Department of Political and Social Sciences A Philosophy of Restraint Justice and Pluralism in the New Theory of Political Liberalism João Rosas Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute Florence, 2001 EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE Department of Political and Social Sciences A Philosophy of Restraint Justice and Pluralism in the New Theory of Political Liberalism João Rosas Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute Examining Board: Professor Catherine Audard, LSE Professor Steven Lukes, New York University / LSE (supervisor) Professor Wojciech Sadurski, EUI Professor Jeremy Waldron, Columbia Law School (co-supervisor) © 2001, João Rosas No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior permission of the author Rosas, João (2001), A Philosophy of Restraint Justice and Pluralism in the New Theory of Political Liberalism European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/13704 Abstract In this dissertation I analyse and criticise the recent theory of political liberalism of John Rawls and Charles Larmore. Furthermore, I sketch an alternative solution to the challenge which this theory confronts. The main challenge in the political liberalism of Rawls and Larmore is the difficult reconciliation between, on the one hand, the value of justice seen as the ultimate and substantive standard for the assessment of institutions and policies and, on the other hand, the pervasive pluralism of ideas of the good life and their supporting world views, in contemporary liberal societies. Political liberalism reconciles these by considering that principles of justice can be consensual in a pluralist society because they are political, not comprehensive (according to Rawls) or neutral in their justifications (according to Larmore). In this way, contentious moralities and philosophies, whether religious or not, are precluded from political justification. I show the unfeasibility of this justificatory restraint both at the level of the idea of justice and in the account of pluralism provided by the advocates of political liberalism. Their implicit theories of pluralism require philosophical fallibilism in order to make sense. Moreover, the hidden perfectionism in the justification of the principles of justice advanced by political liberals goes hand in hand with their pluralist views. These 'contaminations', so to speak, of supposedly political principles by controversial epistemological and moral doctrines show the internal defects of political liberalism. Furthermore, political liberalism cannot keep its promise of consensus because the idea of justice is itself plural. This is due, among other factors, to the influence of personal experiences and the weight of different considerations (i.e., the "burdens of reason") not only in the formation of people's ideas of the good and world views but II Rosas, João (2001), A Philosophy of Restraint Justice and Pluralism in the New Theory of Political Liberalism European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/13704 also in the process of conceptualizing justice. Once one recognizes the relevance of the pluralism of the former, one must also admit the equal relevance of the pluralism of the latter. Political liberals were certainly right in facing the challenge of pluralism. However, political liberalism is unsuccessful in the avoidance of contaminations and it is also useless when it no longer provides the hope of a consensus that would strengthen the cause of justice amidst pluralism. If one perseveres to find a solution to the initial challenge, one must abandon the reconciliation proposed by political liberalism and re-interpret what it means to use restraint in a pluralist society. Instead of restraint as philosophical avoidance, my alternative proposal is a view of restraint as responsibility. Some specific institutions in liberal societies allow for the rule of conflict through suffrage. Responsibility amounts to moral support for this set of institutions, although they are not just. However, convictions of justice must remain in place. I conclude that liberal arguments for justice should preserve the controversy of deep - or comprehensive, or non- neutral - convictions, while accepting responsibly the institutional limitations of this most important social virtue. III Rosas, João (2001), A Philosophy of Restraint Justice and Pluralism in the New Theory of Political Liberalism European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/13704 Este trabalho é dedicado à memória do meu pai Constantino Miranda Rosas (1923-1998) IV Rosas, João (2001), A Philosophy of Restraint Justice and Pluralism in the New Theory of Political Liberalism European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/13704 Contents Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………vi Introduction………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter I Justice, Pluralism and the Grip of Justification………………………..11 Chapter II Rawls' Political Liberalism……………………………………………………61 Chapter III Larmore's Political Liberalism……………………………………………..126 Chapter IV Pluralism Within Justice…………………………………………………...157 Chapter V Another Form of Restraint…………………………………………………188 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….221 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………..230 V Rosas, João (2001), A Philosophy of Restraint Justice and Pluralism in the New Theory of Political Liberalism European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/13704 Acknowledgments This dissertation was made possible with the generous financial support of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European University Institute and the University of Minho. I am thankful for the opportunity given to me by these institutions. My main personal debts are to Steven Lukes, in Florence, and Jeremy Waldron, in Berkeley. Their supervision was an intellectual pleasure and their friendship constant. Although the research work and writing of this dissertation had to be interrupted several times - due to personal or professional reasons - Steven and Jeremy have never ceased to encourage me. Steven, in particular, is responsible for making me carry on during my Florentine moments of hyperbolic self- criticism. Other people provided me with comments and suggestions at different moments of the project. These people include my other professors: Arpad Szacolczai and Will Kymlicka, in Florence, and Les Green and Samuel Scheffler, in Berkeley. I consider myself lucky to have been a student of theirs. In Braga, I benefited from the companionship of my colleagues at the University of Minho. Among them, I would like to single out the permanent support given by the Head of the School, Acílio Rocha. In Lisbon and in other places around the world, I was fortunate to share ideas and projects with João Carlos Espada. Finally, I want to acknowledge the support given by my parents and siblings in Porto, and my fellow graduate students in Florence and Berkeley. The latter include my housemates and personal friends during the preparation and writing of this thesis. They have patiently endured my sometimes-difficult character. VI Rosas, João (2001), A Philosophy of Restraint Justice and Pluralism in the New Theory of Political Liberalism European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/13704 I am glad that this project has reached completion, after so many painful hours, drafts and hesitations. However, to reach the end of a project does not fulfill a life. All my efforts would seem meaningless, if it were not for Bé. VII Rosas, João (2001), A Philosophy of Restraint Justice and Pluralism in the New Theory of Political Liberalism European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/13704 INTRODUCTION 1. Presentation of the subject 2. The main ideas in a glimpse 3. Outline of the argument 1 Rosas, João (2001), A Philosophy of Restraint Justice and Pluralism in the New Theory of Political Liberalism European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/13704 1. Presentation of the subject The subject of this dissertation is the new theory of political liberalism. This is a quite specific subject and it should not be confused with another and more usual meaning attached to the same expression. This more conventional meaning of political liberalism is primarily a form of liberalism which stresses the political sphere - the state - as opposed to the economic sphere - the marketplace. However, the new theory of political liberalism is not in opposition to economic liberalism in this way. Instead, the adjective political refers to the fact that this recent defence of liberalism avoids reliance on comprehensive and controversial religious, metaphysical, epistemological and moral views. In this sense, both its friends and foes agree that political liberalism is a theory of argumentative restraint, avoidance or even abstinence. Political liberalism, then, stands in opposition to comprehensive liberalism. Past (and current) defences of liberalism tend to be unapologetically comprehensive. They use arguments taken from religious revelation, general philosophy and doctrines of moral excellence, together with other arguments - supposedly less controversial - taken from Economics and the social sciences. Liberal philosophers often disagree about the core principles of liberalism. For some, it is 'liberty', for others 'equality'. Another group focuses on 'the rule of law', yet others prefer 'tolerance', and so on and so forth. In their arguments, philosophers also disagree on how one should interpret