Alcatel-Lucent 7750 SR SERVICE ROUTER

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Alcatel-Lucent 7750 SR SERVICE ROUTER Alcatel-Lucent 7750 SR SERVICE ROUTER Alcatel-Lucent 7750 SR multiservice edge routers have been designed from inception to deliver differentiated, high-performance, high availability services. With platform capacities ranging from 40 Gb/s to 2 Tb/s, special- ized service-aware application processing, advanced quality of service (QoS), and a comprehensive range of Ethernet and multiservice interfaces and protocols, the 7750 SR provides industry-leading scale and intelligence to deliver residential, business, and wireless broadband IP services on a converged edge routing platform. The Alcatel-Lucent 7750 Service Router cost-effective solutions to address (SR) portfolio is a suite of multiservice the smallest to the largest network edge routers designed from inception locations. to deliver high-performance, high availability routing with service-aware Features operations, administration, manage- ment, and provisioning. The 7750 SR Industry-leading FP2 silicon integrates the scalability, resiliency, At the heart of the Alcatel-Lucent and predictability of MPLS along with 7750 SR is the Alcatel-Lucent award- the bandwidth and economics of winning FP2 network processing Ethernet and a broad selection of silicon. Clocking in at 100 Gb/s, the legacy interfaces, to enable a con- FP2 chipset enables line interfaces to verged network infrastructure for the scale to 100 Gb/s, while concurrently delivery of next-generation services. supporting processing-intensive edge The 7750 SR’s advanced and compre- routing and mobile gateway services hensive feature set enables it to be without performance impact. Network deployed as a Broadband Network processing silicon is an essential Gateway (BNG) for residential services, element in the quest for no compro- as a Multiservice Edge (MSE) for Carrier mise, high-speed, intelligent services Ethernet and IP VPN business services, that can adapt to customer require- as the aggregation router in mobile ments. Alcatel-Lucent has a proven backhaul applications, or as a mobile track record as an innovator and packet core for 2G, 3G and LTE wireless industry leader in network processor networks. With support for service- silicon technology. enabled, high-density 10GigE and 100GigE interfaces, the 7750 SR is also well suited for core routing applica- tions. Available in five chassis variants, the 7750 SR scales gracefully from 40 Gb/s to 2 Tb/s of capacity, providing Proven end-to-end Service routing specialization Benefits operating system Alcatel-Lucent recognizes that service Increased revenues with Alcatel-Lucent Service Router Operating providers need to be nimble and yet innovative, differentiated services System (SR OS) is a carrier-grade, highly cost sensitive when introducing fault-tolerant, and feature-rich operat- application-enabled services into the Support for advanced networking ing system that operates across the network. With service routing special- services allows service providers to entire Alcatel-Lucent Service Router ization, operators can add new services capitalize on information embedded portfolio. With a single operating with higher-level processing require- in the network to provide subscriber- system across all platforms, operators ments to the network wherever an centric Internet and connectivity can be assured of consistent and Alcatel-Lucent 7750 SR is located, by services. Subscriber, service, and reliable operations and management simply adding an Integrated Services application awareness can be used when deploying Ethernet (VLL, VPLS), Adapter (ISA) or Integrated Services to provide differential QoS treatment IP/MPLS (IP VPN), legacy (ATM, TDM, Module (ISM) to the node. Compared of higher-value traffic streams and POS), and/or mobile services and to using dedicated network elements manage the online experience. applications on an Alcatel-Lucent to provide services, 7750 SR service Guaranteeing a superior Quality of service router network. adapters have tighter management Experience (QoE) for certain applica- integration, higher performance, higher tions and metering them separately Best-in-class high availability scale, and consume less energy. They for billing permits tiered pricing for different levels of service. High availability is more than just allow service providers to leverage the redundant hardware. In addition to network design in deploying services Reduced operational expense redundant common equipment and where most cost effective, where most line card redundancy, SR OS supports easily managed, and with appropriate By combining wireline and wireless numerous features that minimize scale. Applications supported include services on a 7750 SR-based converged service disruption, such as, non-stop Application Assurance, which leverages provider edge, network operations are routing, stateful failover capabilities, deep packet inspection (DPI) technol- simplified because all services run over in-service software upgrades (ISSU), and ogy to provide application-level traffic a platform with consistent feature set, innovative multi-chassis features for reporting and traffic management operational model, and management, service resiliency. Further, the 7750 SR capabilities, advanced video services while supporting the service scalability supports service assurance and monitor- (Fast Channel Change/Retransmission or required to combine services. As legacy ing tools across IP, MPLS, and Ethernet Ad Insertion), IPsec services, large scale services are migrated to converged domains. In short, with a comprehen- Network Address Translation (NAT), and service networks, the legacy networks sive suite of high availability features, L2TP Network Server (LNS) services. that carried the service can be decom- the 7750 SR is the industry’s most missioned, further simplifying overall reliable platform for offering non- Service-aware management network operations and expenditure. stop applications and services. The 7750 SR family is managed by the In addition, the 7750 SR has numerous Alcatel-Lucent 5620 Service Aware features for automated provisioning Advanced Hierarchical QoS Manager (SAM) for assured, simplified of subscribers and services based on service templates and interacting with With today’s IP traffic streams including and integrated operations across both other operational systems for authenti- a range of services consisting of video network and service management cation, authorization, and billing that applications, voice, best-effort Internet domains. 5620 SAM is designed to all but eliminates the need for indi- access, and mission-critical business manage services and provides service- vidual, manual service provisioning. services, QoS becomes a critical element level visibility into the network for for delivering both best-effort and small- and large-scale service deploy- Investment protection SLA-based services on a common ments. The Alcatel-Lucent management platform. The Alcatel-Lucent 7750 SR offering includes additional tools like From its introduction, the 7750 SR sets the standard with its advanced and the 5650 Control Plane Assurance family has evolved with customer highly flexible Hierarchical QoS imple- Manager (CPAM) and 5670 Reporting feature and scaling requirements. mentation with hardware support for and Analysis Manager (RAM) that work The 7750 SR’s sophisticated and flexible multi-tiered shaping and policing in conjunction with 5620 SAM and hardware has a track record of allowing hierarchies. As it is designed as a service streamline network operations and aid new features and enhancements to delivery platform, the 7750 SR provides in the provisioning and management of be introduced “in-place” in software, the tools to define and deliver the most all connectivity and advanced network- rather than through a series of stringent SLAs for high-value, differen- ing services. ever-changing hardware iterations. tiated services. The award-winning FP2 network processing silicon ensures 7750 SR platform capacity and service scale can 2 Alcatel-Lucent 7750 SR | Data Sheet continually evolve in step with customer The Alcatel-Lucent 7750 SR family • Integrated Media Modules (IMMs) – requirements providing an unprec- supports a wide range of media and IMMs are line cards providing inte- edented level of investment protection. service adapters that are optimized grated processing and physical inter- to address different network and faces on a single board. IMMs provide Environmentally friendly application requirements: high-capacity, high-density Ethernet Pioneering advances in power efficiency • Input/Output Modules (IOMs) – IOMs interfaces and are supported on the are incorporated into each member of are supported on the 7750 SR-12 and 7750 SR-12 and SR-7 platforms. IMMs the Alcatel-Lucent 7750 SR family 7750 SR-7 and are optimized for flex- feature the Alcatel-Lucent FP2 net- reducing the expense of both powering ibility in deploying a variety of mobile, work processing silicon. and cooling when comparing products multiservice, and Ethernet-based • Integrated Service Adapters (ISAs) – with less advanced silicon technology. applications. Each IOM supports up ISAs are resource blades that provide Combined with environmentally to two Media Dependent Adapters specialized processing and buffering sensitive manufacturing processes, (MDAs) and can also be used to house for applications. ISAs are supported careful materials selection, and a view Integrated Service Adapters (ISAs). on the 7750 SR-12 and SR-7 platforms. to sustainable product life cycle IOM3-XPs are
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