DOCSLIB.ORG

2016 Annual Report (PDF)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
2016 Annual Report (PDF) Our Commitment WELLS FARGO & COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT 2016 2016 ANNUAL REPORT Contents 2 | Letter from Chairman of the Board 4 | Letter from Chief Executive Officer and President 14 | Demonstrating Our Commitment 14 | Homeownership: More than a dream 16 | Journey through retirement 18 | A prescription for caring 20 | Bringing bankers to the kitchen table 22 | A home for hope 24 | Building with smart technology 26 | Helping create affordable housing 28 | A future of efficient freight 30 | A bank for life 32 | Operating Committee and Other Corporate Officers 33 | Board of Directors 34 | 2016 Corporate Social Responsibility Performance 35 | 2016 Financial Report - Financial review - Controls and procedures - Financial statements - Report of independent registered public accounting firm 273 | Stock Performance 2 2016 ANNUAL REPORT Dear Fellow Shareholders, Since 1852, Wells Fargo has worked to earn customers’ trust We have enforced senior management accountability by meeting their financial needs and helping them succeed for the damage to Wells Fargo’s reputation through very financially, while maintaining the highest standards of significant compensation actions. The Board accepted integrity. That is why my fellow Board members and I were John Stumpf’s recommendation to forfeit all of his unvested deeply troubled that Wells Fargo violated that trust by equity of approximately $41 million prior to his retirement opening accounts for certain retail banking customers that as Chairman and CEO. The Board required Carrie Tolstedt, they did not request or in some cases even know about. the departed head of Community Banking, to forfeit all This behavior is unacceptable, not only to the Board but of her approximately $19 million of unvested equity. also to the overwhelming majority of our people who are hard-working and highly ethical. In addition, given the overall impact on Wells Fargo’s stakeholders in 2016, the eight current members of our We have taken aggressive action to root out these practices 11-person Operating Committee who were in place and to compensate our customers who were harmed by before it was reconstituted in November 2016, including them. We recognize that these events signaled a need for our new CEO Tim Sloan, received no cash bonuses for 2016 fundamental changes in Wells Fargo’s culture, management and forfeited up to 50% of the amounts they would have systems, and executive leadership. Most significant otherwise received under their 2014 performance share among the many changes we have made is naming Tim awards that vested following 2016. Combined, these amounts Sloan CEO and Mary Mack head of the Community Bank. represent lost compensation of approximately $32 million, Together, Tim and Mary are leading a wave of change in based on 2016 target bonuses and our share price on the Community Bank’s culture, performance management, February 28, 2017, when the Board took these actions. compensation systems, and risk reporting structure -- all designed to ensure these problems never recur. These While the Board and management have made significant changes, as well as our actions to make things right with changes in the wake of the sales practices issue, I want our customers, are detailed in Tim’s letter which follows. to assure our shareholders that important aspects of Wells Fargo will not change. We serve the financial Wells Fargo’s Board of Directors has been actively involved needs of one in three U.S. households, and we remain in these management actions and has taken additional committed to generating long-term shareholder value steps to strengthen our oversight and governance by delivering superior returns across a variety of market capabilities. We have changed the company’s bylaws to conditions due to our diverse business model. However, specify that the Board Chair be an independent Director, there is no question that the impact of improper sales and we have bolstered Board leadership by naming practices has damaged our company’s reputation and the Betsy Duke Vice Chair. We have accelerated our ongoing bond of trust with our customers. The Board, management process of Board refreshment by electing two talented and Wells Fargo’s 269,000 team members are determined new Directors to succeed long-serving Board members. to restore that reputation and re-establish that bond We have also modified Board committee charters to of trust. I am confident that we will use this moment of strengthen oversight of such aspects as team member testing to make Wells Fargo stronger in the years ahead. culture, ethics line reports and consumer complaints. The independent Directors are conducting our own Sincerely, investigation to ensure we understand the root causes of the sales practices problem and have learned the lessons that will prevent any future recurrence. We expect to make findings of the investigation public before our 2017 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. Stephen W. Sanger Chairman of the Board 3 We are fully committed to making things right for our stakeholders and rebuilding trust. This is a long-term effort — one requiring commitment, patience, and resolve. Timothy J. Sloan Chief Executive Officer and President Wells Fargo & Company 4 2016 ANNUAL REPORT To Our Owners: This is my first annual report to shareholders, and I am We are conducting thorough reviews and investigations pleased to have this opportunity to share my thoughts to fully understand where things broke down and where on Wells Fargo — our accomplishments, challenges, and we failed. We are committed to learning from our mistakes decisive steps to rebuild trust — as part of our regular, because we recognize the inappropriate sales practices in ongoing conversation about our company. our retail bank did not serve the interests of our customers, our team members, or our company. And despite efforts In October 2016, I was honored to be chosen by our board to set things right, we did not move quickly enough to of directors to succeed John Stumpf as CEO and to lead address these issues. Wells Fargo into the future. John successfully navigated the company through the financial crisis of 2008–2009 All of this was unacceptable, and the lessons we learned must and the largest merger in banking; now, I am fully never be forgotten as we make changes necessary to regain dedicated to guiding our company forward at this our status as one of the world’s best financial institutions. critical moment in our 165-year history. I want to start by stating clearly that the foundation of our company is strong. Despite our current challenges, REBUILDING TRUST I believe that our underlying business strengths and our focus on managing for the long term will continue MAKING IT RIGHT FOR CUSTOMERS to benefit us as we move forward. We have meaningful AND TEAM MEMBERS opportunities, as you will read later in this letter, and we will be prepared to deliver for all of our stakeholders. As always, we take our commitment to our team members, We are fully committed to making things right for our customers, shareholders, and communities very seriously, stakeholders and rebuilding trust. This is a long-term effort and we manage with those constituents in mind. — one requiring commitment, patience, and resolve. Our challenges in 2016 were among the toughest At the outset, we employed a third-party consultant to in our company’s history. Unacceptable sales practices review accounts and identify impacted customers. We in our retail bank resulted in accounts being opened reviewed more than 94 million checking, credit card, and for customers that they were unaware of and neither line of credit accounts, dating from 2011 to 2016. Based on needed nor wanted. This exposed behaviors that needed that review, we refunded more than $3.2 million in charges to be addressed. These behaviors were contrary to our and fees on approximately 130,000 accounts that we values, raised questions about our culture, and damaged could not rule out as being initiated without a customer’s our reputation and the trust of many of our stakeholders. authorization. We also reached out to approximately I want to assure you that we are facing these problems 40 million retail customers and 3 million small businesses head on, and I am confident that Wells Fargo will through email, statement messaging, and postcards to emerge a stronger company. ensure those affected by the unacceptable sales practices could reach us. We are researching how customers’ credit Our top priority is rebuilding trust through a scores were impacted as a result of potentially unauthorized comprehensive plan that includes making things right credit cards, with the goal of aiding customers whose credit for our customers and team members, ensuring we fix scores might have been affected. And we decided to go problems at their root cause, and building a better bank beyond the requirements of our sales practices consent for the future. We are committed to transparency as we orders to expand our account reviews to include the years connect with all stakeholders more frequently through 2009 and 2010. increased communications. 5 We also want to rebuild trust with our team members. Finally, we have increased the information we disclose to A cornerstone of this effort is communicating more our investors, so you can more readily see the impact the frequently and with greater transparency. Between sales practices matters have had on our business and the September 2016 and January 2017, members of the actions we have taken in response. For example, in October, Operating Committee held 50 in-person sessions with we began providing monthly updates detailing trends in team members in more than 40 cities. These sessions our retail bank’s customer activity. In May 2017, we will host reached thousands of team members in person, an off-cycle Investor Day to provide more details, including and tens of thousands participated through satellite the changes we are making across the company to better broadcasts, streaming to desktops, and other serve our customers and build a stronger Wells Fargo.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • JP Morgan and the Money Trust
    FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECONOMIC EDUCATION The Panic of 1907: J.P. Morgan and the Money Trust Lesson Author Mary Fuchs Standards and Benchmarks (see page 47) Lesson Description The Panic of 1907 was a financial crisis set off by a series of bad banking decisions and a frenzy of withdrawals caused by public distrust of the banking system. J.P. Morgan, along with other wealthy Wall Street bankers, loaned their own funds to save the coun- try from a severe financial crisis. But what happens when a single man, or small group of men, have the power to control the finances of a country? In this lesson, students will learn about the Panic of 1907 and the measures Morgan used to finance and save the major banks and trust companies. Students will also practice close reading to analyze texts from the Pujo hearings, newspapers, and reactionary articles to develop an evidence- based argument about whether or not a money trust—a Morgan-led cartel—existed. Grade Level 10-12 Concepts Bank run Bank panic Cartel Central bank Liquidity Money trust Monopoly Sherman Antitrust Act Trust ©2015, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Permission is granted to reprint or photocopy this lesson in its entirety for educational purposes, provided the user credits the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, www.stlouisfed.org/education. 1 Lesson Plan The Panic of 1907: J.P. Morgan and the Money Trust Time Required 100-120 minutes Compelling Question What did J.P. Morgan have to do with the founding of the Federal Reserve? Objectives Students will • define bank run, bank panic, monopoly, central bank, cartel, and liquidity; • explain the Panic of 1907 and the events leading up to the panic; • analyze the Sherman Antitrust Act; • explain how monopolies worked in the early 20th-century banking industry; • develop an evidence-based argument about whether or not a money trust—a Morgan-led cartel—existed • explain how J.P.
    [Show full text]
  • Temple R. Hollcroft Collection
    Temple Hollcroft Collection WELLS COLLEGE ARCHIVES AND SPECIAL COLLECTIONS TEMPLE R. HOLLCROFT COLLECTION Quantity: 5 Linear Feet Containers: 5 Archival Boxes Date Processed: Fall 2010 Processed by: Kathryn McNamara Finding Aid: December 12, 2010 / Amended October 22, 2019 By: Kathryn McNamara / Amended by Robyn Fordyce Edited by: Molly Brown / Tiffany Raymond Prepared for Web: By: Access: There is no restriction on access to the Temple Hollcroft Collection for research use. Particularly fragile items may be restricted for preservation purposes. Copyright: Requests for permission to publish material from the Temple Hollcroft Collection should be directed to the Archives and Special Collections. It is the responsibility of the researcher to identify and satisfy the holders of all copyrights. Page 2 Temple Hollcroft Collection INTRODUCTION Biographical Note/Background: Temple Rice Hollcroft was born in Indiana in 1889. He was a Mathematics Professor at Wells College beginning in 1918 and stayed for 36 years. After his tenure as a faculty member, he was named as the Wells College Historian in 1953, and his interest in history served the college well. He was thorough and dedicated to the position, and a series of his short pieces of historical interest appeared in the Alumna News. He was interested in statistics and intent on accuracy and correct presentation. He died in New York, September of 1967. Related Material: Hollcroft, Temple. A History of Wells College. (3 copies) Hollcroft, Temple. Wells Fargo History. Manuscript (ribbon copy), 1968. Hollcroft, Temple. Salem Town: Partial Autobiography and Masonic Biography. New York: American Lodge of Research, Free and Accepted Masons, 1951. Print.
    [Show full text]
  • During the Past Two Decades, the U.S. Housing Finance System Experienced Changes of a Magnitude Unseen Since the New Deal Era
    FOREWORD During the past two decades, the U.S. housing finance system experienced changes of a magnitude unseen since the New Deal era. In the 1980s, the primary mortgage market restructured and consolidated as a result of the savings and loan crisis, adjustable-rate mortgages became widely available, and the secondary mortgage market grew rapidly. The 1990s saw continued industry consolidation, as well as significant technological de- velopments in mortgage finance. In addition, the past decade was a time of considerable innovation in affordable mortgage lending, part of a growing movement to connect his- torically underserved households and communities to the mainstream housing finance system. This volume examines this movement through case studies of organizations recognized by their peers as leaders in expanding homeownership opportunities. In an extension of their earlier research for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the authors describe the efforts of a broad cross section of industry participants, including small and large lenders, nonprofit community-based organizations (CBOs), and lending consortia. They document a wide range of strategies—in the areas of management, out- reach, borrower qualification, and homeowner retention—designed to expand and sus- tain homeownership among lower-income and minority households. The case studies illustrate three notable aspects of recent efforts to extend the reach of homeownership. First, they demonstrate that leaders in the mortgage finance industry view historically underserved populations and communities as viable business markets rather than regulatory burdens, and back this perspective with action. Second, the stud- ies show the vital role that partnership plays in expanding opportunity.
    [Show full text]
  • GATX Corporation Annual Report 2020
    GATX Corporation Annual Report 2020 Form 10-K (NYSE:GATX) Published: February 19th, 2020 PDF generated by stocklight.com UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 Form 10-K ☑ ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019 or ☐ TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 Commission File Number 1-2328 GATX Corporation (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter) New York 36-1124040 (State or Other Jurisdiction of incorporation or Organization) (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.) 233 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606-7147 (Address of principal executive offices, including zip code) (312) 621-6200 (Registrant's telephone number, including area code) Securities Registered Pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act: Title of each class Trading Symbol(s) Name of Each Exchange on Which Registered Common Stock GATX New York Stock Exchange Chicago Stock Exchange 5.625% Senior Notes due 2066 GMTA New York Stock Exchange Securities Registered Pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Act: None Indicate by check mark if the registrant is a well-known seasoned issuer, as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act. Yes þ No o Indicate by check mark if the registrant is not required to file reports pursuant to Section 13 or Section 15(d) of the Act. Yes o No þ Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days.
    [Show full text]
  • United States District Court Eastern District of New York
    Case 2:14-cv-05169-JMA-ARL Document 15 Filed 10/27/14 Page 1 of 42 PageID #: 122 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MICHELLE F. HARTLEY, STEVEN TOMLINSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and MARIA DEGENNERO, Civil Action No. Plaintiffs, AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, vs. RESTITUTION AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WELLS FARGO & COMPANY; WACHOVIA SECURITIES FINANCIAL HOLDINGS, LLC; JURY TRIAL DEMAND and WELLS FARGO ADVISORS, LLC, all as successors in interest to Wachovia Securities, LLC, Defendants. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by their attorneys, The Law Offices of Christopher Q. Davis, PLLC, alleges, upon personal knowledge and upon information and belief as to other matters, as follows: NATURE OF ACTION 1. This is a collective and class action brought by Individual and Lead Plaintiffs and Putative Class Representative Plaintiffs Michelle F. Hartley and Steven Tomlinson, Individual and Lead Plaintiff Maria DeGennero (together, the “Lead Plaintiffs” or “Named Plaintiffs”) and all putative plaintiffs (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), on their own behalf and on behalf of the proposed classes identified below. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class members were or are employed by Defendant Wells Fargo & Company, Defendant Wachovia Securities Financial Holdings, LLC, and Defendant Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, as successor in interest to former 1 Case 2:14-cv-05169-JMA-ARL Document 15 Filed 10/27/14 Page 2 of 42 PageID #: 123 employer Wachovia Securities, LLC, (collectively, “Wells Fargo” or the “Defendants”). Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant Wells Fargo & Company in their registered broker- dealer, Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, as Financial Advisors in the Private Client Group.1 2.
    [Show full text]
  • EXHIBIT C Lennox Declaration Case 19-11240-LSS Doc 107-4 Filed 06
    Case 19-11240-LSS Doc 107-4 Filed 06/11/19 Page 1 of 55 EXHIBIT C Lennox Declaration RLF1 21403718v.1 Case 19-11240-LSS Doc 107-4 Filed 06/11/19 Page 2 of 55 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE : In re: : Chapter 11 : FTD Companies, Inc., et al.,1 : Case No. 19-11240 (LSS) : Debtors. : (Jointly Administered) : DECLARATION OF HEATHER LENNOX Pursuant to Rule 2014(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"), Rule 2014-1(a) of the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Practice and Procedure of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Local Rules"), and in accordance with the Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Filed under 11 U.S.C. § 330 by Attorneys in Larger Chapter 11 Cases, issued by the Executive Office of the United States Trustee (the "U.S. Trustee Guidelines"), I, Heather Lennox, declare: 1. I am an attorney at law admitted and in good standing to practice in the States of New York and Ohio, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York and the Eastern District of Michigan. The Court has entered an order allowing me to appear pro hac vice (D.I. 33). 1 The Debtors are the following 15 entities (the last four digits of their respective taxpayer identification numbers, if any, follow in parentheses): FTD Companies, Inc. (5852); Bloom That, Inc.
    [Show full text]
  • The Japanese Economy During the Interwar Period
    20092009--JE--21 The Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period: 両大戦間期Instabilityの日本における恐慌と政策対応 in the Financial System and ― 金融システム問題と世界恐慌への対応を中心にthe Impact of the World Depression ― Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies 金融研究所 鎮目雅人 Masato Shizume 2009 年 4 月 May 2009 The Japanese economy during the interwar period faced chronic crises. Among them, the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927 and the Showa Depression of 1930-31 marked turning points. The Showa Financial Crisis of 1927 was the consequence of persistent financial instability because of the incomplete restructuring in the business sector and postponements in the disposal of bad loans by financial institutions. The crisis brought reforms in the financial sector through large-scale injections of public funds and the amalgamation of banks. The Showa Depression of 1930-31 was caused by the Great Depression, a worldwide economic collapse, which had been intensified in Japan by the return to the Gold Standard at the old parity. Japan escaped from the Great Depression earlier than most other countries through a series of macroeconomic stimulus measures initiated by Korekiyo Takahashi, a veteran Finance Minister who resumed office in December 1931. Takahashi instituted comprehensive macroeconomic policy measures, including exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary adjustments. At the same time, the Gold Standard, which had been governing Japan’s fiscal policy, collapsed in the wake of the British departure from it in September 1931. Then, Japan introduced a mechanism by which the government could receive easy credit from the central bank without establishing other institutional measures to govern its fiscal policy. This course of events resulted in an eventual loss of fiscal discipline.
    [Show full text]
  • Riders on the Storm
    But………… Riders on the storm November 21, 2012: 11:25 AM ET Wells Fargo avoided the reckless tactics of other banks and quietly built a powerhouse in the West. Now its takeover of Wachovia makes it a national force, but how much toxic waste is aboard the stagecoach? By Adam Lashinsky This story is from the May 4, 2009 issue of Fortune. It is the full text of an article excerpted in Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything, 1966-2012, a Fortune Magazine book, collected and expanded by Carol Loomis. Pardners: Stumpf, with strongbox, took over as CEO last year, succeeding Kovacevich, who built the empire and plans to retire as chairman. FORTUNE -- Dick Kovacevich ought to be happy. The sun is shining in San Francisco on an early April morning, shares of Wells Fargo, where Kovacevich is chairman of the board, have almost doubled in a month, and Wells appears to have survived the worst of the banking crisis with its reputation intact (so far). Yet Kovacevich, at 65 a pugnacious and famously outspoken banker, is peeved, to put it mildly. He's miffed at short-sellers who have hammered Wells Fargo as if it were one of those troubled-asset repositories. He bemoans the media for failing to recognize Wells Fargo's achievements. Most of all, he's seething with anger at Washington for all sorts of bad decisions, from making a show of big-bank stress tests (which he has publicly The Brooklyn Investor Wells Fargo Page 1 called "asinine") to giving him exactly one hour to accept a $25 billion investment in October from the controversial Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP.
    [Show full text]
  • Tank Car Committee Main Session Docket and Agenda
    Tank Car Committee Main Session Docket and Agenda April 18-19, 2018 Atlanta, GA MEETING SCHEDULE Wednesday April 18, 2018 Tank Car Committee The Whitney, Buckhead, GA 2:00pm – 3:30am Government Regulatory Update 3:30am – 5:00pm AAR M‐1002 Standards Thursday April 19, 2018 Tank Car Committee The Whitney, Buckhead, GA 8:00am – 11:00am AAR M‐1002 Standards/Standing Updates 11:00am – 12:00pm Tank Car Research Program April 2018 Tank Car Committee Main Session Agenda/Docket Page 2 of 114 AAR TANK CAR COMMITTEE MEMBERS Railroad: Affiliation Andy Ash (Chair) Railway Association of Canada Jim Kozey (Vice-Chair) Canadian Pacific Railway Ryan Miller Kansas City Southern Railroad John Birkmann Union Pacific Railroad Jorge Gallardo Ferrocarril Mexicano (FXE) Chris Machenberg CSX Transportation Anthony Ippolito Canadian National Railway Bruce Siebold BNSF Railway Company Alvaro Almaguer Kansas City Southern de México, S.A. de C.V. David Schoendorfer Hazmat Committee Liaison (Norfolk Southern Railway) Paul Williams Norfolk Southern Railway Allen Richter Consolidated Rail Corporation JR Gelnar ASLRRA Non-Railroad Shippers: Kevin Flahive The Fertilizer Institute (Koch Fertilizer) N. Scott Murray ACC (ExxonMobil Chemical Company) Robyn Kinsley The Chlorine Institute Mike Richardson U.S. Clay Producers Traffic Association Kirk Warner American Petroleum Institute (Consultant) Craig Jorgenson The Sulphur Institute Kelly Davis The Ethanol Shippers Non-Railroad Tank Car Builders: A.D. McKisic Trinity Industries Tony Sisto GATX Rail Corporation Joe Perez UTLX
    [Show full text]
  • Our Firm and Understand Your Needs, Helps You Clarify Your Goals, and Takes the Safety and Security of Your Money and Investments Seriously
    Our Firm and understand your needs, helps you clarify your goals, and takes the safety and security of your money and investments seriously. We will be fully invested in your success: Your Financial Advisor can help you stay on track to meet your goals through intelligent financial solutions, in-depth analysis of your investments, and regular feedback on your progress. We will be with you every step of the way: Your needs and goals will change over time. That’s why your Financial Advisor will be there to provide ongoing advice—along with the exceptional service you deserve— Home Office—St. Louis, MO through the ups and downs of markets and economic cycles. A heritage of client service Wells Fargo Advisors is one of the nation’s premier Areas of distinction financial-services firms. Represented by nearly 13,500 • Unique structure that combines the capabilities of a large, Financial Advisors in 5,000 U.S. locations, it was born out national firm with the best practices of several smaller, of Wells Fargo & Company’s 2009 acquisition of Wachovia esteemed firms Corporation.* • Dedicated to Financial Advisors and their relationships Wachovia Securities, LLC, which traced its roots to 1879, with clients grew over the years through mergers with some of the • Exceptional choice and flexibility for Financial Advisors industry’s most respected regional and national firms, and their clients through distinct business channels including the 2007 acquisition of A.G. Edwards, Inc., supported by established products, services, and by Wachovia Corporation. Throughout their histories, technology Wells Fargo Advisors’ predecessors were known for service based on trust and knowledge, and for corporate cultures Products and services that put client needs above all else.
    [Show full text]
  • Court of Appeals STATE of NEW YORK
    To Be Argued By: ROBERT J. GIUFFRA, JR., ESQ. Time Requested: 30 Minutes New York County Clerk’s Index No. 601475/09 Court of Appeals STATE OF NEW YORK ABN AMRO BANK N.V.;d BNP PARIBAS; CALYON; HSBC BANK USA, N.A.; KBC INVESTMENTS CAYMAN ISLANDS VLTD.; MERRILL LYNCH INTERNATIONAL; BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL SERVICES INC.; NATIXIS; NATIXIS FINANCIAL PRODUCTS INC.; THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC; SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE; UBS AG, LONDON BRANCH; and WACHOVIA BANK, N.A., Plaintiffs-Appellants, —and— BARCLAYS BANK PLC; CITIBANK, N.A.; CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE; JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; COÖPERATIEVE CENTRALE RAIFFEISEN-BOERENLEENBANK B.A., NEW YORK BRANCH; ROYAL BANK OF CANADA; SMBC CAPITAL MARKETS LIMITED, Plaintiffs, —against— MBIA INC., MBIA INSURANCE CORPORATION, and MBIA INSURANCE CORP. OF ILLINOIS, Defendants-Respondents. BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS ROBERT J. GIUFFRA, JR. MICHAEL T. TOMAINO, JR. BRIAN T. FRAWLEY JULIA M. JORDAN WILLIAM H. WAGENER JONATHAN C. SHAPIRO SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 125 Broad Street New York, New York 10004 Telephone: (212) 558-4000 Facsimile: (212) 558-3588 Date Completed: March 16, 2011 Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants STATEMENT PURSUANT TO § 500.1(F) OF THE RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Plaintiff BNP Paribas states that it has over 1,000 subsidiaries and affiliates, which are too numerous to list, but states that its principal U.S. subsidiaries include Bank of the West; First Hawaiian Bank; BNP Pari bas Securities Corp.; BNP Paribas Prime Brokerage, Inc.; BNP Paribas Commodity Futures Inc.; Paribas North America, Inc. and BNP Paribas North America, Inc.
    [Show full text]
  • GATX Corporation: an Overview
    COMPANY OVERVIEW PRESENTATION 2020 Revised June 26, 2020 Table of Contents History and Business Overview ....................................................................................................................... 4 Business Model ........................................................................................................................................... 16 Business Segments Overview ....................................................................................................................... 23 Rail North America ...................................................................................................................................... 27 Rail International ........................................................................................................................................ 44 Portfolio Management .................................................................................................................................. 54 Financial Highlights ..................................................................................................................................... 59 Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Measures ............................................................................................................ 65 2 Forward-Looking Statements Statements in this presentation not based on historical facts are “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and, accordingly, involve known and unknown risks
    [Show full text]