• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

C O R P O R A T I O N THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Corporation View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. Periodically, RAND Corporation researchers publish with commercial presses. These books are not available from RAND but can be request- ed directly from the publisher, except in cases where the rights have reverted to RAND and we have republished a new edition. “McNamara’s decisions were not always right. But a lucid new book by two of his former Whiz Kids demonstrates that his choices usually were based on ‘explicit criteria of the national interest.’ Decisions by the military services are often compromises to protect ‘various institutional, parochial or other vested interests.’” —New York Times, March 1971 “Makes a superb contribution to public understanding of the critical and volatile McNamara years. It is not written as the defi nitive ‘insider history’ of that era; but it is the best view we’ve had so far of how McNamara decisions were shaped, told in sharp detail by men who helped frame some of his most diffi cult choices. The authors make an articulate, convincing plea for sanity— for more analysis, instead of ‘appeals to authority’—in defense decision-making. Their logic is exciting, their candor is refreshing, and their clarity of expression (simple but elegant English) make the book a delight to read.” —Armed Forces Journal, February 1971 “Well written . [this book] is more than a ringing defense of systems analysis. It reveals new aspects of in-fi ghting within the Pentagon, particularly over Vietnam. To his credit, Enthoven’s concern goes beyond the status and trappings accorded the systems analysts. The larger issue is what kind of manager a defense secretary elects to be, for that choice will determine how he uses systems analysis.” —Business Week, January 1971 “A great deal of nonsense is written about the Pentagon and military decision making in this country. This is a book that tells, probably better than any other, just how it is possible to come to a reasonable compromise with that unanswerable question, How Much is Enough?” —Evening Star, Washington, DC, March 1971 “The authors were key assistants in the McNamara Defense Department and personally participated in the actions and events they describe. Because of their involvement, only one side of the debate is presented. Conveniently omitted is any meaningful discussion of the failures of systems analysis. That does not diminish the signifi cance of the contribution they are making. Although we shall have to wait for the other side in this debate, this excellent book is by far the clearest statement of the McNamara approach to defense management published to date.” —Defense Management, May 1971 “A clearly written and defi nitive insight into critical aspects of Defense Department life: McNamara’s struggle to gain control of DOD, how systems analysis works, and the limits of military expertise.” —Federation of American Scientists, March 1971 “A ‘must’ acquisition of all college and university libraries . .” —Choice, June 1971 “. Recommended for large public and all academic libraries.” —Library Journal, December 1970 “Hackles of stiff-necked militarists may quiver a little at some of the charges, but those with broader perspectives and more acute discernment will fi nd much that is compatible with their own thinking. This is an important book, and if ever a time demanded such information that time is now.” —Seattle Times, April 1971 How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961–1969 Alain C. Enthoven K. Wayne Smith How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969 was originally published by Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., in 1971. This RAND edition reflects the original layout with the addition of an introduction to the new edition and a new foreword. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Enthoven, Alain C., 1930– How much is enough? : shaping the defense program, 1961–1969 / Alain C. Enthoven, K. Wayne Smith. p. cm. “CB-403.” Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8330-3826-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Military planning—United States—History—20th century. 2. Military administration—United States—History—20th century. 3. United States—Armed Forces—Cost control—History—20th century. 4. United States. Dept. of Defense—History—20th century. I. Smith, K. Wayne. II. Title. U153.E58 2005 355'.033573'09046—dc22 2005018910 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover design by Eileen Delson La Russo © Copyright 1971 by Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2005 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 201 North Craig Street, Suite 202, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-1516 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] To the memory of Charles J. Hitch, founding Chief of the Economics Division at the RAND Corporation and father of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. To Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense 1961–1968, the brilliant leader who made it happen. Last, but not least, to our wives. Introduction to the New Edition Resource allocation issues have long loomed large in Department of Defense (DoD) deliberations. As such, they continue to be the subjects of much of the RAND Corporation’s research on behalf of the DoD. How Much Is Enough? grew out of our early experience in fashioning workable methods for systematically evaluating the choices posed in allocating resources. It is being brought back into print by RAND now as both a classic account of the application of new and powerful means of analysis and a cautionary history of the controversies that inevitably arose from those efforts. The question and the lessons of How Much Is Enough? are fully applicable in today’s national security environment, where new challenges and new technologies further complicate the al- location of resources entrusted to the DoD. The book was originally funded by RAND, and this edition includes a new foreword by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Ken- neth J. Krieg and Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readi- ness David S. C. Chu. James A. Thomson, President and CEO, RAND Corporation Michael D. Rich, Executive Vice President, RAND Corporation vii Foreword to the New Edition We are honored by the opportunity to write a foreword to this new edition of How Much Is Enough? A work of enduring value and last- ing relevance, it is both a classic account of the application of powerful ideas to the problem of managing the Department of Defense (DoD) and a cautionary history of the controversies inspired by that successful effort. Our hope is to provide its readers an appreciation of its ideas, the way in which they were applied, how they have continued to shape the nation’s defenses, and why they are as powerful today as they were in 1961. As How Much Is Enough? recounts, Robert S. McNamara took offi ce in 1961 convinced that the Secretary of Defense, rather than the services, should control the evaluation of military needs and should choose among alternatives for meeting those needs. He was determined to exercise the previously little-used powers that Congress had given the Secretary to integrate the nation’s defenses into a coherent whole. His device was a new system for allocating defense resources, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), which was based on the six deceptively simple fundamental ideas described in Chapter Two: • Decisions should be based on explicit criteria of national interest, not on compromises among institutional forces. ix x Foreword • Needs and costs should be considered simultaneously. • Major decisions should be made by choices among explicit, bal- anced, feasible alternatives. • The Secretary of Defense should have an active analytic staff to provide him with relevant data and unbiased perspectives. • A multiyear force and fi nancial plan should project the consequences of present decisions into the future. • Open and explicit analysis, available to all parties, should form the basis for major decisions.

Load more

  396

Copy Link