DECEMBER 2019
“Year’s end is neither an end nor a beginning, but a going on. With all the wisdom that experience can instill in us.” -Hal Borland
MIDWEST RELIABILITY MATTERS Inside This Issue CEO MESSAGE
3 CEO Message
6 Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program
9 Registration, Certification and Standards
14 Tips and Lessons Learned
17 Bulk Power System Reliability
21 Security Corner
22 Outreach and Engagement
24 MRO Gives Back
28 Industry News and Events Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
CEO MESSAGE
Reflecting on 2019 Finishing A Successful And Seamless Transition
For me, the month of December lends itself to both personal and professional reflection. Annual holiday gatherings with friends and family serve as reminders of the inevitable passage of time. Children grow, families change, traditions evolve, old memories are cherished, and new memories are made. Jack Kornfield, in Buddha’s Little Instruction Book, says, “The trouble is, you think you have time.” It’s this time of year that I contemplate and am grateful for all that I have, for the opportunities that have presented themselves over the years, both professionally and personally, and for the time I have been privileged to spend with others dedicated to supporting a reliable and secure North American bulk power system.
From a professional standpoint, as the year draws to a close, I reflect on the challenges we faced as an organization and all that we accomplished in 2019. We made steady progress towards our strategic priorities and achieved a great deal in just twelve short months. Most noteworthy is the completion of the remaining activities associated with the transition of registered entities and work from the former Southwest Power Pool Regional Entity. You might recall that several governance changes were made in 2018 to encourage participation from entities across our newly expanded footprint—four members were added to the MRO Board of Directors, the board was restructured to facilitate greater alignment and coordination with its organizational groups, and MRO’s organizational group structure was reinvented to be more effective and efficient—with all of these changes fully implemented in 2019.
3 CEO Message
In rethinking MRO’s organizational group structure, staff used the existing MRO Security Advisory Council as a template for creating more engagement and leveraging the technical expertise of industry stakeholders. The Compliance, Operations, Planning and Standards Committees were retired and replaced by the CMEP Advisory Council and Reliability Advisory Council, which began work in 2019 and have far exceeded initial performance expectations. In addition to providing critical input on regional risk, the three advisory councils more than doubled the amount of outreach conducted in 2019 to promote awareness and share information across the region.
Tasked with overseeing the advisory councils, the board’s new “What we accomplished Organizational Group Oversight Committee (OGOC) met in person in 2019 demonstrates a during the first three quarters of the year with one of the three advisory councils. These meetings enabled closer coordination between the commitment to our vision, board and council members on work activities and deliverables. In the and is a reflection of fourth quarter, the OGOC met with chairs and vice chairs of all three advisory councils in a strategic planning session to discuss regional the smart, talented and risk and determine the appropriate areas of focus for the advisory extraordinary people that councils in 2020. This meeting was the first of its kind for MRO, bringing together members of the board, staff, and technical experts I am privileged to work from our industry stakeholders to holistically consider how we address with—both at MRO and risk and execute our work in a collaborative, effective and efficient manner that supports our shared vision of a highly reliable and secure across the entire ERO North American bulk power system. By all accounts, it was a huge ecosystem.” success.
Also in November 2019, the compliance and enforcement authority responsibilities for Southwest Power Pool were transferred from NERC to MRO. This effort, in addition to expanding the board and standing up the advisory councils, was the final milestone related to the transition of entities from the former SPP RE to MRO. While integration efforts continue, I can proudly say that a successful and seamless transition has been completed.
What we accomplished in 2019 demonstrates a commitment to our vision, and is a reflection of the smart, talented and extraordinary people that I am privileged to work with—both at MRO and across the entire ERO ecosystem. It has been an incredibly strong year; credit which is owed to many—our staff, board members, industry stakeholder partners, and colleagues across the ERO Enterprise. Thank you for your continued support!
However you celebrate the holiday season, on behalf of everyone here at MRO, I wish you and your loved ones happiness, laughter, peace and good health. I look forward to all we will accomplish together in the year ahead.
Our future is bright!
-Sara Patrick, MRO President and CEO
4 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
Employee Spotlight
Please join us in weloming the following individuals to the MRO Team:
Dr. Uttam Adhikari joined MRO’s Risk Assessment and Mitigation Department as an engineer in the Operations and Planning area. Uttam joined MRO from PEAK Reliability, where he had experience as an EMS Application Engineer. Uttam has a PhD in Electrical and Computer Engineering.
Tasha Ward joined MRO as Senior Enforcement Attorney and Corporate Counsel. Tasha began her le- gal career as a Judicial Law Clerk for The Honorable Jim Gunter, Associate Justice Arkansas Supreme Court. She has extensive enforcement experience having worked for both SERC and the Southwest Power Pool Regional Entity (SPP RE) as an enforcement attorney. Most recently she had the opportunity to gain experience from the point of view of a registered entity as SPP’s Lead Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Specialist.
MRO is hiring! We currently have the following open positions on our website:
• Manager of Compliance, Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) • Manager of Compliance, Operations and Planning • Risk Assessment and Mitigation Engineer, CIP Sr, II or III • Compliance Engineer, CIP Senior II or III • Compliance Engineer, Ops & Planning, Senior II or III
Watch our Why Work For MRO video to learn more about us. To apply, visit the Careers Page on our website or visit us on LinkedIn.
Happy Holidays From MRO! Click to view our 2019 Holiday Greeting
5 Compliance monitoring and enforcement program
COMPLIANCE MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
Development and Deployment of Internal Controls
Building on Julie Sikes’ internal controls article found in the October 2019 issue of Midwest Reliability Matters, the Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program Advisory Council (CMEPAC) will write a series of internal control articles that will be supplemented by forthcoming webinars. This article begins our series by suggesting how an entity could identify its highest risk standards and requirements, and develop documented internal controls that can be employed to reasonably assure compliance expectations are being met.
NERC published the 2020 Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program Implementation Plan (CMEP IP), which lists 7 risk elements identifying 29 Reliability Standards and 42 requirements as “ERO Enterprise-wide risks to reliability.” MRO published its 2020 Self-Certification Schedule and Timeline based on the list of 2020 CMEP IP standards and requirements. Each registered entity should review these documents to identify which applicable standards and requirements introduce the greatest risks to reliability, and focus on building sound internal controls to mitigate (or reduce) these risks. Each registered entity can expand on this list for areas that present a higher risk within its company (i.e., use of Operating Instructions). Working with its list of higher risk standards and requirements (selected by NERC/MRO and the registered entity), the registered entity can now develop and apply sound internal controls to assure that compliance objectives are met.
Sikes explained that there are three types of internal controls that registered entities should employ: preventative, detective and corrective. Simply defined as:
• Preventive: An internal control designed to avoid an unintended event or consequence. Example: using a recurring reminder to ensure that all review dates are met within described timelines established by a requirement. 6 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
• Detective: An internal control designed to identify errors or deviations from the norm. Example: scheduled review of maintenance evidence and finding a section of a maintenance checklist that was overlooked or incomplete.
• Corrective: An internal control designed to fix a problem that may have risen. Example: triggering a self-report and mitigation plan process when a requirement objective has not been met.
All internal controls should identify the following items, which make up the internal control (based on past Performance Risk and Oversite Subcommittee).
1. Risk Identification 2. Control Objective 3. Control Activity 4. Risk Triggers 5. Sample Size
A brief example of an internal control for reviewing Operating Instructions (OIs) could be:
1. Risk Identified: The failure to use three-part communication when issuing or receiving an OI may lead to a misunderstanding and attribute to a Bulk Electric System (BES) event.
2. Control Objective: Assuring that system operators will employ three-part communication for all BES related written and verbal interactions.
3. Control Activity (preventive): Annually train all system operators on issuing and receiving OIs using three- part communication. Control Activity (detective): Review a sample of voice recordings three times per year to assure Compliance obligations are being met for emergency communications. Control Activity (corrective): Performance discussion and retraining of an operator that did not follow three-part communication protocol
7 Compliance monitoring and enforcement program
4. Risk Triggers: • A new System Operator that: i. Was not fully trained in issuing and receiving OIs using three-part communication. ii. Is unaware of who can issue an OI to them. • A System Operator that works more than five consecutive night shifts.
5. Sample size: 100% (usually for a population less than 9).
These items should be documented within a registered entity’s internal control program and the implementation and results of a registered entity’s internal controls should be clearly recorded. These documented internal controls can then be repeated, and shows that the registered entity is striving to make security and reliability a priority by focusing on their identified highest risk requirements.
-Joe DePoorter, Chair, Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program Advisory Council
About the Author
Joe DePoorter joined Madison Gas and Electric Company (MGE) in 2001 after a 21 year career in the U.S. Marine Corps. He started as a Distribution Operator, gaining his Reliability Coordinator NERC System Operator certificate in 2003. He then transitioned to being a System Operator for the MGE Control Area, mainly working in the functional areas of Reliability, Balancing and Generation Operations. When MGE became a Midcontinent ISO Market Participant, De- Poorter was instrumental at assuring that the Balancing Authority functions were equally divided between the Midcontinent ISO and MGE (along with other Mar- ket Participants).
Early in 2007, DePoorter took the position of Manager – Reliability Compliance. Since that time, he has volunteered to be a member of the NERC Readiness Evaluation team, became the Vice Chair of Project 2009- 01, Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting Standard Drafting Team, chairs the Midcontinent ISO Balancing Authority Committee, chairs MRO’s NERC Standards Review Forum, chaired MRO’s Performance and Risk Oversight Subcommittee, and has presented at NERC and MRO Compliance and Standards workshops, as well at NERC Member and Board meetings. DePoorter has personally briefed several FERC Chairs and multiple FERC Commissioners on many occasions, all con- cerning the impacts of NERC Reliability Standards and on small (low risk) entities.
DePoorter is now Director – NERC Compliance and Generations Operations for MGE, where he has established a strong set of internal controls that systematically review compliance evidence in order to reasonably assure that MGE’s positive compliance posture is not weakened.
He holds a BA degree from Campbell University with a focus in Management and a minor in Economics.
8 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
REGISTRATION, CERTIFICATION AND STANDARDS
Managing High-Population Standards
Definition
The term “high-population standards” is not an officially defined term in the NERC Glossary or any other source, but is used somewhat casually within the ERO Enterprise to describe standards that require entities to manage large populations of items and associated data. A prime example of a high-population standard is FAC-008-3, which requires management of data pertaining to Bulk Electric System (BES) Facilities and the Elements and components that comprise them for the purpose of maintaining accurate Facility Ratings for use in planning and operating the bulk power system (BPS).
Additional NERC standards that deal with large populations are listed in the following table, along with the items or data that lead to the large populations.
9 Registration, certification and standards
It is apparent that several other standards could be added to this list, but these were chosen because they have been enforceable for some time and have acquired a history of noncompliance and mitigation that many entities will be familiar with. In general, high-population standards tend to be the ones that deal with BPS Facilities directly, as opposed to those that deal with Control Centers or the work of entity staff in planning or operating the BPS. Larger entities will typically have larger populations to manage, but it is helpful to both large and small entities to recognize that there are challenges associated with management of any population, and that there are some basic principles that can be applied in this management work.
Population Management Challenges
There are many challenges associated with management of large populations of equipment and data, but in MRO’s experience working with registered entities, there are a few in particular that stand out as being most impactful. Proactively addressing these challenges can help reduce the likelihood of noncompliance with these standards.
• Adapting to Changing Populations. Populations change when BPS Facilities are constructed, retired, or acquired from another owner. Keeping records up to date through various changes to the system requires extra diligence.
• Integrating legacy data systems. Record-keeping platforms that are obsolete or just difficult to integrate are often inherited from mergers or from acquired Facilities or assets. Successful integration of these platforms is essential to keeping intact the ability to manage the expanded population.
• Sustaining adequately trained staff. Even the best population management processes and tools require ongoing training efforts as staff rotate through varying responsibilities and as standards evolve.
• Interfacing with neighbors. The line between where your population ends and your neighbor’s population begins is often difficult to distinguish. It is important to have awareness of such border areas and mutual understandings with your neighbors about them.
Population Management Solutions
In an attempt to break down and study solutions for the above challenges, we will begin by characterizing the types of work done by entities in two main categories: Getting it right, and keeping it right. When a weakness in the management of large populations is identified, either by the entity or through compliance monitoring, the work of getting it right begins. This often takes the form of database consolidation projects, comprehensive data validation projects, or launching new programs for training. Many such projects are initiated by entities outside of the context of any compliance monitoring or enforcement, and can be very effective at preventing noncompliance with NERC standards. When the motivation is a response to a noncompliance, early identification of the noncompliance can have a limiting effect on the associated risk to the BPS.
Once the systems and data are all put in order, the ongoing work of keeping it right proceeds. A few examples include comprehensive change management programs, ongoing data validation through sampling, and implementation of tools to detect variations from expected conditions. This work is very much aligned with the concept of internal controls, whether preventative or detective.
Traits of Effective Population Management
To further the discussion of population management solutions, we have assembled a set of traits that we find are associated with successful population management.
• Accurate Data. This is the core of what we are trying to accomplish. Inaccurate data associated with any of the standards identified above would pose a risk to the BES and would likely constitute a noncompliance.
10 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
• Clear and complete presentation of data. Often, a failure to maintain accurate data is simply a case of mistaken identity. Data systems must “In addition to the obvious clearly present data and context to the user such that the data cannot be confused with other data or be misinterpreted. Furthermore, during an and important benefit of audit or engagement with MRO, clear and complete data directly from the source will greatly enhance the efficiency of the interaction with MRO staff. improving the reliability of
• Accessible data and tools. There are often a variety of individuals in an the BPS, implementation of organization whose work functions require varying levels of access to effective data management the data and tools in these systems. Having proper awareness of which positions require access to which elements of the system can help an for large populations organization ensure that its work will not be hampered unnecessarily. helps entities to prevent Naturally, since these systems likely contain Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII) and/or BES Cyber System Information (BCSI), noncompliance with NERC policies should ensure that access be limited to only those with proper standards.” authorizations.
• Logical process and tool architecture. Processes and tools that are successful at keeping track of large populations appear to be harmonized with the work being performed by the entity’s personnel as they inspect, maintain, record, document, or otherwise interact with the population. Additionally, a well-engineered system (e.g., intuitive user interface, tasks accomplishable efficiently) can help keep its user community engaged and thus keep the tool “used and useful.”
• Scalable capacity of processes and tools. It is important to be aware of possible future expansion of the capabilities of the tools used to track an entity’s populations and understand the scalability limitations of a tool being used or considered.
• Robust tools. A robust system is one that retains integrity of its data over time and functions reliably, with minimal errors or downtime. Data integrity is enhanced by having comprehensive input validation schemes and data integrity checking mechanisms. System reliability has many influences, but thorough testing before deployment is one measure that can help to ensure productivity and satisfaction among the user community.
• Effective training programs. Through the procurement of systems and assignment of resources to maintain data, the investments in “keeping it right” can be substantial. A well-trained staff can help reduce the total effort required to maintain the systems and the data. Developing effective training materials and remaining cognizant of circumstances necessitating the delivery of training can help ensure that the evolving team’s knowledge and skills are established and kept up to date over time.
Benefits of Effective Data Management
In addition to the obvious and important benefit of improving the reliability of the BPS, implementation of effective data management for large populations helps entities to prevent noncompliance with NERC standards. When violations do occur, the ability to self-identify the issues is improved through the application of the general concepts outlined above.
Working with MRO on audits and on mitigation of noncompliance can be made much more efficient if the right tools and processes are in place.
-Adam Flink, Senior Risk Assessment and Mitigation Engineer and Mark Flanary, Risk Assessment and Mitigation Principal
11 Registration, certification and standards
Functional Mapping Understanding Relationships Between Entities
Functional mapping provides the ERO Enterprise a better understanding of the important relationships between registered entities. Through mapping, we are assured that the owners of all bulk electric system assets have been identified, as well as those entities responsible for maintenance, operations, planning, and security. As a registered entity, you need to ensure that all functional relationships related to the assets you own are identified. You also need to know if another entity has responsibility over any of your assets, or if you have responsibility over another entity’s assets.
NERC is replacing the common registration form with the Centralized Organization Registration ERO Systems (CORES) application. CORES will supplement the Align tool with registration data for all registered entities. CORES has extended functionality beyond the legacy webCDMS, currently used by MRO and some of the other Regional Entities. One additional area of functionality added to registration in CORES is the identification of functional relationships between registered entities. The current version of CORES only identifies relationships between functional entities, and not relationships at the asset level. Providing this information in CORES is a relatively simple task since registered owners have been providing this information to MRO, down to the asset level, through the submittal of Facility Verification forms.
The NERC Rules of Procedure address only the required functional relationships and not secondary relationships (those that require one function to provide data to another function). For example, all transmission
12 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
Facilities are under the responsibility and control of one, and only one, Transmission Planner, Planning Authority/Planning Coordinator, and Transmission Operator. MRO staff has been able to identify secondary relationships through the use of the Facility Verification forms.
A number of Reliability Standards require functional entities to support other functional entities in some fashion, like providing data or taking an action to preserve the reliability of the bulk power system. For example, a Balancing Authority (BA) balances the loads and resources within its respective area. By identifying the owners of the generators and the loads, BAs understand which entity has the necessary data to perform specific tasks. The Reliability Standards grant BAs the authority to request this data in order to meet its responsibilities as a BA.
Transmission Planners (TP) are required to develop and verify a long-term planning model for the transmission systems within its portion of the Planning Authority area. The TP must accurately model all existing Facilities interconnected to its system, in addition to planned modifications. Like the BA, the TP is granted the authority to request data from other registered entities through the Reliability Standards. Without this information, TP models are neither accurate, nor complete. All owners of loads and generation interconnected to a transmission Facility are expected to provide the TP with facility data. This provides the TPs the data needed to build and verify planning models. In each of these examples, the Reliability Standards place an obligation on these secondary relationships to support other functions.
The Facility Verification form identifies the transmission Facility that a generator is interconnected with, however, it does not identify the secondary relationships with a TP. Identification of the TP that a Generator Owner must support, can be done through identification of the owner of the Transmission Facility the Generator Owner interconnects with.
The planning standards require the TP to request data from all interconnected generators. The TP utilizes this data to build the transmission area models. This is the “who” in reference to “its” TP found in the Reliability Standards. In this case, the TP is not performing transmission planning on behalf of a Generator Owner. The Generator Owner does not “own” an interconnected bulk electric transmission system. However, the Generator Owner is providing supporting data to the TP of the interconnected transmission Facility. This ensures the TP has the necessary data to develop and verify its models.
During the first quarter of 2020, MRO will be contacting each registered entity to assist in the identification of functional relationships. Entities registered for more than one function do not need to identify functional relationships within itself under the same NERC Compliance Registry ID. MRO will work with registered entities in 2020 to update their functional relationships and to answer any questions related to CORES.Questions related to CORES should be directed to [email protected].
-Russ Mountjoy, Manager, Registration, Certification and Standards
To view a copy of NERC’s most recent Standards, Compliance and Enforcement Bulletin, click HERE.
13 TIPS and lessons learned
TIPS AND LESSONS LEARNED CIP-014-2 Physical Security Requirement R1 Audits
The purpose of the Physical Security Standard, CIP-014-2, is “To identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.”
In the 2019 CMEP Implementation Plan, CIP-014-2 was one of the standards identified as an “area of focus.” As a result of this identification as an ERO-wide risk, MRO prioritized monitoring of CIP-014-2 and MRO audit staff have been regularly auditing the standard this year. Both MRO CIP and O&P audit teams are involved in the audit of CIP-014-2 as it covers a wide range of topics and requires expertise from both groups. This article intends to outline recommendations, Areas of Concern, and some common root causes of noncompliance that MRO has observed while auditing requirement R1 of the CIP-014-2 standard. This article also presents suggested best practices and study methodologies for consideration when developing your next risk assessment study.
CIP-014-2 R1 requires that Transmission Owners (TOs) “perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1.” The analyses shall be “designed to identify the Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.” For TOs that previously identified one or more such transmission stations or transmission substations as critical, the risk assessments shall be performed at least once every 30 calendar months, or at least once every 60 calendar months if the TO has not previously identified any critical transmission stations or transmission substations. As a result, MRO anticipates there may be a significant number of risk assessment studies performed by TOs in 2020, and we hope this article is timely and useful.
While reviewing CIP-014-2 R1, the audit team looks to see if the TO developed and used reasonable criteria, study methodology, and assumptions that help identify transmission stations and transmission substations which, if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of physical attack, could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading. Requirement R2 of CIP-014-2 necessitates an unaffiliated third party verification for risk assessments performed under requirement R1. While the third party verifications are an important part of the review process, MRO’s approach is to review the third party verification, and where needed, perform a deeper dive into the assumptions or details of the base study. For example, if a TO employs optimistic study assumptions, the audit team may inquire to understand the rationale.
To provide clarification and transparency, MRO prepared the following list of key considerations for inclusion in a risk assessment study that the MRO audit team would expect to see:
1. A dynamic study in addition to the steady state analysis. The TO should also develop criteria for steady state and dynamic studies to help identify instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading. 2. Simulate loss of an entire substation, i.e., a “smoking crater” scenario. As a result, remove all lines out
14 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
of the substation in the steady state and dynamic analysis. If the TO is aware of a substation that causes a more severe problem for partial outage, simulate that contingency, in addition to the smoking crater scenario. 3. While simulating a three-phase fault at the impacted substation, use delayed remote clearing (assume local communication equipment at the impacted facility is not available regardless of redundancy). 4. If using a generic time for delayed remote fault clearing as a screening method for dynamic simulation, the time delay should be conservative and cover the “lowest common denominator.” 5. Monitor beyond your footprint for the impact of the loss of entire substation in the steady state and dynamic simulation, particularly if the impacted substation is near the edge of your system. 6. If there are problems in the base case, ensure model fixes are applied prior to conducting the study. 7. Ensure the study is capable of testing the criteria developed to identify when there is cascading, instability, or uncontrolled separation.
The following are some additional best practices to consider when completing a risk assessment study:
1. TOs without critical substations should consider adding a five-year out model to its risk assessment, as it will conduct the study every 60 months rather than every 30 months. 2. Consider adding or choosing models that show your system under stress (for example: winter peak, summer peak, spring light load, shoulder, high wind, high transfer, etc.) 3. Consider the impact of any Undervoltage Load Shedding (UVLS) schemes, automatic underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) and Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) when conducting the assessment study. 4. Monitor voltage and frequency at generator buses to see if generator protection will be triggered. 5. Consider that a “one size fits all” criteria may not be sufficient to identify cascading, instability, or uncontrolled separation on your system. For example, criteria used by another TO might not fit your footprint without some modifications or customization. 6. While conducting the study, consider removing physically contiguous or physically close substations simultaneously. This may be a reality and the combined effect of the substations may result in Cascading, instability, or uncontrolled separation that would otherwise go unrecognized. 7. Make your criteria specific and measurable rather than abstract. You should be able to apply the criteria to the study and analyze whether or not the criteria is met. Based on the output of the steady state simulation, dynamic simulation, and application of your criteria, the audit team should reach the same conclusion. 8. Document the assumptions used in the study. 9. When updating a model in preparation for the study, consider the impact of future transmission reinforcements on both your system and your neighbors’ system. 10. Run the simulation for no less than 10 seconds (preferably 20 seconds). 11. Document consequential and nonconsequential load and generation loss in the steady state and dynamic simulation. Also, incorporate the load and generation impact from the dynamic simulation as a starting point for the steady state study.
If there are any questions, please feel free to contact [email protected].
-Sam Zewdie, Compliance Engineer
15 TIPS and lessons learned Compliance Exception Mitigating Activity Verification
Periodically, the Compliance Monitoring Department (Compliance) at MRO assists the Risk Assessment & Mitigation (RAM) Department with verifying the completion of mitigating activities for Compliance Exceptions. Compliance Exceptions are violations that pose minimal risk to the bulk power system, and generally have mitigating activities with low complexity. For all violations, RAM will work with the registered entity to perform a Risk Determination, and it’s within the Risk Determination where the mitigating activities are listed.
When choosing which Compliance Exceptions to verify, Compliance will perform sampling from a given population. The population is determined based on when a registered entity certifies mitigating activities have been completed, with the timeframe for selection generally consisting of the previous two calendar quarters. For example, the most recent verification effort kicked off on October 1, 2019, and consisted of Compliance Exceptions with mitigating activities completed during the second and third quarters of 2019. Once Compliance has the population, sampling will occur following the ERO Sampling Guide, applying both statistical and risk- based methodologies.
With the sample set determined, Compliance staff will reach out to the registered entity’s Primary Compliance Contact, and let them know which Compliance Exception(s) have been sampled for verification. They will then provide a data request for supporting evidence that demonstrates that mitigating activities are complete. The turnaround time for the data request is typically two to three weeks, but MRO is open to working with the registered entity to accommodate an alternative due date. Upon return of the requested evidence, Compliance staff will review and complete their verification. When reasonable assurance can be obtained that supporting evidence from the registered entity shows completion of mitigating activities, a notification will be sent out by the RAM Administrator.
As a reminder, any data hold associated with the referenced instance of noncompliance will continue for 18 months from the date of the Compliance Exception notification. In the event that reasonable assurance cannot be obtained after multiple rounds of information gathering or Subject Matter Expert interviews, the matter will be escalated to Compliance, RAM, and Enforcement staff for further evaluation.
For questions on the Compliance Exception mitigating activity verification process, please contact [email protected].
-Rob Quinlan, CIP Compliance Engineer
MRO’s Self-Certification Schedule for Q2 of 2020 through Q1 of 2021 is now available on MRO’s website at https://mro.net/assurance/ComplianceMonitoring/ SelfCertifications/Pages/tools.aspx.
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BULK POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Photo by Sami Takarautio on Unsplash
Geomagnetic Disturbances Awareness and Preparedness Through TPL-007
Situational Awareness: One of the key aspects of electric system resiliency is answering the question: “What caused this outage?” Awareness of influencing factors like, storms, wind, heat, cold, etc., can help narrow exploration of event causes. But when no immediate influencing factors are present, more in-depth analysis is required and the process is prolonged. Awareness and preparation for unknown circumstances is the purpose of the NERC Reliability Standards related to Geomagnetic Disturbances (GMDs).
1859—The Carrington Event: Imagine you are a telegraph operator in 1859, sitting at your telegraph key when suddenly sparks start flying and papers catch on fire, leaving you in shock by the event. Telegraph operations across the system are impossible for several hours, and in some locations, for several days. Coincidently, the event occurred a few hours after an observation of a cluster of enormous black spots on the Sun’s surface by astronomer Richard Carrington. Witnesses around the world reported brilliant auroras, even at lower latitudes.
1921—New York Central Railway event: A severe disruption of the entire signaling system of the New York Central railway occurred and an aurora was visible in southern California. Railroad officials blamed the aurora; the connection between the auroral effects and the electrical disturbances was developing.
1989—Quebec Blackout: The entire province of Quebec was blacked-out due to the Geomagnetic Induced ground Currents (GIC) impacting system protection equipment, which tripped major transmission circuits from generation to load, causing severe system instability and eventual voltage collapse. Corrective measures to improve the system protection are made.
2011—NERC GMD Activities: Due to increasing concerns about the impacts of GMD on the electric power system causing large system blackouts, NERC forms a GMD Task Force (GMDTF) in 2011 to provide information and guidance on the assessment of such impacts. The GMDTF assembled various reports on some of the more severe disturbances to provide industry awareness of potential impacts. The GMDTF also facilitated research efforts through various scientific agencies, such as the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Department of Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), along with several utilities’ technical staff. The GMDTF developed a two-phase project plan to: (1) raise awareness of possible GMD impacts to system operators (phase I) and, (2) develop tools and strategies for assessing and mitigating
17 Bulk Power System Reliability
the impacts (Phase II). This plan was approved by FERC in Order 779.
2015—EOP-010-GMD Operations: Phase I efforts produced the EOP-010 standard, which became effective in 2015. This standard contains requirements regarding situational awareness (R2) that requires the Reliability Coordinator (RC) to notify system operators of an impending GMD event. The system operators are required to implement (in R1 and R3) an operating plan that contains pre-determined procedures that can mitigate or reduce the adverse impacts of GMD events.
2017—TPL-007-Planning for GMD events: Phase II of the GMDTF plan created the new NERC TPL-007 Standard to develop a better understanding of the possible impacts of GMD events and identify Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) to mitigate those impacts. The standard requires that an assessment be performed at regular intervals (R4 requires this evaluation every 5 years) by modeling (R2) the network and calculating (R5) the resultant GIC (Geomagnetically Induced Currents). Due to the significant cost and lead times needed to replace damaged Bulk Electric System power transformers, a thermal assessment (R6) must be conducted on each BES power transformers that may experience a maximum GIC of 75 or more amps. If the thermal assessment indicates an adverse impact, suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact must be included in the assessment.
Corrective Action Plans (CAPs): An important part of the recent TPL-007 changes is the requirement (R7) to have corrective action plans, for both benchmark and supplemental events, to mitigate any adverse impacts due to GMD events. The CAPs must be developed within one year after determination, following the completion of the GMD vulnerability assessments. Non-hardware solutions (e.g., operating procedures) should be implemented within two years of the completion of the CAP. Hardware solutions should be implemented with four years of completion of the CAP.
TPL-007—Ongoing Research: Phase II of the GMDTF plan includes continued research to better determine the physical effects of GMD impacts, and which of those effects causes the most adverse impacts and what mitigation can be implemented to reduce or eliminate those impacts. Obtaining data regarding real-time GIC
Source: https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/news/new-noaa-usgs-model-electrical-power-grid-operators 18 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019 values (R12) and geomagnetic field strength (R13) is required from field-based sensors. This data will be used to verify the modeling used in the GIC and transformer thermal analysis.
2018—The Steckelberg non-solar event: My wife and I are sitting in our sunroom on a nice, sunny, spring day when suddenly the lights went out. No storms, no wind, mild temperatures (no immediately present influencing factors). I think, “oh, oh…a solar GMD event?!” My initial response was tuning into a portable radio, but when I turned it on and the radio station was still playing good ‘ole country music…I said ”well, it wasn’t that!” It turned out a neighbor had decided to cut down a tree in his yard and it fell across the main, 3-phase feeder. Our awareness has begun. Now, are we prepared?
2022—Solar Storm 22-Gamma: Clayton, a transmission operator, receives a K-7 solar-event alert from his company’s Reliability Coordinator (RC), indicating that a large Coronal Mass Ejection (CME) has been ejected from the Sun towards the Earth, and based on the Planning Coordinator’s (PC) analysis, high GIC’s can be expected in the region. Clayton implements the operational procedures identified by the Transmission Planners for this type of event. Additional capacitors are switched on and a gas turbine is brought online in an area that expects high load that day in order to reduce the power flow on the transmission lines and transformers in the area. Clayton reports to the RC that the operating procedures have been implemented. Later, the GIC monitors indicate that 55 amps of GIC are flowing on the Riverview transformer, however, the oil temperature is well below the high-limit and although the voltage is a little low, the capacitors are providing a sufficient amount of vars at the substation. Operator’s log: Event 22-Gamma occurred today at 16:55 CST; no load-shedding was required; no voltage, temperature, or loading alarms (Operator CB@23:00, March 15, 2022).
TPL-007-4 Update: The NERC Project 2019-01 (TPL-007) posted materials for final ballot on TPL 007-4 from November 13-22. NERC Board approval is expected during its February 2020 meeting. Information can be found at the project page NERC Project 2019-01 (TPL-007) web page.
The requirements contained in TPL-007-4 will allow the collection of Geomagnetic Disturbance Events. These events may cause transformer hot-spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperations, the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout. As more information on these events are gathered the industry can better prepare and mitigate against significant events.
-Mike Steckelberg, Principal Engineer Transmission Planning and NERC SPIDERWG Rep. Great River Energy
About the Author
Mike Steckelberg is a Principal Engineer, Transmission Planning at Great River Energy with 35+ years of transmission planning experience. He has a Bache- lor of Electrical Engineering degree from the University of Minnesota with the emphasis in electrical power systems, and experience in power flow analysis including both steady state and dynamic (transient) stability simulations. Mike participates in the NERC GMD TF, several NERC standards development teams and the SPIDERWG as the MRO RAC representative. Mike’s present tasks include the study and review of system impact analyses of new gener- ation interconnections including coordination of new Distributed Energy Re- sources (DERs) on the GRE member cooperative distribution systems. Mike is the GRE subject matter expert for the FAC-014, NUC-001, and TPL-007 Standards and is responsible for developing internal processes at GRE for gathering data for the GMD analysis. His hobbies include astronomy and model railroading. He holds a Extra Class amateur radio operator license, K0MJS.
19 Bulk Power System Reliability Technical Workshop on Composite Load Modeling
On October 29, 2019, the NERC Load Modeling Task Force (LMTF) held an industry technical workshop for stakeholders to improve deployment and implementation of Composite Load Model (CMLD) on interconnection- wide basecase models across the MRO and ReliabilityFirst footprints. Planning Coordinators (PCs), Transmission Planners (TPs) and powerflow and dynamics case building entities from both regions reviewed existing load modeling practices and how explicit composite load modeling could significantly improve model accuracy for use in TPL-001-4 performance study of the bulk power system. NERC staff and speakers from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the Department of Energy (DOE), and two Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) discussed best practices and recommendations, including the demonstration of the NERC Load Model Data Tool to generate CMLD data with robust motor data set. The tool is designed to aid entities in generating CMLD data for use in power system dynamic simulation based on load composition estimates for various load types at seasonal and hourly profiles, economic use, and climate zones.
Additional information on the tool tutorial, load types, and materials from the workshop can be found on MRO’s website.
The overall objectives of the workshop included increasing understanding of dynamic load modeling, and field-testing the dynamic composite load models and benchmarking the result against known studies or events. Results from the field test provide MRO, NERC and industry subject matter experts with information needed to improve the load composition profiles for different types of loads, such as residential, business and industrial, based on geographic locations. This information is needed before formally releasing the tool for industry-wide use sometime in mid-2021.
Current practices and requirements do not mandate end-users to provide the load composition information for bulk power system operation and planning. Understanding the fundamental behavior of these loads is critical for accurate modeling and awareness of load performance. More information about the Load Modeling Task Force (LMTF) and Dynamic Load Modeling Technical Reference Document can be found on NERC’s website.
MRO staff are actively involved in the NERC LMTF and the Multiregional Modeling Working Group (MMWG) initiative to improve the load modeling representation of the Eastern Interconnection. Please contact mrorapa@ mro.net with any questions or comments regarding this CMLD modeling initiative.
-Salva Andiappan, Manager, Reliability Assessments and Performance Analysis
“Your work is going to fill a large part of your life, and the only way to be truly satisfied is to do what you believe is great work. And the only way to do great work is to do what you love.” -Steve Jobs, co-founder, Chairman and CEO of Apple Inc.
20 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
SECURITY CORNER
Taking GridEx To The Next Level
NERC held its fifth two-day grid security exercise in November this year, which set a new record with more than 425 organizations participating. This biennial exercise provides the electric utility industry the unique opportunity to test responses to simulated physical and cyber attacks on the bulk electric system. MRO not only observed the exercise this year, but participated by exercising its Emergency Preparedness, Crisis Communications, and Cybersecurity Incident Response plans.
A drill was planned and coordinated with building management and other tenants in MRO’s office complex to test MRO’s emergency evacuation procedures and staff’s knowledge of the procedures and response to the drill. In addition to the evacuation, a GridEx inject or exercise scenario was conducted to test MRO staff’s response to a confidential data breach and what and how MRO would communicate this information to the appropriate audiences.
Following these exercises, MRO’s Emergency Response Team met to capture and review lessons learned from the drills and determine what revisions might be necessary to enhance MRO’s response to specific emergencies and bolster MRO’s emergency response planning efforts.
The day after GridEx, MRO staff walked through both days of the GridEx exercises with a local FBI special agent, Minnesota Public Utility Commissioner John Tuma, and commission staff Dr. Kevin O’Grady. It was helpful to hear their perspectives on the GridEx exercises. I also participated in a secure video teleconference and briefing at the local FBI office, which was a great opportunity to see how the FBI field offices can serve the electric utility industry during emergency events.
We gained a lot of valuable insight and experience as a result of participation in GridEx this year, and plan to expand our participation in the future.
-Steen Fjalstad, Security and Mitigation Principle
21 Outreach and Engagement
OUTREACH AND ENGAGEMENT
Carl Stelly, CMEP AC Vice Chair
MRO Hosts 2019 CMEP Conference Change Is Constant
On October 22, 2019, MRO’s Annual CMEP Conference took place in MRO’s King Conference Center in Saint Paul, Minnesota and via a live WebEx stream. This year’s conference was hosted by MRO’s CMEP Advisory Council (CMEPAC) and the theme of the conference was “Change is Constant.” There were speak- ers from eight MRO registered entities, two speakers from NERC and seven speakers from MRO staff. There were 137 in-person attendees and 101 WebEx connections.
The conference was kicked off by the Vice Chair of the CMEPAC and the emcee for the conference, Carl Stelly. Chair of the CMEPAC, Joe DePoorter gave the conference welcome. Attendees heard presentations from all three of MRO’s advisory councils on how each advisory council helps MRO registered entities by sharing information on risks and best practices related to reliability and security of the regional bulk power system.
John Allen from City Utilities of Springfield provided an update of the status of the Standards Efficiency Review (SER) and the scope of the SER Phase 2 and CIP Standard reviews. Attendees also learned about upcoming CIP and Operations and Planning Standards. Yvette Landin from NERC along with MRO staff re- viewed enhancements to Compliance Oversight Plans (COP) and COP development process. A brief update was provided regarding the CMEP Implementation Plan, changes in self-certifications, and aggregate risk.
22 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
MRO Manager of Registration, Certification and Standards Russ Mount- joy provided a presentation on function registration and mapping. He reviewed the importance of functional mapping and understanding the relationships between registered entities and the potential impacts these relationships can have on reliability of the bulk power system.
Dave Rudolph from Basin Electric Power Cooperative presented on mul- tiple owner agreements and neighbor relations. His presentation provid- ed a background on Basin Electric and member cooperatives, and the importance of coordinating responsibilities with neighboring entities and facilities. Rudolph provided specific examples of the befefits of coordina- tion and the necessary agreements between entities to ensure coordina- tion is taking place.
There were two presentations on internal controls, one from MRO staff and the other from Joshua Roper and Tiffany Lake from Evergy. The audience heard about frequent root John Allen, City Utilities of Springfield causes as well as how to manage and mitigate high population standards.
Brian Allen from NERC gave an update on Supply Chain. MRO Staff and Chuck Lawrence from American Transmission Company spoke about CIP-014-2 R1 assessment observations and common practices to close out the presentations for the day.
MRO would like to thank the CMEPAC for hosting this conference, as well as all of the speakers that helped make this event a success.
Lastly, we would like to thank the participants. MRO registered entities know that change is constant, but together we can work through any
change placed before us to work Russ Mountjoy, MRO staff towards our continued and shared goal of the reliability of the bulk electric system.
The agenda packets and full slide decks from all presentations from the CMEP Conference are available on MRO’s website. MRO will post recordings from these presentations on MRO’s website in the coming weeks.
If you have topic suggestions for future CMEP conferences or webinars, please contact me at [email protected].
-Desiree Sawyer, Compliance Monitoring Coordinator
Dave Rudolph, Basin Electric Power Cooperative 23 MRO gives back
MRO GIVES BACK
Supporting Ronald McDonald House Charities
Ronald McDonald House Charities (RMHC) is a non-profit organization with a mission to create, find and support programs that directly improve the health and well-being of children and their families. RMHC’s primary purpose is to keep families with sick children together and near the care and resources they need.
MRO continuously supports RMHC through participation in the organization’s pop tab collection effort. If you are unaware, you simply take the tab off your aluminum can and add it to one of the RMHC cardboard houses or other receptacles located throughout MRO’s office. At one point, the Twin Cities RMHC Chapter reported that the money raised from collecting these tabs was over $800,000, which made MRO’s decision to be an advocate an easy one.
In addition to our pop tab collection efforts, several MRO staff volunteered at the RMHC Oak Street location in Minneapolis in October by providing all the food and preparing lunch for the residents and staff at the home. We had anticipated this event for several months and many staff members who could not donate their time participated instead by donating food for the meal. Not only did our group have a bit of fun while bonding in the kitchen, we were also privileged to witness the heart-warming and rewarding smiles of the people that we served.
Coincidentally, that same day, our President and CEO Sara Patrick received a letter from an employee of one of MRO’s registered entities sharing the impact that the RMHC has had on his family and thanking MRO for its support. The irony that the letter from Andy Crooks was calling out MRO’s sponsorship of the Ronald McDonald House was not lost on all of us. Andy Crooks with Saskatchewan Power Corporation is one of us. His letter is incredibly moving and offers insight into the benefits provided by RMHC and the importance of supporting this charity.
24 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
His letter is shared here with permission. Please join MRO in supporting RMHC by making sure to add your pop tab to one of the collection boxes when you attend an MRO conference or event.
To find out more about supporting a local RMHC in your area, visit https://www.rmhc.org/get-involved.
-Dana Klem, Registration Certification and Standards Administrator
“Thank You, MRO” The Crooks Family RMHC Story
I think you are all extraordinary humans! I see you working tirelessly with passion and drive for a most noble cause; a highly reliable North American bulk power system. However, I also noticed during a recent visit to MRO offices that your pop can tab fundraising is benefiting Ronald McDonald House Charities.
I want to share a story about a family...my family...so you know how truly valuable your generous donations are. ______
2019 has been a long year for the Crooks family. In March, our second son Cameron (3 years old at the time) required a routine procedure to repair a hernia. The hernia repair was successful and the following day we couldn’t get Cameron to stop sprinting up and down the bleachers at a local hockey rink while we watched his older brother Dominic (5 years old) play. However, on day two it became apparent that something was wrong. Cameron was complaining about pain in his back, head, and stomach and was running a fever. A trip to our family doctor was unsuccessful in determining why. The next morning...he couldn’t walk.
In emergency, they performed x-rays, ultrasounds, and a CT scan, but came up empty. By this time, he was stuck in a curled-up sitting position and was crying out in agony about pain in his back, stomach, neck and arms despite large quantities of morphine. Without an answer we were terrified.
Finally, after a spinal tap (checking for meningitis) came back clean, they sent Cameron for a full body MRI scan. While waiting with Cameron in recovery (he was under general anesthesia for the scan) there was a sudden commotion at the nursing station. The doctor came to our room and told us Cameron had a massive abscess in his spine. He required immediate emergency surgery in Saskatoon (we live in Regina) and the pediatric transfer team was already in route to fly him by air ambulance. A caudal block (needle in epidural space of spine) used for pain relief during the hernia repair had introduced an infection into his spine.
MRI scans showing the monster abscess (highlighted in red) in Cameron’s spine.
25 MRO gives back
Thirty minutes later Cameron and I were in the air. Within an hour of touching down he was in the OR. AND...while my wife Donna frantically drove to Saskatoon with our other boys, Dominic and two month old baby Braden, Ronald McDonald House called. They had received a call from the social worker in Regina, heard about our situation and were preparing a room for our family to stay.
Cameron’s surgery was successful in draining the abscess without causing permanent deformity to his spine. He spent three days in pediatric ICU before being moved to an acute care observation unit for another week. Six days after the surgery….HE WALKED!
We spent a total of ten days in Saskatoon hospital before being transferred back to Regina. Throughout our time in Saskatoon, Ronald McDonald House was home.
It is absolutely incredible what the Ronald McDonald House Charities are doing for families with sick children, and the people working and volunteering Cameron strapped in for air ambulance ride to Saskatoon there are amazing! They provided a home for our family, a place for Cameron’s brothers to feel safe, a sympathetic ear, a shoulder to cry on, and unwavering support and encouragement throughout our ordeal. As much as we never wanted to need it, we are so grateful for this wonderful organization.
Cameron’s treatment required two and a half more weeks in Regina hospital to get his IV antibiotics stabilized, followed by another month on home IV program to treat the infection. Ronald McDonald House became home once again during a week of follow-up visits in May with infectious disease specialists and the neurosurgery team that operated on Cameron.
We are so happy to report that Cameron is fully recovered! You would never know today that anything happened if it wasn’t for the scar down the middle of his back.
But...for the Crooks family, that wasn’t all. Baby Braden (born in January 2019) had a heart murmur at birth. It was something doctors noticed but weren’t concerned with (it didn’t sound problematic and babies often outgrow murmurs). However, during his 6 month checkup the doctor noticed that it was still there. Being cautious, our doctor booked an echocardiogram.
Braden had an echocardiogram on October 9th. On October 10th we were called to our doctor’s office and told that Braden required an urgent procedure on his heart...in Saskatoon...first thing the next morning. The diagnosis was a severe pulmonary stenosis and his heart was functioning at 30% capacity.
We were in total shock! We had seen no symptoms that made us think anything was wrong, but his heart had pressures twelve times normal in his right ventricle. We needed to get to Saskatoon immediately. Cameron in ICU following surgery 26 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
Cameron reciving IV treatments at home and fully recovered and ready to hit the ice with brother Dominic
While we drove to Saskatoon that afternoon, we once again received a call from Ronald McDonald House. They heard about Braden from the hospital social worker and again they were preparing a room for our arrival! As before, Ronald McDonald House became our home base. Braden had a cardiac catheter inserted into his heart with a balloon on its tip to stretch his pulmonary valve. The procedure was successful in reducing pressures to an acceptable level to get him out of immediate danger. We were home by supper time a day later.
Braden will need regular follow ups throughout his lifetime (the cardiologist said, “he belongs to me now”) but his condition can now be properly monitored, and managed if necessary, in the future. He is safe, happy and soooo much more energetic! Near term follow ups will be in Saskatoon and I’m sure Ronald McDonald House will be there to support us once again.We are just one family that has benefited from the support RMHC provides. There are countless others, often dealing with far greater challenges, that rely on RMHC support every day. ______
So, we want to say thank you! Thank you so very much from the bottoms of our hearts! Though it may seem insignificant each time you break off a pop can tab, I assure you it is an extraordinary act; and you...each and every one of you...are extraordinary humans!
With love, Andy, Donna, Dominic, Cameron, and Braden Crooks
Baby Braden recovering post-op and then an alert Baby Braden with his very relieved mom 27 Industry News and Events
INDUSTRY NEWS AND EVENTS
LATEST NEWS: Reliability Milestone Reached in Transition to Multiple Reliability Coordinators Dan Brouillette Confirmed By The U.S. Senate to Be Secretary of Energy The Western Interconnection has reached a major reliability milestone in its transition to multiple Reli- In a bipartisan vote of 70-15, the United States ability Coordinators (RCs) as SPP became the final Senate confirmed Dan Brouillette to be the 15th new RC of record and Peak Reliability ceased to be U.S. Secretary of Energy. Read the full announce- an RC. Read the full announcement ment. President Donald J. Trump subsequently Presided over the swearing in of Brouillette. Read Weather, Forecast, Fuel Issues Overlay the full announcement. Winter Outlook
FERC Staff Identifies Key Cybersecurity Anticipated resources for the upcoming winter Program Priorities season meet or exceed recommended levels in all assessment areas of North America, NERC finds in The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission its 2019–2020 Winter Reliability Assessment. How- (FERC) staff detailed the depth of its continuing ever, potential reliability risks involving extreme efforts to address cybersecurity challenges facing and prolonged cold weather, generation and de- the nation’s energy infrastructure. Read the full mand forecasting, and fuel assurance in the North- announcement. east and Midwest continue to be important issues facing bulk-power system reliability. Read the full Resource Mix Changes Require Improved announcement. Coordination; Distributed Resources, Storage among Challenges NERC Posts 2020 ERO Data Submittal Sched- ule and 2020 ERO CMEP IP Adequate capacity resources are projected to meet increasing peak demand over the next 10 years, NERC posted the 2020 ERO Enterprise Data Submittal Schedule. The Compliance Enforcement NERC finds in its recent long-term assessment. Authority (CEA) requires Periodic Data Submittals The addition of large amounts of utility-scale wind, in accordance with the schedule stated in the appli- solar and natural gas generation combined with a cable Reliability Standards, as established by the major influx of energy storage technology requires CEA, or as-needed, in accordance with the NERC continued enhancements to system planning and Rules of Procedure (RoP), Appendix 4C Section operations. 3.6.
More than 330 GW of solar and wind capacity are NERC updated the 2020 ERO Compliance Moni- planned for installation through 2029, according to toring and Enforcement Program (CMEP) Annual the 2019 Long-Term Reliability Assessment. Mean- Implementation Plan (Implementation Plan) on the while, the rate of transmission infrastructure devel- NERC website to include links to Regional Moni- opment needed to support these variable resources toring Schedules, links to Periodic Data Submittal and system expansion has declined from nearly schedules, and updated “Loss of Major Transmis- 40,000 circuit miles earlier this decade to less than sion Equipment with Extended Lead Times” risk 15,000 circuit miles over the next ten years, the element description based on 2019 ERO Reliability Risk Priorities Report. assessment finds. Read the full announcement.
28 Midwest Reliability Matters - December 2019
INDUSTRY EVENTS:
Please Note: Any of the events listed below are some that each entity will leave with documented con- of many training opportunities that may be of inter- trols applicable to their organization, relative to the est to MRO Members and other readers of the MRO Standard. Register here. newsletter. MRO neither recommends nor endorses any particular vendor or event. Talk With Texas RE January 23, 2020 │9:00 a.m. Central NERC Webinar on Approved Version 4.0 of ERO EA Process and Appendices Register here. January 9, 2020 │2:00 p.m. Eastern MRO Security Advisory Council Meeting The NERC EAS will conduct an industry webinar February 27, 2020 │Saint Paul, MN to review the latest changes and revisions to the Event Analysis Process and Appendices and to an- MRO’s Security Advisory Council meets next on swer questions. Register soon on NERC’s website. February 27, 2020, at MRO’s offices in Saint Paul, Minnesota. This meeting is also available to attend NERC System Planning Impacts from DER remotely by WebEx. Register here. Working Group Meeting MRO CMEP Advisory Council Meeting January 14-15, 2020 │San DIego, CA March 4, 2020 │Saint Paul, MN All attendees must register to attend here. MRO’s CMEP Advisory Council meets next on NERCSystem Analysis and Modeling Task March 4, 2020, at MRO’s offices in Saint Paul, Force Meetings Minnesota. This meeting is also available to attend January 28-29, 2020 │Tampa, FL remotely by WebEx. Register here.
The NERC System Analysis and Modeling Subcom- MRO Reliability Advisory Council Meeting mittee (SAMS) and its technical subgroup – Load April 1, 2020 │Saint Paul, MN Modeling Task Force (LMTF) – will meet January 28-30, 2020. Register here. MRO’s Reliability Advisory Council meets next in person and by WebEx the day before the MRO Board Meeting on April 1, 2020. Register here. REGIONAL AND MRO EVENTS: MRO Board of Directors Meeting SERC Open Forum Webinar April 1-2, 2020 │Saint Paul, MN January 27, 2020 │2:00 p.m. Eastern MRO’s first quarter board and committee meetings SERC staff will present up-to-date information on will take place at MRO’s offices in Saint Paul, MN, current topics of interest regarding compliance on April 1-2, 2020. The open meetings are also with NERC Reliability Standards and bulk power available to attend remotely by WebEx. More infor- system reliability. This event will be of interest to mation will be available soon here. operations, transmission, compliance, and training staff of registered entities within the SERC Region. To see more MRO meetings and events, visit our Register here. website calendar.
Reliability First Internal Control Workshop February 12, 2020 │Cleveland, OH
This workshop will be a working session that focus- es on one CIP and O&P Standard, with the goal
29 Published By: MIDWEST RELIABILITY ORGANIZATION 380 St. Peter Street, Suite 800 Saint Paul, MN 55102 651-855-1760 www.mro.net