Story of War Told in Field Marshal Haig's Reporto on the West Operations Front sss jBritish Staff Kept Faith With Treated as One Single the Public and Described Great Battle Nwmrà Conditions as They Were * ?NË$ mouéour^ By WillUun L. McPheaaon of ene great and continuous INKGRQUM GHENT ! engag< $ almost to Autl\OT of TM» BtraHaaTT «Slfhe Oiwrt W**" ment." vxMuoe rsttMOtmw Bapaume. Bad weathe:-ling e««ch side wore the other «w nueLT and exhaustion stopped the offensiv« ! I savagely by continuous contact MARSHAL HAIGKS The second and broader form, is in November. But its strategic« I restricted territory. * fa, dispstc^ea-ooveringtheperiod "If the operations of the last fou purpose was accomplished. For La FIELDfrom to and e half dendorff had realized that he couh Pounding the D«a«emfe«fv 1918» years ere regarded as ¡ Germans April, 1919, have been «eol- single continuous thei no longer affoTd to stay on in th ! The British armies, aided campaign, ' by ^ lected into a stout can be in shattered Noyon salient, and durinj French volume noté pub- recognised them the san divisions, delivered s ^ :i*h«?d in three general features and the | the winter months he prepared t ' series of eotmtrtea.-France (In translation) and essary stages .which, between for« BRUSSELS'0L constructed Hindenburg line. The German defense had to endta» the United States. B. P. of equal strength, have marked a a Dutton A The Somme w»s e substantial Al pounding whose severity aad (fe. Co. are the American publishers. the conclusive battles of history." lied victory, although its result j moralizing character Ludende,} The text has been edited by Lieu¬ Haig develops this ingenious sin meduoucP didn't become apparent until th j frankly admits in his memoirs. B« tenant Colonel J. H. Earl gestion by comparing the campaigi ! spring of 1917. Yet Haig's repoi the «German line held, and Baraaton, months the within»* Haigas private secretary. A valu¬ of the Marne and of Flanders Í ignored this direct strategical affet ; j Germans were tW 1914 to of the operation and only claim« again in the Lys Valley and in able set of West Front mapa accom¬ the opening skirmishes of th» battle. This the achievement of objectives of outskirts of Ypres. panies this handsome reprint. phase ended in Decet character. Haig's losses in ber, 1814, with the general Flanders and % Haig's reports deserve the com¬ complete aba; necessity of sending several donnent of the war of Somme ¿¡^ pliment.thus paid them. are movement f, |The sions to the Italian front in They the war of ^ of Interest to the rigid positions (tren« The Somme, of course, did relie. jivember, 1917, had the general reader, aa warfare). effect of unforjuna» well aa the German pressure on Verdun. Bt preventing a proper ex« $o> military student. D ar- ploitation of the The i had lost Battle c striking Britjon ing the war the British were prac- Second Phase Falkenhayn $>e success in Cambrai. The Verdun There ft tically alone among the belligerents second phase.4hat of t j before the Battle of tl Julian Byng's 3d Army broke in war of clear adhering to the practice of issu¬ rigid positions .- last- Somme began. The Allied West« through the German line, bin ing periodical analyses of military through 1010 and 101«, and throng offensive of 1916 didn't prevent Ge for lack of reserves it couldn't ta a low up its If operations. The French drew a veil pax* «of 191T, aiquwgft in 101 many from reestablishing the Au advantage. ft hai I done so, "What would have over their campaigns, whether suc¬ the levewkai toward w» tro-Hungarian front, broken 1 beer semi-open the judgment on the Italian cam cessful or unsuccessful. took fare was already under The BrusUoff's attacks. Nor did it hi They way. I der the German» from R paign?" asks LudendorfT. Cambr* not the least chance of the three year« sew the barren crushing was the Allied giving theoi mania and Bucharest. great opportunity n enemy a of useful of attrition entering the West front in 1917. scrap military exploited te the tztmoe &MMEUG6 did wear down th« German West». Bnt Í Information. The Russians issued la 1918 came after the attrition of Ami semi-open warfare b armi«». But the British «nd Fren« and Flanders had only fragmentary bulletins. «German same the rule and wae followed 1 sapped Britb! losses probably exceeded the Goran fighting strength. And the lone reports, like the a revival of the real war losses. A« an "Kriegsberichte aus of mov experiment in atti of 1917, not made good by th dem Orossen Hauptquartier," were ment. This last phase ended tion it« valu« was doubtful. It home government, a few ! led, mouth speciously deceptive, The British Alllad victory, due, «as is general AVBSNES counted a« a successful Allied oper | later, *to the great disaster wbic! General Staff, however, kept full admitted now» to the vast tacrea jtlon solely bceause it produced i jovertook-the 6th British Army wty 'effect.or after effect.of of St. fa^th with the public. It described in the Alliedstrategicreserve cans genui j Quentin. : Admission was made in the at the front .y the arrivai of strategical consequene« th« G. Parlii happenings candidly the Americi man retreat to the Hindenbu ment by a spokesman for the and If the irmies. But gov accurately. interpreta¬ the parallel whi line. ernment that Haig's report on tfci tion of the military situation was Field Marshal Halg has construct« ; The policy of "wearing out" German offensive of 1918 waits sometimes colored from motives of ind especially his insistence en t the W«st front recommended its« printed in its original form. Be I what was policy, the facts themselves were ¡fflcacy of the attrition policy, lea to the Allies in 1915 «nd 1916 1 printed makes it da cause enough that the British ami« î never intentionally juggled or dis¬ urn to exclude from view the they had then a great pi ponderance in crude man power. B France had dangerously extend» torted. .sfve factor in Germany's defeat their to the ¦m» ! in 1917, when it was manifest tl lines south, in accorc he renewal of unrestricted su arrce with an i lí'ar and Truthful the revolution was going to liquid. agreement with tb narine warfare in 10. ! French government, and that ic Field Marshal accounts of February, STQUEfimN Russia's partnership in the Enten Haig's vhich forced American interventi. the I lack of reinforcements the division the campaigns of 1016, 1917 and Allied preponderance quid had to be Elis argument therefore culminai vanished. But for reduced from thtrtee 19 18 were therefore the best and Germany's fo battalions to ten battalions. On n thiB very dubious conclusion i in goading the United States ii clearest sources of information of the inevitable consequences c "In a battle Joined and decid« taking up arms, the Europe the attrition of 1917 wi available during the progress of the would policy fn the course of a few days or hoar struggle have been practica thus dodged by the British Wi war. They were a delight to in¬ in there is no risk that the ol 'THIS IS the official war equalized the fall of 1917 a Office and the way was opened ft vestigators and confused lay * map showing the final British critics, by server will seek duced the offensive from day to "***day VJof wvwKAugust .to win.1918. itIt is military probabilities would hi the destruction of the weak 5t to distinguish tl from published reportssports of Field Ma.rahnïMarahnt Un*»*«.ZmJtt*s*.>a ««as^r-iFZ*m-.*-*---W V ¦ novemoer,November, repro- a mass of second-hand and mislead- 1 pointed to a culminating operations by which vi the period 1ram Deeemher' 1915, to draw.practically a ^ Army. ing reports from the lines. AZ%stimXä°tt. tory for Germany, because she t fighting tory le seized and PmtuñTco^0 j exploited from tl so The Americans Arrive Marshal Foch, who prepared an in¬ Strategy are changeless." He else> I warfare had j big a margin of territorial ga preceding stages by which it hi arrived, the Battle of i Russia and Rumania. "The to The troduction for the French been made remarked: Cambrai in result detriment of the task in hand. I bargain with. United States began to rui edition, possible and determine November, 1917, having weakness . of i at last broken I ing of the two opposing have always wanted to do my work troops to Europe only after th cays Haig's communications: If the whole of the "Lord French saw th<* the deadlock of posi- Foch in operations pre through tional warfare. | lines," adds, "threatened tc\ all thinge according to the for¬ ¡American Aid blow had fallen. They arrived "Written with the strictest snt war are in of the ! for som« 'Sufficient unto regard regarded correct ps strategy Germans, as he tell, It prolong time to come whai mula, the day is the America's aid could arrive o: sufficient masses to tl For truth 11 is obvious that the Entente has been' evil thereof.' The evil constitute and scrupulously exact to Bpeotlve the victories of the summ very simply In his book, within i i j celled the war of attritfor of each day very slowly ; and in the effort on the Western front was .that of is sufficient. And I have interval^ strategic reserve, without who«- «"ho smallest details, these and autumn of 1918 will be seen week r struggle unmarked an. always Western Allies reports efter the British expeditionary ¡ inspired by no consistent or clear sought to handle the would be a* a dis presence Foch could hardly ha^ ure be as unsutteined which wear j big things with A distinguished by their unques¬ direotly dependent apon t force landed in 1914. , idea, such as must advantages all the vantage. policy of continued mass France in W< govern to some out both armies without conscientiousness which one in stopped Ludendorff's driven tionable loftiness and breadth of two years of stubborn fighting th know that extent in a battle. bringinj bringe to little tivity 1917, therefor«, mvol< 1918 and his General Fershing had ' single At th« gain to either.a war re things." undertaken victorlot them." ! cutset without the risk of British i view." pneeded from the Joflfre's Alsace-Lorraine and suit. If a war is Foch did his overstraining counter offensive. The Ameriei beginning, the very définit ' Ardeines offensives to end in victor: work conscientiously French resources before the Ami That is deserved I of failed abruptly it must always be a characte even when he was tied can armies saved the on the Wester thoroughly Seyond plan forcing the fighting Int > The Germans given j down in 1911 reinforcement became av¡ day are Foreseeing swept into France bj différent from this." ! and 1916 to that front. This reinforcea« praise. They also distinguished open warfare." war of attritio. [able. The British and cc timely A battle generally discloses s< way of Belgium. They w»ro haltec which was French was by modesty of tone and lucidity of at the Not so uncongenial to him an mânds were greatly h< the decisive factor in Allie »Ian, some grasp of a French's I Marne, but they couldn't b« Foch's Idea in which his star heartened, success.not the «tyle. They wear well and will re¬ situation, Regrets sank almost t I ever, by the ret« Allied attritic he of expelled. Trench lines were estab j It is no rash that But his Hindenburg of main an part the commander flghi These last two statements hav i lished assumption Foe. j eclipse. attitude of min They dreamed of another breaki policy 1916 and 1917, for tl Invaluable contribution to from Switzerland to the Nortl never indicates that he t He is able to infuse some ui little to the Sea. The j considered the Entente cam would have bee: through operation on a great sc_ attrition policy would have fail« the history of the great war. relevancy point unde tedious war of fixed posi of about the last in nto his . paigns 1916,. 1917 an j person the world t Nivelle, who had succeeded absolutely to guarantee victory designs. But in a discussion. Viscount French ma tions began and lasted three years 1916, attribute to Jol Of Interest as oae f the Entente campaign at the head of the French arm: France and Great Britain had bee To-day ipvead over four years and a have in 11918 great battle, fought 1 on q. thought early 1914 that h On the the West front a c< had an left to the war to a u That aspect of them which Defensive accordance with a clear j closely extraordinarily sangu fight finish Mar¬ er, fought under novel conditi Saw through the strategy of th strategi j ordineted purpose or to view the. temperament. He had aided. shal Foch The mass of the Allied wa plan. Are the of misinterpi has emphasized is of nvolving masses never before Germans in the Marne forces principle« strateg jas a single great battle, ed Ludendorff's campaigi pinned down on so immutable that proceedin very sensible reti The war on the Entente side, greatest interest a n a the defensive ii competent so to a fixed ment. He to-day, when battle front, a war of nati But it was also one of his poignet diess can {according and smooth! had also overestima fact,, took on the character of " modtfi all the battle was ing rest of 1917 the xtent by the first three weeks of the wa world. my strength for over.on Decemt Pre conditions and circum¬ The strategy on both sides was Its problems had to wo. my sped fought warily and stances neither the French nor Oerman gen I task." 23, 1916.the Field Marshal stat sparingly, as Foch's Tribute beyond any strategist's im¬ fated and empirical. Novel co themselves out ov. »hat strategic situation and erais were prepared for the experimentally the joint British and < their own "Was it not tho of W «. mediate vision or control. tions in the field also complet long periods. Conditions French ternal iii8«gliû revolution transformation of all idea did n How Foch Won ifensive had this difficulties required them perienced coB Haig's view is tactics. military ¡yield to strategy. threefold object: do. But the and enlightened that of the profes¬ The old balance between which the development of the opera They dominai* In these interviews ) "1. To relieve the British continued mander which led him to I" sional offensive tions jit. Foch d! pressure < pound away at the [Haig] soldier, with a justifiable and the defensive was inevitably demonstrated to b cusses the immutability of strateg ', Verdun. Germans fi tervene. as he did, with his own gOv pride in his ranged. It had imperative for waging war in prei April until December. eifnment on a» profession and a ten- to travel arouni Unified Command principles. But he says \ "2, To assist our allies in the oth< March 24, 1D18, ent . . conditions. . guarded!; to a circle to reestablish "War never theaters of war with the Allied governments assero dency regard war as an exact itself, "I feel sure in Moreover, changes in its essenc by stopping any fu When Nivelle my own mind th« clarity and unity it ;. t&er transfer of Failed bled at Doullens on March ¡26, to tt «cience rather than as an art war, by its very immensity, over had we realised the strategy can come only changes in its meani German troops fro subject true effect o only if there "No. Western front Field Marshal end that the French and the Briti* to infinite th* strategists. It worked out modern appliances of war in | unified command. Again: Wax hasn't eliang ya » Haig doesn't armies uncertainties and varia¬ Augus And up to Mar since men To scribe his 1917 might at once be placed »Ml own 1914, there would have been no 26, have existed. But x wear down the campaign as a Bee a tions. He undertakes to the strategy and its own tactics re 1918, there was no unified Alii dot the,^8.forces strength phase of the slug!« command, oven tbottgb ¡H clarify treat from Mons, and that if, in Sei j command. you realize that it really deman j opposed to us." "wearing out batt personal position Bhould therts strategy of the four years of tenta¬ Vadition tomber, the a The first part of it, the Offended Germans had learnt thei The war on the West great deal of art?" Tjhe immediate strategical obj« Battle of suffer? In the events which felloe* tive and effort on lesson, the Allies front What are ive ras, was intended to disjointed tha Such a view necessarily would never hav 1915, 1916 and 1917 th« unchanging prta 'wfs ignored, although by 3 dovetail into did he not prove that he was »b'A Western give- driven them back to the Aisne. ] consequen of cember velle's ail front by likening the con¬ rage to those degenerated into a pies strategy? They are 28, 1916, that objective 1 brqak-through toward Li anxious to anticipate and brought up ii was in the on war of attrith fo*eD, been Nivelle in »^ fused and fighting that rive Such a war is highly generalised. Général practically attained. having failed completely, perfect harmony with the get;«?«*' manifold operations there radition that that the eyes of all of us in many respects Nain British strategical pract began to t B. Forrest, a self-made The attack continued into J Allied plsn, frara«sd by the ne' to "one single great battle." as opened. negation of*strategy. It didn't i soldi Allied offensive in the So» ms a immutable as strategical p peal to .ummed up one when "he said aimed to local operation, beci Supreme Command t On this J*»E "New characteristics of offensiv Foch.himself a deep s tl drive a wedge into the mainly the Two Theories p le, and that both are an and dent of the main thing was "to th western face of Germans counter attacked dispatches contain Raps y*P open defensive war began vaguely 1 strategy. In the introdi get the Noyon sali< recovered much prevent tha reader from grasping a The > the professional soldier. A be but tion which he wrote fustest with the mostest me between of the ground w] field marshal states his theory appreciated; it required tY to Haig's v Bapaume and Péronne, they had lost at the reasons for our victory; tna f this successive attempt» of ume he Another is that the a. as to break the the in two ways. The first and narrow¬ school, writing in "The Mannoury, c deprecates attrition and offensiv«, part of the sali Battle of Arras beginning. :ompelled me to complete the t* Castelnau, Foeh and myself to tut scribes it as an rule, is more advantageous than extending died down only >y »unt." er form is; ork Sun," protested the unpromising ex north-northwest f. Ludendorff was agains German flanks in the North i dient forced on the defensive. But the test of a gr Roye to Arras into ready to let it "Neither Fee that the war the Allies by th two smaller iown. In the final the lead« the course of the war had workei old approved style and the pra« soldier is to apply the elus lients, and «to campaign tical ef incomplete preparation for w make it impossible The aip and fighting quality of *¦ itself nor the military lessons to be s own strategy, and cited a failure these attempts 1 "We were principle« of strategy which h¡ the Germans to great Flanders battle, wi bring home to limited," he says, hold on in tl J«gan on ritish army on the Western fW drawn therefrom can from our minds th* tit local and :om« to him or hi two smaller Jun« 7 and ended on properly be ige General March's i nature of war spasmodic engagemei instinctively salients. sached their climax. P to-day." and the best that jeen taught him in th« schools. /ember 6, apparently had for Haig;» comprehended unless the long suc¬ r 1919, in which th« latter could be done i The >bjective the ralahip was superb. The army p rhe to coordinate them as Foch saya again: French Activities clearing of the cession of battles, commenced on the ield Marshal French, compare Deadlock Broken to space i :oast Belj een hardened into an instrument time. That is th« "People have often asked me 11 The region, which could be ac< «Somme in 1916 and ir to a General explanation French, working east on dished ictory. But the new spirit of uoi ended in No¬ single, correlated I Pershing may have h the results expected a long war. I i south side by the very definite poor obtained up to eouldnt of the Somme, ne driving forward nd cooperation, and. th«? vember of last year (1918) on the wording to this "Si pían of ford year 1917." .wer them. It wave* my äff« reached Bruges and enveloping th» Ger «jjf critic, be into The Péronne end almost ei ¡ea merican reserve were far 1*8 Sarabr«, are viewed as part id fighting open warfare." I the future never belongs te m oped base« at Ostend end Zeebru **' forming long ago that the principl efor« he into Fortunately, Germans w and It le a ef ChauliHHJj: Joining the Br 3ut »sponsible for victory than got th« fighting oj also occupied in the less ttoe» of theuj north of the the British never get across East, figfcl _r_ im