Panic of 1792 The Panic of 1792 was a crisis that occurred during March and April of 1792, and resulted from excessive credit growth and financial . In the lead-up to the crisis, the American Revolution had not only left the American Treasury empty but the government heavily indebted. Given this difficult position, the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, , implemented several measures designed to put U.S. finances on a better financial footing. Firstly, he introduced a scheme to convert all old domestic debt into interest only, deferred bonds at lower rates of interest, while agreeing to honour the debts to foreign nations at full face value. The scheme was designed to reduce interest payments to domestic debtors and stabilize the financial system, while maintaining the confidence of foreign investors.i This, of course, would not be the last time a government would penalise its own citizens while seeking to maintain relations with foreign powers. Secondly, he created a Sinking Fund, which was designed to assure bondholders that the government was serious about meeting its debt obligations. One of the key features of the Sinking Fund was that it had the ability to purchase debt on the open market if the debt traded below its true value. This facility would prove critical in the ensuing crises, in that it was through this mechanism that Hamilton was able to purchase bonds on the open market and stem the slide in bond prices. Finally, Hamilton put forward a proposal to Congress to establish a of the United States (BUS), a de facto central bank, which would be capitalised at $10 million. It was proposed that the government would retain a stake of 20% in the BUS, with the remaining shares to be offered to private buyers. The bank would be head-quartered in Philadelphia, the then U.S. capital, but it would also open branches in other states.ii 25% of the capital was to be paid for in specie (gold or silver), while the remaining 75% was payable in the new U.S. debt securities, with payments to be made over four instalments in 1792 and 1793. The use of U.S. debt securities for payment of shares naturally provided a ready market for these securities, a factor that would drive speculators to try and manipulate the market for treasury bonds in early 1792.iii The creation of a federally-sponsored bank prompted a number of states to incorporate more within their own jurisdictions, all adding to the amount of credit available to support both productive and speculative endeavours. The significant increase in credit would play a significant role in the ensuing crisis.iv The initial share offering of the BUS occurred on 4 July 1791 and was heavily oversubscribed. This led to six weeks of heated financial speculation the likes of which had never been witnessed in America. During the ensuing month the share price doubled, before rising tenfold from the original issue price in early August. Equally, the price of public debt securities, which were to be used as payment for BUS shares, also rose by 25% within a month.v , an extremely prescient and economically literate politician, railed against the wanton financial speculation, arguing that the focus on the real economy was being sidelined, while people focused on financial speculation. An angry Thomas Jefferson wrote to a friend: “ and scrip are the sole domestic subjects of conversation ……. Ships are lying idle, buildings are stopped, manufacturers, arts and agriculture are employed in gambling.”vi

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Just as quickly as the stock and bond prices had jumped, by mid-August prices were in freefall, with stock prices falling by half and bond prices dropping 12% in just 4 days.vii Fearing a financial rout (largely of the government’s making), Hamilton swung into action, getting government support to use the privately-owned Bank of New York to purchase up to $200,000 in public debt in New York, while a further $150,000 was purchased in Philadelphia. At the same time, Hamilton let it be known to the market that the U.S. government was in the market to support prices.viii As one of the Sinking Fund commissioners, Jefferson argued strongly against the bail- out of speculators and associated banks using taxpayer money, but in the end, he acquiesced. These open market purchases are estimated to have been the equivalent of $80-90 billion1 of U.S. Treasuries in just one month, ix an extraordinary figure for the time. The fact that this intervention worked, at least in the short run, sent the wrong signals to the markets as it emboldened speculators that the government would bail out the financial system if things went pear-shaped, rather than let the market cleanse mal- investments on its own. By December 1791, the prices of securities had once again started to rise rapidly, driven by the actions of well-connected speculators, including the assistant secretary of the Treasury, William Duer, Alexander Macomb and other prominent bankers. Knowing that investors needed U.S. debt securities to make payments for their stock in the BUS, Duer and Macomb’s plan was to corner the U.S. debt securities market by creating credit by endorsing each other’s notes and using this newly-created money to buy debt securities. x In effect, Duer would create an IOU endorsed by his friends, who would in turn create an IUO guaranteed by Duer, with each transaction creating the credit required to purchase government securities. It was like ring-a-ring a rosy, until they all fell down – which of course, they all did. Whilst all of this was happening, Hamilton suggested that banks begin to slowly tighten credit to slow the amount of speculation. This request would shortly be overtaken by market events, which would render this advice worthless. xi While Duer and friends were seeking to push securities up, other rich investors such as the Livingston family of New York were betting the other way. To do this, they withdrew gold and silver from their bank deposits, contracting the money supply and forcing banks to call in . This created a credit squeeze, which pushed up interest rates to as much as one percent a day. xii The rapid reversal in an overextended credit market meant that many speculators were caught short, forcing a speedy sale in securities and a rapid decline in share prices. The credit contraction also put many banks under stress, prompting Hamilton to authorize government funds be used to support the BUS. The loss of confidence created a downward spiral, with falling prices leading to defaults, leading to a further loss in confidence which subsequently fueled further falls in prices.

1 US$ 2006

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By March 1792, Duer had become insolvent, and in a strange twist fate, he took refuge in the city jail to seek protection from his many creditors who were baying for blood. He was joined shortly thereafter by some of his colleagues, which prompted mobs to surround the prison as unrest spread throughout the city. The financial panic soon spread to the real economy as merchants began demanding payment for their goods in real money i.e. specie, rather than paper money, which they didn’t trust. Philadelphia also felt the , with land prices throughout Pennsylvania dropping two-thirds. xiii As he had done in the previous year, Hamilton quickly swung into action, using the Bank of New York to once again conduct open market purchases of securities to support the market, while using the Sinking Fund to counter the liquidity squeeze. Once again, these actions were sufficient to end the crisis, and stabilize both the financial system and the real economy. The Panic of 1792, and the subsequent collapse of the ensuing land boom in 1796, is notable for several reasons. Firstly, it was the first in America where the government used taxpayer money to bail out the banks and stabilize the financial system. It was also the first time the de facto central bank intervened to stabilize the banking system. Secondly, while speculative fervor subsided on Wall Street, the speculative bubble caused by easy money and ebullient social mood just shifted to another asset class, namely western lands. This second bubble burst in 1796, leading to a collapse of the U.S. real estate market, the bankruptcy of many prominent merchant firms, and the imprisonment of numerous American debtors. The crisis deepened when the Bank of England suspended specie payments. xiv Thirdly, it led directly to more effective securities trading and clearing systems, and the founding in 1792 of what would become the New York Stock Exchange. xv Fourthly, it had a considerable influence on the election of Thomas Jefferson as President in 1800, beginning decades of a federal government that was ideologically hostile to banks, industrial development, and the accumulation of capital. Only when a new generation of businessmen and financiers demonstrated that they could combine profit-seeking with self-restraint and concern for the general welfare did American voters and politicians begin to forget the fear and misery associated with the collapse of Wall Street’s first bubble. xvi Finally, the imprisonment of so many prominent businessmen prompted the government to pass legislation, which established a framework for debtors and creditors to work out their financial problems without the need for bankrupts to go to prison. This was a godsend for thousands of otherwise innocent people, who would have otherwise been sent to prison just because of financial mistakes and miscalculations.

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i https://wiki.mises.org/wiki/Panic_of_1792 ii https://wiki.mises.org/wiki/Panic_of_1792 iii https://wiki.mises.org/wiki/Panic_of_1792 iv https://wiki.mises.org/wiki/Panic_of_1792 v http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers1/Sylla.pdf vi Thomas Fleming "Wall Street's First Collapse", American Heritage, Winter 2009 vii http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers1/Sylla.pdf viii http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers1/Sylla.pdf ix “The US Panic of 1792: Financial Crisis Management and the ”; David J. Cowen, Richard Sylla and Robert E. Wright June 2006 x http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers1/Sylla.pdf xi https://wiki.mises.org/wiki/Panic_of_1792 xii Brian Trumbore. William Duer and the Crash of 1792 xiii Thomas Fleming. "Wall Street's First Collapse", American Heritage, Winter 2009 xiv https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panic_of_1796%E2%80%9397 xv http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers1/Sylla.pdf xvi https://www.americanheritage.com/content/wall-street%E2%80%99s-first-collapse

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