1 Chapter One Democracy, Democratic Ideals and Voting Voting
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Voting Systems: Chapter One Eddie Hyland Democracy, democratic ideals and voting Chapter One Democracy, democratic ideals and voting Voting is at the very heart of the democratic process. Very few people in the modern world believe in the myth of the statesman/woman who, “as the mystical representative of the nation”, can discern what the people think by examining his/her own heart. If the people are to rule, there must be institutionally defined channels of participation. There are many possible forms of popular participation. People can join political parties, they can inform themselves on political issues, they can discuss and debate these issues with their friends, but for most of us, formal participation in the exercise of political power comes down to the solitary act of voting. There are many factors that go to make up a particular voting system. One aim of this book will be to explain what these factors are and how they can be combined. It would probably be a safe guess that most voters would have some basic accurate knowledge of their own voting system in terms of how to fill out a valid ballot and, at least roughly, how their votes go to determine the results. But it would probably also be safe to say the following things: under normal circumstances most people take the voting systems that they are used to for granted. There are many technical aspects of such systems concerning which many people will have only the vaguest idea. The historical origins and rationale may not be fully understood. Furthermore, citizens of one state may lack detailed knowledge of the voting systems of other states and will probably not have engaged in any serious comparative assessment of different types of voting system and their underlying rationales. This relatively uncritical complacency with what people are accustomed to can, however, be seriously disturbed when the circumstances are not normal. A case in point was the U.S. presidential election of November 2000. The basis of the problem in that instance lay in the closeness of the contest between George W. Bush and Al Gore. Events began to unfold dramatically when the major TV networks confidently predicted a Gore victory, only to retract that prediction when it became evident that victory in the electoral college depended crucially on who won the state of Florida, and that Bush seemed to be winning, but by such a small margin that recounts would be needed. The contentiousness, which in the specific case of Florida centred on such things as the late tally of postal votes, the ambiguity of the ballot paper, and 1 Voting Systems: Chapter One Eddie Hyland Democracy, democratic ideals and voting margins of error in vote counting, was compounded by the fact that even if Bush won the state of Florida, and hence the election as a whole, Gore had won a majority of the popular vote. 1 While there are, of course, serious questions concerning the democratic nature of electoral systems where there can be some degree of mismatch between the results and the popular vote, it is our contention that even more troublesome questions arise if we engage in a slightly more detailed analysis of the technicalities of voting systems, and a more searching investigation of what we might mean by “the will of the people”. To illustrate in a preliminary way the major importance of these issues, consider the following constructed electoral scenario, which though imaginary, is not very different from the U.S. presidential election of 2000 in terms of candidate support. In accordance with Mr. Morris’s prescription we will imagine an electoral system in which the result is directly dependent on the popular vote. Labelling our three candidates B, G and N, suppose that, on a turnout of 100,000,000, the percentage support for each candidate was: B G N 47% 45% 8% Table 1 Clearly, using the vote-counting system usually referred to as the plurality system (popularly called “first past the post”), B would win by a margin of two percentage points over G, with N a very distant third. Although two percentage points over a nearest rival is a relatively narrow margin, in terms of the postulated turnout it represents a very substantial 2,000,000 votes. Presumably this, according to Mr. Morris, would be democracy, because the will of the people is being heard and heeded. The 1 By some, this was thought to place democracy in America on trial. Dick Morris, chief electoral strategist for Bill Clinton’s 1996 campaign, wrote at the time of the 2000 election: “I live in a democracy in the United States. Maybe. It is an absolute outrage for George W. Bush to become president if, as current trends suggest, he loses the popular vote by 250,000….if current vote totals stand up, Mr. Bush will win the presidency even though more people voted for Al Gore. This is not democratic….there is a clear and compelling need for the will of the people to be heard and heeded.” (Irish Times, November 10 th , 2000) 2 Voting Systems: Chapter One Eddie Hyland Democracy, democratic ideals and voting “maybe” could be erased and Americans could rest assured that they do indeed live in a democracy. The people of the Republic of Ireland also, so they believe, live in a democracy, with, according to Mr. Morris’s criterion, no “maybe” about it; the system for electing their president being already one in which the result is determined directly by the popular vote. In Ireland, however, the voting system – more strictly the balloting system and the procedures used for determining the results on the basis of the ballots – differs significantly from the simple plurality or “first past the post” system used in our first example. It is usually referred to as the Alternative Vote (AV) system and is rather more complex. To begin with, instead of being asked simply to nominate their first choice candidate, voters are invited to rank candidates according to their order of preference. A ballot form in an election with our three candidates B, G and N would look like this. B G N A voter wishing to select N before G, and G before B, would complete the ballot as follows: B 3 G 2 N 1 The numbers 1, 2 and 3 indicate first, second and third preference. The counting of votes takes pace in several stages. At the first stage each candidate’s first preference votes are summed. With identical preferences to those in our first example, the first count would of course produce the following results: B G N 47% 45% 8% 3 Voting Systems: Chapter One Eddie Hyland Democracy, democratic ideals and voting (47,000,000) (45,000,000) (8,000,000) Table 2 If, as is here the case, no candidate has an overall majority (i.e. no candidate has more than 50% of the vote and hence no candidate has a total vote greater than the combined first preference votes of the other candidates) a second stage of counting takes place. Without going into the finer points, this stage begins with the elimination of the candidate with the lowest number of first preference votes; in our example this would be N. What happens next is that each ballot with N as first choice is examined to see who is the second choice. These second preference votes are totalled for each remaining candidate and added to their first preference total. Taking N’s 8,000,000 ballots, suppose that 6,000,000 identified G as second preference, while only 2,000,000 identified B. The results of the second count would look like this: B G 49,000,000 51,000,000 (47,000,000 + (45,000,000 + 2,000,000) 6,000,000) Table 3 In a three-candidate election, this would constitute the final result, with G winning this time, with a straight 2,000,000 majority. With absolutely identical popular preferences over the candidates, and hence, one would think, the self-same “will of the people” contradictory results are produced. How an identical “will of the people” can produce totally contradictory results is a little puzzling and definitely democratically troublesome. But perhaps all is not lost. After all, the margin between the two front- runners is only two percentage points, and the two voting systems end up selecting one of the front-runners. Perhaps all we are dealing with here is a situation in which two reasonably democratic voting procedures, not being as absolutely fine-tuned as they could be, produce contrary results when the different between the front-runners is very small. We will be able to show in detail later how the narrowness of the margin between the front-runners is not the critical factor, but this point can be demonstrated 4 Voting Systems: Chapter One Eddie Hyland Democracy, democratic ideals and voting immediately and dramatically by introducing a third type of voting system, on that could claim to have just as good democratic credentials as the two already considered. The system in question is known as the Borda Count system, named after its 18 th - century proponent, the French academician Jean Charles de Borda. Many eminent theorists have strongly argued its high democratic credentials (see, for example, M. Dummett, Voting Procedures, pp.xxx). As with the AV system, voters are invited to rank order candidates, but unlike that system there is no sequential elimination of lower- ranked candidates. Rather, each candidate is awarded a number of points for each preference ranking, the usual method being that with n being the number of candidates, n-1 points are awarded for a first preference ranking, n-2 for a second preference and so on.