GATX MARS PRESENTATION

2021 1 Intro to GATX

2 North American Railcar Market: Key Data

AGENDA 3 Remember Early 2020?

4 Where Are We Now?

5 Closing Thoughts 2 Forward-Looking Statements

Statements in this presentation not based on historical facts are “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and, accordingly, involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict and could cause our actual results, performance, or achievements to differ materially from those discussed. These include statements as to our future expectations, beliefs, plans, strategies, objectives, events, conditions, financial performance, prospects, or future events. In some cases, forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of words such as “may,” “could,” “expect,” “intend,” “plan,” “seek,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “outlook,” “continue,” “likely,” “will,” “would,” and similar words and phrases. Forward-looking statements are necessarily based on estimates and assumptions that, while considered reasonable by us and our management, are inherently uncertain. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date they are made, and are not guarantees of future performance. We do not undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise these forward-looking statements. The following factors, in addition to those discussed in our other filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), including our Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2019 and subsequent reports on Form 10-Q, could cause actual results to differ materially from our current expectations expressed in forward-looking statements:

▪ the severity and duration of the global COVID-19 pandemic, including impacts of the pandemic and of businesses’ and ▪ financial and operational risks associated with long-term railcar purchase commitments, including increased costs due to governments’ responses to the pandemic on our personnel, operations, commercial activity, supply chain, the demand tariffs or trade disputes for our assets, the value of our assets and our liquidity ▪ reduced opportunities to generate asset remarketing income ▪ exposure to damages, fines, criminal and civil penalties, and reputational harm arising from a negative outcome in ▪ inability to successfully consummate and manage ongoing acquisition and divestiture activities litigation, including claims arising from an accident involving our railcars and other transportation assets ▪ operational and financial risks related to our affiliate investments, including the Rolls-Royce & Partners Finance joint ▪ inability to maintain our transportation assets on lease at satisfactory rates due to oversupply of assets in the market ventures, and the durability and reliability of aircraft engines or other changes in supply and demand ▪ fluctuations in foreign exchange rates ▪ a significant decline in customer demand for our assets or services, including as a result of: ▪ failure to successfully negotiate collective bargaining agreements with the unions representing a substantial portion of • weak macroeconomic conditions our employees • weak market conditions in our customers' businesses ▪ asset impairment charges we may be required to recognize • declines in harvest or production volumes ▪ deterioration of conditions in the capital markets, reductions in our credit ratings, or increases in our financing costs • adverse changes in the price of, or demand for, commodities ▪ uncertainty relating to the LIBOR calculation process and potential phasing out of LIBOR after 2021 • changes in railroad operations or efficiency ▪ competitive factors in our primary markets, including competitors with a significantly lower cost of capital than GATX • changes in railroad pricing and service offerings, including those related to "precision scheduled railroading" ▪ risks related to our international operations and expansion into new geographic markets, including the inability to access • changes in supply chains railcar supply and the imposition of new or additional tariffs, quotas, or trade barriers • availability of pipelines, trucks, and other alternative modes of transportation ▪ changes in, or failure to comply with, laws, rules, and regulations • changes in conditions affecting the aviation industry, including geographic exposure and customer concentrations ▪ inability to obtain cost-effective insurance • other operational or commercial needs or decisions of our customers ▪ environmental remediation costs • customers' desire to buy, rather than lease, our transportation assets ▪ potential obsolescence of our assets ▪ higher costs associated with increased assignments of our transportation assets following non-renewal of leases, ▪ inadequate allowances to cover credit losses in our portfolio customer defaults, and compliance maintenance programs or other maintenance initiatives ▪ operational, functional and regulatory risks associated with severe weather events, climate change and natural disasters ▪ events having an adverse impact on assets, customers, or regions where we have a concentrated investment ▪ inability to maintain and secure our information technology infrastructure from cybersecurity threats and related exposure disruption of our business

3 Intro to 1 GATX

4 Intro to 1 Who is GATX? GATX

Leading NA lessor Global railcar True “full-service” 123 year-old of railroad rolling investor with railcar provider with -based stock with 118K+ operations in North repair facilities company with $8.7 railcars and 600+ America, Europe, throughout U.S. and billion in assets locomotives India, and Russia Canada

5 Intro to 1 GATX’s 123-Year History GATX

1918 1914 - 1918 1929 - 1933 Spanish Flu World War I Great Depression 1939 - 1945 1898 World War II Established as railcar lessor with 28 railcars

1955 - 1975 Vietnam War 1907 1919 Began manufacturing railcars Initiated quarterly dividend 1970s 1936 Oil Crisis Began rail investment in Canada 1984 Exited railcar manufacturing 1981 Recession 1985 Began locomotive investment

1987 1994 Black Began rail investment in Europe & Mexico Monday 1998 Formed Rolls-Royce and Partners Finance Affiliates (RRPF) 2003 Acquired 100% ownership in European rail joint venture and formed GATX Rail Europe (GRE) 2000 2012 & 2013 Tech Crash Began rail investments in India and Russia 2001 “9/11” 2020 2009 - 2010 $8.7 billion in assets and ~148.5K Great Recession wholly owned railcars worldwide* *As of 9/30/2020

6 Intro to 1 GATX North American Fleet GATX Intermodal Other

13K - 19K gallon 6% 3% Open-Top Cars 3% General Service Tanks 13%

GATX has 20K - 25K gallon 7% 15% approximately Specialty Covered Hoppers 118,000 3% wholly owned 5% > 25K gallon 16% railcars in Pneumatic Covered Hoppers >4,000 cf North 10% High Pressure Tanks * America < 4,000 cf 10% 4% 5% Gravity Covered Hoppers

Specialty/Acid Tanks

*As of 9/30/2020

7 North American 2 Railcar Market: Key Data NA Railcar 2 Industry Ownership Market

Approximately 1.65 million railcars

RAILROADS (16%) LESSORS (56%) ▪ Ownership of railcars continues ▪ Shift from railroad- and shipper- owned significant decline railcars to lessors ▪ Virtually no ownership due ▪ Lessors dominate the tank car segment to complexities and regulations due to complex services and compliance ▪ Focus of capital investment requirements on infrastructure 16%

18% 56% SHIPPERS (18%) TTX (10%) 10% ▪ Shipper ownership share has ▪ Railroad-owned equipment pool declined slightly focused on box, flat, intermodal, and ▪ Alternative focus of capital on core business cars versus railcar investments ▪ Overall market share has remained ▪ Railcar maintenance and management not a steady since 2008 at ~10% of the core competency North American fleet

UMLER as of January 2021

9 NA Railcar 2 Industry Fleet and Ownership Mix Market

RAILCARS BY TYPE TANK CAR OWNERSHIP SHARE (Approximately 1.65 million railcars)

18% 0% 4% 7% Lessor Shipper/Other 8% <1% Railroad 34% Based on approximately 438,000 tank cars 82% 20%

FREIGHT CAR OWNERSHIP SHARE

27% 14% Lessor Railroad 18% Flat Shipper/Other 46% Tank TTX Open Top Intermodal Based on approximately 1.2 million freight cars 22%

UMLER as of January 2021

10 NA Railcar 2 Lessor Market Share Market

LESSOR OWNERSHIP SHARE TANK CAR LESSOR OWNERSHIP SHARE (Based on approximately 919,000 lessor-owned railcars)

15% 17% GATX Union Tank Car 13% 7% Trinity 24% 17% CIT 10% GATX SMBC 33% Other 13% 16% 18% 6% GATX Based on approximately 358,000 lessor-owned tank cars

13% 14% FREIGHT CAR LESSOR OWNERSHIP SHARE

14% 11% GATX Rail 34% CIT GATX CIT 11% 24% Trinity SMBC GATX SMBC Union Tank Car Other Other Trinity 11% 15% 5% Based on approximately 561,000 lessor-owned freight cars

UMLER as of January 2021

11 Remember 3 Early 2020?

For railcar owners, challenges were apparent even before COVID-19 2020 3 PSR and the Railcar Market Recap

▪PSR operating practices drive rail fleet reductions • Class I cost cutting • Shorter cycle times

▪Loss of resiliency and redundancy is a significant issue

▪Carload shippers express concerns • Modal shift remains a risk to railcar demand • PSR must not come at the cost of lost customers and carload volume

13 2020 3 Builder Overcapacity Recap

Industry has averaged nearly 50K annual builds over last decade

1.6M railcars with 50-yr Almost 1 out of every statutory life implies 5 cars today is a coal 32K replacement rate car or small-cube covered hopper

Real replacement Builder capacity need for foreseeable peaked at ~80K future is <25K

14 2020 3 Energy Blues Recap

Secular decline of coal

Shift away from Beginning of rail-hauled frac ‘de-carbonization’ sand of economy?

15 2020 3 COVID-19 Macroeconomic Impact Recap

U.S. GDP U.S. UNEMPLOYMENT

U.S. GDP dropped at an annualized rate of U.S. unemployment jumped from 4.4% in March 2020 31.4% in 2Q20 before increasing at an to 14.8% in April, representing the highest rate and annualized rate of 33.4% in 3Q20 as efforts largest month-over-month (MoM) increase since data continued to reopen businesses and resume collection began in January 1948; For December 2020, activities impacted by COVID-19 it remained unchanged MoM at 6.7%

*Note: At seasonally adjusted annual rate; Bureau of Economic Analysis *Note: Seasonally adjusted; Federal Reserve Economic Data

16 2020 3 COVID-19 Macroeconomic Impact Recap

U.S. CONSUMER U.S. INDUSTRIAL SPENDING PRODUCTION

U.S. consumer spending declined 19.4% The U.S. Industrial Production Index fell by 16.5% between February and April 2020; It rebounded between February and April 2020; It has since risen to relatively quickly, but recovery has slowed in within 5% of its pre-pandemic level recent months; November 2020 saw a slight reversal (-0.4%)

*Note: Seasonally adjusted annual rate; Federal Reserve Economic Data *Note: Seasonally adjusted; Federal Reserve Economic Data

17 2020 3 COVID-19 Rail Impact: Carloads Recap

2Q20 Statistics: Ex-Coal and Coke Down 13.2% vs 1Q20 Down 19.3% vs 2Q19

3Q20 Statistics: Ex-Coal and Coke Up 10.6% vs 2Q20 Down 7.9% vs 3Q19

4Q20 Statistics: Ex-Coal and Coke Up 5.6% vs 3Q20 Up 0.9% vs 4Q19

Note: 2020 volumes based on Weeks 1-52; AAR

18 2020 3 COVID-19 Rail Impact: Railcars in Storage Recap

▪ Between March 2020 and July 2020, railcars in storage increased by 34% (132,600 cars)

▪ Since August 2020, railcars in storage have declined by 22% to 409,289 as of 1/1/21

Total Cars In Car Type In Storage % In Storage % of Stored Cars Service Box 100,847 17,149 17% 4% Covered 569,683 136,895 24% 33% Hoppers Flats 74,560 21,218 28% 5% Gondolas 199,588 52,674 26% 13% Hoppers 124,138 40,600 33% 10% Intermodal 73,619 6,402 9% 2% Refrigerator 10,555 3,090 29% 1% Tanks 439,266 126,732 29% 31% Vehicle Flat 65,099 4,529 7% 1% Grand Total 1,657,355 409,289 25% 100%

AAR (Rail Time Indicators Report) Note: Cars are considered in storage when not moved in 60 days

19 Where Are 4 We Now?

20 Current 4 State Railcar Market Conditions: Before and After

Pre-COVID-19 Post-COVID-19

• After steep declines in 2Q20, carloads recovered • Carloads expected to improve as year progressed to end 2020 down 11.3% vs 2019; China with potential support from U.S.-China trade deal accelerated purchases later in the year but remains behind trade agreement targets for 2020

• Energy carloads have lagged in the recovery; • Railroads viewed petroleum/related products as Grain and farm/food products have been bright spots in sources of growth carload; Intermodal has surged as well

• Healthy secondary market expected to continue • Secondary market weakened during worst of COVID barring interest rate increase and/or material capital crisis but has recovered well market disruption

• Manufacturer overcapacity increasingly seen as • All major railcar manufacturers have reduced an issue capacity during the year

• Strong freight demand, accompanied by driver • Excess capacity and declining rates made trucking shortages, has caused trucking capacity to tighten and more competitive with rail rates to rise, benefitting certain rail segments

21 Current 4 Industry Manufacturing State

INDUSTRY BACKLOG, NET ORDERS, DELIVERIES

45,000 140,000

40,000 120,000 35,000

100,000 30,000

25,000 80,000

20,000 Backlog 60,000

15,000 Net OrdersDeliveries and 40,000 10,000

20,000 5,000

- - ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 ’15 ’16 ’17 ’18 ’19 ‘20

Backlog Deliveries Net Orders

Note: Light blue shading represents 1Q of respective year; Net orders dropped below 0 in 4Q08 at -5,774 and 4Q09 at -5,414 Railway Supply Institute as of September 2020

22 Current 4 Scrap Pricing State

American Metal Market #1 Chicago Heavy Melt Steel Pricing 1975 – 2021 YTD $500

$425.00

$400

$300

$200

$100

$0

Jul-81 Jul-92 Jul-03 Jul-14

Jan-76 Jan-87 Jan-98 Jan-09 Jan-20

Jun-82 Jun-93 Jun-04 Jun-15

Oct-11 Oct-78 Oct-89 Oct-00

Apr-84 Apr-95 Apr-06 Apr-17

Feb-75 Sep-79 Feb-86 Sep-90 Feb-97 Sep-01 Feb-08 Sep-12 Feb-19

Dec-98 Dec-76 Dec-87 Dec-09 Dec-20

Aug-80 Aug-91 Aug-02 Aug-13

Nov-77 Nov-88 Nov-99 Nov-10

Mar-85 Mar-96 Mar-07 Mar-18

May-83 May-94 May-05 May-16

23 Closing 5 Thoughts Closing 5 Never Waste a Crisis Thoughts

I hope we all learned something as we went through 2020…

Builder rationalization needs to be permanent ▪ Industry doesn’t need, and shouldn’t have, 80k cars of nameplate capacity

PSR has been great for railroad shareholders, but a renewed focus on customer value proposition is needed ▪ Customers with modal choice need to be convinced to prefer carload rail ▪ Excited about RailPulse as way to improve customer experience

Railcar market recovery will be supply-led Rail is still a fundamentally attractive mode of ▪ High scrap pricing should help transport in North America ▪ Builder rationalization should help ▪ But the railcar market still faces many headwinds before it ▪ But recovery is likely to be slow will return to health

25 QUESTIONS?