New York City Police Department Active Shooter Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation Raymond W. Kelly Police Commissioner Table of Contents Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………....ii Part I: Introduction…………………………………………………….………................1 Part II: Recommendations………………………………………………………..………2 Part III: Analysis …………………….…………………………………………………..4 Part IV: Analytic Methodology …………………………………………………….........9 Appendix: Compendium of Active Shooter Incidents - Office Buildings……………………………………………………………...12 - Open Commercial……………………………………………………………29 - Factories and Warehouses……………………………………………………61 - Schools……………………………………………………………………….78 - Other………………………………………………………………………..151 i Acknowledgements This report was prepared by the Counterterrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department (NYPD), led by Deputy Commissioner Richard Daddario and Assistant Chief James R. Waters. The drafting of this report was a collaborative effort. The various authors and subject-matter experts include: Sgt. Richard Alvarez, Det. John Andersen, Sgt. Christopher Biddle, Lt. Stephenie Clark, Det. Joseph Cotter, Ryan Merola, Det. Peter Montella, Peter Patton, and Capt. Michael Riggio. In addition, NYPD Intelligence Research Specialists Aviva Feuerstein and Nathaniel Young, Det. Raymond McPartland, and Dr. Evan Levine, Chief Scientist for the Office of Risk Management and Analysis at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, made extraordinary contributions to this report; the completion of this work is due largely to their efforts. Active Shooter was printed by the NYPD Printing Section. The project was overseen by Deputy Chief Michael Blake and Director Jessica Tisch. ii Part I: Introduction Active shooter attacks are dynamic incidents that vary greatly from one attack to another. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.” In its definition, DHS notes that, “in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.” The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has limited this definition to include only those cases that spill beyond an intended victim to others.1 The type of police response to an active shooter attack depends on the unique circumstances of the incident. In the event of such an attack, private security personnel should follow the instructions of the first-responders from the NYPD. Because active shooter attacks are dynamic events, the NYPD cannot put forward a single set of best-practices for private security response to such incidents. However, the NYPD has compiled a list of recommendations for building security personnel to mitigate the risks from active shooter attacks. The recommendations draw on previous studies of active shooter attacks and are presented in Part II.2 The NYPD developed these recommendations based on a close analysis of active shooter incidents from 1966 to 2010. This Compendium of cases, presented in the Appendix, includes 281 active shooter incidents. It is organized chronologically by type of facility targeted, including office buildings, open commercial areas, factories and warehouses, schools, and other settings. The NYPD performed a statistical analysis on a subset of these cases to identify common characteristics among active shooter attacks. This analysis is presented in Part III and the underlying methodology is presented in Part IV. The analysis found a large degree of variation among attacks across some broad categories, including: sex of the attacker, age of the attacker, number of attackers, planning tactics, targets, number of casualties, location of the attack, weapons used, and attack resolution. 1 E.g., a case of a grievance against an employer leads to an attack targeting not only the direct supervisor but also others in the workplace. 2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter: How to Respond,” October 2008, http://www.lpinformation.com/Portals/0/DHS_ActiveShooter_FlipBook.pdf; University of California Police Department, University of California at Los Angeles, “Your Response to an Active Shooter: Safety Tips,” 2008, www.ucpd.ucla.edu/2008/activeshootersafetytips.pdf; US Secret Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States,” May 2002, http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssi_final_report.pdf; Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice, “Workplace Violence; Issues in Response,” June 2002, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/violence.pdf; Hawaii Workplace Violence Working Group Committee, “Workplace Violence: Prevention, Intervention and Recovery,” October 2001, http://hawaii.gov/ag/cpja/quicklinks/workplace_violence/WVfull.pdf; Department of Labor and Industry, State of Minnesota, “Workplace Violence Prevention: A Comprehensive Guide for Employers and Employees,” http://www.doli.state.mn.us/WSC/PDF/WorkplaceViolencePreventionGuide.pdf. 1 Part II: Recommendations The NYPD compiled a list of recommendations to mitigate the risks from active shooter attacks. The NYPD developed these recommendations based on analysis of past active shooter incidents and careful review of previous studies.3 Unlike other works on active shooter attacks, this guide provides recommendations tailored to building security personnel. The NYPD organized its recommendations into three categories: procedures, systems, and training. Procedures: • Conduct a realistic security assessment to determine the facility’s vulnerability to an active shooter attack. • Identify multiple evacuation routes and practice evacuations under varying conditions; post evacuation routes in conspicuous locations throughout the facility; ensure that evacuation routes account for individuals with special needs and disabilities. • Designate shelter locations with thick walls, solid doors with locks, minimal interior windows, first-aid emergency kits, communication devices, and duress alarms. • Designate a point-of-contact with knowledge of the facility’s security procedures and floor plan to liaise with police and other emergency agencies in the event of an attack. • Incorporate an active shooter drill into the organization’s emergency preparedness procedures. • Vary security guards’ patrols and patterns of operation. • Limit access to blueprints, floor plans, and other documents containing sensitive security information, but make sure these documents are available to law enforcement responding to an incident. • Establish a central command station for building security. Systems: • Put in place credential-based access control systems that provide accurate attendance reporting, limit unauthorized entry, and do not impede emergency egress. • Put in place closed-circuit television systems that provide domain awareness of the entire facility and its perimeter; ensure that video feeds are viewable from a central command station. 3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter: How to Respond”; University of California Police Department, University of California at Los Angeles, “Your Response to an Active Shooter: Safety Tips”; Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice, “Workplace Violence; Issues in Response”; Hawaii Workplace Violence Working Group Committee, “Workplace Violence: Prevention, Intervention and Recovery”; Department of Labor and Industry, State of Minnesota, “Workplace Violence Prevention: A Comprehensive Guide for Employers and Employees.” 2 • Put in place communications infrastructure that allows for facility-wide, real-time messaging. • Put in place elevator systems that may be controlled or locked down from a central command station. Training: • Train building occupants on response options outlined by the Department of Homeland Security in “Active Shooter: How to Respond” when an active shooter is in the vicinity:4 o Evacuate: Building occupants should evacuate the facility if safe to do so; evacuees should leave behind their belongings, visualize their entire escape route before beginning to move, and avoid using elevators or escalators. o Hide: If evacuating the facility is not possible, building occupants should hide in a secure area (preferably a designated shelter location), lock the door, blockade the door with heavy furniture, cover all windows, turn off all lights, silence any electronic devices, lie on the floor, and remain silent. o Take Action: If neither evacuating the facility nor seeking shelter is possible, building occupants should attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter by throwing objects, using aggressive force, and yelling. • Train building occupants to call 911 as soon as it is safe to do so. • Train building occupants on how to respond when law enforcement arrives on scene: follow all official instructions, remain calm, keep hands empty and visible at all times, and avoid making sudden or alarming movements. 4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter: How to Respond.” 3 Part III: Analysis The NYPD identified a subset of the active shooter cases included in the Compendium and ran statistical analyses of the data set (see Part IV for an explanation of the analytic methodology). This subset, called the “active shooter data set,” includes all cases in the Compendium, except: 1) those that occurred outside of the United States; 2) those that did not result in casualties of either victims or attackers; and 3) those that