Lars Inderelst

Logoi and Pathemata and the modal/amodal distinction in modern theories of

PETER LANG EDITION Contents

I. Introduction 13 1. Logoi and path&mata 13 2. Theories of concepts 15 3. Aristotle and the modal/amodal distinction 19 4. State of the art 22 5. Method 24 6. Structure 27

II. The of concept' 31 1. Theories of concepts and their presuppositions 33 1.1. Concepts and categories as representations 33 1.2. Concepts and reference in philosophy and 39 1.3. Concept types and kinds of concepts 41 1.4. Monism, pluralism and eliminativism concerning conceptual formats 44 1.5. Concepts as functional kinds, abilities and vehicles 45 1.6. and higher-order thought processes 47 1.7. Theories of concepts - a preliminary sketch 49 2. Towards a of "concept" 51

III. 'Concept' in the history of philosophy 59 1. Antiquity 59 1.1. : Articulating the problem of universals 59 1.2. Stoics: Concept as lekton and phantasia kataleptike 63 1.3. Augustine: Philosophy of and concepts as verba mentis 66 2. Medieval philosophy 68 ;/ 2.1. Aristoteles Latinus: Conceptus as a technical term 68 2.2. Aquinas: An Aristotelian account 69

9 2.3. Ockham: Medieval 71 3. Modern philosophy 72 3.1. Descartes: Concepts in a dualistic account 72 3.2. Leibniz: Rationalism and concepts 73 3.3. Locke: Concepts as abstract general ideas 74 3.4. Hume: Criticism of abstract ideas 78 3.5. Kant: Concepts in transcendental idealism 80 4. 19th and 20th century 82 4.1. Frege: Sense and 82 4.2. Wittgenstein: Concepts and family resemblance 84 4.3. Causal theories of content 85 4.4. Fodor: Conceptual atomism 87 4.5. Peacocke: A Neo-Fregean approach to concepts 88 5. Summary and observations from the history of philosophy 90

IV. Concepts in psychology 93 1. Psychological theories of concepts - a general account 93 1.1. Early psychology 93 1.2. Classical theory 94 1.3. 97 1.4. Criticism of prototype theory and neoclassical theories 100 1.5. Exemplar theory 103 1.6. Theory theory 104 1.7. Frame theory 106 1.8. Other theories of concepts 108 1.8.1. Ideals 108 1.8.2. Conceptual networks and similarity networks 109 1.8.3. Connectionism 110 1.9. Recent developments Ill 1.9.1. Neuroscience of concepts Ill 1.9.2. Pluralism and eliminativism 113 1.10. Conclusions 114

10 2. The modal/amodal distinction 115 2.1. Perceptual symbol systems: Barsalou on modal symbols 116 2.2. Proxytypes: Jesse Prinz 122 2.3. Image schemas and conceptual metaphor 124 2.4. The analogous/symbolic distinction 125 2.5. Criticism on modal theories of concepts 126 2.6. Modality reconsidered 130

Concept as logos 135 1. Disambiguating logos 135 1.1. General meanings of logos 135 1.2. Logos in Plato 138 1.3. Logos in Aristotle 139 2. Logos in the logical writings 141 2.1. The context and function of logos 141 2.1.1. Homonymy and synonymy 141 2.1.2. Logos as meaning of words 153 2.1.3. Logos as /phrase 159 2.2. Logos and adjunct notions 163 2.2.1'.' Logos and the Aristotelian Categories 163 2.2.2. Logos and substance 170 2.2.3. Logos and definition 178 2.3. Some conclusions 188

Concepts as pathemata 191 1. Path&mata 191 1.1. De interpretatione 16a 191 1.2. Pathein, pathos, pathema 197 1.3. Representation in Aristotle .200 2. Aristotelian psychology 203 2.1. Psychi .203 2.2. Perception .210

11 2.2.1. A general account of perception 210 2.2.2. The different senses 219 2.2.3. The common sense 221 2.3. Phantasia -jeweils 226 2.3.1. General characteristics 226 2.3.2. Phantasia and memories 234 2.3.3. Phantasia and dreams 238 2.4. Higher-order thoughts 240 2.4.1. The notion of nous in Aristotle 240 2.4.2 Nous and phantasia 249 3. Concluding remarks 258

VII. Aristotle on concepts and modality 263 1. Aristotle and modal/amodal theories of concepts 263 1.1 Logoi and amodal theories of concepts 263 1.2 Pathemata and modal theories of concepts 268 2. Logoi and pathemata - connecting the dots 272 3. What are concepts in Aristotle? 276 4. Applying the Aristotelian position to the modern debate 281

VIII. Conclusion and outlook 285

Abbreviations 289

Editions 291

References 293

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