From Honneth to Fromm Seiki Okazaki
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Propriety of the Erich Fromm Document Center. For personal use only. Citation or publication of mate- rial prohibited without express written permission of the copyright holder. Eigentum des Erich Fromm Dokumentationszentrums. Nutzung nur für persönliche Zwecke. Veröffentli- chungen – auch von Teilen – bedürfen der schriftlichen Erlaubnis des Rechteinhabers. From Honneth to Fromm Seiki Okazaki This article is a summary of my doctoral dissertation, Political Fromm: Paradigm Shift toward the Active Communication Theory, written in Japanese and submitted to the Graduate School of Public Administration, International Christian University, Tokyo, on December 14, 1998. I wish to thank Mr. Norris Falguera and Ms Mari Tomita for checking the manuscript of „From Honneth to Fromm.” Copyright © 1999 and 2011 by Prof. Dr. Seiki Okazaki, Kyushu University - Faculty of Law, Hako- zaki 6-19-1, Higashi-ku, FUKUOKA, 812-8581, Japan; E-Mail: aktiv[at-symbol]aqua.ocn.ne.jp I Introduction most significant one for its theoretical work”1, Fromm was excluded from the Institute for So- As is well known, Jürgen Habermas opens up cial Research, partly because of the opposition the frontiers of „radical democracy” in the his- to Adorno. And Fromm was labeled as a „neo- tory of critical theory by overcoming the so- Freudian revisionist” in the so-called Fromm- called pessimism of The Dialectic of Enlighten- Marcuse Debate in the 1950s2. In this article I ment. It is Axel Honneth who takes over the po- would like to show that Fromm’s „‘another’ litical orientation from Habermas, who never- critical theory”3 has the potential to overcome theless criticizes Habermas’s language-theoretic the difficulty of Honneth’s critical theory, and to version of communication paradigm and advo- advocate a theoretical shift toward an active cates his own recognition-theoretic version of communication theory. communication paradigm. In The Fragmented World of the Social (1995), Honneth refers to „four thematic domains” of his post- II Critical Theory of Honneth Habermasian critical theory (Honneth 1995, pp. xiii-xxv): (A) „everyday moral experience” con- 1 Honneth’s Criticism of Habermas nected with a „struggle for recognition”; (B) re- lation between „work” and „recognition”; (C) Let’s start with a brief sketch of Honneth’s criti- „pathologies of modern society” having nothing cal theory. Honneth looks back on his intellec- to do with the problem of „rationality”; and (D) tual history in the interview held on the journal „psychoanalytic concept of the subject.” I find potentialities in Honneth’s critical theory in that 1 it will contribute to elucidate many problems on Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance, trans. Michael which Habermas fails to shed light. Robertson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 271. However, in spite of its attractiveness, there 2 In the epoch-making article „The Fromm-Marcuse exists a crucial difficulty in Honneth’s critical Debate Revisited” (1986), John Rickert objects theory. In this article I would like to attempt to against Marcuse’s misreading of Fromm. John Rick- overcome the difficulty of Honneth’s critical ert, „The Fromm-Marcuse Debate Revisited,” in The theory through the dialogue with one of the Frankfurt School: Critical Assessments, Vol. IV, ed. most important critical theorists, Erich Fromm Jay Bernstein (London and New York: Routledge, (1900-1980). While he had been „a member of 1994), pp. 278-319. 3 staff who had for a considerable time been the Burkhard Bierhoff, Erich Fromm: Analytische Sozial- psychologie und visionäre Gesellschaftskritik (Opla- den: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), S. 45. page 1 of 9 Okazaki, S. 1999 From Honneth to Fromm Propriety of the Erich Fromm Document Center. For personal use only. Citation or publication of mate- rial prohibited without express written permission of the copyright holder. Eigentum des Erich Fromm Dokumentationszentrums. Nutzung nur für persönliche Zwecke. Veröffentli- chungen – auch von Teilen – bedürfen der schriftlichen Erlaubnis des Rechteinhabers. Radical Philosophy (Honneth 1993). According and this again makes him heir to the tradi- to it, he started to study philosophy and litera- tion of critical social theory we have inves- ture at the University of Bonn in 1969. At that tigated here --- the communication-theoretic time he was influenced by Adorno and was not approach he had initially opened up: the active politically. However, after moving to the potential for an understanding of the social University of Bochum in 1971, he became a order as an institutionally mediated com- member of the USOS, the youth organization of municative relation between culturally inte- SPD. There Honneth began to read Habermas grated groups that, so long as the exercise and wrote his Magisterarbeit concerning of power is asymmetrically distributed, Habermas’s interpretation of psychoanalysis. takes place through the medium of social Then Honneth moved to the Free University in struggle.” (Honneth 1986, S. 334, p. 303) Berlin and studied sociology. Although he was a „totally convinced Habermasian,” Honneth had In the introduction of The Struggle for Recogni- already some objections to Habermas. Honneth tion (1992), Honneth states that The Struggle for objected that Habermas reduced the concept of Recognition arose in connection with the con- „work” into „instrumental action.” Besides, con- clusion of The Critique of Power. That is, „any trary to Habermas, Honneth came to be closer attempt to integrate the social-theoretical in- to „philosophical anthropology.” sights of Foucault’s historical work within the In The Critique of Power (1986), which is framework of a theory of communicative action the enlarged version of his dissertation submit- has to rely on a concept of morally motivated ted to the Free University in Berlin, Honneth struggle” (Honneth 1992, S. 7, p. 1). What thinks highly of Habermas (and Foucault) for his should be pointed out here is that The Critique „rediscovery of the social,” which overcomes of Power does not contain the concept of „rec- the „incapacity for social analysis” from Hork- ognition” (Anerkennung) as such, which consti- heimer to Adorno. Furthermore, Honneth thinks tutes an important element of his criticism of highly of Habermas’s „communication-theoretic Habermas. To be sure, we can find the concept transformation” of The Dialectic of Enlighten- in the „Afterword to the Second German Edition ment, in comparison with Foucault’s „systems- (1988)” of The Critique of Power (Honneth theoretic dissolution” of it. This does not mean, 1986, S. 385-386, pp. xvii-xviii). However, it is however, that Honneth agrees with Habermas in The Struggle for Recognition that the concept entirely: Honneth criticizes Habermas for failing of „recognition” is discussed systematically for to grasp the role of „struggle” in the history of the first time. species. According to Honneth, among the two In his inaugural lecture entitled „The Social competing models, Habermas develops the Dynamics of Disrespect” (1994), Honneth criti- „model of a two-tiered reproduction of society cizes Habermas’s language-theoretic version of within instrumental-rational and communicative communication paradigm from the standpoint spheres of action,” not the „model of a mainte- of his recognition-theoretic version of communi- nance of the social order through institutionally cation paradigm (Honneth 1994). To be sure, mediated communicative relations between Honneth acknowledges that Habermas opens up morally integrated groups” (Honneth 1986, S. the possibility of an „intramundane transcen- 307, p. 278). This leads Habermas to „two dence,” in contrast to Adorno’s „negativist social complementary fictions”: „the existence of critique.” However, Honneth criticizes Haber- power-free spheres of communication” as well mas for being incapable of finding „pretheoreti- as „the existence of norm-free organizations of cal resource” (vorwissenschaftliche Instanz) action” (Honneth 1986, S. 328, p. 298). Accord- within social reality. According to Honneth, ing to Honneth, Habermas „moral experiences are not aroused by restrict- „not only gives up the possibility of a justi- ing linguistic competences, rather, they are gen- fied critique of concrete forms of organiza- erated by violating identity claims acquired in tion of economic production and political socialization” (Honneth 1994, S. 86, p. 262). administration. Habermas loses above all --- Therefore, critical theory cannot grasp „norma- page 2 of 9 Okazaki, S. 1999 From Honneth to Fromm Propriety of the Erich Fromm Document Center. For personal use only. Citation or publication of mate- rial prohibited without express written permission of the copyright holder. Eigentum des Erich Fromm Dokumentationszentrums. Nutzung nur für persönliche Zwecke. Veröffentli- chungen – auch von Teilen – bedürfen der schriftlichen Erlaubnis des Rechteinhabers. tive presuppositions of social interaction” fully, son who shares with all other members of one’s as far as it remains within the communication community the qualities that make participation theory of Habermas. in discursive will-formation possible” (Honneth 1992, S. 194-195, p. 120). However, „denial of rights” and „exclusion” deprive people of the 2 Struggle for Recognition sense of „self-respect.” Finally, the third form of recognition is In The Struggle for Recognition Honneth pre- „solidarity” (Solidarität) which refers to „social sents his own recognition theory after tackling