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The Year in Review Syria 2017

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The Year in Review Syria 2017 THE YEAR IN REVIEW SYRIA 2017 IFK /ŶƐƟƚƵƚĨƺƌ&ƌŝĞĚĞŶƐƐŝĐŚĞƌƵŶŐ ƵŶĚ<ŽŶĨůŝŬƚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ The Year in Review of Syria is based on the periodical factsheets for Syria that are produced by the IFK-MENA 7HDPDWWKH,QVWLWXWHIRU3HDFH6XSSRUWDQG&RQÁLFW0DQDJHPHQW1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH$FDGHP\9LHQQD7KH $QQXDO5HYLHZFRPSLOHVDQGDQDO\]HVDOOVLJQLÀFDQWHYHQWVSHUWDLQLQJWRWKH6\ULDQFRQÁLFWZKLOHSURYLGLQJDQ outlook for the year 2018. ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQÁLFWDQG&ULVLV0DQDJHPHQW,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQÁLFWDQG&ULVLV0DQDJHPHQW DomesticDomestic PoliticsPolitics 7KH\HDUPDUNHGDWXUQLQJSRLQWLQWKHVH- Domestically, the year was dominated by the sha- ven-year history of the Syrian civil war: the terrorist ping of the future of Syria. Russia suggested the militia Islamic State (ISIS) was territorially defea- concept of a decentrally-organized Syria and deepe- ted by the loss of its strongholds, the opposition QHGLWVUROHDVDQDFWLYHFRQÁLFWPHGLDWRULQ WKDWWULHVWRRYHUWKURZ$VVDGLVPDVVLYHO\ZHDNH- ned and intense political negotiations between MilitaryMilitary DevelopmentsDevelopments Assad's supporters - Russia and Iran - and those On the military level, numerous offensives against RIWKHRSSRVLWLRQ7XUNH\86$DQG-RUGDQ DPRQJ ISIS led to nearly all of ISIS-held territory being re- others) - have frozen the lines of conflict. conquered by the Syrian Arab Army and its allies. The Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) also advanced in ISIS-held areas north of the Euphrates pushing east towards the Iraqi border. Other opposition militias re-organized. Notwithstan- GLQJWKHGHHVFDODWLRQDJUHHPHQWVÀJKWLQJUHPDL- ned ongoing, especially in the northwestern provin- ces of Idlib, Aleppo and Hama. HumanitarianHumanitarian situationsituation 'HVSLWH WKH FHDVHÀUH DJUHHPHQWV ZKLFK DW ÀUVW sight promised a more hopeful future for the Syrian SHRSOHWKHKXPDQLWDULDQVLWXDWLRQLQUHPDL- QHG WHQVH DV ZHOO 7KH HVFDODWLRQ RI ÀJKWLQJ EHW- ween regime forces and opposition on the one hand and air and ground operations by the US-led anti-IS coalition and the Russia-Iran-Assad alliance on the other, led to the death and displacement of many FLYLOLDQV$FFRUGLQJWR812&+$DERXWPLOOLRQ Syrian people need humanitarian aid by the end RI 2I WKHVH PLOOLRQ DUH LQ GHHS GDQJHU Putin’s relationship with Assad has grown from strength-to- due to evictions, battles and limited access to basic strength since Russia’s involvement in Syria which has helped goods and services. consolidate Assad’s power at the helm. Source: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/11 REPORTING DATE: 21.12.2017 COMPILED BY: IFK MENA-Team (Jasmina RUPP, David FUSSI, Nasser EL-HAJ, Maya HADAR,); SOURCES: MEDIA ANALYSIS; LAYOUT: REF III/Medien, IMG INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT The Astana process EUDQFKRIWKH.XUGLVK3.. 7KH.XUGLVWDQ:RUNHUV 3DU- ,QHDUO\0D\5XVVLD,UDQDQG7XUNH\VLJQHGWKH$VWDQD ty). Despite a mechanism to assure compliance with the agreement, establishing four de-escalation zones (Idlib, FHDVHÀUHLQDOO]RQHVUHJXODUFHDVHÀUHYLRODWLRQVRFFXU- North Hama, East Ghouta and South Syria) in which hos- red, particularly in Idlib, North Hama and East Ghouta WLOLWLHVZHUHPHDQWWRKDOW7KHDJUHHPHQWUHÁHFWHGWKH zones and called into question the seriousness of the commitment of the three observer states to use their DJUHHPHQW7KHGHHVFDODWLRQ]RQHVDUHDÀUVWVWHSLQ LQÁXHQFH RQ ORFDO JURXSV LQ RUGHU WR SUHYHQW ÀJKWLQJ containing the hostilities, but they do not offer a political VXVSHQGDLUVWULNHVDQGDOORZKXPDQLWDULDQUHOLHI7KH solution. In September, the Syrian Foreign Minister Wa- US which for years decided against military intervention lid Moallem referred to the zones only as a "temporary in Syria and insisted on a diplomatic solution instead agreement". SOD\HGQRUROHLQWKH$VWDQDDJUHHPHQWDQGKDYHNHSW LWV HQJDJHPHQWV OLPLWHG WR ÀJKWLQJ ,6,6 7KH $VWDQD &KHPLFDO$WWDFNVDQGWKH´QHZROG86VWUDWHJ\µIRU process, which focuses primarily on a negotiated settle- 6\ULD ment at the military level, replaced - much to the disple- $FKHPLFDODWWDFNZKLFKRFFXUUHGLQ$SULOLQWKHUHEHO asure of the opposition - the UN-led peace negotiations KHOGFLW\RI.KDQ6KHLNKRXQVSDUNHGGLUHFW86DFWLRQ in Geneva, which have been unsuccessful thus far. DJDLQVWWKH$VVDGUHJLPHIRUWKHÀUVWWLPHVLQFHWKHEH- ginning of the Syrian war. Yet, contrary to speculation :KREHQHÀWVIURPWKHGHHVFDODWLRQ]RQHV" DERXWDQHZ86VWUDWHJ\LQ6\ULDWKHDWWDFNGLGQRWPDUN The Astana process ultimately failed to enforce a nation- the beginning of a major US military intervention. The ZLGHFHDVHÀUHDQGLPSURYHWKHKXPDQLWDULDQVLWXDWLRQ US' top priority in Syria remained as it was under presi- 7KHGHHVFDODWLRQ]RQHVDUHQRWWREHPLVWDNHQIRUVDIH GHQW2EDPDWKHÀJKWDJDLQVW,6,6)RUWKLVSXUSRVHWKH zones and constitute a strategic decision which enabled US had supplied a wide selection of weapons and armo- the pro-Assad forces, in particular, to urgently relocate red vehicles to the Kurdish-dominated SDF (Syrian De- their troops to the front lines in the battle against ISIS. PRFUDWLF)RUFHV PXFKWRWKHGLVPD\RI7XUNH\WREDWWOH 7KLV ZD\ WKH UHJLPH DQG LWV DOOLHV ZHUH DEOH WR WDFNOH ,6,6LQ5DTTDDQG'HLUH]=RXU5RXJKO\$PHULFDQ ISIS-held areas in Homs, Deir ez-Zour and along the Eu- soldiers are currently stationed in Syria. SKUDWHV9DOOH\DQGVORZHGGRZQDSRVVLEOHJDLQRILQÁX- ence of the US and the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Demo- 7KHGHIHDWRIWKHDUPHGRSSRVLWLRQ cratic Forces (SDF), and build a territorial corridor from The capture of Aleppo, the last urban stronghold of the Iraq to Syria as desired by Iran and Hezbollah. DUPHGRSSRVLWLRQE\UHJLPHIRUFHVDWWKHHQGRI PDUNHGWKHIDLOXUHRIWKHUHYROXWLRQ$IWHUPRUHWKDQWZR In addition, the four de-escalation zones secure the long- \HDUV RI 5XVVLDQ DLUVWULNHV DJDLQVW UHEHO JURXSV ,6,6 WHUPLQÁXHQFHRIUHJLRQDOSOD\HUVLQ6\ULD,QVRXWKHUQ and Al-Qaeda's offshoot Hai'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a 6\ULD-RUGDQDQGWKH86 UHSUHVHQWLQJ,VUDHO FDOOHGIRU VLJQLÀFDQW QXPEHU RI WKH DUPHG RSSRVLWLRQ KDV EHHQ the withdrawal of pro-Iranian forces from Israel's bor- defeated. The suspension of the CIA program to support GHUV0HDQZKLOH7XUNH\KDVH[SDQGHGLWVPLOLWDU\DQG anti-Assad rebels at the end of the year gave the last SROLWLFDO LQÁXHQFH LQ QRUWKHUQ 6\ULD E\ HVWDEOLVKLQJ D fatal blow to the armed opposition. WHUULWRULDO ]RQH EHWZHHQ $]D] DQG -DUDEOXV DV ZHOO DV WKURXJKLWVREVHUYHUUROHLQWKHSURYLQFHRI,GOLE7XUNH\·V On a political level, the fragmented opposition suffered main priority remained the containment of the Syrian VHWEDFNVDIWHUEHLQJSUHVVXUHGE\LWVVXSSRUWHUVPDLQ- ly Saudi Arabia, to merge with less dissident opposition De-escalation zones groups such as the Moscow and Cairo groups for the 1RYHPEHU WK·V *HQHYD URXQG RI QHJRWLDWLRQV DQG WR dana OsmaniyeGaziantep Aseyhan of: 14.09.2017 TÜRKEI TarsusC Ceyhan Ain al-Arab (Kobane) Al-Qamishli refrain altogether from their original conditions for nego- Manbij tiating: Assad's immediate resignation and the release Al-Hasaka Al-Bab Sinjar Antakya Aleppo Mossul of political prisoners. Idlib Ar-Raqqa Euphra The Arab Gulf States, long-time supporters of the opposi- Latakia Deir t ez-Zour Hama WLRQZHUHFRPSOHWHO\H[FOXGHGIURPWKH$VWDQDSURFHVV Salamiyah IRAK Al-Mayadin and were thus forced to abandon their unrealistic tar- Tartus Homs SYRIEN Tripoli Palmyra (Tadmur) gets of a regime crash. Consequently, they had to pursue Abu Kamal LIBANON Qaryatayn new strategic objectives in Syria, most probably rebuil- Baalbek BEIRUT Rebellen ding devastated Sunni Arab territories. Peace and sta- von Rebellen mit Türkei-Unterstützung Baghdadi Douma kontrolliertes Gebiet bility have become much more important to the Syrian von unterschiedlich ausgeprägtenHit islamis- DAMASKUS Al-Walid tischen Gruppierungen kontr. GebietRamadi people than the demand for power and political order. Kuneitra Dschihadistische Rebellen IS Einflusszone/IS kontrolliertesal-Habbania-S Gebiet e *RODQ Assad-Regime und Verbündete KÒKHQ As-Suwayda vom Regime kontrolliertes Gebiet Kurden Dar‘a 7XUNH\·VHQJDJHPHQWLQ6\ULD Irbid von Syrischen Demokratischen Kräften JORDANIEN (SDF) kontrolliertes Gebiet ,Q7XUNH\WULHGLQYDLQWRSHUVXDGHWKH86WRJLYH von Israel besetztes Gebiet 050100150200Az Zarqa km AMMAN in Astana vereinbarte Deeskalationszonen XSLWVVXSSRUWIRU3..DIÀOLDWHGJURXSVLQQRUWKHUQ6\ULD <3*6') DQGLQVWHDGSRVLWLRQ7XUNH\OR\DORSSRVLWLRQ An agreement in Astana was signed to establish four de-escalation zo- nes aimed towards the cessation of hostilities between rebel groups and IRUFHVLQWKHÀJKWDJDLQVW,6,6$WWKHVDPHWLPH7XUNH\ forces loyal to Assad. and Russia tried to identify common interest in Syria to PDNHWKHGHHVFDODWLRQDJUHHPHQWLQWKHODVWIXOO\UHEHO /D\RXW,0*6RXUFH,). KHOGSURYLQFHRI,GOLEZRUN+RZHYHU7XUNH\GLGPDQDJH of Russian forces to western Syria, where they must to surround the hostile Kurdish enclave of Afrin through VXSSRUWWKH$VVDGUHJLPH·VUHFRQTXHVWRIWKHODVWIXOO\ LWVORQJODVWLQJFRQWURORYHUWKHVRFDOOHG-DUDEOXV&RUUL- rebel-held province of Idlib, as well as securing their own GRU VLQFH DQGLWVREVHUYHUSRVWWRPDLQWDLQWKH PLOLWDU\EDVHLQ/DWDNLD FHDVHÀUHLQ,GOLE$OOWKHVHDFWLRQVLQGLFDWHWKDW7XUNLVK PLOLDU\DFWLRQLQ6\ULDLVOLNHO\WRFRQWLQXHLQ 'XULQJWKH86KDVH[SDQGHGLWVEDVHVLQWKH.XU- GLVK DUHDV RI 5PHODQ .REDQH DQG +DVDND PRVWO\ WR SUHYHQW D UHVXUJHQFH RI ,6,6 DQG WR FRQWDLQ ,UDQ·V LQ- ÁXHQFHLQ6\ULD:KLOH7XUNH\UHSRUWHGO\HVWDEOLVKHGLWV base in the ISIS-liberated city of al-Bab, the United King- GRP EXLOW D PLOLWDU\ EDVH LQ WKH -RUGDQLDQ6\ULDQ,UDTL border area in al-Tanf and Iran has operation facilities in Aleppo, Hama and in southwest Damascus. All these VWDWHVZLOOSOD\DNH\UROHLQWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVIRUWKHSROL- tical and territorial future of Syria. Forecast 2018 $OWKRXJKDSROLWLFDOVROXWLRQWRWKH6\ULDQFRQÁLFWLVFXU- 7KH$VWDQD&RQIHUHQFHFUHDWHGWKHSDUDPHWHUVLQZKLFK5XVVLD,UDQDQG
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