CEU eTD Collection THE ABKHAZIAN AND SOUTH OSSETIAN CONFLICTS OSSETIAN ANDSOUTH THE ABKHAZIAN In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENTINGEORGIA: INTERNATIONAL Department of International Relations and European Studies ______International Relations and European Studies European and Relations International Supervisor: Professor Erin Professor K.Jenne Supervisor: Central European University European Central Word Count: Word Count: 15, 091 Nino Kereselidze Budapest, Hungary Submitted to Submitted By 2008 CEU eTD Collection Manana Kobuladze & SulkhanKereselidze Manana Kobuladze To myParents CEU eTD Collection third party third party has interests in prolongation of disputes. the meddling the if successful be to unlikely is mediation international that I suggest conclusion, In conflict. in involvement Nagorno-Karabakh the international caseof comparative the examine I will process mediation international impedes the power party regional third the of involvement the that show better to in order and conflicts both in intervention Russian Iexamine argument, impactof the success.In this developing mediation is of argue that regional security/stability akey determinant resolution. I conflictexternal such involvement, the aim myof research is to examineof the factors impact that facilitated general the or impededidentify to and conflicts Ossetian and Abkhazian in the (OSCE) Europe success of the United of degrees of variation the highlight to order In process. peace the of course the influenced Nations (UN) and has involvement is how itthis factors, external still unclear respect to with however the Organization extensive, been has engagement International settlement. political final without reached for Security and Co-operationconflicts. in a sceneethnopolitical into of turned has Union, Georgia Soviet the of collapse Since the In both cases of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts agreements were ABSTRACT i CEU eTD Collection community community forand encouragement support. and helpful myM.Ed for continuousvery I am support advisorJohn grateful alsoHarbord, to academic and writing process. duringtheentire research comments andmeticulous invaluable guidance consultations.I would like toexpress my tomy gratitude thesis K.supervisor Erin Jenne,PhD for Finally, special thank you to my friends within the CEU ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii CEU eTD Collection ILORPY...... 43 ...... BIBLIOGRAPHY 41 ...... CONCLUSION International Involvement 35 in the Nagorno-Karabakh ...... Conflict 35 Chapter 5. Comparative ...... Case: Chapter 25 4: The UN and OSCE Engagement ...... in Georgia Chapter 3: Third Party 19 Intervener – Russia...... Chapter 2: Background of the Abkhazian and South 10 Ossetian Conflicts...... Chapter 1: International 5 Engagement –Method of Ethnic/National Conflict Mediation 1 INTRODUCTION...... TABLE ...... iii OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... ii i ABSTRACT...... 4.3. 32 OSCE and South Ossetia...... 27 4.2. United Nations ...... in Abkhazia 25 4.1. The ...... UN Mediation 17 2.3. The Nagorno – ...... Karabakh Conflict 15 2.2. South Ossetian Conflict...... 10 ...... 2.1. Abkhazia 4 Methodology...... Contribution 3 and Importance...... TABLE OFCONTENTS iii CEU eTD Collection used. widely is Ossetia South because region” “Tskhinvali term the using from I refrain Nevertheless, ofGeorgia; part anintegral is Ossetia Southern that fact the with conflict into comes that of Ossetia, parts southern and northern Rusetski,Seminar, International Students Forum Kobuleti 2006, July 22, 2006) because underlinesit the 1 are involvement international through management conflict of theories existing the that argue of inresolution, andmediation I would thetheoretical presents framework conflict particular. thesis of this chapter first the questions, answer these to In order conflicts. of these course the influenced has organizations international of involvement how unclear is still it factors, resolution in to external impeded external Ossetia. and South Abkhazia With respect conflict or facilitated that factors the examine to is my research aim of the involvement, such of impact general the identify to and conflicts Ossetian and Abkhazian in the OSCE and UN the the of variation degrees of success of impact.order todemonstrate In a positive peacemaking had in fact in Georgia conflicts in both involvement international whether debated iswidely It Soviet state. former the in resolution conflict to directed been has effort much and attention, international increasing Georgiahas conflict. attracted productof territorial the a prolonged disputed which was war, Ossetian from South the war different Abkhazi the made differences cultural and social political, Embedded government. central Georgian the with confrontation violent autonomous institutions laid thefoundations for secessionistmovements havewhich led to Theexistence before of status warerupted. the OssetiaSouth autonomous enjoyed and ofAbkhazia in Theregions Georgia. situation overall andsocial the political, economic an frozen into impacton Theconflictshavehadaserious area of turning region conflicts. the settlement, final political without werereached agreements ceasefire conflicts, Caucasus South the of cases three In all conflicts. andethnopolitical ethnonationalism scene of a has into turned region the USSR, of the collapse the Since theunion. within boundaries through variousresettlement and of ethnic groups byartificially administrative drawing ethnic confrontations the forleaders current basis created Soviet of An generation earlier and Nagorno-Karabakh, aswell disputes as numerous among the ethnicminorities withinit. Ossetia Southern Abkhazia, – zones conflict includes three It conflicts. with ethno-political The South Caucasus is one of the most diverse regions in the post Soviet area fragmented Although the term “South Ossetia” is repudiated by the Georgian academics and politicians (Aleksander politicians and academics Georgian bythe is repudiated Ossetia” “South term the Although INTRODUCTION 1 1 CEU eTD Collection 2007), 196. 3 (England: Curzon, 2001), 143. 2 for rebelious the minorities.” Russian support varying with of inits domesticaffairs, has suffered„Russian interference degrees overt AbkhazianOssetian and South andconflicts its determines causes anddifferences. Georgia inintervention both Beforeconflicts. this, chapter background presents the the second of the Russia. Indeveloping third argument,the this chapterexamines theimpact of Russian torefrain totheir canbefromantagonizing conflicts theregional attributed power, efforts Ossetia South and Abkhazia the in engagement international of failure overall the that argue I other. the on Ossetians South and Georgians the and hand, one the on Abkhazis, and Georgians the between conflicts the solve helped involvement international which to history of external intervention in these the two conflicts. from In thismediation respect, Iwill analyze the extent international successful of principles general derive to attempt I crises. for explaininginsufficientinfailures ethnic the managing unique UNandof the OSCE these backing or cross-border support.” cross-border backing or external significant enjoy they as long so center the with settlement a negotiate to unlikely therefore prolongingseparatistsupport interventions and regions, these authorities. aredestabilizing Russia’s appearto peacekeepers however,from Moscow, these underpressure inits territory forces the overall conflict. As Erin Jenne puts it, „separatist minorities are both both in mediationterms of conflict andand general support; thirdthe from stage 1997 up to theperiodover of with 1994 andinternational participation active 1997,of the organizations – stage from second community. approach The sideofinternational the and cautious relative ceasefire the agreements leading interference to 1994 with Russian from first stage 1991 to The international involvementin beCaucasus could South the dividedin stages: three the has to do with how the involvement came about infactor theOne first place in conflicts. the two cases. Ossetian South and Abkhazian inthe mediation external of failures the political solution. The chapter identifies the factors that help explain the successes as well then rather as stabilization conflict the to more targeted schemes assistance humanitarian by supplemented assistance character and observing hadmore efforts mediation the that discusses It mandates. their respective under conflicts Georgian resolve the to activities Erin K. Jenne, Erin Svante E.Cornell, Svante Ethnic Bargaining: theParadox of Minority Empowerment Small Nations and Great Powers:of aStudy Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus 3 The fourth chapter gives an overview of UN and OSCE 2 2 Georgia accepted the Russian „peacekeeping” Russian the accepted Georgia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, University Cornell (Ithaca: CEU eTD Collection cooperation. Thus, given the seriousness and intensity of international engagement in engagement international of intensity and seriousness the given Thus, cooperation. regional promote to initiatives own county’s the supporting and Ossetia South and in Abkhazia to mediation the areincreasingly contributing process international organizations international community gives high priority to the promotion of peace in Georgia, therefore stability conditionof isanimportant for peacein Georgia entirethe Caucasus. initiatives for resolving these andconflicts engagingin mutual cooperation. very Also,the peace several haslaunched inCaucasus. Georgia the South for peace potential promoting its emphasizes countries neighboring with relations friendly and policy foreign Georgia’s large. at region the and in Georgian management conflict the of nature the into insights deep international ResearchinginAbkhazi engagement the Ossetian provides and South conflicts Importance and Contribution a decade. more than after conflicts Ossetian Abkhazi and South of the peaceful to resolution contribute Studies, http://www.gfsis.org/pub/eng/security.php. 5 Resolution”, VladimirSocor, October1, 2007, http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372464. 4 law” international andof guardians actors UNandOSCEas“security the that stated UN General Assembly Georgian Mikheilin critically 2007, September Saakashvili President especially from NGOs and the media, regarding human dimension standards. However,in Abkhazia, at the representatives society civil and officials with in dialogue engaged has and ahuman rights role with the Human Rights Office (HRO) under the UNCHR. The OSCE Fund (UNICEF); Children's Nations United (UNDP)and Programme Nations Development Coordination of AffairsHumanitarian (UNOCHA);adevelopmentrole through Unitedthe Nations High Commissioner United through ahumanitarian role in (UNOMIG); Georgia ObserverMission Nations for Refugees (UNHCR)negotiations through Security the Council andamilitary subsequent role Unitedthe through and the United NationsThe Office for theUN has played central the governments obvious failure of mediationthe process. quoinmediation and of the efforts realization be2008 which status could with characterized various roles during the conflict and peace process: diplomatic Archil Gegeshidze, „Georgia: In Quest of a Niche Strategy”, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and Security and Strategic for Foundation Georgian Strategy”, of aNiche InQuest „Georgia: Gegeshidze, Archil Eurasia Daily Monitor, “Saakashvili at UN: International Organizations failing on Post-Soviet Conflict 3 4 failed to 5 The CEU eTD Collection literature on conflict management studies which offer the theory mediation. of theory the offer studies which management conflict on literature respective the will Inaddition, research I conflicts. actual resolve the failed to extent a orlesser greater butto mandates, their under their commitments fulfilled organizations international the that demonstrate will thesis The IDPs. the of return the promoting effectiveness undertaken of efforts by UNtopromotethe lasting peace in Abkhazia andin the explore I will changed. of missions the mandates the under which circumstances review their In publications itis andreports. this own respect, revealingtrace the to Iwill own criteria, mandates usingtheir fulfill their managed to they what extent and to do, to were expected they what to determine order In organizations. those of formats guiding mandates material conflict by theprimary – resolutions, zones legal and the reviewing conflict cases. Iwill examine the activities of the UN and the OSCE mission in Georgia in the Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh South the in Abkhazia, mediation efforts successof the in ofvariation assess causes the to analysis comparative useacontrolled Iwill Specifically, study design. case in Iuseacomparative thesis, posed the toanswer question the In order Methodology ofinternational activities facilitating organizations. rebuild social through broken bridges Georgians reconciliation-Ossetians,the to South and the and Abkhazis, and Georgians the for possible is it which to extent the understanding for isimportant conflicts and causes these of studying dynamics the Furthermore, generally. more and (fSU) Union Soviet former the in both organizations international party mediation rethinksuccess, helping mediationto the and of peacekeepingformats constructionthe of a more nuanced theoretical understanding determinantsthe of of third contribute to Ihopeto in conflicts, external mediation either failure of or of patterns success the on conducted been far thus has analysis in-depth no that Observing formation. policy then, This,auseful resolving could as towards aninternalserve conflict. guide committed to seriously are they when accomplish can organizations international what to as understanding Georgia, an assessment of the effects of this engagement would contribute to an 4 CEU eTD Collection JosephMontville (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 491 –509. 8 University Press, 2007), 187. 7 Conflict, 6 for these regions with toform federal theirstructures ethnic inkin andinArmenia. Russia opportunities itcreates because Azerbaijan and integrity Georgia of territorial to the threats them is full independence andinternational Independencerecognition. in its turn poses for because solution solution republics only secessionist thisthe renewed acceptable refuse the central governments are proposing returning to them the autonomous status. However, the Presently, crisesstarted. before the status autonomous the enjoyed them threeof all because grievances, ethnic their resolve not may autonomy granting Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ossetia South casesofAbkhazia, Inthe thegroups. between resources of state division equitable an fails generate system for example,to the because, parties conflicting tothe acceptable ethnically divided societies function function effectively. societies divided ethnically stake in the central government,ethnic have onlythat inpost-conflictsocieties, divisions arguing when groups warring the a as well as extensiveresolving approach to apower-sharing methoddisagrees andproposes partition Liphart with autonomy over their own regions, can process. reconciliation the could affect that intointer-state wars. loss life local tothe conflict lead transform separation transfercould would andsecond, of of subsequentpopulation decrease thelikelihood hand on other ethnic the first, clashes, two sides to live lastingwith one peace,another because areveryconflicts bloody, separation of into opposingthe groups defensible enclaves ensures in a common mutual state. fears and resolution methods.of conflict the complexity Kaufmann when identity believes that, and hostilities heterogeneity shows literature reviewof this the that illuminate is to of purpose chapter this from the The settlingconflicts. approaches warand global regional different ethnic/national, to proposes make it impossible literature onthisis of resolution,andthe methods There awideissue overthe conflict debate for the Arendt Liphart, “The Power Sharing Approach”, in Approach”, Sharing Power “The Liphart, Arendt Quoted in Erin K. Jenne, Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” in Chapter 1: International Engagement –Method ofEthnic/National Engagement Chapter 1:International ed. Michael E. Brown et. al. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 445. 7 In addition, partition could generate ethnic isolation andestrangement isolation ethnic could generate In partition addition, Ethnic Bargaining: the Paradox of Minority Empowerment Conflict Mediation Conflict Conflict andPeacekeeping in MultiethnicSocieties 5 8 However, this proposition might not be not might proposition this However, 6 Although territorial partition could partition territorial Although Nationalism and Ethnic (Ithaca: Cornell , ed. CEU eTD Collection 13 12 Rubin,(London :Macmillan,1992), 1 – 29. International Relations: Multiple approaches to Conflict Management break-away because the nevertheless, violence; of as cessation mandates in was their defined mediated outcome is a stable and realistic outcome.” is andrealistic outcome a stable mediated “effectively Bercovitch according to intoRussia. In addition, automatic incorporation similarly independence recognition Abkhaziaof itsincorporation into the Russian Federation is likelyhighly and of South Russianthe in engagement Georgian becauseconflicts full after independence and Ossetia would entail its inclusion into North Ossetia with 11 10 Bercovitch(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 11. both protagonists.one or (and allegiance)of presumablypolitical influence bybecomingindispensable totheir orby partiesindispute, gaining the gratitude their enhancing and extending of way a “as opportunity engagement the see may they that conflict management efforts. itselfof asanown parties’ the extension negotiation process conducted success iscarefully and assists to find a mutually acceptable agreement. find mutually acceptable a to and assists conflict”, particular a oroutcome of changecourse the to intervenes party third acceptable an whereby process negotiation the is mediation of extension “an Houston andAllison is rare mediation of analysis systematic however, mediation; of heterogeneity and extent the shows international disputes of An recent year.overview each grows with in of asaway disputes dealing conflicts intervention The use of third-party alwaysbe not outto successful. does turn mediation international factors, contextual andother ground, onthe conditions economic and political itself, ofmediation character the organizations, international of features institutional in the contradictions internal the of because that suggests it conclusion, the In mediation. international of success the favor whatconditions if so, and, conflicts, internal to is solution international mediation examines an whether effective 1990s. This chapter considerably theafter post-Coldyears War and with violentemerging conflicts in Eurasiain mediation expanded on conflict literature internal wars. The after ethnic relations Empirical Evidence,” in Evidence,” Empirical 9 mediation international and intervention party third that hold authors Other Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Issues Theoretical Mediation: International of Study “The Houston, Allison and Bercovitch Jacob Ibid. Ibid. Jacob Bercovitch, “The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations” in Ibid., 12. Resolving the International Conflicts 11 While bringing the motives of the mediators, Bercovitch Bercovitch states mediators, motives of the the Whilebringing 6 : The Theory and Practice of Mediation, 13 In case of the UN and OSCE stability 10 A central condition for mediation for condition Acentral , ed. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Jeffrey and Bercovitch Jacob ed. , 9 . According to Jacob Bercovitch 12 This motive was true for wastrue Thismotive can Mediation in manageinter- ed. Jacob ed. CEU eTD Collection 19 18 2007), 38. disposal.” by shouldmajor becausebe carried out their powers inducements of credentials and attheir interventions party third thatsuccessful she argues mediation, external it to When comes resistance. their for support external receiving are minorities the as long so movements minority de-radicalize not will disparities economic ataddressing policies aimed that argues prerequisitefor ethnic conflict, which was true for all the three South Caucasus conflicts. She minority. revolting the to assistance providing moreactors external or one entail often minority”, concentrated ofa“territorially form the taking often conflicts, nationalist that Jenne observes Erin bargaining, ethnic of In hertheory conflictingwhile groups, the third party Russia wasbacking one of belligerentthe sides. balance of the to thepowers because theUNfailed be out unsuccessful relatively to turned powers. may tobalance their be mediator expected the in relations of and relations asymmetric case 17 1996). Publishers, Jossey-Bass 16 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3261059.stm. 15 15. 1996), Publishers, Jossey-Bass 14 will be found.”soon impasse volatile this of a way out “nosign that with nowhere” got mediate have to efforts early stage of implementation. Thus, as the mediahave noted with the Abkhazi conflict, “UN all sides cannotbefound,of a dispute themediation then alone mightfailin approach the ifBut Ibelieve that underlyingthe mediation of principle asolution acceptable– finding to mediation successis determining understanding mutual andan solution. reaching acceptable mediation and continuing to the post-mediation monitoring phase where an important factor settlement. acceptable find assiststo amutually disputingChristopher mediator the Moore, According parties to realistic. considered regionsrecognized are not asindependentstates theirindependence be defacto cannot Ibid., 190. Ibid., 186. Erin K. Jenne, Erin Moore, Christopher BBC News, “Regions and Territories: Abkhazia,” March5, 2008, Moore, Christopher 16 In this respect, the UN involvement in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh cases in andNagorno-Karabakh Abkhazia UNinvolvement the respect, In this 19 Through assistance packages, government agreements, or tradepreferences, great or agreements, government assistance packages, Through Ethnic Bargaining: theParadox of Minority Empowerment The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict 15 14 Also, mediation can be effective if the parties enjoy equal equal bemediation power parties if the Also,enjoy effective can Mediation is thus seen as an ongoing process starting with pre- 7 17 Also, minority mobilization is an important an is mobilization minority Also, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, University Cornell (Ithaca: (San Francisco: (San Francisco: (San 18 CEU eTD Collection Transcaucasian Conflicts,” Transcaucasian 22 21 2007), 190. conflict.” modernconsiders “the nature of resolution ethnic unique that suggests aconflict theory Baird Anthony conflicts, Georgia-Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh the analyzing Through affinities to either opposing party. 25 24 23 http://trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_4baird.htm. settlement.” find negotiated sides acceptable amutually to compel usesits warring the powerto state “thethird when mediation," "power-based method central control. While mass lackof conflicts, and value-related participation, nature, be "identity" aimed:symbolic discussing these types must resolution which conflict fourto the of aspects consists that ethnonationalism resultant of mediation, he examines of the fearsand as aggregate collective an “unique nature” itself. He describes the conflict the most traditional of nature account the butthe into taking its causes–ethnonationalism, only basisof the on inhavefight” a not succeed they dog likelythe do more when are to 20 influence a settlement rests on another weakness lack– of neutrality.” to “power Thus, Russia. of interests partial the of because successful not was engagement been found has not this werereached,apolitical and obviously solution agreements ceasefire the although However mediation. power-based the of an exemplification was conflicts andNagorno-Karabakh Ossetia Abkhazia, South inthe Russia of involvement to manage the conflicts, the influence of the strong states can resultin a peace settlement. The able relations ininternational are states the unitary actors implies that mediation power-based cooperate. to parities both the for incentives strong can create powers underlying conflict. underlying at achieving is aimed mediation nearly always State-based conflicting sides. for the acceptable resolution achieve to parties powerful mediating arethe international organizations membersthe of the a political where mediation for it institutional difficultthe becomes mediation milieu of power-based the settlement and afterwards no efforts are made to resolve the Anthony Baird, “An Atmosphere of Reconciliation: A Theory of Resolving Ethnic Ibid., 170.Conflicts Based on the Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Erin K. Jenne, Erin 22 According tohim, successful conflict mediation must deal with ethnic conflict not Ethnic Bargaining: theParadox of Minority Empowerment 25 Nevertheless, manynotes, asBaird policymakers and scholars view OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 8 23 Even though considering the considering though Even (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, University Cornell (Ithaca: 20 24 21 Moreover, “mediators To this respect, in the and should not have not should and , 2.4no (1999), CEU eTD Collection (England: Curzon, 2001), 44. 27 Jacob Bercovitch (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 12. and Empirical Evidence,” in Evidence,” Empirical and 26 implement. to difficult very been have of incompatible positions parties.” the deadlocked, the “reaffirm only they that extent the to fully successful not were engagements littlepeace settlementmade apermanent it, As these progress. mediation toward Cornell puts Nevertheless, engagement. international and involvement Russian with conducted been have for AbkhaziaOssetia both political andSouth seeking solutions Negotiations independence. its agreement be recognizes until can insist there Georgia no that thisand proposition reject completely Abkhazis the state, intothe bereincorporated territories break-away the that while the Georgian opposes grantinggovernment the region’s independence and demands Abkhazia, caseof the In offer concessions. and compromise to parties the largely getting on dialogue,” indirect or direct in engage to areready and mediation of form some welcome both when parties occur … is “mediation to likely factors: of contextual note importance the a conflict, of resolution the facilitate can mediators which in ways the listing while Houston, and Bercovitch international ininvolvement formthe might be productive. In this although respect, itself, conflict regardingof context the whether determined the which without will determine be cannot mediation successexternal of potential the I consider that conflict. resolve the to likely is mediation of amount no then rebellion, for support external receives minority the when or is unstable, region the Thus, when factors. theseother of importance the override may mediation of that success is akey determinant security/stability regional argue that however, I, success intervention of causes concerning theories different presented the Within important than is moreneutrality. credibility mediation power-based as most effectivethe form of intervention, because third-party Svante E.Cornell, Svante Quoted in Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues Theoretical Mediation: ofInternational Study “The Houston, Allison and Bercovitch Jacob in Quoted Small Nations and Great Powers:of aStudy Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus Resolving the International Conflicts 26 likelihood the of conflictalwaysresolution not does depend 27 Thus, the Thus, the mutually out agreementto accepted turns 9 : The Theory and Practice of Mediation, ed. CEU eTD Collection (England: Curzon, 2001), 43. 28 Abkhazian of expression the to life new gave movements ethnic autonomous form to freedom the and fear “collective 1980s late the of perestroika Gorbachov’s after but nationalism of expression the repressed centre the At time, that of Abkhazia. status the change to Moscow petitioned they repeatedly extinction, with threatened was identity their ethnic feared that Abkhazis the Because nationality. and culture Georgian the into fully assimilated been not have they relationship, ambivalent the of because however Georgians, with religion partof the Georgian ancient andkingdoms, the Abkhazisshared Christian same the Orthodox a status within Georgia. As for the social relations, the ancestors of Abkhazis were making up into itchanged gradually however the Georgian outside SSR, status republic autonomous the union republic status (SSR) “in a treaty relationship with Georgia.” with relationship (SSR)“inatreaty status union republic inSea has its roots Georgia 1930s.the beingto Before subjugated in1931,Abkhazia had the Georgia on Black in the northwestern situated the is which strategically inAbkhazia, conflict Sovietauthority usedthe Georgia. intoethnicpolicy territorial division of The units towards politicalWhile unrestand had been civil war. partof USSRsincethe Georgia 1921,the The disintegration former Sovietof led the Union Republicof Soviet intoGeorgia South Ossetian conflicts,and this chapter presentsAbkhazian the the backgroundinto of the ethnicinsight tensions. an provide to order In war. civil the to country the led has separatistmovements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and involvement of the regional power early days ofindependence gained on April political9 1990, turmoil,nationalistic incentives, the In governments. central against revolted Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia in Ossetia South Abkhazia, regions autonomous three the Union, Soviet the from movement independence the During control. andterritorial of regions status is the conflicts forthe the stake at issue principal The thesettlement. of courses and causes immediate of their respect with similar significantly are character their specific despite Caucasus conflicts The South 2.1. Abkhazia Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: a Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus Chapter 2: Background of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian Conflicts Ossetian South and of the Abkhazian Background 2: Chapter 10 28 Abkhazia was granted was Abkhazia CEU eTD Collection cause of suspicion from the Georgian side that Russians were assisting the secessionist side. possessed they heavy had was nowhere from This notbefore. arsenal first appearing the suppliedlandmines 100,000 with andforce employing air bombardment for Sokhumi that launchers, rocket T-72 Grad tanks, equipment military with Abkhazis the were armed border, Abkhazi-Russian over control Abkhazi of establishment the to led which 1992 1, October and Russianpolitical andmilitary Abkhazis.providedto support During the offensive on with the same mission. same the with Brunner was sent in missionfact-finding in 1992, andfrom as 1993 until Swiss1997 the Eduard ambassador a “Special Envoy” of the UN Secretary General to Georgia mainly autonomous regions in country.”the the minorities situation by“taking and exacerbated stand amore towards aggressive power came to that ZviadGamsakhurdia of Georgia, president first leader andthe movement of nationalism and anti-Abkhazian declarations. Nationalist forces headed by independence demonstrations mainly in Tbilisi independenceaimed toobtain from Russia reflected upsurge between and from Sokhumi separate this sparkedhostilities Tbilisi. The Georgia; evoking Abkhaziashort-lived their independence1925 constitution of under which was issued apetition Moscow into March 1989stipulatingsecede desire the tofrom Georgia, (England: Curzon, 2001), 171. 35 2002, European Centre forMinority Issues (ECMI), 2002, p. 13. 34 Library of Congress, 1994), http://countrystudies.us/georgia/19.htm. Conflicts,” Transcaucasian 29 from governmentthe retreated Sokhumi. and supply lines,in the Georgian road was National August 1992afterGuard sent to which constitution in July secure1992. In order to borderthe with GeorgianRussia andprotect rail autonomous regions in toreturnvoted tothe Abkhazian 1991, the Soviet 1925 Supreme composed largely of Georgians. less1991, thanfivepercentof Abkhazia population the Abkhazi of wasethnic and the rest consternation.” 33 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3261059.stm. 32 2002, European Centre forMinority Issues (ECMI), 2002, p. 12. 31 30 http://trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_4baird.htm. Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: a Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus February # 15, Paper Working ECMI Caucasus”, South the in Involvement “International Sabanadze, Natalie Anthony Baird, “An Atmosphere of Reconciliation: A Theory of Resolving Ethnic Conflicts Based on the U.S. Online Library of Congress, BBC News, “Regions and Territories: Abkhazia,” March5, 2008, February # 15, Paper Working ECMI Caucasus”, South the in Involvement “International Sabanadze, Natalie Ibid. 29 The demonstrations began in Georgia after 30,000 citizens of Abkhazia of citizens 30,000 after Georgia in began demonstrations The OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 34 The war continued until 1993 where the North Caucasian fighters Caucasian 1993wheretheNorth The until warcontinued Georgia: A Country Study 32 31 After Georgia proclaimed independence with no By that time, after the disintegration of the USSR in 33 At the outbreak of the war, first the UN sent its 11 , ed. Glenn E. Curtis (Washington: GPO for the , 2.4no (1999), 35 30 CEU eTD Collection the CIS force operation. CIS the CIS, along with the UNOMIG, was to monitor implementation of the agreement zonealong Enguri River. This demilitarized the servedbuffer which through asa zone the and observe wouldbeguard a of units) (primarily peacekeeping forces deployed to consisting Russian CIS the which under bases military on agreement an signed and (CIS) States Independent of Commonwealth the Georgia entered in Moscow. Forces” of Separation and a Ceasefire on “the Agreement signed Abkhazi sides and Georgian the Envoy, Special Secretary-General's mandate. On May several of 14, 1994,after negotiations chairedrounds complex bythe deploymentof UNOMIGwassuspendedthe andtheMission was an interim granted mostly weredisplaced.further breakdown people, ceasefire, the the Following of Georgians) of thousands of (hundreds Abkhazia of population entire the days several after and Sokhumi Abkhazi from the Security Abkhazisside the 27,the OnSeptember occupied Council. for Georgia aSpecial inMay 1993. Secretary-General appointed Envoy the (CSCE),the operation initsUN established inTbilisi inNovember1992and Europe office Co- and Security on Conference with the in cooperation actions of coordination effective ensure inincentives Secretary-General means, toassistand of to the peacemaking the by diplomatic restore peaceprocess the to flee. Seeking to civilians nearly and30,000 forced of Abkhazia themajor towns captured Abkhazi 1992, the forces onOctober 1, which started fighting violations. resumed During the with ceasefire extensive remained extremely tense 38 37 http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unomig/background.html. 36 Ochamchire. Sokhumi and fromAbkhazia attacked outside support armed with Abkhaziforces, 16, 1993, establishingits in headquarters Sokhumi. After second the ceasefire breakdown on September incorporated in internationalthe observer group,wasdeployed onAugust 8,1993 in of UN military comprised UNadvanceteam,Gudauta July27,1993andthe observers 10 sides in two the between signed was aceasefire reestablishing anewagreement months, "the territorial integrity Republicthe of of Georgia shall be ensured". that and stipulated apeacesettlement for basis the created in agreement The 1992 Moscow. leadership 3, September Federation on Russian of andthe Abkhazia the RepublicGeorgia, of meetingof the tripartite the at wasreached agreement ceasefire The Russian-brokered Ibid. Ibid. UNOMIG, Georgia – UNOMIG – Background, 38 War continued in spite of the condemnation of the violation of the ceasefire by 12 36 However, the situation 37 After several CEU eTD Collection Mannheim: Germany, Issue 2/2003: 16. Ethnopilitics and Minority Issues 43 http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unomig/background.html. 42 2002, European Centre forMinority Issues (ECMI), 2002, p. 14. 41 40 96/yegorov/05.htm#5-5. Democratic Institutions ResearchFellowships (1994-1996) Report, Union”, oftheFormerSoviet Territory Gali 90% inflictinghousesof region with upto raiding and $2million forUNHCR funds of in considerably criminal mainly activities duetothe the and partisan situation deteriorated 39 meetingthe bring didnot clear about results and subsequentcooperation. however, settlement, a political to reach in efforts the could be observed improvement some In July 1997 as Russia launching its activity and aUNhigh-level meeting wassetinJuly, decreased. theiractivity and Georgia” on of Secretary-General the “Friends notground only among the conflicting among butalso sides, the mediators. Russia'sabout commitment peace tothe process, which made it findhard to acommon skeptical Azerbaijan were Georgia and that fact duetothe conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh the in Minsk Group of that the were similarto faced this group andthedifficulties The character the USA, the UK, Germany, France and Russia sought an acceptable solution for both parties. in1996,underwhich of Georgia” of UNformedthe countries the“Friends underthe aegis of negotiations.” “tozones,not sufficient this interference was settlement setupprerequisitesfor their byway made itAlthough interference possible conflictRussia in to stop escalation CISconflict the incapability of groups,Russia andeconomic the CIS,insufficient experience, complexity of disputes aswith the interestscrisis of many partiesa and politicalwhole, andineffective: was peacekeeping why the various reasons were there to research, inhis concludes intrastateconduct effective use from politicalthe opposing forenough force. torefrain the of AsAlexander parties Yegorov peacemaking instabilityof policy.result a the as though even however, role; important an play CISto had within CIS the within Peacemaking peacemaking the CIS states, as well efforts, as fighting activities were stopped, these efforts were not leaving the Georgian-Abkhaz peace process stalled. peace leaving process Georgian-Abkhaz the negotiations, the issuesof critical the on wasmade progress substantial little steps, these Susan Stewart, “The Role of the United Nations in the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict,” Georgian-Abkhazian in the Nations United the of Role “The Stewart, Susan UNOMIG, Georgia – UNOMIG – Background, February # 15, Paper Working ECMI Caucasus”, South the in Involvement “International Sabanadze, Natalie Ibid. Alexander Yegorov, “ 40 As the Abkhazia crisis gained increased international attention, a group of agroup attention, international increased gained crisis As Abkhazia the CollectiveSecurity System of theCIS States andMeasures , The Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, University of NATO Individual NATO 13 42 http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/94- By 1997, the group was renamed group By1997,the Providing Peace on the Journal on 41 43 Thus, despite Thus, In1998the 39 CEU eTD Collection 2002, European Centre forMinority Issues (ECMI), 2002, p. 13. 48 http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17473. 47 University of Mannheim: Germany, Issue 2/2003: 21. Conflict,” 46 Abkhazia, Georgia, S/2001/1008, October, 2001. 45 Mannheim: Germany, Issue 2/2003: 17. Ethnopilitics and Minority Issues States Peace Keeping Force (CISPKF) with an international peacekeepers international (CISPKF) with an Force PeaceKeeping States change Independent aresolutionparliament of Commonwealth of to the adopted Georgia asin2001the overAbkhazia Russia deteriorated with Georgia’s relations commitments. fact the latteroneincluded that measures 15confidence-building implementation inMeeting in promotion, fact 2001 werenot successful inbilateral the despite quite contacts 44 Abkhazia’s status without a prior return of Georgian refugees. negotiate on to andrefuses federation toAbkhazia inanasymmetric status an autonomous neighbors. Georgian their of eviction the before even population total demanding independence, full although ethnic Abkhazis 17per comprised centof only the is still Abkhazia and reached, been not still has conflict the to resolution a political in government. central representation Abkhazi considerable and zone economic free Saakashvili includingPresident aseries conflictresolution, for a proposals of suggested joint remains inforceand Abkhazia has trade its while commercedeepened In2008 with Russia. government of South Ossetia. An economic embargo from Abkhazian side to Georgia with successions the cooperates Abkhaziaalso Russia Russian citizenship. receiving through with ties political its extending and Georgia from isolated been has Abkhazia war, the Since informingwithout UNOMIG. and in Afterwards,on deployed troops zone April heavy the equipment2002 the CISPKF Russia. Abkhazia with of association acloser suggested side Abkhazian the that circumstance rehabilitation. Natalie Sabanadze, “International Involvement in the South Caucasus”, ECMI Working Paper # 15, February # 15, Paper Working ECMI Caucasus”, South the in Involvement “International Sabanadze, Natalie Civil Georgia, Politics, “Saakashvili Outlines Tbilisi’s Abkhaz Initiatives,” March 28, 2008, Georgian-Abkhazian in the Nations United the of Role “The Stewart, Susan in Situation the Concerning Secretary-General of the Report Council, Security Nations United Susan Stewart, “The Role of the United Nations in the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict,” Georgian-Abkhazian in the Nations United the of Role “The Stewart, Susan Journal on Ethnopilitics and Minority Issues 44 Neither Athens the and in Istanbul conferences 1998 and1999, the Yalta , The Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, University of 46 14 , The Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, Social European for Centre Mannheim , The 48 Georgia hasoffered Journal on 45 , following, the 47 Today, CEU eTD Collection Gamsakhurdia organizedGamsakhurdia a“march to“defendTskhinvali” on that Georgian the population” sent a The massive nationalist turmoil overwhelmed thecountry in 1990asOssetian South petitionofficials to leverage central the government. greater relatively gaining against Moscow wasweakening atthe time, Georgian the state that minority opportunity Ossetian the availed requesting Thus,the center. againstthe power greater have they that perceive minorities mainly when the unification of North and South Ossetians. 2007), 40. minority the enclave. within centrehavingleader by demand support advancedagainstthe popular a political was aparticular since centre the against minority radicalization leading to bargaining minority andplace.local Gamsakhurdia took Ossetians irregularbetween clashes declaration, independence headedof groups Georgians byZviad situation. the deteriorated Sokhumi that Abkhazian campaign against openingthe ofa Georgian branch of Tbilisi University in the supported Nykhas, Ademon Front Popular Ossetian South of leader the Chochiev, Autonomous Region Autonomous Republic. tothe (Oblast) In springthe of 1989, Alan from inOssetia 1988asSouth the changing The firststatus demanded tensions rose Georgia andRussiaOssetia integral recognizedSouth of 1920,Russia asan of Georgia. part between friendship signed of atreaty According to languages hadequalstatus. minority the modifications. Ossetian Cyrillic group toIranian related (Farsi)usingthe with totheIndo-European belongs each other –while is Georgian asubgroup andof Caucasianthe Ossetian languagegroup from they languages,differ the for as elements; paganism practice Ossetians religion, while 52 51 50 Association forResearch on the Caucasus, http://www.caucasus.dk/chapter4.htm. 49 Ossetia. in thirdGeorgians other South (29.44%) the and of population the (66.61%) for nearly two-thirds accounted 1989 census,Ossetians within Georgia andthe of scene ina bloody conflict periodthe 1989–1992.According tothe region Ossetia,autonomous an the areaswasSouth of dispute one period, During Soviet the Conflict Ossetian 2.2. South Erin K. Jenne, Erin Ibid. Ibid. N. Cvetkovski, “The Georgian - South Ossetian Conflict” (PhD. diss., Aalborg University), chapter 4, Danish 50 Ethnic Bargaining: theParadox of Minority Empowerment During the Soviet Union, Georgian was the official state language there and there language state official the was Georgian Union, Soviet the During 52 In addition, according to Jenne’s argument, radicalization happens radicalization argument, Jenne’s to according addition, In On On 26 May, anniversarythe at 1918 Georgia’s of 15 51 This was a noteworthy example of majority- 49 The two groups share a similar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, University Cornell (Ithaca: CEU eTD Collection peacekeepers are comprised of the Russian, South Ossetian, North Georgian and Ossetian North Ossetian, South Russian, the of are comprised peacekeepers where format mediation current the reforming requested Tbilisi sametime the At Sanakoyev in 2007as a way rehabilitatingof Georgian-controlled villages Tskhinvali. around Dimitri leader with government provisional alternative initiated Tbilisi Kokoity, leader Ossetian South facto de the to Parallel be observed. can side center’s the from resolution conflictapproach to Since relatively 2007anew Georgian efficient and side retreated. members. Because the advance was seriously miscalculated, seriously was advance the members. Because Battalion Commando Georgian US-trained the mainly sent were there military that action At territorial integrity and underminethe regimesecessionist launched in incursion Tskhinvali. county'sfightingresumed torestore Saakashvili in asinAugust2004President order edgeof the the at became conflict frozen five the years over stability relative After the December1999 15, OSCEmandatethe was toincludeextended border monitoring. 26, 2004. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3128. 57 56 2002, European Centre forMinority Issues (ECMI), 2002, p. 17. 55 Library of Congress, 1994), http://countrystudies.us/georgia/19.htm. conflictzone. tothe 800families Norwegian the Council returned Refugees of theUNHCRand of assistance 1998with Till relativestabilization. the led to refugees which of return hindered the has not Russia agreement ceasefire the after that bementioned also in North Ossetia should South It and Ossetia. Georgia between a dialogue initiated CSCE 54 2002, European Centre forMinority Issues (ECMI), 2002, p. 15. 53 resumelarge-scale combat. to andthreatened over were negotiations announced that Ossetian ingovernment that South the factJuly 1993, the 1994 despite early throughout force in was It battalions. Russian six the with together troops Ossetian and by Georgian the was enforced cease-fire The mediation. cease-fire leading to administration, onJuly started 1992 bythe Yeltsin 14, operation peace-keeping Russian-led three-sided Tskhinvali.fighting in involvement. with sporadicspring The The 1992 Russian escalated of entered OblastindependenceAutonomous andon declared January 5, 1991Georgian troops city. the from entering was prevented See International Crisis Group, “Georgia: Avoiding War inSouthOssetia”, Europe Report N°159, November OSCE Permanent Council, PC Journal No. 262, Agenda item 4, PC.DEC/334, December15, 1999. February # 15, Paper Working ECMI Caucasus”, South the in Involvement “International Sabanadze, Natalie U.S. Online Library of Congress, February # 15, Paper Working ECMI Caucasus”, South the in Involvement “International Sabanadze, Natalie Georgia: A Country Study 53 On 20 September 1990, the South Ossetian 16 , ed. Glenn E. Curtis (Washington: GPO for the 57 after the armed operations the 54 Later in Later the June 1994, 56 55 On CEU eTD Collection Prague,February 2006,1, (RFE/RL), http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2006-32-31.cfm. 62 Black Sea Paper Series Cooperation, Regional for SeaTrust Black The States, United of the Fund Marshall German The Ossetia?” 61 53. 2001, 546. due Sovietto Armenian troops territorial claims.Armenian Armed Since have 1992, Forces outamongindependence itsAzeri fight broke and inapopular Armenian, referendum and a Karabakh,” subjecting the region directto control from Moscow. In 1991, the region declared solution,leadership Soviet the established“aspecial governmentadministration in Armenia. forincorporationArmenian As voted to ofKarabakh a Council parliament and appropriate time for the unification of the territory to Armenia on December 1, 1989 once the is.” ifKosovo’s granted be andperforce somust Kosovo’s, than more legitimate are independence for cases Ossetia’s officials “Abkhazia’shave been insisting precedent” a“Kosovo that on andarguing South independence inKosovo’s from international beforeof 2008,Russian Serbia recognition illegal with benefited trade Russia and of movementuncontrolled goods allsides. 1980s after Garbachev’s in Committee The first confrontationof Communistlatethe erupted 1921. of Russia Party Central the of Bureau Caucasian the by taken was autonomy regional broad grant and SSR theAzerbaijan keep within territory to the decision the and region centuries over a disputed fromin The modern itsroots conflicthastakes Nagorno-Karabakh period. Sovietthe It been Conflict – Karabakh Nagorno The 2.3. Russian–Georgian the relations. This policy deteriorates approach fullgranted independence, why should wedenythen itAbkhaziato Ossetia?" and South be can Kosovo that believe people “[If] sides, conflicting the all for beneficial principles 60 Black Sea Paper Series Cooperation, Regional for SeaTrust Black The States, United of the Fund Marshall German The Ossetia?” 59 (Central Asia –Caucasus Institute) Analyst, 07/25/2007 issue, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4666. 58 them. recognizing formally without regions the of control take effectively citizenshipcomponents. to the most of the residents of South Ossetia and taking other measures to Johnson’s Russia List, JRL “Russia: Putin Calls For 'Universal Principles' To Settle Frozen Conflicts”, ToSettle Frozen Principles' ForPutin Calls 'Universal JRL “Russia: List, Russia Johnson’s South and Abkhazia in Conflicts the Solving Without NATO Join Georgia “Can Iakobashvili, Temur Charles King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States”, Unrecognized Eurasia’s Understanding War: ofEthnic Benefits “The King, Charles South and Abkhazia in Conflicts the Solving Without NATO Join Georgia “Can Iakobashvili, Temur Johanna Popjanevski,“Georgia Speeds up Efforts toward Conflict Resolutionin South Ossetia,” CACI 58 Russia hasbeen supporting thesecessionist region through granting Russian , no 3, p. 2, http://www.gmfus.org/doc/Black. , no 3,, no p.2, http://www.gmfus.org/doc/Black. 61 As president Putin stated onJanuary findingfor AsPutin stated 31, 2006 common president perestroika as the Armenian minority in Karabakh considered an in Karabakh considered minority as Armenian the 17 59 In addition, the addition, In World Politics 60 Even , 62 CEU eTD Collection 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/NK_CON.htm?v=at_a_glance. 64 karabakh.htm. 63 involvement of regional Russia. the constructive power the with determined be greatly would process theresolution of course the and ethno-political were disputes the of causes the that demonstrates conflicts three the all of The overview recognized. was territory the of independence the until territories from occupied the retreat to refused of countries. the parts other from moved Armenians proper, from Nagorno-Karabakh the displaced Azerbaijanis were nearly ethnic million one killed, were people more than 35,000 in warended with Thefullscale 1994where a ceasefire ethnic districts. seven surrounding Azerbaijan’s occupied including region ofNagorno-Karabakh 20%of territory the and its Reuters Foundation, “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict - Secessionist Region Faces Uncertain Future”, March 5, March Future”, Uncertain Faces Region -Secessionist Conflict “Nagorno-Karabakh Foundation, Reuters GlobalSecurity.org, Military, Nagorno-Karabakh, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nagorno- 63 600,000ethnic Azerbaijanis and 300,000ethnic 18 64 Despite the cease fire, the Armenians the fire, cease the Despite CEU eTD Collection border.” a stable, Georgiaforthat independent security southern Russia's along wasnecessary After final ofGeorgia’s in“Russia's independence recognition 1992, position official was Georgian elite as a window of foropportunity implementing their strategic interests. country’sthe ethno-political crises. geopolitical The of greatpowersareviewedgames the by in mediation foreign seekingWestern involves policy pro-Western which orientated adopted response, and to counterbalance Russia, Georgia aligned itself with Western capitals. Georgia Western oil whoformulatedcompanies in Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan the pipeline project; in of the interest the Georgia attracted Asia.Therefore, inCentral broadly andmore Caucasus domination in as to South the by a prerequisite powers someGeorgia regional isconsidered over control Nowadays, relations. external its balance hadto historically has Iran – Georgia in –Russia, and Turkey, between regional bufferLocated powers a geographic zone several success. mediation international for is regional meddlingargues that absence thirdand the security of akey power precondition region and Caucasus in South the ofRussia interests examines the Thischapter conflicts. frozen of area an into region the turning found been not have conflicts the to solution political howeverlevelsreturn violence, of not to theirprevious stability reachedand did relative Nagorno-Karabakh Ossetia and Abkhazia,South of inthe republics conflicts OSCE, the by After in UN longmanagingchancesthe run.” peacenegotiations the conflicts the and of balanceforeign incentives mediation to in Russia's increasethe order roleand dominating different welcomed Georgia OSCE. the UNand the Russia, of from side the was conducted peacemediation the Ossetia, andin Southern Abkhazia war the neutrality. During mediator of principle the of violation in interests own their promote to intervene often mediators The Library of Congress, 1994), http://countrystudies.us/georgia/20.htm. 65 370,000 ethnicliving Russians inGeorgia; and prevention of refugeethe influx in theRussia the of protection Iran; and Turkey from movements radical Islamic and Russia between unstable of creation a buffer with Ukraine; relations due to Georgia,was questionable which U.S. Online Library of Congress, 65 Georgia had strategic importance for Russia:theBlackSeathrough for access importance Georgia hadstrategic Chapter 3: Third Party Intervener –Russia Georgia: A Country Study 19 , ed. Glenn E. Curtis (Washington: GPO for the CEU eTD Collection 2001), 259. 71 http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0363.pdf. Policy Memo 363, Monterey ofInstitute International Studies, June 2005, 70 (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2003), 124. 69 Studies, http://www.gfsis.org/pub/eng/security.php. 68 67 Library of Congress, 1994), http://countrystudies.us/georgia/20.htm. 66 Caucasus. – North After Shevardnadze’s visit to Moscow in Moscow visitcloseAfter to Russia Shevardnadze’s inayear bases 2000 the agreed to seriously. more neighbour southern the with relations its examining and process withdrawal the Georgian authorities awoke respectstand of consistent withdrawalhowever the cooperation, from policy deteriorate integration would Russian side that lead to the continuation NATO in 1999and Treaty Collective Security of CIS the termination seemed thatGeorgia’s of the At same it the time procedure. the issue wasprolonging because Russia became acontested end of 2000. The CFEimplementation smoothly,proceeded bases whereas withdrawal the the by Georgia of territory the on (CFE) Treaty Europe in Forces Arms Conventional the by limited equipment decrease the agreed to also Russia separately. be negotiated wasto bases remaining onesbefore 1,2001 July thetimeframewhile for the Akhalkalaki andBatumi itself withdrawRussia committed Vazianiandmilitaryto the of bases out four Gudauta the NovemberYeltsin 17,1999, signedaccordingandwhich Shevardnadze ajoint statement to leaders. and communist by nationalist criticized fervently was which withdrawal, the guardscompleted asborder well Russian Navyas USSR. Themajority facilitiesthe of were closed during 1997–1999 andby 1999 the military and Russianmilitary the In andRussiaagreement on equipment an 1995 Georgian signed bases withdrawal“foreign-policy inertia andthe grasping of ina superpower decline.”rapid which Abkhazside.” the on hostilities remained inarms,intelligence, directly and the Russiansoldiers participated ammunition, and in the country theAbkhazianHowever, throughout “Russiaconflict, providedseparatists overtly with the stability. national groups for county’s the those broaden to autonomy the Georgia to after the Ossetia inAbkhaziaGeorgia's and ethnic crises South same and atthe wasencouraging time disintegration makers. military Russian policy the of the Mihai Gribincea, The Russian Policy on Military Bases: Georgia and Moldova, (Cogito Publishing House, Nikolai Sokov, “The Withdrawal of Russian Military Bases from Georgia: Not Solving Anything”, PONARS Monica Duffy Toft, Duffy Monica Security and Strategic for Foundation Georgian Strategy”, of aNiche InQuest „Georgia: Gegeshidze, Archil Ibid. U.S. Online Library of Congress, 66 The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory The national security The of importance by national Georgia openly wasalso security declared Georgia: A Country Study 68 Even now, Moscow’s interests can be characterized as can be characterized interests Moscow’s Evennow, 67 In pursuing these interestsin Russia Inpursuing mediation these offered 20 , ed. Glenn E. Curtis (Washington: GPO for the 70 At the OSCE Istanbul Summit on 69 71 CEU eTD Collection necessary measure to protect its citizens and will discuss the possibility of speedy beginning possibility of its andwilldiscuss the protect citizens measure to necessary any apply will Russia NATO, the joins it in case or Ossetia South or Abkhazia in operation military ''If Georgia conducts statingthat andTransdnestria'' Ossetia Abkhazia, South Recently in Russian March 2008, the lawmakers a statementadopted ''Russian policy towards footing, not by confrontation. strategicin security by with theGeorgia region besecured should onan equal collaborating Regional Studies 75 of Research,Asian vol.14, no. 3 (2003), p.12. http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol14no3.pdf. 74 73 Studies, http://www.gfsis.org/pub/eng/security.php. 72 influence”. US spreadof minimize the to wish and perspective game a zero-sum from Caucasus South view the still of] Russians [majority “the although this, accepted Russia terrorism, military USdeployedin forcesthe totrain Georgian the 2002inits special fightagainst Pankisi Gorge, thein fighters the and refugees the spill-over the of led to conflict Chechen asthe In late1999, Russian air force bombed the northern Asia. Central Eastinto the part of Georgian forvalve penetrationinfluence ofTurkey’s territory. North into the Caucasus andfurther to political When asasafety Georgia Russia considers Basin.Inaddition, Caspian into the interests corporate impede the easily would Georgia over Russia’scontrol Also, Basin. Caspian into the NATO expansion progress check prospective possibility of Russia to leveragefor in provides region. Georgia Presence of the retain its inorder vulnerabilities to Georgia’s influencemanipulated sphereof inthe domestic East – West Abkhazia.” on General Secretary energyincrease corridor to tried Georgia process, management conflict the over monopoly Russia’s avoid to Seeking the and role hamper of the Western bases will not appear in West,the country. FDIresultingunder the provision of usage the Vaziani military airport and the promiseand that NATO military in the formation of the group “Friends of UN Revaz Gachechiladze, “Geographical Background to a Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia”, in Conflict ofthe aSettlement to Background “Geographical Gachechiladze, Revaz Perspectives”, Security Economic and “Military E.Cornell, Svante Ibid. Security and Strategic for Foundation Georgian Strategy”, of aNiche InQuest „Georgia: Gegeshidze, Archil 74 Because Russia finds a profitable economic niche in the South in its Caucasus, the South niche economic Because findsaprofitable Russia , Special Issue (1998), http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/crs/crs_1998sp/crs98sp_gar01.html. 73 75 72 Having interests,comprehensive hasactively Russia 21 NBR Analysis , NBR The National Bureau Caucasian CEU eTD Collection force”. local with police an EU-trained peacekeepers Russian in Abkhazia “replacing format peacekeeping thecurrent reexamined that proposal peace Georgian latest the Medvedev, over In May, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was to meet Russia's new president, Dmitry forces regime." of theceasefireandseparation law, undercuts international underfrom and,with Agreement possible considerations aside inconsistent Moscow the is -in –in third-parties the Federation this case fundamentally Russian zoneof the conflict action by enforcement Mission that considers the therefore, perspective, peacekeeping strict The incidentwas classifiedby UNOMIGas violation the of the ceasefire a of 1994: "[From] atrocities. avoidfurther to in order forces peacekeeping the internationalize try to to Tbilisi ledApril which 2008 on 20 territory Abkhaz-controlled had entered that unmanned aircraft jetsa Georgian L-39 Abkhaz fighter downed the after countries degenerated two also supplementary alongcheck-points the boundary-line inApril 2008. Relations between the 3d9c84e9419e.html. Abkhaz Solution,” May 2008,31, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/05/29ead414-ad45-468c-a7b8- 80 Aerial Vehicle over the Zone of Conflict, May 26, 2008, http://www.unomig.org/. 79 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050908.shtml. EURASIANET.org 78 http://www.rustavi2.com/news/news_text.php?id_news=26507&pg=1&im=main&ct=0&wth=. 77 . http://www.rustavi2.com/news/news_text.php?pg=&cur_d=&month=4&year=08&wth=&ct=0&id_news=25346 2008, 76 2,542 inAbkhazia,ceasefire whichunderthe forcetroops to thepeacekeeping increased exceed ceasefirewhich underthe of 3,000 1994 cannot terms inAbkhazia, troops 2,542 force to increased CISpeacekeeping the had escalations. Russian periodic with tension andbe characterized 2008 could thought Russian-Georgian relations integrity.” by the Foreign Ministry of Georgia as “another step of aggression against Georgia's territorial recent actions in May – sending units of thepolicy Railway Forces of to AbkhaziaRussia – were thatcondemneddiscussion of recognitionit of wantsthe conflict regions.” to expand its interest in the South Caucasus region. Russia’s RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, “Georgia: Security Council Head SaysUnmanned Russia Can PlayGeorgian ofa 'Dignified Downing the Role' in Involving April of20 Incident the on UNOMIG of Report UNOMIG, Nina Akhmeteli, “Georgia: US and EU Support for Tbilisi Grows Amid Escalating Tension withRussia”, Rustavi 2Broadcasting Company,“Tbilisi Accuses Russian of Military Annexation,” May 2008,31, Rustavi 2Broadcasting Company, “Russian Lawmakers Approve Statement on Conflict Regions,” March 20, 80 In addition, tensions between Georgian and Russia increased after and Russiahad betweenGeorgian increased In Russia tensions addition, 77 , May 9, 2008, Eurasia Insight section, 22 76 This statement clearly highlights the highlights clearly statement This 78 and established15 79 CEU eTD Collection Bercovitch(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 13. Empirical Evidence,” in Evidence,” Empirical 86 232 – 272. approaches toConflict Management 85 Resolution 84 Series, CEU,Budapest, November 19, 2007). 83 Georgia and Russia”,May 2008.2, 82 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050908.shtml. EURASIANET.org 81 Kissinger”. itis Hobbesian parties “In this forperspective, a concerned. world Henry ideal dog-eat-dog, in conflicting little with interest interests, their pursue in to peacekeeping engage third parties the best of its interests. incentives to its with mediation in it Caucasus,manipulate the would its of interests spheres Russia noted, reestablish Kagan strives Asto interests. Robert itsdetermined by geopolitical was conflicts Caucasus ininvolvement South the Russian showed, the As thischapter conflicts. of both settlement peaceful UNSC resolution 1808 of April 15 2008,” in the asmost recently reaffirmed borders recognized internationally its within Georgia of integrity territorial and independence, sovereignty, the to commitment firm “its reiterating Ministersnegotiations of Foreign sending and issuing adeclaration efforts, agroup the exceed 3,000. not 1994can terms of goals. advance their employ to states whichthe instrument” policy a “foreign becomes mediation self-interest, theirinfluence andpursuing promoting their arerational actors states because management of conflict be process areactive might mediation international although addition, parties suchaspolitical internal andpower.In defined ethniccomposition, identities, clearly by as is mediation a numberfactors influenced well of of the as thecharacteristics contextual from 1990 by 1945 to revealsBercovitch and Houston that successful the of external outcome and mediation success. An empirical examination of internal conflicts and mediation efforts Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Issues Theoretical Mediation: International of Study “The Houston, Allison and Bercovitch Jacob Saadia Touval, “The Superpowers as Mediators,” in Mediators,” as Superpowers “The Touval, Saadia David Last, “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding,” to Peacekeeping “From Last, David Speakers Distinguished at lecture (public of History" Return The Relations: “Trans-Atlantic Kagan, Robert between of Tension Escalation on the EU the of behalf on Presidency by the “Declaration Statements, CFSP Nina Akhmeteli, “Georgia: US and EU Support for Tbilisi Grows Amid Escalating Tension withRussia”, 85 International disputes in the last decade show heterogeneity of mediator involvement mediator heterogeneity of in lastdecadeshow the disputes International , 5.1no (2003), p.2,www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/5_1last.htm. 84 86 Mediation within a realist framework of international politics shows that shows politics international of framework a realist within Mediation “because solutions to ethnic wars do not depend on dependnotethnictheir on causes” to warsdo “because solutions , May 9, 2008, Eurasia Insight section, Resolving the International Conflicts 83 This policy is clarified by Davit Last. According to his explanation, to According Last. Davit by isclarified policy This , ed. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, (London: Macmillan, 1992), 81 The US and the EU intervened with diplomatic 23 Mediation in International Relations: Multiple OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict 82 thus supporting international efforts for a : The Theory and Practice of Mediation, 87 , stopping ed. Jacob ed. CEU eTD Collection Conflict, 87 for peacesolutionsearching bewould avain quest. wasconflicts ethnicrebellious supportfrom minoritiesenjoying ifpersists,Russia, support remain. In case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, international fightingethnic would through last engagement aslong as intermediaries the because the one of the critical reasons of the Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” in ed. Michael E. Brown et. al. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 445. 24 Nationalism and Ethnic CEU eTD Collection Resolution 90 http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/role_igo/. 89 Bercovitch(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 12. Brahimi inReport 1999. differentiated”, afterissuingin the for Agenda Peace in supplement1992, the 1995, and the and became entrenched andpeacebuilding notions of peacekeeping, peacemaking, “the theUNthat It was through conflicts. in international mediation third party systematize The United Nations,conflicts and examines the outcome of the efforts.along withChapter discusses the engagement of the This UN and the OSCEin Abkhazian conflict. of and South Ossetian mediation itsin third-party role significant a played have predecessormanagement conflict international in outstanding most the is UN the which from organizations International the League of Nations, UNMediation 4.1. The were created to and the OSCE in South Ossetia. Abkhazia in engagement UN the examine will I afterwards and characteristics and methods mediation UN the will I review First, party. third interested an antagonize to not are trying Empirical Evidence,” in Evidence,” Empirical 88 conflicts. in mediating meansuccess increased not intervention does increased their However, conflicts. the of management peaceful and cooperation of possibility the enhance They states. andin within states, conflicts dealing with between settlement conflict active in facilitating havebecome increasingly and intergovernmental International organizations organizations itisoften stop utilized to on-going and conflicts find to solutions thatcan preserve the peace. morebut in diplomacy, used is also preventive Mediation dispute. of the settlement peaceful a negotiate and cease hostilities to persuade parties to effort peacemaking broader of a as part Mediation that is initiated amore upon non-binding character Mediation thatrequest has David Last, “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding,” to Peacekeeping “From Last, David Eric Brahm, “Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)”, Beyond Intractability, March2005, Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Issues Theoretical Mediation: International of Study “The Houston, Allison and Bercovitch Jacob , 5.1no (2003), p.1,www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/5_1last.htm. 89 In Iwillmediation may this chapter international fail argue that mediators when Chapter 4: The UNand OSCE Engagement in Georgia Resolving the International Conflicts 90 Third generation missions werecharacterized asguiding peace Third generation 25 OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict : The Theory and Practice of Mediation, 88 and can be seen ed. Jacob ed. CEU eTD Collection Transcaucasian Conflicts,” Transcaucasian 93 of Public Information, United Nations, 1973), Art. 33. 92 http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/role_igo/. 91 into negotiation.” entered settlements among opposing parties in civiland the ethic conflict whohave“willingly Transcaucasian Conflicts,” Transcaucasian 95 http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/role_igo/. 94 http://trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_4baird.htm. which impartiality, its is mediation. UN state-based than legitimacy itmore gives the of mediation institutional for asset main The Azerbaijan. of (CIS) in process States mediation Independent in the conflicts the and Georgia Commonwealth andthe of Russia engagement the UNwelcomed the reason, For this peace”. maintenance of the “to organizations of regional side the activism on encourages Charter of UN the VIII Chapter peace”. to the to threats respect “with coercion useof for the basis conciliation, mediation, settlement.” judicial enquiry, arbitration, negotiation, by solution a seek all, of first shall, security, and peace international of maintenance the endanger to likely is which of continuance the UN with mechanismsfor facilitating “the resolution. conflict Itstates: parties toany dispute, http://trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_4baird.htm. nations.” other of conflicts internal in the involvement its and self-determination, and sovereignty national for support UN's the between contrast is the contradiction UN the to “Central itself. institution the to internal be might which mediation, UN with problems structural be might there suggests that ofsuchinvolvement mediation, failure relative the inconflict engaged consensus on whether and how to intervene in a conflict. a in intervene to how and whether on consensus be immobilized bydisagreements Council membersamong Security reach tryingwhile to mediation. UNcan The of conflict impeded theprogress themselves powers where regional was of mediation UN effectiveness the hampering crucial factor most The conflicts. Caucasus South inmanagingthe ofthe UNimpotence be the to major culprits not drawbacks appeared process; thathamper theconflictmanagement capability,these capabilities andfinancial military insufficient size, theorganization’s cases, specific research of to attributed resources the UN is consideredmandate, the UN has no power to back up its settlements. In addition,through if conflict resolution of managing the modern ethnic conflicts, then the UN was not Anthony Baird, “An Atmosphere of Reconciliation: A Theory of Resolving Ethnic Conflicts Based on the Charter of the United Nations, United Nations Hague, International Court of Justice (New York: Department Eric Brahm, “Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)”, Beyond Intractability, March2005, Anthony Baird, “An Atmosphere of Reconciliation: A Theory of Resolving Ethnic Conflicts Based on the Eric Brahm, “Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)”, Beyond Intractability, March2005, 94 Among the drawbacks of Among mediation drawbacksof institutional of the the UNareinadequate the OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 91 Charter VI of the Charter of the United Nations empowers the 92 With the aim of security, the following Chapter grants the 26 93 However, given that the UN is actively 95 Second, because of certain of the because Second, , 2.4 (1999),no , 2.4 (1999),no CEU eTD Collection with the authorized strength of with military authorizedstrength the 88 of observers under Council resolution Security 858 On August1993, theUN 24, senta United Nations ObserverGeorgia Mission to (UNOMIG) operations, Russia involvedwas in within itspeacekeeping “near abroad”. in wouldzone part peacekeeping in take a conflict interesthave which states aspecial the accept that not theUNdoes generally Even though force. UN peacekeeping traditional a than rather sent force was peacekeeping Russian) (predominantly aCIS Moscow, Politicalof SettlementApril Georgian-Abkhazianthe signed Conflict” in on 1994in 4, for a Measures on “Declaration Following the in 1993. wassigned December ceasefire becamethe179 After Georgia neighbour Russia. northern the – party mediating third the aswith well as Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ossetia out through international – UNinorganizations the Abkhazia, and the OSCEin South carried been have conflicts Caucasus South the of settlement peaceful the over Negotiations Abkhazia in Nations United 4.2. party mediation methods. developmentand number rising of UNstillethnic conflicts,the traditionalacts through third- institutional slow becausethe of However, tools. diplomacy preventive developing and Minorities National on Commissioner a High establishing through changes significant Transcaucasian Conflicts,” Transcaucasian 97 http://trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_4baird.htm. Conflicts,” Transcaucasian the on 96 OSCE. of participation the with and intermediary an as Russia inpeacefulin started Geneva resolution November 1993 of under theaegis UN,with the actors.” has and,thus, difficulty sub-state ethnicrelating groups to not states, of was established “It asan organization manage conflicts. internal to created Dando, 1998), 179 – 198. Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts 99 of the Abkhazian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.abkhazia.org/infsheet19981010.html. 98 http://trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_4baird.htm. Anthony Baird, “An Atmosphere of Reconciliation: A Theory of Resolving Ethnic Conflicts Based on the Quoted in Anthony Baird, “AnAtmosphere of Reconciliation: A Theory of Resolving Ethnic Conflicts Based Josiane Tercinet, “Europe and United Nations Peacemaking” in Peacemaking” Nations United and “Europe Tercinet, Josiane information-sheet Conflict”, Georgian-Abkhazian the ofSettling Course the “On ofAbkhazia, Republic The OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 97 OJPCR: The Online Journal ofPeace and Conflict Resolution th memberof inJuly negotiating UN the 1992, the for a process , ed. , Tom Woodhouse Robertand Bruce,(London: Malcolm 27 Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards 98 96 As a result, an official The UN is undergoing UN The 99 , 2.4 (1999),no , 2.4 (1999),no CEU eTD Collection http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unomig/background.html. 104 103 102 101 100 continuedthe Secretary-GeneralCouncil 2001, the 18January lackof declared that on its fulfill capacity hampered mandate. to Mission’s the attacks UNOMIGthe on office andabduction of in personnel over1999–2000thatthe turn freedom movementof of also UNOMIG persistedthat incidents comprisednumerous of violations of the “Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation Forces”of and restrictions on the include armedDestabilizing factors and Constant forces. part. criminality uncontrolled upper Valley Kodori the control fully to failed authorities central the while zone, Gali lower in the obvious particularly was enforcement law Abkhazi of insufficiency The unsettled. With the deadlock in the peace process, force. cooperation with CISpeacekeeping the the general integrity” demilitarization, monitoring of stipulated and Georgia operations, patrol situation territorial and sovereignty tothe “commitment its onreaffirmed The document mandate. the ground also27 July 136 observers strength and1994, extended theUNOMIG's military to extended the remained conflicting sidesin May 1994inMoscow, Security by itsCouncil, of resolution 937 (1994) settlement.” political overall an of achieving aim with the process peace carry forward the “to facilitator settlement. political comprehensive a encourage to efforts UN the to relevant situation of developments the on reporting and monitoring contingent, military Russian the and parties both between aninterimwas suspended according to that includedmandate of maintenance contacts mission (1993), on 4 November by 1993the Consequently, 881 Council resolution Security prevent since conflict escalation in fighting Abkhazia in resumed 1993. September failed mission. observer to maintained TheUNOMIG monitoring of an and status the groups inmixed the participation from direct UNrefrained the this mandate with Interestingly, deploymentmixedof monitoring interim with groups Georgian, Abkhaz and Russian units. the referring readiness and situation the on report investigation, cease-fire verification, ceasefire entailed mission the of mandate six-month The authorities. Abkhaz the and Georgia (1993) in with compliance between27, 1993ceasefiretheRepublic July the agreement of UNOMIG, Georgia – UNOMIG – Background, United Nations Security CouncilResolution, S/RES/937 (1994), July 21, 1994. United Nations Security CouncilResolution, S/RES/881 (1993), November4, 1993. United Nations Security CouncilResolution, S/RES/881 (1993), November4, 1993. United Nations Security Resolution,Council S/RES/858 (1993), August 24, 1993. 101 102 In the same mandate, the UN also welcomed the assistance of the Russia as After signing “the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces” by the 103 28 104 In the Report to the Security theReport In 100 CEU eTD Collection Abkhazia, Georgia, S/2008/219, April 2, 2008. 110 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26211&Cr=georgia&Cr1=. 109 Abkhazia, Georgia, S/2003/412, April 9, 2003. 108 Abkhazia, Georgia, S/2001/713, July 19, 2001. 107 Georgia, S/2001/401, April 24, 2001. 106 Abkhazia, Georgia, S/2001/59, January 18, 2001. 105 force.” of non-use the to parties the of of “therenewal significant commitment the outcome was “most the mutual understanding, March in2001 Yalta, wouldboost reconciliation; however, despite urgingboth sides towards in Measures, onConfidence-building third the that hope Meeting General the expressed entire in andcould the regrettable peaceprocess future. endanger the progress on the crucial issue of the political status of Abkhazia within Georgia was peacekeeping process could be assessed not very very notfailedbe couldpeacekeeping process bring highly becauseit assessed to about the UN the parties, the between cooperation practical and stability rolein promoting important an played has UNOMIG the that fact the despite nevertheless, 15; October until mandate Georgian sides. Abkhaz the and between dialogue of resumption facilitate and conflict of zone inthe tensions of escalation France, Germany, of Friends consisting Group of had years, the Abkhaz authorities fourreceived nearly the Russian,in first that time the lack of continued againstthebackground progress the of peace efforts” the US and later until January till “new31 the period2003. Over of 2003 in2007 there momentum wasa the UK. Security the Council extended the UNOMIG’s mandate for sixmonths onJuly31,2002and yet. started not Georgia had within Abkhazia political of future status the over relations. in improvement the to contribute to likely is which months, few previous the sides two the linebetween andin border Kodori Valley the the situation at security stable relatively isit2006 and a 2007, to characteristic unlikethat thetensed relation moon that stated UNOMIG until andApril 15, 2008, on April Secretary-General UNReport 4, 2008 Ban Ki- of mandate the extended The Security inCouncil zone. conflict the situation overall security mandates, the police component of 20 officers was added to the Mission assisting to the UNOMIG the of extension of series a After settlement. levelof political practical the made at United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Situation onthe Secretary-General of the Report Council, Security Nations United UN News Centre, “Further Stability Can Boost Prospects for Georgian-Abkhaz Peace”, UN report, April 4, in Situation onthe Secretary-General of the Report Council, Security Nations United in Situation the Concerning Secretary-General of the Report Council, Security Nations United Abkhazia, in Situation the Concerning Secretary-General of the Report Council, Security Nations United in Situation onthe Secretary-General of the Report Council, Security Nations United 109 The report says The“UNOMIG report that continued tohelp its efforts the prevent 110 The Secretary-General recommended the extension of the of extension the recommended TheSecretary-General 106 Subsequent reports also noted negotiations the that noted Subsequentreportsalso 29 108 However, still little progress hasbeen little However,still progress 105 TheSecretary- 107 Therefore, CEU eTD Collection Nations: New York and Geneva, 2002): 99. 115 Notes,15 August 2006, http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/44e1a6027.html. 114 Resolution 113 Resolution July 2007 and in engaged European the improvingCommission-funded programmefor by 20 projects than finalized more UNDP the zone, conflict Ossetian South In the Georgia. in conflicts fieldsin both recovery and in prevention crisis the operates (UNDP) Programme political solution to the conflict complicates its work. with thehumanitarian needs andfacilitating the development programming. The absence of a (UNOCHA) isinsub-offices Georgia two with operating in and dealing Sokhumi Tskhinvali a political dialogue. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs andparallelefforts itssettlementin role part ofsupportive with conflict processes two peace 112 111 annual million. budgetof US$ 9.4 an with Caucasus South in the conflicts protracted the of aresult as (IDPs) Persons Displaces commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) it deals with over one million refugees and Internally Abkhazia of zones conflict inthe assistance humanitarian extensiveand social The UNpromoted and and assistance meantintercession South directly parties; the with the on parties influence to help or find immediate solutions.intervention diplomatic top-down enable to up reporting entailed Ossetia.observer an explicitly had UNOMIG the although importantly, Most action. on consensus international mission, Withits information that circumstance provided the an transparency was builtand provided to nevertheless that in theteams multinational it was deployed of enquiry. Second, powers and considerable establishment described by First,David Last. it allowing enjoyed diplomatic status, it free movement the itbest violence of had outbursts control to necessary characteristics of a kind the had dual UNOMIG The mandate to monitorinpolicing with a stagnantconflictperiodic eruptions. of and imperial in perpetual or andwar, enforcement, in escalation, results parties the acceptable to the assist. Unitedlong-lasting “using As settlement. David Laststates, peacekeeping Monitoring Nations High United Nations, Office forthe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “OCHA IN 2002”, Georgia, (United UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, David Last, “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding,” to Peacekeeping “From Last, David David Last, “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding,” to Peacekeeping “From Last, David violence”. prevent and to control intervention party “third to as peacekeeping to refers Last , 5.1no (2003), p.2,www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/5_1last.htm. , 5.1no (2003), p.1,www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/5_1last.htm. High Commissioner to Visit toSouthern Caucasus 114 In Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, the UNHCR is 30 OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict 112 115 The United Nations Development Nations TheUnited 111 to impose a solution not , UNHCR Briefing 113 CEU eTD Collection Representative for Southern Caucasus since 2003, and launching a European Security andlaunchinga Security and 2003, European Southern Caucasussince for Representative UNOMIG. becomponent added to UNpolice the return, IDPs for the asafecondition andcreate its mandate, carry out to capacity the a in tostrengthen that order recommendations Secretary-General the authorized OSCE. (OHCHR) andthe Rights Human for Commissioner High the of Office the by operated jointly is and UNOMIG http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/georgia/eu_georgia_summary/index_en.htm. 121 http://www.mic.org.mk/Balkan_Caucasus_publication.pdf. ECPR General Conference,Pisa Italy,September 6 – 8, 2007, 120 119 http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unomig/mandate.html. 118 September15, 2005, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Georgia_DU_15Sep2005.pdf. 117 http://www.undp.org.ge/new/index. 116 zones. conflict provided 505million foreuros supporting various above mentioned incentives in both EU measures. the building 1992–2006, During andconfidence economic rehabilitation contributionThe EUis been hasnot a directin mechanisms, thirdits party resolution and conflictthe to the Abkhazia has remained stalled”. peaceprocess the “Georgian-Abkhaz thus, and economicSouth cooperation, Ossetia priority issues; of three and IDPs; political areas: security return the refugees led to little dispute substantialengagement. results Despitesettlements theavoiding approach cautious direct highlights the resolution which actual conflict political on the the key UN-ledissues Georgianof “Geneva conflicts entailedthe more humanitarianthe in assistance negotiations,rather then effective organizations effortsis towards international of process” engagement the so that show programmes assistant far starting limited from These (UNV). Programme Volunteers Nations theUnited through role confidence-building 1997 thatto focused on the zones. in conflict the development social inchild protection of providingand assistance technical the areas supply and interventions, been key has UNICEF dealing with the staff, andinternational resources financial limited Despite zones. conflict in the Agencies UN other the with cooperating been household supplies and infrastructure. European Commission External Relations, Summary on EU-Georgia Relations, Korneli Kakachia, “The Role of International Organisations Regionaland Actors Abkhazia,in Georgia,” 4 Ibid. UNOMIG, Georgia UNOMIG Mandate, April 11, 2008, update, donor Ossetia,” South and Abkhazia Zones: Conflict “Georgian Action, Humanitarian UNICEF Recovery, and Prevention Crisis Programme, Development Nations United 121 Despite the intensified diplomatic activity through EUSpecial the through activity diplomatic intensified Despite the 118 By By (2003) of Council 30 July resolution 2003, the 1494 119 117 In this direction also operates a low-key capacity and alow-key capacity alsooperates Inthis direction 116 The Human Rights Office (HRO) forms part of Working since 1993,the UNICEFin has Georgia 31 120 th CEU eTD Collection Transcaucasian Conflicts,” Transcaucasian 122 down. shot In 2001,hostilities October in was the and Kodori resumed Valley UNOMIGhelicopter the tensions. increased of occasions because three on werecancelled opposing sides the between achievein UN-sponsored talks Georgia’sconflict. apoliticalmade settlementto during 2001 mediator.” thethird-party as Russia’s actions legitimacy to giving UN’smediation of the conflict has had little effect, as does its current "observing," other than actions, served asaforum of informationdiscussion and atransparent “Butthe provider. Russian peacekeepers’ the to track mission observer role, sent amediator The UNplayed process. resolution Defence Policy (ESDP) mission, the EU has refrained from direct engagementin the conflict http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1990/06/13992_en.pdf. 125 Abkhazia.php. Quell Spiraling Tensions, May 10, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/05/10/news/Georgia-US- 124 Nations: New York and Geneva, 2002): 99. 123 http://trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_4baird.htm. negotiations 30,1995. on AsOctober OSCE-mediated aresult, the useofforce was and Russian initiated sides Ossetian South and Georgian The conflict. Ossetian South the was conducted was actively mediation international where conflict ethno-political Another institutionalizedfirst the atthe 1990Copenhagen Meeting within OSCE. the was CSCE” the of dimension human the of field the in confidence and prevention “conflict specifically international andconflict, of “maintenance ethnic Managing peace security”. VIII,theprimary Chapter OSCEwasthe in the role of Created UNCharter 1972 underthe Ossetia South and 4.3. OSCE armed conflict. avoid aresumed to negotiations start to sides both urged Bryza Matthew State of Secretary Russian-backed the and Tbilisi between Assistant Deputy negotiations stimulate province. Anthony Baird, “An Atmosphere of Reconciliation: A Theory of Resolving Ethnic Conflicts Based on the Document of Copenhagenthe Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Art 43, International Herald Tribune, associated Press, “Senior U.S. Official Travels to Georgia's Rebel Province to United Nations, Office forthe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “OCHA IN 2002”, Georgia, (United 123 On May 10, 2008 the US envoy held talks with Abkhaz authorities trying to 124 OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 32 122 Little progress was , 2.4 (1999),no 125 CEU eTD Collection frequent contact severely damaged inter-ethnic relations. severely inter-ethnic contact damaged frequent lack and of becausecivil war andAbkhaznations of between points Georgian the contact common infinding obstacles areembedded Ossetia withcase,there South In contrast the process. mediation the for benevolent be to out turn and youth the between process dialogue for the youth from South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia. andfor Peace Stability” – Guarantee Integration Atlantic “Euro NATO School the Summer it observe PublicDivision inAugust,2006 activity of NATO the Diplomacy the organized as isitinteresting to Tothisrespect movements. mobilize to reconciliation ground around mediators Thus,cansuccessmediators. of conflictsbyhelpingyouth assist resolve on the The impact of the youth on mediation of conflict might be one of the conditions that favor the Georgia. in mission” “long duration inOSCE the of newmandates wasthe reflected activities Journalists,” August,28 – 30,Georgia, http://www.georgiafornato.ge/A/NATO%20Summer%20School.htm. 128 Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Bulletin, vol., no. 3, (Fall 1995, Warsaw): 16. 127 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110404.shtml. EURASIANET.org, April 11,2004, Eurasia Insightsection, 126 region. in the incentives monitoring on the issue to conference international organize an efforts however Russiahindered Georgian settlement, within for aconflict in search community the the international involve to tried Georgian government the OSCE. time,that the At sides apart. two the for keeping responsibility assumed OSCE sides, It has also and Russian Georgian, the representing Force, Peacekeeping Joint The zone. conflict the hinderedused it’s mostthe frequently used strategic deploying tool, peacekeepingmissions, them in a considerablefrozen conflict in inthe resulted Augustreemergence of conflict armed 2004.The OSCE cease-fire a success inasmuch expansionas it separated the belligerent parties. The rising tensions in this the considered incidents The OSCE ofviolence. isolated a few therewerestill procedures, of OSCE peacekeeping the of implementation andthe agreement cease-fire After the of zone conflict. signed inMay 1996, and asmallnumber of refugees totheirwas repatriated homes in the renounced in Measures “Memorandum Providingon for and Security Joint Confidence” Georgia for NATO, “NATO Summer School for Georgian and South Ossetian Students and Young Prospects”, and Present Past, OSCE: of the Dimension Human “The Bloed, Arie Talks”, Ossetia –South Georgia Lowfor “Expectations Devdariani, Jaba 127 126 Incorporation of the human dimension in the security in the dimension human the of Incorporation 33 128 Such movements assist the assist movements Such OSCE Office for Office CEU eTD Collection forcefully, but very cautiously ineffectively. cautiously very but forcefully, by undertaken UNandOSCEwere unlikelythe to succeed because intervenethey not did efforts mediation the Thus, conflicts. the of in continuation interested been has Russia player powerful that fact the to due conflicts Caucasus South the in successful been not has solution for reaching political mediation the international all incentives, despite the Nevertheless 34 CEU eTD Collection Transcaucasian Conflicts,” Transcaucasian 129 130 http://trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_4baird.htm. January with1997 when together US Russia, the andFrance became co-chairs of Minsk the resolution was launched.activity conflict ethnic Nagorno-Karabakh caseof the with thus ensued, forces specific peacekeeping case- creating over discussions OSCE, into theCSCE of transformation of During period the impeded Russia, political of conflict. resolution the OSCE failure,most butalso importantly interventionthe of a destabilizing regional power, military for for the and practical insufficient personal accounted peace-keeping guidelines mandate, lacking weak onlyprecedencenot first arguing its thisengagement, of that conflict in of OSCE the engagement the It discusses conflict. in Nagorno-Karabakh the involvement international of case comparative the Iwill discuss process mediation international In order to better mediation. institutional of cases most extensive is show of the one conflict The Nagorno-Karabakh that the involvement of the third party regional power impedes the Dando, 1998), 179 – 198. Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts deployment where she could useher veto within the Force or CIS troops. for High the Karabakh, Russia demanded aresolution of Security the forCouncil the establishforce to meetingas in a CSCOdecided the AtaBudapestgains; December1994, place inpractical whichresulted and the CSCEtook betweenRussia confidence-building decreased influenceof 1994 till CSCE; the From December endof the 1996 cooperation and weakness; half secondthe In of shift which Russian1992 policy the leadof the interests to predominance mediation inof CSCE the mediation unilateral attempts and Russian Duringfourneighbour. Internationalbe parts: mediation process into divided 1992 can northern country’s the role of dominating becauseof the quite successful werenot efforts their engagement, the after even involvement; from refrained and one internal an conflict Anthony Baird, “An Atmosphere of Reconciliation: A Theory of Resolving Ethnic Conflicts Based on the Josiane Tercinet, “Europe and United Nations Peacemaking” in Peacemaking” Nations United and “Europe Tercinet, Josiane International Involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh Involvement International OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution Chapter 5.ComparativeCase: 129 The international community at first considered the considered first at community international The , ed. , Tom Woodhouse Robertand Bruce,(London: Malcolm 35 Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards 130 , 2.4 (1999),no And period of the CEU eTD Collection and missions; establishedin in Baku 2000. was OSCEoffice with Azerbaijan,intensifying the relations cooperative For established. management,prevention employing, and crisis instruments thatfurtherenhanced capacity andits CSCE's the in settlement role conflict military in OSCEconflictthe wereaddedto Budapest Declaration peacekeeping 1994, Abkhazia, but under its mandate the OSCE refused to accept these terms. accept these to OSCErefused the its mandate under but Abkhazia, likeforce” onein due tothe factpeacekeeping Russiainsistedon a “Russian-only that force of the composition by the wascomplicated peacekeeping the issue of The ceasefire. so it adopted was Russia When weak,chairmen created, of and MinskGroup. wasrelatively the group this a low co- French by mediated US,and Russian negotiation been talks have the Since 1997,the profile in the mediation. account into weretaken demands Azerbaijani peaceplan, the the with in accordance Inrefused fully comply with to condition.Atthis November in the 1993Minsk Vienna, Group Azerbaijan 1993, stages. in corresponding blockade its lift to had Azerbaijan and month, the one within CSCE set territories occupied different from the withdraw gradually were to forces armed Karabakh a deadline Nagorno- chairman 1993,the insuggested byMarioRaffaelli, Group October Minsk the for the 1994. 135 (England: Curzon, 2001), 112. 134 133 October7, 1994. 132 (England: Curzon, 2001), 110. 131 resolve problem. the USto the and Turkey Sweden, Russia, Italy, Minskof Group eleven Azerbaijan,countries: Armenia, Belarus,France, Germany, Hungary, team meetings negotiating of the preliminary CSCEorganized the of occupied territories, the untilparticipate return to inMinsk.Azerbaijan the refused conference Because international an bring at parties opposing the together to InMarch OSCEtried the “Minsk1992 Group”. meeting Conference negotiating the wasenvisagedand the namethe where received team the group. CSCE Budapest Declaration, “Towards A Genuine Partnership In A New DOC.RC/1/95,Era”, December21, E.Cornell, Svante Ibid. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report onthe Conflict inNagorno-Karabakh, Doc. 7182, E.Cornell, Svante 131 The entities with the aim of mediating the conflict was formally named the Minsk the named formally was conflict the mediating of aim the with entities The 135 thus, the first OSCE peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh were Small Nations and Great Powers:of aStudy Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus Small Nations and Great Powers:of aStudy Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus 36 inter alia, the CSCE peacekeeping operations CSCEpeacekeeping the 132 In a peaceful plan 134 At the CSCE 133 CEU eTD Collection During this clash, in line demarcation yearsthe May5,2008fourteen since inNagorno-Karabakh theceasefire. there was a deathvotingincluded for Georgia, Ukraine and Turkey. toll of more parties--the andvote, mediating US,Russia France the Group 39countries not Minsk and did thenthe Significantly, ten territories. occupied peopleArmenian the from forces Armenian all of withdrawal from unconditional and immediate the the demanding and bothintegrity territorial Azerbaijan’s sides.reiterating The March Assembly UNGeneral 14, the passed aresolution supporting the Minsk Group Armenian side interpreted as interpreted Armenian dissolution format side of currentthe of negotiations. side demanded replacing terminating or co-chairmanship the which of MinskGroup, the the bytheceasefire. abide strictly to parties both on called lines and front the along clashes occasional the regretted encouraged negotiations, Council Statement OSCEMinisterial The beenreached. hasnot settlement apolitical however, Thus far, theregion. towards his concerns Bush reiterated President meeting in2002, tripartite Florida the addition, after In process. in settlement conflict the involvement US with correlated basin oil resources Caspian Azerbaijani in the interest company’s oil and government US the hand, other the and turned Armenia intoone of the highest per capita recipients of US aid in the world. http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=343764&apc_state=henpcrs. Reporting, Peace War and for Institute Service, Reporting 141 Armenia.Now.com, 28 March, 2008, http://www.armenianow.com/?action. 140 139 2002, European Centre forMinority Issues (ECMI), 2002, p. 10. 138 Congress, December4, 2001. 137 1993. 136 Support ActSection 907 issue wasthe pressure lobby Armenian the of in USCongressthe leading Freedom tothe itshowever, stand disputingthe towards wasquite parties controversial. Thecomplicating with numerous USAIDfunded programmes was among the main donor organizations, US The Azerbaijan. and Armenia to schemes assistance general more entailed UNOCHA andresumingnegotiations. Azerbaijan resolutions of Security the fighting,Council condemning affirming territorial integrity of from limitedThe initsby issuing theconflict UN refrained engagement direct and role Zarema Velikhanova and Ara Tadevosian, “Armenia, Azerbaijan Clash over OSCE Mediation”, Caucasus Mediation”, OSCE over Clash Azerbaijan “Armenia, Ara Tadevosian, and Velikhanova Zarema Naira Hayrumyan, “The UN resolution: Will Azerbaijan Break up the OSCE Minsk OSCE,Group MinisterialFormat?” Council Statement on Nagorno Karabakh, Brussels, 5 December 2006. February # 15, Paper Working ECMI Caucasus”, South the in Involvement “International Sabanadze, Natalie of Library The Congress”, for Brief Issue CRS Conflict”, “Armenia-Azerbaijan Migdalovitz, Carol Security ResolutionCouncil 822 (1993), adopted by the Security Council at its3205th meeting.April 30, 137 , which restricted non-humanitarian US assistance to Azerbaijan to US assistance , whichnon-humanitarian restricted 136 Its involvement through the UNDP, UNHCR, and UNHCR, UNDP, the through involvement Its 37 141 Extensive military clashes took place at Extensivemilitary took clashes 139 On March Azerbaijani 12, 140 Later, on Later, 138 On CEU eTD Collection http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=11024. Network, ISN Security Watch inMoscow,March21, 2005, 146 Weinstein.pdf. http://diplomacy.shu.edu/academics/journal/resources/journal_dip_pdfs/journal_of_diplomacy_vol8_no1/13- and International Relations 145 96/yegorov/04.htm. Democratic Institutions ResearchFellowships (1994-1996) Report, Union”, oftheFormerSoviet Territory deadlocked peaceful negotiations, despite the political targets of Azerbaijani government to government ofAzerbaijani targets the political despite negotiations, peaceful deadlocked territorial over considering the Therefore, self-determination the conflict. of peaceful of resolution complicate integrity priority the about talks recent the addition, In conflict. KarabakhRussia the RussialeverageAzerbaijan through independence), energy (mostly and Armenia less likely. economic Despite development and independencepolitical from Azerbaijan between outcome a makes in peaceful turn that Russia with cooperation strategic enjoys it participation its with incursion, a potential deter to forces the of contribution the in 1999. (CSTO) Security Treaty Organization Collective the called pact a defense founded Tajikistan and Russia Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, five years. coming for the Treaty the reaffirm experiencing theineffective involvement of in northern the neighbour its refusedconflicts, to with the Russiandiscontented Azerbaijan, failure Russia. with schemes to mediatecooperative other with along its in disarray conflict was with Armenia, along with Georgia which was 144 http://news.trendaz.com/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1152518&lang=EN TrendNews, 2008, 8, March ofContact”, Line the 143 Day.Az,May 24, 2008, http://www.day.az/news/politics/119102.html. 142 which was amilitary dimension of the CIS. republics integrating through into Collective them the in Security Treaty May (TCS) 1992, influence the sister- best-equipped to was USSR,Russia the During disintegration the of negotiations. subjectof the calling parties torestoreconfidence, the reaffirmingNagorno-Karabakh's is that status still statement issued ajoint Bryza Matthew State Secretary of Assistant andDeputy France from BernardFassier Ambassador Yury Ambassador Merzlyakov, Russian Chairmen the – in May2008. regime the ceasefireviolated military Armenian fact the that duetothe be unsuccessful to out turn OSCE negotiations Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia’s CIS Alliances Lack Real Substance”, International Relations and Security and Relations International Substance”, Real Lack Alliances CIS “Russia’s Saradzhyan, Simon Organization,” Treaty Security Collective The Phoenix: “Russian Weinstein, Adam J. Babayeva, “OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs Call on Azerbaijan and Armenia to Restore Confidence along Timur Husseinov, “Armenian Military Forces Attacking Positions of the Azerbaijani Army in Four Regions”, Alexander Yegorov, “ CollectiveSecurity System of theCIS States andMeasures , Winter/Spring 2007, p.171, 143 NATO Individual NATO 144 38 The Treaty Thehadfive-year term and by1999it Treaty a 145 142 146 On the basis of the TCS, Armenia, Belarus, Armenia, TCS, of the basis the On In response, the three Minsk Group Co- While Armenia has been arguing referring arguing been has Armenia While http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/94- Providing Peace on the Journal of Diplomacy CEU eTD Collection conflict via backing Armenia. the leveraging and troops the of re-entry of Azerbaijan forcing region, in the dominance its reestablish to attempts aiming mediation unilateral process through mediation entire the washampering Russia in negotiations. rolethe the OSCE the of to hostile increasingly settlement of the conflict besolution.a finalseemed to exhausted By peaceprocess without2008 the political due to the delay seem apolitical power” to fact bythe “strong supported actions separatist However, that one side of the conflicting partiesNagorno-Karabakh. had grown on territory deploymentof the international of peacekeepers the suggests Azerbaijan nations in belligerent isin region the uncertain, ordertoguaranteepeaceful coexistence, the of coexistence peaceful the although conflict, of the settlement political the after along the borders a highproposed level autonomy including self-determination minorityand Armenian rights of has Azerbaijan side Azerbaijani the that noting worth is It settlement. political a peaceful of likelihood as a possible the decreases and conflict the of compromise complexity the demonstrates zone cordon the of condition solution into Thisbargainingintegration Armenia. independence forregion andprospective the for political the get to this side Armenian from compromise a as problem. discussion, international of Even subject the iscurrently seven regions from military forcesthose of withdrawal The offense. inof case attempt Nagorno-Karabakh around obtaining a possible safety circle of future asan reasoned actions these TheArmenian by Azerbaijanis. side mainly ethnic populated Karabakh – Aghdam,Fizuli, Zangelan, Djabrail, Gubadly, Lachin and Kelbajar –were motivation was quite different. Interestingly, the seven regions surrounding Nagorno- connected to Armenia for political and historical reasons, war results showed that the obvious be to was Azerbaijan of minority of Armenian initial fact that the target the Despite region. Caucasus in of Russia South power” the “big influence of the direct the effective due to is not mediation role of international the factorsthese suggest thatthe Karabakh isunlikely be conflict to solved in nearfuture, and the All assist Armenia. to areexpected forces Russian agreement, pact CSTO basis the the of fact on the that low dueto is outcome political of desired probability the military expansion, maintain its integrity territorial by increasing military the budget and solving the by conflict 39 CEU eTD Collection searching forsearching the political solution. 53. 2001, 529. 147 interests, external and disputes interethnic Caucasus were intheSouth conflicts armed the of among causes the it, puts As King efforts. mediation the of outcome ineffective the for responsible is evidently andmembers effective in conflicts permanent asthe Russia of Council resolving Security the quite not were recommendations and UNresolutions the chapter, inthis Thus, asidentified Charles King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States”, Unrecognized Eurasia’s Understanding War: ofEthnic Benefits “The King, Charles 147 these structural factors would impede in anyinternational these efforts structural 40 World Politics , CEU eTD Collection Resolution 149 2007), 40. 148 of Russia interests andin particular factors specific the Caucasus, South case of the the In situation. the of characteristics and context the by shaped also was mediation the result, and its process affected occurred conflict Caucasus in theSouth which context the Because form of thirdthe party Russia involvement underminedthat abenevolentpolitical solution. in mediation mediation involved because the power-based overall successful the process be fully failed to engagement international cases, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ossetia South isconflictresolution a andwithout dead end.” interests peacekeeping in their own peacekeeping “strategic on concentrated are still parties third Unfortunately, tensions. ethnic ameliorate than rather deteriorate to likely more is actor interventionist presence of the demonstrates that model Caucasus conflicts of the minority South problems, Although we mightexpect would meddling that state helpsolve to the center thesecessionist of parties. stronger by bethe mediation interests hinderedthe could outcome of their the powers, by regional the backed parties or sides, of stronger the interests the reflect arecommitted tobe their that donot actions impartial, so mediators Even ifinternational bein to limitedit out hasscope. turned regional power, the from influence” of sphere “the and issue status the on conditioned been has assistance providingbackingArmenia. all to international considerable because cases, In three the it was operations, peacekeeping the leadingbeennot has whereRussia Caucasus South the in zone only the was conflict Nagorno-Karabakh the though Even neighbor. northern its with relations Georgia's complicating while settlement, permanent a of emergence the impeded in conflicts the interference andRussian pieces several into Georgia fragment to threatened movementsSoviet By governments. inAbkhazia separatist Ossetia1993 the andSouth added problems post- Ossetia areasof tothe Georgia's Abkhazia andof autonomous South understanding nature of of conflictsthe possibilitiesthe management. forand The their a better to insight an offers studied are poorly that conflicts researching therefore Eurasia, security of endangers regional the Caucasus inthe inter-ethic relations The South tensed David Last, “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding,” to Peacekeeping “From Last, David Erin K. Jenne, Erin , no 5.1 (2003), p. 8, www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/5_1last.htm. 8, p. (2003), 5.1 , no Ethnic Bargaining: theParadox of Minority Empowerment CONCLUSION 41 OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, University Cornell (Ithaca: 149 In Abkhazia, the 148 CEU eTD Collection find a long-lasting political solution. inmediators aneutral shouldmediationin to while approach take engaging process, order providing for rebelling support hamper political minorities outcome of Thus, disputes. the initial condition for mediation success. The destructive effects of external patrons who are issides. third Regionalis security backingone belligerent of that an interventionist party the overridingOssetia suggest the of importance conflicts absence of an regional stability and the to internal conflict. solution be size-fits-all aone appear to not theredoes factors, context-dependent on depends However, usage and its process is mediation acomplex Because in long run. permanently the conflicts the conclusionsitmay resolve fail the stabilization, to conflict might facilitate mediation Thus, while from individual cases of Abkhazi stability. regional the in affects turn that in country the and South Permanentclashes andarmed regionsconflict operations inboth demonstrate turbulencethe success. be seenasa not can outcome overall the stability, andrelative agreements ceasefire freezingbrought with it conflict the because successful could considered conflicts be in mediation thatthe Georgian argue organizations Although international the this respect. is effectiveness crucial for should mediation successful the outcome, efforts bemeasured to influenced the efforts of the international mediation to manage the conflicts. 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