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BROKEN PROMISES: Human Rights Human Rights, constitutionalism and Socio-economic exclusion in Bahrain | 1 BROKEN PROMISES Human Rights, Constitutionalism and Socio-economic Exclusion in Bahrain Omar F. Ahmed www.ihrc.org.uk 2 | BROKEN PROMISES: First published in Great Britain in 2010 by Islamic Human Rights Commission PO Box 598, Wembley, HA9 7XH © 2010 Islamic Human Rights Commission Design & Typeset: Ibrahim Sadikovic Printed by Impeks Print Cover photo: KARIM SAHIB/AFP/Getty Images The photo shows a Bahraini woman taking part in a demonstration in Manama in 2006 at discriminatory policies and detentions without charge. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereinafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. ISBN 9781903718711 Human Rights, constitutionalism and Socio-economic exclusion in Bahrain | 3 Contents Acknowledgements ....................................................................................... 4 Foreword .......................................................................................................... 5 Overview .......................................................................................................... 6 I. Executive Summary ............................................................................ 6 II. Aims and Remit .................................................................................. 9 III. Legal Framework .............................................................................. 10 Historical Context ......................................................................................... 11 The Failure of Constitutionalism .............................................................. 15 I. Undelivered Promises of Reform ................................................... 15 II. Oppositional and Popular Demands ............................................. 18 The Politics of Socio-Economic Exclusion .............................................. 21 I. Bahrain’s Economy ........................................................................... 21 II. Poverty in Bahrain ............................................................................ 22 III. Migrant Workers ............................................................................... 23 IV. The Role of the Royals ...................................................................... 25 V. Judicial Oversight ............................................................................. 27 Sectarianism and the Policy Process ......................................................... 29 I. The Al Bandar Report ....................................................................... 29 II. Shia Exclusion ................................................................................... 30 III. Political Naturalisation of Foreigners ............................................ 31 Observing Human Rights ........................................................................... 33 I. Torture ......................... 33 II. Freedom of Protest & Freedom of Association ......................... 35 Recommendations ..................................................................................... 38 Appendix A: IHRC Work on Bahrain ....................................................... 40 4 | BROKEN PROMISES: Acknowledgements This report owes a great deal to the courageous and selfless contribution of civil society groups and activists in Bahrain. The author therefore expresses thanks to the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and its President Nabeel Rajab, Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace of the Haq Movement for Liberty and Democracy, Bahrain’s Migrant Workers Protection Society and the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, among many others, for their unfailing assistance and continuing efforts in defence of human rights in Bahrain. The author is grateful to all colleagues at IHRC for their expertise and support, not only during the compilation of this report but also for quality of previous research on the human rights situation in Bahrain carried out by IHRC staff which provided the foundations of the work herein. Human Rights, constitutionalism and Socio-economic exclusion in Bahrain | 5 Foreword The case of Bahrain is one of special interest to IHRC. At its inception in 1997, several of IHRC’s key members had been involved in campaigning on Bahrain. The now late Sheikh Abd al-Amir al-Jamri, a senior cleric and opposition leader, was adopted as one of IHRC’s Prisoners of Faith, and a campaign to raise awareness of the activities of Ian Henderson, the “Butcher of Bahrain”, was another of IHRC’s projects at the time. The change of King and the promises of reform and radical transformation at the start of the era of King Hamad b. Isa al-Khalifa were more than welcome. Whilst IHRC and so many activists and NGOs within Bahrain and outside remained reticent, space was given to the new ruler to enact his promises. With leaders like al-Jamri embracing the new system, we hoped, prayed and awaited with anticipation the eventual transformation of Bahrain. Sadly, as this report testifies, early cynicism about the proposed process was justified. This report aims to give those unfamiliar with the situation in Bahrain a good historical background as well as current overview of the failure to move from outright monarchy to constitutional monarchy in Bahrain, with all its consequent fallout. At a time when the international community still hails Bahrain as a transformed and model society, IHRC calls for more comprehensive understanding of that state, and an external and internal push for real change in that country. Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2010 6 | BROKEN PROMISES: Overview I. Executive Summary As of 2010 Bahrain has not successfully completed its transition from an absolute monarchy in which unqualified power lies with the unelected head of state to a constitutional monarchy that assigns decision-making authority to an elected legislature and representative government. Socio-economic and political exclusion of the wider population is prevalent. The country’s regional economic success belies the fact that a significant proportion of Bahrainis live in poverty and unemployment. Resentment is further exacerbated when accusations of profligacy and corruption are levelled at some senior government officials who are protected from legal scrutiny and public accountability due to their close proximity to royal power in the country. Confrontation between the security forces and protestors has resulted in violence and, on occasions, death. The focus of many demonstrations is allegations of discriminatory practices carried out by the ruling Sunni al- Khalifa family against Bahrain’s majority Shia population. Discriminatory policies are deployed as a tool by the ruling government to marginalise and disenfranchise the largest section of Bahraini society. Though outwardly sectarian in nature, these measures are designed to prevent democratic reform, and are therefore not necessarily concerned primarily with religious exclusion. The response by marginalised Shia in turn is fuelled by socio-economic neglect and political marginalisation as opposed to sectarianism. Recent developments in the Kingdom of Bahrain are also indicative of a continuation of long-term trends in human rights abuses carried out by the government and the country’s state institutions, predominantly its security and intelligence services . This includes unwarranted restrictions on the freedom of expression, assembly and association. Human rights groups within Bahrain also accuse authorities of arbitrarily detaining opposition figures and human rights activists, and subjecting numerous prisoners to torture and ill treatment. Bahrain is a relatively small island nation that resides along the Persian Gulf coast of the Arabian Peninsula, and is linked to the Saudi Arabian city of Dhahran via the 26-kilometre King Fahd causeway. Bahrain is Human Rights, constitutionalism and Socio-economic exclusion in Bahrain | 7 currently the headquarters of the United States Navy’s Fifth Fleet and is a support base for US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bahrain is also a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council since 2006. 1 The population of around 1,039,000 is comprised of approximately 527,000 Bahraini nationals with the remainder foreign workers and professionals originating predominantly from other Arab countries and 2 South Asia. Islam is the religion followed by the vast majority of citizens; around 60 to 70 per cent of whom are Shia and the rest largely Sunni. The ruling al-Khalifas ascribe to the latter and as a consequence all political and security apparatus within the country is tightly controlled on sectarian lines. Hesitant reforms by Sheikh Hamad upon his ascension to power in 1999 were carried out in an attempt to avoid a repeat of major scenes of social and political unrest in the 1990’s; which had threatened the power of the ruling al-Khalifa family. Whilst these reforms ostensibly attempted to move Bahrain towards a more open and democratic society, in reality many failed to be implemented or were otherwise not radical enough to guarantee the long-denied rights of the Bahraini people. As it stands, the reign of the current ruler King Hamad al-Khalifa has represented a failure of constitutionalism and a resurgence of monarchical
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