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Overcoming Escobar: Creating a Sustainable Future for Colombian Soccer Initiatives Dutt, Cassandra 2013

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Introduction both teams were enormous. Colombian coach and his players began to When the World Cup began in June of receive death threats from their war-torn home. 1994, the Colombian national soccer team Forward Faustino Asprilla lamented, “This is seemed destined for international success. what was on our minds as we went on to the The team’s impressive World Cup campaign put pitch—that, if we didn’t win, there would be front and center on the world stage, trouble and we would be killed” (Ginn). Bur- gaining approval of international soccer crit- dened with fear, Colombia entered the match ics and even the coveted blessing of the sport’s against the United States lacking the confidence greatest legend, Pelé. Led by defenseman and that to date had helped them to rise to the top captain Andrés Escobar, the team was expected of the international pool. to rehabilitate the image of a country torn by Despite several promising attacks by the drug lords and rampant violence through their Colombian team at the beginning of the match, inspiring play and imminent success. Unfortu- the fate of the national team was changed for- nately, Colombia’s World Cup field of dreams ever when U.S. midfielder John Harkes sent a would prove more of a nightmare for the shot that ricocheted off of the foot of Andrés nation’s international image. Escobar and into the Colombian net. The U.S. The team was upset in its first match team went on to clinch a 2–1 victory, deeming against Romania 3–1, further adding pressure the game “the biggest win in the history of to the Colombian squad to defeat the United United States soccer,” thereby thrusting U.S. States and advance out of group play. Although soccer onto the world stage (Howard). This the United States had not won a World Cup stunning victory over the pretournament match since 1950, the pregame tensions for favorites sent Colombians into a violent frenzy 71 that would make a lasting impression on the Colombian Sports Structure sport. At 3:30 A.M. on July 2, as Andrés Escobar Colombian soccer can be viewed on three was leaving a nightclub on the outskirts of distinct levels: grassroots or local programs, the Medellín, he was verbally attacked about the professional league, and the national teams. . After the verbal altercation, the Each level has characteristics unique to Colom- assailant then shot Escobar six times and imme- bia and the Latin American sports franchising diately fled from the scene. Although accounts system. Comprehension of the sport’s structure differ, many claim to have heard the attacker cry is crucial to understanding the development out, “GOAL!” with every shot, mimicking the of soccer over time as well as how the public vio- sports commentator from the U.S. match. Esco- lence and financial failures of major soccer pro- bar was taken to the hospital and pronounced grams have had a direct impact on Colombian dead on arrival (McCallum). culture and economics. Soccer is a powerful sport that has direct Grassroots and youth development pro- effects on culture, national identity, and eco- grams are growing increasingly popular in both nomics. It is a connecting point for people remote areas of Colombia and urban slums, across political, geographic, and socioeconomic where children have limited access to education boundaries and a uniting force for both national and opportunity. International aid agencies, gov- and global communities. An integral part of life ernment initiatives, and in-country organiza- in Colombia, soccer is tied to the country’s tions have sent coaches and community organ- rich history, social evolution, and political res- izers to areas of extreme poverty or duress to olution and has recently been utilized as a provide a creative outlet for struggling youth. tool for future development. Colombian soc- These programs are meant to promote sports- cer has never reached a sustainable level of manship, gender equality, heath, and education excellence, however, due to events like the mur- as well as provide athletic training, all at a low der of Andrés Escobar in 1994. cost. Youth development programs not only The path to becoming a successful soc- focus on children but also have concentra- cer nation requires planning, from grassroots tions in community development, involving initiatives and education to the compilation families and local leaders to create a more of a national squad that has the perfect mixture suitable environment for community growth of background, training, and talent. This arti- and advancement. cle explores whether Colombia has been invest- Colombia’s premier professional football ing in soccer in a way that is beneficial to the league is Categoría Primera A. This league advancement of national identity, cross-cultural includes 18 teams and is regulated by the foot- relations, and youth development. I first pro- ball governing body, División Mayer del Fút- vide a base understanding of the sport’s struc- bol Profesional Colombiano (DIMAYOR), and by ture and the bloody history haunting the Coldeportes,1 the judicial board for all Colom- Colombian soccer programs before exploring bian sports. Play culminates in a championship the efficiency of the grassroots initiatives and game, called , at the end of the professional soccer leagues. Through an inves- season. Teams are distributed evenly through- tigation of the youth and professional pro- out the country, with larger cities hosting two grams, I evaluate the effectiveness of the cur- teams each. rent systems and how they might be improved Unlike American sports franchises, teams to ensure a sustainable future for the success are structured as clubs. Apart from holding sea- of Colombian soccer, both nationally and inter- son tickets, fans can purchase membership to nationally. It is important to understand that a club and have access to amenities, meeting successful sports programs are not simply eval- uated on a win-loss basis. Financial stability, 1 community-based outputs, regulation, and ath- Coldeportes is the Departamento Administrativo del Deporte la Recreación, la Actividad Física y el letic talent will also be appraised to develop a Aprovechamiento del Tiempo Libre (Administrative Depart- clear picture of the successes or failures of each ment of Sport, Recreation, Physical Activity and the Use program. of Free Time), initially created in 1968. 72 spaces, and social networks. Clubs have a pres- rently working toward rehabilitating the image ident and board of trustees who are responsi- of the program and hopes to qualify for the 2014 ble for managing finances, hiring coaches, tournament in Rio de Janeiro. It is the national and recruiting players. Leadership is crucial teams that receive the most international press because teams are not guaranteed a spot in and serve as the face for Colombian soccer on the Primera A league. Teams placing last in the world stage. the Primera A league can be interchanged with the champion of the Primera B league. This The Evolution of Colombian sports structure is common across Latin Amer- Narco-Soccer ica, although it promotes team association with an economic class, political party, or ethnic Soccer has been woven into the fabric of identity. This phenomenon tends to pit city, Colombian history, serving as the national ethnic, and class identities against each other pastime since 1903. British workers on the rail- and has been instrumental in the violent his- roads of first introduced the game, tory in the Colombian professional league. and the sport quickly spread with the first Violent tendencies continue onto the pitch, as organized football club founded, Barranquilla Colombian soccer stars, such as the retired Iván FBC, in 1909 (“Football”). It was not until Ramiro Córdoba, were infamous for collecting 1924 that the first Colombian Football Feder- up to 25 yellow cards, or personal fouls, per sea- ation, Liga de Fútbol, was formed and in 1936 son (Miguel et al.). The more successful Euro- that FIFA affiliation was first granted. A national pean clubs rarely draft Colombian professional soccer league would not emerge until 1948. players due to a lack of international visibility Between 1948 and 1954 the Colombian soccer and the tendency for violent play. It is possi- scene was promising, as Argentinean players ble, however, for players to advance by first mov- populated the new league due to player strikes ing to the more prominent Argentinean or in Argentina, which led to nicknaming the Brazilian teams to train with some of Latin era, El Dorado. Because of the successful early America’s most talented players, before moving years of football, Colombia became internation- on to a more competitive level of play. ally recognized for its playing style and young The Colombian men’s and women’s talent (Museo . . .). In 1962, Colombia quali- national teams are managed and regulated by fied for its first FIFA World Cup but was elimi- the Federación Colombiana de Fútbol (FCF)2 nated in the first round of group play. Despite and Fédération Internationale de Football Asso- the 1962 World Cup defeat, Colombia’s Cate- ciation (FIFA).3 Similar to the United States, goría Primera A league began to flourish, dom- players are selected from national pools to com- inated by the Millonarios team. Not until pete at the international level at a variety of the 1970s did challengers, such as Atlético age ranges. The national team must qualify National, Deportivo , Independiente Santa through a series of continental regulation Fe, and Atlético Junior, join Millonarios in its games to attend the FIFA World Cup, the world’s success and become recognized on the world most watched sporting event. Colombia has not stage. qualified for the event since 1998 but is cur- In 1979, América de Cali established a new regime in Colombian soccer, ushering in a 2FCF is the organizing body for football in Colom- period dominated by violence and politics, bia that helps develop the sports culture through FIFA- known as the era of narco-soccer. América de approved programs, supports the Primera A and B leagues, Cali dominated the next decade of Categoría selects national team members, and helps improve the quality of life in Colombia (Federación Colombiana de Primera A play, backed by infamous Cali drug Fútbol). cartel leaders, the Orejeula brothers (Museo . . .). 3FIFA is the governing body for international football With cocaine exportation on the rise, drug charged with protecting standards, encouraging competi- cartels began to rule throughout the nation, tion, and promoting solidarity in the world game. Every four profiting as much as U.S. $50 million a day from years FIFA organizes the World Cup, a tournament that brings together qualifying international squads to com- sales in the U.S. market. These large profits pete in the world’s most watched sporting event (Fédéra- were often legitimized through money launder- tion Internationale de Football Association). ing, making soccer club ownership a popular 73 cleansing mechanism for the most profitable of resources, Atlético Nacional went on to be the drug lords. With a large influx of money, the first Colombian winners of the Copa Liberta- country’s most popular professional teams dores, the South American soccer champi- began to excel. Clubs could afford to hire inter- onship, in 1989. His charity work did not, national coaches and players, bringing a new however, save him from the threats of extradi- style to the game and fresh talent to the Colom- tion to the United States. Escobar continued bian soccer scene (Zimbalist). In order to make to support the development of national soccer the team more competitive, Gonzalo Rodríguez in Colombia, until his murder in 1993. He Gacha, leader of the Bogotá drug cartels, pur- was buried with the flag of his team, Atlético chased the Millonarios club in 1982. Investi- Nacional, and his death was mourned by mil- gations after Gacha’s murder in 1990 led to lions of impoverished soccer fans nationwide the discovery of paperwork detailing illegal (Zimbalist). player payments and money-laundering oper- It was the close involvement of the Colom- ations. His was not the only murder associ- bian drug cartels that helped write the history ated with soccer throughout the 1980s and of Colombian soccer, both with its international 1990s. Attempts to purge the cartels from club successes and failures leading to bloody con- ownership also led to the murder of Colom- sequences. The Colombian national soccer team bian Justice Minister Rodrigo Bonilla in 1984. qualified for the World Cup in 1990, at the The murder of eight soccer officials in 1986 over peak of drug exportation and violence. It was not unfavorable, game-changing calls sent a mes- until 1994, however, that the Colombian sage of hostility to the international soccer com- national team earned international attention for munity. Violence continued into 1988 when the its startling rise through the FIFA ranks. Colom- secretary of the Metropolitan Soccer League lost bia finally had acquired an exceptionally strong his life over statements about the drug cartels. collection of players and had the financial means It was not by chance that the rise of Colom- to keep them engaged. In the midst of extreme bian soccer coincided with the popularity of guerrilla warfare, the Colombian national cocaine. The most successful years for the most team was the face of the country, responsible for popular professional teams, Millonarios, Atlético promoting a national image of peace and pros- Nacional, and América de Cali, can be correlated perity. The team needed to stand proud in a time with the presence of the country’s most pow- of national violence, playing harder to bring pos- erful drug kingpins in each of the major cities. itive press coverage to Colombia. Connections Under control of the wealthy drug lords, these remained, however, with Pablo Escobar and teams dominated Primera A league play, clinch- other drug kingpins who had helped the players ing the championship titles and asserting their step out of poverty onto the world soccer stage. power as a soccer (Zimbalist). During the 1994 World Cup, these relationships During this time, Colombia’s most noto- proved dangerous as head coach Francisco Mat- rious drug kingpin, Pablo Escobar (no rela- urana and midfielder Gabriel Gómez received tion to Colombian defenseman Andrés Escobar), many death threats from drug kingpins and involved himself in the direction of Atlético national team owners via fax and telephone. Nacional, his favorite team from Medellín. It was “There will be bombs in your house and in said that Escobar would kill to win a soccer Gomez’s house, if you put him on the field” match and was suspected in the notorious mur- (Brooke). More threats had been extended to der of referee Michael Ortega after an unfavor- players prior to the U.S. match, creating an aura able call in November 1989. He was personally of panic and fear, throwing off the game of the invested in the development of the team and Colombian team from the norm. Seeded first, its players. He used drug profits to benefit the the team lost in the first round of group play and community, building soccer fields and provid- returned to Colombia defeated and targets for ing equipment for the impoverished children in numerous death threats. Escobar’s tragic death Medellín. These fields later proved an excel- brought a frenzy of media attention to the lent recruitment resource, producing some of broader violence and anarchy in Colombia, the country’s most talented players (Ginn). Due forever tying soccer to drug trafficking. After to Escobar’s commitment and sheer financial 1994, the government purged the national 74 soccer organizations of drug cartels, bringing remote rural areas do not often have full access in new management and heavily regulating to educational resources or authoritative figures sources of team funding. As a consequence, 14 and role models. These communities are most of 18 Categoría Primera A teams were at risk susceptible to the rule of the few remaining of becoming bankrupt and were not competitive drug cartels, as families and children have on the international level in 2010. The Colom- limited means and are always looking for oppor- bian national team’s world ranking fell from 4th tunities to climb the socioeconomic ladder. to 34th, as many players moved abroad or Unlike Escobar’s work, current youth develop- resigned. Colombia has not qualified for a World ment initiatives seek to use soccer as a tool to Cup since (Zimbalist). keep young children in rural areas from being drawn to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionar- Youth Initiatives: Opportunity and ias de Colombia (FARC), considered a terrorist Reward organization by the government, or to local drug cartels. With almost 400,000 children lack- It was with great irony that, despite the ing access to a proper primary education nation- immense violence and tragedy connected to the wide, soccer can serve as a constructive edu- actions of drug king Pablo Escobar, his work cational tool for those in need (World Bank). as a community activist provided a starting Although some programs are well organized, point for grassroots initiatives in the world of others are informal, as teachers or govern- children’s athletics and education. Building hos- ment officials bring the game to remote villages pitals, churches, schools, and soccer fields in the with limited access to the more developed parts slums of Medellín, Escobar became a Robin of the country. These individuals often leave the Hood figure for the poor and uneducated popu- first impression of authority on the community lation. Although he took interest in the impov- and its youth who have had little or no con- erished so that he could later use them as pawns tact or experience with government agencies. in his drug trafficking practices, he set an Soccer in these ungoverned spaces provides a unlikely standard for community development creative outlet for children and complements initiatives. His programs produced soccer play- what little formal education they receive. Sports ers like Andrés Escobar, who went on to define encourage them to learn values, such as fair- an era in Colombian soccer on an interna- ness, health, hard work, and friendship (Cano). tional scale. He believed that soccer fields pro- Formal nongovernmental organizations vided children without access to an education promoting soccer for health, education, and the opportunity to develop a unique athletic skill peace have become increasingly popular in set, to experience community relationships, and the more developed areas of Colombia. Under to at least momentarily break free from the the Soccer and Peace Network, 25,000 Colom- world of drugs and violence surrounding them bian children participate in a social development (Zimbalist). Although Escobar’s motives were initiative in which organized sport and activ- not purely altruistic, he believed in the power- ity can be used to improve life skills. The open ful benefits of soccer for both children and the network of 17 not-for-profit organizations is community. Growing up in poverty, Escobar supported by the World Bank through the Japan understood the need for organized sport and Social Development Fund (JSDF), the German education and used his abundant resources to Agency for International Cooperation, and the create a standard for future work in community United Nations Development Programme. Since development. 2010, the organizations involved in the network Youth grassroots soccer initiatives today have been using soccer to promote coexistence, seek to provide benefits similar to those started reconciliation, and peace among children by Pablo Escobar and his fellow drug king- and community members (“Playing Soccer for pins. Programs currently present and working Peace . . .”). One of the most notable organiza- in Colombia stand as models for social change tions is Fútbol con Corazón, a group based in through organized sports and education in eight urban locations nationwide that focuses the most impoverished areas of the country. on respect, honesty, tolerance, and solidarity Children living in slums in major cities or through organized play. The program not only 75 includes professional trainers but also allows for an international scale through the Golombiao permanent monitoring and evaluation for all soccer tournament. Originating in Medellín in participants, ages 5 to 16, living in extreme 1996, this tournament brings together about poverty. Fútbol con Corazón uses a three-step 200 children from around the country to take model for social intervention: (1) sports train- part in a “Game of Peace.” Game advisors help ing that promotes healthy living, the develop- children collaborate and embrace themes of ment of on-field skills, and abiding by the estab- civic participation, gender equality, and conflict lished conventional rules of the game; (2) social resolution. Rules echo these themes as no for- welfare programming, including workshops for mal referees are used, and the first goal of the the development of life skills, school for parents, game must be scored by a girl in order to be and partnerships with certified educational counted (“Golombiao”). In 2005, the tourna- institutions; and (3) nutritional benefits, such ment became an international event, and the as lunches and afternoon snacks and dietary Football for Peace methodology has been monitoring by the staff. This model is used by exported to countries around the world. the organization in hopes of promoting positive These programs, in Colombia and interna- social change in the lives of youth and their tionally, focus on building whole individuals communities (Fútbol con Corazón). The JSDF rather than just athletes and stress civic engage- Colombia: Soccer Together campaign through ment as well as personal health and fitness. the World Bank was handled by Fútbol con Although they may develop young athletes in Corazón for the improvement of gender equal- a way that could be beneficial to the growth and ity and inclusion in the local educational insti- success of the professional and national pro- tutions and received $2.76 million of funding in grams, the real success lies in the opportunities 2011 (World Bank). provided for the children and the community at The model used by Fútbol con Corazón large. As Soccer Without Borders co-chair Mary and its counterpart organizations is the Foot- McVeigh states: ball for Peace methodology and is the princi- What we seek as “outcomes” are growth, pal reason for the overwhelming success of inclusion, and personal success. Growth these organizations. This methodology, estab- means that the youth is moving posi- lished in 2003, uses principles of coexistence tively toward adulthood, which requires and physical exercise to promote values, such the development of character, respect, as teamwork, gender equality, victory with identity and personal responsibility. Inclu- humility, defeat with dignity, tolerance, peace, sion means that youth who are often fair play, and respect for the body and mind. Soc- excluded from opportunities gain the cer is a tool to counteract the negative influ- social capital they need to integrate. Per- ences children are exposed to in the poverty- sonal success means that youth can set stricken urban areas where they live. Physical tangible goals that are relevant to them exercise and athletic training are used as a and their dreams, and have the tools, base for lessons in fair play, respect, and gen- skills, and support to reach them der equality. Organizations, such as Tiempo (McVeigh). de Juego (translated, Playtime), also include What do growth, inclusion, and personal suc- other creative and technologic opportunities for cess mean for Colombia? A more positive out- participants. These opportunities are part of the look for the future of at-risk youth, social inclu- Generación de Oportunidades Laborales (GOL) sion, and community growth may be just a (Generational Careers) program offered through few of the benefits found by using soccer as a Tiempo de Juego. GOL, in conjunction with a development tool. The Football for Peace pro- variety of government-sponsored programs, gram encourages children and coaches alike seeks to improve the socioeconomic situation to develop a strong sense of sportsmanship, of the youth participants by providing training leadership, and personal identity through programs and employment opportunities in unique rules and lessons on fair play. As the pop- journalism, athletic training, dance, and sys- ularity of these grassroots soccer initiatives con- tems engineering (Tiempo de Juego). The Foot- tinues to grow, more children living in under- ball for Peace system was recently adopted on developed areas will gain access to a broader 76 range of educational opportunities. Whether expenditures for a new stadium that was to gen- these programs could be as successful on a erate urban growth and revitalization. The Inde- national level is yet to be seen, because they pendiente Santa Fe team was accused in 2010 require a strong personal and individual rela- of having ties to the Norte de Valle mob, one tionship with the community. of Colombia’s largest remaining cartels, and laundering about U.S. $1.5 billion of illegal cash Rehabilitation of the Professional (“Colombian Football”). Soccer Scene Because of these and other incidents, the Colombian legislature subsequently passed Law In response to the series of professional 1445, or the Football Law, in May 2011, with soccer-related issues (discussed previously), the President and fan Colombian legislature passed Law 181 in 1995 Manuel Santos’ approval. Primarily the law (Willis). Commonly referred to as the Sports seeks to stop professional teams from being Law, it was the first attempt at regulatory leg- funded by criminal activity. Under the Foot- islation aimed at making the operation of all ball Law, no one “may hold control over more professional sports teams more transparent. The than one club within the same sport, directly or law created the National Sport System, which indirectly through a third person,” and the own- was to promote sports and recreation in Colom- ers must prove where funding comes from bia, along with Coldeportes. In addition it called (Barahona). Professional football teams must for the corporate restructuring of professional follow one of two corporate structures and thus sports clubs, along with minimum financial be regulated by one of two government agen- standards and player labor requirements. cies. A team can be structured as a nonprofit Although the rules for professional teams organization, regulated by the Civil Code, or it were strict under Law 181, no sanctions were can be a corporation/stock company, regu- put in place for clubs that did not comply with lated by the Commerce Code. The Football the newly promulgated regulations (Uribe et al.). Law provides new standards for company profit, Despite the efforts of the Colombian govern- voting power, minimum number of stockhold- ment, professional soccer continued to be rid- ers, and labor regulations for players. Teams are dled with drug cartel control, labor law viola- now held financially responsible for player pay tions, debt, license suspension, and default on by Coldeportes and can be subject to suspension federal loans. DIMAYOR general secretary Rafael or withdrawal of recognition as a professional Arias attributes these financial struggles to sports organization for defaulting on this liabil- the ending of the narco-soccer era. Previously ity. In addition to corporate restructuring, labor money was laundered through the soccer pro- regulation, and financial stipulations, the Foot- grams, and they were free to spend frivolously ball Law makes professional soccer clubs and begin large projects, such as stadium con- responsible for fan violence and substance abuse struction. When such funding dried up, teams within the stadiums (Uribe et al.). Barras had to take on debt to maintain roster salaries bravas, better known as football hooligans with and continue operation. América de Cali, which a tendency for violence and stadium vandalism, has floundered financially since being placed on can now be jailed up to ten years for the use the Clinton List4 in 1995, owed players more of explosives within the stadium. Law officials than ten months of back pay in May 2011 and are hoping that ticket sales, which have fallen has had its license revoked by Coldeportes for by almost half since 1991 due to extreme hooli- violating players’ labor rights. Government gan violence and a decline in player quality statements show that the team and team competitiveness, will increase with has defaulted on debt due to construction enhanced security measures for fan safety (“Colombian Football . . .”). 4The Clinton List, formally known as the list of Specif- The price of a stable, competitive soccer ically Designated Nationals, is a compilation of individu- league is high, with the Colombian legislature als or companies acting on behalf of targeted countries, ter- rorists, or narco-trafficking groups. Groups on this list authorizing a government investment of more generally have their assets frozen and are cut off from all than U.S. $53 million in sports infrastructure. U.S. business interaction. With the passing of Law 1445 also came the 77 pledge to invest 20 percent of state publicity such an offer, setting off a debate among own- funds to promote sports and culture within ers and managers about the moral obligation of Colombia. In addition, the implementation of sports teams and the legality of the act. The the Superate (Get Ahead) program will add debate raises the question, “What will it take another U.S. $40 million to the growing govern- to clear the scoreboard of Colombian profes- ment investment, through the creation of a sional soccer?” Colombian government officials more secure sports infrastructure and the offer- seem to think that returning the coveted titles ing of more than 300 sports scholarships to is a positive start, while rival owners call the ges- talented youth nationwide (Barahona). The ture absurd and refuse to follow suit. Although Superate program provides incentives for at-risk it is noble of Millonarios to propose wiping away youth ages 7 to18 and municipal educational titles won during the narco-trafficking era, institutions to participate in an exchange of the talented players of that day should not be learning and athletics. Program objectives discounted. The club still clinched the cham- include linking the National Sport System to pionship title, defeating the highly skilled and educational institutions in order to develop well- talented opponents it faced in 1987 and 1988. rounded athletes and the creation of spaces that Those who played in the years of drug cartel allow for the discovery of athletic talent that can control were the most talented players in South be promoted to professional leagues. Partici- America, helping to foster the most competitive pants in the program receive bonds exchange- play since the years of El Dorado. Relinquishing able for educational technology or sporting the title would imply that Millonarios intends equipment and outstanding athletes receive to discount the talent of the players whose scholarships and opportunities to perform on only fault lies in accepting a much-needed a national level. It is the hope of program direc- paycheck from the country’s most notorious tors that more than 1,600,000 children and edu- drug cartels. cators in 88 urban areas will be participants in What the Football Law is not structured to 2014 (Superate). accommodate is the interesting, even positive, With the influx of government funding, effect of the narco-soccer era on the Colombian the development of upcoming athletes, and professional league. “Remember that in the the newest regulations in place, will the Colom- 1980s and 1990s, most people wavered between bian Primera A league change for the better? desire and ethics. They wanted the team man- Many believe that the Football Law is another agers to create winning teams by hiring famous step in the right direction for cleaning up the footballers, at the same time they ignored or hid sport. Hopefully, the professional league will no the disappointment they may have felt about the longer be a place associated with drug traf- participation of narco-trafficking money,” states ficking, where the cartel with the most business Colombian sociologist Fernando Morales (Mar- can decide the winner. Players will be paid tinez). With Colombian soccer organizations regularly, with the expectation that the finan- receiving more than U.S. $40 million between cial stability will improve their home lives 1985 and 1989 alone, teams were able to pur- and, therefore, their attention to the game. chase the most talented foreign players, rais- Labor regulations for players should help the ing the standard of the domestic league (Bara- league to avoid the unionization of athletes, hona). Even teams like Atlético Nacional, based which could cause a massive overhaul of the in Medellín, which only signed domestic play- corporate structure held by most teams. Most ers, had the capability of paying for the best. notable, however, is the sense of accountabil- Drug money made Colombia competitive and ity that is now shared by Coldeportes and the entertaining on a national level and helped team owners, presidents, and stockholders. Mil- the country to develop its hybrid style of play. lonarios, one of Bogotá’s two soccer clubs, is New financial restrictions and more league reg- even considering relinquishing the two league ulation may stifle the growth of professional titles won while the team was controlled by drug clubs and limit their creativity in rebuilding the lord Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha in 1987 and 1988 once mighty empire that was Colombian pro- (Willis). Since the establishment of the Football fessional soccer. This regulation is necessary Law, Millonarios is the only team to have made to ensure the safety and well being of players, 78 club owners, and fans. Although this may be a in a Copa Colombia qualifying match, soccer step in the right direction for the rehabilitation renews hope. It removes focus from the nega- of Colombian soccer, the very need for the Foot- tive, if only for 90 minutes, and unites an ball Law nonetheless indicates the sport’s con- unlikely group of individuals. tinued captivity to its bloody past. Transitioning Success also brings favorable press to from a long history of violence and corruption Colombia, which has struggled to present itself will be difficult, but it can be managed through in a positive light. Although the Colombian team accountability and an ownership of the national soccer team has failed to qualify for a past by players, coaches, club owners, and FIFA World Cup since 1998, the team is cur- fans. rently making great strides toward a bid for the 2014 games. Qualification for an event of Overcoming Escobar: The Future this nature would not only bring together a Development of Colombian Soccer nation but also give Colombia the opportunity to show the international soccer community Soccer is the pastime of a nation plagued that it is capable of overcoming the tragic events by poverty, violence, and instability. It is an inte- of 1994. Colombian soccer would be seen as gral part of Colombian culture, becoming “an no longer defined by the two Escobars. A great arena in which social actors symbolize and source of pride can be found in the ever-grow- reproduce by means of their social practices the ing number of youth initiatives, new legislation values dominant in a given period” (Archetti and changing the way the professional league is run, Romero, p. 39). As narco-trafficking and vio- and the newfound success of the national pro- lence diminish and Colombians strive to cre- gram. Soccer emulates the changes being made ate a more civil environment within which on a national scale. As the country continues to the nation can thrive, the social practices and grow and mature, so will the game. values of soccer will further evolve as well. Soc- On the surface, soccer is nothing more cer becomes a model for social inclusion, as any than a flat patch of grass, 22 players, two goals, person regardless of gender, race, age, or socio- and one ball. It is nothing more than a hobby. A economic status can play and follow the local, soccer team, whether at the youth, national, professional, or national team. It becomes a or international level, is not the same as a city societal bonding agent, uniting the people in a and most certainly is not the same as a country; common cause. Fostering this sense of commu- yet the purpose that soccer serves in Colom- nity, soccer breaks down temporal boundaries bia transcends the game itself. Soccer lies left behind by years of government neglect, deep within the spirit of the citizenry and acts racial violence, and the iron rule of the FARC as a strong uniting force in the lives of all and leaves in their place a rediscovered hope for Colombians. In order to create a sustainable success and achievement. Whether a child in the future for the sport, the nation must recog- urban slums of Bogotá, one day hoping for a nize its past, look toward its future, and con- chance to play soccer on the world stage, or a tinue to foster a special sense of community that resident of Cali cheering for América de Cali can be found through soccer.

79 REFERENCES

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