Introduction to the Dissertation
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Introduction to the Dissertation 0.1 Overview of Dissertation This is a dissertation about the political thought of Thomas Hobbes and the early-modern practice of honoring. More specifically, this is a dissertation about Hobbes’s account of sovereign authorization and the mid-seventeenth-century-English practice of honoring. I argue that what Hobbes says about sovereign authorization invites us to portray this practice as an honoring practice. I focus in the dissertation specifically upon sovereign authorization in Hobbes, and how we should portray it, because sovereign authorization has come to characterize Hobbes’s political thought as a whole. By authorizing a sovereign, individuals leave the state of nature where life Hobbes tells us is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Through sovereign authorization, individuals constitute political society. Sovereign authorization is one of Hobbes’s major contributions to the history of political thought. Analyses of this practice and arguments that help explain it frequently take center stage in contemporary scholarship about Hobbes. Making sense of sovereign authorization is therefore crucial to our understanding of Hobbes’s political theory as a whole. By portraying sovereign authorization as an honoring practice, I intend to challenge scholars who exclusively use a legal-juridical framework to understand Hobbes’s 1 political theory. The legal-juridical account predominates and is authoritative today.1 That is, contemporary scholars employ legal-juridical practices, words and assumptions to make sense of Hobbes’s account of sovereign authorization. Formal procedures such as transferring or surrendering rights and voting are part of this account. Concepts such as “disenchantment,” “representation,” “contract,” and “equality” predominate. Scholars also use assumptions about man’s egoism, and his ability to negotiate exchange relations to make sense of sovereign authorization in Hobbes’s texts. The legal juridical account of Hobbes’s text has a hold on us in part because its inventory of concepts, practices and assumptions are so much a part of our form of life, of our contemporary grammar.2 The legal-juridical account makes the distinctions we make. It summons the concepts and the correspondences that we use to make sense of the world around us. It notices the features in Hobbes’s texts that we notice in our lives. It also neglects the features that we regularly neglect. For this reason, we are inclined to use a legal-juridical framework to make sense of Hobbes’s political thought, specifically his account of sovereign authorization. But, the legal-juridical account of sovereign authorization has its problems. Scholars who use it to make sense of Hobbes’s text tend to neglect or explain inadequately the passages where what Hobbes says about sovereign authorization does not fit neatly into this authoritative framework. They do not critique the framework’s conventions. They do not 1 See especially Gauthier (1990); Flathman (1993); Hampton (1988); Kraus (1993); Macpherson (1962); Mansfield (1971); Orwin (1975); Pitkin (1964); Sabine (1961); Skinner (1972); Strauss (1936); Zarka (2001). 2 The structure of this section is highly influence by James Tully’s (1995) account of Wittgenstein’s political philosophy. 2 ask if perhaps these conventions themselves give rise to the tensions and the questions that they write about. And, they do not acknowledge that these conventions fail in crucial ways to make sense of what Hobbes says. Let me offer some examples. First, the legal-juridical framework cannot accommodate the sacred arguments offered by Hobbes in favor of sovereign authorization. Scholars who employ this framework tend to reduce Hobbes’s account of authorization to two variables: fear and prudence.3 Here, they go on as if the sacred justifications for authorization simply did not exist, or did not matter. They neglect these features of Hobbes’s account of sovereign authorization. Second, the legal-juridical framework cannot marshal a persuasive argument against John Locke’s claim that it is not prudent to authorize a vain, possibly irrational and ungodly sovereign power. This is the sovereign power Hobbes unabashedly calls the “Leviathan,” the “Mortal-God,” and the “King of the Proud.” Scholars who employ the legal-juridical account obscure this problem. They do so by expanding the notion of prudence beyond its reasonable limits.4 Third, scholars who employ the legal-juridical account cannot make sense of Hobbes’s claim that individuals transfer rights to the sovereign (to-be) when they authorize him. They solve this problem inadequately in one of two ways. Either they eschew Hobbes’s 3 See especially Hampton (1988), Kraus (1993), Sabine (1961), Skinner (1972), and Strauss (1936). 4 See especially Gauthier (1969), for an elastic reading of prudence. 3 account of transference altogether.5 Or, they make peculiar arguments about transference. These arguments are peculiar because they contradict Hobbes’s claim that the sovereign possesses the right to everything prior to authorization.6 Fourth, scholars who employ the legal-juridical account cannot avoid problems generated by Hobbes’s commitment to nominalism.7 Hobbes says that sovereign authorization requires to-be-subjects to declare their will through a sensible medium. Words are the only medium offered in the legal-juridical account. But, this medium is riddled with difficulties because words frequently breed collective misunderstanding. Scholars who employ the legal-juridical account neglect the problem of collective misunderstanding that Hobbes associates with words. They just go on interpreting sovereign-authorization as a purely verbal act. Fifth, the legal juridical account cannot make sense of Hobbes’s assertion that individuals transfer power to the sovereign (to-be) through authorization.8 Scholars who employ the legal-juridical account here conclude that Hobbes’s theory is impoverished, perhaps even fatally flawed. Without superior power, Hobbes’s theory unravels. The sovereign will not be able to keep subjects obedient. Scholars who expose the flaw in Hobbes’s account do not ask if the flaw resides elsewhere. That is, they do not ask whether the legal-juridical account of sovereign authorization generates the flaw and is therefore impoverished. 5 See especially Orwin (1975), for an account of why we can eschew transference altogether. 6 See especially Pitkin (1964), for an account of why we need transference. 7 See especially Kramer (1997), for an account of the use of words in the act of authorization. 8 See especially, Flathman (1993) and Wolin (1960), for an account of the problem of power in Hobbes. 4 Instead, they go on using the legal-juridical account even though they acknowledge that power transference is crucial and show that their account cannot accommodate it. Sixth, the legal-juridical account does not explain how sovereign authorization creates a positional relation between subjects and the sovereign. Hobbes grounds this positional relation in power. Authorization positions subjects as standing below and in awe of a powerful sovereign. The act, in turn, positions the awe-inspiring sovereign as standing powerfully above his subjects. Because equality is a central feature of the legal juridical account, the inequality between the sovereign and his subjects is problematic. Scholars who use the legal-juridical account to make sense of what Hobbes says address this problem in one of two ways. Either they neglect it. Or, they cover it over by appealing to the concept of “representation.” Luckily, the legal-juridical account—with all its problems---does not exhaust all possible ways of making sense of Hobbes’s account of sovereign authorization. Portraying sovereign authorization as an honoring practice explains what Hobbes says about sovereign authorization in a different way. Sovereign authorization as honoring more closely resembles the Christian relationship constituted by a humble individual honoring God than it does a legal contract between members of a nascent bourgeoisie. By situating sovereign authorization within a mid-seventeenth-century religious discourse, and by making sovereign authorization correspond to a sacred practice, I challenge the legal- juridical account’s dogged reliance upon a secular and word-centered framework for understanding central elements within Hobbes’s political theory. 5 My portrayal significantly changes the way we go on making sense of sovereign authorization in Hobbes. It explains sovereign authorization in a way that does not generate the problems that scholars using the legal-juridical account ignore or cannot adequately resolve. The framework of honoring also dissolves some the flaws generated by scholars who use the legal juridical account. Portraying sovereign authorization as an honoring practice fits better with what Hobbes says about the practice. That is, it more faithfully captures Hobbes’s description of it, and the claims that he makes to explain it. That said, portraying sovereign authorization as an honoring practice does not cut all ties with the legal-juridical portrayal. The former portrayal shares significant similarities with the latter. It also differs significantly from the latter. The fact that the legal-juridical portrayal is hegemonic renders it difficult to give the differences presented by the framework of honoring a fair hearing. And, the differences are what render making sense of sovereign authorization as an honoring practice a more persuasive