The Need for a Common Perception of Human Rights in a World of Diversity: a Canadian Perspective Ed Ratushny
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Document généré le 2 oct. 2021 01:37 Les Cahiers de droit The Need for a Common Perception of Human Rights in a World of Diversity: A Canadian Perspective Ed Ratushny Paix, relations internationales et respect des droits humains Résumé de l'article Volume 28, numéro 3, 1987 La force juridique et morale des instruments relatifs aux droits de l'homme dépend en grande partie d'un consensus quant à la signification de ces droits. URI : https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/042826ar Sur le plan international, ce consensus est des plus difficiles à réaliser en DOI : https://doi.org/10.7202/042826ar raison des différences idéologiques, économiques, culturelles et religieuses. Peut-on dans un tel contexte concevoir que les droits de l'homme véhiculent Aller au sommaire du numéro des valeurs universelles ? Au niveau du droit interne, la classification des droits de l'homme et le degré de protection accordée à chaque catégorie de droits, individuels, collectifs, économiques et sociaux, traduit la nécessité de tenir compte de réalités Éditeur(s) concrètes spécifiques. Faculté de droit de l’Université Laval L'auteur examine l'approche canadienne des droits de l'homme et les grandes étapes ayant marqué la reconnaissance de ces droits avant qu'ils ne soient ISSN consacrés constitutionnellement. Enfin, l'auteur situe les grandes catégories de droits humains dans le contexte canadien et porte un jugement de valeur 0007-974X (imprimé) quant au degré de protection qui leur est respectivement accordée. 1918-8218 (numérique) Découvrir la revue Citer cet article Ratushny, E. (1987). The Need for a Common Perception of Human Rights in a World of Diversity: A Canadian Perspective. Les Cahiers de droit, 28(3), 487–500. https://doi.org/10.7202/042826ar Tous droits réservés © Faculté de droit de l’Université Laval, 1987 Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d’auteur. L’utilisation des services d’Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique d’utilisation que vous pouvez consulter en ligne. https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/ Cet article est diffusé et préservé par Érudit. Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l’Université de Montréal, l’Université Laval et l’Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. https://www.erudit.org/fr/ Les droits humains The Need for a Common Perception of Human Rights in a World of Diversity : A Canadian Perspective Ed RATUSHNY * La force juridique et morale des instruments relatifs aux droits de l'homme dépend en grande partie d'un consensus quant à la signification de ces droits. Sur le plan international, ce consensus est des plus difficiles à réaliser en raison des différences idéologiques, économiques, culturelles et religieuses. Peut-on dans un tel contexte concevoir que les droits de l'homme véhiculent des valeurs universelles ? Au niveau du droit interne, la classification des droits de l'homme et le degré de protection accordée à chaque catégorie de droits, individuels, collectifs, économiques et sociaux, traduit la nécessité de tenir compte de réalités concrètes spécifiques. L'auteur examine l'approche canadienne des droits de l'homme et les grandes étapes ayant marqué la reconnaissance de ces droits avant qu'ils ne soient consacrés const itutionnellement. Enfin, l'auteur situe les grandes catégories de droits humains dans le contexte canadien et porte un jugement de valeur quant au degré de protection qui leur est respectivement accordée. Pages Introduction 488 1. Individual Rights in Canada 490 2. Collective Rights in Canada 492 3. Economie, Social and Cultural Rights in Canada 495 * Director, Human Rights Centre, Ottawa Law School. Les Cahiers de Droit, vol. 28, n° 3, septembre 1987, p. 487-500 (1987) 28 Les Cahiers de Droit 487 488 Les Cahiers de Droit (1987) 28 C. de D. 487 Pages A. Peoples'Rights 497 Conclusion 499 Introduction In spite of the existence of international declarations and covenants on human rights, the problem of their definition persists. For example, in a recent article, B.G. Ramcharan of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights raised the following controversial questions : Do human rights pertain solely to individuals ? May they appertain to groups or to peoples as well? Do human rights embrace only traditional civil and political rights or do they also embrace economic, social and cultural rights? Do newly asserted rights, such as the right to development, exist? Are they capable of existing as human rights, and, if so, again, would they appertain to individuals only, to groups, to peoples or to a combination of these?1 The author concludes that the recognition of human rights is essentially a normative process requiring recognition by a competent organ. Nevertheless, there is an evolution in the stock, of human rights : It is fallacious to confine the definition of human rights only to traditional categories or criteria. There are ongoing processes of discovery recognition; enlargement, enrichment and refining; and adapting and updating.2 At the same time, the legal and moral force of laws and legal principles will be diminished if they can mean completely different things to different people and, in the international sphere, to different countries. The integrity of international structures for the promotion of human rights, therefore, requires a common perception of the meaning of human rights. How can this be achieved in a world of ideological, economic, cultural and religious diversity? People from lesser developed nations have often stated that traditional civil and political rights have no significance in the face 1. "I he Concept ol Human Rights in Contemporary International Law", (1983) I Can. H.R. Yearbook 2d7, al 26X. 2. //./</., at 2X0. E. RATUSHNY Droits humains 489 of starvation or dominance by outside forces. Often members of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples see their hopes and aspirations as being more crucially dependent upon the vitality of the collectivity to which they belong than to their civil and political "freedom" as individuals. These are fundamental concerns which must be recognized in any discussion of human rights. However, in my view, it is regrettable that too often discussions in this area become a debate on the relative merits of individual rights versus collective or peoples' rights. Such an approach leads to the separation of rights into water-tight compartments and forces people to choose to support one category in favour of another. Geographical distinctions are often emphasized and the discussion may become a debate of social, economic and political ideology. Such an approach is unfortunate because the concept of human rights should transcend such ideology. Human rights should represent a core of fundamental and universal human values which every political ideology should respect, protect and foster. All human rights have as their foundation the "inherent dignity" of all persons. This central phrase is embedded in the first line of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. All human rights can be viewed as no more but, of course, no less, than the basic requirements for ensuring the preservation and enhancement of the human dignity of all persons3. If this approach is accepted, how can it be argued that one category of rights is more important than another? Indeed, how can there be any justification for maintaining classifications at all ? The real goal should be the implementation of human rights while over-emphasis upon classification can become a tedious and sterile exercise. On the other hand, there is a need for a clear understanding of what different human rights encompass in order to address specifically the manner in which their protection and promotion might be achieved. One reason for classifying human rights is the variety of contexts in which they must be considered. The intrinsic validity of a human right does not change. However, the manner and degree to which human dignity is most seriously offended will vary from one society to another. In Canada, for example, the most serious violation of human dignity may be the collective situation of the aboriginal peoples. Greater emphasis must be placed upon the amelioration of this situation. However, in doing so, care must also be taken .V Sec, generally, I he discussion by Schacler, "Human Dignity as a Normative Concept", (ISM) 11 Am. ./. Im. I.. I. 490 Les Cahiers de Droit (1987) 28 C. de D. Ail not to jeopardize the rights of others, such as women. These different interests should not be seen as being mutually exclusive. Rather, the importance of both must be recognized and an appropriate balance reached depending on the context. A variety of historical, social, cultural and economic considerations may come into play in determining not only how human dignity may be most seriously offended, but also the manner in which it can best be preserved and enhanced. This leads to a second justification of discussing categories of human rights. Such classification can suggest the kinds of approaches which will be most functional in the promotion of human rights. Different societal responses may be necessary for different categories of rights. If I am correct in suggesting that it is desirable to examine human rights in a concrete context with the goal of seeking their greater protection and enhancement, it may be useful for us to examine these issues from a Canadian perspective. Let me warn you beforehand that the categories which I suggest do not fit neatly into existing international documents. However, they do emerge from the Canadian reality. 1 suspect that the same may be said of the experience of some other countries as well. 1 propose briefly to canvass the Canadian approach to human rights with a view to illustrating both the contextual and the functional implications of our experience.