This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu

ROBERT J. DOLE ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Interview with

BOB DOVE

March 27, 2008

Interviewer

Brien R. Williams

Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics 2350 Petefish Drive Lawrence, KS 66045 Phone: (785) 864-4900 Fax: (785) 864-1414 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 2

[Note: First 5:20 of interview recorded on audio file but not on videotape. See page 3 for start of video recording.]

Williams: This is an oral history interview with Bob Dove for the Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics at the University of Kansas. We are in Bob’s home in the city of Falls Church, Virginia, and today is Thursday, March 27, 2008. I’m Brien Williams. Bob, I want to ask you to start by just giving me a little bit of your own personal background and the steps that led you to the Senate.

Dove: It was an incredibly lucky choice on my part. I attended Duke University and worked under a major professor there, who the Parliamentarian of the Senate in 1966 had worked under in the 1930s, and he was looking for someone to bring into the parliamentarian’s office at the bottom position, called second assistant parliamentarian. He wrote to this professor. At that point I was actually teaching at Iowa State University in Ames, Iowa, and I got this letter from my professor, would I be interested in going to Washington, D.C., and working for the U.S. Senate as second assistant parliamentarian, a job I knew nothing about. I had been trained in constitutional law and public administration. I had no particular training in Senate procedure or parliamentary procedure, but I certainly didn’t hesitate to tell my professor, “Yes, I would love to do that.” I was interviewed by the Parliamentarian; his name was Floyd Riddick. And based on that interview, I was selected. So I arrived in Washington in July of 1966, went into the Parliamentarian’s office, frankly, assumed that having done so, I would never leave the Parliamentarian’s office. That was the tradition in the mid-sixties; you entered the office and you stayed. That didn’t happen to me, and partly thanks to Senator Bob Dole, I actually ended up being Parliamentarian of the Senate twice, once when Senator [Howard] Baker was Leader, and then for the first two years of Senator Dole’s Majority Leadership, and then again when Senator Dole became Majority Leader again, and at his behest, I returned to the office and I stayed there until the spring of 2001. So I spent thirty-five years working for the Senate, either in the Parliamentarian’s office or for Senator Bob Dole.

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Williams: Did you regret, after all your training, leaving the academic profession a bit? Was that a difficult decision to make?

Dove: No, for this reason. I loved the teaching, and in fact, since I left the Senate in 2001, I’ve returned to teaching and now teach at three universities here. I did not like the faculty meetings. I did not like the other parts of academia that are necessarily a part of it. I loved the teaching, and I’m glad I got back to that.

Williams: Stepping back before Duke, where did you grow up and when did you graduate?

Dove: I’m a native of Ohio. I grew up outside of Columbus. I did my undergraduate work at Ohio State University and did not leave Ohio until I went off to graduate school at Duke University.

Williams: Prior to coming to the Senate, were you much aware of Bob Dole?

Dove: Not at all. I was only in academia three years before I came to the Senate, two years at The Citadel, a military college in South Carolina, and one year at Iowa State. I knew that Senator Dole was a member of Congress then, but I had not focused on his career at all. In fact, I didn’t really focus on his career until he was elected to the Senate, at which point, of course, I was working on the floor of the Senate and began to see him on a regular basis.

Williams: In your family background, were you highly partisan? Hold on. Something happened here. [Pause. Video recording begins here.] Okay. I was asking you about partisanship in your family.

Dove: I was in a Republican family. My parents supported Senator Robert Taft, who was, in their mind, kind of a demigod, very popular in Ohio. I adopted their politics and actually worked under a gentleman by the name of Ray Bliss, who was the chairman of This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 4 the state Republican Party when I was in college at Ohio State. I was a chairman of an Iowa caucus in 1965, but this is long before the Iowa causes meant anything or anyone had ever heard of them. It’s always been a pleasure of mine to remember that there was a time before Jimmy Carter. Jimmy Carter changed the whole Iowa caucus experience. But Iowa was holding caucuses long before then, and they were very low key and on the campus at Iowa State I held a caucus, and we were lucky to have eight people at that caucus. Of course, that has all changed. But that was my experience with partisanship. I will say that in the Parliamentarian’s office I tried to be studiously non-partisan, which I thought was expected, and I think that was appropriate, but up to that point I had considered myself a Republican.

Williams: I think rather than follow my original scheme here, before we can talk about your working for Dole, it’s probably important to talk a little bit about that period prior to your working with Dole, when you were appointed the Parliamentarian by Howard Baker. But let’s back up even further from that. When you first started working in the Parliamentarian’s office, explain your role.

Williams: The Parliamentarian’s office is an unusual place, in that no real outside training is much help. What the Parliamentarian in the Senate does is impart to senators and staff their knowledge of what the Senate rules are and, much more important than that, the precedents that have been set since the rules were codified in 1884. There would be no reason, I think, for anyone to study that without really good reason, and, of course, the best reason is you’re in the office. So it was totally on-the-job training. Having gone into the office, the expectation was that you would spend several years training, before you were of any value at all to the office, both watching the Senate in action and, more to the point, reading some of the 11,000 precedents of the Senate that interpreted the Senate rules, the only copies of which are in the Office of the Senate Parliamentarian. So for three years that is what I did, watched the Senate, read those precedents, and tried to get up to speed so that I could do what the two people above me, Floyd Riddick, who was the Parliamentarian, and a gentleman by the name of Murray Zweben, who was the assistant were doing, because they had also done this. It’s an office which operates much like a monarchy. If you live long enough, you get to be Parliamentarian. It’s a straight-line This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 5 ascension. It’s not a pyramid where people are competing against each other. You just wait your turn, and if you have studied and if you have produced, then you get to be Parliamentarian.

Williams: I’m curious. Where was your position to watch the Senate? Where did you observe?

Dove: On the Senate floor. This is long before the Senate was on television, so until 1986, if you were going to watch the Senate, you had to sit on the floor, and for those first three years I would be sitting on the back benches, where staff sat. After three years, I began to sit in the Parliamentarian’s chair, which is a very good vantage point to watch the Senate from.

Williams: When you were doing that, you were actually operating as Parliamentarian?

Dove: Yes, which was to advise the chair on everything they say, and then to advise senators and staff, who would come up to the desk and ask questions.

Williams: You mentioned these 11,000 pages, I guess it was, or 11,000 precedents.

Dove: Precedents. There are more pages than precedents. Many precedents are multi- page writings.

Williams: Are these a matter of public record or is it a closed book in the Parliamentarian’s office?

Dove: There was an attempt, when Senator Baker was Leader, to make them a matter of public record. For whatever reason, that ended up failing, and as of now, to my knowledge, there is no public record of the precedents. Now, there is a book, it is called Senate Procedure, which is a small, like one- or two-sentence summary of each of these precedents, but the full precedents are not published or available.

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Williams: I’m curious and ignorant about the distinction between a rule and the precedents that follow that rule. Just make that clear.

Williams: Let me tell you, the importance is not the rule, but the precedent. We have many instances in which the way the Senate has interpreted its rules reads as if the rule was being changed, and the key is, the Senate follows the precedent that interprets the rule. And that’s the job of the Parliamentarian, to try to explain to people who are a little skeptical, “Well, the rule says this,” and we have to say, “Yes, but this is how the Senate has interpreted this rule, and it may be an illogical way, but it is the Senate’s way. Until it’s changed by the Senate, that’s the advice we will continue to give.”

Williams: The operative precedent is the most recent one?

Dove: Absolutely. Yes.

Williams: Would it be fair to ask you to just give an example of a rule, and then a little bit of a flow of precedents afterwards?

Dove: Yes, because I’ve seen them set. The rules have not changed in their wording, but their interpretation has definitely changed. When Senator [Robert C.] Byrd was Majority Leader in the late 1970s, he was quite annoyed at some of the hoops that he had to go through to accomplish some things, and one of the things that annoyed him was that the Senate does two kinds of business: legislative business—bills, resolutions, and so forth— and executive business—treaties and nominations. Under the Senate rules, when you go in from legislative session to executive session, you are automatically on the first item of the executive calendar, and that motion is not debatable, so you can easily get to the first item. Well, Senator Byrd didn’t like that. He wanted to go into the executive session to some other item on the executive calendar. Well, under the rules, if you go into executive session and you’re on that first item, a motion to proceed to another one is debatable, and he would have to get cloture, and that would slow him down. Well, he set the precedent that it was perfectly in order for him to move to go to executive session, to go to any item. There was a challenge to This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 7 that. The chair ruled actually against him. He appealed that ruling. The Senate voted with him, and ever since then, any Leader can go to an item on the executive calendar, thus saving himself a considerable amount of time in terms of delay. So it doesn’t matter that the rule doesn’t read any different than it did in the period before Byrd set the precedent; that precedent controls and has continued to control.

Williams: Are any of the rules from 1884, you said, intact?

Dove: They’re all intact, but they were written at a time when the Senate did not have a position that anyone referred to as Majority Leader or Minority Leader, and so there are many precedents that involve those two Leaders that are not part of the rules. A key one is recognition. The rules say that the presiding officer shall recognize the first senator to address them. The precedent is if one of the Leaders is seeking recognition, it doesn’t matter if they’re first; they get it. Again, the advice from the Parliamentarian to the chair, if one of those Leaders is seeking recognition, you recognize them, you don’t recognize anyone else.

Williams: How spontaneously are you expected, as Parliamentarian, to come up with the right information when the presiding officer is asking for it or you see the need for it?

Dove: That is, in a sense, the great tension of the job. You are expected to know what the presiding officer is supposed to say instantaneously, and you’re not supposed to have any hesitation or delay. I mentioned at the beginning that one of the tense times that I can remember sitting in the Parliamentarian’s chair, was during the impeachment trial of William Jefferson Clinton, and it’s because the presiding officer was the Chief Justice. I had to have that same role and be able to give the Chief Justice immediate answers to problems that we did not deal with on a regular basis, and that was kind of tough.

Williams: I can well imagine. So after your three years of incubation and absorption, then where did you move?

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Dove: Then I spent another five years in this post called second assistant Parliamentarian. In 1974, the Parliamentarian who had hired me, Floyd Riddick, retired. He was sixty-five and he had started working for the Senate in 1947, so he was ready to move on. The person above me, who was the assistant Parliamentarian, was advanced to the post of Parliamentarian, and I was advanced to the post of assistant Parliamentarian.

Williams: Was there anything about Riddick’s leaving in ’74 that related to the possible impeachment of [Richard M.] Nixon and the turbulent times, or not?

Dove: No. I will tell you that in 1974 we thought, in the summer, that there was definitely going to be an impeachment trial of Richard Nixon. And at that point we had very little to go on about how that trial should be handled. I was the low person in the office, and I was given the job of spending that summer coming up with a document that would explain how we would handle an impeachment trial. That document was finished and published about four days before President Nixon resigned, and I remember at the time thinking, “Well, I have just wasted a perfectly good summer on a document that nobody is going to use.” I was very delighted that that document existed when we started the impeachment trial of President Clinton, because I could simply pull it off the shelf and say, “This is how we do it.”

Williams: Did anyone in the White House read your document in ’74, and did it have any role to play in convincing the president to resign?

Dove: I don’t think so at all, no. I think the role was entirely one of two senators, Barry Goldwater and Hugh Scott, going to the president and saying, “If you force this to a trial, you will be convicted.” That was the consensus. He did not have the one-third plus one necessary to avoid conviction.

Williams: So what was the breakdown, then, of your role vis-à-vis the Parliamentarian when you took the secondary position?

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Dove: As I say, it’s a monarchy, and I can remember, in a sense, feeling over the years when people would tell me, “This is what the Parliamentarian views are. This is what the assistants’ are.” I’m second assistant, and I’m thinking, “It’s totally irrelevant what the assistants’ views are, unless there’s been a coup. It’s the Parliamentarian’s view that counts. And that’s what I tried to be when Murray Zweben was Parliamentarian, a loyal assistant. So that’s what I did.

Williams: Were there times when a situation evolved where you’d get on the phone to Murray Zweben and say, “How do we do this?” or were you pretty much on your own?

Dove: There was no phone at the desk, so if I was in the chair and I had a problem that I really thought needed his attention, I would get a page to go down to the office, but that was all I could do. Basically, I would handle it as best I could.

Williams: You were then elevated to Parliamentarian. What were the circumstances of that?

Dove: The circumstances of that, frankly, were not particularly pleasant. As I said, I thought, when I went into the office, that I had made a commitment and that the Senate had made a commitment to me, in a sense, that if I performed well, that I would be there permanently. It was in 1980 that it became clear that that was not really the commitment the Senate had made. In 1980, the Republicans took the Senate. Murray Zweben was still a relatively young man; I think he was fifty-one or fifty-two. He was informed that he was not going to be the Parliamentarian when the Republicans took the Senate. I was informed that Senator Baker was planning to move me up. I was not happy about this. I didn’t like that precedent. It’s the first time that a Parliamentarian had been removed when a party change occurred in the Senate. I had come to the office in 1966. Two years earlier, a gentleman who had been the Parliamentarian had retired at the age of eighty-six. He had survived four party changes, and there’d been no change in the office due to parties. Suddenly, in 1980 a precedent was set that when the parties change, the Parliamentarian changes. I didn’t find that comforting, but I did become Parliamentarian and remained Parliamentarian, frankly, only as long as the Republicans maintained This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 10 control of the Senate, which was six years. At the end of that time, Senator Baker had left after four; Senator Dole had been Majority Leader for two, and the Democrats took the Senate and I was asked to move on, and that’s when I started working for Senator Dole.

Williams: Had it become clear that Zweben was a Democrat, or was it just that he was appointed by a Democrat?

Dove: I’ll tell you what became clear, was that the Office of Senate Parliamentarian had changed dramatically. I can tell you that when I came to the office in the mid-sixties, it was not that important an office. The Senate rules and precedents largely were known by almost every senator, for this reason: the Senate was not a partisan body in 1966. Both parties were incredibly split. The Democratic Party had a large wing of Southern Democrats whose philosophy was totally at variance with many other Democrats. There was also a fairly large part of the Republican Party that I would call liberals, people like Jacob Javits of New York. All four of these groups—Southern Democrats, other Democrats, liberal Republicans, conservative Republicans—were minorities. Minorities need to know the rules in the Senate to protect themselves. They did. And frankly, the rules and the precedents were not all that difficult to learn in the 1960s, and so often what was happening, in terms of the Parliamentarian’s role to senators and staff, is that the Parliamentarian was simply confirming what these people already knew, and so it wasn’t a particularly difficult job of convincing them, and it was, as I say, something of a backwater. That all changed in the 1970s. Congress decided that a number of very vexing problems would be dealt with through procedural means. To me, probably the most important one was the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which set up a very complicated procedure for dealing with the budget. But there were other issues dealing with the issue of war powers. Congress set up a regime in which resolutions, when the president sent troops into a foreign country, would be privileged if those troops were in either hostilities or in imminent danger of hostilities. I don’t think anybody focused on the fact that who would be deciding whether these resolutions, say, under War Powers Act, were privileged. It turned out to be the Parliamentarian. This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 11

I very well remember, in 1982, when President [Ronald] Reagan sent Marines into Lebanon, a resolution was brought to the desk to force those Marines to be removed under the War Powers Act, and it came to be my decision as to whether that was indeed a privileged resolution. Under the War Powers Act, I got to decide whether those Marines were either in hostilities or in imminent danger of hostilities. I thought at the time, “This is way above my pay grade.” I decided that they were. I can tell you I made a lot of enemies by that decision. What happened in the seventies and the eighties and continues to happen to this day is that a lot of procedural decisions are now made by the Parliamentarian, dealing with procedures that are not well understood, and, particularly with regard to the Budget Act, change, it seems like, yearly, because they can be written into the budget resolution that’s passed every year, and therefore it’s not confirming knowledge that senators and staff already have; it’s often a surprise, it’s often an unpleasant surprise, and basically the Parliamentarian makes enemies by the handful.

Williams: That was the story with Zweben?

Dove: That was the story with Zweben. That was the story with me. That was the story with my successor [Alan S. Frumin], who, in 1994, was asked to step aside as Parliamentarian. I’m hoping that the Senate backs off a little bit, because, frankly, they’re running out of people. So it is a comfort—the gentleman who succeeded me as Parliamentarian in 1986 also succeeded me in 20001. Two weeks after I left, the Senate changed hands; it went Democratic. He stayed on as Parliamentarian. When the Republicans took back the Senate in 2002, he stayed on as Parliamentarian. And when the Democrats took back the Senate in 2006, he stayed on as Parliamentarian. I think we have begun to establish the idea that basically the Parliamentarian is doing the best he can. He’s not there as a partisan official, and he’s making some very difficult calls on how the Senate runs.

Williams: Do you think any particular senator was instrumental in changing the course there a little bit or not?

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Dove: Well, of course, the most important decisions were made first by Senator Baker in 1980, and then Senator Byrd in 1986, then Senator Dole in 1994, and then, ironically, by Senator [Trent] Lott in May of 2001. I understand that basically it is the call of the Majority Leader. Parliamentarians are just staff, and they have no tenure, they’re not Civil Service, and they can be dismissed for any reason that a Majority Leader decides, but as I say, it’s an office which only operates if people come into it and stay, and if the view is that your job security is really at risk every time the Senate changes party hands, and you have no idea how often that’s going to be, that gives you pause about coming into the office.

Williams: That kind of orientation period that you had, the three years, does that still happen?

Dove: It has happened up to this point. Again, there’s some irony in that the latest person in that office came in under the old expectations. He came in in 1977. I was assistant; he was second assistant. I helped train him. I think he’s excellent. I think he’s doing a good job. But it is a thankless job. As far as I know, that will follow. There are two assistants under him. They have both been there now long enough that they can sit up at the desk, and I think can follow him, but the Senate will have to decide that, yes, we think the Parliamentarian’s office needs a little bit more protection than it had in that period 1980-2001.

Williams: What were the circumstances of you learning that you were being replaced?

Dove: I was approached by a gentleman by the name of Bill Hildenbrand, who was about to become the new Secretary of the Senate. The Parliamentarian works for the Secretary of the Senate, the chief administrative officer. That is a partisan position. It has always been a partisan position. The anomaly was that the Parliamentarian who works for the Secretary has not been considered to be a partisan position, but you can see there is some tension there. But I was told by the incoming Republican Secretary that, one, Murray Zweben was not going to be Parliamentarian when the Republicans took the Senate in January of ’81, and that they were requesting that I take that position. I felt, as This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 13

I say, very uncomfortable with that, and, frankly, I remember suggesting to them—Dr. Riddick at that point, I think, was seventy-two, but he was working for the Rules Committee and had stayed on the Senate payroll and was still there—why don’t they bring him back if they’re not happy with Murray? He was an excellent Parliamentarian. He wasn’t that old. They didn’t want to do that. So I became Parliamentarian. I felt, frankly, one, I was fairly young; I think I was forty-three. Dr. Riddick had been fifty-five when he became Parliamentarian and had been in the office longer than I. I had only been in the office at that point fourteen years. I wasn’t sure that was enough time to master it all, there was so much. It felt rather uncomfortable doing it.

Williams: What was your first tenure like?

Dove: I must say it was incredibly enjoyable, in that lots of interesting things were happening. The Budget Act had been used in a major way in the last year of Senator Byrd’s Majority Leadership, and it had been used in a way that no one had seen before. It was used to create a bill which could not be filibustered on the Senate floor. Now, that’s unusual. I mean the filibuster is kind of entrenched in the Senate. But the budget process allows a bill to be created, as long as it is a budget bill, which cannot be filibustered. Senator Byrd had used it to try to achieve a balanced budget in 1980. Senator Baker used it to implement the Reagan economic program in 1981. So it was a huge endeavor. There were a lot of procedural ramifications of that bill, and I can remember working closely with the Senate Budget Committee about that, and what could be in it and what was appropriate. It was in many ways, although I had a lot of trepidation about becoming Parliamentarian, a happy time. As I said, I think earlier, Senator Baker’s idea was that all of the precedents should be made publicly available, and so our office was in charge of that project, and I thought we did an excellent job. For a while, they were publicly available. Just a lot of things were happening that, to me, were interesting and new, and a lot of Republicans who had never been powerful suddenly were running the Senate. They were almost like kids in a candy store. I remember a statement of Senator Dole when he was told that he was going to be the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 14

“Who’s going to tell Senator Russell Long?” I mean, this was seen as an enormous, significant change, and it was. In that sense, it was kind of exciting and fun to watch.

Williams: From your perspective, how would you characterize Senator Baker versus Senator Dole in the Majority position?

Dove: Very different. Senator Baker, in a sense, shared this with Senator Dole: they both wanted to be president. The question was, what is the relationship between being a Leader and running for president. Ironically, both of them decided in the end that those were not compatible positions. Baker left in 1984 so that he could run for president. Senator Dole left his position as Majority Leader so that he could run for president. But Senator Baker, I think, tried to govern by consensus. Senator Dole was not as interested in consensus as he was in winning, and if he could forge a winning coalition on issues that really concerned him, that was good for him. I would show you the difference in their approaches to the budget deficits. We had never seen budget deficits like the deficits that were created in the Reagan administration, and there were interesting reactions to that. You had a statement, I think, by Congressman Jack Kemp, that the Republican Party no longer worships at the shrine of the balanced budget. Clearly, they didn’t. The budget deficit appeared to be $200 billion and climbing as far as the eye could see. Nothing really was done about that during Senator Baker’s tenure. Senator Dole was very concerned about that deficit, and he was determined to create a coalition that would deal with that, and it was difficult, because it was going to involve some painful decisions, things that were sacred cows, like Social Security, like veterans’ benefits. Entitlements, if they are not dealt with, will eat up the federal budget and leave nothing left, and he knew that. So he went along with what I would call stronger measures to try to deal with that budget deficit than Senator Baker ever tried to get through.

Williams: Did one or the other involve the Parliamentarian more intimately in the processes?

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Dove: I actually spent an enormous amount of time both in Senator Baker’s office, when he was Leader, and Senator Dole’s office, and ironically, also in Senator Byrd’s office, who was Minority Leader at that time. I used to shuttle back and forth between those offices. I saw my role as trying to advise both sides, and I did. One of the issues that was dealt with when Senator Dole was Majority Leader was the issue of putting the Senate on television. Senator Byrd not only wanted a resolution to put the Senate on television, he wanted a number of changes to be made to the Senate rules along with that. I can remember going back and forth between the two offices, because Senator Dole also had ideas on Senate rules changes. I would try to give advice to both sides about what would be the effect of those rules changes that were eventually included in that resolution to put the Senate on television.

Williams: I’m very curious about that. What were some of those?

Dove: The issue of conference reports. That’s a pretty arcane issue, but before that resolution to put the Senate on television, it was possible—and it was a regularly done thing—that in the last week of a session, senators would come from a conference with a conference report, often hundreds of pages, and under Senate rules, they could say, “Mr. President, I call up this conference report. It’s a privileged matter.” There’s only one copy; it’s sitting at the desk. No one has ever seen it, and the Senate would be discussing it. I heard many complaints, frankly, from senators on the floor, “This is an outrageous way to proceed. We need copies.” Well, one of the rules changes was made that before a conference report can be called up on the Senate floor, one copy must be on the desk of every senator; a hundred copies must be made. It may not seem like a big deal, but I think it was. These were just generally attempts to make the Senate work better. Another rule that was changed was the rule on limiting debate. Before 1986, if the Senate used its role—it’s called the cloture rule—to end debate, the Senate could continue for one hundred hours of consideration on a measure. That is a lot of time. I can remember in 1982 we almost missed Christmas because of the one-hundred-hour rule, and we weren’t going to use it up before Christmas was coming, and that was changed. It was changed to thirty hours, which is a much more reasonable time that you This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 16 can get through. You can put the Senate in round-the-clock sessions, and within a day and a half, you’ve used up thirty hours.

Williams: Do you see a relationship between those changes and the fact that they were going to be exposed on television?

Dove: There was a lot of nervousness about the Senate being exposed on television. The House had been on television at that point for seven years. What I heard—and it was a very unhappy statement of a number of people who said that in the view of the American people, Congress was the House. This they could see. This could be on the evening news. And suddenly the Senate didn’t exist. They thought that was terrible. On the other hand, they didn’t want the Senate really changed, and they were quite concerned that putting the Senate on television would make enormous changes in the Senate. I, frankly, thought they were right. I was convinced that something that had happened in the Senate all the time up to 1986, which was long periods in which the Senate was doing nothing but listening to a quorum call, would never happen in the future, because suddenly some senator would see that we were in a quorum call and he could have an audience of millions simply by walking to the floor and making a speech, and therefore this would happen and we would never have another quorum call. I’m not sure why, but I can tell you that the Senate that you see on television is much like the Senate I used to see before television, with only one significant change, and that’s the charts. You didn’t have charts before 1986. Now you have these dazzling charts that look good on television. They’re quite sophisticated. But that’s, to me, the only change that really has happened as a result of television.

Williams: Did you go through a wardrobe revamping or have more frequent haircuts or something yourself?

Dove: [laughs] There is a Dress Code in the Senate. It didn’t really change because of television. So basically the wardrobe that you saw before television basically was the same wardrobe after TV.

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Williams: And your degree of ardent attention to matters remained the same?

Dove: Again, your job is there to advise the chair and advise people who come up. You continue to do that, whether or not you’re on television.

Williams: Then came the sad day in ’87, was it, when you were informed—

Dove: In December of 1987, I was called into the office of Senator Robert Byrd and told that I would not longer be Parliamentarian. At that point I’m forty-eight years old, as I recall, and I have a son at Duke [University] and two daughters headed off to college. I’m too young to retire. So I go to Senator Dole and I tell him what has happened, and I tell him that he’s about to become the Minority Leader—he knows he’s going to become the Minority Leader—but that I think that I could be of help to him working as a consultant on parliamentary matters. He agrees. So on opening day of Congress in 1987, I leave the Parliamentarian’s office and I go to his Minority Leader’s office, where I spend the next eight years, when he is Minority Leader. I do think I did help, and particularly in the first two years, because the first two years were the only two years that Robert Byrd was Majority Leader again He left that post and George Mitchell became Majority Leader for the next six. But in those two years, in a sense, dealing with Senator Byrd, whose knowledge of the rules is incredible, and whose ability to use them is also incredible, I think it was helpful that I could be there to advise Senator Dole about what he could do to try to counter some of the parliamentary problems that Senator Byrd might cause for the Republicans.

Williams: So were you a staff member?

Dove: I was on the Senate staff, yes.

Williams: Were you on the senator’s staff?

Dove: He has a staff in his personal office, which is in the Hart Building, and then there’s a staff that’s in what’s called the Minority Leader’s office, and that’s where I was. This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 18

Williams: That was a full-time—

Dove: That was a full-time job. I was on the floor a great deal, not in the Parliamentarian’s chair, obviously, but there are staff chairs in the back or in the cloakroom or in the Leader’s office, again dealing oftentimes with both senators and staff. In some ways it was similar to the job that I had done before. Lots of Republican senators wanted advice, and I was happy to give it to them.

Williams: That was probably a fairly novel thing, to have a former Parliamentarian working in that kind of role.

Dove: It was, in a sense, not all that novel, because when Murray Zweben had been asked to leave, he performed much that function for Democrats. So I would see him on the Senate floor. I did something when he was on the Senate floor that made me really happy later, in a sense. When the Parliamentarian had left in 1974, he’d been given an honorific. A resolution was passed that said he was Parliamentarian emeritus of the United States Senate. Well, being Parliamentarian emeritus is not only an honorific; you’re specifically mentioned in the Senate rules as having permanent floor privileges. I thought that Murray Zweben deserved that. So two years after he had been fired as Parliamentarian, I went to both Leaders, Senator Baker and Senator Byrd, and asked if they would sponsor a resolution to name Murray Zweben a Parliamentarian emeritus of the U.S. Senate. They agreed to do so, and they did. So he was given permanent floor privileges for the rest of his life. Ironically, on opening day of 1987, Senator Dole put forth a resolution that named me a Parliamentarian emeritus of the United States Senate, giving me permanent floor privileges, and in response to that, when my successor was removed as Parliamentarian, but stayed in the office as deputy Parliamentarian, I pushed through a resolution to name him a Parliamentarian emeritus. I’m hoping that this kind of situation doesn’t repeat itself and you have to do that, but ironically, the present Parliamentarian of the Senate is not only Parliamentarian, he’s also Parliamentarian emeritus. [laughs]

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Williams: Another exclusive club on Capitol Hill. That’s interesting. Just in the qualitative sense, what was it like being under Dole’s influence and working in his office?

Dove: I don’t know when I’ve had more fun, in the sense that in the Parliamentarian’s office, you never win and you never lose. You’re not supposed to take sides. You see the fights out there, but you’re not part of them and you’re not supposed to have any joy or any sadness at how they turn out. Well, that’s not true when you’re in the Minority Leader’s office. You pick sides, and you have joy when you can win and you have sadness when you lose. But I will tell you, the Minority Leader in the Senate is a powerful position. You don’t lose them all, by any means, and you are often at least part of a lot of winning coalitions, particularly when Senator Dole began working with the new Majority Leader, after Byrd, George Mitchell. There was a period in which those two people had enormous respect for each other, they had worked together on the Finance Committee, and they could often work together to do important things for the Senate. The Senate really works best when the two Leaders are working together, and so in a sense, I became part of a kind of a coalition. I would often meet with the Parliamentarian, with Democratic staff, as well as Republican staff, as they were trying to get through what were often bipartisan proposals. I still remember in 1990, there was a group that met at Andrews Air Force Base, trying to work out how they were going to deal with several problems. One was the fact that we had all these troops over in Saudi Arabia, and it was clear, in August of 1990 and September of 1990 and October of 1990, it became clearer and clearer they weren’t just going to just sit in Saudi Arabia; at some point they were going to move into Kuwait. This was expensive. How are we going to support these troops? So the solution was created. We were going to raise taxes. Now, this was a fateful decision. I think it, frankly, led to the defeat of President George [H.W.] Bush, because he had promised that he would not raise taxes. But when he had promised that, we weren’t sitting with 500,000 troops in Saudi Arabia and having to support them in a war that was going to occur in 1991. But then it was the job of Senator Dole and Senator Mitchell, working together, to support that on the Senate floor, and it was not universally supported. I know Senator This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 20

Dole had a lot of complaining from people on his side, and so it was a bipartisan effort that successfully got that bill through, successfully raised the money to support the war that finally came about in January of 1991.

Williams: And your role in that?

Dove: There were some procedural things that, frankly, I came up with, that helped both Mitchell and Dole in dealing with that bill.

Williams: And at that time, with you as former Parliamentarian operating around and being influential and whatnot, do you think you were ever kind of a threat to the sitting Parliamentarian, or were you all such good buddies that that wouldn’t have been an issue?

Dove: It was uncomfortable. That did not make me happy. I was, frankly, very glad that the sitting Parliamentarian was, as I say, forced to step down in 1994, had a period of then seven more years when I’m back in the office for us to try to deal with that eight- year period, because he would have been very happy if I’d have just disappeared from the face of the earth, and I understood that. It was a very unpleasant situation, in that I wasn’t there to help him; I was there to help Senator Dole, and only after, as I say, we got back together and stayed in the office at adjoining desks for seven years, that we kind of worked through some of the things that had happened in the previous eight years. We’re now actually very good friends. I left the office in 2001. I’ve been in the office probably once a week since then. Of course, I don’t work for anybody in the Senate. I teach at the common alma mater of the two of us; we both went to Georgetown Law, and I teach over at Georgetown Law and I bring my students over, and he talks to them. He’s happy to talk to Georgetown law students, since he went there himself. So it’s kind of evolved very nicely, but I cannot say that there were not periods of tension during the eight years when I was seen as giving advice to the Minority Leader that he would have been just as happy if the Minority Leader hadn’t known about.

Williams: You’ve been referencing him anonymously, but that is Alan Frumin. This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 21

Dove: Alan Frumin, yes. I’m sorry. The present Parliamentarian, Alan Frumin.

Williams: Let’s take a break here for a moment.

[Begin Tape 2]

Williams: I think probably you had an unusual perspective when you were working in the Leader’s office for Dole, because you weren’t coming through the partisan campaigning track or anything like that, so you were kind of an observer. I’m wondering, could you characterize the power structure of that office as a little cosmos?

Dove: Well, first of all, it wasn’t a little cosmos. The office of Majority Leader is an office that has undergone a lot of transformation in the period that I’ve watched it. I first went into a Leader’s office in 1966, when I went into Senator [Mike] Mansfield’s office, which consisted of Senator Mansfield and a secretary, in a very small room. It was transformed largely by Senator Howard Baker, who, in 1981, told the new Minority Leader, Senator Robert Byrd, that he could stay where he was—this was seen as a generous gesture—and that Senator Baker was going to stay in his office, which at that point was smaller than Senator Byrd’s office. But what Senator Baker didn’t say was that the offices next to his, which were then the Senate Dispersing Office, and went on through a series of rooms right up to the House side of the Capitol, were going to be taken over by Senator Baker, and the Dispersing Office was going to be moved off to the new Hart Office Building. And that’s precisely what happened, and suddenly Senator Baker had a huge suite of offices and a huge staff of people. When Senator Dole became Majority Leader in 1985, he inherited that huge suite of offices. Now, in 1987, evidently there was a view on the part of Senator Byrd that that was really a huge grab of territory, and that Senator Dole should lose one of his rooms, and so he did. Senator Byrd took away one room. That still left quite a bit. And when Senator Mitchell became Majority Leader, that room was restored. So you have now a tradition, and I will tell you that Senator Byrd’s old offices no longer are the office of the Democratic Leader; they’re now the office of the Whip. What had been the office of the This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 22

Secretary of the Senate, a huge suite of offices, is now the office of the Democratic Leader. So both Leaders have very large suites of offices and very large staffs. So I was only one of a large number of people that worked for Senator Dole in his leadership office. I liked it for many reasons, but one of which, Senator Dole’s main office, where he sat, was right next to the press office, and right next to the press office was my desk. He had a habit of leaving his office, walking to the press office, talking to those people, walking out, and there were six people in the next room, talking to them, walking on through and talking to other people, and he would do this seven or eight times a day. You had enormous access. Now, this is the only senator I’ve ever worked for, so I don’t have anything to compare it with, but you really felt part of what was going on. The thing about the Senate is that, frankly, you never know what is going to go on, so it was my job—at that point, of course, the Senate was on television, and there was a television there, which had the Senate floor on it, and it was my job, one, to monitor what was going on, was there something that I could help with, that I could help deal with, but also just to follow what was in his mind about what was going to happen. So that was a kind of constant interchange. This was very different, as I say, from being in the Parliamentarian’s office, which is something of an ivory tower in which people come, and if they don’t like the advice they’re being given—and they often don’t—are not hesitant at all about letting you know. I mean, I loved the fact that basically the people I talked with were very grateful to get the advice. This was unusual. You don’t usually have somebody who’s in a position to give parliamentary advice in a senator’s office. So I felt very happy about being there.

Williams: What about your observations of the other players? Who did the senator rely on particularly, or who had great influence over him?

Dove: Oh, well there was no question that the most powerful staffer, by far, was Sheila Burke. Sheila Burke was the chief of staff. If you heard something from Sheila Burke, it was as if you had heard it from the senator. They were that much in sync. Everybody else was not in that position. So if I couldn’t get to him, if I could get to Sheila, then I could find out definitively what the situation was. This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 23

Williams: Despite the office’s size, was it pretty well working and efficient?

Dove: It was well working and efficient because he demanded it. I don’t think I’ve ever worked, with the possible exception of Robert Byrd, for anyone or with anyone who I thought worked harder. The only reason I would make possibly that exception is that Senator Dole actually had a life. He was married to a very powerful woman [Elizabeth Dole] and he had other things that he did. In my view, Senator Byrd was married to the Senate, and it was his life, it is his life, and therefore he worked, in terms of his Senate job, all the time—weekends. I have been called at home by Senator Byrd on Christmas Day. Senator Dole never called me at home on Christmas Day. [laughs]

Williams: Do you recall what the call was about on Christmas Day?

Dove: I wish I could tell you. All I remember is trying to block it out, thinking, “I really don’t want to be talking to Senator Byrd today.” [laughs] But it didn’t’ seem to bother him.

Williams: I interviewed Senator [William] Armstrong of Colorado a long time ago now, and one of the things he talked about was how senators gain a highly exaggerated sense of their own importance.

Dove: He didn’t. He was so fun.

Williams: That’s one of the reasons he left, yes.

Dove: Ironically, he’s the reason that that change in the conference report being available. It was his speeches on the floor that I remembered, and I’m not sure he was even still in the Senate when that was put through, but I remembered them well, and I thought how perfectly appropriate, here he was being asked to vote on a conference report and he couldn’t even get a copy of it. It should be called the Armstrong Provision of the Senate Rules. [laughs] This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 24

Williams: But how do you account for one member of the human race thinking that he can call another member of the human race on a national holiday like that with impunity? Where do they get this idea?

Dove: I must say, I wasn’t offended and I didn’t feel it untoward. The Senate is a family. It’s a small enough group. I felt like I was being called by a family member. It’s maybe strange. In a way I was flattered. I mean, Senator Byrd, to me, was kind of a demigod. He cared about procedure in a way that no other member of the Senate did. My whole life was procedure. I was pleased to be able to help him. So, no, I wasn’t offended at all.

Williams: Tell me about the steps, then, where you were brought back into the Parliamentarian’s role.

Dove: When the Democrats lost the Senate in 1994, I was still in Senator Dole’s office and, frankly, Sheila Burke called me in and asked me what job I would like now that the Republicans were back in control, and I told her, quite frankly, the only job I ever wanted in the Senate was the job of Parliamentarian, and if that could be arranged, that would make me very, very happy. It was her job to deal with the Parliamentarian at the time, Alan Frumin, and convince him that, one, I should come back, and, two, that he should stay. That, I think, was a very delicate thing that she did, but the bottom line is, she did it. There was an interesting thing in that she was about to become the Secretary of the Senate, so she was about to become our boss. But on January of 1995, I came back. I remember sitting in the Parliamentarian’s chair, and I remember the first senator who came up to congratulate me, and that was Robert Byrd, which I thought was lovely. So I didn’t know how it was going to work out, but I can tell you, after seven years, it did work out. Alan and I are friends, and it was a friendship based on mutual respect and what we saw of each other in that seven- year period.

This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 25

Williams: Did Dole in any particular way acknowledge this change that was occurring for you personally?

Dove: Not that I recall. This was, of course, totally in his control. But it was all handled by Sheila Burke, who, as I say, spoke for Dole. If you heard it from her, you’d heard it from him.

Williams: So after your departure, where was Senator Dole getting his advice on parliamentary matters?

Dove: Basically the Parliamentarian gives advice to the Leaders.

Williams: So no one replaced you in his office is what I’m driving at.

Dove: No.

Williams: How was working with him and observing him as Majority Leader in those last two years of his Senate career?

Dove: First of all, he didn’t stay two years. He left, and to me they were not a happy period. There is nothing, I think, that is more difficult than to try to be a Majority Leader of the Senate and run for President of the United States. To me, Dole had been a very successful Majority Leader in the period ’85 to ’86, and the reason he had been successful is that he worked very well with various Democrats. If it was Americans with Disabilities [Act], he worked with Tom Harkin. Democrats liked to work with him, but Democrats were not going to work with the person that they knew was going to be running against their candidate for president. They had no reason to, in effect, make his job easier, and they had every reason to make it more difficult, and they did. It made it incredibly frustrating for him. I think that’s the reason he left. It became clear, he could either run for president or he could be Majority Leader; he could not possibly do both. He wanted to run for president, and that’s why he left. But his second term as Majority Leader was not a happy term. This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 26

Williams: Not happy for him or—

Dove: Not happy for him, not happy for the Senate. I would call it a time of some great strife. Basically, of course, this was the third year of President Clinton’s presidency, and President Clinton had been—there was an attempt, and I think it was much more on the part of Speaker [Newt] Gingrich than Dole, to marginalize the president. You cannot marginalize the President of the United States, and their attempt, I think on the part of Gingrich, made him look foolish. Then Dole, I think, was caught in the middle. He knew that, but he couldn’t criticize Gingrich, who was immensely powerful and popular, and he certainly didn’t want to try to defend Clinton, so he really was trapped. So I think he was unhappy on all kinds of levels.

Williams: Our scope here is really Dole’s time in the Senate, and I’d love to go on with the remainder up to ’01 for you, and maybe we should talk about that a little bit about that at the end, but right now we should concentrate—

Dove: I think we should concentrate on Dole.

Williams: Is there anything else we need to say about Dole?

Dove: We’ve said almost nothing about Senator Dole’s period from 1968, when he came to the Senate, to the period, for example, when he ran for vice president with President [Gerald R.] Ford, and his period as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. To me, there’s a lot of significant stuff that was going on in that period. You have his working with Senator George McGovern, who, I think, was both a close personal friend--they both served in World War II--and they worked together on the Food Stamp Program, which I think was a credit to Senator Dole to work on that. There was a relationship, and it was so clear, because various senators would come up and form a little group, and by working in the Senate at the desk you would hear the conversations. Senator Dole had been in a hospital in Michigan [Percy Jones Army This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 27

Medical Center]. Senator Phil Hart was there. Senator Danny [Daniel K.] Inouye was there. That was an incredible bond. So the relationships were not partisan; they were based on a lot of other things, and they allowed Dole, in a sense, to play a role, even though he was in the minority, that had great influence. And of course, then when the Republicans became the majority party, he was chairman of probably the most important committee, because it was the Finance Committee that handled the Reagan signature issue of tax cuts. He not only managed to get successfully through the Reagan tax cuts, but he also successfully got through a tax bill that was at least aimed at trying to deal with the deficit, so that he had enormous influence as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and I think that’s probably the reason he finally became elected Leader. What Republicans saw from 1980 to ’84—actually, there were five senators that ran for Leader in 1984: Senator Jim McClure, who, I think, was seen as the leader of the conservative wing; Senator Richard Lugar, who was seen as a very impressive internationalist; Senator Pete [V.] Domenici, who had basically run the Budget Committee; Senator Ted Stevens, who had been Howard Baker’s Whip; and Senator Dole. I don’t think that was an easy choice for the Republican Party, but I think what they saw about Dole in his running of the Finance Committee impressed enough of them that they thought, “This is what we want.” And I think they saw the problem that was going to have to be dealt with as a problem of the budget. You can attack the budget only from two sides: taxes and spending. And they thought that Dole could balance those, and he tried very hard to do that. He only had two years as Majority Leader. The deficit went down significantly in those two years, and then when the Democrats took over after the ’86 election, it again became kind of a tax-and-spend kind of place, and the deficit went back up. But that, to me, was an extraordinary significant period in which he played a huge role.

Williams: What about the tax bill of ’81 versus the tax bill of ’82, and his role there?

Dove: He was in charge on both of those. The tax bill of ’81 was basically the Reagan program. It was, I think, 10-10-5. Anyway, a three-year tax cut, I think started off with 5 percent, then the next two years a 10 percent. But I think in 1982 it became clear, if you This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 28 just didn’t do anything about this, the deficits were going to explode beyond measure, so he came up with—I don’t know if it’s accurate—I think it was called at the time the largest tax increase in American history; 98 billion dollars is what I remember being the figure in 1982. It raised taxes on tobacco. It hit some sacred cows, and it almost failed. It was only saved—and I think it was a tribute to Senator Dole’s leadership that it was saved—by the two senators from North Carolina, for whom voting for a tobacco tax was not a plus, and at the last moment, when it looked like it might go down, Senators Jesse Helms and John East voted in favor.

Williams: Did you instantly see that Dole would become an important figure when he arrived in the Senate? What was your perception?

Dove: In 1968?

Williams: Yes.

Dove: It was hard, frankly, in 1968 to look at any Republican as being a power in the Senate. The Republican Party, first of all, was small. When I came to the Senate in 1966, there were only thirty-two Republicans. They gradually grew to the high thirties, but the Senate was, first of all, not as partisan a place, and the Senate was largely run by people who had been there a long time. Richard Russell was still there when I came to the Senate, and he was still quite powerful. So the view was, first of all, you didn’t talk when you came to the Senate. That has changed. You waited, and your first speech often was made after you’d been there two or three years; it was called your maiden speech, and it was a big event. That doesn’t even exist anymore. So you didn’t tend to look at freshmen senators and think, “Well, this is somebody who’s a comer.” You waited for them to gain some stature. When I really started focusing on Senator Dole was when he became chairman of the Finance Committee in 1981, and then he clearly had a huge role and had the respect of his colleagues. That’s when I really started paying attention.

This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 29

Williams: Anything more to say about impartiality in terms of the Parliamentarian? Or maybe another way to put it is, what does one look for in terms of temperament for a Parliamentarian?

Dove: It is my view that the present Parliamentarian, as the Parliamentarian before, have been impartial, that what they are trying to do is interpret the Senate rules and procedures and precedents as they understand them. The problem comes when there is nothing solid to base that decision on, and there have been some new procedures—and the budget was certainly one of them—that there is no history. I’ve talked about precedents going back to 1884. They’re of no help in interpreting the Congressional Budget Act, and often these procedures are created on a year-by-year basis, as new budget resolutions are adopted that contain new procedures in them. So you’re kind of flying blind. But I don’t know of any decision that has been made by any Parliamentarian that was not, quote, impartial.

Williams: I noticed that you served as the Parliamentarian for the Republican Platform Committee.

Dove: I did. Once I started working for Senator Dole, and therefore became identified as a Republican staffer, the first convention that was held after that, which was in 1988 in New Orleans, was chaired by a senator, Senator Bob Kasten of Wisconsin. He needed a Parliamentarian, and he asked if I would go. I think maybe my performance there led to later requests, because the bottom line is, I have served at conventions since then. I was in New York for the 2004 convention, when Senator [Bill] Frist was the chairman of the Platform Committee.

Williams: So you didn’t serve in that capacity while you were Parliamentarian.

Dove: No, no. I, frankly, did not think that would ever be appropriate while I was Parliamentarian. I only served during the time that either I was working for Senator Dole or after I left the Parliamentarian’s office.

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Williams: Which senators come to your mind as what I’m going to call the Parliamentarian ideal?

Dove: Robert Byrd. And I don’t think he has any peer. There are, I think, a number of reasons for that. First of all, again, there used to be a system in the Senate—I don’t really think it exists anymore—where senators had mentors. Well, he had the best; he had Richard Russell of Georgia, who took him under his wing, and he made a point of reading the book of precedent in Senate Procedure, asking questions about them. He would come up to the desk and really put me through my paces with things that he wanted to know about what that book said. There was possibly a senator who, for a short period of time, was his rival, and that was Senator Allen of Alabama, James Allen. The reason, Senator Allen had been the lieutenant governor of Alabama, and Alabama Senate, which is presided over by the lieutenant governor, uses U.S. Senate rules. So he had learned them before he came to the Senate. He knew them, and in spite of the fact that he was a Democrat and Robert Byrd was the Democratic Leader, he would challenge Byrd and challenge him from a knowledge base. I will say those fights were dazzling to watch. They were really two masters. But Allen died in the 1970s. Possibly Senator Jesse Helms might be considered in that category. But no one else really comes to mind as someone who almost devoted themselves to being a parliamentary master.

Williams: What about the opposite side? Were there some who, quote, unquote, trashed the precedents?

Dove: There were senators who hated, basically, the way that the Senate ran. When I came to the Senate, there was a senator from Pennsylvania, named Joseph Clark, who was clearly an enemy of the Parliamentarian’s office, of the way the Senate ran. He hated the filibuster. He wanted to change the place in every way. Ironically, he ran for a post in 1968 of secretary to the Democratic Conference and ran against Robert C. Byrd, and he lost. [laughs] So Byrd became secretary of the conference, and two years later This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 31 became Whip, and then in 1977 became Majority Leader, and Joseph Clark left the Senate. Nobody in the Parliamentarian’s office was really crushed when he left. [laughs]

Williams: How did senators learn the rules and regs? Was there an orientation?

Dove: It was much more a mentoring system. There were senators who basically took other senators under their wing. I don’t think that system exists anymore, and, frankly, I don’t think there are many senators who know Senate rules and procedures anymore, which makes the job of the Parliamentarian that much harder.

Williams: So as a result, Parliamentarians are called upon more frequently now?

Dove: Yes, but not with happy results. There is a lot of either public or semi-public sniping about the Parliamentarian’s office, something which I never heard in the 1960s, but it’s partly because the decisions they make have such a much wider effect now. They may be called procedural, but their effect is often substantive. Senators really don’t like to have their positions, in effect, undercut by a decision of a Parliamentarian, an unelected, fairly anonymous official.

Williams: So how would you express the changes that have occurred over the years of your association with the U.S. Senate? What are the biggest changes?

Dove: First of all, the Senate has become a very partisan body. You no longer have the Southern Democrats as a bloc. You don’t have many senators in the Republican Party I would call moderate, not to mention liberal. So the parties have become much more homogenous, and therefore it becomes much more difficult to form coalitions across the aisle, and that makes it difficult for whoever is trying to lead the Senate, because the Senate rules are not designed, as they are in the House, for a majority to rule. The Senate rules right now are designed to allow sixty votes to make important decisions. Well, neither party has sixty votes. Neither party has had sixty votes since 1976. So we’ve never seen a Senate where basically one party could almost ignore the other party. That situation, I think, is particularly difficult right now for a Majority Leader of the Senate. This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 32

Senator [Harry] Reid has fifty-one votes on a good day, and only forty-nine of those are Democrats. Then you have to add Senator [Bernie] Sanders of Vermont and Senator [Joseph] Lieberman of Connecticut, neither of which call themselves Democrats, but they do tend to vote with Reid on important issues. But that’s very hard to try to lead the Senate in that situation. It’s, frankly, I’m sure, more fun to be Senator [Mitch] McConnell. You don’t have the onus of being the Leader of the Senate. Nobody’s blaming you for what the Senate is doing, but you have the power to determine what the Senate does.

Williams: Talk a little bit about the change from the sixty-seven to the sixty for cloture. What prompted that? Wasn’t that Byrd?

Dove: No. There’s some irony. That was not Byrd at all. That was a trifecta of three people. One was the Vice President of the United States, Nelson Rockefeller. Two was a senator from Minnesota, Walter Mondale, and the third was a senator from Kansas, [James] Pearson. I mentioned that Republicans were of a different ideological stripe when I was first coming into the Senate. Pearson was of a little different ideological stripe than other Republicans, and he could work very well with Senator Mondale. Senators Mondale and Pearson decided, in 1975, when Nelson Rockefeller was the vice president, that the Senate’s cloture rule, which at that point was two-thirds, needed to be changed, and it needed to be changed in a way that I still look back and shudder a little bit. Their plan, which was successful, was that in 1975 a resolution to change that rule would be sent to the desk, and the resolution would state in the wording of the resolution that this was a constitutional issue, that the Senate had the right to change its rules, and since it was a constitutional issue and the Senate had a right to change its rules, then it was incumbent upon the vice president to put the question to the Senate, without debate, on adoption of that resolution. Okay? Then, in their view, if a senator made a point of order that such a resolution was not in order in the Senate, since this was a constitutional question, the vice president would submit to the Senate the question, “Is the resolution in order?” And that is a debatable question. But any question before the Senate is subject to a motion to table, which is a killing motion, which is not debatable. And that if indeed that point of order This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 33 was tabled, that the vice president should follow the wording of the resolution and put the question to the Senate without debate. I shudder, because I still think the idea that the presiding officer should enforce a resolution which has not been yet voted on and follow the wording of it is logically absurd, but it was not absurd to the vice president, and he stated that that was exactly what he was going to do. And that is exactly what he did. But there ensued a period of what I will call chaos, because indeed you could have a period without debate, but you couldn’t have a period without votes, and senators came up with the most outrageous excuses for votes, motions to adjourn, motions to reconsider, motions to appeal to ruling of the chair. It went on for several days, and my view is it would still be going on, because these senators who were against this were furious, except that the vice president decided to shut this down, and so he stopped recognizing senators. That is just unheard of, but he did it. He forced the vote. Two weeks later, Vice President Rockefeller returned to the Senate to apologize to the Senate for having not recognized a senator seeking recognition, and I thought at the time, “That’s very nice. What does that apology do? It’s already been done. The rule has been changed.” The way the rule was changed led a lot of people to think, “This was an illegitimate exercise of power. Let’s look at this rule that we’ve just changed. Let’s see if there are some holes in this rule.” And there were. And from the time the rule was changed in 1975, for four years it was almost a worthless rule. Yes, you could end debate with sixty votes, but what happened when you had that vote? Well, each senator was limited to one hour of debate, but there was no limit on the time on amendments or quorum calls. You could run out the clock on a post-cloture filibuster, and that was shown, frankly, when President [Jimmy] Carter was trying to get through his energy program. The Senate invoked cloture, I believe in September of 1977. It was opposed largely by only two senators: Senator [Howard] Metzenbaum of Ohio, Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota. For eight days, they used amendments and quorum calls to delay the Senate. At the end of the eight days, I think each of them had used about two minutes each of their one hour of debate time, and it was clear this was going to go on forever. At which point Senator Byrd, who was Majority Leader, stepped in and set a series of precedents about what could happen in the post-cloture period, with the aid of the vice This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 34 president, Walter Mondale, and shut that filibuster down. But because of that, the rule was changed in 1979 to put an overall cap of everything that happened after cloture at one hundred hours, which was then later reduced in 1986 to thirty. So now you do have a workable cloture rule. But the way that rule was changed was cited, frankly, a few years back. It was referred to then as “the nuclear option” when senators wanted to shut down debate on judicial nominations. My view at the time was, well, it was done once; it could be done again. All you need is a compliant vice president and an ability to basically say that some things should be not debatable, and there you are.

Williams: This is just a real minor question to clear up my own ignorance. It has to be three-fifths of the Senate, not three-fifths of those present.

Dove: That’s right. The cloture rule, as it read in 1974, was two-thirds of those present and voting, a quorum being present, so that could be a varying number from sixty-seven, if there were a hundred, down to as low as thirty-four if there were only fifty-one voting. But right now it is a solid sixty, irrespective of how many vote.

Williams: Your mentioning Rockefeller just brought something to my mind, and that is, when the vice president sits as—if he attends the Senate in his role--he is always the presiding officer.

Dove: Oh yes. He can bump anyone. If he wants to preside, he can.

Williams: So what about holding hands of vice presidents over your time in the Senate?

Dove: Again, that has changed so much. The vice president, when I came to the Senate, was Hubert Humphrey. Hubert Humphrey was not a part of the inner circle of Lyndon [B.] Johnson’s administration, and as a result, he spent a lot of time in the Senate. He did like the Senate. He had been a senator starting in 1948. He had been the Majority Whip. And senators liked him. He played a role in the Senate. He would make rulings that the Parliamentarian didn’t advise him to make, and it was so much the worse for the This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 35

Parliamentarian. I remember at the time being kind of embarrassed. I worked for this office and we had no influence over the vice president. If he wanted to rule one way and we thought that was inappropriate, so much the worse for the Parliamentarian. I thought many years later, I wish we had that again, because when they didn’t like Vice President Humphrey’s rulings, they yelled at him; they didn’t yell at the Parliamentarian. That time has gone. It was Jimmy Carter who gave the first West Wing office to a vice president, Walter Mondale. That has continued to this day, and basically vice presidents have left the Senate. You just don’t see them. So it has not been my experience to have much of a relationship with a vice president over the years, because they’ve simply been gone.

Williams: What about Spiro Agnew?

Dove: He wanted to play a role. He tried to play the role of administration lobbyist, and there were some close votes in the Senate, in which I remember him going down on the floor and trying to lobby senators on the vote; they hated it. Senators’ view of the vice president, he’s supposed to be their lobbyist to the president, not the president’s lobbyist to them. Agnew’s reception, I think, was so unpleasant that he stopped doing it.

Williams: Did Dole run into any trouble when he was, quote, unquote, Nixon’s hatchet man, for that reason?

Dove: First of all, he wasn’t the Leader; Hugh Scott was the Leader. So people didn’t look to Dole in a way that they would have had he been Leader. They looked to Hugh Scott. What was Scott going to do? And it’s my understanding, at least, it was Scott and Goldwater who delivered the message to Nixon. It was just a different situation.

Williams: I still want to ask you questions about Byrd that I asked you off camera. With his familiarity, his total command of the rules and such, was he able to use them in a strategic way and bend them and maybe sometimes be almost an obstructionist?

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Dove: Not so much an obstructionist, but if he didn’t like the rules, he was not averse to setting precedents that changed the rules. You say that you interviewed Senator Armstrong. We have a precedent in the Senate that in the Parliamentarian’s office it’s called the Armstrong precedent. It’s called that because Senator Byrd did not like what was happening on appropriation bills. In the 1970s, when he was Majority Leader, senators were taking advantage of a little loophole in a rule on appropriations, which says that if you send an amendment to the desk, which is legislation, and the rules of the Senate say that such an amendment is not in order, that you can raise a defense to that point of order, and that is the defense that the House has opened the door, that the House has legislation, and therefore the Senate has a right to perfect that. And you do that by raising an issue called germaneness, whether your amendment is germane to the House language. That is never ruled on by the chair; that’s a vote of the Senate. What was happening was that if the Senate liked an amendment, it voted it germane, and often there was no House legislative language at all, but it didn’t bother the Senate, so senators were getting votes on amendments, and Byrd didn’t like it. It was an Armstrong amendment that was the issue, and Senator Armstrong raised the question of germaneness and was expecting again an immediate vote, and if the Senate voted it germane, then it would be in order, when Senator Byrd intervened and said that the chair should play a role and that chair should decide whether there was any House legislative language to which this amendment could be germane. That wasn’t in the rule. There was no precedent to that effect. But there was an appeal of Byrd’s point of order. Byrd had the majority, he won the appeal, and suddenly we have a new interpretation, and Rule 16, ever since then, with the setting of the Armstrong precedent, provides a threshold. And when you send an amendment to the desk on an appropriation bill that is legislation, it’s up to the Parliamentarian to decide whether there’s any House legislative language. Again, you’re made the Parliamentarian more powerful and you’ve put him in a situation where he doesn’t have a lot of precedence, because this was only set in the 1970s, and he’s going to make senators unhappy. It’s just one of those kind of things that has happened. He liked to operate that way, and it means that the Senate, in terms of the way that it operates, is almost a Byrd Senate, in that there are a number of precedents that were set by Senator Byrd when he was Majority Leader from ’77 to ’81, that were new and changed the way the Senate operated. This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 37

Williams: What will a post-Byrd Senate look like?

Dove: To me, the Senate right now, because I don’t see either Leader, Senator Reid or Senator McConnell, caring to play the role that Senator Byrd played, is nothing like that Senate, in that you don’t see parliamentary fights on the floor of the Senate. You don’t see dazzling displays of knowledge of Senate rules. Basically you see a test of wills, and in the words of, I believe, a member of the House, the Senate operating by exactly two rules: unanimous consent and exhaustion. And that’s basically, I think, how the Senate is working now. Now, my reaction is, at some point in the future maybe there will be a senator who decides to play the role of a Senator Byrd, and becomes a master of the rules and then shows the Senate how they can be used, but I don’t think that’s going to be soon.

Williams: Along those lines, do you think Dole will have a lasting place in history?

Dove: I do, for this reason. To me, Dole is a role model of the old school, of the kind of senator who could reach across party lines and achieve an enormous amount of legislative output. To me, he was a master legislator. That hasn’t changed. I know there are senators who remember Dole and remember how that worked, and in a sense, try to model themselves on that, because it really is the way the Senate works, and I think probably the closest senator in that mold right now is Senator John McCain, who has reached out to Senator [Russ] Feingold on campaign finance, has reached out to Senator [Edward M.] Kennedy on immigration, and that basically is how the Senate works. So in a sense, I think it’s a tribute to the kind of legislator that Dole was, that that continues.

Williams: To what degree do you feel the Senate is a reflection of the country as a whole?

Dove: It really isn’t. I get in my classes complaints from students about the fact that this or that in the Senate isn’t very democratic. Well, the Senate isn’t very democratic. It wasn’t designed to be democratic. The House was designed to be democratic. The This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 38

House was designed to reflect the popular will of the moment, and that was seen as important. The Senate was designed to look at that popular will of the moment and then ask themselves, “Is that going to be what the people want two years from now, four years from now, six years from now?” And of course, they have six-year terms. So they are given the luxury of the long view. What I think senators are—and I would give you this example which I still remember so well, a senator from New Hampshire by the name of Thomas McIntyre waited during the debate on the Panama Canal Treaties in the 1970s until almost the last day or so before the treaties were going to be voted on—and at that point I think we’d been debating them for eight weeks—to make his speech. It was an important speech because it was going to be a close vote, and nobody really knew how he was going to vote. He got up and he made his speech, and he said he was going to support ratification of those treaties, and then he came up to the desk. Senator McIntyre was up for reelection the next year. He told us at the desk that he had just signed his own political death warrant, that these treaties were extremely unpopular in New Hampshire and that he would be defeated based on this vote alone, but it didn’t seem to bother him, because he really felt that in the long run, the country was going to be better off if those treaties were ratified, and that’s why he was there. He wasn’t there to get reelected the next year; he was there to feel that he had done, while he was there, what he thought would be in the long-range best interest of the country. To me that’s a luxury that senators are given. Not all of them have to pay the price that he did, but as I say, it didn’t seem to bother him. And he was right; he was defeated for reelection, and I think that was probably the reason. But it always has made me feel neat about working in a body where people like that come and do what they think is in the long-range best interest of the American people and are content to do that, irrespective of what happens in their own political careers.

Williams: I’ve heard the comment made a lot, though, that the partisanship of the Senate now is partially due to the fact that so many of the senators came through the House, so your remarks make me think maybe they’re bringing this more short-term perspective into the Senate. Would that be true?

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Dove: Let me give you another story. I won’t give the name now, because it’s a senator who’s still in the Senate. But he’s a very conservative Republican senator, and one of the things that happens when people are presiding and there’s long periods of quorum calls, and there’s nothing else to do but talk to whoever’s at the desk, and the Parliamentarian’s handy. So he was chatting with me. He had come from the House, and he was saying that while in the House, he had never spoken to any Democratic member; he didn’t need to. They were irrelevant to his life; they couldn’t do anything for him. Basically he spoke to other Republicans. He was telling me the story with such glee. As I say, this is a very conservative Republican. He had teamed up with one of the most liberal Democrats on an issue, and why had he done that? Because that’s how the Senate works. If he was going to be successful on this issue, he needed the cover of a liberal Democrat to co-sponsor it with him, and he had found that. He was like a little kid who had discovered there’s another world out there and it’s kind of fun. It’s not that they were going to become ideological allies in the future on probably much else, but on this issue, yes, and that’s how the Senate works. So I think, one, the fact that members do leave the House and run for the Senate and do not go the other way, is an indication that there are members in the House who maybe don’t like the partisanship of the House of Representatives, which is an incredibly partisan place, and prefer the more consensus-oriented Senate, because they do move in that direction. So I don’t really see a transference that way.

Williams: We’re almost to the end of this tape. There’s one word we haven’t used here today, and I thought maybe you’d like to end briefly by discussing holds.

Dove: Holds have this terrible reputation as if they are just really evil things. Holds are letters, letters sent by a senator to the leader of his party stating either in very mild terms, “Please notify me before this bill,” or this resolution, “is called up,” or in very strong terms, “I will fight this bill with every breath in my body.” It’s really advantageous for the Leaders to know about that. Getting legislation through the Senate is difficult. It was designed to be difficult. If the Leaders are surprised when they try to call up a bill and find out that one of their caucus is really angry about that, that doesn’t make anybody happy. Yes, you could eliminate holds in the U.S. Senate. You could do it by turning the This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 40

Senate into a small House of Representatives, in which a majority can work its will whenever it wishes. I really don’t think there are many senators who want to turn the Senate into a miniature House of Representatives. One of the reasons they like being in the Senate is that senators, every one of them, is powerful. I’ve heard the Senate floor described as a place where there’s two inches of gasoline over the entire floor, and every senator has a book of matches, and they all know that they can individually blow up the place. The reason they normally don’t is because of this self-restraint, and holds are simply a reflection of the fact that, yes, you do have to be restrained in the Senate in getting things done. So I’m not an enemy of holds.

Williams: What about earmarks?

Dove: I know that they are also now in disrepute. My problem with their being in disrepute is that I assume that earmarks are the reason people come to Congress. They want to be able to go back, if they’re a member, to their district; or if they’re a senator, to their state, and say, “Look what I did for this in my state, and it wouldn’t have happened if I hadn’t have been there on the job.” I can remember the person I sat next to in Dole’s office handled appropriations for Dole, and a question that was given every day, “What have we done for Kansas today?” I’m not against earmarks. The power of the purse is the most powerful thing that Congress has. If you eliminate earmarks, then suddenly it’s the Executive Branch that decides where every dime is spent. I don’t think that’s a power that Congress should give away.

Williams: Great.

[End of interview] This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 41

Index

Abourezk, James, 33 Agnew, Spiro, 35 Allen, James, 30 Armstrong, William, 23, 36

Baker, Howard, 2, 4, 5, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 21 Bliss, Ray, 3 Burke, Sheila, 24, 25 and Robert J. Dole, 22 Bush, George H.W., 19 Byrd, Robert C., 6, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 30, 33, 36 and Richard Russell, 30

Carter, Jimmy, 4, 33, 35 Citadel, The, 3 Clark, Joseph, 30 Clinton, William J., 7, 26 Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 10

Democratic Party, 10 Dole, Elizabeth, 23 Dole, Robert J., 12, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, 26, 37 and Bob Dove, 2, 18 and Elizabeth Dole, 23 and George McGovern, 26 and George Mitchell, 19 and Newt Gingrich, 26 and Sheila Burke, 22, 25 and staff, 23 as chairman of Senate Finance Committee, 27, 28 as Senate Majority Leader, 25, 26, 27 Domenici, Pete V., 27 Dove, Bob and university teaching, 3 as member of Robert J. Dole's staff, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 as Parliamentarian for the Republican Platform Committee, 29 describes rules and precedents, 6, 7 describes Senate leaders' offices and transition procedures, 21 educational background, 2, 3 employment background, 2 in Senate Parliamentarian’s Office, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 22, 24, 29, 31 joins Senate Parliamentarian’s Office, 2 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 42

on Alan S. Frumin, 20, 24 on being reappointed Parliamentarian, 24 on change in cloture rule, 32, 33, 34 on conference reports reaching the Senate floor, 15 on Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 10 on Democratic Party, 10 on earmarks, 40 on Elizabeth Dole, 23 on Floyd Riddick, 12 on George H.W. Bush, 19 on Harry Reid, 32, 37 on holds, 39 on House of Representatives, 31 on Howard Baker, 14 on Hubert H. Humphrey, 34 on Jacob Javits, 10 on James Allen, 30 on Jesse Helms, 30 on Jim McClure, 27 on Jimmy Carter, 4, 33 on John McCain, 37 on Joseph Clark, 30 on Mitch McConnell, 32, 37 on Murray Zweben, 11, 18 on Nelson Rockefeller, 33 on Newt Gingrich, 26 on partisanship in the U.S. Senate, 31 on Pete V. Domenici, 27 on preparations for impeachment trial of Richard M. Nixon, 8 on preparations for William J. Clinton impeachment trial, 8 on Republican Party, 10, 13 on Republican Party in the 1960s, 28 on Richard Lugar, 27 on Richard Russell, 28, 30 on Robert C. Byrd, 17, 23, 24, 30, 36 on Robert J. Dole, 3, 14, 19, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 37 on Ronald Reagan's tax bills of 1981 and 1982, 27 on Senate, 31 on Senate Parliamentarian’s Office, 36 on Sheila Burke, 22, 24 on Spiro Agnew, 35 on teaching at Georgetown University Law School, 20 on Ted Stevens, 27 on the cloture rule and limiting debate, 15 on U.S. House of Representatives, 37, 39 on U.S. Senate, 12, 13, 15, 16, 24, 28, 31, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40 on William Armstrong, 23, 36 Parliamentarian emeritus of the U.S. Senate, 18 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 43

political background, 3

East, John, 28

Feingold, Russ, 37 Frist, Bill, 29 Frumin, Alan S., 11, 12, 18, 20, 24 and Bob Dove, 24

Gingrich, Newt, 26 Goldwater, Barry, 35 and Richard M. Nixon, 8

Harkin, Tom, 25 Hart, Phil, 27 Helms, Jesse, 28, 30 Hildenbrand, Bill, 12 Humphrey, Hubert H., 34

Inouye, Daniel K., 27 Iowa State University, 2, 3

Javits, Jacob, 10 Johnson, Lyndon B., 34

Kasten, Bob, 29 Kemp, Jack, 14 Kennedy, Edward M., 37

Lieberman, Joseph, 32 Long, Russell, 13 Lott, Trent, 12 Lugar, Richard, 27

Mansfield, Mike, 21 McCain, John, 37 McClure, Jim, 27 McConnell, Mitch, 32, 37 McGovern, George and Robert J. Dole, 26 McIntyre, Thomas and his vote on the Panama Canal Treaties, 38 Metzenbaum, Howard, 33 Mitchell, George, 17, 21 and Robert J. Dole, 19 Mondale, Walter, 32, 34, 35

Nixon, Richard M., 8, 35 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas. http://dolearchives.ku.edu Dove 3-27-08—p. 44

Ohio State University, 4

Panama Canal Treaties (1970s), 38 Pearson, James, 32 Percy Jones Army Medical Center, 26

Reagan, Ronald, 11, 27 Reid, Harry, 32, 37 Republican Party, 10, 13, 28 Riddick, Floyd, 2, 4, 8, 13 Rockefeller, Nelson, 32, 33 Russell, Richard, 28 and Robert C. Byrd, 30

Sanders, Bernie, 32 Scott, Hugh, 35 and Richard M. Nixon, 8 Senate Parliamentarian’s Office, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, 22, 29, 31, 36 Senate Procedure (publication), 5, 30 Stevens, Ted, 27

Taft, Robert, 3 television coverage and influence on the Senate, 16

U.S. House of Representatives, 31, 37, 39 and television, 16 U.S. Senate, 12, 13, 15, 24, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and television, 15, 16

Zweben, Murray, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18