Bigger Pie, Bigger Slice: Liquidity Value and IPO Underpricing ∗ Wei Gao y Lily Li z Hongda Zhong x Abstract Initial public offerings (IPOs) transform private firms into publicly traded ones, thereby improving liquidity of their shares. Better liquidity increases firm value, which we call \liquidity value". We use a simple model and hypothesize that issuers and IPO in- vestors bargain over the liquidity value, resulting in a discounted offer price, i.e., IPO underpricing. We find supporting evidence that underpricing is positively related to the expected post-IPO liquidity of the issuer, controlling for firm and deal characteristics and market conditions. We also explore two regulation changes as exogenous shocks to issuers' liquidity before and after IPO, respectively. With a difference-in-differences approach, we find that underpricing is more pronounced with better expected post-IPO liquidity or lower pre-IPO liquidity. Keywords: Liquidity, IPO underpricing, Nash bargaining game JEL: G32; G34 ∗The authors are grateful for helpful comments from Dirk Jenter, Michelle Lowry, Sudipta Basu, Thomas Chemmanur, Debarshi Nandy, session participants at the 2019 SFS Cavalcade Conference at Carnegie Mellon University, the 2019 FMA European Conference, the 2019 FMA annual conference in New Orleans, the 2019 CFEA Conference at New York University, and seminar participants at Temple University, London School of Economics, Michigan State University, and Drexel University. All errors are our own. yFox School of Business, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, 19122, USA;
[email protected] zFox School of Business, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, 19122, USA;
[email protected] xLondon School of Economics, London, UK;
[email protected] Bigger Pie, Bigger Slice: Liquidity Value and IPO Underpricing Abstract Initial public offerings (IPOs) transform private firms into publicly traded ones, thereby improving liquidity of their shares.