CRYPTOCURRENCY MINING Our Definitive Guide to Cryptocurrency Mining
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
CRYPTONAIRE WEEKLY CRYPTO Investment Journal
CRYPTONAIRE WEEKLY CRYPTO investment journal CONTENTS WEEKLY CRYPTOCURRENCY MARKET ANALYSIS...............................................................................................................5 TOP 10 COINS ........................................................................................................................................................................................6 Top 10 Coins by Total Market Capitalisation ...................................................................................................................6 Top 10 Coins by Percentage Gain (Past 7 Days)...........................................................................................................6 Top 10 Coins added to Exchanges with the Highest Market Capitalisation (Past 30 Days) ..........................7 CRYPTO TRADE OPPORTUNITIES ...............................................................................................................................................9 PRESS RELEASE..................................................................................................................................................................................14 ZUMO BRINGS ITS CRYPTOCURRENCY WALLET TO THE PLATINUM CRYPTO ACADEMY..........................14 INTRODUCTION TO TICAN – MULTI-GATEWAY PAYMENT SYSTEM ......................................................................17 ADVERTISE WITH US........................................................................................................................................................................19 -
Crypto Research Report ‒ April 2019 Edition
April 2019 Edition VI. “When the Tide Goes Out…” Investments: Gold and Bitcoin, Stronger Together Technical Analysis: Spring Awakening? Cryptocurrency Mining in Theory and Practice Demelza Kelso Hays Mark J. Valek We would like to express our profound gratitude to our premium partners for supporting the Crypto Research Report: www.cryptofunds.li Contents Editorial ............................................................................................................................................... 4 In Case You Were Sleeping: When the Tide Goes Out…............................................................... 5 Back to the Roots ............................................................................................................................................. 6 How Long Will This Bear Market Last .............................................................................................................. 7 A Tragic Story Traverses the World ................................................................................................................. 9 When the tide goes out… ............................................................................................................................... 10 A State Cryptocurrency? ................................................................................................................................ 12 Support is Increasing ..................................................................................................................................... 14 -
Bypassing Non-Outsourceable Proof-Of-Work Schemes Using Collateralized Smart Contracts
Bypassing Non-Outsourceable Proof-of-Work Schemes Using Collateralized Smart Contracts Alexander Chepurnoy1;2, Amitabh Saxena1 1 Ergo Platform [email protected], [email protected] 2 IOHK Research [email protected] Abstract. Centralized pools and renting of mining power are considered as sources of possible censorship threats and even 51% attacks for de- centralized cryptocurrencies. Non-outsourceable Proof-of-Work schemes have been proposed to tackle these issues. However, tenets in the folk- lore say that such schemes could potentially be bypassed by using es- crow mechanisms. In this work, we propose a concrete example of such a mechanism which is using collateralized smart contracts. Our approach allows miners to bypass non-outsourceable Proof-of-Work schemes if the underlying blockchain platform supports smart contracts in a sufficiently advanced language. In particular, the language should allow access to the PoW solution. At a high level, our approach requires the miner to lock collateral covering the reward amount and protected by a smart contract that acts as an escrow. The smart contract has logic that allows the pool to collect the collateral as soon as the miner collects any block reward. We propose two variants of the approach depending on when the collat- eral is bound to the block solution. Using this, we show how to bypass previously proposed non-outsourceable Proof-of-Work schemes (with the notable exception for strong non-outsourceable schemes) and show how to build mining pools for such schemes. 1 Introduction Security of Bitcoin and many other cryptocurrencies relies on so called Proof-of- Work (PoW) schemes (also known as scratch-off puzzles), which are mechanisms to reach fast consensus and guarantee immutability of the ledger. -
A Behavioral Economics Approach to Regulating Initial Coin Offerings
A Behavioral Economics Approach to Regulating Initial Coin Offerings NATHAN J. SHERMAN* INTRODUCTION Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are an outgrowth of the cryptocurrency space in which companies raise capital by issuing their own cryptocurrency coin to investors. Although ICOs are an innovative method of raising capital, the growth of the ICO market is troubling considering no investor protection regulations govern the ICO process. Investors pour large amounts of money into these offerings, which are issued by companies that typically have no history of producing a product or revenue, and the prices of coins issued in ICOs are only rising because other investors also funnel money into them.1 This pattern is markedly similar to that of a speculative bubble. A speculative bubble occurs when there are “‘unsustainable increases’ in asset prices caused by investors trading on a pattern of price increases rather than information on fundamental values.”2 In a bubble, “smart money”—informed investors—bid up prices in anticipation of “noise traders” entering the market.3 The noise traders then enter the market due to the psychological biases they encounter in making their investment decisions.4 Eventually, the smart money investors sell their holdings and the bubble bursts. 5 Thus, regulators should create a framework that adequately protects investors in ICOs. The behavioral economics theory of bounded rationality provides insights for building this regulatory framework. Bounded rationality implies that humans make suboptimal choices.6 By understanding the psychological biases that influence investors’ choices, regulators will be able to help investors adopt habits that reduce the harmful effects of speculative bubbles. -
Liquidity Or Leakage Plumbing Problems with Cryptocurrencies
Liquidity Or Leakage Plumbing Problems With Cryptocurrencies March 2018 Liquidity Or Leakage - Plumbing Problems With Cryptocurrencies Liquidity Or Leakage Plumbing Problems With Cryptocurrencies Rodney Greene Quantitative Risk Professional Advisor to Z/Yen Group Bob McDowall Advisor to Cardano Foundation Distributed Futures 1/60 © Z/Yen Group, 2018 Liquidity Or Leakage - Plumbing Problems With Cryptocurrencies Foreword Liquidity is the probability that an asset can be converted into an expected amount of value within an expected amount of time. Any token claiming to be ‘money’ should be very liquid. Cryptocurrencies often exhibit high price volatility and wide spreads between their buy and sell prices into fiat currencies. In other markets, such high volatility and wide spreads might indicate low liquidity, i.e. it is difficult to turn an asset into cash. Normal price falls do not increase the number of sellers but should increase the number of buyers. A liquidity hole is where price falls do not bring out buyers, but rather generate even more sellers. If cryptocurrencies fail to provide easy liquidity, then they fail as mediums of exchange, one of the principal roles of money. However, there are a number of ways of assembling a cryptocurrency and a number of parameters, such as the timing of trades, the money supply algorithm, and the assembling of blocks, that might be done in better ways to improve liquidity. This research should help policy makers look critically at what’s needed to provide good liquidity with these exciting systems. Michael Parsons FCA Chairman, Cardano Foundation, Distributed Futures 2/60 © Z/Yen Group, 2018 Liquidity Or Leakage - Plumbing Problems With Cryptocurrencies Contents Foreword .............................................................................................................. -
Transparent and Collaborative Proof-Of-Work Consensus
StrongChain: Transparent and Collaborative Proof-of-Work Consensus Pawel Szalachowski, Daniël Reijsbergen, and Ivan Homoliak, Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD); Siwei Sun, Institute of Information Engineering and DCS Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/szalachowski This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium. August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA 978-1-939133-06-9 Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX. StrongChain: Transparent and Collaborative Proof-of-Work Consensus Pawel Szalachowski1 Daniel¨ Reijsbergen1 Ivan Homoliak1 Siwei Sun2;∗ 1Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD) 2Institute of Information Engineering and DCS Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences Abstract a cryptographically-protected append-only list [2] is intro- duced. This list consists of transactions grouped into blocks Bitcoin is the most successful cryptocurrency so far. This and is usually referred to as a blockchain. Every active pro- is mainly due to its novel consensus algorithm, which is tocol participant (called a miner) collects transactions sent based on proof-of-work combined with a cryptographically- by users and tries to solve a computationally-hard puzzle in protected data structure and a rewarding scheme that incen- order to be able to write to the blockchain (the process of tivizes nodes to participate. However, despite its unprece- solving the puzzle is called mining). When a valid solution dented success Bitcoin suffers from many inefficiencies. For is found, it is disseminated along with the transactions that instance, Bitcoin’s consensus mechanism has been proved to the miner wishes to append. -
3Rd Global Cryptoasset Benchmarking Study
3RD GLOBAL CRYPTOASSET BENCHMARKING STUDY Apolline Blandin, Dr. Gina Pieters, Yue Wu, Thomas Eisermann, Anton Dek, Sean Taylor, Damaris Njoki September 2020 supported by Disclaimer: Data for this report has been gathered primarily from online surveys. While every reasonable effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the data collected, the research team cannot exclude potential errors and omissions. This report should not be considered to provide legal or investment advice. Opinions expressed in this report reflect those of the authors and not necessarily those of their respective institutions. TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORDS ..................................................................................................................................................4 RESEARCH TEAM ..........................................................................................................................................6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... 11 METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................................ 14 SECTION 1: INDUSTRY GROWTH INDICATORS .........................................................................17 Employment figures ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................17 -
Evolutionary Game for Mining Pool Selection in Blockchain
1 Evolutionary Game for Mining Pool Selection in Blockchain Networks Xiaojun Liu∗†, Wenbo Wang†, Dusit Niyato†, Narisa Zhao∗ and Ping Wang† ∗Institute of Systems Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China, 116024 †School of Computer Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 639798 Abstract—In blockchain networks adopting the proof-of-work studies [3] have shown that the Nakamoto protocol is able schemes, the monetary incentive is introduced by the Nakamoto to guarantee the persistence and liveness of a blockchain in consensus protocol to guide the behaviors of the full nodes (i.e., a Byzantine environment. In other words, when a majority block miners) in the process of maintaining the consensus about the blockchain state. The block miners have to devote their of the mining nodes honestly follow the Nakamoto protocol, computation power measured in hash rate in a crypto-puzzle the transactional data on the blockchain are guaranteed to be solving competition to win the reward of publishing (a.k.a., immutable once they are recorded. mining) new blocks. Due to the exponentially increasing difficulty In the Nakamoto protocol, the financial incentive mecha- of the crypto-puzzle, individual block miners tends to join mining nism consists of two parts: (a) a computation-intensive crypto- pools, i.e., the coalitions of miners, in order to reduce the income variance and earn stable profits. In this paper, we study the puzzle solving process to make Sybil attacks financially unaf- dynamics of mining pool selection in a blockchain network, where fordable, and (b) a reward generation process to award the mining pools may choose arbitrary block mining strategies. -
Fraud & White Collar Crime 2019
FRAUD & WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2019 EXPERT GUIDE www.corporatelivewire.com 33 CHANCERY LANE Expert Guide | Fraud & White Collar Crime 2019 Alma Angotti United Kingdom | United States [email protected] UK: +44 (0) 20 7550 4604 | US: +1 202 481 8398 www.navigant.com The ability to trace transactions on the blockchain allows for the identification of the originating cryptocurrency wallet address and the beneficiary cryptocurrency wallet address. Elizabeth Sisul Bitcoin is said to offer “pseudo-anonymity” because it United States [email protected] is often difficult to connect the cryptocurrency wallet +1 646 227 4725 www.navigant.com addresses with real-world individuals and entities. Brandy Schindler United States 1. Money Laundering Risks ability to move private keys across borders with a piece of paper [email protected] in his or her pocket, or by handing off that piece of paper to a co- +1 646 227 4881 I. Pseudo-anonymity/Anonymity conspirator crossing a border. www.navigant.com Many erroneously believe that the most popular cryptocurren- The ability to easily move money across borders facilitates the cies, including bitcoin, offer complete anonymity to its users. In layering3 stage of money laundering. Bad actors may leverage reality, bitcoin transactions can be traced on the bitcoin block- the ability to conduct cross-border transactions in order to direct chain. The ability to trace transactions on the blockchain allows complex transactions through multiple countries and/or through Key Considerations and Risk Management Practices in Building for the identification of the originating cryptocurrency wallet countries with weak regulatory frameworks. In addition, the in- address and the beneficiary cryptocurrency wallet address. -
A View from Mining Pools
1 Measurement and Analysis of the Bitcoin Networks: A View from Mining Pools Canhui Wang, Graduate Student Member, IEEE, Xiaowen Chu, Senior Member, IEEE, and Qin Yang, Senior Member, IEEE Abstract—Bitcoin network, with the market value of $68 billion as of January 2019, has received much attention from both industry and the academy. Mining pools, the main components of the Bitcoin network, dominate the computing resources and play essential roles in network security and performance aspects. Although many existing measurements of the Bitcoin network are available, little is known about the details of mining pool behaviors (e.g., empty blocks, mining revenue and transaction collection strategies) and their effects on the Bitcoin end users (e.g., transaction fees, transaction delay and transaction acceptance rate). This paper aims to fill this gap with a systematic study of mining pools. We traced over 1.56 hundred thousand blocks (including about 257 million historical transactions) from February 2016 to January 2019 and collected over 120.25 million unconfirmed transactions from March 2018 to January 2019. Then we conducted a board range of measurements on the pool evolutions, labeled transactions (blocks) as well as real-time network traffics, and discovered new interesting observations and features. Specifically, our measurements show the following. 1) A few mining pools entities continuously control most of the computing resources of the Bitcoin network. 2) Mining pools are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma where mining pools compete to increase their computing resources even though the unit profit of the computing resource decreases. 3) Mining pools are stuck in a Malthusian trap where there is a stage at which the Bitcoin incentives are inadequate for feeding the exponential growth of the computing resources. -
Balaci 18 U.S.C
2017R00326/DVIF/APT/JLH UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Hon. Claire C. Cecchi V. Crim. No. 19-877 (05) SILVIU CATALIN BALACI 18 U.S.C. § 371 SUPERSEDING INFORMATION The defendant, Silviu Catalin Balaci, having waived in open court prosecution by Indictment, the United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey charges: BACKGROUND 1. At times relevant to this Superseding Information: Individuals and Entities a. BitClub Network ("BCN") was a worldwide fraudulent scheme that solicited money from investors in exchange for shares of pooled investments in cryptocurrency mining and that rewarded existing investors for recruiting new investors. b. Defendant SILVIU CATALIN BALACI assisted in creating and operating BCN and served as programmer for BCN. c. Coconspirator Matthew Brent Goettsche created and operated BCN. d. Coconspirator Russ Albert Medlin created, operated, and promoted BCN. e. Coconspirator Jobadiah Sinclair Weeks promoted BCN. f. Coconspirator Joseph Frank Abel promoted BCN. Relevant Terminology g. "Cryptocurrency" was a digital representation of value that could be traded and functioned as a medium of exchange; a unit of account; and a store of value. Its value was decided by consensus within the community of users of the cryptocurrency. h. "Bitcoin" was a type of cryptocurrency. Bitcoin were generated and controlled through computer software operating via a decentralized, peer-to-peer network. Bitcoin could be used for purchases or exchanged for other currency on currency exchanges. 1. "Mining" was the way new bitcoin were produced and the way bitcoin transactions were verified. Individuals or entities ran special computer software to solve complex algorithms that validated groups of transactions in a particular cryptocurrency. -
Blockchain (R)Evolution
AUGUST 2018 REPORT BLOCKCHAIN (R)EVOLUTION EXPLORING THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY BLOCKCHAIN (R)EVOLUTION INTRODUCTION Blockchain technology is generating a great deal of excitement as organizations consider its potential implications. Companies announcing blockchain-related initiatives have seen their stock prices spike, and the technology has ushered in talk of new levels of security, data fidelity, and an immutable digital ledger that can serve everything from supply chain data to financial transaction records. Since its early applications in cryptocurrency, blockchain implementations have focused on keeping data secure by ensuring integrity. But the journey of blockchain technology now stretches far beyond Bitcoin. For businesses, blockchain implementations can change the game in terms of providing a secure way to store and track transactions, and they have sparked significant investment and interest, particularly in the financial services industry. As can be expected however, the growing interest in blockchain technology has impacted both the legitimate and illicit economies. Due to its decentralized nature, cryptocurrency and the anonymity it can offer have been leveraged by cybercriminals for years. Beyond that, the growing popularity of cryptocurrency among the public has made it more than just a payment mechanism. It is now a target, as attackers are increasingly deploying cryptomining software onto computers surreptitiously to make money. Looking ahead, innovation is certain — both for cybercriminals and corporations. In this paper, we will examine the past and present uses of blockchain technology, provide an inside look at the growing focus on cryptomining by attackers, and offer predictions of how the technology will have an impact on both the corporate world and the underworld.