CEU eTD Collection In requirements for of fulfillment the Master thedegreeArts partial of of Understanding Gods Supe Department ofPoliticalScience Central European University rvisor: Professor Andras
Budapest, Hungary of Central Asia: Erali Paiziev Submitted to Submitted
Neopatrimonialism 2014 By
Bozoki
CEU eTD Collection region. Asia: f explanatory main two on focused factors behind the persistence in formal and concerned scholars of challengin The Abstract Central Asian Central reasons behind the behind reasons rsdnils mdl o executive of models presidentialist
g but also the most central questions
ih xlrn the exploring with info aig okd n hs oi, hy r sil a from far still are they topic, this on worked having rmal forms ofpolitical behavio rmal forms
political landscape. political amazing durab amazing
of of neopatrimonialism in Central Asian states. ocp o neopatrimonialism of concept actors for the persistence of neopatrimonialism in Central in neopatrimonialism of persistence the for actors
The central aim of this research is to identify to is research this of aim central The ility of authoritarian regimes r regimes authoritarian of ility - eiltr relations legislature ii r of social science.
in understand ing
n the and
And despite the long
and and and explain consensus. emains emains oiia clue f the of culture political eainhp between relationship To do so, this thesis ing among the most the among
This
forms of rule rule forms of
tradit thesis the key key the ion
is CEU eTD Collection support. enjoyable. fri improvement. for suggestions and support continuous his my goal and complete thesis. this I would like to express my gratitude to those people who supported me along the way to achieve Acknowledgements ends, especially Illia and Ralu and Illia especially ends,
Last but not the least; I want to thank my parents for their for parents my thank to want I least; the not but Last
ca, for making this challenging journey much more fun and fun more much journey challenging this making for ca, I wish to mythank supervisor, AndrasProfessor Bozoki, for iii
I would als would I o like to thank all my all thank to like o
trust in me and their their and me in trust CEU eTD Collection References Conclusion Chapter 3.Case Studies Chapter thePersistence inCentral 2: FactorsNeopatrimonialism Asia behind of ChapterFramework: 1. TheoreticalNeopatrimoniali Defining Introduction Table ofContents 2.3.Democratic Central in Asian republics institutions 2.2.Authoritarian regimesofCentral Asia 2.1.Presidentialist modelsofexecutive 3.6.Role of3.6.Role clans and groupings politics informal inKazakh 3.5.Post neopatrimonialism inKazakhstan3.4.Soviet 3.3.Kazakhstan 3.2.Neopatrimonial after Uzbek politics in Independence relations the 3.1.The historical 3.1.Uzbekistan during politics 2.8.Clan thepost during politics 2.7.Clan theSoviet times 2.6.The significance offamilyclans regional networks, and centers power in 2.5.Factor politics two: Clan 2.4.The failure model Presidential ofgovernance inCentral Asia of -
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Central Asia - Soviet periodSoviet ...... - legislature relationslegislature
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3 1
CEU eTD Collection democratic the not from coming is leader the of legitimacy The himself. leader the from legal and bureaucratic formal are there though at what really characterize their regime types, namely neopatrimonial power mechanisms. Even want we if However, whole the in destabilization and wars civil to lead it Will violent? or peaceful be it Will occur? will need that questions many are There pow big the for also but region of the consequences thatthe power transit occupied with the question of succession dilemma. The importance of the topic lies in the scale Nazarbayev, the of presidents Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan respec and Karimov Both independence. their since transition leadership a experienced not have that states Asian Central only the are Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Turkmenistan.) and (Tajikistan demise of the Soviet Union, and two transitions followed by a civil war and death of t the after (Kyrgyzstan) leadership of transition peaceful one only witnessed has that region repr political is not only known for its rich natural resources but also for its long lasting authoritarian leaders, terrorism 19 the in Empires Russian and British the 2009) (Aldulhamidova, ec of levels five “stans” (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) with different by represented is It history. the throughout powers world of interest the attracted always has The strategic location of Central Asia, at region? region? launched by the United States at States United the by launched nmc eeomns n wt a ouain ecig vr 0 ilo people million 60 over reaching population a with and developments onomic essions, widespread corruption and weak establishment of rule of law. It is a a is It law. of rule of establishment weak and corruption widespread essions,
to analyze the power structure power the analyze to
.
It is a geographic area geographic a Itis ers that have significant economic investments in the region. the in investments economic significant have that ers to Introduction be answered, such as: In what manner the succession succession the manner what In as: such answered, be the the crossroads of the two continents: Asia and Europe, ion in Centralion in Asian states
th the beginning of the new millennium. Central Asia Asia Central millennium. new the of beginning the
century and gained new emphasis with a war on on war a with emphasis new gained and century 1 - rational pow rational
where the “Great Game” was played between between played was Game” “Great the where
in these countries, it is important to look to important is it countries, these in
er structures, all power is derived is power all structures, er tively,
will entail onlywill not tothe aged aged over seventy he leader , are
CEU eTD Collection scrutinizekeywill for elements an explanatory framework. future. I will address the above mentioned questions by selecting adequate conceptual tool that the among prerequisites, strong exhibiting are countries two these in developments political recent the secondly, interest, academic of focus the them makes regimes personalistic and authoritarian all outlived have countries both in regimes the because firstly, study; case a as chosen were Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan the that thesis the in executive hypothesized is It in persist will persistence? Asia Central in neopatrimonialism its behind factors the and of Asia Central in neopatrimonialism of emergence the persistenceof reasons main the are what questions: the of factors main the thesis the particular, In investigate Asia. Central in neopatrimonialism to is thesis this of objective The autocratic leade the to succession of question the makes this power, of transition peaceful and transparent 2013) their constituencies and opposing in votes securing by president the to support their extend turn, in groupings, elite privileged agent These natur other and gas, oil, the surrounding typically funds, wealth sovereign or companies state ministries, key in positions to friends, or family him, to close people appointing by power his exercises and I personality networks. elite clientelistic effective of cult strong a from rather but ideologies, and processes and structures .
ic tee r n etbihd eortc ntttos n rls ht a esr the ensure can that rules and institutions democratic established no are there Since - eiltr rltos ad oa pltcl utr, ersne b ca pltc . politics clan by represented culture, political local and relations, legislature
al resources, which they can use to advance their private in private their advance to use can they which resources, al other countries in the region, for the leadership transition in Central Asia in near near in Asia Central in transition leadership the for region, the in countries other - principal relations are often followed by state corruption and nepotism. The The nepotism. and corruption state by followed often are relations principal r inneo - patrimonial patrimonial other regimes in the region, the amazing longevity of these these of longevity amazing the region, the in regimes other anyone who is threat states sucha fundamental issue n such neopatrimonialistic types of regimes, the leader leader the regimes, of types neopatrimonialistic such n 2
a country with a presidentialist models of models presidentialist a with country a ening the preside
intends to address the following following the address to intends
(Giersch, 2013) (Giersch, terests nt’s authority
(Giersch, 2013) (Giersch, .
(Giersch, (Giersch,
. CEU eTD Collection forexplanation underdevelopmentgranted. whichsomescholars take as it state,” the of decline the of explanation “teleological a become term. n notions diverse very the explain to overused analyticalutility” its losing of danger “in became term to describe the 1973) (Eisenstadt, tradition neo prefix the use to proposed book 1973, In “the servantsandcompletely are personally uponthe lord” dependent is based on male lin authority: in the traditions and continued for a long period of time. There are two sub types of traditional materialized n does public and private between separation the latter the in while connections individual of source that is societies patrimonial medieval and traditional, authority: of types three charismatic, and legal defines he where legitimacy, and domination of The origins of the concept of neopatrimonialism lie in Max Weber’s sociological classification Chapter1.The
“ s ail ah a rmnn shlr n neopatrimon on scholar prominent a Bach, Daniel As t exist ot rdtoa Patrimoniali Traditional
from the regimes that rests on more diverse mechanisms of legitimation and authority a form of oligarchic rule Shmuel Shmuel through heredity. Traditional authority is authority Traditional heredity. through
personalistic personalistic regimes in (Brunn . e of hierarchy that is called patriarchalism. Eisenstaedt By 1970s, 1970s, By - , 2012) s, rational rational bureaucratic. oreticalFramework: Defining Neopatrimonialism t .
he concept of neopatrimonialism neopatrimonialism of concept he
m n Mdr Neopatrimonialism” Modern and sm is cnetaie te term the conceptualized first - patrimonialism, traditional In
o itnus te eein armnaim e patrimonialism Weberian the distinguish to that is based on elders called gerontocracy; and second type sub - institutions Saharan Weber Weber writes that 3 ot necessarily related to the core essence of the the of essence core the to related necessarily ot
Africa. However, I must note here that the
legitimate because it has deeply rooted rooted deeply has it because legitimate in the first one constitutes impersonal constitutes one first the in (Theobald, 1982, p. 555) p. 1982, (Theobald, In a purely patriarchal structure, the differe aim ntd te concept the noted, ialism, t he “neopatrimonialism” has been put into use into put been has
Bc, 2012) (Bach, ih t gvr uuly is usually govern to right
(Weber, 1958,(Weber, p.5) Esntd, 1973) (Eisenstadt, nce nce between Western
and has been has and and an easy easy an and bde in mbedded i his in , mostly
. and
has
CEU eTD Collection that patrimonial statesfundamental such a issue the makes this power, of transition peaceful and transparent the ensure can that rules and institutions democratic established authority president’s the threatening is who anyone o and constituencies their in votes securing by president the to support their extend turn, in groupings, elite privileged The nepotism. and corruption state by followed often are theycan to use which resources, natural other or and gas, oil, the surrounding typically companies funds, wealth sovereign state ministries, key in positions to friends, or family him, to close people po his exercises leader the regimes, of types neopatrimonialistic such In ideologies, but rather from a strong cult of personality and effective clientelistic elite networks. legitim The legal and bureaucratic p rationally driven exchange of services, when a patron buys a loyalty o the ruler. well in found are sometimes which mechanisms, informal and formal both regime, neopatrimonial co can patrimonialism “ authority of forms traditional or heredity on purely rest not does neopatrimonialism the patrimonialism, unlike However, old to comes it When eortc xeiet i Af in Experiments Democratic oeto o cins interests clients’ of rotection - ye armnaim iial paig esnl oat a te pcne o th of epicenter the at loyalty personal placing similarly patrimonialism type - n noarmna rgm bt legal both regime neopatrimonial a in established democratic systems democratic established Neopatrimonial regimes “areNeopatrimonial based acy of the leader is coming from not the democratic structures and processes and processes and structures democratic the not from coming is leader the of acy advance private their interests neopatrimonial power mechanisms power neopatrimonial - rational power structures, all power is derived from the leader himself. himself. leader the from derived is power all structures, power rational - exist (Snyder, 2002, p. 396) p. 2002, (Snyder,
”
ih legal with Ikao, 07 p 66) p. 2007, (Ilkhamov, , are employed to maintain the submission submission the maintain to employed are , rica usin f ucsin o h atcai lae i neo in leader autocratic the to succession of question ” sae ht eptioils ulk classic unlike neopatrimonialism that state ,
(Giersch, 2013) (Giersch, - - ainl legitimacy rational
not only on patriarchal values and norms, on onpatriarchalvalues but not only ainl n ifra co informal and rational (Giersch, 2013) 4
. , it has common characteristics with an an with characteristics common has it , Bratton and Bratton
Gesh 2013) (Giersch, . .
The other important difference is important The other . Even though there are formal formal are there though Even
These agent These
van de Walle in their work their in Walle de van Lrel, 2012) (Laruelle, f a client in exchange for pnns r equally are mponents Sne hr ae no are there Since . - wer by appointing appointing by wer principal relations and loyalty and system e . pposing pposing
In a a In to to - .
CEU eTD Collection explaining the carry cronyism and corruption of concepts the that state They of existence the neopatrimonialism with its legal describing and obvious are states authoritarian and neopatrimonialism relations the that claiming argument, this challenge that scholars other are there well saying that is but compa states authoritarian only to characteristic not is neopatrimonialism that contended found its usage in the typology of regimes only recently 303) non toward patterns reinforcing mutually are practices nepatrimonial and seeking rent “as economies, rentier into light shed to used performances economic poor of reasons the and sociology economics, including study of anthropology. The economic scholarship has fields different in utilization its found concept The multidisciplinary. and multidimensional is neopatrimonialism of concept The However, over inprevalentis dominant legal cases,informal component components which trace tu subjects and ruler betweenthe relationship seemingly sightimpersonal first the wherein condition acreates law important - . established and functioning states that are accountable to their populations. populations. their to accountable are that states functioning and established
Despite the fact that the concept of neopatrimonialism comes from political science, it science, political from comes neopatrimonialism of concept the that fact the Despite tible with all types of regimes of types all with tible (Ilkhamov, 2007) (Ilkhamov,
the the elements of neopatrimonialism can reproduce or even themselvesstrengthen in informal rn out to be the key element of the neopatrimonial regime. neopatrimonial the of element key the be to out rn
politics indemocratic politics societies. - legal .
The presence of well of presence The - rational or informal, are prevalent in neopatrimonial regimes. regimes. neopatrimonial in prevalent are informal, or rational - rational rules in well
(Laruelle, 2012, p. 303) p. 2012, (Laruelle, - productive economic productive of states of used the concept of neopatrimonialism 5
- established state bureaucracy and formal formal and bureaucracy state established - and their underdevelopment. their and established democracies are misleading.
(O'Dwyer, 2006)
. They justify their argument by by argument their justify They
activities
oe xlntr pwr in power explanatory more - . ” rational mechanism. rational Some Some scholars have
(Laruelle, 2012, p. p. 2012, (Laruelle, hip between hip It is hard to to hard is It It was also also was It
to explain However,
CEU eTD Collection is themainindicator of syste neopatrimonial with states that demonstrates fair. not is wealth one the to contribute even can sometimes and growth economic that is neopatrimonialism and cronyism between involves it when especially circles, political and groups business between services of exchange “an Cronyism alsoprevalent is in manywell and centralized rights” distributi the in balance certain non in occur may that practices “specific to refers corruption definition, Laruelle’s to According look a encompa that concept broad a is which syndrome, (Laruelle, 2012,p.304) man” big “the patronage, p kleptocracy,capture, predation, godfatherism,warlordism, clientelism, cronyism, nepotism, corruption, for synonym a as used been often has Neopatrimonialism other. each from distinguished be should meaning their and synonyms as used be could them of all not However, neopatrimonialism. of concept the with interchangeably used are that terms many are There - does not contribute to the economic growth, because in this system the distribution of distribution the system this in because growth, economic the to contribute not does patrimonial states. It can be non be can It states. patrimonial t howthey the differ
Lrel, 02 p 305) p. 2012, (Laruelle,
the allocation of public funds structural corruption that constitute a part of politica of part a constitute that corruption structural Branko Milanovic, in his book “Is inequality in Africa really different?” different?” really Africa in inequality “Is book his in Milanovic, Branko
. unequal distribution ofwealth distribution unequal Most of these terms have narrower meaning than neopatrimonialism, narrower meaning than ofthese have Most terms
concept ofneopatrimonialism. on of wealth in the absence of state of absence the in wealth of on .
n h ohr ad noarmnaim aiet a more a manifests neopatrimonialism hand, other the On - ” politicized and decentralized, thus indirectly ensuring a a ensuring indirectly thus decentralized, and politicized
sses many of these terms. Let me Let terms. these of many sses (Laruelle, (Laruelle, 2012, p. 305) - established democraticestablished because societies, supposes it 6
the former the ms have the highest Gini coefficient, which which coefficient, Gini highest the have ms
(Milanovic, 2013)
rebendal regime and ma and regime rebendal
development; does not necessarily prevent the the prevent necessarily not does . One One of the striking differences - l legitimization process. legitimization l enforced legal property legal enforced .
define the terms and terms the define
however, the latter latter the however, nyothers clearly
CEU eTD Collection relations power indirect the by “limited is Uzbekistan as such system neopatrimonial a in existence of loyalty at the m the is neopatrimonialism and sultanism between difference important most the Probably, personal of nature universal and extreme by them from distinguished is sultanism neopatrimonialism, and patrimonialism in those to As Kunysz notes,“althoughgeneral the of authority regime inasultanistic forms are identical pers to owned is loyalty but monarchs, like institutions, the to not and heredity, of legitimate because asseen person the to not eitherand tradition to not is calledsubjects, often regimes patrimonial The neopatrimonialism has a larger scope, individual on services and goods group patron and client, while patronage refers to the relationship between a Enge and Erdman are not competing models, on the contrary, they are closely attached complementary concepts. Erdman and Engel, do not share this assumption, stating that clientelism and neopatrimonialism 1982) (Medard, patron the a to is legitimation clientelism traditional that claiming notions, competing as neopatrimonialism and clientelism terminological intersections of neopatrimonialism and clientelism. the on scholars among debate growing a is There neopatrimonialism. of concept the replace refer to the c Capture, predation and clientelism constitute the central elements of neopatrimonialism, which ”
(Erdman & (Erdman Engel, 2006, p. 21)
(Weber, 1978) (Weber, onfiscation of public .
regimes may take extreme forms, which Weber classif Weber which forms, extreme may take regimes The other group of sch of group other The l believe that clientelism “implies a dyadic personal relationship between relationship personal dyadic a “implies clientelism that believe l . In this type of extreme patrimonial regime, the loyalty of citizens, or citizens, of loyalty the regime, patrimonial extreme of type this In iddle range of executive power. and private level may be present in all kinds of societies, while while societies, of kinds all in present be may level
and and mostly includes the relationships on intra . - Clientelism Clientelism supposes the relationship and exchange of let relationship client olars such as such olars loyalty to the in the to loyalty property for personal purposes, but cannot solely 7
Eisenstaedt dividual ruler dividual
For example, the executive power hl noarmnaim s not is neopatrimonialism while , Bratton and van de Walle, Walle, de van and Bratton , Scholars led by n individual and a bigger ” ied them as Sultanistic Sultanistic as them ied
(Kunysz, 2012, p. 2) p. 2012, (Kunysz,
Medard Medard see on himself. on - elite level. .
CEU eTD Collection a of description Weber’s Max world. resembled closely the “more in rule his regimes under system totalitarian governance and closest most the into world, the in reserves h largest the of one with country a Turkmenistan, turned Niyazov Saparmurat Berdimuhammedov by Gurbanguly by ruled followed leadership and authoritarian Niyazov firm Saparmurat in entrenched been has Turkmenistan history, Turkmenistan. is sultanistic considered be could that four other authority their of nature into themselves integrates often he/she that and regimes “window for is part dressing”,tojustify personal themost “used theruler’s authority, sultanistic of ideology the that is Linz and Chehabi by noted regimes sultanistic of aspect a as power their exercise represen must and ruler the to loyalty absolute to subject are levels all is country. the of outside opposition exist to forced usually and oppressed The titles. unique him/herself granting and cult personality a constructing 2) p. 2012, networks and support in civil society through some patron traditional on dependence the from him/herself free to ruler the of ability their neopatrimonial regimes. clearly anddemonstrates thedi the category sultanistic, of their book “Sultanistic regimes” provide a comprehensive analysis of the regimes that fall into ruler. the by dominated solely loyaltyis the and power executive 2) p. 2012, (Kunysz, own local patronage networks and thus accrue a significant deg middle th to loyalty by for exchange in divided who and governors are who authorities local and executive central the between tative instruments of the ruler the of instruments tative .
This state of uncontrolled power creates a situation where where situation a creates power uncontrolled of state This . oee, slaitc eie ak ti “ide pc” withi space” “middle this lacks regime sultanistic a However, ” According tothem, “sultanistic regimes are par
(Kunysz, 2012, p. 3) p. 2012, (Kunysz,
(Chehabi & Linz, 1998, pp. 13 pp. 1998, Linz, & (Chehabi 8
.
this ideology by emphasizing the tradit the emphasizing by ideology this The only Central Asian republic among the the among republic Asian Central only The e central authority are able to manage their their manage to able are authority central e internal or external mechanisms fference between the sultanistic and and thesultanistic between fference The state apparatus membe apparatus state The ree of power in their own right H.E.Chehabi and J.J.Linz in in J.J.Linz and H.E.Chehabi For its its For - 25) t icularly in distinctive .
post Another important important Another
fe hs death his after the ruler starts starts ruler the - independence ydrocarbon ”
(Kunysz, - ranking - client client the n ional rs at rs The ” .
CEU eTD Collection 1998) (Lodge, g neopatrimonialism of concept The corporatist relations areequally andneopatrimonial important andrelevant. Central in situation the with coherent truly not is observation law” or ideology that rather patronage, personal exclusively chann bureaucratic organic ideology of national unity and attempts at direct political mobilization along controlled an of existence the by characterized are regimes authoritarian “corporatist him, to According corpo and regimes difference neopatrimonial the between demonstrate to attempts republics”, Asian Central the in democratization states. neopatrimonial the among debate Another with the other S former administration away from sult governance. and policy in changes saw Turkmenistan Berdimuhamedov, president current of rise the with seen in other neopatrimonial regimes in Central Asia. Niyazov of cult personal nation, face himself“the great sun,proclaiming the to rotates that himself of statues golden building Turkmen), of (father “Turkmenbashi” title 2) p. 2012, sultanistic regime than a neopatrimonial state like the other republics overnance and corruption characteristic corruption and overnance aigmnh o h ya fe i deceas his after year the of months naming . The vivid examples from sultanistic regime of Niyazov include Niyazov of regime sultanistic from examples vivid The The The recent studies suggest that there is a “gradual move by the current presidential .
The most striking common characteristic of these countries is the difficulty of of difficulty the is countries these of characteristic common striking most The els, while neopatrimonial regimes ostensibly maintain authority through through authority maintain ostensibly regimes neopatrimonial while els, John Ishiyama, in his article his in Ishiyama, John oviet republicsAsia ofCentral
(Kunysz, 2012) (Kunysz, scholars evolved around the around evolved scholars anism of the Niyazov era to a neopatrimonial system more in line has principally associated with principally associated has
to local polit local to .
Noteworthy, these are the elements that are rarely are that elements the are these Noteworthy, Serdar” a givenSerdar” title tothehe 9 ratist authoritarian regimes in Central Asia. Asia. Central in regimes authoritarian ratist
“Neopatrimonialism and the prospects of of prospects the and “Neopatrimonialism ed parents, ed However, with the death of Niyazov, and ” ical elit ical
(Kunysz, 2012, p. 4) (Kunysz, 2012,p. difference between corporatist and and corporatist between difference (Ishiyama, 2002) (Ishiyama, e s in some developing countriesdevelopingsome in s
and many other eleme other many and sa rpbis wee both where republics, Asian post
of Central Asi - colonial legacy of bad bad legacyof colonial r o es ofthe Turkmen
.
giving himself a a himself giving .
However, this this However, a ”
(Kunysz, (Kunysz, t of nts
CEU eTD Collection and general in landscape political Soviet developing state the for researching scholars by paid was used attention little countries, widely was neopatrimonialism of concept the that fact the Despite as athreat durability possible the regimes. to oftheir s civil vibrant facts dissonant shi by and hear to wants he what leader the telling by positions own their Instead, those supreme leaders “surround themselves consolidate various groups in society to their maintain ow legitimacy l personal upon built is apparatus ruling the when them, to According transitions. political of absence the for insights provide systems neopatrimonial in incentives power political of structure litt superstru systems, bureaucratic Walle pre in organization social the to “corresponds it because World, Third the in authority” of type salient (Bratton & Walle, 1994) states at all; rather, they are virtually t 1994) Walle, & master a is neopatrimonialism that claim Theorists state. institutionalized an in interests group accommodating and law of rule implementing le chance for the regimes for for regimes the for chance le
also cture of political institutions political of cture yly “urm laes fe ls tuh ih oua p popular with touch lose often leaders “supreme oyalty, ” argue that personal relationships are important factor at the margins of basically all Batn Wle 1994) Walle, & (Bratton ociety, because ociety, ” .
Batn Wle 19, . 162) p. 1994, Walle, & (Bratton Theobold contends that “some of the new states are, properly speaking, not speaking, properly are, states new the of “some that contends Theobold u we i cms o fia te cnttt te onain and foundation the constitute “they Africa to comes it when but .
And Christopher Clapham claims that neopatrimonialism is “the most - colonial societies” colonial
these regimes cannot tolerate the independent centers of power, power, of centers independent the tolerate cannot regimes these peaceful and democratic transitions. transitions. democratic and peaceful he private instruments o ” .
(Bratton & Walle, 1994, p. 459) p. 1994, Walle, & (Bratton h rlr i ti rgms lc isiuinl is to ties institutional lack regimes, this in rulers The eta Ai in Asia Central
10 (Bratton & Walle, 1994) Walle, & (Bratton
.
c
Neopatrimonial rule also suppresses the the suppresses also rule Neopatrimonial with sycophantic
oncept for comparative politics comparative for oncept n survival on based popular support. particular f those powerful enough to rule - building process in process building They also argue that the the that argue also They
lieutenants lieutenants who protect Ikao, 2007) (Ilkhamov, . retos f regime of erceptions Bratton and Van De De Van and Bratton .
Therefore, there is is there Therefore, elding him from him elding normal forms of of forms normal
(Bratton post .
As As ” - CEU eTD Collection are results the decades two promote democr to institutions financial and community international by invested were dollars of Billions governance in those countries, will eventually produce the desired results and support 115) p. 2012, reform political and economic same the on embark democracy. Eventually, given the right encouragement and support, these political leaders will authoritarian states in Central Asia are just “ the is, that transition, of theory from stems approach first The misleading. them of both but traced, be could states natureof authoritarian Asian Central approachesto Western main Two networks late Sov established inthe through went Asia Central in leadership and apparatus current of part considerable The population. general w corresponds necessarily not does that logic specific own their with system, patronage and politics informal of legacy important an left 1982) of formation personalized but with well Africa in For instance, S Regardless on what region the concept was applied, it encountered the region Asi Central in process with respect to developing countries, it was surprisingly neglected by scholars of state Alisher Ilkhamov notes, “Whereas the concept of neopatrimonial regime has been widely used from international community international from
Hge, 1996) (Hughes,
the post the . the
ultanism ultanism in Middle East, Stalinism in post h suppor The acy and human rights since the independence of Central Asian states, but
B rezhnev - Soviet regimes Soviet ad t and a - elaborated politics of popular participation, weighed heavily on the . disappointing b approach this of ters - era The hybrity of the Soviet regime, “which was both highly highly both was “which regime, Soviet the of hybrity The post he school iet period. ”
in strengthening the capacity building and accountable accountable and building capacity the strengthening in (Laruelle, 2012, p. 307) p. 2012, (Laruelle,
- of elite formation and became the part of patronage patronage of part the became and formation elite of oit pc i general in space Soviet . The second approach looks at looks approach second The a tempor 11
lee ht ocre effort concerted that elieve s that worked in Eastern Europe Eastern in worked that s ary stag ith the needs and aspirations of the the of aspirations and needs the ith - Sovi e in a drawn et space, and . The Brezhnev regime (1964 regime Brezhnev The ” Ikao, 07 p 67) p. 2007, (Ilkhamov,
- Central Asia through through Asia Central out out transition toward patronage systems bring democracy. - s pecific debates.
n financial and ” - building building
(Lewis, after - .
CEU eTD Collection growth thatprovide somewhat citizens. middle improved class living for standards relations and activities of patronage and elite netw stro been so great, enoug elite business wider a allowed and President the of allies close and family the benefited sectors gas and oil to its v due much stability maintain to managed country the of leadership The Nazabayev. Nursultan levels of co neopatrimonialism. rule of forms o terms in differences the Despite alternativeauthoritarianrule ofunderstanding thein way region. regi relationships, client a and system, legal behind informal, with combined are body) legislative a ministries, (government state modern the of institutions familiar the which “in system political a describes that term a neopatrimonialism, of concept the that explanations are must for of many intern from support weak and secular Central Asian states are facing the threat of Islamist radicals and need security includes Afghanistan the lenses of strategic framework of the “war on terror” as part of “Greater Central ng economic performance overall performance economic ng ast supplies of natural resources, especially oil. the most the ncentration of economic, political and symbolic power in the hands of “strong man” ,
to grow to all political systems in Central Asia could be characterized by the dynamics of dynamics the by characterized be could Asia Central in systems political all
vital internal dynamics of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, regimes. authoritarian of dynamics internal vital ational community. However, both approaches are mislea areapproaches both However, community.ational h has trickled down to at least some groups in society to provide a relatively Kazakhstan and and Pakistan
(Lewis, 2012) (Lewis, the o a ntok ad kinship and networks nal durability of these regimes in Central Asia. olw h pten f lsi noarmnaim ih high with neopatrimonialism classic of pattern the follow
f internal political trajectories, economic development, and and development, economic trajectories, political internal f (Lewis, 2012) . As Lewis notes, “since the largesse from oil and gashasand oil Lewislargessefrom “sincethe notes, As ”
(Lewis, 2012, p. 117) p. 2012, (Lewis, 12
.
orks are partially compensated by econom According to the advocates of this approach, - The wealth accumulated ” the
Lws 21, . 116) p. 2012, (Lewis, - sce nes p nes . Therefore, the neopatrimonial the Therefore, oliticking based on patron on based oliticking
David David Lewis ding and neglect and ding as a result from the alternative alternative the
Asia,” Asia,” which rvds an provides
contends contends ic ic - CEU eTD Collection limited neighbors its with comparison In era” Niyazov the of ‘sultanism’ the from away move to begun “has Turkmenistan of government President, current the under but authoritarian highly remains regime the Nevertheless, with path his continued have d rule” neopatrimonialof characteristicnetworks complex the beyond“went that financial persuasion coercion use to state the encourages and loyalty of price the raises stagnation population has let Karimov only forced labor of men and women, but also forced labor of children. not is it ironically, more perhaps But labor. forced on relies still is cotton product produced Noteworthy, impoverished. and poor remain areas rural the cities, the fortu family a acquired have Karimova, Lola and Gulnora President, the of daughters two that Karimov dominate the large sectors o elites o dynamics patrimonial the to relation in state the weaken to “appears have demonstrated strong persistence in tightening their grip on state wealth and such activities of rest the to wealth the distributing However, reserves. gas and oil of Uzbekistan, thelargest ofregion population,alsoenjoys countrytheadvantage terms inthe I have already mentioned mentioned already have I uring the late Saparmurat Niyazov
(Kunysz, 2012,p.1) ne of almost $1 billion $1 almost of ne ”
Lws 21, . 117) p. 2012, (Lewis, natur
vanished al resources and lack of significant sectors to boost the economy. However, However, economy. the boost to sectors significant of lack and resources al
their agricultural capital depreciate and atrophy.
” l srs f netvs f incentives of sorts all
(Lewis, 2012) (Lewis, .
above above
(Bilan, 2010) (Bilan, . h fml mmes n coe lis f h Peiet Islam President the of allies close and members family The , about the regime in Turkmenistan, an extreme dictatorship dictatorship extreme an Turkmenistan, in regime the about
e ecpinl trbts rm h peiu regime. previous the from attributes exceptional few unlike Kazakhstan, it followed a slightly different path in in path different slightly a followed it Kazakhstan, unlike Tajikistan remains Tajikistan ’s . the
f f domestic business. regime and his successor Gunbanguly Berdimuhamedov society. .
While there have been some economic growth economic some been have there While r agriculture or 13
The patronage groups and elite in Uzbekistan in elite and groups patronage The the poorest country in the region with region the in country poorest the The Swiss BilanMagazine
n invto ta te general the that innovation and As Lewis notes, “economic The regime i f political and business and political f n Uzbekistan, the most most the Uzbekistan, n
(Lewis, 2012) (Lewis,
of President instead of of instead reported reported the the
in
CEU eTD Collection patterns of ne its authorita man” “strong same the followed Kyrgyzstan Bakiev, Kurmanbek and Akaev i by Asia Central in openness and democracy of model role for hope the remained and democracy” of island that resulted in toppling the presidents and regime change. neighbors. authoritarian more its relatively and society civil vibrant The 2013) in Ru Service of Russian Federation reported that part of the population survive economically only by working in Russia. Danghara ba networks, patronage and family his around power centralized power after the civil war ca who President Tajik current Rakhmon, Imomali region. the in regimes authoritarian neopatrimonial of patterns similar the follows also Tajikistan Kyrgyz case is clearly specific, as it is the most democratic state in the regionthe in state democraticmost the is it as clearlyspecific, is Kyrgyzcase ssia .
, while the whole population of the country is ”
(Lewis, 2012, p. 117) p. 2012, (Lewis, ighbors for almostdecades. for two ighbors nternational community. However, under the first two presidents, Askar Askar presidents, two first the under However, community. nternational in the 1990s, “has gradually closed down rival political groupings and
The country experienced two revolutions in 2005 and 2010 2010 and 2005 in revolutions two experienced country The .
The poverty is widespread in the country, while the large large the while country, the in widespread is poverty The free market, an attempt that distinguishes it from some of of some from it distinguishes that attempt an market, free there are an estimated 3 million illegal 14
slightly more than six million The The country was proclaimed as “the relations and remains one of the the of one remains andrelations e i hs oeon of hometown his in sed The The Federal Migration
Tajik (RIA Novosti, t hat have a a have hat migrants me to me rian rian CEU eTD Collection on the for their own favor employ various techniques of manipulation to elites hold on power Local and change the fair. results o nor free neither are they however, elections, conduct states authoritarian with democratic institutions but almost never exercise their functionality. The majori regimes of prototype a represent time present in regimes authoritarian the of some However, 2009) t necessity the seen not have and constitution the by unconstrained regimes of types these considered theybecause field, the of scholars the by neglected been have mostly states authoritarian the that noted be must It stage. initial their paid been on more favorable is parliamentary, or presidential governance, of system which on debate ongoing an is There 2.1. culture explanations: Asia. Central in neopatrimonialism of persistence the behind power explanatory plausible most the carry that factors key the consider to aims chapter This Chapter the role of institutional design institutional of role the Presidentialist models ofexecutive . internal politics of authoritarian regimes. Sherzod Abdukadirov, a prominent scholar on , represented by clan politics. politics. , represented by clan
on the countries in transition, because of their specific path of democrat of path specific their of because transition, in countries the on 2:Factors behind the PersistenceofNeopa rsdnils mdl o executi of models presidentialist to democratic consolidation. How
(Schedler, 2002) for conso for .
Therefore, the institutional design has an immense impact
Central AsiaCentral lidation of democracy. A particular attention particular A democracy. of lidation 15 - legislature relationslegislature o incl o
ve ever, the general consensus has - eiltr relations legislature ude them in their studies their in them ude
It considers considers It
trimonialismin and ,
(Abdukadirov, local political political local
the the been been reached f elections ty of these ization in ization w key two
has has
CEU eTD Collection presidents. the by rule neopatrimonial the strengthen to In this 2.3. and regional competing clans forresources. state independence, dependent on dominant eli republics, who retained their power after independence, h factions. elite dominant or clan particular purges brought to power the neutral leaders that were free from any strong connection with any ruler based Moscow appointing and purges through mainly practicesinformal eradicatesuch to attempts from pre nepotism republic Asian Central of trajectory political the times, Soviet the relying on the support of re singleleader ofa became concentrated inthe increasingly hands marginalized. became Power communist of decades last the at nomeklatura Party Communist Soviet the from career their started states Asian Central in result of strong Geddes 2.2. regimes and thep increases the of nature predatory the exacerbates system presidential “a that contends Asia, Central Democratic institutionsAsian Central in republics Authoritarian ofCentral regimes Asia
section, I will elaborate on the formal institutions in Central claims that authoritarian or personalistic regimes arise from one from arise regimes personalistic or authoritarian that claims -
Soviet Soviet Central Asia and integrated into Soviet rule. The Soviet Communist Party had (Collins, 2004) (Collins, s , but such attempts could not be considered as considered be not could attempts such but ,
the presidents in these republics became the brokers between different ethnic different between brokers the became republics these in presidents the military presence in the state . te networks The nepotism and other informal political practices were inherited inherited were practices political informal other and nepotism The latively small circle elites of robability violentconflicts of
rule. Therefore, “as the elites consolidates their power, parties parties power, their consolidates elites the “as Therefore, rule. ”
(Abdukadirov, (Abdukadirov, 2009, p. 287)
osqety “h peiet o Cnrl Asian Central of presidents “the Consequently, (Geddes, 1999) 16
”
” (Abduk ad relatively weak bases and so were
(Abdukadirov,2009, p.285) There is a necessity to clarify the the clarify to necessity a is There very .
Most Most of the present political elite
adirov, 2009, p. 286) successful. successful.
Asia .
Therefore, ws hrceie by characterized was s
and how they are used - party systems or systems party Never following the theless, the the theless, .
During During .
as a a as - CEU eTD Collection under parliament the dissolve could presidents the all that, to addition In ministers. cabinet parliaments had little influence on the internal affairs and did not have the autho gave the massive power to control the elite and state resources. According to Abdukadirov, the (Anderson, 2003) consi formally were republics Asian Central All and serve just for body represented by parliament has little influence on internal political dynamics in the country 288) p. stron is power of balance “the power, politica over control the maintain manipulated by the central governments of Central Asia in order to secure their status are results the however, parliament, the and president the for both conducted are elections und the covering facades, as serve “mostly they instead creation, of purpose their to serve not do presidential president considered be will system the cabinet, the dismiss to authority the has president the if Thus, cabinet. the accoun be will determinedby the and president,system shared legislature the by the is cabinet the appoint to authority the When legislature. the of hands the in is authority such appo to authority systems. two Design and Electoral Dynamics” present a comparative clarification of how to differentiate the used in my study. be will they context what in and systems presidential and parliamentary between difference emocratic nature of the regimes the of nature emocratic .
With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, in all other Central Asian r Asian Central other all in Kyrgyzstan, of exception the With ”
(Abdukadirov, (Abdukadirov, 2009 According to them, “a presidential system is considered if the president has the the has president the if considered is system presidential “a them, to According
int and dismiss the cabinet. The system will be considered parliamentary if if parliamentary considered be will system The cabinet. the dismiss and int . the interestofexecutive Shugart Shugart and Carey, in thei
All of the presidents had the power to appoint and dismiss the cabinet, which - alaetr. tews, h sse wl be will system the Otherwise, parliamentary. , p. 288) l and economic resources. resources. economic and l ”
gly skewed toward the executive the toward skewed gly (Abdukadirov, 2009, p. 2009, (Abdukadirov, .
It must noted that, the formal democratic institutions r work “Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional
17 body represented by the President. body byrepresented thePresident.
ee as dered Although there is a separation of separation a is there Although rsdnil ytm utl 2006 until systems presidential 288) .
As I mentioned earlier, earlier, mentioned I As epublics the legislative the epublics ” (Abdukadirov, 2009, 2009, (Abdukadirov, osdrd premier considered rity to censure
tability of tability of - quo and -
CEU eTD Collection legitimacy democratic dual instance, Shugart and Mainwaring claim that the parliamentary systems are not institutions. democratic but system, balance and is this course, Of obliged to present their loyalty to the be latter in will order to formeracquire the the share from where the state ruler, resources. the and elite the between balance power of shift for way a lead to the one will it president, by represented body executive the of hands the in concentrated is advantage single a in power exe the of most of concentration to due systemspresidential in government to approach 2009, p. 289) not allowfor the flexibility ofresponding toa does system presidential “the that argues He terms. presidential of length the around evolves will the represent to right the have and elected people. He contends that in the presidential system, both president and parliament are popularly presidential democratic rule. The essence argument ofthe inthe first right lies represent to the arguments major two poses (1994) Linz instance, For democracy. presidential against and for arguments and criticisms forward that scholars of groups different are There of Ce restricting the power of the president and giving more power to the legislative body. 2009) b the veto and authority decree to power the circumstances.certain ntral Asian republics will be will p ntral Asian republics . fe 20, ygztn dpe svrl osiuinl hne i 20 ad 2007 and 2006 in changes constitutional several adopted Kyrgyzstan 2006, After .
- Linz also emphasizes that “strong majoritarian tendencies and a winner person person executive nature of the whole g
not the case for all the presidentialist systems, where there is a strong check strong a is there wheresystems, presidentialist the all for case the not office Like in other strong presidential systems, Central Asian presidents had had presidents Asian Central systems, presidential strong other in Like ”
hr ae te gop f coas ht one ti argum this counter that scholars of group other are There (Abdukadirov, 2009, p. 289) p. 2009, (Abdukadirov, it is characteristic to the systems with personalistic rule and weak and rule personalistic with systems the to characteristic is it
(Shugart, M.S.; Mainwaring, S., 1997) Mainwaring,S., M.S.; (Shugart, resented ina section chapter. separate inthis 18 ills c ills changing politicalchanging environment
of th of
oming from the parliament the from oming e people e overnance overnance system. In its turn, it will pave .
When the power and decision and power the When
(Linz J, 1994) J, (Linz . Most of the parliamentary parliamentary the of Most .
Second argument Second ” either
(Abdukadirov, (Abdukadirov,
against the the against The cases safe safe - - ent. For For ent. making making take cutive from from - all all CEU eTD Collection othe been has president parties. political cohesive strong and society regime. their to challenge or protest any of control absolute the of because mostly masses, general the to responsive genuinely not are presidents The of the countries refresh their legitimacy every five or six years by conducting falsified electi gothrough. leadersto their let and fair” “freeand called so were that elections group other any over power disproportionate the possess who and population, the by sma a in power concentrate systems. political presidential strong bythe run are republicsAsian Central fourother Kyrgyzstan, allexception of the With 2.4. representing ofallthe country. nations could rule theinterests less for lacks cohesive polit 289) p. (Abdukadirov,2009, to him, “strong cohesive parties are necessary in order to provid sui more is system presidential that le solution to this problem just to shorten the length of the presidential terms. In their view, it will powers. legislative strong have political d democraciesexperience ad to more flexible and less rigid election cycle. election rigid less and flexible more to ad The failure of r formal institutions institutions formal r ” - (Cummings, 2012) (Cummings, developed countries, with social and ethnic cleavages, where the strong president president strong the where cleavages, ethnic and social with countries, developed ical parties.
more more Presidential model of Presidential governance Central model in Asia (Cummings, 2012) (Cummings, strengthened than weakened in these republics, and dominated all dominated and republics, these in weakened than strengthened . ll, usually closed, political elite, who may be elected or unelected unelected or elected be may who elite, political closed, usually ll, For the years of independence, these republics have seen many seen have republics these independence, of years the For .
However, the party system in Central Asia is not developed and developedand not is Asia Central in system party the However, Therefore, he contends that presidential system is better suited Concerning the fixed term of the presidents, scholars see the the see scholars presidents, the of term fixed the Concerning s Cummings As eadlocks, especially in bicameralism, where both chambers bothchambers eadlocks, especiallybicameralism, where in table for less developed states developed less for table .
The possible explanation of this tendency could tendency this of explanation possible The 19 For the last two d two last the For
Moreover, Shugart forwards the argument the forwards Shugart Moreover, tts “uhrtra pltcl systems political “authoritarian states, These countries lack vibrant civil vibrant lack countries These
e collective goods in a country ecades, the institution of the of institution the ecades,
(Shugart, 1999) (Shugart,
The leadership leadership The institution or institution .
According ons. ons. ”
CEU eTD Collection aitself into firm authoritarian Rahmon. ruleEmomali under in the country took place between 1994 war civil tragic by hampered been have liberalization of attempts its However, independence. nei Kyrgyzstan’s Otunbaeva, thefirst electedas fe was system of governance. This historical development was followed by another major event, Roza 2012, (Cummings, direc attracting and rule his anchoring of way a as ideology liberal personality county’s served asinhis others a factor liberalization, decision tohis toembrace a arg scholars Some capabilities. export and import its adjusting and economy neighbors. 64) mid in levels freedom its and p. 64) in the region and continues to have the most vibrant con explicit features of authoritarianis and repressions political by marked were Bakiev Kurmanbek of rule the and Akaev Askar th demonstrate to continue systems Despite the notorious differences in power an tosymbolize individual and legac the be .
It was proclaimed as the “island of democracy” located in the middle of its authoritarian its of middle the in located democracy” of “island the as proclaimed was It .
According onlyindep tothe“itboasted scholars, the The country joined World Trade Organization in 1998, thus adopting free market free adopting thus 1998, in Organization Trade World joined country The y of the Soviet rule, represented by the strong leadership and “the preference for for preference “the and leadership strong the by represented rule, Soviet the of y ho Tjksa dmntae a okt f ieaim n t ery er of years early its in liberalism of pocket a demonstrated Tajikistan ghbor . 64) p. .
n 00 te onr sitd rm rsdnil o parliamentary to presidential from shifted country the 2010, In - late 19 late represent the polity” represent the polity” m, Kyrgyzstan remains “the most liberal of all five republics e features of authoritarianism. Although the last years of years last the Although authoritarianism. of features e male president in Central in Asia.male president 90s were regionally unsurpassed regionally were 90s - 1997. - sharing and 20 Following the peace the agreement, country
(Cummings, 2012,p.63) ruling mechanisms, all five presidential testational politics endent printing press printingendent oftheregion
”
t
(Cummings, 2012, p. p. 2012, (Cummings, oeg investment foreign ” (Cummings, 2012, ue that “Akaev’s “Akaev’s that ue .
put ” CEU eTD Collection post in landscape political the of much to characteristic is it region, Asian Central only to peculiar not is trend presidentialism. strong into fell and The integral question that fascinates the scholars of the field is why Central Asia is authoritarian and au Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to dedicated be will chapter separate A brutality. his by lon the Karimov, Islam hand, other the On had become the longest he 2006 in death his of time the by and collapsed Union Soviet the when years five some for countries. down, shut were NGOs suppressed, harshlybeen society has civil The arena.political the from forceschallenging the neigh their Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan ontheother hand, pursued a more path totalitarian compared to com the of nature in authoritarian factor decisive a been having as viewed often is Nazarbayev Nursultan of personality intra the balanced skillfully has Nazarbayev Nursultan shar the for competition elite for ground 64) p. ta a of exhibited some levels of democratization in the beginning of 1990s, however, “it seemed more country the of leadership the also which in Kazakhstan, is republic Asian Central Another thoritarian and neopatrimonial rulethoritarian be of will elaborated andtheleaders neopatrimonial indetails. promise and nepotism . ctical compromise in setting up of a tightly run tightlya of up setting in compromise ctical
h lre mut f aua rsucs n ery cnmc ieaiain rae a created liberalization economic early and resources natural of amount large The Saparmurat Niyazov, the first president of Turkmenistan, “had been in power already bors. In both countries, the centralization of the power took place, eliminating all all eliminating place, took power the of centralization the countries, both In bors. - oit egah. oee, h dsicie etr o Cnrl Asian Central of feature distinctive the However, geography. Soviet - serving leader of the and ” (Cummings, 2012, p. 64) (Cummings, 2012,p. regime, its dual civic and national character and in the art of of art the in and character national and civic dual its regime, opponents of the presidents were exiled or exiled were presidents the of opponents Thomas Carothers (2002) believe t believe (2002) Carothers Thomas e of those state resources. However, the However, resources. state those of e g - post lasting president of Uzbekistan, has been known known been has Uzbekistan, of president lasting 21
- commu .
presidential system presidential nist nist space - lt competition elite ” (Cummings, (Cummings, 2012, p. 65) took as took hat the authoritarian the hat ” (Cummings, 2012, (Cummings, . ylum in other in ylum In fact, “the “the fact, In
President President .
CEU eTD Collection (Cummin with negotiate and unity forge to elite new a of ability the and leadership, on primacy places will, political importanceof the “emphasizes approach, transitional second a sustain to develop middle the configuration, class and development economic of level certain a “without that argues that approach modernist/structural the approach first The question. this answer to attempt that approaches contested two are There democratized? been not have states Asian Central why reverse: the from asked be could authoritarianism of question The that the states could face the consequences of the reforms in their early period of liberalization. reform to leaders democratization with comes often that trap nationalism of Asia Central for curse a than rather cure a be may “authoritarianism 67) p. 2012, particula (Cummings, this at goals societies’ these serves “better Central why of explanation Another thefamioutside into an p. 38) societies Asian Central impel to seem would authorityto submissiveness, deferencepopular hierarchical structure of the society. and patriarchal the emphasized Scholars region. the in countries the of culture political the submission to one leader. p the exhibit to tends it that is authoritarianism d continuing to be, immutable, immutable, be, to continuing d .
After After two of decades independence, “others see Central Asian tradition as gs, 2012, p. 68) p. gs,2012, ” (Kubichek, 1998 (Kubichek, liar, ‘traditional’ life way of
ieaiain path liberalization .
(Cummings, 2012) John Ishiyama, on its turn, claims that authoritarian presidentialism authoritarian that claims turn, Ishiyama, its on John . al uie frad a ut itrsig argu interesting quite a forwards Kubicek Paul the complete rejection of anything new introduced from the the from introduced new anything of rejection complete the ) As Gleason noted, “Central Asian traditions of patriarchy, .
Asian states are author are states Asian Kubicek’s point is that democratization cost is too high high too is cost democratization that is point Kubicek’s ” Cmig, 02 p 68) p. 2012, (Cummings,
towards an authoritarian future authoritarian an towards One possible explanation for this q 22 and to elders and weakdemocraticand eldersinstitutions to and
” roaitc aue f uhrtraim the authoritarianism, of nature ersonalistic (Poliakov, 1992,p.4) (Poliakov, jntr o ter development their of juncture r
and the propensity of authoritarian of propensity the and itarian is that this type of regime of type this that is itarian , including the avoidance avoidance the including , .
n h ohr ad the hand, other the On .
oppositional elites oppositional ”
(Gleason, 1997, 1997, (Gleason, ls wl not will class uestion lies in having been, ment that that ment ” ”
CEU eTD Collection terminology politics informal the elaborate to order In which B” he“Politics calls Cent in politics informal mere between theexecutive relationship and legislative bodies rights. human and law of upholdrule the to institutions its strengthen andprinciples networks. regional and clans, actors, different between interactions informal without politics Asian great power brokers and networks th relationship “sides a by represented is culture political The region. the of culture political the is Asia One ofthe 2.5. directwith its neighbors. h common the shares that country a Kyrgyzstan, in evidenced will authoritarianism 69) p. 2012, sys the competitive elections, and ensures that the syste into predictability perceived infuses authoritarianism presidential mai to way best the Centra of leaders all four date, To this is anindispensable part of neopatrimonialism inherited from past. the Soviet Factor two:Clan politics Thes important that factors contribute totheCentral persistence in ofneopatrimonialism rather than what is occurring on the main political stage, wh stage, political main the on occurring is what than rather that is going to be used in my in used be to going is that .
According to the Starr, the main challenge of Central Asian countr Asian Central of challenge main the Starr, the to According Nevertheless, Nevertheless, e informal practices hinder Central Asian states to foster genuine democratic democratic genuine foster to states Asian Central hinder practices informal e ntain political power political ntain
transform itself into more democratic and responsive form of rule, as as rule, of form responsive and democratic more into itself transform ral Asia is characterized by the bycharacterized is Asia ral
(Starr, 2006) (Starr, hr ae rrqiie that prerequisites are there
in CentralAsia ey control l Asian republics, are convinced that authoritarianism is arerepublics, convinced that Asian l .
(Cummings, 2012) (Cummings,
thesis. thesis. in Central Asia Central in 23 ”
m remains closed to competitors (Starr, (Starr, 2006, p. 6)
According to Kathleen Collins, a clan is an an is clan a Collins, Kathleen Accordingto
relationship between informal acto informal between relationship , there is a necessity to clarify the the clarify to necessity a is there , the current trend of presidential presidential of trend current the .
- It is so because “the regime of of regime “the because so is It what A”. “Politics hecalls But istorical legacy of Soviet past Soviet of legacy istorical .
It is hard to imagine ensure the ensure ich is dominated by by dominated is ich (Ishiyama, 2002) e avoiding tem ” protection of of protection ies is not the the not is ies (Cummings, Central Central h ow ow rs -
CEU eTD Collection e wealthy both areas urban more pat of councils informal areas rural or traditional more “in instance, For society. of members different by governed are places different in clans The easy to define, measure and estima difficult to know the exact number cla of organization. volunteer or group particular a join to wanted someone clear without blurry, of boundaries the constructed or metaphorical kinsh “linking elites and non up the core essence and relations When it comes to kinship, variables p key are and persistent surprisingly be to proved have clans as such pre that observes further He spheres. political the and economic the both in roles important play organizations and institutions informal that ob always have theory modernization instance, For function. and role their explain to try and organizations regime have received little attention by the scholars and have rarely been linked to major debates about interests clan of pursuit in defines the clan politics as “the politics of informal competition and deal making between cla organizat informal stacle to political development political to stacle change or political development political or change
(Collins, 2004, p.226) 2004, (Collins, en rdtoa ad oil raiain sc a lnae ca ad tribe and clan lineage, as such organizations social and traditional seen
the genealogical unit genealogical the o o individ of ion and fixed lines. However, it is difficult to enter or exit a clan, unlike if if unlike clan, a exit or enter to difficult is it However, lines. fixed and - elites, elites, and they reflect both actual blood ties and fictive kinship, that is, Collins ”
(Collins, 2004, p. 224) p. 2004, (Collins, .
of clans.
as ikd y kin by linked uals ip based on close friendships or marriage bonds that redefine stresses that affective ties of kinship ar
te the informal institutions with (Collins, 2004) (Collins, ie ad les r i control in are elders and lites ”
” ns and their members in Central Asia. (Collins, 2004, p. 231) p. 2004, (Collins,
These These clan ties might be both horizontal and vertical (Collins, 2004) (Collins, 24 - modern and informal collectiv informal and modern
.
. Douglass North for instance, “has argued argued “has instance, for North Douglass
According to her, informal organizations informal her, to According - based bonds bonds based riarchs and elders govern the clan; in clan; the govern elders and riarchs .
Many theories deal with informal informal with deal theories Many .
The boundaries of clans are are clans of boundaries The unwritten norms and values. ” Clis 2004) (Collins,
Clis 20, . 232) p. 2004, (Collins, Therefore, it is highly is it Therefore, e crucial, which makes olitical and economic and olitical ist organizations ist It is i .
ndeed ndeed not And she she And - as an an as ns ns .
CEU eTD Collection rooted in visible markers (as ethnic divisions tend to be) but rather in exchange of genealogical Kazakhstan. One of them is that kinship hidden. could be He notes that “sub in clans of persistence the for reasons several emphasizes Schatz Kazakhstan. in networks informal and analyzingpolitics in clan specializes Heidentity.ethnic andaffiliation clan both 58) p. 2007, (Gullette, th extend and surveillance Soviet evade to them enabling each KathleenbetweenWhile, clans focuses and Collins between onthethey pacts make dynamics to another the relations clan holdsin different toother clan. of because identity he/she beneficial relations. non pro at bazaar, accessing education, getting loans, obtaining goods in an economy of shortages, and Ieconomic needpatrons them toassist and eldersfinding system.Nonelites clan dealing jobs, protect status, their maintain to with non elites turn, their in elites, to support and loyalty their group. Blood members. own its to only characteristic is which identity distinctive own its has clan Every by class thesocial affiliation wom non include and this than larger much are clans the However, curing social or political advancements” political or socialcuring - elites are in advantages position and en, relatives, youth, council of elders, close friends and kinsmen. and friends close elders, of council youth, relatives, en, other, Edward Schatz “explores how these groups were able to conceal their relations, relations, their conceal to able were groups these how “explores Schatz Edward other, - based kins or fictive bonds are continually reinforced to sharpen the identity within the identity within sharpenthe reinforced to arecontinually bonds fictive or kins based There is a continuous exchange of benefits within the clan, the within benefits of exchange continuous a is There - elite members of their clan. Even if a if Even .
Schatz argues that genealogical descent is the main requirement for requirement main the is descent genealogical that argues Schatz
of individuals member of a certain clan intends to exit it, he or she cannot join join cannotshehe it, or exit to intends clan certaina of member their group, and make gains within an overarching political or or political overarching an within gainsmake and group, their As Collins notes, “elites need the support of their network are
(Edgar, 2001) (Collins, 2004, p. 233) p. 2004, (Collins, interested interested in maintaining reciprocal and mutually 25
share financial and economic incentives incentives economic and financial share .
i ifune no independence into influence eir - elite members represented by by represented members elite .
Therefore, both elites and elites Therefore,both where non where Clans are also divided also are Clans - ethnicity was not - elites present present elites
”
CEU eTD Collection (Central the Kyrgyz op.1,d.527,1.76 Archivesof State f.10, Republic, Chonbashev has work. their from activists Part dismissed and activists Partyrural of persecution the organized Chonbashev bais, the of eviction on insisted activists party rural the When Kyrgyzstan. of out in counter policy old his continued There,he work. political Com Communist Party Chonbas member fellow his on reported Ailchinov that was case interesting Another nepotism. and tribalism tactic main the (Central State Archives of the Kyrgyz Republic, f.0, op.1, d.527, 1.12 Organization” Party Communist Kyrgyz the within continue struggles groups and remnants wrote: he which in report a filed once Belotskii, Republic, ideology. communist the party communists and bais, whowere therich landowners and elites inpre mainly represented by tribalism and nepotism. One of their main concerns were former manaps a declared Party Communist the times, corruption.” political foment to tactics “discursive were (Gullett Asia” Central in politics clan of understanding evolutionist the reveals tribalism to link the analyses politics clan of “label him, to According tribalism. is which inCentral powerinformalpolitics Asia, of explanatory hasmore a term largerconceptual that authori 58) p. the agents surveillance ofSoviet whoprosecuted network behavior as illegal” information that defines identity and difference. Clan backgroun rade Chonbashev was sent out on business in the Karakol District to conduct important conduct to District Karakol the in business on out sent was Chonbashev rade .
tarian rule of the Soviet times. e, 2007, p. 69) p. 2007, e, Therefore, the clan groups and informal networks continues to survive even under under even survive to continues networks informal and groups clan the Therefore, - offers offers a curtailed understanding of everyday political practices in the region. Usually, - revolutionary affairs and protected his brother and other class en for Party Apparatchiks to strengthen their status by accusing the opponents of opponents the accusing by status their strengthen to Apparatchiks Party for
not told the Partynot told about this
feared that manaps and bais could mobilize the communities and challenge challenge and communities the mobilize could bais and manaps that feared .
Gullette also contends that the accusations of tribalism and tribal links tribal and tribalism accusationsof the that contends also Gullette For example, a Communist Party Apparatchik in Kyrgyz Soviet Soviet Kyrgyz in Apparatchik Party Communist a example, For h ev,allegedly forand manaps having ties withbais A prominent scholar, David Gullette, argues that there is
massive campaign to eradicate the informal relations, relations, informal the eradicate to campaign massive .
26
- he protected bais and manaps, was engagedwas manaps, and protectedbais he - Soviet CentralSoviet Asia. The members of
(Gullette, 2007) (Gullette, - as it is it as “The d could thus be concealed from
understood in mainstream in understood
, nlec o feudal of influence (Gullette, (Gullette, 2007) , (Gullette, 2007) (Gullette, . emies emies from eviction
During the Soviet Soviet the During
(Gullette, 2007, (Gullette, 2007, ) . :
It was ) -
clan clan
CEU eTD Collection which g war, while 2005“tulip” shiftednorth revolution’s political Kyrgyzstan’s power from failed. In Tajikistan, “the transfer of power from north (Khojent) to (Kulyab) south led to civil other among control the “diversify” to times Soviet the during attempts were There Uzbekistan. day present of politics the control Uzbekistan, in cities largest two Tashkent, and Samarkand from networks Uzbekistan) have long dominat and Azerbaijan (Afghanistan, center power regional another with alliance in or Tajikistan) Notew Khanates. the during past the in existed bases power same the reflects which center, power Connected with close political and economic ties, the regional networks constitute an important dominat that group Second impact everyday onindividuals’ lifeAsia. inCentral today. of members family remnants historical and fights Tribal groups. family of memories of longevity the to out points Starr tribes, which is very important identity source for peoplthese of level lowest next groups.Thefamily these of illustrations 7) lower into un that areturnsubdivided in nomadic peoples, the Kyrgyz Kazakhs, and areTurkmens, comprised of large kinship systems groups. three into divided invisible the dominate that clans the Starr, to According 2.6. .
The Kazakh hordes and Kyrgyz northern and southern groupings constitute one of the best groupings onethebest of Kyrgyz Kazakhand constitute and The southern hordes northern The significance networks, ofc family orthy that “the largest of these, acting alone (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and ravely destabilized the country happened for instance in 19 in instance for happened regions in the country, for instance, including Ferghana network, but it it but network, Ferghana including instance, for country, the in regions
Thus, t Thus, is gop s h fml gop. tr oe ta “h formerly “the that notes Star groups. family the is group First e the invisible politics in Central Asia are regional networks. networks. regional are Asia Central in politics invisible the e ed the politics of each country eknhp is eana a motn atrta a an has that factor important an as remain ties kinship he th ”
its culits (Starr, (Starr, 2006) century still have a psychological effect on tribe and tribe on effect psychological a have still century 27 minating families inindividual
all all the nations mentioned above lans and regionallans and power centers .
Regarding lateTurkmenistan, President politics in Central Asia could be be could Asia Central in politics ”
(Starr, (Starr, 2006, p. 7) es he calls as clans or or clans as callshe es ”
(Starr, 2006, p. 2006, p. (Starr, .
(Starr, (Starr, 2006) The The regional to south,
.
CEU eTD Collection c “formed system Kolkhoz system. clan the and kolkhoz one, First Union. Soviet eradicate and societies Asian Centralthe reorganize the to introduced were systems korenizatsiya during clans of survival the to contributed Kazakh and Turkmen Tajik, namelyethnoorganizations, social of formsmodern more in not transforming Not surprisingly, they faced resistance from the local informal leaders as the whole system was they undermined the Communist ideology that the Soviet rule tried to implement in the region. for all against fight to started it state, modern region. the in organization social of form primary were tribes and clans the 1924, Before Asia. Central in domination its established rule Soviet after state of understanding modern The 2.7. downfall ofthe Union. Soviet the after emerged who oligarchs Russian from different them makes that factor important an times, Soviet the ancestorsfrom their from control their inherited usually economicbarons whether cotton, power, mineral extrac the control of irrigation systems. Today, it means “control of the whole sectors of the economy, resources state key the con the from comes Asia Central in power B Politics of source This barons. economic Last but not the least group that plays an important role in invisible politics in Central Asia are the stronggrip onpower Saparmurat Niyazov tried to portray himself as the leader of all tribes and regions as to maintain Cla n politics during the Soviet timesn politics during the Soviet their favor. Soviet state had attempts to replace clans and tribal links withlinks tribal and clansreplace to attempts had state Soviet favor.their
(Starr, 2006) (Starr, .
(Fierman, 1991) (Fierman,
, with bureaucracy and bureaucracy with , .
tion, tion, construction or transport meant resources of control the times, Soviet the During . 28
ms of informal politics and networks, because because networks, and politics informal of ms mua frs lcn pol it working into people placing farms ommunal Collins points Collins
After the Soviet Union established a established Union Soviet the After - national identities: Kyrgyz,U identities: national state apparatus, state
out to the additional factors that factors additional the to out ”
(Starr, (Starr, 2006, p. 8)
came to be known be to came .
trol of trol Those zbek, zbek, CEU eTD Collection appointing by clans different of interests of balance maintain to tried system Soviet The Asia. Despite seemingly traits, similar clans and informal networks differ ineachcountry inCentral officialsRussian) their for services membe and goods providing continued they roles; subversive more into clans system, he brought in his relatives and extended kin through patronage; the Soviet state forced a given been had member clan a “once notes, Collins As revival. their manifested again once ties kinship and nepotism Moscow. from punishment from fear little with again once positions Therefore, clans and regional networks in Ce info as such practices to eye lo as that cadre’meant‘stability centuryadvocating of nearquarter Brezhnev’s Moreover,“Leonid region. Asian Central in networks informal the with fighting in interest and time little had clans. system kolkhoz the wit appointment action used who elites, clan for networks patronage of source a “provided policies into leaders clan local transformed values and ideology promo of purpose the for membership party communist to leaders local attract (Gullette, 2007, p. 57) were people therefore, and other, each to proximity close in brigades. These new communities were often combination of villages. Yet, clans tended to live ng as Central Asia and other republics were politically submissive, he would turn a blind a turn would he politicallysubmissive, wererepublics other and Asia Central as ng With thebeginninWith rs through an extensive underground economy and collusion against So against collusion and economy underground extensive an through rs ”
(Collins, 2004, p.239) 2004, (Collins,
strengthened the kinship bonds of ethnic groups, instead of destroying destroying of instead groups, ethnic of bonds kinship the strengthened Glet, 2007) (Gullette, . Korenizatsiya h little monitoring from Moscow from monitoring little h g ofthe SecondWar, World the Central Communist party inMoscow
position within the local or regional party apparatus or economic or apparatus party regional or local the within position ml arng o oes network one’s of patronage rmal civic or even national leaders national even or civic - on on other hand .
oee, prdxcl eut f h Sve policies Soviet the of result paradoxical a However, .
ntral Asia had time and chance to strengthen their 29
- was the policy to fight against tribalism to ”
(Collins, 2004, p. 239) p. 2004, (Collins,
tl coe o hi relatives their to close still
” (Starr, 2006) (Starr,
Clis 20, . 239) p. 2004, (Collins, During Brezhnev era, era, Brezhnev During
the affirmative affirmative the
because these these because viet (mainly viet . ting Soviet Soviet ting
Moreover, Moreover, ” .
CEU eTD Collection and Nazarbayev, Akaev, presidents launched who leaders who could serve on their behalf, youngeryears, backingand lenttheir tonew, thirty imposed thebalances workedfor theyhad 1 in elections first the “with and regroup, to started leaders clan and magnates themselve weakened by Gorbachev’s policies 1989 by However, arrangements. new the from excluded and 2004) (Collins, Rafiq later and Usmonkhodjaev Inamzhan Kyrgyzstan, in Masaliev who were loyal to Moscow and had little connection with local clan networks, namely Absamat politi and economic with massive corruption of because positions their from fired were Usubaliev Turdakun and Rashidov Sharaf U power. political and economic from denied and positions their from dismissed were officials Soviet class 1985 and 1988 corrupted local leaders. from system Soviet whole the eradicating (purge), chistka of policy the started Gorbachev deteriorated internally in the region. Therefore, the following Soviet leaders like Andropov and Soviet the that time, Brezhnev the under mostly republics, their in networks patronage simply,clans bec power in maintained They Tajikistan. in Sharaf Rashidov in Uzbekistan, Kunaev in Kazakhstan, Gapurov in Turkmenistan, and Rasulov leader Moscowlocalsupported the clans, of interest achieve To republics. the rule to leaders influential and strong , n rgi pwr rm Moscow from power regain and s,
(Starr, 2006) (Starr,
. (Collins, (Collins, 2004)
Local dissatisfaction grew, as the clans were removed from economic power economic from removed were clans the as grew, dissatisfaction Local nder Gorbachev rule, the first secretaries of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan of secretaries first the rule, Gorbachev nder in their republics The The chistka was launched in 1983, and cal resources during their rule their during resources cal .
However, Moscow appointed leaders established their own strong own their leadersestablished appointed MoscowHowever, .
During the famous purge, around 30 thousand top and middle of glasnost and perestroika, which let local clans to reassert and for establishing extensive networks that they supplied thus, it is the power brokers, clan leaders, and magnates ause they were backed by local by backed were they ause 30
Clis 2004) (Collins, s Kari
like Turdakun Usubaliev in Kyrgyzstan,in UsubalievTurdakun like . o, ahr hn vice than rather mov, They were replaced by local leaders leaders local by replaced were They - Gorbachev con 90, the Soviet regime has been been has regime Soviet the 90, .
the By the end of 1990, local local 1990, of end the By balance of the divergent divergent the of balance Nishanov
power brokers or or brokers power tinued it between
- in Uzbekistan in versa 989 they re they 989 ”
(Starr, (Starr, state state the the - -
CEU eTD Collection himself “found he unfortunately but ones, democratic the pursue and norms informal the of that. countryto the prior in existed freedomsliberal the observers international loc extent; large a to existed expression and press of freedom the republics; neighboring in case the not 1993; between 1992 and 1995, twelve independent political parties were registered which was broad a liberalization: of extent Gorbachev. ally close was and Russia in career scientific his made He network. regional strong a of part a not was and Historically, the first President of Kyrgyz Republic, Kyrgyzstan create com re to sought “leaderscountries, neighboring Other country. the of democratizationrapid with career presidential his started Akaev, Askar President Kyrgyz independence. the after paths political differences small with but similar seemingly followed Asia Central of republics The in transitions political generated that collapse clans were not ready for the transition. Collins notes that it was the and regime the of collapse the support not did Asia Central in leader single a not because uncertain clan situation, oftheUnionputCentralThe networksinan Soviet Asian dissolution 2.8. pacts, continu informal these manage could who leaders new selected informally thus networks, 9) p. 2006, Clan politics during the post e tobalance clan interes munism, albeit without ideology albeitwithout munism, l n peieta eetos n 94 n 19 wr cle fe and free called were 1995 and 1994 in elections presidential and al .
Basically, “Kyrgyz and Uzbek clan elites, each representing powerful clan elite clan powerful representing each elites, clan Uzbek and “Kyrgyz Basically,
(Collins, 2004) (Collins, In the first years of independence, Kyrgyzstan witnessed a large a witnessed Kyrgyzstan independence, of years first the In ts, and stabilize therepublicsts, andstabilize and open constitutional assembly adopted a constitution in constitution a adopted assembly constitutional open and - Soviet period Soviet .
However, starting from 1995, Akaev started to limit to started Akaev 1995, from starting However, ”
(Collins, 2004, p.246) 2004, (Collins, 31 the first years of independence of years first the
Askar
He publicly called for the publiclycalledfor He Akaev, was far from the clan politics ”
(Collins, 2004, p.241) 2004, (Collins, not the clan pacts but the Soviet .
(Collins, 2004) (Collins, abandoning abandoning .
fair by by fair - .
CEU eTD Collection These country. the country. the from in society civil vibrant of emergence run the to lead not did to tendencies authoritarian had or exile to sent were leaders opposition the down, that centralized government and tight control of economic rule resources. authoritarian an launched he Instead, independence. the Unlike Akaev, Islam Karimov did not initiate any democratic reforms in the country, following Uzbekistan catalyzerand downfall his ofpopular unrest in2005 revolution social Kyrgyzstan. in 250) p. just clans rival to out doling simultaneously clans was according conducted to the rules of clan politics. Akaev, “generously fed several northern affected by clan networks and nepotism. Last but not the least, the allocation of public resources jud and parliament The positions. key to representative their appoint networks were there to influence of presidential institution, namely by making the president to pres allies wife his of that network, clan own his through voters mobilized and interests….Akaev thereby abandoned his weak democ their protect to power in stay to determined Akaev pact, the behind elites clan his of advice politics severely affected Kyrgyz election the undermine polit clan how of examples striking several are There country. the in consolidation democratic for obstacle an posed and flourish to began again once politics clan s clan on relying increasingly dnil lcin. elections. idential - ” ei, imtv Srglv cla Sarygulov Aitmatov, Kemin,
. Clis 2004) (Collins,
The clan politics that Akaev exercised until the last days of his rule, rule, dayshis last of the until Akaevexercised that politics clanThe
critical elements of democracy. First example comes from e from comes example First democracy. of elements critical .
Clan politics was exercised in all spheres of life and politics. Clan Clan politics. and life of spheres all in exercised was politics Clan hs ye f oiiain eue hs itr i 19 ad 2000 and 1995 in victory his secured mobilization of type This upport to keep himself in power in himself keep to upport s from 1995 and years.2000 By late 1995, “upon the s n ms epcal hs ies clan wife’s his especially most and ns enough to prevent open conflict open prevent to enough 32
ratic constituency of urban intelligentsia ” The politic
(Collins, 2004, p. 248) p. 2004, (Collins, icial system had severely severely had system icial , and their closest clan closest their and , a caatrzd by characterized was ics were in place to to place in were ics al parties were shut lections. became the main becamethe ”
(Collins, 2004, (Collins, The clan The -
while while .
The CEU eTD Collection while liberalization economic significant launched Kazakhstan However, independence. republics, Turkmenistanand were Kazakhstan equally by clan pervaded politic control hegemonic positions key the occupied region, Kulyab by represented clan Presidential while was powers, economic the politics, from excluded Tajik the dominated historically which clan, Khodjenti The arrangements. agreement reached in 1997, the Preside w in war civil base of Khodjenti clan. from resources economic of off cut and Union Soviet the of collapse The decades. four almost for power political and economic from excluded been have clans other of members the of Most republic. the of control and loyalty provided represented by Khodj clans, northern by controlled was resources its and Tajikistan of politics the Historically, Rakhmon. Emomali of President the under war civil the following reshaped was politics clan pacts between the elitesregional in the co of failure The region. the in republics other from different obviouslyis Tajikistan of case The Other Kazakhstan republics:Tajikistan, republic. Ferghana continue to play key role in controlling and distribution of economic resources in the 2004) (Collins, dep are networks patronage clan turn, their in and support, controlled by informal politics. affiliati clan without technocrats appointing Despite
ih prxmtl 4 tosn people thousand 40 approximately hich .
The strongest three regional networks from Tashkent, Samarkand and and Samarkand Tashkent, from networks regional three strongest The
over Tajik politics since 2001 since politics Tajik over enti clan. The The competition of clans for the resources led the country to the bloody
in government and ministries. Rakhmon and his clan asserted asserted clan his and Rakhmon ministries. and government in The Khodjenti clan had extensive supp
(Collins, (Collins, 2004) nt nt Rakhmon reorganized the clan politics and made new and Turkmenistanand 33 untry led to civil war from 1992
It evidentis that Karimov is dependent on clan
(Collins, 2004) (Collins, ons, Karimov’s agenda was largely largely was agenda Karimov’s ons, Moscow, severely affected the power power the affected severely Moscow, were killed. killed. were endent on his patronage as well as patronage his on endent
.
Other two Central Asian Central two Other ort from Moscow as they olwn te peace the Following - s following the 1997. The clan
CEU eTD Collection a neutral po of appearance the maintained Berdimuhamedov, by followed Niyazov, and Nazarbayev Both cla for arena an became countries these of parliaments national The priority. highest a resources economic of control the makes which resources, difference of these two countries from their neighbors is that they are extremely rich in natural com the maintained Turkmenistan desta inmanagingdesta pact theclan
munist style authoritarian rule authoritarian style munist
(Collins, 2004) (Collins, 34
n competition n .
(Collins, 2004) (Collins,
and regional networks. networks. regional and .
The striking striking The CEU eTD Collection in Uzbekistan whereneopatrimonial he h regimes, so a developed scholar, Uzbek prominent a Ilkhamov, legalwith incorporatingit ideologyand state developingstrong a Index Perception 177 ranked is It world. the in countries corrupt most the of one is it International, Transparency The current political regime in Uzbekistan could be classified 3.1. scrutinize key anelements explanatory for framework. politics clan by represented countries, of persistence the for way a pave that factors hypothesized ot the among prerequisites, strong exhibiting are developments, political significant other and parliament Kazakh of Speaker deputy a as Nazarbayeva Dariga of appointment the Karimov, including countries, two these in developments political recent the Secondly, interest. academic of focus the them makes regimes personalistic and authoritarian these of longevity amazing The respectively. respectively,Kazakhstan re the in regimes other athese case study. as two countries Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. There are number of reasons why I chose I thesis, this In her countries in the region, for the leadership transition in Central Asia in near future. The The future. near in Asia Central in transition leadership the for region, the in countries her th Uzbekistan
ot orp cutis u o 13 countr 183 of out countries corrupt most presidentialist models of executive of models presidentialist
(See Table 1)
aim to investigate the main factors of persistence of neopatrimonialism in two in neopatrimonialism of persistence of factors main the investigate to aim
01 2011) 2011, arrest of business assets of Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of President President of daughter the Karimova, Gulnara of assets business of arrest gion, aged over seventy overaged .
will be addressed by selecting adequate conceptual tool that will that tool conceptual adequate selecting by addressed be will First component is the regime of power control, which deals with
Chapter3.Case Studies . and Uzbekistan of presidents the Nazarbayev, and Karimov
However, the regime of the country has been successful in in successful been has country the of regime the However, ighlights two essential components of ne essential components of two ighlights Firs t
of all, the regimes in both countries hav regimesof all, the countries inboth ,
have ruled the countries since the 1990 and 1989 and 1990 the sincecountries the ruled have 35 - legislature relations legislature
e i pbi sco corruption sector public in ies
- called the structural structural the called
neopatrimonialism neopatrimonialism as as neopatrimonial.
- rational procedures. Alisher procedures. rational
a nd local political culture political local opatrimonial rule opatrimonial rule osiuin of constitution According to e outlived all e all outlived
in these two these in (Corruption , CEU eTD Collection sharin for or service military loyalty, their for governors local favored to granted were licenses which systemunder “tanho”, a methodof usedBukharan the example, the Emir present the characteristic the conditioned were and existed that period historical certain a neopatrimonialism in Uzbekistan. However, it is known that patterns of patron trace to difficult is It 3.1. Source: ofneopatrimonialTable 1. Structural authoritarian constitution regimes law and administration impl in procedures and rules rational legal impersonal by and administration, state steered and organized “rationally the by characterized is component This system. provision 67) p. market of elite ruling the of interests mechanisms the in economy and law of use selective production, ideology state of apparatus power of control “exclusive by characterized mainly is component power the shaping in institutions informal and formal Theroots historical of .
(Ilkhamov, 2007) eod opnn o a eptioil eie s h rational the is regime neopatrimonial a of component Second ”
(Ilkhamov, 2007,p.67)
neopatrimonial relations in Uzbekistan feature of Bukharan, Khivan and Kokand khanates. For For khanates. Kokand and Khivan Bukharan, of feature
and qu and 36
.
asi - societal corporatism societal mechanisms of the regime. This This regime. the of mechanisms - wielding agencies; the the agencies; wielding
” -
ea government legal (Ilkhamov, 2007, 2007, (Ilkhamov,
- client relations client relations emen te tax the g - ting day day
CEU eTD Collection their making in secretaries first (raikom) district to provided secretaries first obkom that favoritism and protection “the is authorities local and managers farm between relations between the farm leaders and local authority membe resources economic of flow constant a was there and branch) party obkom communist (provincial in holders office important by protected and supported were networks patronage problem, this tackle not did Party Communist of committees local The networks. patronage a build and farms collective through bases economic their establish to leaders local for opportunity Uzb other Soviet re elites political manag their units, agricultural collectivized around control political of problem the Soviet system. First, “it concentrated significant resources under farm cha agriculture. the of S the dominance, well. as Moscow in the government of central the Committee and Central Party the Communist to also but republics, Asian Central to characteristically p.66) (Ilkhamov, 2007, dis in and politics in both flourished networks patronage with informal practices totan close country from 1959 to 1983 during which he successfully combined the Soviet as the god father of the current neopatrimonial rule in Uzbekistan. His long years of rule of the of branch Uzbekistan the of Secretary First former Rashidov, vassal these of Bukha with revenues ksa’ trioil apparatus territorial ekistan’s
s oe f h mmes ee hmevs inv themselves were members the of some as ” publics, shifted markedly over time, giving rise to ordersneopatrimonial within
- (P.Markowitz, 2012, p. 393) p. 2012, (P.Markowitz, uean eainhp to a e bet drn te oit ie. Sharaf times. Soviet the during breath new a took relationships suzerain oviet power in the former Soviet republics heavily relied on collectivization on relied heavily republics Soviet former the in power oviet In the long the In ra
. 175) p. 1997, Abramzon,Kislyakov, & Tolstov, (S.P. However, the patronage system and informal practices were not only notonly were and practices patronageinformal However, the system - run, the collectivization process entailed several side effects to effects side several entailed process collectivization the run, ” ho, manifests thenew type under offeudal which state, the
PMroiz 21, . 393) p. 2012, (P.Markowitz, 37 .
And secondly, “mechanisms of control, as in in as control, of “mechanisms secondly, And
rs. As a vivid example of this patron le i te process. the in olved rbto o eooi resources economic of tribution the CSPU, could be considered considered be could CSPU, the .
In its turn, it gave an an gave it turn, its In After establishing the the establishing After irs, reshaping the . - style leadership The new facets facets new The ers, and local local and ers, The strong strong The - client
CEU eTD Collection infor and formal the along other each with linked bureaucrats administration level high and party communist of consisted class political of type certain a of establishment and emergence the Brezhne Leonid of rule practices and institutions continued to expand even after post informal of proliferation The politics. informal and networks patronage the instigated few holders and party members or principle, blat where regime, Ken points Jowitt out that the patrimonial practices were already exercised during the Stalinist state inearly 1990s. Uzbek echelonsof highest the filled school Party this graduatesof the independence, yearsof furthe to connections making and sites soviets and party district of members staff 900 approximately year, six created raispolkom chairs through passed inter School. Party selected toCommunist Party membersh the state apparatus. In fact,system itselfencouraged the Soviet and strengthened thepatron district another in post same the to reassigned often were secretaries first district rule, Soviet the of appointments ” mal relationships. And the establishment of this political class emerged on different levels
(P.Markowitz, 2012, p. 393) p. 2012, (P.Markowitz,
(See Figure 1) - month inter month ”
According to Markovitz, “by 1967, 590 gorkom and raikom secretaries and and secretaries raikom and gorkom 590 1967, “by Markovitz, to According (P.Markowitz, (P.Markowitz, 2012, p. 393) During the Soviet period, one of the most important requirements for being
,
(P.Markowitz, 2012) (P.Markowitz, v (1964 v - oblast courses in Tashkent, Ferghana and Samarkand, and in its firs its in and Samarkand, and Ferghana Tashkent, in courses oblast
(Jowitt, (Jowitt, 1992 - 82). According to Ilkhamov, the Brezhnev era was marked by by marked erawas Brezhnev Ilkhamov,the to According 82). r career within the Communist Party System. Party Communist the within career r tanish . Later, these schools served as a platform for networking networking for platform a as served schools these Later, - republicyear, study. of The same however, the School ip in Uzbekistanip in was from thediploma Tashkent High - bilish , p. 127) .
. As Markowitz points out, in the last three decades
38
in Uzbek, was widely used among the o the among used widely was Uzbek, in
.
The centralized economy and the rule of the - Stalinist Stalinist era especially during the were trained at the three three the at trained were - client relations withinclient
Following the the Following ffice ffice t CEU eTD Collection after trajectory political new a launched Karimov rule, Soviet the during apparatchik party A po and biography political with connected post in neopatrimonialism of practice and politics informal The 3.2. Source: FigureLateral 1.ofraikom first movements secretaries, Uzbekistan,1960 Rashidov’s rule, including through and politics during career administrative their cadre started who cadres, his of his Many pacts.” “clan establishing to thanks networks patronage strong build to managed the implemented turn, his in Rashidov, of governance and paved a way for intere Neopatrimonial in Uzbekrelations politics (P.Markowitz, 2012) (P.Markowitz, Islam Karimov, dominated Uzbek pol
st group politics to take root Brezhnev litical regime of Islam Karimov Islam of regime litical 39
- style patrimonial rule in Uzbekistan. He He Uzbekistan. in rule patrimonial style after the Independence after the - itics itics in post Soviet Uzbekistan is closely is Uzbekistan Soviet (Ilkhamov, 2007) - 1991
(Ilkhamov, 2007) (Ilkhamov, - Rashidov period.
.
Sharaf Sharaf
.
CEU eTD Collection This policy hindered appointed regional governors to accumulate financial resources and local regional of rotations strictly grouping controlled by the President decreased the their role. Secondly, Karimov of used the policy of frequent hands the in capital of types other and financial of accumulation measure strategic some to due importance their 2007) grou of its command economy and monopoly over the key resources within the hands of one political the export resources under his personal control. As I noted earlier, Uzbekistan preserved much elites, local for resources After liquidating the leaders of old clans, Karimov significantly limited the channels of national tosust hierarchy which him helped neopatrimonial the strengthening at directed were actions his all contrary, the the on country; in rule neopatrimonial the dismantle to opportunity historic the use not did Karimov dep his decreasing thus clans various from himself distancing in successful was and control personal his under power consolidated Karimov years, later In government. the in positions key given were and politics Uzbek of stages the itself politics clan formation. He managed to ‘liquidate the influence of some powerful clans around hi practice, in However, forward. move to and develop to society Uzbek the hinders it that stated and politics clan the and nation whole to sought Karimov centralize a strong state and from the very beginning nationalism, tried to portray himself strong of emergence the Under independence. gaining ping, which led to re to led which ping, . Noteworthy, the regional clans and local elites were significantly diminished and lost and diminished significantly were elites local and clans regional the Noteworthy, ” loyalty clan any above standing (Ilkhamov, 2007) (Ilkhamov,
hakims from their pos their from hakims Karimov pursued a politics that was directed at reshaping the clan clan the reshaping at directed was that politics a pursued Karimov especially in the cotton sector cotton the in especially - emergence of ‘clan’ fo ‘clan’ of emergence ain h . The representatives of Rash of representatives The is personal power control ts every three years on average on years three every ts 40 s taken by the central government. Firstly, the the Firstly, government. central the by taken s
’ rmations and inter and rmations (Ilkhamov, 2007) (Ilkhamov, endence on them. On the other hand, hand, other the On them. on endence
(Ilkhamov, 2007) (Ilkhamov, (Ilkhamov, 2007) (Ilkhamov, idov clan once again took took again once clan idov . -
clan rivalry clan He publicly denounced publicly He
. (Ilkhamov, 2007) (Ilkhamov, as ‘a leader of the Karimov took all took Karimov
(Ilkhamov, . m, but not
. CEU eTD Collection country, and informal thepatronage employed practices regime networks by Karimov’s failed 2010) (Kavalski, to ensure the family capital as a retirement or insurance package t of enrichment mega by wealth of accumulation the the behind goal overarching The family. Presidential to contribute to were agencies enforcement law aforementioned of duties integral the of One family. Presidential the around centered formation clan a to important feature of Karimov mega of example The the Karimov. of sustaining rule personal and loyalty their for reward a as resources economic to access and power 2007) (Ilkhamov, ki a as and counterweight a as Security National the of Zak by led Service Security National the and Ministry Interior the between observed was struggle governmental departments unlike between regional factions used to be in the past. The vicious post in Uzbek of era new in a Therefore, relations neopatrimonial of phase new a called be could central government such as security, law enforcement agencies, tax service, and customs. This revolvednetwork informal typenewof This In the meantime, a new type of patronage network emerged in the political arena of Uzbekistan. is very findready to ways difficult the tosolve problem…” Unfortuna beings. human of characteristic evils other many and tribalism, regionalism, cupidity, subjectivity, encounter always we times such at Usually easily. solved been never should take the “… we need to perfect the system of selecting cadres, appointing them and renewing them…we fact:admitted this sub control to enough government. central the challenge to support ir Olmatov and Rustam Inoyatov respectively. The Ministry of Interior has been put rival rival put been has Interior of Ministry The respectively. Inoyatov Rustam and Olmatov ir path path of selecting the most suitable candidates for a position…The problem has . .
Although Karimov’s political regime provided security and stability in the the in stability and security provided regime political Karimov’s Although These two ministries gained consid gained ministries two These - national state officials in the regions. Once President Kari President Once regions. the in officials state national ter ’s style of - clan struggle could be characterized by a rivalry between the between rivalry a by characterized be could struggle clan neopatrimonial neopatrimonial rule around the key administrative departments in the in departmentskey administrativethe around 41 However, these p these However,
- clan formation in Uzbekistan highlights an an highlights Uzbekistan in formation clan erable amount of uncontrolled coercive coercive uncontrolled of amount erable
(Kavalski, 2010) d f hc ad aac system balance and check of nd (Eurasianet, 2000) in in case of the death of Karimov olicies proved not to effective to not proved olicies . Mega -
oit politics. soviet
mov himself mov - clan refers - clan is clan tely, it it tely, he
CEU eTD Collection review judicial for provides essentially law the “although that notes Initiative Law European courts. in trust public of decline the for influence 2012) (P.Markowitz, othe and extortion bribery, corruption, of proliferation the to than not, the state security and law enforcement agencies abused their status and power leading person the safeguard to importantly most but country, the in security the ensure to power uncontrollable almost obtained country the Union and establishment of the independent Uzbek Republic, the law enforcement agencies of Uzbekistan. in law of rule the weakened Neopatrimonialism 399) rhetorically only incomes and no necessity to share wealth with the broader population” is that larg elite and reform an in place interested in government…leaving the in positions powerful income key system, the in sclerosis to led reform of “lack they say that: Soviet period. the from inherited nepotism and corruption of system the endanger institutions financial and organizations international the by urged reforms The interests. economic and political their to status the preserve to eagerness their to related is officials state provision d and institutions, law of rule weakened reform, economic and political halted it effects: main three had Uzbekistan in neopatrimonialism that contends Markowitz socio appealin the address could that institutions democratic and administrative robust build to .
- economicUzbek population. of needs
the court decisions (P.Markowitz, 2012) (P.Markowitz, - producing sectors of the economy were taken over by vested interest groups with groups interest vested by over taken were economythe of sectors producing
This situation This is situation skilfully illustrated in International Crisis group’s report where .
h poeuo’ ofc, oie n sae sec state and police office, prosecutor’s The , which in itself undermines the judicial institution and pave a way l hpy ih sau qo ht rvds t ih significant with it provides that quo status a with happy ely .
The lack of genuine interest in launching reform programs by programslaunching reform in interestgenuine of lackThe al regime of Islam Karimov. However, more often more However, Karimov. Islam of regime al American Bar Association Central and Eastern Eastern and Central Association Bar American
42
high levels of corruption went unchecked, and and unchecked, went corruption of levels high
After the collapse of the Soviet Soviet the of collapse the After - mtos f lea activities illegal of methods r quo, a system that best serves best that system a quo,
(P.Markowitz, (P.Markowitz, 2012, p. rt aec strongly agency urity rained social welfare welfare social rained g
CEU eTD Collection political the led have competition institutions altered or new from challenges characteris neopatrimonial by underpinned distinctive The 3.3. 2012, p.406) their maximize top the at elites few a because without go people many but gas, natural in rich is country months of winter. However, most of the population outside of the capital remains without gas even in the coldest just Eurasia, producerin gasbeenlargest has ranked third Uzbekistan Administration, Energyand government central the gas, natural of largereserves owns Uzbekistan factthat the electricity.Despite and gas like population its to services basic bringing from short fell Uzbekistan Asia, Central in percent to 10.2 from expenditure education in decline a and 1999 in percent 2.5 to 1992 in percent 4.5 reports, Uzbekistan has experienced a decline in healt yearthe countryyear. byThe money allocatedare sectors tothese declining. According tothe in worsening are system. population general the to services basic key welfare other with coupled healthcare, social Uzbek overall affected neopatrimonialism The to make d of administrative decisions, the law is not frequently used, and the courts are reportedly hesitant
Kazakhstan behind ecisions 7.8 percent for the same period decides to export rather tha rather export to decides usa n Trmnsa i 2011 in Turkmenistan and Russia .
etr o Kzksa' post Kazakhstan's of feature
As Markow against the governmentagainst itz itz aptly notes, “a frequent refrain heard in Uzbekistan is that the
leadership, namely the president the namely leadership, ” n to utilize it for internal needs. According to U.S. to According needs. internal for it utilize to n ”
(P.Markowitz, (P.Markowitz, 2012, p. 405)
(P.Markowitz, 2012,p.404) (P.Markowitz, such as parliamen as such tics 43
rents from natural gas exports gas natural from rents
- oit oiia dvlpet s regime a is development political Soviet Iac, 09 p 104) p. 2009, (Isaacs,
US Eeg ad diitain 2014) Administration, and Energy (U.S. h expenditure (as a percent of GDP) from gas to cook or heat their homes homes their heat or cook to gas t, t, political parties and electoral and parties political
Nursultan Nazarbayev Nursultan .
Like any other country . .
n Kazakhstan, In ” dcto and Education
(P.Markowitz, (P.Markowitz, , to , the .
CEU eTD Collection reform process. Later, the in inaction for Kazakhstan, in Sciences of Academy of Head a as serving was time that at the In power. turn went against Dinmukhamed Kunaev, who played an important role in Nazabayev’s rise to Sovie the reform to vision Gorbachev’s furthered he period, perestroika oligarchy” develop the bureaucratic skills and patronage necessary to rise to the top of Kazakhstan's party “ out points forty of age republic. the in position political highest second the was which Ministers, of Council decades. His foll 1996) the sponsor helped Dinmukhamed resources. material important of exchange the for loyalty on based ties political informal of network extended his established 1960 from republic the ruled who CSPU the of branch Kazakhstan the of Secretary Kunaev, Dinmukhamed Kazakhstan, In republics. Asian Central in networks patronage strong of emergence the with marked was era Brezhnev the earlier, Imentioned As 3.4. competition. 2009) the confront to effort an in rely on informal political norms of Soviet neopatrimonialism Kazakhstan in . . The His loyalty and faithful service under Brezhnev secured his position for almost three almost for position his secured Brezhnev under service faithful and loyalty His
s Oct, 02 p 28) p. 2002, (Olcott, p e - atrimonial four, he was the youngest among all the Soviet leaders at that time. time. that at leaders Soviet the all among youngest the was he four,
attempts exacerbated patronage groups and elites to a higher de higher a to elites and groups patronage exacerbated attempts last years of Soviet rule, Nazarbayev started to criticize Kunaev’s brother, who who brother, Kunaev’s criticize to started Nazarbayev rule, Soviet of years last Kunaev “ Kunaev ower, Nursultan Nazarbayev,
educational and cultural and educational Kunaev wrote in his memoirs about the betrayal feelings on
communism provedcommunism a good schooling Nazarba for built up built
inst ability that arises with transition and new ins new and transition with arises that ability
Widely known Widely
. an ethnic Kazakh, largely polit largely Kazakh, ethnic an
aabyv isl ws reform a was himself Nazarbayev behavior and relationships to secure and consolidate power 44 development of ethnic Kazakhs” ethnic of development was was appointed as the Chairman of Kazakhstan’s
with promoting the interests of Kazakh elites, elites, Kazakh of interests the promoting with
ico - administrative cadre and and cadre administrative - minded leader. Under Under leader. minded t system, which in its in which system, t y ev allowing to him titutions titutions gree of political of gree
(Ian & Cory, & (Ian omr First former Nazarbayev As to 1986, to (Isaacs, At the the At Isaacs
CEU eTD Collection the society. Nazarbayev turned to informal politics to maintain c processes including institutional competition, electoral competition an of range broad in manifested was uncertainty This mechanisms. sharing power and authority political over uncertainty of degree high a themselves with brought independence of years independence. the following challenges political important faced Nazarbayev Nursultan as habits. Soviet post in elements personal the of members administration between loyalty of relations horizontal ver neopatrimonial, “the by characterized are structures party and state Soviet The 3.5. president ofthe newly Republic. independent Kazakh t assumed Nazarbayev crowd with went I right. were who people the of betrayal inexcusable an faced such Ia dilemma that realized I town into march to began people the When gains. ultimately himself, to true remains who circumstances, the to conform not does who dilemma a such with faced between what is familiar, comfortable, and “In everyone’s life there are moments when suddenly a crucial choice has to be made, a choice Nazarbayev demonstrati roleinthis remembers his an country own their in citizens Kazakhs, ethnic young including into transformed which streets, the to take to Almaty Committee. Central KPK’s the of Secretary First a as Russian, ethnic an Kolbin, Gennadii appointed Moscow o the from him removal the Moscow from demanded and Post ”
(Cummings, 2001, p.60) (Cummings, 2001, - Soviet politicaltrajectories inSoviet Kazakhstan ” -
(Franke, Gawrich, & Alakbarov, 2009, p.112) Gawrich, 2009, &Alakbarov, (Franke, either ta -
Soviet Kazakh politics are inherited from the Soviet past and are considered considered are and past Soviet the from inherited are politics Kazakh Soviet hs appointment This he power in 1989, later becoming the first democratically elected elected democratically first the becoming later 1989, in power he ke ke a stand or return to the Central Committee offices. The latter seemed .
protesting against perceived status as a secondary class class secondary a as status perceived against protesting d appointment of Kolbin, an outsider from Moscow. Moscow. from outsider an Kolbin, of appointment d trigge what is unpredictably complex or painful. A person 45 red red
thousands of demonstrators in the capital capital the in demonstrators of thousands ons as following:
country ffice
.
(Cummings, 2001) (Cummings, ontrol over these uncertainties Therefore, the neopatrimonial neopatrimonial Therefore, the - ie as rtss mostly protests, mass wide
them, at the head of the the of head the at them, d emerging pluralism in n bureaucratic and .
However, However, tical and and tical
The The
CEU eTD Collection lineages t three among divisions historical the faced He Uzbekistan. in did Karimov as pacts, clan the manage to broker independent of image an of portray to Kazakhstan’s political trajectory is plagued by the politics of clans. Nazarbayev initially needed 3.6. o Kazakhstan influence and of prosecution, criminal from President immunity presidents, future First to access Nazarbayev the on Law the passed Kazakhstan, of body thehighest and2010theMazhilis, been 2000.On27June, widelylegislative in1999 falsified friends close and consisting considerably thatof 1991,largely than elite himself witha smaller core members. family and allies close Presidents the of Court Constitutional decisions. and referendums through mainly control personal his under power Kazakhstan. in relationsneopatrimonial that characteristics last the with concerned am I However, rule. Nazarbayev’s strengthened were characteristics three other all one, first the Except is highli 104) p. 2009, (Isaacs, ver policy domestic and foreign Role ofclansand groupingsin informal Kazakh
(Cummings, 2001,p.62) A strong by corruption, buttressed personalism, A kleptocraticandeconomy; The absencein favor ofideology of leadership a type managerial of A process ofstate ghted characteristics:four bymain
(Schatz, 2000) The so ” - called independent media existed at that time slo
(Cummings, 2001, p. 65) p. 2001, (Cummings, . According to Cummings, the first decade of presidency of Nazabayev of presidency of decade first the Cummings, to According . Albeit some promises and to a certain extent the practical implications -
and institution building and institution . ”
(Cummings, 2001, p.65) (Cummings, 2001,
Starting from 1995, Nazarbayev began to consolidate to Nazarbayev 1995, began Startingfrom
.
The presidential and parliamentary elections had had elections parliamentaryandpresidential The 46
y 00 Nzrae “a surrounded “had Nazarbayev 2000, By neopatrimonialism and venalit .
ribal grou ribal politics wly shifted under the control
pings and smaller clan clan smaller and pings
in the first decade of of decade first the in
sue the assumes
“granting , of relatives y
CEU eTD Collection t of leaders former on based system group developed size and seniority genealogical the on under two subcultures. The first subculture “is the traditional order of the horde, which depends co it elite, to comes it When pyramid. the of level bottom the at residing mega his by surrounded top, the on President the pyramid, a as designed is politics Kazakh of structure power The participation well but implicit the by abide to expected ‘the between pacts personal and Family’, or the inner circleinformal of the regime and the of series a involves politics in engage to “Authorization A Kazakh political scientist abuse the l not must they Kazakhs, the all as same But business. into go and posts public hold jobs, professional “ clan Nazarbayev kinship, on based Kazakhstan in interests business large own and posts high hold relatives president’s blooming Kazakh economy, especially in gas and oil sectors. son other Nazarbayev’s oth and media the over control seized Aliev 2009, p. 114) industry, as well as largeparts of construction the of parts important over control “wields Aliya, daughter, younger president’s mega his employed networ his which “ h three all of representatives the of inclusion liberalization, party political and media mass of osee b ol elh Nzrae suh t cnoiae super a consolidate to sought Nazarbayev wealth, oil by bolstered re, aabyvs eie und t fc t authorit to face its turned regime Nazarbayev’s ordes, s o te ebr o m fml, hy a al h rs o te iies hv te ih t d their do to right the have citizens, the of rest the all as they, family, my of members the for As aw, being equal before that law” ” . (Franke, Gawrich, & Alakbarov, 2009, p. 115)
His other other cnrl pwr n resources” and power controls k - clan to control the most important sectors of economy and politics. politics. and economy of sectors important most the control to clan dau - - , clan including his family members, family his including clan in once Dossyp - ghter, Dariga Nazarbayeva and son his a, iu Klbe, and oto o almos of control gained Kulibaev, Timur law, commented ascommented follows: the water and gas industry Satpaev, -
” (Novosti, 2010) nesod om o bsns competit business of norms understood , and the second one one second the and ,
aptly notes that: various contenders, according to which the latter are 47 er important business interests business important er
(Co .
. he Communist party, former Soviet Soviet former party, Communist he
ln, 04 p 257) p. 2004, llins, ” raim A Clis contends, Collins As arianism. In response to severe (Franke, & Gawrich, Alakbarov, and business and political elite political and business and is represented by “strongly “strongly by represented is - in - law (until (until law 2007) Rakhat - rsdnil ytm in system presidential uld be categorized categorized be uld
9 pret of percent 90 t (Collins, 2004) (Collins, o ad political and ion .
Nazarbayev criticism of The The .
CEU eTD Collection follow aftersteps from thepower. Nazarbayev pyramid. balancing the power between competing different Therefore, hi secure run. to trying been longer has Nazarbayev President the in process democratization the hinder and clans the between short the in stable more country. the in revenues oil of distribution uneven for government events Zhanaozen population general the However, in its turn, leads to corruption and even deeper entrenchment of informal politics in Kazakhstan. Itcircles.is close his andby President revenuescontrolled the arestatetightly up,the sum To (Franke, 2009,& p.126) Gawrich, Alakbarov, wit worked who officials and nomenklatura Komsomol factor behind the long existence of his grouping is owed to “personal ties, which go back to the led exchange for it. status their secure and loyalty their present both to order in President the of circle interests. economic and power their maintaining in them for element key the are interests lobbying Rather, structure. their to These business elites do not necessarily see the blood ties or genealogical kinship lines essential economic str by former m former However, it is not clea not is it However, ln ad oiia groupings. political and clans uctures and new business groups One of the business groupings that can exemplify this case is a Kazakh Group, ayor of Almaty of ayor
n 01 wee udes f oil of hundreds where 2011, in - run, however, energy resources seem to be the catalyst of instability instability of catalyst the be to seem resources energy however, run, Therefore, they tend to posit to tend they Therefore,
an r what kind of trajectories business groupings and elite will elite and groupings business trajectories of kind what r ’s discontent is discontent ’s d current mayor of Astana, of mayor current d business and political groupings and sustain his power o hs ae Nazarbayev date, this To ” 48
. (Franke, Gawrich, & Alakbarov, 2009, p. 116)
on the rise, as it was manifested during the the during manifested was it as rise, the on s own position by arbitrating between the the between arbitrating by position own s - field workers protested against the the against protested workers field Tsaabtv n oit times Soviet in Tasmagambetov h ion themselves closer to the inner the to closer themselves ion
ImangalyTas Wealthy regimes might be be might regimes Wealthy
has been successful in in successful been has magambetov. - u in quo The The ” .
CEU eTD Collection more effective. and stronger become institutions state once democracy to turn will countries these theory sees the au to experience the challenges of transformation onefrom system of governance to another. The power. According to this theory, Central Asian states, like any other country in transition, have Central in behavior political the explain to employed been have science political of theories Different state the post for especially countries, developing for used widely been has neopatrimonialism of concept the that fact the Despite Webe encompasses many of these terms. neopatrimonialism have narrower meaning that neopatrimonialism terms other from it distinguish and concept the of meaning the analyze to tried I chapter, first the In politics. Asian Central in implications its and neopatrimonialism of concept the scrutinize to attempted thesis This genuinely politics. informal neopatrimonial by characterized presidentialism authoritarian strong in entrenched However, post of democratization in result will Union Soviet former the of divorce peaceful the that predicted scholars Many Conclusion rian and classic patrimonialism Asia. The transition theory is among the - ulig rcs i post in process building Apart from this, other approaches tackled but even strengthened buteven republics tackled leaderships ofthe by the fe to eae o idpnec, lot l te eulc i te ein are region the in republics the all almost independence, of decades two after
thoritarian thoritarian nature of the states as a temporary phenomenon and contends that . It has been found that most of these terms that are used instead of of instead used are that terms these of most that found been has It . oe ofte More - oit republics Soviet - colonial Africa, little attention was paid by scho by paid was attention little Africa, colonial ta nt te eptioils hs o only not has neopatrimonialism the not, than n -
Furthermore, the key differenc Sovie neopatrimonialism. pltcl landscape political t
are used interchangeably with with interchangeably used are s i general, n such as
whereas neopatrimonialism 49 leading ones to have the strongest explanatory
democratization theory and Greater Cen and and
eta Ain tts n particular in states Asian Central
n Cnrl sa n particular. in Asia Central and es were pointed out between is a broad concept that
of Central Asia the concept of of concept the lars researching researching lars never never ism been been
and tral tral .
. CEU eTD Collection interactions be culture. political its to linked is Asia Central in neopatrimonialism of persistence the for factor explanatory key secondThe presidentialstrong systemso inCentral Asia. lack of strong check and balance system, robust parliament and vibrant civil society makes suggest that for serve just and country the in dynamics political internal on influence little has parliament by represented body legislative the republics Asian Central other all in Kyrgyzstan, of exception authoritarian nature of governance executive of model presidential the was factor first The region. informa the best understand to us allow that ones the are only the not are these pre from legacies deep has that region: strong presidential rule, supported by the Constitutions of the republics and the clan politics in neopatrimonialism of persistence the to contributes that factors overarching two are t revealed research my and topic this on scholarship contemporary The thesis. my of Identifying t for thedurability ofthe regimesregion. inthe it became evident that the concept of Therefore, neopatrimonialism best serves as Asia. Central in regimes the explaining in misleading be to proved theories Asia approach
h itrs o the of interest the
presidential system itself he
tween different actors, and clans, regional networks. have have attempted to explain the informal politics in Central Asia. main contributing for the persistence of neopatrimonialism I analyzed in this thesis thesis this in analyzed I neopatrimonialism of persistence the for contributing factors behind the persi
factors for the persistence of neopatrimonialism in the region but these but region the in neopatrimonialism of persistence the for factors executive t s adt imagine to hard is It - Soviet and Soviet hist Soviet and Soviet
oy ersne b te President. the by represented body is due cannot explain the persistence of neopatrimonialism. The - legislative relations. legislative
to strong p stence ofneopatrimonialism was theintegral goal 50
residential model of governance. Central Asian politics without informal without politics Asian Central ory. l nature of political behavior in the the in behavior political of nature l However, I need to point out that out point to need I However, I argue that t that argue I I argue that
an an alternative explanation
oee, t However, he entrenchment of of entrenchment he However, these even today he
hat there there hat With With the findings findings the the the CEU eTD Collection the Uzbekistan rent characteris future. near in Kazakhstan in persist to likely seem relations neopatrimonial and practices Informal neopatrimonial rule inthecountry. presidential conceal to hard increasingly becoming are problems politics. Gulnora Karimova, is a clear sign of stunning pow The recent political developments around the mega of mixtu the practices, and institutions modern and traditional both informal, and formal from circumstances, of complex a on rests practices Kazakhstan’s and region. the in countries neighboring other in different slightly are which systems, political centralized and neopatrimonial in parallels and similarities structural stu case a as chosen were Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan therulestrengthen touphold institutions ofand its ensure law and principles democratic genuine foster to states Asian Central hinder practices informal politic the between relations neopatrimonial of persistence the to contribute and countries the of trajectories political the shaping in role significant a play politics clan which could what constitutes
near
seeking h regime The
future. The economic performances of the country are country the of performances economic The tics
and
and lcin i 21 my ver may 2015 in elections
of
Kazakhstan
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as depending is iet n aahtn s evl indebted heavily is Kazakhstan in
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re on acterized as neopatrimonialism. acterized as lkl t rfet h cneune o long of consequences the reflect to likely y main
oil
51 are within
most important of them of important most
p er struggle in the highest echelons of Uzbek - clan of President Karimov and his daughter oor
the of dy, because both countries demonstrate countries both because dy,
governance
power
Teeoe te upcoming the Therefore, . framework that the longevity of authoritarian authoritarian of longevity the that deteriorating every year every deteriorating the protection ofhuman protection rights. the .
Therefore,
The example of Uzbekistan of example The o i revenues. oil to
performance,
of
neopatrimonialism (Ilkhamov, 2007) , its ability to benefit benefit to ability its ,
I
contend al actors. al
a
and social social and T culture
that he - lasting lasting Uzbek
These These
main
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CEU eTD Collection i governance. neopatrimonial in This n
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Asian
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focused
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countries .
The
only
could
the further
could
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research factors
neopatrimonial a
subject
that
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into of
52 are
a
behind separate more
investigate power
democratic
the
relations
research.
persistence
the
on and
conditions
the
accountable
of
leadership
neopatrimonialism
under
system transition
which
of
CEU eTD Collection years? twenty after democratization about know we do What (1999). B. Geddes, Kazakh (2009). G. Alakbarov, & A., Gawrich, A., Franke, Fierman, Central Transformation. (1991).Asia: The W. Soviet Soviet Eurasianet. (2000). &Erdman, G.,(2006). Engel,Beyond a U. Catch (1973). S. Eisenstadt, Edg Cummings, S. N. (2012). N.(2001).Cummings, S. Power andIn Change Asia. N.Cummings. inCentral S. Routledge. (2011). trajectories. Asian Central from politics:Evidence clan of logic The (2004). K. Collins, Clapham, C. (1985). Third World Introduction.Politics:An regimes. (1998).Chehabi, Sultanistic Linz, H.,& J. & Daniel, D. (B. interpretations. its and domination Patrimonial Weber's (2012). H. Brunns, Bratton, M., & Walle, N. V. (1994). Neopatri Bilan (2012). C. D. Bach, Change (2003).Anderson, Constitutional J. Ed.) inCentral 75 Asia. (S.Cummings, Aldulhamidova, N. (2009). The European Un Asia. Central in Presidentialism of Failure The (2009). S. Abdukadirov, References ar, A. (2001). Genealogy, Class, and 'Tribal Policy' in Turkmenistan, 1924 Turkmenistan, in Policy' 'Tribal and Class, Genealogy, (2001). A. ar, (00 Dcme 3. eree Arl 4 21, from 2014, 04, April Retrieved 3). December (2010, . Review of Post Regimes. in 'Curse' Double a as Autocracy and Incomes Resource States: Rentier Sage. Review New York: Routledge. 56 Politics, M. Gazibo,Eds.) http://liu.diva World Politics from http://www.bilan.ch/sites/default/files/docs/300 riches_2010.pdf 2014, 09, Transcriptions. 25 May Retrieved portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:286608 Sweden. Science,Political 17 Corruption Perception Index Perception Corruption
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