From Honneth to Fromm Seiki Okazaki

Home , Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom

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From Honneth to Fromm

Seiki Okazaki

This article is a summary of my doctoral dissertation, Political Fromm: Paradigm Shift toward the Active Communication Theory, written in Japanese and submitted to the Graduate School of Public Administration, International Christian University, Tokyo, on December 14, 1998. I wish to thank Mr. Norris Falguera and Ms Mari Tomita for checking the manuscript of „From Honneth to Fromm.”

I Introduction most significant one for its theoretical work”1, Fromm was excluded from the Institute for So- As is well known, Jürgen Habermas opens up cial Research, partly because of the opposition the frontiers of „radical democracy” in the his- to Adorno. And Fromm was labeled as a „neo- tory of critical theory by overcoming the so- Freudian revisionist” in the so-called Fromm- called pessimism of The Dialectic of Enlighten- Marcuse Debate in the 1950s2. In this article I ment. It is Axel Honneth who takes over the po- would like to show that Fromm’s „‘another’ litical orientation from Habermas, who never- critical theory”3 has the potential to overcome theless criticizes Habermas’s language-theoretic the difficulty of Honneth’s critical theory, and to version of communication paradigm and advo- advocate a theoretical shift toward an active cates his own recognition-theoretic version of communication theory. communication paradigm. In The Fragmented World of the Social (1995), Honneth refers to „four thematic domains” of his post- II Critical Theory of Honneth Habermasian critical theory (Honneth 1995, pp. xiii-xxv): (A) „everyday moral experience” con- 1 Honneth’s Criticism of Habermas nected with a „struggle for recognition”; (B) relation between „work” and „recognition”; (C) Let’s start with a brief sketch of Honneth’s criti- „pathologies of modern society” having nothing cal theory. Honneth looks back on his intellec- to do with the problem of „rationality”; and (D) tual history in the interview held on the journal „psychoanalytic concept of the subject.” I find potentialities in Honneth’s critical theory in that 1 it will contribute to elucidate many problems on Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance, trans. Michael which Habermas fails to shed light. Robertson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 271. However, in spite of its attractiveness, there 2 In the epoch-making article „The Fromm-Marcuse exists a crucial difficulty in Honneth’s critical Debate Revisited” (1986), John Rickert objects theory. In this article I would like to attempt to against Marcuse’s misreading of Fromm. John Rick- overcome the difficulty of Honneth’s critical ert, „The Fromm-Marcuse Debate Revisited,” in The theory through the dialogue with one of the Frankfurt School: Critical Assessments, Vol. IV, ed. most important critical theorists, Erich Fromm Jay Bernstein (London and New York: Routledge, (1900-1980). While he had been „a member of 1994), pp. 278-319. 3 staff who had for a considerable time been the Burkhard Bierhoff, Erich Fromm: Analytische Sozial- psychologie und visionäre Gesellschaftskritik (Opla- den: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), S. 45.

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Radical Philosophy (Honneth 1993). According and this again makes him heir to the tradi- to it, he started to study philosophy and litera- tion of critical social theory we have inves- ture at the University of Bonn in 1969. At that tigated here --- the communication-theoretic time he was influenced by Adorno and was not approach he had initially opened up: the active politically. However, after moving to the potential for an understanding of the social University of Bochum in 1971, he became a order as an institutionally mediated com- member of the USOS, the youth organization of municative relation between culturally inte- SPD. There Honneth began to read Habermas grated groups that, so long as the exercise and wrote his Magisterarbeit concerning of power is asymmetrically distributed, Habermas’s interpretation of psychoanalysis. takes place through the medium of social Then Honneth moved to the Free University in struggle.” (Honneth 1986, S. 334, p. 303) Berlin and studied sociology. Although he was a „totally convinced Habermasian,” Honneth had In the introduction of The Struggle for Recogni- already some objections to Habermas. Honneth tion (1992), Honneth states that The Struggle for objected that Habermas reduced the concept of Recognition arose in connection with the con- „work” into „instrumental action.” Besides, con- clusion of The Critique of Power. That is, „any trary to Habermas, Honneth came to be closer attempt to integrate the social-theoretical in- to „philosophical anthropology.” sights of Foucault’s historical work within the In The Critique of Power (1986), which is framework of a theory of communicative action the enlarged version of his dissertation submit- has to rely on a concept of morally motivated ted to the Free University in Berlin, Honneth struggle” (Honneth 1992, S. 7, p. 1). What thinks highly of Habermas (and Foucault) for his should be pointed out here is that The Critique „rediscovery of the social,” which overcomes of Power does not contain the concept of „rec- the „incapacity for social analysis” from Hork- ognition” (Anerkennung) as such, which consti- heimer to Adorno. Furthermore, Honneth thinks tutes an important element of his criticism of highly of Habermas’s „communication-theoretic Habermas. To be sure, we can find the concept transformation” of The Dialectic of Enlighten- in the „Afterword to the Second German Edition ment, in comparison with Foucault’s „systems- (1988)” of The Critique of Power (Honneth theoretic dissolution” of it. This does not mean, 1986, S. 385-386, pp. xvii-xviii). However, it is however, that Honneth agrees with Habermas in The Struggle for Recognition that the concept entirely: Honneth criticizes Habermas for failing of „recognition” is discussed systematically for to grasp the role of „struggle” in the history of the first time. species. According to Honneth, among the two In his inaugural lecture entitled „The Social competing models, Habermas develops the Dynamics of Disrespect” (1994), Honneth criti- „model of a two-tiered reproduction of society cizes Habermas’s language-theoretic version of within instrumental-rational and communicative communication paradigm from the standpoint spheres of action,” not the „model of a mainte- of his recognition-theoretic version of communi- nance of the social order through institutionally cation paradigm (Honneth 1994). To be sure, mediated communicative relations between Honneth acknowledges that Habermas opens up morally integrated groups” (Honneth 1986, S. the possibility of an „intramundane transcen- 307, p. 278). This leads Habermas to „two dence,” in contrast to Adorno’s „negativist social complementary fictions”: „the existence of critique.” However, Honneth criticizes Haber- power-free spheres of communication” as well mas for being incapable of finding „pretheoreti- as „the existence of norm-free organizations of cal resource” (vorwissenschaftliche Instanz) action” (Honneth 1986, S. 328, p. 298). Accord- within social reality. According to Honneth, ing to Honneth, Habermas „moral experiences are not aroused by restrict- „not only gives up the possibility of a justi- ing linguistic competences, rather, they are gen- fied critique of concrete forms of organiza- erated by violating identity claims acquired in tion of economic production and political socialization” (Honneth 1994, S. 86, p. 262). administration. Habermas loses above all --- Therefore, critical theory cannot grasp „norma-

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tive presuppositions of social interaction” fully, son who shares with all other members of one’s as far as it remains within the communication community the qualities that make participation theory of Habermas. in discursive will-formation possible” (Honneth 1992, S. 194-195, p. 120). However, „denial of rights” and „exclusion” deprive people of the 2 Struggle for Recognition sense of „self-respect.” Finally, the third form of recognition is In The Struggle for Recognition Honneth pre- „solidarity” (Solidarität) which refers to „social sents his own recognition theory after tackling esteem” (Honneth 1992, S. 196-210, pp. 121- the recognition theory of the early Hegel and 130; S. 216-218, p. 134). In contrast to legal rec- that of G. H. Mead. Honneth argues that „prac- ognition, social esteem is the recognition of tical identity-formation” presupposes „recogni- „concrete traits and abilities.” It presupposes the tion” and distinguishes three forms of recogni- existence of a „community of value,” which is tion. an evaluative system of social esteem. In tradi- The first form is „love” (Liebe), which is tional societies, where the conceptions of ethical prior to the other forms of recognition (Hon- goals were substantive and hierarchical, social neth 1992, S. 153-172, pp. 95-107; S. 214-215, esteem took the form of „honour” of „status pp. 132-133). Honneth defines „love” broadly as groups.” It was symmetrical within a status „primary relationships insofar as they --- on the group, yet asymmetrical between status groups. model of friendships, parent-child relationships, In modern societies, however, social esteem as well as erotic relationships between lovers --- takes the form of „standing” or „prestige” of in- are constituted by strong emotional attachments dividuals, not of status groups. Relations of so- among a small number of people” (Honneth cial esteem become „symmetrical,” though they 1992, S. 153, p. 95). When discussing „love,” are subject to permanent conflict. The denial of Honneth is based on the psychoanalytic object- this form of recognition is „denigration” and relations theory, especially on that of Donald „insult.” W. Winnicott. According to it, „mother” and The denial of these three forms of recogni- child depend on each other in the first months tion causes the „negative emotional reactions,” after birth. After that phase, the child become which constitute the „motivational basis” of a aggressive to the „mother.” If the mother reacts „struggle for recognition” (Honneth 1992, Kap. to the child without revenge, the child develops 8, Chap. 8). This does not mean, however, that a sense of „basic self-confidence.” However, Honneth regards every experience of „disre- „abuse” and „rape” damage the sense of „basic spect” constituting the basis of „social” struggle: self-confidence.” he sees the basis of „social” struggle in the denial The second form of recognition is „rights” of „rights” and „solidarity,” not in the denial of (Recht) (Honneth 1992, S. 173-195, pp. 107-121; „love.” It is true that Honneth realizes cases S. 215-216, pp. 133-134). Legal recognition is the where „pursuit of interests” constitutes the mo- recognition of universal features of human sub- tivational basis of struggle. „It will always be an jects. In modern societies, legal recognition is de- empirical question as to the extent to which a tached from „social esteem.” With the help of social conflict follows the logic of the pursuit of Marshall’s study, Honneth distinguishes two interests or the logic of the formation of moral „developmental possibilities” of legal recogni- reactions.” (Honneth 1992, S. 265, p. 165). tion: one is the development of „substantive However, according to Honneth, „interest” content” --- civil rights, political rights and social does not have to be seen as „something ultimate rights. The other is the development of „social or original,” but may be seen as something scope,” in which the excluded or disadvantaged „constituted within a horizon of moral experi- groups acquire existing rights. One can acquire a ence”4. sense of „self-respect” by legal recognition. Ac- cording to Honneth, „in the experience of legal recognition, one is able to view oneself as a per- 4 Nancy Fraser points out the „redistribution- recognition dilemma.” Nancy Fraser, „From Redis-

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It should be noted here that Honneth re- sively on the experience of „being disrespected” gards „struggle for recognition” not only as an (or of „being recognized”), not on the experi- „instrument” for the expansion of recognition, ence of „to disrespect” (or of „to recognize”). I but also as a field of recognition. In other shall quote them in German (italicized by OKA- words, „struggle for recognition” is „ends” as ZAKI). well as „means.” Honneth states that: „[t]he collective resistance stemming from Sentence A the socially critical interpretation of commonly „denn in der Selbstbeschreibung derer, die shared feelings of being disrespected is not solely sich durch andere falsch behandelt sehen, a practical instrument with which to assert a spielen bis heute moralische Kategorien eine claim to the future expansion of patterns of rec- dominante Rolle, die wie die der ‘Beleidi- ognition. For the victims of disrespected --- as gung’ oder ‘Erniedrigung’ auf Formen der has been shown in philosophical discussions, in Missachtung, der verweigerten Anerken- literature, and in social history --- engaging in nung also, Bezug nehmen.” (Honneth 1992, political action also has the direct function of S. 212) tearing them out of the crippling situation of passively endured humiliation and helping them, Sentence B in turn, on their way to a new, positive relation- „das, was es in einer derartigen Empfindung to-self. The basis for this secondary motivation über sich selber erfährt, ist die konstitutive for struggle is connected to the structure of the Abhängigkeit seiner eigenen Person von der experience of disrespect itself.” (Honneth 1992, Anerkennung durch Andere.” (Honneth S. 262-263, p. 164) 1992, S. 223-224)

In addition, there are two interesting sentences III Intermediate Reflections in Chapter 6, which reinforce my interpretation. Respectively, after quoting the original sentence Here I would like to „educe” a constitutive ele- in German, I shall quote the English sentence ment latent in Honneth’s recognition theory: an translated by Joel Anderson (italicized by OKA- element of „passivity” of his communication ZAKI). theory. It is true that Honneth does not con- struct his communication theory as „passive” in- Sentence C tentionally. Rather, he is not conscious of the ac- „weil das normative Selbstbild eines jeden tive-passive problem. In this sense, Hiroshi Fu- Menschen, seines ‘Me’, wie Mead gesagt jino is right to translate the term „Mi§achtung” hatte, auf die Möglichkeit der steten Rück- into „(being) disrespected” in Japanese (Hon- versicherung im Anderen angewiesen ist, neth 1994). However, we cannot overlook the geht mit der Erfahrung von Missachtung die fact that Honneth concentrates his attention ex- Gefahr einer Verletzung einher, die die clusively on the experience of „being disre- Identität der ganzen Person zum Einsturz spected.” In order to demonstrate this interpre- bringen kann.” (Honneth 1992, S. 212-213) tation, I would like to take Chapter 6 of The Struggle for Recognition, where Honneth ex- Sentence C’ plains his concept of „disrespect,” for example. „Because the normative self-image of each The following two sentences, which are all the and every individual human being --- his or sentences found in Chapter 6 that specify the her ‘me’, as Mead put it --- is dependent on subject of disrespect (or of recognition), reveal the possibility of being continually backed that Honneth concentrates his attention exclu- up by others, the experience of being disrespected carries with it the danger of an in- jury that can bring the identity of the per- tribution to Recognition?: Dilemmas of Justice in a son as a whole to the point of collapse.” ‘Post-Socialist’ Age,” New Left Review, No. 212 (Honneth 1992, pp. 131-132) (July/August 1995), pp. 68-93.

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in The Struggle for Recognition. The concept „to Sentence D disrespect” (and „to recognize”) is assigned only „In solchen Gefühlsreaktionen der Scham a secondary position in his theoretical system. kann die Erfahrung von Missachtung zum Honneth’s recognition theory may reflect motivationalen Anstoß eines Kampfes um our „fear of not being recognized.” More than Anerkennung werden.” (Honneth 1992, S. that, it may reflect our „fear to recognize.” 224) Fromm says, „while one is consciously afraid of not being loved, the real, though usually uncon- Sentence D’ scious fear is that of loving” (Fromm 1956, p. „In the context of the emotional responses 115). associated with shame, the experience of being disrespected can become the motivational impetus for a struggle for recogni- IV Critical Theory of Fromm tion.” (Honneth 1992, p. 138) 1 Honneth’s Interpretation of Fromm In these two sentences, Anderson translates the noun „Missachtung” into the passive form „be- Before contrasting Fromm’s communication ing disrespected.” There exists, no doubt, an in- theory with Honneth’s, I would like to glance at terpretation of the translator. However, this Honneth’s interpretation of Fromm, in order to does not mean that it is an arbitrary interpreta- show the relevance of taking up Fromm in the tion that violates the intention of the author. context of contemporary critical theory. While Honneth thinks highly of Anderson’s ability to critical theorists of the „inner circle” labeled translate in the preface of The Struggle for Rec- Fromm as a „neo-Freudian revisionist,” Honneth ognition. „He has the rare ability of understand- interprets Fromm as a pioneer of communica- ing the intentions of the author sometimes bet- tion theory in the tradition of critical theory. ter than the author himself” (Honneth 1992, p. In The Critique of Power Honneth argues xxii). It is true that this statement is not directed negatively that Fromm falls into the „closed to specific terms. However, in the light of the functionalism” by crushing the dimension of importance of the term „Missachtung” in that „social action” (Honneth 1986, S. 32-34, pp. 23- book, Honneth is likely to be satisfied with the 24). Honneth does not revise the negative esti- translation from „Missachtung” into „being dis- mation in the article „Critical Theory” (1987) as respected.” With the interpretation of the trans- well. However, what should be noted here is lator, the English version of The Struggle for that Honneth comes to think highly of the later Recognition shows the „passivity” of Honneth’s Fromm, contrary to the early Fromm (Honneth recognition theory more clearly than the Ger- 1995, pp. 83-84). In this article Honneth thinks man original version. highly of the „outer circle” of the Frankfurt Here the objection may be raised that School, that is, Neumann, Kirchheimer, Benja- Honneth articulates „mutual” or „reciprocal” min, and the later Fromm, as pioneers of com- recognition and that he regards recognition as a munication theory. „moral obligation” (cf. Honneth 1997, S. 38-39, Whereas I acknowledge the importance of p. 32). However, since „being disrespected” Honneth’s interpretation, it is far from being sat- (and „being recognized”) presupposes „to disre- isfactory. Honneth regards Fromm merely as a spect” (and „to recognize”), the existence of the pioneer of communication theory. However, concept „to disrespect” (and „to recognize”) Fromm constructs a communication theory deci- does not contradict my interpretation. The deci- sively different from Honneth’s, which I would sive question is the quality of its „mutuality” or like to call active communication theory. Hon- „reciprocity.” Are there any insights that „to dis- neth fails to grasp the uniqueness of Fromm’s respect” weakens the person who disrespects, communication theory. In what follows, I and insights that „to recognize” strengthens the would like to sketch Fromm’s active communi- person who recognizes? I can find no evidence cation theory. Needless to say, it is beyond the

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scope of this article to deal with Fromm’s critical Freud’s sense is similar to the market --- it is theory as a whole. an exchange of satisfaction of biologically given needs, in which the relationship to the other individual is always a means to an 2 Fromm’s Concept of „Activity” end but never an end in itself.” (Fromm 1941, pp. 9-10) Burkhard Bierhoff points out that Escape from Freedom „occupies a special place in Fromm’s With regard to his criticism of Freud, I would works”: it is not only the work „in which the like to emphasize that the concept of „activity” previous works culminate and, as it were, bear plays an important role in his conception of „re- fruit,” but also the work „which produces the latedness to the world.” The concept of „activ- new basis for the later works of Fromm”5. In his ity” comes to the fore in his later writings. In To chief work Escape from Freedom, Fromm rejects Have or to Be? (1976), for example, Fromm Freud’s instincts theory and adopts a new theory characterizes the mode of „being” as its „activ- of Man which emphasizes the need for related- ity.” „Its fundamental characteristic is that of be- ness to the world. According to Fromm, con- ing active, not in the sense of outward activity, trary to the Freud’s understanding of human re- of busyness, but of inner activity, the productive lations merely as „means,” Man has a need to use of our human powers” (Fromm 1976, p. relate oneself to the world as „ends.” Here are 88). It should be noted here that Fromm does crucial sentences, though somewhat longer, not replace the concept of „relatedness to the from Escape from Freedom. world” with the concept of „activity.” When he „Freud always considers the individual in refers to Albert Schweitzer in that book, Fromm his relations to others. These relations as states that „[t]he only meaningful way of life is Freud sees them, however, are similar to activity in the world; not activity in general” the economic relations to others which are (Fromm 1976, p. 163). characteristic of the individual in capitalist Admittedly, the role that the concept of society. Each person works for himself, „activity” plays in Escape from Freedom is less individualistically, at his own risk, and not central than in his later writings. In Escape from primarily in co-operation with others. But Freedom, however, Fromm refers to „sponta- he is not a Robinson Crusoe; he needs oth- neous activity” as what enables both „individu- ers, as customers, as employees, or as em- ality” and „relatedness.” „Spontaneous activity is ployers. He must buy and sell, give and the one way in which man can overcome the take. The market, whether it is the com- terror of aloneness without sacrificing the integ- modity or the labor market, regulates these rity of his self; for in the spontaneous realization relations. Thus the individual, primarily of the self man unites himself anew with the alone and self-sufficient, enters into eco- world --- with man, nature, and himself” nomic relations with others as means to one (Fromm 1941, p. 259). The concept of „activity” end: to sell and to buy. Freud’s concept of does not mean „doing something.” It means human relations is essentially the same: the „the quality of creative activity that can operate individual appears fully equipped with bio- in one’s emotional, intellectual, and sensuous logically given drives, which need to be sat- experiences and in one’s will as well” (Fromm isfied. In order to satisfy them, the individ- 1941, p. 257). In order to express this idea, ual enters into relations with other „ob- Fromm creates the concept of „activeness” in jects.” Other individuals thus are always a The Revolution of Hope (Fromm 1968, p. 12). means to one’s end, the satisfaction of striv- It is not easy for us to understand the con- ings which in themselves originate in the in- cept of „activity” fully: for there exists a premise dividual before he enters into contact with which is alien to us. It is the premise that „the others. The field of human relations in self is as strong as it is active” (Fromm 1941, p. 260). We have a tendency to think that to be active is to consume energy, hence, to weaken 5 Burkhard Bierhoff, Erich Fromm, S. 50.

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the self. However, Fromm does not think so. tion” is the „perversion of potency.” „ But in a In order to understand what Fromm means, psychological sense, the lust for power is not I would like to consider Fromm’s discussion in rooted in strength but in weakness. ... It is the The Art of Loving (1956). As is well known, desperate attempt to gain secondary strength Fromm emphasizes that the problem of love is where genuine strength is lacking” (Fromm 1941, not the problem of „being loved,” but the prob- p. 160). lem of „loving.” Fromm does not regard passive As we have seen, Fromm advocates „lov- love as „mature love”: passive love, both ing,” not „being loved.” However, this simple „motherly love” and „fatherly love,” has its formula requires some qualification. For Fromm, own weakness (cf. Fromm 1956, pp. 35-41). Ac- love is paradoxical: by being loved, the loved cording to Fromm, „motherly love” is uncondi- person becomes a loving person. In turn, the tioned: we need not do something in order to loving person comes to be loved. be loved. However, if we lose it, we cannot ac- „He does not give in order to receive; giv- quire it by ourselves. On the other hand, „fa- ing is in itself exquisite joy. But in giving he therly love” is conditioned: we can acquire it by cannot help bringing something to life in meeting the expectations of „father.” However, the other person, and this which is brought „fatherly love” causes the suspicion that „I am to life reflects back to him; in truly giving, not really loved.” he cannot help receiving that which is given On the contrary, strength is inherent in the back to him. Giving implies to make the activity of „loving” (cf. Fromm 1956, pp. 20- other person a giver also and they both 24). One of the most important elements of share in the joy of what they have brought „love” is „giving.” For the „receptive character,” to life. In the act of giving something is „exploitative character” and „hoarding charac- born, and both persons involved are grate- ter”, „giving” means „ ‘giving up’ something, be- ful for the life that is born for both of them. ing deprived of, sacrificing.” The „marketing Specifically with regard to love this means: character” is „willing to give, but only in ex- love is a power which produces love; impo- change for receiving.” In sum, for the „non- tence is the inability to produce love.” productive characters,” „giving” means „impov- (Fromm 1956, p. 23) erishment.” Contrary to these, „giving” assumes quite different meaning for the „productive I would like to pay attention to the fact that character.” Fromm does not value „being loved” as such. „For the productive character, giving has an Fromm values the experience of „being loved,” entirely different meaning. Giving is the as far as it constitutes the driving force from „be- highest expression of potency. In the very ing loved” to „loving.” act of giving, I experience my strength, my wealth, my power. This experience of heightened vitality and potency fills me V Toward an Active Communication Theory with joy. I experience myself as overflow- ing, spending, alive, hence as joyous. Giving So far I have contrasted Fromm’s active com- is more joyous than receiving, not because munication theory with Honneth’s passive it is a deprivation, but because in the act of communication theory. This is not only an at- giving lies the expression of my aliveness.” tempt to compare them, but also an attempt to (Fromm 1956, p. 21) show Fromm’s Aktualität in the contemporary critical theory. In this final section, I would like Here the concept of „potency” is quite signifi- to show that Fromm’s active communication cant. Already in Escape from Freedom, Fromm theory has the potential to overcome the diffi- distinguished two kinds of „power” (Fromm culty of Honneth’s critical theory. What is the 1941, pp. 160-161). One means „domination,” difficulty of Honneth’s critical theory? As Hon- the other „potency.” According to Fromm, the neth himself acknowledges, „struggle for recog- two concepts are mutually exclusive: „domina- nition” is not necessarily democratic. Honneth

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states that: tures of violence” (Honneth 1994, S. 93, p. „social esteem can be sought in small milita- 269). Faced with this question, we have two ristic groups, whose code of honor is domi- theoretical alternatives: one is to restrict Hon- nated by the practice of violence, as well as neth’s recognition theory with a theory of de- in the public arenas of a democratic society. mocracy. It will give us the recognition theory The sense of no longer being within the compatible with a kind of democracy. The other network of social recognition is in itself an is to criticize the „passivity” of Honneth’s recog- extremely ambivalent source of motivation nition theory and to perform a theoretical shift for social protest and resistance.” (Honneth toward an active communication theory. 1994, S. 93, p. 268) Obviously, in Escape from Freedom, active communication theory is the anthropological While Honneth criticizes the early critical theory basis of his criticism of Fascism and of „our own for its „sociological deficit,” Fromm would criti- democracy”7. Fromm, who advocates to realize cize Honneth for his „democratic deficit.” It is both „individuality” and „relatedness” through true that, as Takashi Kibe points out, Honneth’s being „active,” cannot but be critical of Fascism recognition theory „offers important suggestions which is characterized by sadistic domination to radical democracy”6. However, his recogni- and masochistic submission. More than Fascism, tion theory is incapable of laying the foundation he cannot but be critical of „our own democ- of democracy, to say nothing of „radical democracy” constituted by „automatons,” which is in racy.” As Honneth himself acknowledges, „being danger of Fascism. His despair of „our own de- recognized” can be sought not only in democ- mocracy,” however, leads Fromm to radical ratic groups, but also in neo-Nazi groups. The democracy. Paradoxically, Fromm attempts to cult group AUM in Japan gives us a concrete overcome the pathology of „our own democ- image of the distorted form of recognition. racy” through the development of democracy it- It should be added that „being recognized” self. This paradoxical faith in democracy differ- can be sought by sadistic domination as well as entiates Fromm from Schumpeter (Capitalism, by masochistic submission. Sadistic domination Socialism and Democracy, 1942). may appear to be „active.” Although it is „ac- „The only criterion for the realization of tive” in the sense of „doing something,” sadistic freedom is whether or not the individual domination is not „active” in the sense of ex- actively participates in determining his life pressing one’s potency. As Fromm points out and that of society, and this not only by the exactly, the sadist owes his/her sense of formal act of voting but in his daily activity, „strength” to the „object” of sadism (cf. Fromm in his work, and in his relations to others. 1941, p. 144; Fromm 1956, pp. 18-19). As the Modern political democracy, if it restricts it- masochist depends on „being recognized” by the self to the purely political sphere, cannot sadist, the sadist depends on „being recognized” sufficiently counteract the results of the by the masochist. economic insignificance of the average indi- After acknowledging that the sense of being vidual.” (Fromm 1941, pp. 271-272) disrespected lacks „normative direction,” Hon- neth concludes his article „The Social Dynamics To repeat, we can select the way of restricting of Disrespect” by addressing „the question of how a moral culture could be so constituted as 7 to give those affected, disrespected and ostra- I interpret Escape from Freedom as a self-criticism of democracy faced with Fascism, rather than a simple cized, the individual strength to articulate their criticism of Fascism. In this respect, I disagree with experiences in the democratic public sphere, Neil McLaughlin („Nazism, Nationalism, and the rather than living them out in the countercul- Sociology of Emotions: Escape from Freedom Revis- ited,” Sociological Theory, Vol. 14, No. 3, Novem- ber 1996, pp. 241-261). The final chapter (except 6 Takashi Kibe, „Radical Democracy in contemporary Appendix) of Escape from Freedom is devoted to Germany: Habermas, Maus, Honneth,” (in Japa- the self-criticism of democracy, not to the criticism nese), Thought, Vol. 867 (September 1996), p. 218. of Fascism.

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Honneth’s recognition theory with a theory of Works Cited democracy. However, I insist that we should select the way of performing a theoretical shift Fromm 1941: Escape from Freedom (New York: toward the active communication theory. What Henry Holt and Company, 1994). Fromm 1956: The Art of Loving (New York: Harper I would like to emphasize is that to strengthen and Row, Publishers, 1989). the self through being recognized means to de- Fromm 1968: The Revolution of Hope: Toward a pend on the external sources of „strength,” and Humanized Technology (New York: Harper this must inevitably weaken the inner strength of and Row, Publishers, 1968). one’s self. This is the reason why I am critical of Fromm 1976: To Have or to Be? (New York: The the „passivity” of Honneth’s recognition theory. Continuum Publishing Company, 1997). It is in this sense that I formulate „from Honneth Honneth 1986: Kritik der Macht: Reflexionsstufen ei- to Fromm” provocatively. I do not intend to re- ner kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie, 2 Aufl. ject Honneth totally. I intend, speaking more (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994); The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a pragmatically, to invite Honneth to revisit Critical Social Theory, trans. Kenneth Baynes Fromm, and speaking more theoretically, to ap- (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: The peal to Honneth to perform a theoretical shift MIT Press, 1991). toward the active communication theory. Honneth 1992: Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur morali- What I have argued in this article is so lim- schen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, 1 Aufl. ited that it requires detailed discussions8. How- (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994); ever, I believe that the perspective of active The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral communication theory will contribute to the Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel Ander- development of „politics of recognition.” What son (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996). Honneth 1993: „Critical Theory in Germany Today: I share with Honneth and with many other po- An Interview with Axel Honneth,” interviewed 9 litical theorists like Charles Taylor is the view by Peter Osborne and Stale Finke, Radical Phi- that the problem of „recognition” is of great losophy, 65 (Autumn 1993), pp. 33-41; re- significance in our contemporary society. How- printed in A Critical Sense: Interviews with In- ever, I do not agree with Honneth’s interpreta- tellectuals, ed. Peter Osborne (London and tion based on passive communication theory. New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 89-106. What I advocate is to create the conditions in Honneth 1994: „Die soziale Dynamik von Mißach- which each person is capable of strengthening tung: Zur Ortsbestimmung einer kritischen Ge- his/her self by expressing his/her own potency in sellschaftstheorie,” Leviathan, Heft 1, Jg. 1994 (März 1994), S. 78-93; „The Social Dynamics the world. I would like to develop this formula of Disrespect: On the Location of Critical The- of active communication theory in my subse- ory Today,” trans. John Farrell, Constellations, quent studies. Vol. 1, No. 2 (October 1994), pp. 255-269. Honneth 1995: The Fragmented World of the Social: Essays in Social and Political Philosophy, ed. 8 To take an example, I find it dubious that Honneth’s Charles W. Wright (Albany: State University of recognition theory is capable of dealing with the New York Press, 1995). problem of „nature” adequately (cf. Rin-itsu Kawa- Honneth 1997: „Anerkennung und moralische Ver- kami, ed, „Honneth Symposium: Power and Critical pflichtung,” Zeitschrift für philosophische For- Theory,” [in Japanese], History and Society, No. 8, schung, Bd. 51, Heft. 1 (Januar-März 1997), S. September 1988, pp. 175-216; Masao Higurashi, 25-41; „Recognition and Moral Obligation,” „Die Entwicklung der Theorie der Anerkennung bei trans. John Farrell, Social Research, Vol. 64, Axel Honneth,” [in Japanese], Annals of the Society No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 16-35. for the History of Social Thought, No. 22, 1998, pp. 93-100). I would like to suggest that Fromm’s active communication theory is capable of dealing with the problem of „nature” adequately. 9 Charles Taylor, „Politics of Recognition,” in Multi- culturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. and intro. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

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