by S. L. A. Marshall *.N ?. Commentary On INFANTRY OPERATIONS AND WEAPONS USAGE IN KOREA Winter of 195031 by S. L. A. Marshall The operations of Eighth Army which formed the basis for this study were of the period of maximum reverse and then recovery. The report does not reach back to the initial period when troops were green and our commitments were so limited that there was seldom a chance for an equal fight on local ground. Nor does it extend forward into the period when the fronts became stabilized and positional warfare ensued. It focuses exclusively upon the campaign of the first winter in which 8th Army experienced its greatest and most prolonged stress; the conditions peculiar to that period provide the best opportunity for the clear profiling of weapons, tactical and leadership values in combat against the background of training methods and the armament program. The author of the report developed the post-combat company critique technique in Central Pacific Theater and then applied it in European Theater during World War II. He used the same general method in Korea, beginning with the November battle. The one major change for OR0 purposes was that the method was amplified so as to include more precise detail on the logistics of the infantry fight and place primary emphasis on the fighting characteristics of the new enemy. The commentary is divided into three parts - the behavior of men in the use of weapons, the behavior of weapons as men use them, and the use of information in augmenting fighting power. The first draft of this work was studied and criticized by 43 divisional, regimental, and battalion commanders who had successfully led troops in the winter campaign. They were asked to give it the best of their attention, strengthening, sharpening, and refining it where needed. Where the work may have any special merit, it is because of the unani- mously generous spirit of cooperation with which they responded. For such opinions and judgments as are expressed herein, however, the author of the report accepts sole responsibility. uWASSlFlED Abstractpagefrom: ORO0&13 (xx + 142 ye4 iii Received: 7 October 1951 Project’DOUGHBOY The conclusions and recommendations of the Report abstracted here are those of the Operations Research Office. No official approval by the Department of t.he Army, express or implied, should be inferred. UNCLASSIFIED Thie Document conteius inform&ion &&ing the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The trauemition or the revelation of its contenta in any mmmer to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. , . ‘. COMMENTARY ON INFANTRY OPERATIONS AND WEAPONS USAGE IN KOREA, WINTER OF 195041 20 NOV to 1 DEC THE PIVOTAL OPERATIONS UNCLASWD REPORT ORO-R-13 Commentary On INFANTRY OPERATIONS AND WEAPONS USAGE IN KOREA WINTER OF 1910 - 51 bv Se L. A. Marshall Project DOUGHBOY Received 27 Ott 19 51 Approved: OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE The Johns Hopkins University Chevy Chase, Maryland UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Second Printing June 1953 by OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE 6410 Connecticut Avenue UNCLASSlFiED :. Chevy Chars, Maryland FOREWORD Sometimes there can be lost, in the analysis of combat, critical details in the relations amongst fighting men, as well as with their opponents, weapons, environment, and fatigue. Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, who writes with a soldier’s under- standing of men under fire, does not do this. He does not dissociate the weapon from the man who fires it, the load from the man who carries it, the action from the man who engages in it, nor information from the men who die for the lack of it. It is only an understanding of this kind of detail that gives some hope we can achieve an analytical insight which will permit major advances in combat effectiveness. Most who serve science shore up the principles which others seek and define. It is the Army’s profit that Marshall has the originality to scout not only the front line of combat (where others have gone) but the front line of the unknowns which military operations analysis seeks to penetrate. This work is not statistical. The statistics which gain breadth by describing the aggregate of happenings may provide the broad abstractions essential to those generaliza- tions which can guide the development of analytical combat theory. They also tend to average out the vital clues hidden in individual happenings whi& point the way to new and improved ways of fighting. One is not a substitute for the other; study of averages and study of incidents truly complement each other. OR0 is fortunate in being able to offer both for the Army’s use. ELLISA.JOHNSON Director, OR0 ix UNCLASSIFIED , CONTENTS PAQE . Abstract 111 Foreword ix . Introduction: Some Principles Emerge x111 Disappearance of the Flankless Battlefront - The Arms are Joining - A New Standard for American Forces - General Propositions - Background of the Study PART I OPERATIONS CHAPTER I Infantry Fire 3 Well-Balanced Family - More Men Fire - CCF in Attack - The Chief Preservative - Effective Ranges - Value of Slow Fire - Arms Load in Action - Order of Cessa- tion - Loose Ammunition - Weapons Appreciation II When Weapons Fail 17 Effect on Morale - Under Conditions of Cold - Recommended SOP III When Communications Fail 24 Losing Touch - Pyrotechnics as Signals - The Block at the Source IV Strain 29 Stress on Operating Staffs - Stress on Troops - They Must Move on Foot - March Table - Digging In - Intrenchments: Doctrine and Practice - Infantry Adjustment to Artillery V Exhaustible Infantry and ‘Inexhaustible’ Stores 42 Fighting Load - The Natural Load - Burden Limit - Outfit by Popular Verdict - Command Load - What Might be Done - Prodigal Wastage - QM Supply VI The Rifle Company 51 The Infantry NC0 - Company Strength - The Squad - In Summary PART II WEAPONS - USE AND USEFULNESS VII The Rifle 59 The Old Standby - Sniping - Lack of Tactical Surprise - Ml : Evaluation - Mis- fires - Weapon Interdependence VIII The Carbine 67 Anvil Chorus - Individual Users - Carbine and Patrolling - Range and Effect - Inaccuracy - Conditioning - Exception xi UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSlFiED ORO-R-13 IX The BAR 72 The Mainstay - Effect of Reconditioning - Augmentation X Machine Guns 75 Their Use - Augmentation - Malfunctioning - Fire Discipline - In Rearguard - The .50 XI Recoilless Weapons 84 Use of Artillery and Recoilless Weapons - Appreciation of Weapon - Against Armor XII Rocket Launchers 89 A Marginal Weapon? - The Bazooka Against Men - The 3.5 XIII Mortars The Family - Breakage in Extreme Cold - The 4.2 - Example - The 81-mm - Suggested Modifications - The 60-mm XIV Grenades 99 One of the Main Weapons - Cold Weather Operations - General Utility xv The Bayonet 103 More for Morale - Case Study - In Summation - The Knife Bayonet XVI Pistols and AA Guns 109 .45 Pistol - Multiple Mounts PART III COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION XVII The Public and Headquarters Be Informed 115 Needed: Accurate Battle Data -What was Written - The Effect XVIII The November Battle 120 Facts from the Infantry - Baker Company - Staff and Command Hypothesis - Data from Company Studies-Set to Roll-Characteristics of the Enemy Attack - Tactical Unity XIX Noise: Signal and Weapon 133 Tactical Use of Sound xx Communication with our Allies 136 Our Attitude Toward Allies - SOP for Coalition Team Play XXI Combat Information for the Infantryman 139 Receptive Audience - Training Misses the Mark - Readier Men UNCLASSIFIED xii INTRODUCTION SOME PRINCIPLES EMERGE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE FLANKLESS BATTLEFRONT Korean operations have presented a unique set of problems for American forces. Not only has the Communist enemy possessed at all times the advantage of superior numbers, some of which were in position to harass our rear and cut our communications, but our own side has never been in strength sufficient to form a continuous, closely knit forward line. During operations in the winter, 1950-51, the enemy used little artillery, less air power, and no armor. In the attack, he advanced against our hill positions with hand- carried weapons, relying heavily on the machine gun, and slightly less on the mortar. Or else, under cover of the night, he moved forward through the interstices in the main line of resistance, either to attack artillery and other rear installations or to set up a road block behind forward infantry battalions in an effort to induce their withdrawal. These were the principal unorthodoxies in his method of making war. Against a more strongly armed opponent, fitted with ample air and artillery weapons, some of the tactics and techniques which have proved most effective against the NK-CCF armies would require modification. The principles which gave them rise, however, would remain inviolate. There is no doubt whatever that perimeter defense is the correct solution in Korea, or that success in perimeter defense derives primarily from organic unity within the position combined with the maximum union-by-com- munications with all higher headquarters and co-equal tactical bodies to left and right. The perimeter is by nature only a modified hedgehog. Its main requirements are by no means unique to Korea. In any war where the forming of a flankless battlefront is impossible, because of the superior numbers of the opponent and the vast expanse to be defended, a main requirement will be organization by all tactical bodies for all-around defense. This implies an accommodation of doctrine, combined tactics, materiel, and supply-communications methods to the same end. The rise of modern air power, the development of the vertical attack by infantry, the high mobility of armor with its foot accompaniment, and, finally, the impact of atomic weapons upon the battlefield have destroyed any further possibilities in the traditional linear system in which a wall of men holds a flankless belt of works with the main object of preventing penetration at any point.