of Statistics (DİE) discloses. 1 Prepared from Turkish Probe by Atay Akdevelioğlu, Research Assistant, Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University. 148 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK [VOL. XXV February 06- Turkey's population has risen to 62.6 million from 56.5 million in 1990, according to the final results of a national census. April 27- Turkey privatizes mobile phone licenses in a much-awaited deal worth $1 billion, the biggest privatization move undertaken in the country so far. June 27- A strong earthquake causes extensive damage in the southem city of Adana, the township of Ceyhan and its environs, killing at least 150 and injuring more than a thousand people. July 15- The High Board of Privatization (ÖYK) approves the sale of 51 percent of the petroleum marketer Petrol Ofisi for $1.16 billion to a consortium of local companies in the largest single sell-off deal in Turkey's privatization history. July 23- Parliament passes wide-ranging tax reforms sought by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). August 13- The İMKB-100 index dives 6.83 percent, in reaction to increased economic turmoil in Russia, a key trading partner of Turkey. August 26- The IMKB-100 index drops 7.8 percent amid increasing concerns över the grovving economic crisis in Russia and över taxes on earnings on securities and interbank transactions. August 28- Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz announces a package of measures designed to head off the possible adverse effects of the Russian financial crisis on the Turkish market. August 28- General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu takes över command of Turkey's armed forces, vowing to intensify the military's fight against radical islam. "The Turkish Armed Forces should be more povverful and vigilant than ever against problems such as radical islam," he said at the ceremony in vvhich he replaced General ismail Hakkı Karadayı as the Chief of General Staff. September 16 - Indian President Kocheril Raman Narayanan arrives in Ankara for a three-day state visit aimed at boosting bilateral ties. October 14- 42 year old Archbishop Mesrob Mutafyan is chosen as the 84th patriarch of the Armenian community in Turkey. October 22- Ankara says it has asked Moscovv to extradite Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the terrorist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), vvho it says has been in Russia for more than one vveek. October 29- The 75th anniversary of the republic is celebrated. November 06- Turkey imposes nevv navigation rules for the Turkish Straits. 1998] CHRONOLOGY 149 II. RELATİONS WITH THE EUROPEAN STATES AND THE EU January 02- Italy stands firmly by its stated aim of granting political asylum to Kurds from Turkey and Iraq despite mounting fears in Germany that Rome was opening the floodgates to a tide of immigrants into the European Union. January 04- Germany urges Turkey to find a political solution to its "Kurdish problem" to stem the flow of refugees to Westem Europe. January 05- Turkey rejects European pressure to find a political solution to its festering Kurdish problem and says hundreds of Kurdish illegal aliens who reached Italy on flimsy boats last week are fleeing economic hardship, not political repression as suggested by Italian leaders. January 07- Turkey says it has complained to Britain about a remark by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook that Turkey's borders were not clearly defined. January 13- German Prosecutor-General Kay Nehm says the PKK, which is outlavved both in Turkey and Germany, is no longer regarded as a terrorist group. However, he says, the PKK leadership is stili blacklisted in Germany as a criminal organisation linked to cases involving child abduction, extortion of money, causing bodily harm and arms offences. January 14- British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook reiterates the European Union's invitation to Turkey to take part in a European Conference scheduled for March 12. "We recognise Turkey's European vocation and the need to draw her into the enlargement process," Cook telis the European Parliament in Strasbourg. January 20- The European Union expresses its dismay at Turkey's banning of the Welfare Party. "The European Union notes with regret the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court ... to order the closure of the Welfare Party, to confiscate its property and to ban certain present and former members of that party from being members of the Turkish Parliament or from further political activity for five years," the European Union presidency says in a statement. February 19 - President Demirel begins a state visit to France for talks that officials saw as a chance to repair a damaging row betvveen Ankara and the European Union över its bid for membership in the bloc. French President Jacques Chirac urges Turkey not to boycott an upcoming European Union conference. Demirel, responding to Chirac, says the European Union should treat it as equal to other candidates for membership. March 04- The European Commission, asked by the European Union at the Luxembourg summit to prepare a European strategy for Turkey, presents its customs union plus proposal for Ankara. 150 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK [. March 06- Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz compares the German approach to European Union expansion to Adolf Hitler's "Lebensraum" plans for German settlement of eastern Europe, the Financial Times reports. March 11- Prime Minister Yılmaz charges that Germany is using "intolerable delaying tactics" in the European Union vvhich are aimed against Turkey. "The federal government [of Germany] is the architect of discrimination" against Turkey in the European Union, Yılmaz telis Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) in Ankara. March 16- Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş officially rejects an offer by the European Union for Turkish Cypriots to join a team that vvill negotiate the island's entry into the European Union. March 29- Leftist arsonists in Athens torch a car belonging to Turkey's military attache Colonel Haluk Arabacı, causing some damage but no injuries. April 02- A series of anti-German outbursts by Turkish Prime Minister Yılmaz is souring relations betvveen the two countries, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel says in Bonn. In his latest remarks, Yılmaz calls German Chancellor Helmut Kohl an "enemy" during a tourism conference in Antalya, Turkey, vvhere he also says he vvouldn't mind if German tourists stayed avvay. April 06- On a rare visit to Greece, the head of Turkey's military, General ismail Hakkı Karadayı, meets vvith his Greek counterpart General Athanasios Tzoganis in advance of a gathering of European defense officials in Athens. Later Karadayı calls for dialogue vvith Greece to resolve longstanding disputes in the Aegean. May 08- Şemdin Sakık, a leading PKK member vvho earlier claimed his organization had assassinated Svvedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, later denies responsibility for the killing, rejecting his earlier testimony, according to a Turkish nevvspaper that quoted Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz. May 13- The European Union issues a statement condemning the shooting of human rights activist Akın Birdal, and condemns the gunmen vvho seriously wounded Birdal. May 18- United States President Bili Clinton says that both Turkey and Greece need to make difficult decisions to help defuse rising tension över divided Cyprus and Turkey's bid to join the European Union. May 21- The Foreign Ministry announces Turkey vvill boycott a key meeting of the Turkish-Eurepean Union Association Council. May 22- Former VVelfare Party officials appeal to the European Commission of Human Rights against the closure of the Party, banned from politics for threatening Turkey's secular constitution. 1998] CHRONOLOGY 151 May 25- Turkey confirms it will not attend a key meeting with European Union ministers, as there has been no improvement in the Union's stance över Ankara's exclusion from Eurepean Union expansion plans. Later, Eurepean Union foreign ministers voice their "regret and disappointment" över Ankara's decision to boycott the meeting with the bloc's top officials in Brussels. May 29- The French National Assembly passes a bili recognizing the alleged 1915 killings of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks as genocide. Turkey condemns the bili. June 03- The Turkish Parliament condemns a French legislative motion recognizing the alleged 1915 mutual killings of Armenians and Muslims in Turkey as genocide. June 12- France says it is committed to maintaining close ties with Turkey and regrets tensions caused by a French parliamentary motion condemning as genocide the alleged 1915 killings of Armenians by Turks. June 13- British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who wants the European Union to ease Ankara's anger at being left out of the enlargement process, clashes with his Greek counterpart över Turkey in the last round of meetings aimed at paving the way for a smooth Eurepean Union summit.
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