What a Post-Cotonou Agreement with the ACP States Can Achieve Evita Schmieg
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NO. 1 JANUARY 2019 Introduction EU and Africa: Investment, Trade, Development What a Post-Cotonou Agreement with the ACP States Can Achieve Evita Schmieg The EU is currently negotiating a successor to its Cotonou Agreement of year 2000 with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. The political and economic con- text has changed enormously over the past two decades, with trade relations between the EU and the more developed ACP countries now largely regulated by bilateral and regional Economic Partnership Agreements. Since 2015, in line with international sustainability targets, social and environmental aspects must be taken into account in international treaties, while in 2018 the African Union (AU) agreed to establish an African Continental Free Trade Area. A successor to Cotonou offers an opportunity to modernise the rules on issues including investment, services and migration. This could also generate greater interest in the talks in Germany and the EU. But the cooperation need to be placed on a new foundation and the African states will have to decide whether they want to negotiate together, as a continent. The Cotonou Agreement and its predeces- protocols for the three regions. In July 2018 sors, the Lomé Agreements, regulated the the European Council adopted a negotiat- EU’s relations with its member states’ for- ing mandate confirming the Commission’s mer colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and line. In its own negotiating mandate of May the Pacific during the decades following 2018, the ACP Council of Ministers under- their independence. A successor needs to be lines its interest in an overall ACP agree- negotiated before the Cotonou Agreement ment. The negotiations began in September expires in 2020. In 2017 the European Com- 2018. mission published a proposal for future The first, fundamental question is relations with the ACP group, which today whether an agreement between the EU and comprises seventy-nine countries. It pro- the member states’ former colonies is still poses a framework agreement with the relevant at all, given the enormous changes entire ACP, concluded between all parties in circumstances over the past decades. to the Cotonou Agreement and defining Europe’s political and economic signifi- shared values, goals and principles for cance to Africa has declined markedly. In future cooperation, with additional regional 2017 it was still the most important desti- nation for African exports with 29 percent Negotiating Partners (down from about 42 percent in 2000), but China has made up a great deal of ground. Below the level of the proposed framework Even as recently as year 2000 China played agreement, it remains unclear whether the almost no role in the global economy, with African Union will negotiate a regional just 3.6 percent of world trade. Today it is protocol for Africa as a whole or the ACP responsible for the largest share of new in- Secretariat will seek a protocol just for the vestment flowing to Africa, namely 23.9 per- African ACP states. The Africa-EU Partner- cent in 2016; the top two EU countries, ship – based on the Joint Africa-EU Strate- France and the United Kingdom, account gy of 2007 – already links the European for almost 5 percent each, while Germany Union and Africa, with the latter repre- occupies tenth place with just under 2 per- sented by the AU. From the Union’s perspec- cent. But Europe still leads the field for in- tive it would make sense to merge its co- vestment stocks. Finally, Europe’s political operations with the AU and the African interest in Africa has also revived. The con- ACP states, which are also members of the tinent is now viewed as a realm of oppor- AU. The EU’s mandate therefore proposes tunities, where a number of economies are keeping talks with ACP members open to developing very fast and the African middle other states that share the basic values of class in particular is experiencing very rapid the Cotonou Agreement. It remains unclear growth. At the same time migration from how Africa will respond to this offer. The Africa to the EU has become an important AU’s role has grown enormously over the issue – although migratory movements past two decades, driven by its interventions within Africa are actually much larger. The in peace and conflict resolution and its determining factors for trade and invest- spring 2018 decision to create an African ment flows have changed too: tariffs have Continental Free Trade Area. So it was only fallen globally, reducing their importance, logical for the AU’s Executive Council in allowing global value chains to arise, and March 2018 to claim the role of lead nego- making the economic and political frame- tiator for the African regional protocol. The work even more important for national final decision on this has not yet been made. competitiveness. Foreign direct investment The states of North Africa are not mem- is regarded as a decisive factor for securing bers of the ACP group. Some of them, like growth and employment. Egypt, are sceptical towards the idea of Both the EU and the ACP states want co- joining the negotiations for a post-Cotonou operation to continue. The Cotonou Agree- agreement. They are already connected to ment built on three pillars: trade policy the EU by bilateral association agreements, (with the EU granting non-reciprocal trade some of which are currently being renego- preferences), development policy (with the tiated. So these states already possess a for- Agreement defining areas and procedures mat within which they can assert their in- for the European Development Fund) and terests vis-à-vis the EU. It is unclear whether political dialogue. Both sides’ negotiating it would be advantageous for them to join mandates foresee discussions about all the Cotonou successor agreement. Nor can areas of cooperation addressed in the Coto- it be automatically assumed that the African nou Agreement. But the priorities will have ACP states would welcome a pan-African to shift. Europe’s biggest challenge in this protocol. With the question of development connection will be to shape its relations funding representing one of their main with Africa. interests, they might fear possible disadvan- tages if all African states are included in the successor agreement. The ACP’s negotiating mandate says nothing about this, and the African states have yet to adopt a position. SWP Comment 1 January 2019 2 The “Political Dimension” of example in the international trade system, Cooperation could play a role in future. In their man- dates the EU and ACP both underline their Both the ACP and the EU value the “politi- interest in a strong multilateral system. cal dimension” as an achievement of the The EU treats migration as a high priori- Cotonou Agreement, and wish to retain it. ty and would like to keep the relevant pro- It encompasses political dialogue about vision from the Cotonou Agreement. Arti- national, regional and global questions of cle 13 outlines basic principles for dealing mutual interest, as well as a commitment to with migration, emphasises the observance human rights, good governance, and peace of human rights, and obliges states to take and stability. Article 9, which names the back rejected migrants. Bilateral talks on “essential elements”: “human rights, demo- these issues are foreseen if necessary. Al- cratic principles and the rule of law”, is though it is relatively detailed, however, regarded as especially important. The Agree- this set of provisions has not to date played ment created the framework and institu- a role in EU-ACP relations. The ACP states tions for political dialogue (such as the have already indicated that they are not Council of Ministers and the Joint Parlia- interested in including Article 13 in the mentary Assembly) and a procedure for post-Cotonou agreement. dealing with violations (Article 96). The latter has been used about fifteen times to date in response to coups, violent escala- Development Funding tions and human rights violations in ACP states. Sanctions under Article 96 are re- It is currently an open question how devel- garded as having limited effect and the opment finance is to be regulated. To date existing EU-ACP institutions are also seen as the European Development Fund (EDF) has rather ineffectual. Meetings of the Council depended on successively renegotiated con- of Ministers to date have been regarded as tributions from the member states under ritualised and generally not high-level. A procedures defined in the Cotonou Agree- need therefore exists to make the institu- ment. The Commission would like to inte- tions of the Cotonou Agreement more effi- grate the EDF, with a volume of €30.5 bil- cient and lend them greater political weight. lion for 2014 to 2020, into the EU budget. Formulations relating to human rights in This would place it under normal budget the existing bilateral and regional economic procedures and closer oversight by the partnership agreements (EPAs) between the European Parliament. Development finance EU and ACP states cross-reference the Coto- would then operate in a context where all nou Agreement, giving the EU further rea- states followed the same rules. From the son to include those provisions in the new perspective of the Commission and some agreement. EU member states that would be more effi- Cooperation with a large group of states cient and align better with the Union’s ex- on the basis of shared fundamental values ternal relations today. Such an orientation can gain new significance for both sides, on more objective criteria would satisfy the especially in times of growing foreign poli- aims of the Global Strategy for the Foreign cy instability. This applies all the more and Security Policy (2016), which places when a dialogue is held not only on issues development funding in the context of of bilateral concern but also as an exchange global challenges and strategic interests.