2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with

2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia: The Role of the State Treasury for Industrial Competitiveness and Civil Service Pension Reform in Indonesia 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia

Project Title The Role of the State Treasury for Industrial Competitiveness and Civil Service Pension Reform in Indonesia

Prepared by Samjong KPMG ERI Inc. Global Development Institute Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT)

Supported by Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), Republic of Korea Korea Development Institute (KDI)

Prepared for The Government of the Republic of Indonesia

In Cooperation with Ministry of Finance (MOF), Republic of Indonesia

Program Directors Kwangeon Sul, Executive Director, Center for International Development (CID), KDI Siwook Lee, Professor of KDI School of Public Policy and Management, Former Executive Director, CID, KDI

Project Manager Kyung Doug Kwon, Director, Division of Policy Consultation, CID, KDI

Project Officers Min Je Joo, Research Associate, Division of Policy Consultation and Evaluation, CID, KDI Kwang Ryeol Yi, Partner, Samjong KPMG ERI Inc. Doo Been Yim, Manager, Samjong KPMG ERI Inc. Sookyung Kim, Senior Analyst, Samjong KPMG ERI Inc. Min Joo Cho, Analyst, Samjong KPMG ERI Inc.

Authors Chapter 1. Jong-Woon Kim, Professor, Hannam University Jin Wook Choi, Professor, Korea University Cornelius Tjahjaprijadi, Ministry of Finance Ali Moechtar, Ministry of Finance Chapter 2. Chang Kil Lee, Professor, Sejong University Agustinus Prasetyo, Ministry of Finance Chapter 3. Jong-goo Lee, Director, Korea Credit Guarantee Fund Myoungho Song, Director, Korea Credit Guarantee Fund Siswanto, Ministry of Finance Yohanes P. Satrio, Ministry of Finance

English Editor International Writing Services (IWS), Korea University

Government Publications Registration Number 11-1051000-000790-1 ISBN 979-11-5932-249-5 94320 ISBN 979-11-5932-227-3 (set) Copyright ⓒ 2017 by Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea Government Publications Registration Number 11-1051000-000790-01

2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia:

The Role of the State Treasury for Industrial Competitiveness and Civil Service Pension Reform in Indonesia Preface

With the global economy slowing down, sustaining growth by generating, collecting, and disseminating relevant knowledge has become more important than ever. The Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) was launched in 2004 by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and implemented by the Korea Development Institute (KDI). The KSP program seeks to share the development experience and knowledge that Korea has accumulated over the past few decades to assist in the socio-economic development of partnering countries.

The 2016/17 KSP with Indonesia aims to utilize the knowledge and experience of the Korean government to help Indonesia devise new policies and increase the efficiency of existing ones in order to boost its overall economic growth and the development of specific industries within the economy.

After the successful completion of the KSP with Korea in 2015/16, the took the initiative in 2016/17 to work with Korea again in order to receive guidance in formulating and implementing viable policies that will eventually allow Indonesia to develop a strong economy.

The demand-driven KSP project with Indonesia this year focuses on the role of the State Treasury for Industrial Competitiveness and civil service pension reform in Indonesia. The project involves sharing Korea’s experiences related to three main issues that currently affect Indonesia: (1) strengthening the role of fiscal policy to enhance the manufacturing industry as a sustainable economic growth engine, (2) implementing pension system reform for government employees, and (3) the establishment of the Credit Program Information System (SIKP) to support Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs).

As the end of this project approaches, I would like to use this opportunity to thank all of the stakeholders and specialists who have contributed and shared their knowledge to help ensure the successful completion of this year’s project. Samjong KPMG ERI will continue to actively engage in the KSP and to seek other opportunities to assist Indonesia in achieving its economic growth targets.

Kyo-Tae Kim CEO Samjong KPMG Contents

2016/17 KSP with Indonesia ...... 013 Executive Summary ...... 015

Chapter 1 Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia

Summary ...... 018 1. Introduction ...... 020 1.1. Importance of Fiscal Policy ...... 020 1.2. The Role of the Manufacturing Industry ...... 025 2. Indonesian Industry ...... 027 2.1. Industry Analysis for Indonesia ...... 027 2.2. The Manufacturing Industry in Indonesia ...... 031 2.3. Analysis of the Competitiveness of the Manufacturing Industry ...... 032 2.4. SWOT Analysis of the Manufacturing Industry ...... 034 3. Industrial Policy in Indonesia ...... 035 3.1. Required Policy ...... 035 3.2. Support Programs for the Manufacturing Industry ...... 037 3.3. Effectiveness of the Support Programs ...... 046 4. Fiscal Policies for Industrialization in Korea ...... 049 4.1. Industrial Policy Focus and Structure ...... 049 4.2. Fiscal Policies for Manufacturing ...... 053 4.3. Effectiveness of Korea’s Industrial Policies ...... 057 5. Policy Recommendations ...... 058 5.1. Introduction ...... 058 5.2. Selection of Priority Industries and Establishment of Long-Term Plans ...... 059 5.3. Selection of Promising Enterprises ...... 061 5.4. Incentive Programs ...... 063 References ...... 069 Chapter 2 Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia

Summary ...... 072 1. Introduction ...... 073 1.1. Background ...... 073 1.2. Research Objectives ...... 074 2. Current Pension System for Civil Servants in Indonesia ...... 074 2.1. History and Regulations ...... 074 2.2. Current Pension Schemes ...... 079 2.3. Governance of the Pension System ...... 086 3. Challenges Facing the Current Civil Servant Pension System in Indonesia ...... 089 3.1. Predicting the Long-Term Balance of the Pension Fund ...... 089 3.2. Challenges for the Pension System and Individual Schemes ...... 092 3.3. Pension System Governance ...... 101 4. The Civil Servant Pension System in Korea ...... 102 4.1. Basic Structure and History of the Pension System ...... 102 4.2. Civil Servant Pension Reform in 2015 ...... 104 4.3 Pension Governance ...... 106 4.4. Policy Implications of Pension Reform in Korea ...... 108 5. Policy Recommendations for the Civil Service Pension System in Indonesia ...... 109 5.1. Proposed Reform Directions ...... 109 5.2. Reducing the Financial Burden on the Government ...... 110 5.3. Reforming the Pension System ...... 111 5.4. Managing the Pension System ...... 113 5.5. Proposed Transition Strategy ...... 115 6. Conclusion ...... 116 References ...... 118 Contents

Chapter 3 Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia

Summary ...... 122 1. Introduction ...... 124 1.1. Background and Objectives ...... 124 1.2. Project Direction and Structure ...... 125 2. KUR and SIKP in Indonesia ...... 126 2.1. Status of the KUR ...... 126 2.2. Status of the KUR Operations System (SIKP) ...... 135 2.3. Status of the MSME Credit Information Infrastructure in Indonesia ...... 141 3. Status of the MSME Credit Support System and Credit Information Infrastructure in Korea ...... 144 3.1. MSME Credit Support System in Korea ...... 144 3.2. Development of Korea’s SME Credit Rating Model ...... 149 3.3. Credit Information Infrastructure Management in Korea ...... 153 3.4. SME-Integrated Management System ...... 157 4. Policy Recommendations ...... 159 4.1. Improvement of the KUR ...... 159 4.2. Improvement of the SIKP ...... 162 References ...... 167 Contents | List of Tables

Chapter 1

Numbers of Large and Medium Manufacturing Enterprises in Indonesia (2009-2013) ...... 027
Number of Workers in the Large and Medium Manufacturing Enterprises in Indonesia (2009-2013) ...... 028
Indonesian Manufacturing Industry Growth Rate ...... 030
Manufacturing Non-Oil Exports ...... 031
Industrial Development ...... 037
Fiscal Incentives in Indonesian Special Economic Zones (SEZs) ...... 045
Examples of Economic Stimulus Packages ...... 046
Differences Between Tax Holiday Conditions for SEZs and Other Areas ...... 047
Participation Rate for Tax Incentives ...... 047
Korea’s Industrial Policy Focus ...... 050
Korean Economic Development Plans (1962-1996) ...... 051
Number, Workforce, and Value Added of SMEs in Korean Manufacturing ...... 053
Changes in Korean Industrial Policy ...... 056
Changes in Korea’s Major Exports (1970-2013) ...... 057
Prioritized Industries and Sub-Industries in Indonesia ...... 060
Criteria for Venture Businesses in Korea ...... 062
Current Tax Benefits for Korean Businesses ...... 063
Recent Statistics for Public Loans and Credit Guarantees in Korea ...... 065
Korean Government Procurement Targets and Performance ...... 067

Chapter 2

The Legal Basis for the Pension System for Civil Servants in Indonesia ...... 075
Number of Retirees in Each Indonesian Government Employee Pension Group (2016) ...... 080
Qualification Age for Civil Servant Pensions ...... 083
Veteran Classification and Allowance ...... 085
Average Incomes and Pensions for Various Government Employee Positions in Indonesia ...... 097
Number of Civil Servants in Indonesia (1950-2012) ...... 099
Life Expectancy in Some Countries (1995-2015) ...... 099 Contents | List of Tables

Estimated Number of Civil Service Retirees in Indonesia (1990-2044) ...... 099
Pension Systems in Korea ...... 103
Contribution and Payment Calculations for the CSP After the 2015 Reform ...... 105
Age Distribution of Retirees in Indonesia ...... 112
Pension Contributions During the Transition Period ...... 115
Old Age Savings Contributions During the Transition Period ...... 116

Chapter 3

Definition of MSMEs and Breakdown by Size ...... 127
Distribution of Loans by Company Size and NPL Ratio ...... 127
Major Changes to the Indonesian KUR Scheme ...... 131
KUR 2016 Target and Supply ...... 132
KUR Performance in 2016 ...... 132
KUR Performance by Industry Sector ...... 133
Current SIKP Services ...... 136
Customer Information Collected by the SIKP ...... 137
Jamkrindo Credit Rating Scale ...... 143
Types of Corporate Credit Ratings in Korea ...... 149
Criteria Used in KODIT Credit Evaluation (Manufacturing) ...... 151
KODIT Credit Grades and Scores ...... 152
Credit Information Companies in Korea ...... 154 Contents | List of Figures

Chapter 1

[Figure 1-1] Growth of GDP and Investment in Indonesia ...... 022 [Figure 1-2] Percentage Change in Exported and Imported Goods and Services in Indonesia ...... 023 [Figure 1-3] Growth of Employment by Economic Sector in Indonesia ...... 025 [Figure 1-4] Growth Trends in Developed and Developing Countries ...... 026 [Figure 1-5] Backward GVC Participation by Industry in Indonesia ...... 033 [Figure 1-6] Forward GVC Participation by Industry in Indonesia ...... 034 [Figure 1-7] SWOT Analysis of the Industrial Sector ...... 035 [Figure 1-8] The Distribution of Industries between Regions in Indonesia ...... 036 [Figure 1-9] Staff Size and Profile of Workers in Micro and Small Enterprises ...... 037 [Figure 1-10] Current Industrial Strategy for Indonesia ...... 038 [Figure 1-11] National Industry Structure in Indonesia ...... 040 [Figure 1-12] Priority Industries in Indonesia (2015-2035) ...... 040 [Figure 1-13] Stages of Industrial Development for Indonesia (2015-2035) ...... 041 [Figure 1-14] Incentives for the Manufacturing Industry in Indonesia ...... 042 [Figure 1-15] Industrial Zones (IZs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Indonesia ...... 044 [Figure 1-16] GDP Growth and Per Capita Income of Korea ...... 049 [Figure 1-17] Change in Korean Economic Structure (1963-2014) ...... 052 [Figure 1-18] Contribution to Korean Economic Growth by Industry ...... 053

Chapter 2

[Figure 2-1] Governance Structure of the Pension System for Public Service Employees in Indonesia ...... 088 [Figure 2-2] Proportion of Pensions Paid from General Revenue and the Pension Fund through PT Taspen (1994-2008) ...... 090 [Figure 2-3] Proportion of Pensions Paid from General Revenue and the Pension Fund through PT Asabri (1998-2009) ...... 090 [Figure 2-4] Indonesian Government Employee Pension Fund Size (1997-2016) ...... 091 [Figure 2-5] Financial Balance of a Pension System ...... 092 [Figure 2-6] State Budget Allocation for Pension Expenditure for 2011-2016 in Indonesia ...... 093 [Figure 2-7] Government Spending on Pension Payments for 2011-2016 in Indonesia ...... 094 [Figure 2-8] Ratio of Pension Expenditure to Domestic Revenue (2010-2016) ...... 094 [Figure 2-9] Number of Local and Central Government Retirees in Indonesia (2011-2016) ...... 096 Contents | List of Figures

[Figure 2-10] Estimates for Government Retiree Population in Indonesia (1980-2044) ...... 100 [Figure 2-11] System for Delivery of Pension Payments in Indonesia ...... 102 [Figure 2-12] Customized Pension Service System ...... 108

Chapter 3

[Figure 3-1] KUR Loan Framework ...... 130 [Figure 3-2] SIKP Web Service Dashboard ...... 136 [Figure 3-3] SIKP Data Flow for the KUR System ...... 138 [Figure 3-4] SIKP Topology ...... 138 [Figure 3-5] KUR Loans by Industry (to the end of 2016) ...... 139 [Figure 3-6] SLIK Development Timeline ...... 142 [Figure 3-7] Process for MSME Documentation and Rating ...... 143 [Figure 3-8] Credit Program for MSMEs in Korea ...... 145 [Figure 3-9] KODIT’s CCRS Rating Model ...... 153 [Figure 3-10] Korea’s Credit Information Infrastructure ...... 155 [Figure 3-11] SME Information Management System Framework (Oct. 2014) ...... 158 [Figure 3-12] SIMS Operational Framework ...... 158 [Figure 3-13] SIKP as an Integrated Management System for MSME Support ...... 163 [Figure 3-14] Rating Model for Potential KUR Customers ...... 164 [Figure 3-15] SIKP Topology Improvement ...... 166 2016/17 KSP with Indonesia

Kwang Ryeol Yi (Project Officer, Samjong KPMG) Doo Been Yim (Project Officer, Samjong KPMG)

The Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) with Indonesia was launched in 2005. Between 2006 and 2016, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Indonesia have accomplished ten KSP projects on over 50 topics including economic development, finance, energy, health, etc. In 2010, based on the strategic importance of bilateral relations between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Indonesia and Indonesia’s growth potential, MOSF designated Indonesia as a Strategic Development Partner Country (SDPC) and conducted three years of close cooperation. In the fallowing year of 2012, returning to the Development Partner Country (DPC), the consultation on the theme of the Policy Consultation to Strengthen Indonesian Economy's Capacity; 2014, Reforming Economic Institutions and State Bureaucracy for a Strong Indonesia; then in 2015, Performance Enhancement in the Government of Indonesia for Market Productivity and Social Stability; and most recently, The Role of the State Treasury for Industrial Competitiveness and Civil Service Pension Reform in Indonesia in 2016.

In its tenth year, KDI and MOF confirmed three topics. The following information gives a brief overview of this year’s programs, including its topics, team of researchers, and project timeline.

2016/17 KSP with Indonesia • 013 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia

The Role of the State Treasury for Industrial Competitiveness and Civil Service Pension Reform in Indonesia Korean Project Manager Indonesian Project Supervisor RM. Wiwieng Handayaningsih Okyu Kwon (Professor of KAIST) (Director of Treasury System) Topic Researchers (Korean) Researchers (Indonesian) Strengthening the Role of Jong-Woon Kim Cornelius Tjahjaprijadi Fiscal Policy to Enhance the (Hannam University) (Ministry of Finance) Manufacturing Industry as a Jin Wook Choi Ali Moechtar Sustainable Economic Growth (Korea University) (Ministry of Finance) Engine in Indonesia Implementing Pension System Chang Kil Lee Agustinus Prasetyo Reform for Public Sector (Sejong University) (Ministry of Finance) Employees in Indonesia Improvement of the Credit Jong-goo Lee (Korea Credit Siswanto Program Information System Guarantee Fund) (Ministry of Finance) to Support Micro, Small and Myungho Song (Korea Yohanes P. Satrio Medium Enterprises in Indonesia Credit Guarantee Fund) (Ministry of Finance) Korean Program Director / Program Officer Indonesian Program Officer Kyoung Doug Kwon (KDI) Min Je Joo (KDI) Kwang-Ryeol Yi (KPMG ERI) Setia Parasian Doo Been Yim (KPMG ERI) (Ministry of Finance) Sookyung Kim (KPMG ERI) Min Joo Cho (KPMG ERI)

The project progressed without a problem. During the interim reporting period, the Korean KSP team presented its policy analyses to date and held discussions with Indonesian experts, providing details of the analysis for a specific topic and suggesting strategic directions for the Indonesian government. The project then moved onto the Final Reporting Workshop, the last stage of the year-long project.

In the end, it was another successful KSP project with Indonesia. Through extensive research and the efforts of the delegation members and the Indonesian experts, the Indonesian government received useful and valuable information and guidelines. The policy recommendations and shared knowledge will serve as important factors that will take the Indonesian economy to the next level of development.

We would like to thank the Korean and Indonesian delegations for their efforts in completing another KSP project. We hope that the relationship between the two countries and their respective economies continue to strengthen in the future.

014 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia Executive Summary

Jin Wook Choi (Korea University)

The 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) with Indonesia aims to use the knowledge and experience of the Korean government to guide Indonesia in devising new policies and increasing the efficiency of existing ones for the purpose of boosting economic growth and promoting the development of specific industries in the Indonesian economy. The demand-driven research focuses on the role of the state treasury in industrial competitiveness and civil service pension reform in Indonesia.

It is important to recognize the significance of these specific topics in light of Korea’s “miracle economy” because these happen to lie at the heart of Korea’s policy making, which has aimed to establish an advanced, knowledge-driven economy. This report is the result of detailed research conducted by the KDI and KPMG, which had three main goals:

Task 1: Strengthening the role of fiscal policy to enhance the manufacturing sector as a sustainable economic growth engine in Indonesia

Task 2: Implementing pension system reform for public sector employees in Indonesia

Task 3: Establishing the Credit Program Information System (SIKP) to support Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in Indonesia.

Executive Summary • 015 The first task focuses on the development of the Indonesian manufacturing sector based on the Korean experience. We recommend the following three long- term strategies to achieve this objective. First, the Indonesian government should focus more on a select few industries based on their international competitiveness potential. Secondly, more specific economic development plans should be established for each of the targeted industries, including specific tools and programs and the budget required for them. Finally, there should be coordination and communication between related ministries when putting the development plans into practice, and all of the available resources in each ministry should be utilized. This would create a strongly coordinated body, one that includes private industry experts.

Next task discusses pension system reform for public sector employees in Indonesia. The pension system in Indonesia faces the potential collision between the increasing financial cost and the demand for pension welfare. The Indonesian government is responsible for finding a compromise between both in its policy design. The government should continue to seek a consensus among all stakeholders including those receiving a pension, current civil servants, and private citizens. The pension reform of 2015 in Korea is an appropriate benchmark when it comes to achieving social consensus.

The third task presents Korea’s background and experience in the design, development, implementation, and management of a system that handles credit program information that supports the development of SMEs. Because the data currently collected through the current Indonesian Credit Program Information System (SIKP) do not include a sufficient number of variables to develop a credit rating model, efforts to collect public information such as SID (SLIK) and tax information are necessary. Qualitative assessment by local government officials is critical to the generation of final ratings. Currently, SIKP information sharing is limited to the operation and management of an SME credit guarantee scheme (“People’s Business Credit”; KUR).

016 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia: The Role of the State Treasury for Industrial Competitiveness and Civil Service Pension Reform in Indonesia Chapter 1

Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia

1. Introduction 2. Indonesian Industry 3. Industrial Policy in Indonesia 4. Fiscal Policies for Industrialization in Korea 5. Policy Recommendations ■ Chapter 01

Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia

Jong-Woon Kim (Hannam University) Jin Wook Choi (Korea University) Cornelius Tjahjaprijadi (Ministry of Finance) Ali Moechtar (Ministry of Finance)

Summary

The manufacturing industry in Indonesia steadily increased by 10-18% per year in terms of production before the financial crisis in 1997-1998. However, following the crisis, there was a downturn of lower than the industry average growth, accounting only for 12% of its exports recently, compared to 24% in the 1980s. Even though several manufacturing sub-industries, such as machinery, equipment, and textiles, play a key role in creating value and jobs, the manufacturing industry in Indonesia can be strengthened by utilizing its natural resources and domestic market.

The government of Indonesia recently introduced financial and tax incentives to boost investment and job creation in addition to an economic stimulus package that included deregulation and infrastructure building for industrial development. However, the incentives have not been strong enough to encourage potential entrepreneurs and business people to actively invest in startups and the growth of existing companies, especially in terms of innovative activities such as research and development or employee training.

Korea still remains the only country that has transitioned from being a recipient of development assistance into becoming a donor. During this process, it has received attention for the role of the manufacturing industry in its economic development and its recovery from the economic crisis between 1997 and 1998. Some of the primary reasons for Korea’s rapid economic development have been identified as the

018 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia active intervention of the government, protectionism, and a focus on exports, while Korean researchers have highlighted the availability of a cheap but high-quality labor force and well-trained technocrats, an emphasis on education, the investment in human resources, a high level of entrepreneurship, and a general can-do spirit.

Over the past five decades, the main purpose of the Korean government’s policies related to industry have been the promotion of exports, replacing imports with domestically produced alternatives, the promotion of the heavy, chemical, and high technology industries, and the development of infant industries. To achieve this, one tool the Korean government has implemented is the establishment of entry barriers for target industries so that incumbents can gain an advantage from economies of scale to improve their international competitiveness. This was particularly true for the heavy and chemical industries, including machinery, ship building, electronics, steel, and petrochemicals.

Another method used by the Korean government to increase industrial development has been improving financial accessibility. Public loans were major sources of capital for priority industries, with individual firms benefitting from lower interest rates and longer maturities so that they could build factories and purchase production facilities. For example, the interest rate for corporate bonds was 18.8% and that for public loans for facilities was 12.0% in 1990.

A third strategy has been tax incentives in the form of exemptions or reductions for targeted industries or export businesses. Typical examples include indirect tax benefits for the raw materials needed for export and capital goods and the direct reduction of corporate tax for R&D investment and employee training programs. The ratio of corporate tax reduction was 16.8% in 1989.

Finally, industry protection was a key tool for industry development, as typified by the use of tariffs. In the 1960s and 1970s, relatively high tariffs helped decrease domestic competition so that firms had time to become more efficient. However, from the 1980s, tariffs were lowered as a result of international and bilateral negotiations.

Even after changing its industrial policy framework from focusing on a few selected industries to focusing on innovative firms, Korea still assists the manufacturing industry using tax incentives, financial incentives, and government procurement programs.

As a result, the first recommendation for Indonesia is a “selection and focus” strategy. The government should target a select group of industries or sectors on which to focus its efforts after analyzing the international competitiveness potential

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 019 of its industries.

The second recommendation is the selection and support of promising businesses. Eligibility criteria for public support programs should be established for startups, such as the number of years since their founding and being part of a targeted sector or industry. This support will allow important startups to successfully survive “the death valley” period and then grow.

The third recommendation is setting up an effective set of incentive programs. There are three ways in which this can be achieved.

First, the activities or conditions required to qualify for tax benefits should be more specific so that firms can clearly understand what the government is looking for. These conditions could include “venturousness,” “innovativeness,” and age. Even more importantly, tax benefits for R&D expenditure and employee training costs can be prioritized.

Second, the current credit guarantee program should focus more on manufacturing. The average credit guarantee under the current system for firms in the manufacturing industry is too small to guarantee their survival or to encourage business expansion through the building of new factories or the purchasing of new machines or facilities. Therefore, it may be preferable to have a separate category for manufacturing firms with favorable conditions, including an increase in the maximum guarantee allowable, lower premiums, and lower interest rates.

Finally, the public procurement system should be more welcoming to domestic SMEs in order to nurture domestic manufacturing companies. Because Indonesia has already established a public procurement system, we recommend introducing a new program which favors products or services of Indonesian SMEs. This program could require every central government agency and public institution to spend a certain proportion of its budget purchasing goods or services from domestic SMEs. This could start at, say, 20 percent and be increased annually thereafter.

1. Introduction 1.1. Importance of Fiscal Policy

The economic development of a nation is important for the development of all other fields, such as law, politics, and agriculture. Successful economic development can be characterized by high per capita income, which allows the state and its citizens to be more flexible in their choice of activities and how they carry them out.

020 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia The industrial sector plays an important role in national development. This role can be traced back to the contribution of each subsector to national economic growth and the rise in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This sector has several advantages compared to other sectors due to capitalization of capital tied very large, providing a large source of employment and the ability to create added value from any input. In developing countries, the industrial sector also makes a significant contribution to national development.

The industrial sector is expected to become the driving force of the national economy in Indonesia, with the manufacturing industry an engine of economic growth. This is understandable, given the wide range of abundant natural resources available that need to be processed into industrial products in order to gain higher added value. In accordance with its current stage of development, it is time for Indonesia to shift its focus from the primary sector to the secondary sector, particularly the non-oil manufacturing industry. Promoting the industrial sector requires a consistent strategy that is appropriate for the era of globalization, allowing its various industries to be competitive domestically and internationally, which in turn can encourage economic growth, create jobs, increase average income, and ultimately reduce poverty.

Until recently, industrial sector growth in Indonesia was dominated by labor- intensive industries, which typically have a relatively short chain, so the added value was relatively small. However, because of the large population, the business unit still makes a large contribution to the economy. There are primarily four economic actors that support the development of the industrial sector: privately owned enterprises, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), small and medium sized businesses, and cooperatives.

The industrial sector should be supported by increasing investment in capital expenditure to increase capacity and production efficiency, thus boosting economic growth. During the 2006-2008 period, investment in Indonesia increased (Figure 1-1). In 2008, investment grew by 11.7 percent, higher than in 2007, which grew by 9.4 percent. Investment growth, driven by investment in transport equipment from abroad, amounted to 41.4 percent. The effect of this increase in investment was generally positive, as demonstrated by the rise in certain indicators: capital goods by 56.6 percent, domestic cement sales by 12.6 percent, investment credit by 37.4 percent and working capital credit by 28.4 percent.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 021 [Figure 1-1] Growth of GDP and Investment in Indonesia

(Unit: %) 15.00

10.00

5.00

0.00 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Investment GDP

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics.

In 2010, investment rose by 8.5 percent, far higher than in 2009 (3.3 percent). This surge occurred as a result of increased production activities associated with the recovery of global economic activity and rising domestic demand. The highest growth was recorded in machinery and equipment from abroad, which reached 19.3 percent. This is in line with the increase in imports of capital goods. Meanwhile, investment in domestic machinery and equipment only grew by 5.5 percent.

Investment growth in 2011 increased further to 8.8 percent, primarily driven by investment in imported machinery and equipment, as well as imported transportation equipment. A rise in domestic consumption led to the need for new machinery to ensure sufficient production capacity in the future. Investment also grew in 2014 by 4.1 percent, but this was lower than investment growth in 2013 (5.3 percent). The global liquidity crunch and high bank interest rates acted as a constraint on investment activity. The presidential elections also prompted many investors to take a wait-and-see approach. In addition, the pressure on the rupiah against the US dollar increased the cost of imported capital goods, which also impacted investment performance.

Although the effect of investment on GDP has been relatively small compared to private consumption (Figure 1-1), investment spending still makes an appreciable contribution to economic growth.

Being closely linked to global economic conditions, exports and imports are influential factors in terms of national income and economic growth. In particular, export levels depend on demand and the purchasing power of the global economy and the trading partners of Indonesia. Imports depend not only on domestic purchasing power, but also on the material need for imported inputs (e.g., machinery

022 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia and raw materials).

For Indonesia, the level of exports and imports for the period 2008 to 2012 fluctuated in accordance with changes in international and domestic conditions (Figure 1-2). The global economic recession that occurred in 2009 led to a decrease in export and import activities in various parts of the world, including Indonesia. For example, exports from Indonesia in 2008 grew by 9.5 percent, but then fell by 9.7 percent in 2009. This was mirrored by imports, which grew in 2008 by 10.0 percent but fell in 2009 by 15.0 percent. Despite the pressure on international trade, there was an overall increase in net exports in 2009. A fall in the income and purchasing power of Indonesia's major trading partners led to a significant decline in exports.

The fall in exports also impacted imports by reducing the need for the capital goods and raw materials required to meet international demand, with import levels also negatively affected by Indonesia’s own loss of income and purchasing power. In addition, the global economic crisis led to concerns about the financial and economic stability of developing countries, reducing support from the banking industry for production activities.

[Figure 1-2] Percentage Change in Exported and Imported Goods and Services in Indonesia

(Unit: %) 20.00

10.00

0.00 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 -10.00

-20.00

Export Goods and Services Import Goods and Services

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics.

Between 2010 and 2011, both exports and imports recorded positive growth of above 10%. The improvement in global economic conditions, though it was relatively weak, had a positive impact on Indonesia's exports. However, there was a slowdown in exports and imports in 2012 due to the slow pace of the global economic recovery and rising economic pressures for trading partners. However, the reduction in the growth of imports was not as high as that for exports, leading to a trade deficit for Indonesia for the first time since 1961. One of the primary causes for this was the

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 023 trade balance for oil and gas commodities. Economic growth and rising prosperity stimulated the rise in domestic fuel consumption, increasing the need for fuel imports. At the same time, Indonesian oil and gas production fell due to the oil wells becoming older and less productive. A combination of the increased consumption of subsidized fuel oil, the rise in crude oil prices, and the continued weakness of the rupiah led to the introduction of a subsidized fuel price adjustment policy in Indonesia.

In 2014, export growth slowed compared with the previous year, while imports rose slightly. The slowing global economy and falling world trade volume, particularly with major trading partners such as and , were major external factors affecting the growth of Indonesian exports and imports. In addition, internal factors such as mineral export restriction policies have also affected export levels since the beginning of 2014. On the other hand, there has been an increase in imports due to the consumption of overseas non-oil and gas commodities.

Greater global economic growth and world trade volume are expected to boost Indonesia’s exports, despite the fall in global commodity prices. The Indonesian government continues to seek to improve export performance by switching its focus from commodity-based exports to manufacturing exports, developing processed non-oil and gas products, developing high value-added services, and increasing competitiveness in the international market. In addition, the development of global and regional value chains provides an opportunity for a diverse range of Indonesian businesses to access the export market for manufactured products. Imports are also expected to increase, especially non-oil and gas fuel imports, as the domestic economy strengthens.

[Figure 1-3] shows that the average employment growth in the primary sector decreased by 0.63 percent for the 2006-2016 period. However, the manufacturing industry and the service sector grew on average by 2.46 percent and 4.37 percent, respectively. The fall in the number of jobs in the primary sector was mainly in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. Over the same period, the average decline in employment for three sectors combined was 0.78 percent. The loss of agricultural land and forest and increased urbanization have been the main factors resulting in the decline in labor force growth in the primary sector.1)

The Indonesian government will continue to pursue a policy of integrated development between the center and regions, increase legal protection, and investment-related businesses, and provide both fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to

1) Employment growth in the manufacturing industry was a result of the 4.49 percent growth in the size of the manufacturing industry during this period. With an average contribution of 22.32 percent to the GDP, which is higher than other industries, the manufacturing industry greatly affects economic growth.

024 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia improve competitiveness. Indonesia aims for the global economic recovery and rising economic pressures facing its trading partners, as well as to stimulate economic growth. To strengthen the national economy, the government has issued several economic policy packages which specifically aim to increase the competitiveness of national industries, increase employment, improve domestic purchasing power, and spur economic growth.2)

[Figure 1-3] Growth of Employment by Economic Sector in Indonesia

(Unit: %) 10.00

8.00

6.00

4.00

2.00

0.00

-2.00

-4.00

-6.00 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Primary Sector Growth Manufacturing Growth Services Growth

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics.

1.2. The Role of the Manufacturing Industry

Since the 1990s, some emerging markets have experienced rapid economic development, rises in income, and increased job creation on the back of the development of the manufacturing industry. [Figure 1-4] shows that the growth in per capita GDP for developed countries has decreased since the 1960s, while developing countries have experienced rapid growth since the 1990s. This latter trend has been led by Asian economies such as China and Vietnam, and has also been observed in countries such as Mexico, Turkey, South Africa, Chile, and Argentina. If this trend continues, it is possible that the axis of world economy may shift from North America and Europe to Asia and South America.

The rapid economic growth of developing countries has been analyzed by many researchers, especially focusing on the role of the manufacturing industry in economic development. Economists have highlighted that emerging economies

2) These policy packages are explained in Chapter 3.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 025 can show high rates of growth despite differences in their political systems, social conditions, and geographical characteristics, and rapid increases in productivity have occurred in conjunction with participation in international value chains due to the vertical division of the global manufacturing network. Rodrik (2011) analyzed labor productivity changes in emerging markets and concluded that the group of countries, including China, Thailand, and Mexico, that have actively participated in international value chains exhibit the greatest increases in productivity, resulting in a large number of new jobs.

[Figure 1-4] Growth Trends in Developed and Developing Countries

(Unit: %)

.06

.04

.02

0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 year

Smoothed Developed Countries Growth Developed Smoothed Developing Countries Growth Developing

Source: Dani Rodrik, “The Future of Economic Convergence”, Mimeo (August 2011).

In addition, the role of the manufacturing industry has recently been reassessed in developed countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom after the global financial crisis in 2008. The US president at the time, Barack Obama, emphasized the importance of the manufacturing industry in terms of international competitiveness and job creation and subsequently strengthened the financial and tax incentives for domestic manufacturing firms. The UK government has also attempted to reinvigorate its manufacturing industry by creating industrial clusters to attract international investment.

The main reason why both developing and developed countries stress the importance of the manufacturing industry is the new global economic environment.

026 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia The manufacturing industry is considered an economic growth engine due to the globalization of the industry, the industrialization of many developing countries, and rise in unemployment in developed economies. Most importantly, emerging economies are able to participate in global value chains as locations for factories, suppliers of resources for the industry, or globally competitive suppliers of products or services themselves. They can thus develop their economies on the back of their supply of cheap labor, their abundant resources, and their large domestic markets.

2. Indonesian Industry 2.1. Industry Analysis for Indonesia

In terms of the number of companies, the manufacturing industry in Indonesia increased by an average of 0.36 percent between 2009 and 2013 (Table 1-1). The sub- industries with the highest growth in the number of companies during this period were machinery and equipment (7.74 percent), followed by motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers (7.55 percent). In contrast, wood, cork, straw, and plaiting materials lost the greatest number of companies (-4.85 percent), followed by furniture (-4.74 percent).

Numbers of Large and Medium Manufacturing Enterprises in Indonesia (2009-2013)

Industrial Description 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Code 10 Food Products 5,527 5,248 5,463 5,662 5,795 11 Beverages 309 328 335 345 367 12 Tobacoo Products 1,053 981 989 945 866 13 Textile 2,365 2,333 2,251 2,246 2,287 14 Wearing Apparels 2,395 2,242 2,222 2,248 2,075 Leather and Related Products and 15 683 673 665 684 671 Footwear Wood, Cork Except Furniture, Articles of 16 1,303 1,254 1,150 1,112 1,067 Straw and Plaiting Materials, etc. 17 Paper and Paper Products 511 511 450 463 477 Printing and Reproduction Recorded 18 474 472 515 529 533 Media 19 Coke and Refined Petroleum Products 73 73 64 70 72 20 Chemical and Chemical Products 869 858 885 911 978 Pharmaceuticals, Medicinal Chemical and 21 257 254 236 246 236 Botanical Products 22 Rubber and Plastic Products 1,626 1,655 1,612 1,603 1,729

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 027

Continued

Industrial Description 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 code 23 Other Non-Metalic Mineral Products 1,694 1,619 1,606 1,624 1,581 24 Basic Metal 253 272 267 274 306 Fabricated Metal Products, Excepts 25 907 926 943 938 958 Machinery and Equipment Computer, Electronic and Optical 26 312 324 297 308 351 Products 27 Electrical Equipment 306 299 303 306 333 28 Machinery and Equipment 271 276 315 341 364 29 Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers 276 280 303 307 366 30 Other Transport Equipment 266 273 268 277 315 31 Furniture 1,563 1,475 1,463 1,419 1,284 32 Other Manufacturing 672 639 677 649 602 Repair and Installion of Machinery and 33 86 80 91 85 85 Equipment Total 24,051 23,345 23,370 23,592 23,698

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Manufacruting industrial indicator Indonesia (2013).

The repair and installation of machinery and equipment (18.19 percent) and motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers (13.37 percent) showed the greatest increase in the number of workers between 2009 and 2013 (Table 1-2). Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products lost the most workers (-0.84 percent), followed by the computer, electronic and optical products sub-industry (-0.83 percent).

Number of Workers in the Large and Medium Manufacturing Enterprises in Indonesia (2009-2013) Industrial Description 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Code 10 Food Products 676,259 675,797 742,195 884,602 901,550 11 Beverages 37,378 38,914 43,267 46,691 51,628 12 Tobacoo Products 336,178 329,877 304,243 324,614 362,933 13 Textile 450,639 482,963 477,387 482,349 477,985 14 Wearing Apparels 510,112 528,579 561,908 600,109 571,458 Leather and Related Products and 15 227,794 234,173 247,426 256,500 266,918 Footwear Wood, Cork Except Furniture, Articles 16 222,794 221,226 212,313 225,456 229,819 of Straw and Plaiting Materials, etc.

028 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia

Continued

Industrial Description 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Code 17 Paper and Paper Products 121,500 126,438 131,250 129,359 136,114 Printing and Reproduction Recorded 18 41,663 42,658 46,006 52,147 51,334 Media 19 Coke and Refined Petroleum Products 6,140 6,218 5,844 6,574 6,470 20 Chemical and Chemical Products 159,122 152,352 162,031 185,066 203,413 Pharmaceuticals, Medicinal Chemical 21 63,562 63,415 67,632 63,529 61,179 and Botanical Products 22 Rubber and Plastic Products 327,065 357,274 356,334 353,624 365,958 23 Other Non-Metalic mineral Products 168,707 168,868 174,811 193,136 182,420 24 Basic Metal 62,272 68,623 64,678 60,430 73,258 Fabricated Metal Products, excepts 25 140,001 155,473 154,779 161,861 173,210 Machinery and Equipment Computer, Electronic and Optical 26 156,157 164,273 164,247 158,706 150,564 Products 27 Electrical Equipment 99,954 99,988 108,512 115,488 118,963 28 Machinery and Equipment 37,726 39,471 48,621 56,905 58,679 Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi- 29 83,861 95,629 111,384 118,643 138,179 Trailers 30 Other Transport Equipment 72,838 78,649 85,109 85,349 86,350 31 Furniture 166,398 199,925 191,356 190,127 165,307 32 Other Manufacturing 138,704 151,408 149,149 160,019 153,603 Repair and Installion of Machinery 33 10,543 18,954 18,887 17,555 17,620 and Equipment Total 4,316,777 4,501,145 4,629,369 4,928,839 5,004,912

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Manufacruting industrial indicator Indonesia (2013).

In terms of production for the period 2011-2016 (Table 1-3), food and beverages grew by an annual average of 8.48 percent, the highest of any sub-industry, followed by metal goods, computers, electronics, optics, and electrical equipment (7.46 percent). In contrast, coal, oil and gas refining was the only sub-industry to exhibit a negative average growth rate (-0.90 percent); the next lowest was rubber, manufacturers of rubber and plastics, with 0.94 percent.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 029

Indonesian Manufacturing Industry Growth Rate

Description 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Coal and Oil and Gas Refining -0.33 -2.40 -2.64 -2.12 -1.13 3.24 Food and Beverages 10.98 10.33 4.07 9.49 7.54 8.46 Tobacoo -0.23 8.82 -0.27 8.33 6.24 1.64 Textile and Garment 6.49 6.04 6.58 1.56 -4.79 -0.13 Leather, Leather Goods and Footwear 10.94 -5.43 5.23 5.62 3.97 8.15 Manufacture of Wood, Articles of Wood and -2.72 -0.80 6.19 6.12 -1.63 1.80 Cork and Woven Goods from Bamboo, etc. Industry Paper and Paper Products Printing and 3.89 -2.89 -0.53 3.58 -0.16 2.16 Reproduction of Rocorded Media Chemical, Pharmaceutical and Traditional 8.66 12.78 5.10 4.04 7.61 5.48 Medicine Rubber, Manufactures of Rubber and plastics 2.08 7.56 -1.86 1.16 5.04 -8.34 Excavation instead Metal Goods 7.78 7.91 3.34 2.41 6.03 5.46 Basic Metal 13.56 -1.57 11.63 6.01 6.21 0.76 Metal Goods, Computers, Electronics, Optics, 8.79 11.64 9.22 2.94 7.83 4.34 and Electrical equipment Machinery and Equipment 8.53 -1.39 -5.00 8.67 7.58 5.05 Transport Equipment 6.37 4.26 14.95 4.01 2.40 4.52 Furniture 9.93 -2.15 3.64 3.60 5.17 0.47 Other Processing Industry, Repair and Installation -1.09 -0.38 -0.70 7.65 4.66 -2.91 of Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 6.26 5.62 4.37 4.64 4.33 4.29 GDP 6.17 6.03 5.56 5.01 4.88 5.02

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, data processed.

For the period 2012-2015, overall manufacturing exports decreased on average by 2.41 percent (Table 1-4). However, the processing of gold, silver, precious metals, and jewelry experienced the highest average increase in exports (34.09 percent), followed by leather, leather goods and shoes/footwear (9.09 percent). Rubber and electronics exhibited the greatest decreases (-16.90 and -9.84 percent, respectively).

030 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia

Manufacturing Non-Oil Exports (Unit: USD Million) No Description 2012 2013 2014 2015 1 Processing Coconut / Palm 23,397.00 20,660.40 23,711.60 20,746.10 2 Steel, Machinery and Automotive 15,029.60 14,684.40 15,813.50 14,443.20 3 Textile 12,446.50 12,661.70 12,720.30 12,262.60 4 Electronics 9,444.10 8,520.10 8,066.90 6,903.70 5 Rubber Processing 10,818.60 9,724.10 7,497.50 6,171.40 6 Basic Chemistry 4,870.50 5,083.50 5,703.40 4,150.70 7 Food and Drink 4,652.90 5,379.80 5,554.40 5,597.00 8 Pulp and Paper 5,518.00 5,644.00 5,498.60 5,332.60 9 Wood Processing 4,539.90 4,727.70 5,202.30 5,186.60 10 Processing of Copper, Tin, etc. 5,049.50 4,843.50 4,886.40 3,619.30 Leather, Leather Goods and Shoes / 11 3,561.70 3,933.10 4,090.30 4,615.40 Footwear Processing of Gold, Silver, Precious 12 2,186.00 2,031.20 3,671.80 4,721.70 Metals, Jewelry, etc. 12 Major Industrial Products 101,514.30 97,893.50 102,417.00 93,750.30 Other Industries 13,712.10 15,136.40 14,913.00 12,886.50 Manufacturing 115,226.40 113,029.90 117,330.00 106,636.80

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, processed by the Ministry of Undustry.

2.2. The Manufacturing Industry in Indonesia

The provision of machinery and equipment has played an important role in the growth of the manufacturing industry and the increase in employment. While based on the growth of production and exports, food and beverages and the processing of gold and silver meet the material needs of the country and increase foreign exchange. Prioritizing certain industries requires a consideration of what is in the national interest, including an understanding of the purpose of industrial development, the problems related to economic growth, and the desire to catch up with developed countries. Increased productivity can be achieved through the use of appropriate technology.

The National Industry Development Master Plan 2015–2035 presents the selection criteria for priority industries in Indonesia: meeting domestic demand, replacing imports, improving the quantity and quality of employment opportunities, being internationally competitive, progressively offering added value within the country, strengthening the industrial structure, and demonstrating a comparative advantage in terms of the mastery of raw materials and technology.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 031 The 10 priority industries that have been selected based on these criteria can be grouped into mainstay, supporting, and upstream industries. The mainstay industries are (1) food, (2) pharmaceutical, cosmetics, and medical devices, (3) textiles, leather, footwear, and miscellaneous, (4) transportation equipment. (5) electronics and telematics, and (6) energy generation. The sole supporting industry is the capital goods, components, auxiliary materials, and services industry. The upstream industries are (1) agro-upstream, (2) basic metal and non-metal minerals, and (3) basic chemicals based on oil, gas and coal.

2.3. Analysis of the Competitiveness of the Manufacturing Industry

Globalization cannot be avoided. The world economy has become increasingly integrated, resulting in global production chains, also known as Global Value Chains (GVCs). These chains occur when a product (either a good or service) is manufactured using production bases from around the world to create a comparative advantage. GVC activity can cover the entire production process, including design, the preparation of raw materials, assembly of the final product, and marketing of these cross-border products. The creation of a GVC is primarily motivated by increased cost efficiency, quality improvement, and market expansion, and can also be driven by changes in the business climate, corporate strategy and regulation, the improvement in technology, and the liberalization of trade and investment over the last two decades.

In Indonesia, efforts to increase participation in GVCs need to be supported by the stakeholders involved, including the government. The development of the industrial sector requires the establishment of government incentives and disincentives to overcome market failure and coordination problems and to improve capacity and systems. Therefore, the government needs to impose various regulations that encourage the development of the industrial sector and participation in GVCs. This can also attract investment from transnational corporations, which consider openness to foreign investment, the ease of doing business, legal certainty, the quality of services, and the degree of trade openness when making investment decisions.

The Indonesian government has introduced various fiscal incentives related to trade and industry which directly or indirectly improve the participation of local companies in production networks and global trade. These incentives include the provision of tax holidays, tax allowances for investment in the industrial sector and in particular locations, and the establishment of tax and customs facilities in Special Economic Zones (SEZs).

032 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia GVC participation can be analyzed in terms of both backward and forward participation. Backward GVC participation is when a country imports foreign inputs for use in their manufacturing industry to create domestic products that they can then export. For Indonesia, the backward participation index for national industries is generally lower than the average of other countries (Figure 1-5). Some industries exhibit higher backward participation, including mining, food and beverages, textiles, chemicals, and basic metals.

[Figure 1-5] Backward GVC Participation by Industry in Indonesia

(Unit: %) 5

4

3

2

1

0 t r s y e e g d c r e n ive i u nc e Gas an t rical a ine r ct ion Fo o Trade Paper Water Wood u & rod u Metals Mi n Rubb Textiles icul t

Fi n P omo t c Elec t Chemical as, estau r nal Services nal Computer Mac h anufactu r G Ag r o ons tr Au t s Bas i r M C e Other Mineral Other and R Metals P

s & ricity, l Business Activities e Refining Oil r Othe r ial Transport & Telecom Transport Elec t Ho t So c Indonesia Peers

Source: Database of Trade in Value Added, OECD (2015).

In contrast, forward GVC participation – in which a country exports materials to other countries for use in manufacturing – demonstrates the opposite trend in Indonesia (Figure 1-6). The forward participation index is higher than average for most Indonesian industries compared to other countries, with oil and gas processing, computers, chemicals, and base metals being most prominent. Forward participation can be seen as the share of domestic value added to the raw materials used in other countries' exports. The high forward participation of the electronics and computer equipment industry indicates that the ability of domestic companies to supply the components needed for high-tech products is particularly high, though more data is needed to confirm this.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 033 [Figure 1-6] Forward GVC Participation by Industry in Indonesia

(Unit: %) 5 Indonesia Peers 4

3

2

1

0 r t s y e e g d c r n ive i u nc e Gas rical an t a ine r ct ion Fo o Trade Paper Water Wood rod u Metals Mi n Rubb e Textiles

icul t Fi n P omo t c Elec t Chemical as, Computer estau r Mac h anufactu r Ag r G ons tr u nal Services Au t Bas i C M Other Mineral Metals and R

ricity, Pers o s Business Activities l Refining Oil & & e Othe r Transport & Telecom Elec t Ho t Social

Source: Database of Trade in Value Added, OECD (2015).

2.4. SWOT Analysis of the Manufacturing Industry

Based on the SWOT analysis presented in [Figure 1-7], various strategies can be pursued to take advantage of strengths and opportunities while mitigating or avoiding weaknesses and threats. The main opportunities in Indonesia include the large domestic market based on the large population and cheap labor, while the main weaknesses include the lack of both infrastructure and government support programs, insufficient technology, and the low global competitiveness of domestic manufacturing firms.

Given the strengths and opportunities, the main strategic priorities should be an improvement in the quality of production to diversify potential marketing channels and increase market potential and the strengthening of partnerships between suppliers, customers, and competitors by guaranteeing the availability of human resources through government support. When considering strengths and threats together, the government should seek to minimize piracy and reinforce intellectual property rights, while the combination of weaknesses and opportunities requires that production costs be kept in check by increasing the efficiency of human resources and developing new technologies and that industry and information technology be used to increase flexibility and bargaining power. Finally, the primary strategy for dealing with both weaknesses and threats is increasing technological capabilities in order to develop new products that meet customer requirements.

034 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia [Figure 1-7] SWOT Analysis of the Industrial Sector

EXTERNAL FACTORS OPPORTUNITES THREATS

INTERNAL FACTORS Strong Domestic Market Potential Increasing of Subcontracting Markets Large Domestic Population of Social Network Media like Diffusion and Education Sector Lack of Supporting from Training Lack of Government Support in Distribution and Finance Still Low Penetration of Internet Infringement and Copyright Piracy STRENGTHS Strengths and Opportunities Strategies Strengths and Threats Strategies Flexibility to Respond to Market Trend 1. Improvement of the quality of production to expand marketing 1. Increasing government support to minimize piracy and handling of intellectual Attractive Design channels and increase market potential Relatively Low Production Cost property rights Rich of Local Values and Local Cultures 2. Enhancement of partnership between suppliers, customers and competitors by guarantee the availability of human resources through the government support WEAKNESSES Weaknesses and Opportunities Strategies Weaknesses and Threats Strategies Lack of Working Capital 1. Suppression of production costs with the efficiency of human 1. Increasing the technological capabilities to develop new products in order to Lack of Managerial Skills resources and development of new technologies meet customer requirements Low and Inequality of Financial Access Provided by Government 2. Increasing the use of industry and informantion technology to Mostly Centered in Java and Other increase flexibility and bargaining power Province Capitals

Source: Koshpasharin and Yasue (2014).

3. Industrial Policy in Indonesia 3.1. Required Policy

Indonesia is a member of the G20 and thus has one of the 20 biggest economies in the world. However, Indonesia’s income per capita is still quite low compared to others G20 members. Some countries have raised their GDP through success in industrialization, but Indonesia’s manufacturing industry is relatively weak in terms of its overall contribution to the Indonesian GDP. It accounted for only 20.8 percent in 2015, compared to 27.7 percent in Thailand and 35.9 percent in China. Therefore, Indonesia still has the potential to boost its manufacturing industry on the back of its abundant natural resources by creating more value-added products and increasing exports to foreign markets.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 035 Even so, the manufacturing sector in Indonesia faces some challenges. The unequal distribution of industry between regions has been a problem (Figure 1-8). Java has been the center of development for more than 50 years. Therefore, the infrastructure for manufacturing is more developed in Java than in other regions, although natural resources are abundant outside of Java, such as in Sumatra and Kalimantan. As a result, foreign products may be cheaper than domestic products and may require more imports to fulfill domestic consumption demand.

[Figure 1-8] The Distribution of Industries between Regions in Indonesia

(Unit: Company)

11% 2% 2,064 2,792 2,402 2,453 2,377 499 504 371 394 419 3% 86 87 80 99 104 2005 2007 2011 2012 2014 2005 2007 2011 2012 2014 2005 2007 2011 2012 2014 569 740 560 567 577

2005 2007 2011 2012 2014 0.46% 83% 19,440 19,554 18,640 2% 16,996 16,968 515 808 517 525 466 2005 2007 2011 2012 2014

2005 2007 2011 2012 2014

Source: Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning.

Another issue for Indonesia’s manufacturing industry is its composition (Figure 1-9). Micro and small enterprises (as defined by the number of workers they employ; in this case, it is 20 workers or fewer) account for around 99 percent of all businesses but only generate 8 percent of Indonesia’s GDP. The question then is how to assist micro and small enterprises in becoming medium or large enterprises. In terms of worker profile, only 2 percent of the workers in micro and small enterprises have higher education qualifications (e.g., a university diploma). As a result, micro and small enterprises lack the ability to absorb and implement knowledge and thus build a more productive business.

036 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia [Figure 1-9] Staff Size and Profile of Workers in Micro and Small Enterprises

Unit Number Workers Profile in Micro and Small Scale Enterprises (2015) Industries Micro (<5 workers) 3,385,851 Others 693472 Small (5-20 workers) 283,022 Elementary 1188137 Medium (20-100 workers) 16,559 JHS 451185 Big (>100 workers) 7,099 SHS 353784 Diploma Total 3,692,571 15976 Contribute only 2% University 30170

0 400,000 800,000 1,200,000

Source: Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning.

3.2. Support Programs for the Manufacturing Industry

The manufacturing industry has become more important for the Indonesian economy recently because it makes the highest contribution to GDP. Therefore, to generate strong economic growth, the government should target the manufacturing industry. Under President , Indonesia targeted an increase in the contribution of manufacturing to GDP from 20.8 percent in 2015 to 21.6 percent in 2018 (Table 1-5). To meet this goal, the manufacturing industry should grow by 6.9 percent in 2016, 7.4 percent in 2017, and 8.6 percent in 2018. Although it may not be easy for the government, the target should be fulfilled to increase national income per capita.

Industrial Development

Target 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Growth of Industry Industry Growth (%) 4.7 6.1 6.9 7.4 8.6 (Actual & Projected) (4.63) (4.25) (5.4) (6.2-6.5) (8.00) Contribution to GDP 20.70 20.80 21.00 21.10 21.60 (%) (Actual & Projected) (21.01) (20.84) (20.95) (21.35) (21.76) Industrial Zone Development Special Economic Zones 7 7 7+3 10+2 12+2 Industrial Zones n.a. n.a. n.a. 14 14

Source: Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 037 To achieve this, certain policy directions have been introduced by the Indonesian government. First, Indonesia is seeking to develop manufacturing outside of Java because other regions have abundant natural resources and creating industrial areas closer to raw material sources may lead to cheaper products. Second, Indonesia wants to establish another 9000 medium and big enterprises and another 20,000 small enterprises in order to quickly boost the growth of the manufacturing industry. Third, Indonesia is looking to improve its competitiveness and productivity in terms of the value of its exports and the value added per worker. Indonesia also wants to establish special zones of industry on certain islands and in certain regions by creating more special economic zones (SEZs). These SEZs would (i) be downstream of natural resources, (ii) increase connectivity, (iii) encourage more investment in human capital and technology, (iv) be subject to deregulation to improve the ease of doing business, and (v) improve the business climate through the use of incentives.

Indonesia can benefit from comparative advantages such as its abundant natural resources, both labor and markets as in one combination, the potential of the green and blue economies, and the potential education of its work force (Figure 1-10). To improve Indonesia’s role in GVCs, development of the manufacturing industry could focus on those sub-industries that are value-added oriented, that replace imports, and that engage in global production based on labor competitiveness. In terms of manufacturing regions, Indonesia should assist the north coast of Java in attracting more labor-intensive and technology-intensive sub-industries, coasts outside of Java in establishing manufacturing companies based on natural resources, and or in developing enterprises that support GVCs.

[Figure 1-10] Current Industrial Strategy for Indonesia

• Abundant of natural • Industry for value • North Coast of Java: resources added oriented • Labor intensive and • Labors and market • Industry for import technology intensive added oriented • The potential of green • Other Coasts outside and blue economy, • Industry for global Java: creative economy, and production with the • Natural resource the education level of labor competitiveness industry workers to improve Indonesia’s • Batam and Riau role in the Global Islands: Value Chain • Industry for Global

C o m p a r t i ve A d v n g e I n d u s t r ial A g l o m e a i Value Chain C h o i c e f I n d u s t r ali z a

Source: Ministry of Industry Indonesia.

038 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia Based on these long-term goals, Indonesia’s National Industry Development Strategy (Rencana Induk Pengembangan Industri Nasional; RIPIN) has the following specific targets: a. The development of upstream and resource-based industries b. The control of raw materials and energy exports c. Strengthening human resources in terms of technology knowledge and skill d. The shortlisting of industrial development areas e. The development of core industrial development areas, industrial areas, areas for industrial purposes, and small and medium industry centers f. The establishment of favorable policies for small and medium businesses g. The development of industry infrastructure h. The development of green industries i. The development of strategic industries j. The increase in the use of “Made in Indonesia” products k. The improvement of international industrial cooperation.

In order to achieve these national industrial development targets, the Indonesian government created an industrial roadmap in 2015 in the form of a national industry structure (Figure 1-11). This structure consists of (i) the vision and mission of national industrial development, (ii) mainstay industries, (iii) supporting industries, (iv) upstream industries, (v) resources, and (vii) prerequisites. There are six mainstay industries (food processing, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and medical apparatuses, textiles and footwear, transportation, electronics and telematics, and power plant equipment), while supporting industries include capital goods and components, among others. Upstream industries are also important, including agro-based industries, basic metal and non-metallic minerals industries, and coal and gas-based industries. To construct a strong manufacturing industry, resources and prerequisites are both important. Indonesia has a large number of resources suitable for industrial development such as natural resources, human resources, and technology, innovation, and creativity. Prerequisites that must be present for the successful development of the manufacturing industry are infrastructure, supporting policies and regulation, and financing.

Based on this national industry structure, not all industries can be developed to the same extent. Instead, the Indonesian government should select certain industries to concentrate their energies on. [Figure 1-12] presents the 10 industries that should be the focus of development: food processing, pharmaceutical, cosmetic and medical apparatus, textile and footwear, transportation equipment, electronics and telematics, power plants, capital goods, components, and supporting industries, upstream agro-based industries, basic metals and non-metallic minerals, and upstream coal and gas-based industries.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 039 [Figure 1-11] National Industry Structure in Indonesia

VISION & MISSION NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Mainstay Industry

Pharmaceutical Texile and Food Transportation Electronic and Power Plant Comestic and Footwear & Processing Equipment Telematic Equipment Medical Apparatus Other Indsutries Industry Industries Industries Industries Industries

Supporting Industry

Capital Goods, Component, Supporting Industris

Upstream Industry

Upstream Agro-based Basic Metals and Non Metalic Upstream Coal and Gas based Industries Mineral Industry Industries

Resources

Technology, Innovation Natural Resources Human Resources & Creativity

Pre-Requisites

Infrastructure Policy & Regulation Finance

Source: Ministry of Industry Indonesia.

[Figure 1-12] Priority Industries in Indonesia (2015-2035)

Food Processsing Power Plant Industries Industries

Pharmaceutical, Capital Goods, Cosmetic and Medical Component, and Apparatus Industries Supporting Industries

Textile and Footwear Upstream Agro-Based & Other Industries Industries

Basic Metals and Non- Transportation Metalic Minerals Eqiupment Industries Industries

Electonic and Upstream Coal and Telematic Industries Gas Based Industries

Source: Ministry of Industry Indonesia.

040 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia As summarized in [Figure 1-13], the Ministry of Industry has divided the industrial development roadmap into three stages: Stage I (2015-2019), Stage II (2020-2024), and Stage III (2025-2035). In Stage I, the government will focus on increasing the value added for natural resources. In Stage II, the government will focus on strengthening its competitive advantages and promoting sustainable development. Finally, in Stage III, the government will focus on how to cement Indonesia as a strong industrialized nation. By the end of this last stage, Indonesia is projected to be developed country with a high per capita income.3)

[Figure 1-13] Stages of Industrial Development for Indonesia (2015-2035)

Stage Ⅲ 2025- 2035 Stage Ⅱ 2020- Indonesia as a strong 2024 industrialized nation Stage Ⅰ 2015- Competitive 2016 advantage and sustainable Increase natural development resource value added

Source: Ministry of Industry Indonesia.

Government incentives for the manufacturing industry can be classified into four main categories: licensing incentives, tax incentives, business and infrastructure incentives, and other incentives (Figure 1-14). Licensing can be made more attractive via deregulation, de-bureaucratization, free visa agreements with 174 countries, and the creation of SEZs. The Ministry of Finance provides tax incentives in the form of income tax allowances for workers in labor-intensive industries, for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), and for real estate. The business and infrastructure incentives offered by the Indonesian government target a diverse range of economic activity: the import of raw materials for drugs and food, infrastructure development, the use of water resources, dwelling time, oil refineries, aviation, downstream industries, debt-to-equity ratios, logistics, DPO funds, and export-oriented industries. For other incentives, the government pursues a one-map policy and has increased the scope of and interest subsidies for the Kredit Usaha Rakyat (“People’s Business Credit”; KUR) scheme for SMEs.

3) Incentives for industry are also an important consideration for the Ministry of Finance in Indonesia. Therefore, fiscal policy should be strengthened to develop the manufacturing industry as an engine of sustainable economic growth for Indonesia. Two kinds of fiscal policy can be introduced to boost the manufacturing industry.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 041 [Figure 1-14] Incentives for the Manufacturing Industry in Indonesia

Incentives for Other Incentives for Business & Infrastructure Licensing Tax Incentives Incentives

Simplification of Licensing Garments & Simplification Acceleration of Regulation for through Income Tax Footwear Procedures for Importing Infrastructrure Manufacturing of Deregulation & Allowance for Workers in Labour Raw Materials of Drug & Development Water Resources Bureaucratization Food One Intensive Industry MAP Policy

Free Visa for 174 Countries Insentives Optimize the Develop Oil Incentives for Develop the for REITS Dwelling Time Refinery Industry the Aviation Downstream Industry Industry Expand the Scope and Interest Susidy Special of KUR Economic Insentives Debt to Logistics CPO Fund Support the Zone (SEZ) for Property Equity Export-oriented Sectors Ratio Industries

Source: Ministry of Finance Indonesia.

In terms of fiscal incentives, the government provides stimulus packages to boost investment and industrialization by improving the investment climate and strengthening the competitiveness of domestic products and infrastructure. Tax incentives for the manufacturing industry come in many forms. First, tax allowances (based on Government Regulations No. 18/2015 and No. 9/2016) are granted to high priority industries that promote economic diversification, strengthen the national industry structure, increase competitiveness in the international market, generate significant employment opportunities, and support the transfer of technology, with a particular focus on industries located outside of Java, Bali, and the Batam Islands (i.e., remote areas and the East Indonesia Zone). Tax allowances include (i) an investment allowance of 30%, (ii) accelerated depreciation/amortization, (iii) a dividend tax rate of 10% for foreign taxpayers, and (iv) loss compensation for 5 to 10 years.4)

4) The tax allowance policy aims to encourage long-term investment, create more jobs, improve local content in industry, boost exports, prevent the repatriation of dividends, and increase research and development. Companies can receive the tax allowance if they meet the following criteria: a. Domestic corporate tax payer b. New investment/expansion c. Fulfilling general criteria d. Complying with the Indonesia Standard Industrial Classification (KBLI) and the requirements in the 1st and 2nd Attachments of Govt. Reg. No. 18/2015 jo. No. 9/2016 e. Highly investment/export oriented f. Labour intensive g. High local content.

042 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia The government also provides companies with tax holidays based on Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 159/PMK.010/2015 and No. 103/PMK.010/2016. A tax holiday involves a reduction in income tax of 10%-100% for 5–15 years and is granted to corporate taxpayers within what is classified as a “pioneer industry” that have investment of at least IDR 1 trillion (USD 1 = IDR 13,300), exhibit high economic integration, contribute high added value and positive externalities, introduce new technology, and/or play a strategic role in the national economy.

A third tax incentive is Value Added Tax (VAT) incentives under Government Regulation No. 81/2015. Taxpayers can take advantage of VAT incentives in the import and/or transfer of certain taxable goods which have strategic value. Products that can be exempt from VAT on imports and/or transfers include capital goods in the form of machines and factory equipment, assembled or not, but spare parts are not included.

Another fiscal incentive is import duty incentives under Ministry of Finance Regulation (PMK) No. 176/PMK.011/2009 as amended by PMK 188/PMK.010/2015. Machines, goods, and materials for construction or the development of industry within the framework of investment are exempt from import duties, as are machines, goods, and materials from free port zones or under free trade, special economic zones, or bonded hoarding, and machines and goods if using imported production machines bought in the domestic market. Manufacturing and service companies that fulfill the requirements of machines, goods, and materials if not produced in the domestic market, produced but not qualifying the specification, and produced domestically but in insufficient quantities are subject to this regulation.

Import duties borne by the government (BM DTP facility) are another fiscal incentive used to strengthen the manufacturing industry. With this policy, import duties are paid by the government with funds set aside in the state budget.

The Ministry of Finance in Indonesia also supports domestic industry by financing certain SOEs with domestic and overseas borrowing. The SOEs that receive this financial incentive are in the defense industry and other strategic industries, such as PT PINDAD (an SOE that produces weapon systems), PT PAL, and PT DI. This strategy has as its foundation the following regulations:

a. Government Regulation No. 56 of 2011 about Project Financing through the Issuance of Government Sharia Securities b. Government Regulation No. 10 of 2011 about Procedures of Foreign Loans Procurement and Grants Receipt c. Government Regulation No. 54 of 2008 about Procedures for Obtaining and On-lending of Domestic Loans.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 043 To improve the competitiveness of Indonesia’s exports, the Ministry of Finance issued Regulation No. 1156/KMK.08/2015, which assigns Indonesia’s Export Financing Agency (Lembaga Pembiayaan Ekspor Indonesia: LPEI) the task of providing financing for the SOE PT INKA (Persero) to export railway cars to Bangladesh through the National Interest Account (NIA) scheme. The Ministry of Finance believes that this financing may boost domestic industry through backward linkages.

To promote the equal distribution of industry, the government also plans to create many more Industrial Zones (IZs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) outside of Java (Figure 1-15). IZs are established primarily for industry, but SEZs also provide for other sectors, such as tourism. In IZs and SEZs, the government provides certain fiscal incentives (e.g., tax allowances, tax holidays, VAT incentives, and import duty incentives) in a one-stop service (see

for a summary of these incentives). The government has set as a target 16 SEZs and 16 IZs to be established by 2019.

[Figure 1-15] Industrial Zones (IZs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Indonesia

Source: Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning.

044 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia

Fiscal Incentives in Indonesian Special Economic Zones (SEZs)

No. Tax Incentives (a) Tax holidays Criteria: New taxpayers with a new capital investment plan or the expansion of new capital investment. The business is from a priority industry within the SEZ and meets the target debt-to-equity ratio. Submitsa commitment letter to place at least 10% of the total capital investment in Indonesia Bank, anIndonesian legal entity which was founded on or after August 15, 2011. Benefits: Income tax reduction of 20-100% for 5 to 25 years

(b) Tax allowances Criteria: Taxpayerswithin domestic agencies which engage in capital 1 Income Tax investment in the SEZ in the form of new capital investment and expansion. The business is from a priority industry within the SEZ, does not qualify for a tax holiday, or isengaged in other activities in the SEZ. Benefits: • A reduction in net taxable income of up to 30%, prorated at 5% for six years • Accelerated depreciation and amortization • A reduction in withholding tax on dividends paid to non-residents to 10% • Extension of tax-loss carryforwards for more than 5 years but not more than 10 years • VAT and sales tax on luxury goods not collected for the importation of goods beyond customs territory to SEZs, and for the delivery of Value Added Tax goods beyond customs territory (e.g., bonded zones, FTZs etc.) (VAT) and Sales 2 • VAT refunds for individual taxpayers on foreign passportsfor goods Tax on Luxury purchased from retail stores in a tourism SEZ Goods • Exemption for sales tax on luxury goods for the transfer/delivery of property and occupancy in a tourism SEZ • Enterprises builder and manager entitled to import duty exemption for the import of capital goods for 3 years Import Duties 3 • Businesses entitled to import duty exemption for the import of (Exemption) capital goods and raw materials for 2 years • The type and volume of goods isdecided by SEZ administrators • Import duties on raw materials, capital goods, and packing goods Import Duties will be deferred 4 (Deferment) • For production that uses 40% local components, the import duty tariffis 0% • Excise exemption for raw materials used to produce non-excisable 5 Excise goods.

Source: Ministry of Finance Indonesia.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 045 Recent Economic Stimulus Packages

Between September 2015 and November 2016, the Indonesian government announced 14 economic policy packages which included tax incentives, deregulation, and more open foreign investment opportunities in a bid to boost Indonesia’s economic growth (Table 1-7). However, according to the latest information, not all of these stimulus packages have been fully implemented.

Examples of Economic Stimulus Packages

Package Unveiled Main Points Completed - Lower tax rates for property acquired by local 100% real estate investment trusts - Improvement in the efficiency of customs 11th March 29, 2016 checks at ports (to reduce waiting time) - Government-subsidized loans for export- oriented small and medium enterprises - Roadmap for the pharmaceutical industry - Enhancing the ease of doing business in 80% 12th April 28, 2016 Indonesia by simplifying procedures and permits and reducing costs - Deregulation of residential property projects n.a. 13th August 24, 2016 for low-income families - An e-commerce roadmap which is expected n.a. 14th November 14, 2016 to boost community activities

Source: Indonesia’s Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs.

3.3. Effectiveness of the Support Programs

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have been earmarked by the government as a way to enhance the role of the manufacturing industry in creating sustainable economic growth by providing benefits for privately owned businesses. The facilities and services that the government provides in an SEZ differ significantly from those in other areas. For example, private businesses in an SEZ are eligible for a tax holiday with new investment under IDR 500 billion, compared IDR 1 trillion for businesses outside these zones. Other differences are summarized in

.

046 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia

Differences Between Tax Holiday Conditions for SEZs and Other Areas

Category Other areas SEZs Part of a pioneer industry Business that is deemed to participate in 1 Eligibility themain activity of the SEZ Minimum 1 trillion (or 500 billion for a - Less than 500 billion 2 Amount of particular industry) - 500 billion to 1 trillion Investment (IDR) - Greater than 1 trillion

• Tax reductions ranging from - Tax reductions ranging from 20%-100% 10%-100% - Reduction period varies based on • Reduction period ranging from 5 investment size: 3 Benefits years to 15 years - Less than IDR 500 billion or IDR 500 • At the discretion of the Ministry billion to IDR 1 trillion: 5 to 15 years of Finance, maximum reduction - Greater than IDR 1 trillion: 10 to 25 periodcan be 20 years years

Source: Ministry of Finance Indonesia.

The Indonesian government has faced a number of challenges implementing the tax allowances. The government has increased the coverage for tax allowances to cover more industries, but the utilization rate has been low (Table 1-9). The government has revised tax allowance regulations several times, the last being Government Regulation (PP) No. 18/2015 jo. PP No. 9/2016. Only 25 of the 140 different industries classified by the government took advantage of tax allowances in 2015/2016 (17.8%).

summarizes the tax policy implementation from 2007 to 2016.

Participation Rate for Tax Incentives

PP 18/2015 KET PP 1/2007 PP 62/2008 PP 52/2011 PP 1-52 PP 9/2016 Annex I 45 67 52 - 71 Annex II 19 33 77 - 74 Industry Classification 1 3 5 - 5 (KBLI) NET 63 97 124 155 140 Duration 2 years 3 years 3 years - - 23 15 5 32 25 Utilized KBLI (36%) (16%) (4%) (20.65%) (17.86%) 40 82 119 123 115 Non-utilized KBLI (64%) (84%) (96%) (79.36%) (82.14%) Number of Taxpayers 57 21 5 83 31

Source: Ministry of Finance Indonesia.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 047 Evaluation of the Economic Stimulus Packages

Not all of the economic packages have been fully successful, so there are some improvements that need to be made by the government. One issue has been resistance from regional governments. In several cases, deregulation measures have not been implemented by the local government as it does not see the advantage in doing so. Unlike under the previous authoritarian government, currently regional governments have much more power due to the focus on decentralization.

One example of a deregulation measure that has yet to be implemented effectively by regional governments is integrated one-stop service centers (Pelayanan Terpadu Satu Pintu; PTSP) through the Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM). Using this service, investors who meet specific criteria can obtain investment licenses within three hours. This service works well at the central level, but at the regional level, there is much room for improvement.

One reason for the lack of coordination and cooperation with regional governments is that the central government did not make local government an intrinsic part of the plan, thus dampening any enthusiasm to participate at the local government level. The central government should thus attempt to increase communication with local governments regarding these stimulus packages and sell them as a joint effort, rather than simply asking the local governments to implement them.

The central government should also compensate the regional governments in some way for their participation as another incentive. By scrapping thousands of regulations that were considered to hinder direct investment at the local level (in the 14th package), the local governments lost a significant source of revenue. Another example is the central government’s decision to scrap double taxation on real estate investment trusts (in the 5th package), reducing the tax income for regional governments in the process.

This is part of the ‘mental revolution’ that Indonesian President Joko Widodo talked about during his successful presidential campaign in 2014 (although he used it in a much wider sense). The central government has been very eager to seek new ways to boost the economy and social development (examples include the tax amnesty program, economic policy packages, and infrastructure development). However, given the strength of the regional governments in the decentralized political structure, these efforts require local government support. If not, these plans will not bear much fruit.

048 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 4. Fiscal Policies for Industrialization in Korea 4.1. Industrial Policy Focus and Structure

4.1.1. Korean Economic Development

Korea is currently the only country that is a donor for overseas development assistance (ODA) after originally being a recipient, and this transition has drawn the attention of economic experts. Of particular interest has been the role of the manufacturing industry in Korea’s economic development and its recovery from the 1997-1998 economic crisis.

International researchers have identified many reasons for the rapid economic development of Korea (summarized in [Figure 1-16]), including but not limited to government policy, protectionism, and a focus on exports (Woo-Cumings, 1999), while Korean researchers also point to cheap, high-quality labor, well-trained technocrats, the emphasis on education, investment in human resources, the high level of entrepreneurship, and the can-do spirit.

[Figure 1-16] GDP Growth and Per Capita Income of Korea

20 90

80 15 70

10 60

50 5 40

0 30 GDP Per Capita (OECD=100) Annual GDP Growth Rate (%) Annual GDP Growth

20 -5 10

-10 0 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

GDP Per Capita Annual GDP Growth Rate

Source: Industry and Technology Policies in Korea (OECD), 2012.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 049 4.1.2. Changes in Industrial Policy Focus

Between 1948 and the beginning of the 1960s, the major industry in Korea was farming, which accounted for 40% of production, while the manufacturing industry only accounted for 10%. However, during the 1960s, Korea started to actively pursue economic development, with manufacturing taking on a key role. At the beginning of the 1970s, manufactured products accounted for 90% of Korea’s exports, a huge increase from one third only a decade earlier. However, the main export products were from labor-intensive industries such as textiles, shoes, and home electronics.

In the 1970s, with Korea’s dependence on the import of raw materials, intermediaries, and capital goods increasing, the Korean government moved its development focus from labor-intensive industries to the heavy and chemical industries (Table 1-10). This was a drastic shift in the industry structure, one that was ultimately successful because of the government’s consistent implementation of relevant policies, including tax and financial incentives. The heavy and chemical industries are currently Korea’s major industries.

Korea’s Industrial Policy Focus

1950s Industrialization through Import Substitution under Protection 1960s Export Promotion 1970s Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) Drive 1980s Stability / Market / Trade Liberalization 1990s Institutional Reforms

Source: Korea’s Economic Development Model and Role of Government (Oh, 2011).

With the political situation being more democratic, the 1980s was a period during which the Korean government looked to liberalize domestic industries and international trade. The government sought to remedy the unbalanced economic growth by eliminating certain individual industry support systems so that businesses could select the fields that suited them best, thus boosting international competitiveness.

In the 1990s, the focus of Korean government business support programs shifted to technology and international competitiveness, with technological superiority considered a key factor in global competitiveness. Advances in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) during this period allowed Korean businesses to expand their boundaries and become more involved in global value chains.

050 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia In the 2000s, the Korean government focused on the development of future economic growth engine industries such as the 6Ts (information technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, environmental technology, space technology, and cultural technology) and high value service industries (e.g., healthcare, broadcasting, convention, and tourism industries) to improve the competitiveness of its main industries and create more domestic jobs.

4.1.3. Economic Development Plans

In each of the economic developmental stages outlined above, large companies played a leading role. Korea is considered as one of the most successful examples of rapid economic growth in the world, for which the Korean government’s most effective policy instrument was its “Five Year Economic Development Plans.” From 1962 to the beginning of 1990s, the Korean government introduced seven of these plans (Table 1-11), which supported major domestic industries by outlining various programs that promoted business development and export activity.

Korean Economic Development Plans (1962-1996)

1st • Expansion of social infrastructure 1962-66 • Promotion of exports

2nd • Self-sufficiency in food 1967-71 • Promotion of key industries: chemical, steel, machinery

3rd • Rural development (Saemael movement) 1972-76 • Promotion of heavy/chemical industries • Social development (distributive equity, etc.) 4th • Enhancing self-sufficiency in investment finance 1977-81 • Science & technology development

5th • Price stability 1982-86 • Efficiency enhancement through institutional reform • Enhancement of economic efficiency: promotion of competition, market 6th opening, industrial restructuring 1987-91 • Promotion of equity: balanced regional develop, social welfare, etc. • Strengthening of growth potential 7th • Acceleration of globalization 1992-96 • Improvement in people’s living environment

Source: Korea’s Economic Development Model and Role of Government (Oh, 2011).

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 051 4.1.4. The Role of the Manufacturing Industry

Since Korea’s industrial policy has long focused on the manufacturing industry, it remains a pillar of Korean economic growth. Even with concerns over productivity and technological leverage, manufacturing has taken on even greater importance in the recovery from the 1997-1998 financial crisis. Usually, the more developed a country is, the lower the contribution to the economy from the manufacturing industry. However, the role of manufacturing in Korea remains high (Figure 1-17 and 1-18). Its contribution to economic growth has steadily risen each year, from almost 30% in the 1980s to an average of 44% between 2010 and 2014.

[Figure 1-17] Change in Korean Economic Structure (1963-2014)

(thousand) 45,000 90.0%

40,000 Public Utilities, Construction and 80.0% Services

35,000 70.0% Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing

30,000 60.0%

25,000 50.0%

20,000 40.0%

15,000 30.0% Mining and Manufacturing 10,000 20.0%

5,000 10.0% Nember of Employed Person 0 0.0% 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008

Source: Evolution of Industrial Policy and Economic Growth in Korea (Koo, 2013).

In addition, the number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the Korean manufacturing industry increased from 29,779 in 1980 to 94,212 in 2000, a three-fold increase, accompanied by a large increase in value added (Table 1-12). In fact, more and more small Korean firms have become involved in global value chains, increasing their global competitiveness.

052 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia [Figure 1-18] Contribution to Korean Economic Growth by Industry

(Unit: %) 3.0 2.2 2.0 8.3 4.7

17.0 19.3 23.0 28.0 29.1

12.2 7.9 12.0 6.7 5.9 Agriculture & Fishery Manufacturing Construction/Unity Service 55.4 Other 55.6 54.1 53.6 53.5

7.0 9.7 10.6 9.5 9.5 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014

Source: Korea’s Next Big Manufacturing Leap (Park, 2016).

Number, Workforce, and Value Added of SMEs in Korean Manufacturing

Year 1980 1985 1990 1997 2000 Number of Firms 29,779 42,950 67,679 91,324 94,212 (Share in Total Manufacturing Firms) (96.6%) (97.5%) (98.3%) (99.1%) (99.2%)

Number of Employees (Thousand) 1,000 1,368 1,864 1,870 1,849 (Share in Toal Employees) (49.6%) (56.1%) (61.7%) (69.3%) (69.7%)

Value-added (Billion) 4,168 10,059 31,432 84,148 92,124 (Share in Toal Value-Added) (35.2%) (37.6%) (44.3%) (46.5%) (41.9%)

Source: Evolution of Industrial Policy and Economic Growth in Korea (Koo, 2013).

4.2. Fiscal Policies for Manufacturing

4.2.1. Introduction

The Korean economy currently has a clear set of strengths, such as large investment in R&D, a highly educated and skilled workforce, a high take-up of advanced technology, and numerous companies that have embraced globalization. However, at the beginning of its development, Korea had a very limited amount of resources. Due to this, an “unbalanced economic development strategy” was devised so that certain industries could be prioritized in a way that they could effectively utilize the available resources for economic development. A summary of Korean

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 053 economic development policies used to achieve this target is presented here (see also Table 1-13).

First, Korea set clear investment priorities: light industry in the 1960s, heavy industry and the chemical industry in the 1970s, high technology industries in the 1980s, and venture businesses from the 1990s onward.

Secondly, Korea established coordinating bodies to mobilize available resources for use in these priority industries. Most importantly, the Economic Ministers’ Meeting coordinated planning and implementation between economic ministries and sometimes non-economic ministries as well. In addition, the President (or more accurately, the top advisors of the President) played an important role in coordinating ministry actions when there were disagreements over major programs or budget allocations.

Thirdly, the Korean government successfully allocated its budget and distributed foreign capital according to the priorities it had set with the support of the national leadership. Setting a budget for the priority industries was a complicated process that involved a significant number of interest groups. Therefore, the Korean government created the Korea Development Institute in 1971, which developed the 5-year economic development plans and major economic policies.

4.2.2. Export-Oriented Industrialization in the 1960s

To promote the labor-intensive light manufacturing industry, Korea redesigned its secondary education system to provide a suitable workforce. In addition, to encourage businesses to export more, the government provided various incentives, such as currency depreciation, tax reductions, and subsidies, as well as establishing institutions such as the Korea Trade Promotion Agency (KOTRA) and new systems (e.g., the monthly ministerial meetings to monitor export performance and free export zones).

Export incentives include preferential export credits: ① direct subsidies and tax reductions. ② indirect tax reductions on export sales and intermediate imports. ③ tariff exemptions or drawbacks on raw materials for export. ④ tariff and tax exemptions for domestic supplies of intermediate goods. ⑤ accelerated depreciation allowances. ⑥ discounts on railway freight and electricity rates.

Due to these export-oriented policies, the competitiveness of Korean industry increased significantly through specialization, economies of scale, and strong

054 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia competition, resulting in substantial job creation in labor-intensive industries.

4.2.3. Promotion of Heavy Industry and the Chemical Industry in the 1970s

In the 1970s, Korea revised its strategy for industrial development, shifting its focus to heavy industry and the chemical industry in order to achieve sustainable growth in the face of rising protectionist barriers and increasing wages, which made it difficult to compete with late-comer developing countries. The new priorities were iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding, general machinery, chemicals, and electronics.

The Korean government provided three tax incentives: ① a tax holiday of 5 years, ② an investment tax credit of 8% for machinery and equipment, and ③ 100-percent special depreciation. In addition, it created the National Investment Fund in 1974 to provide financial resources to companies in the heavy and chemical industries because these industries required significant capital investment to construct factories and maintain operations.

Due to the refocus on heavy industry and chemicals, Korea’s industrial structure underwent significant change. Though this generated significant benefits overall, new problems did surface, including unbalanced economic power and a severe dependence on foreign markets.

4.2.4. Restructuring and Technological Development in the 1980s

After analyzing the efficiency of the significant investment that had been made in heavy industry and chemicals, the Korean government initiated industrial restructuring in the 1980s to avoid over-investment or duplicated investment in certain industries, such as power-generating equipment, construction equipment, motor vehicles, and electrical equipment. It strongly encouraged mergers, debt- equity swaps, debt rescheduling, capacity reduction, and the adjustment of product lines.

Korea also introduced the Industrial Development Law in 1986, which outlined a new, consistent incentive system. It emphasized technological development by encouraging business-affiliated research centers, R&D investment, and the standardization of parts and technologies. In conjunction with this, government research institutes, such as the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), were established to help firms acquire new technology and to commercialize in-house or transferred technology. Furthermore, the Korean government started to support research and development projects in cooperation with private firms.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 055

Changes in Korean Industrial Policy

Stage of Development Goals & Policy Technology S & T Policies HRD Policies Directions Development Build production base for exports Build legal basis Imitating foreign Reduce 1960s • Expand light industries & administrative technologies illiteracy • Mobilize capital frameworks Build self-reliant growth base Indigenizing Set up S&T infra. Expand 1970s • Promote HCI foreign (Daedeok Science vocational • Build SOC technologies Town) training Promote business Expand tech-intensive industries Developing Expand higher R&D & launch 1980s • Industrial rationalization advanced education a national R&D • Trade liberalization technologies system program Enhancing productivity through Encourage Develop life- innovation Promoting frontier research 1990s long learning • Nuture venture business creative research & innovation system • Build ICT infrastructures clusters

Source: Korea’s Economic Development Model and Role of Government (Oh, 2011).

4.2.5. Innovation Drive from the 1990s Onward

The 1990s was a painful period for Korea because of the economic crisis of 1997-1998 caused by the poor management of government-bank-conglomerate partnerships, which resulted in moral hazard and irresponsible financial liberalization. GDP shrank by 6.9% in 1998, and the exchange rate skyrocketed from 888 won/USD at the end of June 1997 to 1,695 won/USD at the end of 1997.

Manufacturing played a major role in the recovery from this crisis by increasing its export volume based on the depreciation of the Korean currency. Furthermore, many Korean companies became globalized in the 2000s, taking advantage of Korea’s information and communication technologies. Another measure that Korea introduced in 1997 was the Special Law for the Promotion of Venture Businesses, which promoted small innovative firms. This law laid down definitions of targeted venture businesses and the support programs designed to encourage their innovative activities.

It should be noted that the Korean economy started to grow again by embracing innovation. Previously, growth primarily arose from the traditional production factors, capital and labor. However, innovation has become a new major source of growth, one based on knowledge, creativity, and exploration. As a result, the government provides tax incentives for innovative startups, R&D activity, and employee training programs, in addition to increasing accessibility to finance by

056 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia issuing grants for R&D and innovation activities and supplying preferential credit for the purpose of increasing productivity, such as by building “smart” factories.

4.3. Effectiveness of Korea’s Industrial Policies

shows the effectiveness of Korea’s industrial policy stages. In 1970, textile products accounted for 40.8% of Korea’s exports, decreasing to 7.2% in 1980 and not appearing on the top 10 list in 2013. In 2013, cars were the largest export (13.5%), followed by semi-conductors (10.3%), petroleum products (9.5%), chemical products (8.7%), ships (6.7%), and steel (5.9%).

Changes in Korea’s Major Exports (1970-2013)

2013 1970 1980 (Capital & Tech-Intensive (Light Industry Products) (Heavy Industry & Electonics) Products) Product Portion(%) Product Portion(%) Product Portion(%) Textile 40.8 Clothes 11.7 Cars 13.5 Venner 11.0 Home Electronics 11.3 Semi-Conductors 10.3 Wig 10.8 Textile 7.2 Petroleum Products 9.5 Iron Ore 5.9 Semi-Conductors 7.0 Chemical Products 8.7 Electronics 3.5 Steels 6.7 Ship 6.7 Cookies 2.3 Shoes 6.6 Steel 5.9 Shoes 2.1 Ship 4.4 Flat Display 5.2 Tobacco 1.6 Computers 3.9 Phones 5.0 Steel 1.5 Cars 3.6 Home Electronics 2.6 Others 20.5 Others 38.3 Others 33.6

Source: Author’s Own Analysis.

In conclusion, Korean industry has performed exceptionally well over the last five decades. The main factors behind its success in terms of both the speed and effectiveness of its industrialization are:

① timely shifts in the focus of government support, from farming to labor- intensive light industry to heavy industry and chemicals to high technology industries ② broad access to education and raising technical know-how ③ strong leadership and vision sharing between the government and the private sector ④ consistent policy aimed at the global competitiveness of Korean businesses, especially with a focus on science and technology development.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 057 It is widely accepted that R&D and innovation are vital for sustainable growth and economic development. Investment in R&D and human resources will continue to increase in order to promote basic research and innovation activities in all industries and to discover potential fields for future growth.

5. Policy Recommendations 5.1. Introduction

Over the past five decades, the main purpose of the Korean government’s industrial policy has been the promotion of exports, the substitution of imports with domestic goods, support for heavy industry and chemicals, the development of new industries, and building high technology industries. The government has used entry barriers to certain industries so that the incumbents could take advantage of economies of scale to improve their international competitiveness, especially in heavy industry and chemicals, including sub-industries such as machinery, ship-building, electronics, steel, and petrochemicals.

Another tool used by the Korean government to promote the development of manufacturing has been financial accessibility. Government loans with low interest rates and/or longer maturities have been a major source of capital for firms to building factories or production facilities.

Tax incentives in the form of tax exemptions or tax reductions for priority industries or export businesses have also been utilized in Korea. Typical examples include indirect tax benefits for the raw materials needed for export manufacturing and capital goods, and the direct reduction of corporate tax for R&D and employee training expenses.

The last main policy tool for industrial development has been industry protection. A typical example is tariffs. In the 1960s and 1970s, relatively high tariffs helped decrease domestic competition so that firms had the time to become more efficient. However, since the 1980s, tariffs have been lowered because of international and bilateral negotiations.

Even after changing its industrial policy framework from focusing on a few selected industries to focusing on innovative firms, Korea still promotes the manufacturing industry using a combination of tax incentives, financial incentives, and government procurement programs.

058 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 5.2. Selection of Priority Industries and Establishment of Long-Term Plans

5.2.1. Korea’s Example

As analyzed in the previous chapter, the Korean government clearly targeted certain industries depending on the stage of development the economy was in: ① 1960s: labor-intensive light manufacturing industries ② 1970s: heavy industry and chemicals ③ 1980s: high technology industries ④ 1990s onward: innovative industries and businesses.

These changes in focus were detailed in the seven 5-year economic development plans. The plans included corresponding resource allocations so that the new strategy could be effectively implemented through coordination between related parties.

5.2.2. Recommendations

The Indonesian government through the Ministry of Industry has also prioritized 10 industries for economic development: food processing, cosmetics and medicine, textile and footwear, transportation equipment, electronics and telematics, power plant equipment, capital goods, agro-based goods, basic metals and minerals, and coal and gas. The 10 industries consist of 41 sub-industries in total (Table 1-15).

Selecting priority industries for development is important in that a country can efficiently utilize limited resources. However, the Indonesian government currently has too many of these priority industries and it has not yet formulated specific plans nor allocated specific resources. It needs to outline detailed programs for the development of each industry, including the budget required, as well as specific economic stimulus packages. Longer term plans that detail the budget spending required for the programs to be successfully implemented will also allow a more focused and coordinated effort.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 059

Prioritized Industries and Sub-Industries in Indonesia

No PRIORITY INDUSTRY SECTORS a. Fish processing industry b. Milk processing industry c. Refreshment industry 1. Food Processing Industries d. Vegetable oil processing industry e. Fruit & vegetable processing f. Flour milling industry g. Cane sugar industry Pharmaceutical, Cosmetic and a. Pharmaceutical and cosmetic 2. Medical Apparatus Industries b. Medical apparatus a. Textile Textile and Footwear & Other b. Leather and footwear 3. Industries c. Furniture and wood product d. Plastics, rubber processing, and rubber products a. Vehicles Transportation Equipment b. Train 4. Industries c. Shipbuilding d. Aerospace a. Electronic 5. Electronic and Telematic Indutries b. Computer c. Communication Power Plant Equipment 6. Electrical equipment Industries a. Machinery and tools Capital Goods, Component, and b. Component 7. Supporting Industries c. Auxiliary material d. Industries’ services a. Oleofood b. Oleochemical c. Chemurgy 8. Upstream Agro-Based Industries d. Animal feed industry e. Wood stuff/product industry f. Pulp and paper a. Ferrous metals industry Basic Metal and Non-Metallic b. Nonferrous metals industry 9. Minerals Industries c. Precious metals, rare earth, and nuclear fuel d. Non-metallic minerals industry a. Upstream petrochemical industry b. Organic chemical industry Upstream Coal and Gas Based c. Fertilizer 10. Industries d. Synthetic resin and plastics industry e. Natural and synthetic rubber f. Other chemical product industry

Source: Indonesian Ministry of Industry (2016).

060 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia Therefore, the following recommendations can be made:

① Select fewer industries or sub-industries for the government to focus on after analyzing each industry’s potential international competitiveness. ② Create more specific economic development plans for each of the targeted industries, plans that include specific tools or programs and the budget required for them. ③ Encourage coordination and communication among related ministries so that the development plans can be successfully implemented utilizing all of the available resources in each ministry. It is also a good idea to create a strong coordination body that includes private industry experts.

5.3. Selection of Promising Enterprises

5.3.1. Korea’s Example

In conjunction with the selection and development of priority industries outlined above, Korea also established a set of criteria in 1998 to identify economic growth engines to replace large companies. Companies that were able to meet these criteria were defined as “venture businesses” because they were small but innovative or technologically focused (Table 1-16).

The first criterion for qualification as a venture business, as laid down by a Special Law, was garnering investment from a venture capital company that amounts to more than 10% of total capital, with a minimum of KRW 50 million. The second criterion was that the company’s operations and intellectual properties exhibit a high technology level, as evaluated by government evaluation institutions, in addition to innovativeness in the firm’s business activities. The third criterion was based on a firm’s R&D activity. If a firm spends more than 5% of its sales on R&D and it has an in- house R&D center, then it can be recognized as a venture business.

When a firm is recognized as a venture business, it receives the following benefits:

① Corporate tax reductions, registration and acquisition tax exemptions, and property tax cuts ② Preferential treatment for the approval of factory construction and for venture clusters ③ Deregulation of the provision of stock options for employees, easing of conditions for R&D center establishment, and granting opportunities to apply to be a defense contractor ④ Preferential treatment for stock market listing eligibility, electricity bill discounts, and TV advertising discounts.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 061

Criteria for Venture Businesses in Korea

Technology Evaluation Venture Investor R&D Institution Guarantee Loan Receivers

• A company with an in-house/ • When Kibo provides a • When a venture investing subsidiary research center venture with loans worth 80 institution invests 10% or • A company with R&D expense million won or more loans more of its total capital 5% or over of its total sales • Venture with excellent tech. * Minimum 50 million won • A company with a great evaluation result feasibility test result

Source: Author’s Own Analysis.

In addition to the venture business system, Korea has established general tax benefits for startups in most manufacturing sub-industries. The Startup Promotion Act defines a startup as a firm that is 7 years old or younger. Startup firms receive favorable treatment for business support programs without their track record being checked or being asked to provide collateral. They are also eligible for several startup funding programs, in addition to training and mentoring programs.5)

5.3.2. Recommendations

In order for the government to provide clear signals to businesses or potential entrepreneurs when it comes to their decision making, it is a good idea to select firms based on characteristics or activities which can contribute to economic development, designate them as special, and provide related benefits. In this way, the government can focus on a group of firms that engage (or seek to engage) in high technology or innovative activity and thus utilize its limited resources effectively.

Based on this, the following recommendations can be made:

① Establish criteria for startups in terms of their eligibility for public support programs, including their age and sub-industry. They can thus be supported so that they can successfully survive “the death valley” period and then grow. ② Consider introducing a system to recognize innovative or venture businesses so that the government can help them to promote their technologies and global competitiveness. This system can focus on either a small number or a wide

5) There has been some criticism of the venture business system, mostly regarding the leading role of the public sector in evaluating and supporting selected firms, rather than leaving that role to the private market. Recently, however, the Korean government has attempted to modify the system by incorporating the advice of the private market and expert evaluations in the identification of venture businesses and in public venture capital investment decisions. The most significant introduction has been the public venture fund (called “The Fund of Funds”) which invests in venture businesses in accordance with the investment decisions of private venture capital firms.

062 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia range of industries and provide various incentives, including tax, financial, location or zoning, and manpower incentives.

5.4. Incentive Programs

5.4.1. Tax Incentives

5.4.1.1. Korea’s Example

The Korean government provides various tax incentives for firms based on their age and business activities (Table 1-17). Tax benefits, exemptions, or reductions for businesses include:

① Tax benefits for startups and venture firms – 50% reduction in corporate tax and a reduction in property tax for 5 years and tax exemptions for venture (angel) investors on capital gains ② Business investment – corporate tax reduction of 3-6% for the purchase of business assets and 7% for spending on production automation ③ R&D activities – corporate tax reduction of 30% for R&D expenditure on fundamental technologies (25% for other technologies) ④ Employment promotion – 70% reduction in income tax for the first 3 years for SME employees, and a corporate tax reduction of KRW 5 million for the permanent employment of young workers.

Current Tax Benefits for Korean Businesses

Category Tax Benefits - Corporate tax: 50% reduction for 5 years - Registration and acquisition tax: exempted Startups or Venture - Property tax: 50% reduction for 5 years Business - Venture investors or (angel investors): corporate tax and capital gain tax exempted (or reduced) - Spending on business assets: 3-6% deducted from corporate tax Business Investment - Spending on production automation: 7% deducted from corporate tax - Fundamental technology R&D expenditure: 30% deducted from R&D Activity corporate tax - Regular R&D expenditure: 25% deducted from corporate tax - SME employees: 70% income tax reduction for the first 3 years Employment - Permanent employment of young workers: KRW 5 million reduction per person

Source: Author’s Own Analysis.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 063 5.4.1.2. Policy Recommendations

The Indonesian government also recently introduced a tax credit system to encourage firms to invest more and create extra jobs using tax incentives. However, the eligibility is strict and thus firms cannot be sure whether they will receive tax credits if they apply. Because so few firms receive support, it is not very effective at encouraging business investment or increasing employment. Based on this, the following recommendations can be made:

① Be more specific about the activities or conditions required for tax benefits so that firms can clearly understand government expectations. This can include the concepts of “venturousness” or “innovativeness,” and cover startups of a certain age. More specifically, and most importantly, tax benefits for R&D expenditure and employee training should be prioritized. ② The results of applications for tax benefits should be more predictable for firms. If the results are not predictable or if they are based on an evaluation procedure that is too subjective, the effectiveness of the program will be reduced as firms will lack confidence in the process and their future depends on the government’s decision.

5.4.2. Financial Incentives

5.4.2.1. Korea’s Example

Korea’s financial support programs for businesses include the Bank of Korea program, direct and indirect public loans, credit guarantees, and government funding for venture investments. Also important are grant programs for startups and R&D projects, which are the primary focus of SMEs.

1. Grant programs: The two major programs which provide grants to manufactur- ing firms are ⓐ a startup program which supports the commercialization of promising startups with up to KRW 100 million for 1,000 startups ⓑ an R&D program which provides up to 65% of an R&D project budget up to a maximum of KRW 500 million for 2 years.

2. Public loans: Public loans financed by the government are designed to improve the availability of finance and support companies in priority industries. These loans have been popular with manufacturing companies because of their low interest rates, longer terms, and the positive effect on the reputation of the business of having their operations validated by objective government evaluation. The Small Business Corporation offers

064 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia ⓐ startup support funds which provide financial assistance to high-tech startups with insufficient financial resources in order to promote startups and create jobs ⓑ a physical asset support program that provides loans of up to 4.5 billion KRW at a favorable interest rate (currently about 3% per year) with a 7-year maturity to be used for building new factories or purchasing operational equipment.

3. Credit guarantees: Three credit guarantee institutions provide credit guarantee services mainly to startups, manufacturing firms, and micro businesses. In 2015, a total of KRW 3.9 trillion in public policy loans were provided to 17,796 companies, with KRW 79.7 trillion in credit guarantees issued (Table 1-18).

Recent Statistics for Public Loans and Credit Guarantees in Korea (Unit: Trillion) year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total Amount 3.3 3.4 3.7 4.9 4.5 3.9 Public Loans No. of Firms Supported 18,094 23,580 28,334 40,244 55,805 17,796 Credit Guarantee Fund 39 38 39 41 41 41 Credit Technology C G Fund 17.4 17 17.7 18.9 19.2 19.8 Guarantee (Tril. Won) Micro Business C G Fund 14.3 14.5 14.3 16 16.7 18.9 Sub-Total 70.7 69.5 71 75.9 76.9 79.7

Source: http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main.

d) Public venture funds: Korea created a public venture fund, “the Fund of Funds,” to attract private investment for early-stage innovative startups in 2005. The fund invests up to 80% of the total private venture funds from venture capital companies invested in a company so that the public sector can share the risk of their investment. Until 2015, the Korean government invested KRW 1.8 trillion in the fund, with the total investment (public and private) coming to over KRW 6 trillion.

5.4.2.2. Policy Recommendations

For Indonesia to improve access to financing for manufacturing firms, more programs through which manufacturing companies can acquire financial resources are required; if capital is too limited or costs too high, potential entrepreneurs are less likely to found or expand a company. As a result, the following recommendations can be made.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 065 ① The current credit guarantee programs should focus more on manufacturing companies. The average size of credit guarantees under the current system is too small for manufacturing firms to expand operations by building new factories or purchasing new equipment. Therefore, a separate category for manufacturing firms should be established which has favorable conditions, including higher credit guarantees, lower premiums, and lower interest rates.

② More effective public loan systems should be introduced so that potential entrepreneurs can utilize these loans to establish a company. If Indonesia creates a public corporation similar to Korea’s Small Business Corporation, it can issue public bonds to innovative firms more cheaply, saving the government money in the process.

③ In later stages, when the government has more resources available, it can provide grants for innovative startups and R&D activity in established firms as a strong incentive for more active policy orientations. In this situation, the government can create a public venture fund which can encourage venture capital companies to invest more in early-stage venture businesses by decreasing their risk.

5.4.3. Government Procurement Programs

5.4.3.1. Korea’s Example

In Korea, as in the United States, public procurement programs have been an effective tool for the government in their support of domestic manufacturing firms. This is because the government needs to spend a significant portion of its budget on infrastructure, public services, and government agencies, and it makes sense that this spending be redirected to domestic companies where possible. From the 1990s, the Korean government has considered public procurement programs to be a major economic policy through which they can boost domestic industries by giving domestic suppliers preferential treatment.

summarizes the spending on this type of program.

In Korea, the core procurement program is the general requirement for all national and local government agencies and public institutions that 50% of their purchases be from domestic SMEs. This applies to 516 institutions including central government agencies, local government agencies, and public institutions. Government agencies, including the Ministry of Defense (KRW 11.3 trillion), local governments, and the Office of Education spent KRW 31.7 trillion, with 75.5% of goods, 62.1% of total construction materials, and 73.3% of services purchased from SMEs. The government is trying to encourage public agencies to expand their

066 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia purchase of SME products by reflecting their previous year’s SME product purchase performance in the assessment of public agencies.

This procurement program also includes the priority purchasing of high-tech SME goods. This requirement was introduced in 1996 to support the domestic market for high-tech products and to encourage the development of new technologies. Public institutions are expected to prioritize the purchase of those products developed by SME technology that have been certified or approved. As of June 2014, there are nine types of certification used in the scheme, with the sales of products carrying this certification to public institutions increasing every year.

Korean Government Procurement Targets and Performance

Target Performance Year Total From Small Biz Total From Small Biz (Trillion Won) Portion(%) (Trillion Won) Portion(%) ’08 104.1 71.3 68.5 100.9 61.3 60.7 ’09 104.8 63.4 60.5 122.3 79.8 65.2 ’10 124.0 77.2 62.2 104.4 66.9 64.1 ’11 102.1 68.8 67.4 99.8 67.7 67.8 ’12 101.4 71.1 70.1 106.4 72.0 67.7 ’13 107.1 74.2 69.3 113.0 78.8 69.7 ’14 114.9 80.2 69.8

Source: Korean Small and Medium Business Administration (www.smba.go.kr).

5.4.3.2. Policy Recommendations

Once an entrepreneur has successfully taken their business idea and navigated the startup process, they then face the problem of marketing their products or services. This is especially true for products built on new technology because startups have not yet established a reputation in the market and thus there may be reluctance on the part of buyers to purchase their product. Thus, a public procurement system is an ideal way for SMEs to develop a market for their products and gain credibility. Based on Korea’s example, the following recommendations can be made.

① A public procurement system that targets domestic SMEs in order to nurture domestic manufacturers should be developed. Because Indonesia already has a public procurement system, introducing a new program that favors products or services from Indonesian SMEs is recommended. It can start with

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 067 the requirement that every central government agency and public institution purchase a certain amount of goods and services from domestic SMEs. This could start at 20 percent of total expenditure and then be increased annually afterward.

② In addition, the Indonesian government can use the public procurement system to boost the development of high-tech products because the lack of a reputation in the market is a more serious problem for new high-tech products from startups. This scheme could begin with a requirement that 5% of total spending in government organizations be used on domestic high-tech products, with gradual increases until it becomes mandatory after achieving some level of performance in purchasing high technology products from domestic manufacturing firms.

068 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia References

Anglund, Sandra M. (2000), Small Business Policy and the American Creed, Westport, USA. Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics, www.ekon.go.id. Kim, Dohoon (2010), “Korea’s Industrial Development and Its Future”, Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade. Kim, Jong-woon (2008), The US Small Business Policies, Korean Small Business Institute, Seoul, Korea. Koo, Yangmi (2013), “Evolution of Industrial Policies and Economic Growth in Korea: Challenges, Crises, and Responses”, European Review of Industrial Economics and Policy, vol. 7. Korea Statistics and Index, www.index.go.kr. Koshpasharin, S. and K. Yasue (2014), “Study on the Development Potential of the Content Industry in East Asia and the ASEAN Region”, ERIA Research Project Report 2012-13, pp.95-117. : ERIA. Lee, Byungkee (1998), “Contributing Factors for Korean Economic Development and the Role of Industrial Policy”, Korea Development Institute. McKinsey Quarterly (2006), “An Executive Take on the Top Business Trends”, a McKinsey Global Survey. Ministry of Knowledge Economy (2012), “Building Technological Capabilities: Four Cases from Manufacturing Sectors in Korea”. Ministry of National Development Planning, www.bappenas.go.id. Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning, Korean Government, www.msip.go.kr. Ministry of Strategy and Finance (2013), “2013 Survey on Cooperatives”. OECD (2014), “Industry and Technology Policies of Korea”, OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy. OECD (2015), “Database of Trade in Value Added”. OECD (2000), “Enhancing the Competitiveness of SMEs through Innovation”, Conference for Ministers for SMEs and Industry Ministers, Bologna, Italy. Oh, Byungho (2011), “Korea’s Economic Development Model and Role of Government”, SBC Training Material. Rodrik, Dani (2011), “The Future of Economic Convergence”, mimeo. Small and Medium Business Administration (2016), “Tax Incentives for SMEs in Korea”. Suh, Jungdae (2014), Korean Small Businesses, Korea University Press, Seoul, Korea. World Bank (2015), “Indonesia: Rapid Growth Needs More Investment”.

Chapter 1 _ Strengthening the Role of Fiscal Policy to Enhance the Manufacturing Industry as a Sustainable Economic Growth Engine in Indonesia • 069

2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia: The Role of the State Treasury for Industrial Competitiveness and Civil Service Pension Reform in Indonesia Chapter 2

Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia

1. Introduction 2. Current Pension System for Civil Servants in Indonesia 3. Challenges Facing the Current Civil Servant Pension System in Indonesia 4. The Civil Servant Pension System in Korea 5. Policy Recommendations for the Civil Service Pension System in Indonesia 6. Conclusion ■ Chapter 02

Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia

Chang Kil Lee (Sejong University) Agustinus Prasetyo (Ministry of Finance)

Summary

A pension system for government employees had long been in operation before Indonesia became independent in 1945. However, this long history does not mean that the system has been consistent or sustainable. The most recent law related to the public sector pension system is Law No. 11/1969, which mandates a fully funded pension based on contributions by both employees and the government. The pension for retirees is fully financed by the government as mandated in Article 2 of this law. Consequently, the growing number of public service retirees has led to an increase in the costs of maintaining the pension system, which places pressure on the government’s budget. Adding to the problem is the fact that the current pension system has numerous variations depending on the type of government employee; each variation has its own regulations that may hinder efforts to establish a comprehensive, uniform pension system. Other significant issues that need to be addressed in the present system are the low replacement rate of higher officials, pension benefits that are indexed to the employee’s final salary, and benefits that differ depending on the recipient group, in addition to administrative issues such as the significant costs associated with managing the pension system and the time- consuming channeling process for the delivery of the pension to recipients. Based on this, the government has proposed a new sustainable pension system for public sector employees that can strengthen pension administration in the future.

072 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 1. Introduction 1.1. Background

A pension system aims to provide financial stability and increase the welfare of the elderly by providing direct monetary assistance or other financial support after retirement. To achieve these goals, sound pension system design and governance are important. A well-designed pension system has to consider, among other things, the government’s financial ability to support the scheme, the sustainability of the pension fund in meeting future demand, and the level of financial assistance required to meet the basic needs of retirees.

Recently, many countries have faced difficulties generating a level of government revenue sufficient to provide the necessary financial support for retirees. As a response, some countries have set about reforming their pension system before running into more serious problems. Other countries, however, continue to implement their existing system even though it is inevitable that it will place significant financial pressure on the government and/or lead to inadequate financial support for retirees.

The pension system for public servants in Indonesia operates under Law No. 11/1969 and has been designed to be fully funded. The law mandates that the government establish a pension fund that is separate from the rest of the governmental budget and stipulates the government’s contribution to the fund. However, at the time of compiling this report, the government has not formulated the aforementioned regulations. Consequently, the long delay in establishing the pension fund and the government’s contribution has led to significant problems, such as financial pressure on the government and insufficient financial support for retirees.

The financial sustainability of a pension system is important for current pension beneficiaries and for future generations. The design of the system, including the characteristics of the pension fund and level and type of financial assistance for pension holders, determines its long-term sustainability. In Indonesia, government pensions are paid using general revenue, thus financing for the system is currently secure. However, the continued increase in pension spending due to the growing number of retirees, increases in life expectancy, rises in pensionable salary, and the expansion of the system to cover more government employees is likely to place financial pressure in the government in the long term.

Ideally, a pension needs to be able to meet retirees’ basic needs. However, in Indonesia, living costs vary between cities and retirees, something which is not

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 073 reflected in the current pension system. In addition, using a single scale to calculate pensions means that civil servants who receive the same basic salary will receive the same pension even if their income from performance allowances differed during their service.

Pension system governance also determines service quality, cost efficiency, and operational effectiveness. The pension system for government employees in Indonesia has been run by two public service agencies under the Ministry of State Owned Enterprises, PT Taspen, and PT Asabri, since 1985 and 1989, respectively. The governance issues faced by these governing bodies are more or less similar. Informal research also suggests that the use of two public service agencies to govern the pension system and the pension fund is inefficient and potentially leads to idle funds. Based on this, it is essential for the government to reform the system.

1.2. Research Objectives

This chapter aims to provide policy recommendations for the establishment of a sustainable pension system for government employees in Indonesia, suggest strategies for exiting the current pension system, and propose new governance guidelines to strengthen service delivery and increase the cost efficiency of pension system administration.

2. Current Pension System for Civil Servants in Indonesia 2.1. History and Regulations

2.1.1. History of the Pension System for Civil Servants

Historically, the pension system for civil servants in Indonesia had been in place for a long time before Indonesian independence in 1945. For more than 350 years before Japanese colonization, Indonesia was under the control of the Dutch, who introduced a pension system for government employees, both local and foreign, in 1926. After Indonesia gained independence in 1945, several laws and regulations for the pensions of civil servants and other public service employees were formalized. In 1949, the Head of the Civil Servant Management Office proposed a pension system for civil servants. Since then, the pension system for government employees has only undergone minor revisions. The list of laws and regulations that have acted as the legal basis of the Indonesian government pension system are summarized in

.

074 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia

The Legal Basis for the Pension System for Civil Servants in Indonesia

No Law Key Principles

a. Indische Burgerlijk Pensioen Reglement 1926 (St. 1926 No. 550, revised with St. 1940 No. 440) b. Niet-Euripeesch Locaal There is insufficient information available about the Pensioen Reglement 1931 pension scheme from 1926 to 1945. However, it is (St. 1931 No. 500 Jo. St. known that government employees made contributions 1 1939 No. 440, revised with to a pension fund. The fund was managed by Indische St. 1934 Nos. 115 and 556 Pensioenfondsen and was separate from the rest of the and St. 1937 No. 532) government budget. c. Reglement op het verleenenaan Europeesch Locale Ambtenaren (St. 1939 No. 707)

Eligibility: Civil servants, the widows of civil servants, and orphans under Law No. 3/1946 as Indonesian citizens. A. Allowances are payable to terminated employees who have allowance rights after March 9, 1942 and who work under IndischeBurgerlijk Pensioen Reglement 1926; Niet-Euripeesch Locaal Pensioen Reglement 1931, and Reglement op het verleenenaan Europeesch Locale Ambtenaren (St. 1939 No. 707). 1. Minimum service of 25 years and minimum age of 55 years 2. Minimum service of 5 years with physical and/or Law No. 14/1947 mental disabilities making them unable to work in On Allowances for ex-Civil any position 2 Servants and their Widows 3. Unable to work in any position because of physical and Orphans illness or injury caused by related work. Implemented June 1, 1947 B. Allowances are payable to the wives and children of employees who 1. died after March 9, 1942 2. have the right to receive a pension or onderstand according to the Minister of Finance’s Decision No. 4/1946 and No. 21/1946. C. Benefit formula: 1. For pensions up to R. 50,- x 100% 2. For pensions up to R. 100,- x 50% 3. For pensions of more than R. 100,- x 25% Minimum R. 5,- maximum R. 150,- per month.

1. Years of service calculated from August 17, 1945 2. Minimum service of 25 years and a minimum age of 50 years Law No. 34/1949 3. Minimum service of 5 years for those who cannot work 3 on Civil Servant Pensions in any position because of disability 4. Minimum service of 15 years and the accumulation with the age is not less than 75 years and retire with pension rights

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 075

Continued

No Law Key Principles

5. Benefits: • 40% of the basic pension, an additional 2% for each year above 25 with a maximum of 50% of the basic pension per month • 50% of the basic pension for civil servants who are unable to work in any position • 1.6% of the basic pension each year for civil servants in categories 3 and 4 above with a minimum of 25% and a maximum of 50% of the basic pension • Minimum benefits are 45 IDR, and for married retirees with children, the minimum benefit is 65 IDR. 6. If a retiree is re-appointed to work with the government, his/her pension payments will be suspended and when he/she stops working, he/she will receive the pension again with a new basic pension based on the total service years. 7. Other conditions for the termination of pension rights: • The retiree works in the army or in a foreign country • If the retiree is proven to have provided false information 8. Contribution: • Employee: 2% of salary • Retirees who did not contribute during his/her service have to pay 2% from his/her pension as a substitute.

Membership for temporary and permanent civil servants. Eligibility: 1. Minimum service of 25 years and a minimum age of 50 years 2. Unable to work in any position due to physical or mental disability caused by his/her work 3. Has at least 4 years of service and judged to be unable to work in any position due to physical and/or mental disability not related to his/her work 4. Minimum service of 15 years and minimum age of 50 years old if service years and age adds to at least 75 years Law No. 20/1952 4 5. Minimum service of 25 years if the service years and on Civil Servant Pension age adds to at least 75 years 6. Minimum service of 10 years and minimum age of 50 years for employees who lose their job/position because of organizational restructuring 7. Former president, vice president, or minister with a minimum service of 10 years and a minimum age of 50 years. Employee service definitions under Government Regulation No. 64/1954 are as follows: 1. Permanent or temporary employees assigned to a local government and receiving a salary from the central government is considered full time service

076 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia

Continued

No Law Key Principles

2. Permanent or temporary employees prohibited fromworking and receiving half of their salary from the government is considered full time service 3. Permanent or temporary employees appointed as parliamentary members and senior officers is considered full time service 4. Military personnel who have not paid pension benefit or allowance is considered full time service 5. Permanent or temporary employees assigned to a local government and not receiving a salary from the central government is considered half service 6. Employees taking leave and residing in Indonesia is considered full time service 7. Employees taking leave and residing abroad is considered half service 8. Employees assigned to study abroad is considered half time service 9 Employees assigned to study in Indonesia is considered full time service 10. Employees working with the central government or local government who received monthly, weekly, or hourly payments for at least one year is considered full time service 11. Employees working in the government and not receiving a salary from the government is considered half service. Payment: 1. Formula: 1.6% x pensionable income for those who have less than 25 years service. If service is more than 25 years, 2% of the basic pension will be added each year, with a minimum of 25% and a maximum of 50% 2. Minimum pension is 75% of the minimum civil servant salary. Should a retired civil servant return to government work, pension payments are suspended until he/she stops working.

Law No. 11/1969 on Pension Law No. 11/1969 has been in force since 1969 to the 5 for Civil Servants and Civil present time. Servants’ Widow/Widower

Source: Ministry of Finance.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 077 2.1.2. Laws and Regulations

Indonesia does not have a unified pension system for public and private sector employees. For government employees, there are several pension schemes, each with their own unique characteristics and their own regulations that suit their specific target group. The legal basis for the pension systems for government employees in Indonesia are as follows:

2.1.2.1. Laws

a. Law No. 11/1969 on Pensions for Civil Servants and Civil Servants’ Widows/ Widowers b. Law No. 6/1966 on Pensions and Allowances for Former Voluntary Soldiers c. Law No. 7/1978 on Administrative/Financial Rights of the President/Vice President and Former Presidents/Vice Presidents d. Law No. 12/1980 on Financial/Administrative Rights of Leaders and Members of the Highest State Institution/High State Institutions and the Formers Leaders and Members of the Highest State Institution/High State Institutions e. Law No. 15/2012 on Veterans of the Republic of Indonesia.

2.1.2.2. Government Regulations

a. Government Regulation No. 50/1980 on Administrative/Financial Rights of Ministers and Former Ministers and Widows/Widowers b. Government Regulation No. 9/1980 on Financial/Administrative Rights of Head of Local Governments, Former Heads of Local Governments and Their Widows/ Widowers c. Government Regulation No. 25/1981 on Social Insurance for Civil Servants d. Government Regulation No. 76/2000 on Financial/Administrative Rights of the Attorney General, the Commander of the Indonesian Military, and Other Officers at the Same Level as Ministries e. Government Regulation No. 20/2013 on the Revision of Government Regulation No. 25/1981 on Social Insurance for Civil Servants f. Government Regulation No. 67/2014 on the Implementation of the Law No. 15/2012, amended by Government Regulation No. 23/2016 g. Government Regulation No. 37/2015 on Independence/Nationality Movement Pioneer Allowance.

2.1.3. Ministry of Finance Regulations

a. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 82/PMK.02/2015 on Technical Guidance for the Calculation, Allocation, Payment and Responsibility of Pension Expenditure

078 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia b. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 201/PMK.02/2015 on the Management of Civil Servants’ Pension Contribution Accumulation c. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 211/PMK.02/2015 on the Operational Cost of Pension Governance by PT Taspen (Persero) and PT Asabri (Persero) d. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 53/PMK.02/2016 on the Management of Pension Contribution Accumulation of Indonesian National Military Soldiers, Police Personnel, and Civil Servants in the Ministry of National Defense and State Police of the Republic of Indonesia e. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 231/PMK.02/2016 on Technical Guidance for the Planning, Researching, and Determining of the Budget Allocation, and the Legalization of the Budget Execution List for the State General Treasury f. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 30/PMK.05/2015 on the Mechanism for Veterans’ Allowance, Veterans’ Honorary Allowance, and Veterans’ Death Allowance Disbursement g. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 170/PMK.02/2016 on Fund Allocation for Former Civil Servants Retired from the Ministry of Transportation in PT KAI.

2.2. Current Pension Schemes

In reviewing the current pension schemes for civil servants and other public service employees in Indonesia, this chapter focuses on eligibility criteria, contribution rates for employees and the government, and payment formulas. It also discusses pension governance and the status of the pension fund. In addition, to provide a better understanding of the civil servant pension system and its link to those of other public service employees, the pension recipients will be described.

2.2.1. Pension Recipients

Currently, the recipients of pensions for government employees in Indonesia can be divided into 13 groups. The number of retirees in each group based on the latest 2016 data is presented in

.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 079

Number of Retirees in Each Indonesian Government Employee Pension Group (2016)

No. Pension Groups Number of Retirees Administration Body 1 Central Government Civil Servants 898,935 PT Taspen 2 Local Government Civil Servants 1,235,265 PT Taspen 3 Civil Servants Assigned to the Pawnshop 815 PT Taspen 4 Indonesian Army before 1989 167,818 PT Taspen 5 High Level Officers 5,975 PT Taspen 6 Judges 3,094 PT Taspen 7 Veteran Allowance 128,076 PT Taspen 8 Veteran Honorary Allowance 7,477 PT Taspen 9 Independence Fighter Allowance 711 PT Taspen 10 Military Soldier after 1989 198,238 PT Asabri 11 Police Personnel 90,656 PT Asabri 12 Civil Servants in the Ministry of Defense 79,514 PT Asabri 13 Civil Servants in the Police Organization 13,887 PT Asabri TOTAL 2,830,461

Source: Ministry of Finance’s Disbursement Data (2016).

Most of these groups have their own pension schemes and associated regulations. However, some groups follow the same regulations. For example, the majority of retirees are civil servants for the central or local government. These two groups, plus those civil servants assigned to the pawnshop, share the same scheme and regulations.

The high-level officer group consists of legislative members, heads of executive state institutions (i.e., ministers), heads of state judicial institutions, and members of local government legislative institutions. This retirement group is subject to many laws and regulations, but they follow the same scheme in terms of contributions and payments.

Members of the Indonesian army who retired before 1989 and military soldiers who retired after 1989 have separate administration bodies. The Indonesian army retirees are administered by PT Taspen, whereas the military soldier retirees are governed by PT Asabri. In the Indonesian army era, there was no separation between military soldiers and police personnel; both were under the Department of Defense until 1998, when organizational reform was undertaken by the government. Since 1989, new military soldier and police personnel retirees have been administered

080 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia by PT Asabri, as have civil servants in the Ministry of Defense and in the police. This change in administration aimed to integrate the pension systems for military and police personnel by sharing the Old Age Saving Fund and requiring the same pension contributions.

In addition to the retiree groups described above, there is another retirement group that consists of Ministry of Transportation employees who used to work in the railway industry with PT Kereta Api Indonesia (hereafter PT KAI). PT KAI is a state-owned enterprise delivering public services for transportation. The number of retirees from PT KAI in 2016 was 25,859. This is expected to reduce because the number of civil servants working at PT KAI remains very small.

2.2.2. Pension Contributions

According to Article 2 of Law No. 11/1969 on Civil Servant Pensions, the money used to pay the pensions of retirees and widows/widowers, and to cover other allowances related to the pension system should come from two main sources:

a. Employees who received their salary and retired before the establishment of the Pension Fund should be paid from the state budget. b. Employees or former employees not covered by point (a) above should be paid from the Pension Fund.

Following Article 2, the government issued Regulation No. 25/1981, amended by Government Regulation No. 20/2013 on Social Insurance for Civil Servants. Based on these regulations, there are two types of social insurance for civil servants: the pension program and the old age savings program. Employees have an obligation to contribute 8% of their basic salary and family allowance to the programs: 4.75% for the pension program and 3.25% for the old age savings program. Unlike other countries, including Korea, the contribution by civil servants is subject to change if the financial stability of the programs needs to be improved. The Indonesian government, however, has chosen to maintain the same rate until the present time.

The retiree groups which share this contribution scheme (i.e., contribution rates of 4.75% and 3.25%) are civil servants in central and local government, military personnel who retired before 1998, former pawnshop employees, high level officials, judges, military personnel who retired after 1998, police personnel, and civil servants in national defense and the police department. The remaining groups are not required to make contributions because the payment is considered a reward for service from the government.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 081 For employees who are required to do so, contributions to the pension fund start from the first month employees register as civil servants and stop when they quit work or resign. It means that employees working for more than 30 years still have to contribute to the fund. However, the maximum contribution period for the determination of pension payments is only 30 years. This means that the contributions made by civil servants once they have been working for more than 30 years do not influence the payment they receive when they retire. This has generated criticism from senior civil servants.

Pensions are still awarded to civil servants who cannot meet the minimum contribution amount but who have reached a sufficient number of service years. For example, civil servants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were deployed abroad before 1992 did not receive a normal salary; they were paid based on the living costs of their host country. During this service abroad, they did not contribute to pension fund. In order to meet the minimum contribution, they have to pay their contribution after retirement. PT Taspen deducts the contribution from the pension payment they receive. However, since April 1992, employee contributions have been paid in a lump sum in advance at the start of their overseas deployment.

Finally, the source of pension payments for the PT KAI retiree group is a combination of PT KAI contributions, PT KAI’s pension fund, and government contributions. The formula has been modified many times in order to reflect PT KAI’s financial ability to meet its obligations. The most recent contribution formula is based on Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 170/PMK.02/2016: the government contributes 78%, PT KAI 11%, and the PT KAI pension fund 11%.

2.2.3. Pension Benefits

2.2.3.1. Eligibility

To be eligible for a normal pension, civil servants have to meet the minimum service period of 20 years and be 50 years old or over. Unlike some other countries such as Mexico (men 30 years; women 28 years) and Iran (men 30 years; women 20 years), the civil service pension system in Indonesia does not have differing length of service requirements for male and female workers (Palacios and Whitehouse, 2006:13). However, the age requirement varies for certain positions within the government, as summarized in

.

082 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia

Qualification Age for Civil Servant Pensions

No. Group Retirement Age Administrative Officers Before January 1, 2015: 56 years 1 (Staff, Echelon IV and After January 1, 2015: 58 years Echelon III) Senior Officers (Echelon 2 60 years II and Echelon I) - Teacher: 60 years - Lecturer: 65 years - Senior Lecturer: 70 years - Emeritus Senior Lecturer: 75 years - Vice Minister: 62 years - Pharmacist: 60 years Functional Position 3 - Judges, Head and Deputy of state courts: 60 years old Officers - Public Persecutor: 62 years - Judges, Head and Deputy of high court: 60 years - Supervisor: 60 years - Doctor: 60 years - Researcher: 65 years - Echelon I for special positions: 62 years Military and Police - Lower Grade Soldier: Minimum age 42 years, maximum 48 years 4 Personnel - Senior Soldier: Minimum age 48 years, maximum 55 years

Source: Summarized from Law No. 5/2014 and Government Regulations.

Generally, pension benefits for civil servants are based on the civil servants’ final basic salary: 2.5% of their base salary per year of service up to a maximum of 30 years. This gives a maximum pension benefit of 75% of their final salary and a minimum of 40%. Accordingly, the formula for pension payments upon retirement is 2.5% x Service Year x Basic Pension.

2.2.3.2. Pension Calculations

Different groups of government employees have different formulas for their pension payments. The calculation for employees who reach pension age/normal pension = 2.5% x service year x final month base salary.

For employees who resign, there are three possible calculations depending on their situation:

(1) Appointed before January 1, 2001 = F1 x S2 (2) Appointed after January 1, 2001 = F2 x S2 (3) Appointed before January 1, 2001 and acquitted after January 1, 2001 = (F1 x S2) + (F2 x (S2-S1))

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 083 F1 = A factor related to the contribution period since appointment, accounted for within a year F2 = A factor related to the contribution period since January 1, 2001 to the time of leaving, accounted for within a year S1 = Most recent monthly salary payment before resignation, referring to Government Regulation No. 6/1997 S2 = Most recent monthly salary before the participant resigned as a civil servant that become contribution deduction, consisting of the base salary and family allowances.

Pension payments for widows, widowers, or surviving parents or children are subject to three possible calculations: (1) For government employees whose death is unrelated to their work, pension payments are calculated as = 36% x basic pension, with a continuity salary equal to 4 months of pension and a condolence allowance of 3 months (2) For government employees whose death is related to their work, pension payments are calculated = 72% x basic pension, with a continuity salary equal to 4 months of pension and a condolence allowance of 6 months (3) Parents of government employees who die receive pension payments calculated as (20% x 72% x base salary) + death allowance.

Retirement due to disability has a payment calculation = 75% x final base salary.

Government employees who resign before reaching 20 years of service and are younger than 50 years old receive a refund of their pension contributions and interest gained on those contributions (Ministry of Finance Regulation No 71/ PMK.02/2008). This refund is calculated as follows:

(1) Employees who left work before 2001 = F1 x P1 (2) Employees who started work after 2001 = F2 x P2 (3) Employees who started work before 2001 and left work after 2001 = (F1 x P1) + (F2 x (P2-P1)) (4) Employees who left before 2008 will receive all of their contributions and 9% interest per year. (5) Minimum contribution refund is 200,000 IDR.

F1 = Index factor related to service years before 2001 F2 = Index factor related to service years after 2001 P1 = Final salary based on Government Regulation No. 6/1997 P2 = Final salary before the employees left work.

High level state officials have a special formula: 1% x months of service x final

084 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia base salary. Payments thus range from 6% to 75%. For those who are ruled by the health committee to be ineligible to work in all positions will receive the maximum payment of 75%.

Pensions for former presidents and vice presidents are calculated as 100% x final base salary.

Veteran allowances are based on Government Regulation No. 67/2014. There are four types of veterans: (1) warrior veterans, who served from August 17, 1945 to December 27, 1949, (2) defense veterans, for the period after December 27, 1949, (3) peace-keeping veterans under the United Nations, and (4) posthumous warrior veterans and posthumous defense veterans. The allowance is calculated based on the length of their military engagement (Table 2-4). Additionally, there is an Honorary Veteran Benefit of up to 750,000 IDR per month for all veterans who hold an Honorary Certificate.

Veteran Classification and Allowance

No. Classification Length of Service Allowance (IDR) A. Warrior Veterans 1 Class A At least 4 years 1,600,000 2 Class B 36 months to 47 months 1,550,000 3 Class C 14 months to 25 months 1,500,000 4 Class D 12 months to 23 months 1,450,000 5 Class E 6 months to 11 months 1,400,000 B. Trikora Defense Veterans 1 Class A At least 18 months 1,600,000 2 Class B At least 12 months 1,550,000 3 Class C At least 6 months 1,500,000 4 Class D At least 3 months 1,450,000 5 Class E Less than 3 months 1,400,000 C. Dwikora Defense Veterans 1 Class A At least 27 months 1,600,000 2 Class B At least 18 months 1,550,000 3 Class C At least 12 months 1,500,000 4 Class D At least 6 months 1,450,000 5 Class E At least 3 months 1,400,000

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 085

Continued

No. Classification Length of Service Allowance (IDR) D. Seroja Defense Veterans 1 Class A At least 14 months 1,600,000 2 Class B At least 12 months 1,550,000 3 Class C At least 9 months 1,500,000 4 Class D At least 6 months 1,450,000 5 Class E At least 3 months 1,400,000 E. Survivors of Warrior Veterans 1 Class A At least 4 years 1,450,000 2 Class B 36 months to 47 months 1,400,000 3 Class C 14 months to 25 months 1,300,000 4 Class D 12 months to 23 months 1,250,000 5 Class E 6 months to 11 months 1,200,000 F. Survivors of Warrior and Posthumous Defense Veterans 1 Widow/Widower/Orphan 1,450,000

Source: Government Regulation No. 67/2014.

2.3. Governance of the Pension System

The pension for public sector employees in Indonesia is governed by numerous regulations. The underlying legal foundation is the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia, a product of the People Consultative Assembly of Indonesia. Laws within the civil state apparatus are a product of government and parliament consensus, but stem from the Indonesian constitution. In terms of pension policy, new regulations are generally initiated by the Ministry of Civil Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform (for civil servant pensions), the Ministry of Defense (for military soldier pensions) or the Head of the Indonesian Police (for police personnel pensions) and then introduced by the government or the President. The Minister of Finance is responsible for providing guidance on pension disbursement, investment, and financial reporting of pension expenditure and the Head of the National Civil Service Agency is responsible for setting pension decrees for civil servants.

From 1969 to 1986, the pension system for public servants was overseen by the Ministry of Finance. However, in order to improve service delivery, governance was gradually moved to PT Taspen between 1986 and 1990. This shift in administration duties to PT Taspen was codified by the following Ministry of Finance decisions:

086 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia (1) Ministry of Finance Decision No. 822/KMK.03/1986 for Bali Province, West Nusa Tenggara Province, and East Nusa Tenggara Province, (2) Ministry of Finance Decision No. 702/KMK.03/1987 for Sumatera Islands, (3) Ministry of Finance Decision No. 812/ KMK.03/1988 for Java and Madura Islands, and (4) Ministry of Finance Decision No. 79/KMK.03/1990 for Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and Irina Jaya Islands.

In addition to the transfer of pension system administration, the government also shifted the administration of the Pension Fund to PT Taspen. In compliance with Ministry of Finance Letter No. S-244/MK.011/1985 dated February 12, 1985, the Pension Fund was collected by the Ministry of Finance from civil servants and by the Ministry of Defense from military soldiers and police personnel. However, the shift in responsibility for the fund was mainly administrative, with the fund remaining in the government’s accounts in the same government banks and PT Taspen not allowed to use the fund for any purpose. However, for newly collected employee contributions, PT Taspen is allowed to invest the fund in new investment portfolios.

PT Taspen was originally established in 1963 under Government Regulation No. 15/1963 to manage savings and insurance funds for civil servants as mandated by Government Regulation No. 10/1963. Since 1969, in addition to running the pension system for civil servants and high state institution officials, PT Taspen governs the military personnel and police personnel pension systems. However, in 1989, the administration of these two pension systems was transferred to PT Asabri. PT Asabri was originally a state general enterprise established under Government Regulation No 45/1971 before becoming a state-owned enterprise based on Government Regulation No. 68/1991. The purpose of establishing PT Asabri was to provide social insurance for military soldiers and police personnel. In 1989, the government tasked PT Asabri with administering the pension program for military soldiers and police personnel along with civil servants in the respective organization (Ministry of Finance Decision No. 13/KMK.03/1989 and Minister of Defense Letter No. SKEP/140/I/1989).

Moreover, the Indonesian government offers an old age savings program for military soldiers and police personnel. This program has generated an old age savings fund with a rate of 3.25% of the base salary and family allowances (Presidential Regulation No. 56 Year 1974 and the Government Regulation No. 25 Year 1981). Given that the old age savings program was introduced since the establishment of the two bodies, this program is seen as an original core duty of PT Taspen and PT Asabri. The pension programs for civil servants, military soldiers, and police personnel remain the government’s responsibility, and are thus administered separately from the pension program within these governing bodies.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 087 [Figure 2-1] Governance Structure of the Pension System for Public Service Employees in Indonesia

Executive LAWS Legislative

MoF REGULATIONS MoPAN National Civil Service Agengy/Ministry

MoSOE of Defense/Indonesian State Police Pension Decree Pension Fund DG BUDGET DG TREASURY Investment Reports MoF MoF Guidance (Ministry Regulations on Guidance (Ministry Technical Payment or Pension Program) Regulations on Pension Disbursement of Pension Fund from Rate, Other Technical State Budget for Pension Benefit and Payment Schemes) Payment and Operating Cost Reports Governing Body Pension Benefit Payment Reports (PT Taspen/ Guidance on SOE PT Asabri) Pension Decree Operation Pension Benefit Payment Required Documents Submission BANKING / RETIREES

Source: Ministry of Finance.

In terms of the organizational relationship for pension system governance, the government (the President and legislative branch) provide guidelines in terms of laws and regulations, while the Ministry of Finance provides technical guidance and supervises PT Taspen and PT Asabri in their pension service provision and pension fund investment. For their part, PT Taspen and PT Asabri submit performance reports and financial reports twice a year to the Ministry of Finance. PT Taspen and PT Asabri’s delivery of the pension programs is based on a pension decree from the State Civil Service Agency for civil servants and from the Minister of Defense and the Police Department for retired military soldiers and police personnel.

Following Minister of Finance Regulation No. 82/PMK.02/2015, PT Taspen and PT Asabri submit to the Ministry of Finance every year in the first quarter projections for the number of retirees in the following year. This projection is combined with other government policies and macro predictions to formulate the budget for the next year. At the same time, based on Minister of Finance Regulation No. 211/ PMK.02/2015, PT Taspen and PT Asabri propose a rough budget plan to the Minister of Finance for the delivery of the pension programs in the following year. This proposal is used by the Ministry of Finance to decide pension expenditure allocations and operational cost allocations for the coming year. However, this budget proposal is only a broad estimate because formal budget determination for state-owned enterprises occurs during a general meeting of shareholders, which is held at the end of the year. This difference in timing can lead to mismatches in budget spending during implementation.

088 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 3. Challenges Facing the Current Civil Servant Pension System in Indonesia 3.1. Predicting the Long-Term Balance of the Pension Fund

To predict the long-term sustainability of the pension fund for government employees, this report covers several factors known to influence pension fund growth from both a fund investment perspective and in terms of government policy. The investment portfolio will determine the growth of the fund through its gains and losses, while government policy provides guidelines for investment portfolio selections to begin with.

To start with, the long history of the current pension system for government employees has both directly and indirectly created hesitancy among policy makers to reform either the system itself or the fund underlying it. As a result, the system is predicted to face complex issues in the future. For example, there has been a significant increase in pension expenditure over the last decade, while pension payments in terms of value for money have remained the same or even decreased.

Since the Dutch colonial era, there has been no significant change in the Indonesian pension system. There was an effort to reform the pension by introducing Law No 11/1969, which integrated the social security system for public service employees, including civil servants, military soldiers, high state institution officers, veterans, employees in subsidized private schools, and military students, all of whom fell under different retirement laws and regulations. However, the system has not changed in terms of its source of funding (from the government budget) and pension contribution rate (4.75% of the base salary and family allowance).

Following Law No. 11/1969, the government pays for pensions from general revenue and leaves the pension fund largely untouched. The fund was used from 1994 to 2008, when the government was under serious fiscal pressure from the global financial crisis. The proportion of pension payments that came from the pension fund was relatively small (Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3), but the fund was depleted within less than two decades.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 089 [Figure 2-2] Proportion of Pensions Paid from General Revenue and the Pension Fund through PT Taspen (1994-2008)

(Unit: %)

100

85.5 91.0 82.5 79.0 77.5 77.0 75.0

25.0 22.5 23.0 21.0 17.5 14.5 9.0 0

Jan-Mar Apr 1994- Apr 1997- Jan 1999- Jan 2003- Jan-Dec 2006 Jan-Dec 2007 Jan-Dec 2008 1994 Mar 1997 Dec 1998 Dec 2002 Dec 2005

Pension Fund Government Budget

Source: Ministry of Finance.

[Figure 2-3] Proportion of Pensions Paid from General Revenue and the Pension Fund through PT Asabri (1998-2009)

(Unit: %) Pension Fund State Budget

98 98 99 99 97 97 97 97 97 97 98 100

2 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Source: Ministry of Finance.

From 2009 until 2016, the pension fund has grown quickly, increasing ten-fold from IDR 12 trillion to more than IDR 123 trillion (Figure 2-4). However, from 1997 to 2008, pension fund growth was relatively stagnant. The improvement over the last eight years has many reasons. For example, the government started to reform the management of the pension fund and pension program and the number of employees contributing to the fund increased from 4.0 million to 4.6 million.

090 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia [Figure 2-4] Indonesian Government Employee Pension Fund Size (1997-2016)

(Unit: Mil. IDR) 140,000,000 Pension Fund Accumulation 120,000,000

100,000,000

80,000,000

60,000,000

40,000,000

20,000,000

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Ministry of Finance.

Pension payments are set according to the employee’s final base salary (defined benefit). Initially, employees only received a base salary and a family allowance. In order to ensure employee salaries kept pace with inflation, the government increased salaries by providing additional supplementary allowances. Eventually, the supplementary allowances made up a greater proportion of the employees’ take- home pay than the base salary. Unfortunately, pension payments remained indexed to the base salary, so retirees received significantly less in pension payments than their final income before retirement.

In line with the increase in government employees’ incomes, the income of retirees also increased in nominal terms (pension payments are indexed to the employees’ final salary). However, the government’s decision to increase the base salary was only implemented until 2015, after which the government became aware that the rising incomes increased the market price of basic foods and other commodities. It means that the purchasing power of pensions has remained the same or has even decreased.

Two main regulations govern the investment policy for the pension fund: Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 201/PMK.02/2015 (amended by Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 23/PMK.02/2016) on pension fund management for civil servants and Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 53/PMK.02/2016 on the management of the pension fund for military soldiers, police personnel and civil servants. Based on these regulations, the pension fund can be invested in certain portfolios, primarily government bonds and deposits; investment in high risk portfolios is very limited and only occurs in the domestic market. This strategy aims to reduce the risk of investment losses. However, this risk avoidance has slowed the growth of the fund.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 091 3.2. Challenges for the Pension System and Individual Schemes

The greatest challenge when designing a new pension system for government employees in Indonesia is ensuring that it is sustainable. Any new system should alleviate the fiscal pressure on the government as an employer, ensure that funds will be available in the long term, and provide an adequate income for retirees. Ultimately, the system needs to be affordable for the government and the contributing employees in the long term, as reflected in the balance between revenue and expenditure. The contribution rate and fund investment performance are the primary factors affecting pension revenue in Indonesia. However, some countries bolster their pension funds using other sponsors or government subsidies. In terms of expenditure, the replacement rate, payment type, and operational costs are all important (Figure 2-5).

[Figure 2-5] Financial Balance of a Pension System

Revenues: Contributions, Expenditure: Pension Benefit and Investment, Sponsor, etc. Pen Administration Cost, etc.

Source: Author’s Own.

3.2.1. Sources of Pension System Financing

The Indonesian government employee pension system is fully financed by general revenue as mandated by Law No. 11/1969. This gives the system a sense of stability, with pension expenditure consistently accounting for 5% of total government spending. However, nominal spending on pension payments is increasing every year, which can be expected to place significant burden on the government in the long term.

Law No. 11/1969 has mandated that the pension system for government employees in Indonesia be fully funded, with both the employees and the government

092 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia contributing to the fund. However, the government’s contribution obligations and the establishment of the Pension Fund are still not adequately regulated. Since 1969, the government has chosen to implement the transition period to use the state budget to finance the program and bear the operational costs. [Figure 2-6] summarizes the state budget set aside for the pension system from 2011 to 2016, showing that this has consistently increased from about IDR 59.5 trillion to IDR 102 trillion over this time.

[Figure 2-6] State Budget Allocation for Pension Expenditure for 2011-2016 in Indonesia

(Unit: Billion IDR) 120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Indonesian Budget Documents.

The increase in the budget set aside for the government employee pension system reflects the actual increase in spending on pension payments (Figure 2-7). While it has increased each year during this period, the size of the increases between consecutive years has not been uniform, due to various influential policy decisions, such as the retirement age rising from 56 to 58 years for civil servants (Law No. 5/2014) and the freezing of base salaries for civil servants and retirees’ pensions in 2015. The main goal of the latter policy was to reduce the proportion of the state budget used for pensions. To make up for this freeze, the government provides an allowance related religion to the civil servants of up to 50% of the base salary, but not for the retirees. This strategy can delay future sharp increases in pension expenditure, but it has drawn criticism from union retirees.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 093 [Figure 2-7] Government Spending on Pension Payments for 2011-2016 in Indonesia

(Unit: Billion IDR) 100,000 86,136 87,989 72,106 78,048 80,000 66,374 58,440 60,000

40,000

20,000

0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Pension Expenditure, Ministry of Finance.

[Figure 2-8] illustrates the ratio of pension expenditure to general revenue (tax and non-tax) from 2010 to 2016. This ratio has consistently increased over this period, with the highest increase occurring from 2010 to 2011 (0.7%). Since then, it has risen slowly to 5.6% in 2016 from 5.0% in 2012.

[Figure 2-8] Ratio of Pension Expenditure to Domestic Revenue (2010-2016)

(Unit: %) Pension Ratio to State Revenue

5.6 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.1 5.0 4.4

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Ministry of Finance.

Indonesia has a mandatory budget allocation for the education and health sectors of 20% and 5% of total expenditure, respectively. Any increase in pension expenditure will influence the money available for education and health. In 2016, pension expenditure stood at 4.7% of the total budget. Taken with education and health, this leaves only 70.3% of budget remaining for line ministries, transfer funds for provincial and district governments, and other state general treasury expenditure.

094 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 3.2.2. Fund Collection Policy

The implementation of the pension system for civil servants in Indonesia is unique. Law No. 11/1969 mandates a fully funded system, whereby both employees and government contribute to a pension fund. However, as yet the law has not been fully implemented. The government has not set a contribution rate for itself and the pension fund has not been established. Although employees have contributed to the pension fund, the government currently finances the system fully from the state budget. In addition, the government does not have a clear policy for the use of the pension fund; it has not clearly defined how to use the fund to finance the program in the long term, nor when it should be used as the main source of pension payments.

Because the government has not yet fully legislated the use of the pension fund as the main source of its pension program, the employees’ contributions ultimately remain a contingency fund. For example, the fund is used for reserve funds at the beginning and the end of the year. The periodical system of budget spending limits the government to executing the budget only in the same fiscal year. This system has raised the issue of using the fund for pension payments at the beginning of the year when the government distributes the fund before the beginning of the fiscal year. In order to secure pension payments at the beginning of the year, the government uses the pension fund.

According to Minister of Finance Regulation No. 201/PMK.02/2015 amended by Minister of Finance Regulation No. 23/PMK.02/2016 and Minister of Finance Regulation No. 53/PMK.02/2016, the pension fund can be used to (1) pay pensions, (2) bail out pension payments at the beginning of a year, (3) bail out pension payments at the end of a year, (4) finance operational costs, and (5) finance pension fund investment.

Although it is possible to use the pension fund for pension payments, the government seldom does so, preferring to use it only when facing very difficult financial conditions. This reinforces the perception that the pension fund is free standing and can be used under certain conditions as an emergency fund. This will reduce the future growth of the fund.

3.2.3. Centralized Financial Burden of Pension Expenditure

The Indonesian administration system consists of the central government and more than 540 local governments. Each government has the authority to recruit employees according to their needs. Law No. 32/2004, subsequently superseded by Law No. 23/2014 on Local Government, has contributed to an increase in the

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 095 number of employees because it allows regional governments to strengthen their regions by creating new districts or dividing existing districts, thus increasing the number of government employees required. According to the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2014, the central government had 909,426 employees, provincial governments had 297,774 employees, and municipal/district governments had 3,248,103 employees. As a result, the number of local government retirees will increase rapidly in the next 25 years. Additionally, it is becoming more common for central government employees to movie to local governments for the rest of their working career. Consequently, the number of central government retirees has fallen in the past five years (Figure 2-9).

[Figure 2-9] Number of Local and Central Government Retirees in Indonesia (2011-2016)

1,500,000

1,000,000 Local Gov. Retirees

500,000 Central Gov. Retirees

0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Ministry of Finance.

There is a debate whether pension payments for retirees from local governments should be financed by local governments or the central government. Currently, their pensions are covered by the central government but this is complicated by the governmental system in Indonesia, which has three tiers: central government, regional government, and municipality government. In order to maintain national unity, a financial element is necessary.

3.2.4. Promoting Corruption-Free Government and Labor Market Competition

An effective pension system can promote a corruption-free government and encourage competition between the public and private labor markets. Pensions are a part of the compensation package received by civil servants and other government employees. A small pension threatens the financial stability of government employees in their old age.

shows the average income for various levels of employee and the percentage of that income that their pension accounts for (i.e., the pension replacement ratio). It can be seen that former senior civil servants receive

096 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia about 9% of their final income as a pension, compared with 24% for common employees of rank IIIc. This is perceived to be insufficient to meet the basic needs of senior employees in their retirement. An insufficient pension tends to hinder efforts to combat corruption within the government as the low potential income from a pension tends to justify corruption among government employees, especially near the end of their career. To address this issue, the government needs to improve the pension replacement ratio in some manner.

Average Incomes and Pensions for Various Government Employee Positions in Indonesia (Unit: IDR) Rank IV a Rank IV e Legislative Description Rank III c Ministers (Eschln 3) (Eschln 1) Members Basic Salary 4,383,300 4,762,000 5,620,300 4,200,000 5,040,000 (30 years of service) Performance Allowance 5,786,200 10,910,500 43,492,500 36,108,000 18,824,400 Total Income 10,169,500 15,672,500 49,112,800 40,308,000 23,864,400 Pension 3,287,470 3,571,500 4,215,200 3,150,000 3,780,000 (75% of final base salary) Replacement Ratio of 24% 23% 9% 7.8% 15.8% Pension

Source: Ministry of Finance.

To be eligible to receive a pension, civil servants have to meet the minimum service year and age. The Indonesian pension system normally requires at least 20 years of service and for the retiree to be at least 50 years old. This length of service is considered too long, and when an employee leaves their job at 50 years old or older, the availability of other jobs is very limited. However, if the minimum service period is shortened, it is more difficult for the government to retain employees once they reach the service minimum. Currently, those who do quit the government before their 20 years of service have passed only receive their contributions back. In addition, the private sector tends to offer higher salaries and other forms of remuneration, such as bonuses for high performance. Furthermore, abundant work force outside of the government poses very good performance. If the government cannot offer competitive salaries or an attractive pension, people will be less enthusiastic to work for it.

3.2.5. Fragmented Pension System

As described previously, the pension system for government employees consists of several different schemes depending on the type of retiree. This adds to the

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 097 complexity of any pension reform the government undertakes. Each scheme operates under different laws and regulations under the supervision of different government administrations. For example, the pension for military and police personnel is controlled by the Ministry of National Defense and the Police Department, while the pension for employees in high state institutions is the responsibility of the Secretariat of the House of Representatives and the pension for civil servants is the concern of the Ministry of the State Civil Apparatus and Bureaucracy Reform.

This fragmentation of the pension system in the Indonesian government creates issues such as high administration costs for policy formulation and implementation, juggling multiple sources for the pension fund, the rising demand to integrate the pension system for state-owned enterprises with that for civil servants, and the potential difficulty of doing so. For example, in 2016, PT KAI proposed changing the contribution conditions for both the government and PT KAI. The government approved the proposal with Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 170/PMK.02/2016, which replaced Regulation No. 105/PMK.02/2010. In the same year, the government revised Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 30/PMK.05/2015 with Regulation No. 229/ PMK.05/2016 on Veterans’ Allowances. The new regulation has expanded eligibility for and the size of veterans’ allowances.

Another implication of the fragmented system is the growing calls to establish a new pension scheme for employees at semi-public service corporations. Some retiree unions at state-owned enterprises have proposed the integration of corporate and civil service pension schemes in order to increase payments. For example, the retiree unions at PN Garam, Perjan Pegadaian and Perum Pos dan Telekomunikasi believe that the civil service pension system is better than their current system in term of payments and fund sustainability. However, the government has regulations for minimum requirements for service years and pension age, so to be eligible to receive a pension, workers at semi-public service enterprises will need to meet these requirements if these enterprises become state-owned.

The fragmented system also potentially increases pension expenditure. Under different schemes, retirees may receive pension payments from different pension schemes, but they come from the same financial source: state revenue. For example, about 35,000 retirees receive more than one pension from the civil servant, legislative member, executive officer, and presidential pension schemes. It can be said that the system is too generous, but less considering fiscal effect of the schemes.

3.2.6. Potential Long-Term Financial Unsustainability

As described earlier, the number of retirees and the size of the base salary dictates pension expenditure. To estimate the size of pension expenditure in the future, the

098 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia long-term prediction of retiree numbers is needed. To achieve this, rough data on civil servant numbers from 1950 to 2012 and average life expectancy from 1995 to 2015 are presented in

and
, respectively. To make a projection of retiree numbers, this report combined the average service years (30 years) with the life expectancy for the related period.

Number of Civil Servants in Indonesia (1950-2012)

No. Year Number of Civil Servants 1 1950 303,500 2 1960 393,000 3 1970 515,000 4 1980 2,047,000 5 1993 4,000,000 6 2012 4,646,357

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics.

Life Expectancy in Some Countries (1995-2015)

Years Description 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 Life Expectancy 66.0 67.8 69.1 70.1

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics.

Government employees typically retire after 30 years of service at 58 years old. For certain positions such as high-ranking officers or employees holding functional positions, the retirement age is 60, 65, or 70 years old, depending on the position. However, this report will use the most common retirement age (58 years).

and [Figure 2-10] show the estimated number of retirees from 1980 to 2044.

Estimated Number of Civil Service Retirees in Indonesia (1990-2044)

No. Year Civil Servant Retirees Predicted Year Retirees to Last 1 1980 303,500 1990 2 1990 393,000 2001 3 2000 515,000 2012 4 2010 2,047,000 2022 5 2035 4,000,000 2047 6 2044 4,646,357 2056

Source: Ministry of Finance.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 099 [Figure 2-10] provides an estimate of the number of retirees from 1980 to 2044. From 1980 to 2000 the number of retirees increased steadily from 350,000 to 515,000. However, between 2001 and 2035, the retiree population dramatically rises from 515,000 to 4 million retirees. This increase is predicted to reach a peak in 2044, with about 4.6 million retirees. Currently, in 2017, the number of retirees is 2.5 million.

[Figure 2-10] Estimates for Government Retiree Population in Indonesia (1980-2044)

5,000,000 4,500,000 4,646,357 4,000,000 4,000,000 3,500,000 3,000,000 2,500,000 Retirements 2,000,000 2,047,000 1,500,000 1,000,000 50,0000 303,500 515,000 0 393,000 1980 1990 2000 2010 2035 2044

Source: Ministry of Finance.

Based on these projections, the government needs to ready itself for a dramatically larger fiscal burden over the next 25 years. On the other hand, the government should pursue a strategy to secure retirees’ interest on pension income. As such, a co-financing scheme involving general revenue and the existing pension fund or reforming the current pension system will be necessary.

3.2.7. Pensions for Electoral and Appointment-Based Positions

Based on Article 13 of Law No. 12/1980, Government Regulation No. 9/1980 states that the formula used to calculate the pension for leaders or members of high state institutions within the central government and local government is 1% for each month of service multiplied by the base salary for their final month. There has been public criticism regarding the generosity of the pension compared with other pension schemes. As there is no minimum age requirement, it is possible for pension recipients to be quite young. Currently, many legislative members come from the younger generation, such as art workers and non-governmental organization activists. This group of government officials have a five-year service, so it can be predicted that they will “retire” after five years of service.

In addition to this, the general public has also questioned the pension payment

100 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia formula for former high state institution employees. This group consists of the head and members of the House of Representatives, and higher officials of the People’s Consultative Assembly, Supreme Court, Supreme Consultative Council, Judicial Commission, and Constitutional Court. The main issue is that, even though this group contributes at the same level, but there are no restrictions on service years or retirement age, and pensions are calculated based on the months of service.

It has been argued that five-year government positions should not have a lifetime pension attached to them. It has been suggested that retirees instead receive a lump sum severance payment immediately upon retirement. In addition, for every five- year period, there is at least 500 House of Representatives retirees, some of whom are still very young when they leave. As a result, the government has to pay these young retirees and their families for life. Because they are paid out of the state budget, this will further increase the fiscal burden on the government.

Another important issue is the insufficient size of the pension itself, which is due to the payment formula used in the pension system. To determine the size of an employee’s pension, the employee’s final base salary and years of service are used. In Indonesia, civil servants have four ranks (I-IV), with each rank consisting of four classes, ‘a’ to ‘d’. The base salary range, from the lowest to the highest rank and class, is IDR 1,486,500 to 5,630,200. The pensionable base salary generally ranges from IDR 3,213,000 for civil servants of rank ‘Ia’ with 30 years of service to IDR 5,620,300 for civil servants of rank ’IVe’ with the same years of service. An employee of rank ‘IIa’ generally receives a performance allowance of IDR 4,815,300 and those ranked ‘IVe’ receive IDR 43,492,500. The pension received for ‘IIa’ retirees is thus IDR 2,409,750 based on a final month income of IDR 8,028,300, while ‘IVe’ retirees receive IDR 4,215,200 based on a final income of IDR 49,112,800. In other words, the actual replacement ratio for the pension is 30% for the lowest ranked employees and 9% for the highest ranked employees. Thus, many former senior civil servants believe that their pension is not sufficient to meet their basic living standards when they retire. This increases the likelihood of moral hazard among senior civil servants who want to secure ‘additional income’ before retirement.

3.3. Pension System Governance

As described earlier, PT Taspen and PT Asabri have been responsible for administering the pension system for government employees in Indonesia since 1985 and 1989, respectively. This costs them about IDR 1.5 trillion per year for administration expenses, though both receive 5% of the investment gain from the pension fund in return. The decision regarding which governing body (or bodies) is responsible for the operational costs for the pension system is covered by Law No. 11/1969. However, research and high-level discussions have suggested that it would

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 101 be more efficient if the pension system was managed by a government organization to reduce costs. It is argued that pension expenditure is fully covered by general revenue, while public organizations are currently more efficient because cost standards are lower in public administration than in corporations and public sector reform has been successful.

Given that pensions are funded from the government budget, the pathway for the delivery of pensions to retirees will be shorter than it is currently if a government organization takes over administration duties. Within the current system, the government has to transfer the money for the pensions to the governing bodies at least three working days before payments are due (Figure 2-11). In practice, the money is transferred about 5 to 6 days before the first working day of the month, which is when the pension payment is due. This leads to potential opportunity loss every month.

[Figure 2-11] System for Delivery of Pension Payments in Indonesia

Governing Bodies Government Current Method Payment Government’s Account PT Taspen/PT Asabri Fund has to be transfered to governing bodies in 3 working Shorter lane and cheaper days before payment date. operating cost Retirees’ Banks Accounts

Proposed Reform: Retirees Direct Method Payment

Source: Ministry of Finance.

4. The Civil Servant Pension System in Korea 4.1. Basic Structure and History of the Pension System

4.1.1. Overview of Korean Pension System

There are four different public pension programs in Korea, categorized by working sector: the Civil Service Pension System (CSPS), which was introduced in 1960 as the first public pension, the Military Personnel Pension System (MPPS) introduced in 1962, the Private School Teachers Pension System (PSTPS) in 1975, and the National Pension System (NPS), which was established in 1988. See

for a summary.

102 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia Pension payments are based on a Defined Benefit (DB) plan. Annual expenditure is financed by annual contributions by employees (civil servants 7%) and employers (government 7%), known as the PAYG plan. Financial shortages have been subsidized by the government since 2001.

Pension Systems in Korea

Private Self- Military Private School Sector Civil Servants Employed Personnel Teachers Employees

Tier 3 Individual Private Pensions (voluntary)

Retirement Military Private School Tier 2 - Civil Service Allowance Personnel Teachers Pension Pension Pension Scheme Tier 1 National Pension Scheme Scheme Scheme (Retirement (Retirement (Retirement Allowance Allowance Allowance included) Tier 0 Basic Pension Scheme included) included)

Source: In-Young Jung and Honsoo Kim (2014).

4.1.2. Background for Civil Servant Pension Reform

Public pension reform has become a major global social policy issue because many countries are facing significant demographic changes. Korea is no exception. The Civil Service Pension (CSP) was the first public pension scheme in Korea, set up in 1960 primarily as a way to recruit, retain, and motivate a competitive work force. However, since the mid-1990s, it has run into financial and equity problems.

First of all, due to its generous contribution and payment structure and the rapid increase in the number of pension holders with the rising life expectancy, the cost to the Korean government of the CSP rose dramatically from KRW 59.9 billion in 2001 to KRW 2.5 trillion in 2014. In return for low wages and retirement re-numeration, pension payments are relatively high compared to the contributions made by the employees. For example, payments for retirees with 33 years of service have risen from 46.0% in 1960 to 62.7% in 2010, while the contribution rate has increased from 3% in 1960 to 14% in 2010.

In addition, the CSP has been criticized for the disparity between civil servants and private sector employees in terms of pension payments. The ratio of pension payments to contributions is 2.08 for the CSP, compared to 1.50 for the national pension. Consequently, serious concerns have been voiced over the need to improve the financial soundness of the CSP and to resolve systematic inequalities.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 103 4.2. Civil Servant Pension Reform in 2015

4.2.1. Reform Progress

On February 14, 2014, then President Park Geun-hye announced the government’s strong intention to reform the CSP. In early 2014, the government commissioned the Korea Development Institute (KDI) to draft reform proposals; these proposals were subsequently presented to the government in mid-2014. Based on these, the ruling Saenuri Party (SP) submitted its reform bill on October 28, 2014. However, civil service unions and the main opposition party, New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD), strongly opposed it. In order to seek a social consensus on the pension reform, the National Assembly set up the Special National Assembly Committee and Grand Compromise Committee on December 29, 2014, which consisted of congressmen from opposition parties, government officials, civil service union members, and related experts.

After around 60 conferences held over six months, a grand consensus on the pension reform was reached in late May. On May 29, 2015, the final reform bill was submitted to the National Assembly and the bill passed 233-0 with 13 abstentions. On June 22, 2015, the government made the law public, with it coming into force on January 1, 2016. Overall, both the government and the National Assembly sought to resolve the various issues surrounding the CSP through social compromise and consensus.

4.2.2. Main Features of the Pension Reform

1. The contribution rate was increased from 7 percent to 9 percent over a transition period from 2016 to 2020 for both government employees and employers.

2. The annual accrual rates for 30 years of service were reduced from 1.9 percent to 1.7 percent, which totals 51 percent for the average career.

3. Income redistribution was introduced. The previous scheme was purely income- based, but it is now changed to apply one percent accrual rates.

4. The maximum pensionable salary was lowered from 1.8 times to 1.6 times the average salary of all civil servants. This prevents excessively high pension payments.

5. The minimum years of service was lowered from 20 to 10 years. This aimed to create a balance with the National Pension Scheme and to strengthen the social security rights of civil servants.

104 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 6. The maximum years of service was increased from 33 to 36 years with a transition period depending on length of service.

7. The retirement age for a full pension was raised from 60-65 years to 65 years for all civil servants; this new standard is to be fully in place by 2033.

8. Pensions for widows/widowers or surviving children of civil servants were reduced from 70 percent of the old age pension to 60 percent. This does not apply to pensions currently being received.

9. Pension payments, which had been adjusted according to the consumer price index (CPI), were frozen for 5 years until 2020. Indexing pension payments to the CPI will resume from 2021.

10. The division of pension payments following divorce has been allowed. Pension rights are equally divided, though the proportion of the split can be determined by the two parties or via a court order in advance.

A summary of these changes is presented in

.

Contribution and Payment Calculations for the CSP After the 2015 Reform

Before the reform After the reform Income base Gross wage (no change) Ceiling of contributions and 1.8 times the average wage of all 1.6 times the average wage of payments members all members Benefit formula for retirement 1.9% × n 1.7% × n payments (accrual rate per year) * n: contribution years * n: contribution years Maximum years of contributions 33 years 36 years Contribution Employee 7% 9% (5-year transition) rate Employer(gov't) 7% 9% (5-year transition) Pension base Career average gross wage The newly 60 Normal retirement age 65 (11-year transition) The current 65 Cost-of-living increases CPI (no change) Pension freeze No 5 years (2016-2020) Minimum service years 20 10 The newly 70% Survivors’ pension 60% The current 60% Nonjob-related disability pension No Yes Income redistribution No Yes Pension splitting No Yes Reference earning Average salary Average pension Earnings test Coverage Real estate income excluded Real estate income included

Source: Ministry of Personnel Management (2015).

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 105 4.2.3. Resistance from Civil Servant Labor Unions

Civil Service Trade Unions (CSTUs) have argued that the government should increase the employer’s contribution rates because the government’s contribution rate is very low compared to most advanced countries. They have protested the reform in various ways: blocking a public hearing for the new reform plan (September 22, 2014), a massive assembly of up to 100,000 people (November 28, 2014) and TV advertising focusing on the strength of public pensions (February to April 2015). Given the strong opposition of the CSTUs, the National Assembly set up the Special National Assembly Committee (SNAC) in October 2015, which would seek a social consensus. The Grand Compromise Committee (GCC) was also established to discuss reform measures and to provide reform proposals to the Special Committee.

Despite the numerous conferences, reaching a consensus within the set time schedule proved impossible. However, as the first trial in Korean history led by the National Assembly, all of the participants, including the trade unions, understood the inevitability of pension reform. Eventually, the Korean National Assembly passed the much-needed reform of the public employee pension system in May 2015, 5 months and over 90 formal and informal discussions after the GCC was established. Many consider the 2015 pension reform a success in that the National Assembly demonstrated that it was possible to address public pension reform through public consensus, in particular by creating the GCC, where the CSTUs were able to formally express their opinions.

4.3 Pension Governance

4.3.1. Balancing the Pensions for Civil Servants and General Employees

Some experts have argued that the civil servant pension system should be integrated into the National Pension System (NPS). However, this would have to overcome several obstacles. First, the government would have significant difficulty providing the pensions for the current 390,000 civil service retirees. The revenue generated from the contributions of active civil servants and the government would fall dramatically if new civil servants enter the NPS instead of the CSP. This difference between pension payments and contributions would have to be made up by the tax payers. Around KRW 10 trillion is spent on the CSP annually, and this would increase sharply.

Secondly, the lowering of pension contributions that would follow integration is not appropriate for an aging population and growing pension spending. The contribution rate for the CSP is 14%, which is 5% percent higher than that of the

106 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia NPS. Consequently, the decrease in revenue from employee contributions would weaken the financial stability of an integrated pension system.

Thirdly, many agree that separating the CSP from the national pension is important to maintaining a career-based civil service system, which is distinguished by policies such as the ban on taking profit-making positions while in office and the loss of a half the pension when an employee is dismissed from office or punished for a crime.

Finally, the two pension schemes can easily be made more comparable without the need for actual integration by such measures as increasing contribution rates, decreasing accrual rates, and raising the retirement age. Therefore, it is necessary to find a suitable compromise between the unique character of the state apparatus and the demands of citizens for a more equitable pension system.

4.3.2. Establishing an Improved Pension Management System

The Government Employees Pension System (GEPS) was established as a public institution in 1982. The organization has 524 employees, who are themselves not civil servants. It is responsible for collecting pension contributions, distributing payments, managing the pension fund, and delivering other welfare services for pensioners. Overall, its main mission is to improve the welfare and old-age income security of pensioners and their families. To achieve this, it pursues five main strategies:

1. Implement best practice for pension services 2. Prevent pension fraud through data sharing with government departments to verify eligibility 3. Establish and provide customized and specialized pension services for civil servants over their lifetime (Figure 2-12) 4. Protect personal information through the Management of Information Security System (MISS), which prevents individual information from being leaked unlawfully 5. Establish the Pension 25 System, a reliable payment system that delivers pension payments on the 25th of every month. It efficiently provides error-free payments through the Work Process System (WPS), which forms a link between government departments and GEPS.

Underlying these are the three core principles to which GEPS adheres in order to deliver the best pension services: faster processing, real-time services, and convenience. The process can be sped up by simplifying the application for pension eligibility, while personal information about civil servants can be updated in real time, allowing pensions to be delivered reliably. Convenience has been improved by

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 107 allowing clients to switch bank accounts and changing personal information anytime and anywhere.

[Figure 2-12] Customized Pension Service System

Disability Official Loan for Loan for compensation Disaster relief appointment participants college education service

From appointment to retirement and from retirement to death, life cycle & customized service is provided.

Rental housing, Cafeteria plan Retirement Survivors Retired life welfare facilities benefits service pension pension support management

Source: Government Employees Pension Service (2015).

4.4. Policy Implications of Pension Reform in Korea

The reform of the civil servant pension has several implications for policy makers. First, the long-term prospects of the government’s pension budget are relatively positive because civil servants and the government have increased their contributions and pension payments have been lowered. According to the new scheme, civil servants pay 29 percent more in contributions (from 7% to 9% of their base salary), receive 11 percent less (from 1.9% to 1.7% per service year), and receive the pension 5 years later (retirement age moving from 60 to 65 years) than before.

Secondly, the reform improves the balance between the civil servant pension and the national pension by reducing the generational inequality in pension benefits and contributions. Pension redistribution can help to reduce the social inequality between high-income and low-income earners in the civil service.

Thirdly, the reform was a success because it achieved a social consensus among the many stakeholders involved. Conflict over the civil service pension has been serious since 2013. Lawmakers, government officials, union members, experts and

108 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia civic activists all participated in the negotiations, coming to a social agreement based on mutual understanding and concession.

5. Policy Recommendations for the Civil Service Pension System in Indonesia 5.1. Proposed Reform Directions

The Indonesian government wishes to adhere to a number of important principles when reforming the pension policy for civil servants.

1. The size and type of the pension should be the same as the current system. 2. The pension should be higher than what can be gained from the social security system. 3. The pension should be seen as continuation of income, as both a right and a reward for the dedication of civil servants. 4. The source of funds for the program should come from the government and civil servants. 5. Local governments should be more involved in pension funding. 6. Any new system should take into account the adequacy, affordability, and sustainability of the program.

In summary, the foundation of pension reform is to provide appropriate support that can compensate government workers for their service and sacrifice for their country. However, Indonesia faces a problem maintaining the balance between providing a sufficient pension and maintaining a sustainable system in terms of funding. The government may increase the pension for retirees in the short term, but tax payers are likely to protest the increased spending required to do so. As a result, the Indonesian government will have to resolve some inescapable difficulties in reforming their pension system. However, three main directions for pension reform can be recommended.

1. The new civil servant pension system should promote fiscal sustainability by reducing the burden on government revenue. The number of retirees in the next 25 to 30 years will reach a peak of about 4.6 million, and the government is predicted to spend IDR 250 to 300 trillion servicing these retirees. Under a new scheme, the government should only pay a contribution to the pension fund that is lower than the total expenditure on full pensions. 2. The reform should guarantee the safe and secure payment of pensions in the long term. The financial balance between revenue and expenditure is important in establishing a strong pension program. The sustainability of the

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 109 pension system rests on its ability to deliver payments to retirees and meet administration costs. The pension system is expected to provide a pension for retirees and their families for at least 30 years after retirement. During this period, maintaining the purchasing power of the pension is necessary. 3. The pension services and management should be efficient and effective. The government should make an effort to increase the pension fund for the future. At the same time, it should develop initiatives to reduce operational costs. Also, pension services related to the delivery of payments, including other welfare alternatives for retirees, need to be fast and fair.

5.2. Reducing the Financial Burden on the Government

5.2.1. Establishing a Partially Funded System

The Indonesian government has a choice between a fully funded or a pay-as-you- go system. Currently, the civil servant pension is similar to a pay-as-you-go system in that the government provides the total amount of expenditure for the pension payment. Even though civil servants have requested a pay-as-you-go pension system without having to make any contribution themselves, collecting contributions from employees is unavoidable. Considering the increasing difficulty funding the pension system, the most promising direction would be to establish a partially funded system in which the government takes full liability for managing and distributing the pension fund after the pension is taken from employees’ contributions.

5.2.2. Sharing Contributions Between the Government and Employees

In order to share the costs of the pension system between employers and employees, equal contributions are the favored strategy. In situations where the revenue cannot cover the outgoing benefits to retirees, the scheme is subject to reform, while government subsidies are the last resort. During the transition period, the government’s financial ability to make contributions and to pay pensions to the beneficiaries is considered. It is also a way to create a pension fund from which benefits can be paid out and to strike a balance between the civil servant pension and the national pension in the future. It improves the health of pension finances, which currently depend on government revenue.

5.2.3. Creating a Long-Term Strategic Plan

To improve the financial stability of the civil servant pension system, the Indonesian government should prepare a long-term strategic plan based on future projections of available pension funds. This should involve setting up a pension

110 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia fund that can be used to pay the benefits to retirees and conducting a medium- and long-term analysis of the amount of money that will be spent on benefits in the future based on the expected number of retirees and life expectancy. Even though projections are not infallible, they allow the government to sketch out medium-term budgetary plans. To achieve this, the assessment of financial projections, civil servant benefit predictions, and the equitability between the public and private sectors is a priority.

5.3. Reforming the Pension System

5.3.1. Pension Contributions

5.3.1.1. Increasing the Contributions of Civil Servants and the Government

The current civil servant pension system in Indonesia requires a relatively low contribution by individual civil servants at 4.5 percent of their base salary, rising to 7.0 percent if old-age savings are included. In Korea, contributions are 9.0 percent of the base salary for the civil servant pension and 4.5 percent for the national pension. In comparison, the Japanese government plans to increase contributions to 9.15%, the French government has set a target of 10.8% by 2020, and federal employees in the United States previously paid 7%, but with an additional 3% for new employees since 2013. To ease the financial burden of pension benefit delivery, the pension system should increase the required contributions to the pension fund.

5.3.1.2 Extending the Minimum Contribution Period

In the current system, the minimum contribution period that is needed to receive a pension is 20 years, with the pension benefits payable once an employee reaches 50 years of age. In order to retain government employees, a 10-year service period is ideal. Moreover, a longer service period allows for a larger pension fund and more return on investment. The minimum service period is 5 years in Germany and the United States, 2 years in the United Kingdom, and 15 years in .

5.3.1.3. Extending the Pensionable Age

The pensionable age should increase in line with the increase in life expectancy to preserve the sustainability of the pension system. Currently, the life expectancy in Indonesia is about 71 years old on average. Most retirees in Indonesia are under 70 years old (55%), with 28% between 70 and 79 years old (Table 2-11). This age distribution is important when considering raising the civil service pension age. In Indonesia, the age at which pension benefits start being received may be extended from 60 to 65 over a reasonable transition period. However, 60 may still be

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 111 reasonable at the moment when the current average life expectancy is still around 68. Even the second option, which is to increase the minimum age at which a pension can be received to 60, should be undertaken step-by-step.

Age Distribution of Retirees in Indonesia

Age Bracket < 70 years 70-79 years > 80 years

Percentage of Retirees 55% 28% 17%

Number of Retirees 1,555,172 776,969 479,845

Source: Ministry of Finance (2016).

5.3.1.4. Balancing Current Salaries and the Pension System

The civil servant pension in Indonesia is closely linked to the salaries of current workers. Currently, the base salary for civil servants is not large enough to act as a sufficient income, and there is also a significant gap between current salaries and pension benefits, particularly for high-level positions. Therefore, a change in the pension system necessitates an in-depth review of the current salary system, which depends on rank and position. Other policy recommendations include increasing contributions and basing pension benefits on the average salary over an employee’s last three years before retirement rather than the last month before retirement as is currently the case.

5.3.2. Pension Benefits

5.3.2.1. Indexing Pension Benefits to Consumer Prices

The Indonesian practice of basing pension benefits on the final base salary of employees means that many retirees struggle later in life; the base salary is only part of an employee’s income, which is also made up of allowances and bonuses. Thus, in order to alleviate the financial difficulties facing retirees, pension benefits need to be indexed to consumer prices and based on average income over a 10-year period.

5.3.2.2. Compensating Transferred Retirees

Pension system portability is important to a successful integrated pension system and to securing pension rights when shifting workplaces. If a retiree returns to work in the government or at an SOE, their pension payments are suspended and restarted when they retire again. To secure financial stability during old age, pensions should be awarded to a beneficiary when they do not have adequate regular income.

112 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 5.3.2.3. Removing Privileged Pension Schemes

The Indonesian government should eliminate privileged pension contributions and benefits for high level officials and instead create a separate compensation program. Inequality in pension benefits can lead to social conflict and public complaints. In Korea, pension benefits for parliament members were removed as part of the pension reform in 2015. Accordingly, elected officials like parliament members, provincial governors, and local congress members now enter the national pension program, which is sometimes even argued to be a form of reverse discrimination. Many other countries also use the same pension system for elected officials and ministers as for the general public.

5.3.2.4. Lowering the Pension Accrual Rate

Another recommended action is to lower the accrual rate, which is currently 2.5% in Indonesia, to improve fund sustainability by reducing pension benefits. In the Korean pension system, the accrual rate has been 1.7% since the 2015 reform. A replacement ratio at least 40% of employees’ income (combination of pension program and old age saving program). However, the accrual rate depends on what is defined as a pensionable salary. If a portion of the allowances are included as part of the base salary for calculating pension benefits, the accrual rate may not need to be decreased. Therefore, setting the accrual rate depends on the salary structure for government employees. In the long term, total salary including various allowances or taxable may be applied as the basis for setting the accrual rate to improve the replacement rate. In Korea, base salary and a partial allowance were used to calculate pension benefits before 2010, but this was changed to taxable salary. The Indonesian government may consider modifying the tax system for civil servants in order to change the accrual and replacement rate. Most OECD member countries maintain an accrual rate of 1.5 to 2.0% per year, such as 1.8% in Germany and France.

5.4. Managing the Pension System

5.4.1. Improving Management Efficiency and Services

It is necessary to minimize inefficiency and waste within the pension system. The organization in charge of administering pensions does not just manage pension payments but is also responsible for providing and improving the quality of the pension services available for beneficiaries. The Government Employees Pension Service (GEPS) in Korea and the various programs it provides may be a useful template for the Indonesian government to follow. Pension and old age savings systems are expected to be more efficient under government administration.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 113 Modernizing day-to-day operations and the processing of pension payments will also lead to a more efficient and effective service.

5.4.2. Integrating the Civil Servant Pension and Old Age Savings

The pension and old age savings programs are mandatory for civil servants, with the minimum benefits from both programs set at 40% of an employee’s final income. Reviewing the old age saving system as an integrative contribution by 3.25 percent with the regular pension program. This issue is related to the organizational change between PT Taspen and Asabri. Though it is recommended that these two compensation systems be integrated, it does not necessarily require the integration of PT Taspen and Asabri, which may be a possible issue in the long term.

5.4.3. Realigning the Pension Governance Structure within the Government

The Indonesian government should restructure the overlapping and conflicting roles in policy making of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises and in implementation of PT Taspen and PT Asabri. One recommendation to improve the pension system in this respect is the establishment of an organization under the Ministry of Finance that takes over pension governance. The Directorate of the Treasury may make efficient use of local and regional offices to pay pension benefits. However, this may cause more bureaucratic red tape which two organizations as public enterprises enjoy a more service-oriented attitude or entrepreneurial management for its efficiency. In Korea, the GEPS, as a public enterprise, spends only 1% of pension revenue on operating costs, compared to approximately 15% to 20% for private pension companies. Therefore, the efficiency of the two organizations should be analyzed first to improve the quality of the services from the perspective of the beneficiaries.

Another option is for a social security committee under the Ministry of Finance to be established to supervise and provide guidance for the program. In addition, pension fund investment could be managed by a special unit within the government. However, to reform the organizational structure, an in-depth analysis of the current system is required first.

5.4.3. Increasing the Responsibility of Local Government

With the steady increase in the number of pension beneficiaries, local government needs to take on more responsibility. Even though local government is limited in the extent to which it can provide financial assistance, other policy tools in pension service or even finance help pension governance Contribution and To finance the

114 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia whole pension.

5.5. Proposed Transition Strategy

Implementing two schemes, the modification of the current system and a new system. Shifting from a pay-as-you-go scheme to a fully funded scheme will be a challenge for the government. In order to ensure a successful transition period, the current system should be gradually modified by increasing pension benefits by at least two-fold, but only for retirees who receive one pension source or who are under the minimum taxable pension income.

Pension and old age saving contributions should also be adjusted to match the government’s financial situation. The increasing average age of civil service employees will increase the future outlay of money in the form of pension payments. It is important to consider the government’s financial status during the transition period because the government needs to provide pension benefits for current retirees while also contributing to the new pension scheme. The total contribution for the pension program will be 3% in 2019 and increase gradually every 2 years by 1% until it reaches 14% by 2041 (Table 2-12).

Pension Contributions During the Transition Period (Unit: %) 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035 2037 2039 2041 Gov. 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 Empl. 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 Total 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Source: Ministry of Finance.

The old age savings program is a semi-mandatory top up of the pension program. The employees and government make the same contributions, with a minimum of 1% of employee income and a maximum of 5%. Old age savings contributions increase 1% every 5 years. This scheme is shown in

. The collected money can be used to increase pension benefits for current retirees or as initial capital during the transition period.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 115

Old Age Savings Contributions During the Transition Period

(Unit: %) 2019 2024 2029 2034 2039 Government 1 2 3 4 5 Civil Servants 1 2 3 4 5 Total Contribution 2 4 6 8 10

Source: Ministry of Finance.

Although a careful transition strategy can ensure the success of pension reform, the total contributions for civil servants – 7% for the pension and 5% for old age savings, 12% in total – may be too high to gain acceptance among government employees. Therefore, one option is to give employees the freedom to choose a contribution rate between 1% and 5% for the old age savings program. In the United States, civil servants are able to choose a Thrift Saving Plan (TSP) from 1% to 5%, with the government matching the contributions.

6. Conclusion

The civil service pension acts as compensation for retirees for their lifetime service and sacrifice for their country. The pension system in Indonesia faces the dual problems of the increasing financial burden on the government and the increase in demand for pension welfare. The government is responsible for addressing both in its policy design to create an acceptable equilibrium.

There are a number of strategies that the government can pursue to achieve this goal. First, it should continue to seek a consensus among all stakeholders including pension holders, current civil servants, and the general public. The 2015 pension reform process in Korea may be a good benchmark for how to achieve social consensus.

Secondly, more detailed analysis of and projections for the current and future pension program is needed before developing a new pension system. Variables that need to be assessed include how much money is required to provide pension benefits to retirees, how many retirees there will be in the future, and how adjusting the contribution rate for civil servants affects financial sustainability. Numerous simulations should be run based on these variables and any others that may affect pension finances.

Thirdly, it may be necessary to take one of both strategies, a one-time and

116 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia comprehensive reform and a step-by-step and partial renovation. Civil servant pension reform is an urgent issue in Indonesia, with the stakeholders involved very sensitive to any possible changes. This is why sound political leadership is critical to achieving policy goals.

Lastly, policymakers should recognize that the success of civil servant pension reform depends upon domestic variables such as the rate of economic growth, the structure of the population, and the degree of trust in government bureaucracy.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 117 References

Government Regulation No. 50/1980 on Administrative/Financial Rights of Ministers and Former Ministers and Widow/Widower. Government Regulation No. 9/1980 on Financial/Administrative Rights of Head of Local Governments, Former Head of Local Governments and Their Widow/Widower. Government Regulation No. 25/1981 on Social Insurance for Civil Servants. Government Regulation No. 76/2000 on Financial/Administrative Rights of Attorney General, the Commander of Indonesian Military, and Other Officers at the Same Level with Ministries. Government Regulation No. 20/2013 on the Revision of Government’s Regulation No. 25/1981 on Social Insurance for Civil Servants. Government Regulation No. 67/2014 on the Implementation of the Law No. 15 Year 2012, amended by the Government’s Regulation No. 23 Year 2016. Government Regulation No. 37/2015 on Independence/Nationality Movement Pioneer Allowance. Government Employees Pension Service, 2015. The Best Practice of the GEPS Administration in Korea, Asia-Pacific Pension Experts Conference. Inbo Song & Jung Gun Oh (2015). Government Employees Pension Reform in Korea. The 10th Pension Experts Meeting, OECD Korea Policy Centre To be held in Jeju Island 10- 11 November 2015, Korea. In-Young Jung and Honsoo Kim (2014), Sustainability of the National Pension Scheme. National Pension Research Institute, National Pension Service. Law No. 11/1969 on Pension for Civil Servants and Civil Servants’ Widow/Widower. Law No. 6/1966 on Pension and Allowance to Former Voluntary Soldiers. Law No. 7/1978 on Administrative/Financial Rights of President/Vice President and Former President/Vice President. Law No. 12/1980 on Financial/Administrative Rights of Leaders and Members of the Highest State Institution/High State Institutions and the Former of Leaders and Members of the Highest State Institution/High State Institutions. Law No. 15/2012 on Veterans of Republic of Indonesia. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 82/PMK.02/2015 on the Technical Guidance on Calculation, Allocation, Payment and Responsibility of Pension Expenditure. Ministry of Finance Regulation No.201/PMK.02/2015 on the Management of Civil Servants’ Pension Contribution Accumulation. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 211/PMK.02/2015 on the Operational Cost of the

118 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia Pension Governance by PT Taspen (Persero) and PT Asabri (Persero). Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 53/PMK.02/2016 on the Management of Pension Contribution Accumulation of Indonesian National Military Soldiers, Police Personnel, and Civil Servants in the Ministry of National Defense and State Police of Republic Indonesia. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 231/PMK.02/2016 on Technical Guidance on Planning, Researching, Determining of the Budget Allocation, and Legalization of the Budget Execution List for State General Treasury. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 30/PMK.05/2015 on the Mechanism for Veterans Allowance, Veterans’ Honorary Allowance and Veterans’ Death Allowance Disbursement. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 170/PMK.02/2016 on Fund Allocation for Former Civil Servants Retirements of Ministry of Transportation in PT KAI. Ministry of Personnel Management (2015), 2015 Korean Civil Service Pension Reform. Muliati, Lene (2013), Pension Reform Experience in Indonesia. Presentation at the IMF Conference for Designing Equitable and Sustainavle Pension Post Crisis World, Tokyo, January 9-10, 2013.

Chapter 2 _ Implementing Pension System Reform for Public Sector Employees in Indonesia • 119

2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia: The Role of the State Treasury for Industrial Competitiveness and Civil Service Pension Reform in Indonesia Chapter 3

Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia

1. Introduction 2. KUR and SIKP in Indonesia 3. Status of the MSME Credit Support System and Credit Information Infrastructure in Korea 4. Policy Recommendations ■ Chapter 03

Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia

Jong-goo Lee (Korea Credit Guarantee Fund) Myungho Song (Korea Credit Guarantee Fund) Siswanto (Ministry of Finance) Yohanes P. Satrio (Ministry of Finance)

Summary

The key objective of the Kredit Usaha Rakyat (“People’s Business Credit”; KUR) scheme is to improve the access to finance for Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), enabling them to build and expand their business and raise their competitiveness using state-run credit programs in cooperation with commercial banks. KUR is one of the most important of the various government credit programs available, providing a market-friendly framework that utilizes a nationwide network of commercial banks. The Indonesian government has made an extensive effort to address the current problems associated with MSME loan market practices through the amendment of government intervention policies. Among others, the Ministry of Finance has focused on changes to the KUR framework and sought to improve the loan system through the Credit Program Information System (SIKP), an IT system that directly manages KUR data. The Ministry of Finance began developing the SIKP when they introduced the new KUR scheme. The current version of the SIKP provides limited services, i.e., it only calculates monthly interest subsidies and provided basic statistics on KUR distribution. Therefore, the current function of the SIKP falls short of its original objective of ensuring the effective operation of KUR. Using an analysis of the current KUR scheme and the SIKP in Indonesia, in addition to an analysis of Korea’s experience running an MSME credit program and credit information system, this chapter provides key policy recommendations that can improve both KUR and the SIKP.

122 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia First, it is necessary to specifically target businesses or industries for KUR eligibility that are included in the KUR contracts with banks. If a bank provides loans to MSMEs that are not targets of government policy and not on the eligibility list, then the banks should not be able to receive interest subsidies or payments under the credit guarantee program. If the eligibility remains as unclear as it is currently, the banks will inevitably focus only on MSMEs with high credit ratings to ensure the viability of their lending department and to avoid credit risks in their loan portfolios.

Second, the government needs to find ways to distribute government support to a greater number of companies. Currently, interest subsidies are as high as 10%. Because of this, the KUR program is a significant cost for the government. Hence, the interest subsidies need to be gradually reduced and the benefits shared with as many MSMEs as possible. In addition, market-friendly methods need to be explored so that companies with positive KUR repayment histories may more easily borrow additional funds. Loan conditions can also be improved by encouraging free competition among banks based on the sharing of information on MSMEs using government- assistance programs such as KUR. To this end, it is necessary to improve the SIKP so that it acts as an integrated information management system for MSME assistance programs.

Third, the government has to establish a regular systematic analysis of KUR performance. External experts, such as professors or researchers in the field, should be invited to analyze KUR performance to produce a more objective and credible assessment. Diverse statistical analyses are also required, in particular an extensive comparative analysis of companies receiving KUR and those that do not. The data accumulated by the SIKP can be used in this analysis, but it still lacks information on key variables. Therefore, qualitative measures need to be identified and assessed with surveys. Additionally, it is important to identify indicators that can be used to accurately analyze performance, considering we may have to wait a few years after the system’s launch rather than observing direct outcomes in the early stages of the implementation.

The SIKP has built a robust IT environment to collect information from KUR recipients. Based on network connections with local government, relevant government ministries, guarantee institutions, financial institutions, and the OJK, valuable information on MSMEs can be collected, though there are differences in the quality and quantity of this information depending on the information provider. Even though the SIKP’s current data set is currently limited to a few key items that are needed to ensure the efficient operation of KUR, SIKP data can contribute to the development of Indonesia’s credit information infrastructure in the long term. To improve the SIKP so that this objective can be achieved, the consolidation of credit information can be recommended as an immediate, short-term initiative and the

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 123 collection of government-assistance information as a longer-term initiative.

1. Introduction 1.1. Background and Objectives

Indonesia is an archipelagic state with a population of 260 million, making it the world’s fourth largest country. Because of its geography, agriculture, fishing, and related industries are the primary economic activities. Indonesia’s main exports are minerals, coal, and processed palm oil, rubber, and wood products and its main imports are petroleum, gas, and manufactured products.

Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) play an important role in the Indonesian economy, providing the vast majority of employment opportunities (97.2%) and generating 59.1% of the nation's GDP in 2013. MSMEs encompass a vast range of economic activities in agriculture, fishing, farming, mining, trade, and services.

In terms of promoting the domestic economy, one of the government’s most important tasks is to improve access to financing for MSMEs, which enables them to build and expand their business using subsidized credit programs in cooperation with commercial banks, thus improving their competitiveness. Of the numerous government credit programs, Kredit Usaha Rakyat (“People’s Business Credit”; KUR) is a key avenue by which MSMEs can access capital, offering a market-friendly framework that establishes a nationwide network of commercial banks.

Since its inception in 2007, KUR has been quite successful in providing finance for MSMEs, especially for those in remote regions. However, MSMEs still face high interest rates even though KUR is subsidized by government revenue. Since President Joko Widodo came to power in 2014, he has emphasized balanced development and poverty reduction in remote regions, which has spurred the government to improve the KUR scheme. Beginning in 2015, a modified KUR was introduced, with additional monetary support available. In 2016 alone, the government was ready to distribute up to IDR 100 trillion in MSME credit.

Three key components were modified in the new KUR. First, the Ministry of Finance launched the SIKP to improve the monitoring and statistics management of KUR. The Directorate of the Treasury Information System and Technology within the Ministry of Finance is in charge of developing and managing the system. Considering that the annual budget for KUR is at least IDR 3.6 trillion (as of 2016), the government needs to monitor the administration of the scheme and the political,

124 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia social, and economic outcomes more closely. Second, the government changed KUR’s financial support framework from guarantee fee subsidies to interest subsidies. In the previous version of the scheme, commercial banks charged interest rates of up to 22%, even though the majority of the KUR loan risk was covered by credit guarantee institutions. Therefore, the government directly subsidizes part of interest paid by MSMEs. Third, the government redrew the eligibility of KUR recipients in line with government policy directions. In general, banks tend to expand their loan base with customers who can contribute to healthy margins based on commercial decision- making. As such, banks have tended to prefer to loan money through the KUR scheme to merchants, who are considered a lower risk than farmers, fishermen, and the manufacturing industry. The updated KUR focuses more on supporting priority industries.

Of the various improvements to the KUR scheme, Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance has particularly emphasized the successful introduction of the SIKP, an IT system that directly manages KUR data. The challenge the government faces, however, is developing a credit program information system that enables the controlled management of credit funds, ensuring they are correctly directed at maximizing economic growth throughout the region while maintaining fairness, competitiveness, and accountability.

To address this situation, the Indonesian government has been making extensive efforts to improve the KUR system. For example, the Ministry of Finance is seeking to improve the management of the KUR system by further developing the SIKP. The current version of the SIKP provides limited services, i.e., it only calculates monthly interest subsidies and basic statistics about KUR distribution. In this regard, the current SIKP has clear limitations in its ability to support KUR operations. Thus the ministry is looking for policy recommendations that remove these limitations and make the best use of the SIKP in order to develop Indonesia’s SME credit information infrastructure.

1.2. Project Direction and Structure

1.2.1. Project Objectives

The objective of this project is to improve the SIKP by benchmarking Korea's well designed and well-developed information system. Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance seeks an improvement in the overall functionality of the SIKP, more effective collection of MSME information, and the reinforcement of KUR’s policy function, thus leveraging the credit information system. Meanwhile, given that the SIKP’s ultimate purpose is to ensure the effective implementation of KUR, suggestions regarding the improvement of the KUR scheme itself will be also provided.

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 125 The three main objectives of the project can thus be summarized as follows:

1) To suggest ways to improve the current KUR scheme 2) To determine how to improve the functions of the SIKP, including the construction of a credit evaluation model for MSMEs 3) To outline a long-term strategy to transform the SIKP into a comprehensive information system for the support of MSMEs.

1.2.2. Key Content

The first section of this chapter describes the new KUR system, the development and status of the SIKP, and the status of Indonesia’s SME credit information infrastructure. First, the new KUR scheme is compared with the old one and is subject to a performance analysis. Following this, based on an analysis of the SIKP’s development and operational system, recommendations for further development are given, as are suggestions for using existing functions more efficiently. Finally, based on an analysis of Indonesia’s MSME credit information infrastructure, ways to strengthen the collection of MSME information are identified and a credit evaluation model that is tailored to local needs is constructed.

1.2.3. Chapter Structure

This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, the SME credit guarantee scheme in Indonesia (KUR) and the IT operation system (SIKP) are reviewed. In Section 3, Korea’s experiences in running financial-assistance programs for MSMEs and its SME credit information infrastructure are summarized. Based on the previous sections, Section 4 presents policy recommendations customized to Indonesia’s social and economic conditions.

2. KUR and SIKP in Indonesia 2.1. Status of the KUR

2.1.1. Status of the MSMEs and Loans to the MSMEs

Indonesian businesses are classified as micro, small, or medium in size based on the size of their assets or revenue. As of 2013, there were 57.9 million enterprises in Indonesia, with MSMEs accounting for 99.9% of these. MSMEs employ 97.0% of all employees in Indonesia and generate 57.6% of the GDP (Table 3-1). Given these figures, the Indonesian government’s MSME policy is closely tied to its macroeconomic goals, such as creating effective public demand by expanding the

126 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia scale and size of microbusinesses.

Definition of MSMEs and Breakdown by Size

Category Large Medium Small Micro 10 billion or 500 million–10 50 million–500 50 million or Total Assets (IDR) higher billion million lower 50 billion or 2.5 billion–50 300 million–2.5 300 million or Annual Sales (IDR) higher billion billion lower No. of Employees 100 or more 20–99 5–19 1–4 No. of Companies 50 521 6,542 57,189 (000s) (%) (0.01) (0.09) (1.13) (98.77) 3,537 3,949 5,570 104,624 Employment (000s) (3.01) (3.36) (4.73) (88.9) Real GDP 1,133.4 386.5 342.6 807.8 (Trillion IDR) (%) (42.4) (14.5) (12.8) (30.3)

Source: http://www.depkop.go.id (2013).

As Indonesia’s loan market has grown consistently, those loans extended to MSMEs have also risen steadily. MSME loans increased from IDR 458.1 trillion in 2011 to IDR 710.9 trillion in 2015, although this represented a fall in terms of the percentage of all loans (20.8% in 2011 to 18.6% in 2015). The NPL ratio of all MSME loans was 4.43%. While the NPL ratio of microbusiness loans remained the lowest at 3.01%, the NPL ratio of loans to middle and small enterprises stood at 4.32% and 5.70%, respectively (Table 3-2).

Distribution of Loans by Company Size and NPL Ratio

(Unit: %) Regional Proportion of State-Owned Joint Venture/ FX banks Development Total Loans Banks Foreign Banks Banks MSME Total 50.1 39.7 2.7 7.5 100.0 Micro 76.6 16.9 0.5 6.0 100.0 Small 66.7 21.0 0.3 12.0 100.0 Medium 28.9 60.6 5.0 5.5 100.0 Regional State-Owned Joint Venture/ NPL Ratio FX Banks Development Total Banks Foreign Banks Banks MSME Total 4.48 3.13 3.10 11.48 4.43 Micro 2.29 3.04 21.26 10.62 3.01 Small 5.20 5.66 0.23 8.72 5.70 Medium 6.07 2.64 2.46 15.38 4.32

Source: Bank Indonesia.

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 127 In addition to a policy of direct assistance to increase the availability of loans for MSMEs, the Indonesian government has also attempted to diversify the range of MSME loan providers, including large state-owned banks, foreign banks and joint venture banks. The government has also introduced regulations that require all banks to increase the proportion of their loans issued to MSMEs to 20% or more by 2018. However, there is no specific penalty for the failure to meet the target MSME loan ratio. The Indonesian Financial Services Authority (OJK) encourages banks to meet the target by checking the business plan of each bank and their actual loan extensions. However, it seems that strict and specific regulatory measures need to be introduced because many banks fail to meet the target ratio.

2.1.2. KUR Overview

KUR was first launched with the enactment of Presidential Order No. 6 of 2007, with the objectives of reducing poverty, stimulating the national economy, and increasing employment. As in many other developing countries, micro and small businesses in Indonesia do not have easy access to bank loans. They need to provide collateral and meet strict requirements, which many small businesses cannot do. Because many microbusinesses are run by those living on or below the poverty line, financial support for this economic group is essential for sustainable economic growth.

Since the inception of KUR, the program has produced a number of positive outcomes, such as broadening access to finance for MSMEs in remote areas. The most significant advantage of KUR from the point of view of business owners is that micro and small businesses can receive a loan without any collateral after a simple credit check. Until the end of 2014, KUR had overseen the delivery of IDR 178.8 trillion in loans to 12.7 million MSMEs. However, when President Joko Widodo took office in October 2014, the new government realized that the interest rates for KUR loans were generally too high. Therefore, the government revised the scheme to ensure that microbusinesses had easier access to loans with lower interest rates instead of just focusing on the expansion of outreach.

Since late 2015, KUR loans have been provided in accordance with the revised scheme. The new scheme was carefully designed with the cooperation of relevant government ministries and commercial banks. Even though the new scheme has performed reasonably well so far, there are still many obstacles to overcome, including the financial burden on the government. The Ministry of Finance is thus focusing on improving the SIKP because it can raise the efficiency of KUR and reduce administration costs and other expenditure. The government wants the SIKP to be developed even further so that it can be utilized as an integrated MSME financial support system and be used as part of the Indonesian MSME information infrastructure.

128 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 2.1.3. KUR Operational Status

2.1.3.1. Policy Objectives

The key objective of KUR policy is to improve access to financial services for MSMEs, allowing them to grow further and contribute to national economic growth. This can also reduce poverty and lead to balanced regional development by creating a stable business operational environment for these companies. KUR is designed to increase the SME loan market by offering fiscal resources because private financial institutions are not very active in the MSME loan market. In the medium to long term, the government expects that KUR will help improve MSME financing by private banks in market-friendly ways.

In the KUR revision process, lower-interest KUR loans have become a key program objective. In the previous KUR scheme, banks had the leeway to determine the interest rates, and in some cases, an annual interest rate of 22% was placed on KUR loans to microbusinesses. However, direct interest subsidies from the government have now been adopted to allow MSMEs to receive loans at fixed rates lower than 10%.

2.1.3.2. KUR Framework

The government determines the policy direction of the KUR loan system and supports it with interest subsidies. The process for the delivery of KUR loans is as follows (Figure 3-1). After an annual plan is set by the government, contracts between the government and KUR-affiliated banks that define criteria for loan eligibility are signed. The banks then provide KUR loans based on this contract. Automatic guarantee approval by a guarantee institution is an essential condition for a KUR loan to be eligible for interest subsidies from the government. MSMEs repay the principal and interest based on the loan’s payment schedule, with the government calculating the interest subsidies on a monthly basis at the request of the KUR banks. The banks extend loans by leveraging their nationwide branch network to identify MSME demand, evaluate their qualifications, and conduct credit assessments. Guarantee institutions provide partial guarantees (within 70%) to lower the KUR credit risk, but approval is almost automatic, and the institutions’ actual role and authority are limited.

The KUR Steering Committee chaired by the Minister of the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (CMEA) determines the total amount of loans to be offered each year, the level of interest subsidies, and the requirements for loan beneficiaries. In addition to the CMEA, 11 other departments and ministries attend the KUR Steering Committee, including the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of MSMEs.

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 129 The Ministry of Finance oversees most of the practical activities related to KUR loan implementation. The ministry allocates money for interest subsidies and manages the operation of the SIKP, which monitors the KUR scheme and assesses its performance.

[Figure 3-1] KUR Loan Framework

Government Demand upload Local Gov’t (CMEA, MoF, MoSMEs) (SIKP) Line Ministries

① KUR contract ⑤ Interest subsidy potential customer (Target amount) (monthly) recommendation(SIKP)

③ Credit guarantee Credit Guarantee FI* Institutions

② KUR loan ④ Principal & disbursement interst payment

Micro & Small Businesses

*FI: Banks and non-bank financial institutions (finance companies and cooperatives) Source: Ministry of Finance of Indonesia.

2.1.3.3. Key Content

The KUR scheme is divided into KUR Micro and KUR Retail. KUR Micro provides microbusiness loans up to a maximum of IDR 25 million (USD 2,000) a year for three years per company, while KUR Retail provides SME loans up to a maximum of IDR 500 million (USD 40,000) per company. The loan period is up to five years for facility loans and three to four years for operating fund loans. All KUR loans must have 70% credit guarantee coverage from guarantee institutions. However, given that credit guarantees are automatically granted, banks can receive guarantee approval just by paying guarantee fees. To apply for interest subsidies from the government, the bank must connect its IT system to the SIKP and maintain an NPL ratio of lower than 5% for its existing loans.

A key feature of KUR currently is that it allows customers to borrow money at a fixed rate of 9% (Table 3-3). For KUR Micro loans, banks ultimately receive 18.5% interest per annum, so the government covers the 9.5% difference through interest subsidies. The banks then pay a 1.75% guarantee fee to a guarantee institution. This

130 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia means that the final interest that the banks receive is 16.75% from KUR Micro and 11.75% from KUR Retail loans.

To receive interest subsidies from the government, banks must send loan data to the Ministry of Finance via the SIKP when they issue a KUR loan. Banks must also provide up-to-date information on their customers’ interest and principal payments. The Ministry of Finance calculates the interest for each bank based on this data and provides the subsidies every month. The Ministry of MSMEs processes the payments to the banks, while the Ministry of Finance calculates the amount of interest for each bank and draws up the budget.

Most banks that participate in KUR are state run, such as BRI, Bank Mandiri, and BNI. They identify the KUR loan demand and find loan applicants mostly through business partners or their network of existing bank customers. The government also encourages the provision of KUR loans to those customers recommended by line ministries and local governments, who identify the demand and upload pertinent information about these potential loan applicants to the SIKP. However, not many companies have been identified and loaded into the system, and banks rarely extend loans to the companies that have been recommended in this way. For example, only 100 or fewer companies have been recommended by the Jakarta government and it is not certain whether loans were actually provided to these candidates.

Major Changes to the Indonesian KUR Scheme

Category Prior to 2014 2017 Government Intervention Guarantee fee subsidies Interest subsidies KUR Micro: 9.5% p.a. Interest Subsidies N/A KUR Retail: 4.5% p.a. N/A Guarantee Fee Subsidies (Initial) loan amount *3.25% p.a. 1.75% p.a. is paid by the bank Final Interest Paid by KUR Micro: 22% p.a. (est.) KUR Micro: 9.0% p.a. (fixed) MSMEs KUR Retail: 13% p.a. (est.) KUR Retail: 9.0% p.a. (fixed) KUR Micro: IDR 25 million Maximum Loan Amount KUR Micro: IDR 20 million (max for three years = IDR 75 million) per MSMEs KUR Retail: IDR 500 million KUR Retail: IDR 500 million Facility investment: Five years Maximum loan Maturity No change Working capital: Three to four years Collateral Requirement Determined by banks No change Guarantee Coverage 70%–80% 70% Credit Check Determined by banks Mandatory SID inquiry Data Collection N/A Development of SIKP (2016–)

Source: Ministry of Finance of Indonesia.

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 131 2.1.3.4. Performance

The government set a KUR loan target of IDR 106.6 trillion in 2016 and set a ceiling for KUR loans from major banks (Table 3-4). The value of the loans that were actually issued that year was 83.7% of the targeted amount, which is a reasonably high implementation rate. KUR Micro came in at 88.2% of the target, while KUR Retail reached 80.7%. In fact, most banks came close to fulfilling the given target.

KUR 2016 Target and Supply

Category Target (IDR) KUR Supply (IDR) Achievement (%) KUR Micro 71.8 trillion 63.3 trillion 88.2 KUR Retail 32.1 trillion 25.9 trillion 80.7 KUR Labor 2.7 trillion 0.01 trillion 0.5 Sum 106.6 trillion 89 trillion 83.7

Source: Ministry of Finance of Indonesia.

Looking at bank data, BRI generated 75.2% of the loans that were issued and covered 91.8% of the companies receiving loans, maintaining its position as the leading KUR bank (Table 3-5). BRI was followed by Bank Mandiri, which accounted for 14.1% of all loans and 6.8% of the companies, and BNI, which accounted for 8.4% of total loan value and 1.0% of the companies. The fact that 97.7% of loans were provided by either BRI, Bank Mandiri, or BNI reveals a limitation of the KUR scheme in that the loans are dominated by a few state-run banks.

KUR Performance in 2016

No. of Debtors Amount (Billion IDR) Interest Subsidies Bank Micro Retail Total Micro Retail Total (Billion IDR) BRI 3,837,698 50,561 3,888,259 59,595 7,507 67,103 3,009 BNI 3,303 36,983 40,286 62 8,301 8,363 352 Bank Mandiri 178,403 109,741 288,144 3,469 9,120 12,589 266 Others 11,240 6,910 18,150 215 978 1,194 7 Total 4,030,644 204,195 4,234,839 63,342 25,906 89,248 3,635

Source: Ministry of Finance of Indonesia.

In 2016 alone, the government provided IDR 3.6 trillion in KUR loan interest subsidies. Given that 2016 was the first-year interest subsidies were offered after the KUR scheme was revised in late 2015, the money required to cover government

132 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia interest subsidies will continue increasing as the balance of outstanding KUR loans grows in the coming years. This financial liability for the government is even larger when one considers it still provides guarantee fee subsidies for outstanding KUR loans that were issued under the previous KUR scheme.

KUR’s target beneficiaries are those companies in the agricultural, fishery, and manufacturing industries, but wholesalers and retailers are also included. In fact, in contrast to the government’s original intention, the banks supply loans mostly to wholesalers and retailers, as it is easier to attract customers from these sectors and they tend to have lower risk. As of 2016, agriculture, fishery, and manufacturing companies took out only 23.4% of the value of the loans in the KUR system (Table 3-6). To address this situation, the government plans to modify the system to give loans to wholesalers and retailers only when the businesses are closely related to the agriculture, fishery, and manufacturing industries, beginning in 2017.

KUR Performance by Industry Sector

No. of Debtors Loan Amount (Billion IDR) Sector Number % Amount % Manufacturing 187,483 4.4 3,849 4.3 Agriculture 948,499 22.4 15,898 17.8 Fishery 56,505 1.3 1,148 1.3 Merchant (Trade) 2,691,225 63.4 59,204 66.2 Others 359,952 8.5 9,276 10.4 Total 4,243,664 100.0 89,375 100.0

Source: Ministry of Finance of Indonesia.

The NPL ratio of KUR loans remains relatively low at less than 0.1% for all major KUR banks. For KUR Retail, almost no loans have become insolvent, indicating that the banks select KUR customers that are low risk based on a strict risk assessment. However, the new scheme has been in operation for only a short time, and it is too early to conclude that the KUR loan default rate will naturally remain this low in the long term. In fact, the average NPL ratio for loans to microbusinesses was 3.0% as of 2015.

2.1.4. Challenges for the New KUR

Since its launch in 2007, KUR has had a positive impact because it offers opportunities to MSMEs with no previous financing experience to access bank loans and many micro- and small companies can leverage funds at lower interest rates thanks to government support. However, instead of supporting the agriculture,

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 133 fishery, and manufacturing industries, the majority of KUR loans have been extended to wholesalers, retailers, and service businesses, who are considered to be more stable and thus in compliance with the banks’ risk management policy.

As a result, to improve the support for businesses within the target industries, the government needs to alter its current strategy. The SIKP was introduced as a way to eliminate the divide between the government and banks on who should be prioritized for loans by collecting data on potential KUR customers from local governments and line ministries. Though it is not working as originally intended, the problem lies not only with the SIKP but in the recommendation process itself. Functional improvement of the SIKP will be covered later in this chapter.

Under the current KUR scheme, government spending on interest subsidies needs to continue no matter how much it ultimately costs, thus placing financial pressure on the state budget. To make sure that KUR contributes to the long-term development of the MSME loan market, the financial impact of the scheme should go beyond budgetary support. In other words, the KUR scheme must contribute to a paradigm shift so that banks expand the availability of MSME loans using their own financial resources rather than relying on the government’s interest subsidies. However, the current KUR system does not promote a market-friendly financial system by increasing competition between banks to provide MSME loans. If the government stops paying interest subsidies due to financial restrictions, it is likely that the MSME loan market will return to its original size. It is also worth considering whether direct government intervention like KUR prevents the growth of an MSME loan market led voluntarily by banks or public finance institutions.

To address the issue, a system that shares MSME credit information collected by the KUR scheme needs to be established. Facilitating the sharing of customer information can create an MSME loan market where competition between banks increases the availability and efficiency of loans. Currently, KUR is dominated by only three state-run banks, with other banks rarely participating in the KUR scheme nor extending loans to microbusinesses. Consideration needs to be given to expanding the range of MSME loan providers (both KUR and private loans) across the entire banking industry in cooperation with the OJK.

Another issue that needs to be addressed is that the current assessment of KUR performance and achievement is insufficient. In fact, one of the government’s key objectives in developing the SIKP was to monitor KUR operations and assess its performance. However, the SIKP does not provide sufficiently detailed information about KUR performance and outcomes. While the SIKP provides basic data on KUR implementation, the government should make a separate effort to evaluate the overall KUR scheme in order to refine those practices that will improve the scheme.

134 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia Analysis by external agents, such as universities and research centers, will also provide a more objective and critical assessment of the KUR scheme. Based on the results, the government can decide whether to continue to support KUR and how to improve the scheme.

2.2. Status of the KUR Operations System (SIKP)

2.2.1. SIKP Overview

Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance established the SIKP to monitor the efficiency of KUR operations in 2016. The Directorate of Treasury Information and Technology (SITP), which is an IT system management unit under the Directorate General of Treasury, is in charge of the system operations. The ministry plans to use the SIKP as a comprehensive IT system to collect and manage KUR-related information.

2.2.2. SIKP Operational Status

2.2.2.1. Functions

The primary functions of the SIKP include ① managing company recommenda- tions and approval for KUR loans, ② calculating bank interest subsidies, and ③ moni- toring and managing statistics.

For the first function, the SIKP receives a list of recommendations from local governments and line ministries such as the Ministry of SMEs and the Ministry of Agriculture and then sends a list of KUR candidates to banks. It also monitors the loan implementations for the recommended MSMEs. For its second function, the SIKP calculates the amount of interest that the Ministry of Finance should pay to the banks each month. This is not a complex process; simple updates of the KUR loan balances are enough to make it work. Finally, the SIKP monitors KUR operations to determine if it is working properly and manages statistical data for KUR support. Because the statistics required are not extensive or detailed, the data collected from the banks for the calculation of interest subsidies are enough to provide basic statistics to stakeholders.

The SIKP is able to provide the government and relevant parties such as financial institutions easy access to information about KUR’s operational performance. With features like a live dashboard (Figure 3-2), monthly and annual reports, and web- based statistical graphics, the system offers data and statistics on loan amounts, debtor information, interest subsidies, bank distributions, and regional distributions of loans (Table 3-7).

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 135

Current SIKP Services

Services Users Information • Annual loans: national, by bank, and local government • Annual number of debtors: national, by bank, and local government Live KUR Committee, KPA • Annual subsidies: national, by bank, and local Dashboard government • Geographical KUR distribution • Detailed reports by age, occupation, and education Monthly • KUR subsidy realization by scheme, economic and Annual KUR Committee, KPA sector, period, bank, local government, and Reports guarantee company KPA, Banks, Local • Number of accepted records and rejected records Government, by file or by user and period (upload or host to Web-Based Guarantee host) Statistical Companies, Line • Detailed subsidy calculation reports Graphics Ministries, and • Total loans and number of debtors by user and Government-Affiliated period Agencies

Source: Ministry of Finance of Indonesia.

[Figure 3-2] SIKP Web Service Dashboard

SIKP RUPIAH DALAM JUTAAN SKEMA KUR MIKRO SKEMA KUR RETAIL SKEMA KUR TKI TOTAL SKEMA

plafon plafon plafon plafon Rp 85,899,000 Rp 41,600,000 Rp 2,924,000 Rp 73% 71% 3% 71% akad akad akad 130,424,000 Rp 62,661,686 Rp 29,467,098 Rp 98,453 akad debitur debitur debitur Rp 92,227,237 4,048,559 org 214,434 org 6,139 org debitur

Sektor Debitur Akad Sumatera Utara Rekapitulasi Bank PERTANIAN, RERBURUAN 54,672 1,022,509 SIKP Penyalur DAN KEHUT... Institusi Plafon Debitur Nilai Akad Debitur Nilai Akad RETAIL JASA KEMASYARAKATAN, 1,228 38,686 Bank Rakyat 90,900,000 3,861,119 65,559,939 2,758,041 48,858,155 SOSIAL BU... MIKRO Indonesia LISTRIK, GAS DAN AIR 1,259 29,626

Bank Mandiri 15,200,000 344,541 14,919,871 200,098 7,816,601 KEGIATAN YANG BELUM 525 10,755

JELAS BATA... RETAIL Bank Negara 14,700,000 49,886 10,922,509 33,657 8,330,752 MIKRO LAINNYA 118,872 3,333,437 TKI Indonesia 1946

Debitur Akad (dalam RP) BPD Bali 305,000 1,397 239,117 778 112,877

BPD Sumatera Utara 200,000 1,131 149,735 282 29,447 Rekapitulasi per wilayah Rekapitulasi per Sektor

80M Nilai Akad 20M Nilai Akad Penyalur Lainnya 7,912,000 12,063 461,796 0 0

Total 129,217,000 4,270,137 92,252,967 2,992,766 65,147,832 0M 0M ... Jat... Jatim Jabar Sulsel Sumut LISTRI... LAINNYA JASA K...KEGIA...PENERI...LAINNYA

Source: Ministry of Finance of Indonesia.

136 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 2.2.2.2. Data Flow

In the past, the Ministry of Finance collected monthly KUR guarantee data from banks and guarantee institutions. However, with the adoption of the SIKP, the Ministry of Finance can collect almost 40 categories of information from banks every day (Table 3-8). The SIKP can also collect data from credit guarantee institutions, but most of the information items are the same as those collected from banks except for a few specifically related to credit guarantees. The system is also connected to a few line ministries and local governments, while some key information such as tax registration numbers and individual ID number authentication is collected from the Directorate General of Tax under the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Interior.

Customer Information Collected by the SIKP

Category Items Number ID no., registration no., name, date of birth, gender, marital status, education, occupation, home address, regional code, postal code, Debtor taxpayer no., business start date, business address, business 25 Information classification, business approval no., capital, no. of employees, loan amount, lender, linked organization code, contact, security, subsidy payment, subsidy payment program Bank code, citizen no., previous bank accounts, new bank accounts, loan contract status, bank account status, loan Loan Contract agreement no., date signed, maturity, loan amount, guarantee 14 Information institution code, guarantee certificate no., amount guaranteed, miscellaneous

Source: Ministry of Finance of Indonesia.

[Figure 3-3] depicts the transfer of information to and from the SIKP. Local governments, line ministries, and Lembaga Keuangan Masyarakat (LKM) can access the SIKP via the Internet to send it information about potential customers. The information for these recommended companies is then delivered to the banks, who decide whether or not to extend them loans. Currently, recommendations by government agencies and actual loan extensions by KUR banks do not significantly overlap due to a lack of monitoring. The banks tend to select customers and extend loans using their own internal assessment procedures. When the banks issue a KUR loan, they send the data required by the KUR contract, such as the loan contract information, transactions, and interest subsidies. At the same time, the banks request interest subsidies from the Ministry of MSMEs. The SIKP calculates the interest required to be paid for each loan and regularly submits the data to the Ministry of SMEs. Stakeholders, including the KUR Steering Committee, monitor and improve KUR policy and operations based on the data and statistics provided by the SIKP.

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 137 [Figure 3-3] SIKP Data Flow for the KUR System

2. Data of prospective debtor BANK Credit Guarantee Guarantee Data 3. Uploads loan contracts and transaction Company 4. Uploads data on bills of subsidized interests 5. Bills the Tax ID 6. Calculates actual subsidized interests subsidized DG TAX SIKP interests 7. Monitors through ID Number reports, charts etc. Ministry of Interior Ministry 1. Uploads data of prospective debtors SMEs

Intranet Connection Local Line Ministries LKM Stakeholder Internet Connection Governments

Source: Ministry of Finance of Indonesia.

2.2.2.3. SIKP System Configuration

The SIKP system configuration includes a firewall to protect data from external intrusions (Figure 3-4). The information system is a single computer cluster with an independent server for each web service, an external connection, a report server, transaction processing, program operations, and an OLAP server. The system uses the Internet or an exclusive line (wide area network, WAN) to connect to external institutions and agencies.

[Figure 3-4] SIKP Topology

Internet WAN

Firewall Gateway Gateway Server Server Web Server for BRI for Non-BRI

Application Server BANK, Local Governments, OLTP Line Ministries, Server etc.

Report Server

OLAP Server

Source: Ministry of Finance of Indonesia.

138 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 2.2.3. SIKP Challenges

The SIKP is limited to those functions that ensure accurate and prompt payment of KUR interest subsidies and that provide key statistics for KUR loans. The Ministry of Finance wants a sufficient number of KUR loans to reach the correct targets with the help of key SIKP functions such as the collection and distribution of potential customer recommendations from the government and local agencies and in-house credit ratings. However, very few KUR candidates are recommended by line ministries and local governments, and the data collected by the SIKP are too limited to develop an internal credit rating model. Therefore, if the Ministry of Finance wants to upgrade the SIKP with an internal credit rating, it may have to increase the range of data items collected from the banks, which will provide more useful statistics concerning KUR.

2.2.3.1. Weaker-than-Expected Key Functions

Local governments and relevant line ministries can recommend prospective KUR beneficiaries via the SIKP, but the banks receiving the information do not seem to consider these recommendations to be important. Because the banks’ loan decisions are mostly based on their internal systems, they focus primarily on wholesale and retail businesses rather than the government’s key targets, which include companies in the agriculture and fishery industries (Figure 3-5). At the same time, the process of identifying potential KUR customers is still unreliable. For example, the number of MSMEs recommended by the Jakarta government, one of the largest municipal governments, is lower than 100 per year.

[Figure 3-5] KUR Loans by Industry (to the end of 2016)

Amount (billion Rph.)

59,204

60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 15,898 9,276 20,000 3,849 1,148 10,000 0

Others Fishery Merchant Agriculture Manufacturing

Source: Ministry of Finance of Indonesia.

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 139 2.2.3.2. Lack of Credit Ratings

To actively increase the use of the new KUR, the Ministry of Finance believes that the SIKP must offer internal credit ratings, which can be calculated using a simple credit scoring model. The Ministry of Finance anticipates that adopting a rating model will help local governments and line ministries easily find potential customers based on prior assessment. In this case, the active recommendation of potential KUR customers will become possible, thus improving KUR accessibility for priority targets.

If the SIKP is equipped with a credit evaluation system, it will better serve the government’s objectives by allowing companies to be pre-screened to determine their eligibility for KUR loans. It is also expected to aid in the fair allocation of subsidies to MSMEs in various industries based on the readjustment of the variables used in the credit evaluation system.

However, it is not easy to develop a credit evaluation model that meets the objectives above with the information that is currently available. Instead, the Ministry of Finance must collect and store a more extensive range of information relevant to a company’s credit risk that can be used in the model, such as annual revenue, annual profit, total assets, current liabilities, real estate ownership, arable land owned, number of vehicles owned, tax paid in the previous year, reasons for rejection for previous loans, delinquency information, and credit assessment information from banks.

2.2.3.3. Securing IT Resources for the Stable Operation of the SIKP

The operation of the SIKP is managed by SITP, the IT unit under the Directorate General of Treasury within the Ministry of Finance. It also runs the IT system that supports the general operations of the Ministry of Finance, such as HR, accounting, groupware, and KUR management. Because the KUR scheme is supervised by the KUR Steering Committee, the Ministry of Finance cannot determine the direction of KUR operations itself, and the SIKP faces the same inefficiency. The Ministry of Finance hopes to improve SIKP functionality to aid in the further development of KUR and to use the system as a key part of the nation’s MSME credit information infrastructure. Considering the presence and roles of KUR and the SIKP, it is worth considering an independent organization to run these systems.

The SIKP connects with participating parties either through a Web service or a direct line (host to host). Web service integration will improve the efficiency of the internal system and ensure greater flexibility when increasing the number of connections to external institutions for extensive data collection. Additionally, if the single IT architecture is changed to double architecture, fault tolerance will improve

140 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia and system usability will increase.

2.2.3.4. Efficient Management of MSME Support Information

The Indonesian government provides a diverse range of credit support programs for MSMEs, including KUR, and these programs will continue to multiply through cooperation with government departments, local governments, and financial institutions. However, without the efficient management of support information, the effectiveness of government policies will be undermined. A vast amount of government investment goes into MSMEs, so it is necessary to collect information from different programs to avoid redundancy and ensure systematic performance management. Even though the Ministry of Finance has plans to develop the SIKP into a key component of the MSME credit information infrastructure, there is a clear limitation in that the SIKP focuses only on information from MSMEs.

2.3. Status of the MSME Credit Information Infrastructure in Indonesia

2.3.1. Overview

The infrastructure in Indonesia used to collect and share financial information still requires further development. This is because direct government intervention alone is not enough to ensure policy initiatives that improve MSME access to finance like KUR succeed; there needs to be constant monitoring and tweaking of regulations and targets, and this stems from a ready supply of information. The foundation of the credit information infrastructure is the Public Credit Registry (PCR). In Indonesia, the Debtor Information System (SID) has been running since June 2006, but this has various functional limitations, and it is currently in the process of being upgraded.

The limitations of the current financial infrastructure has led to delays in the development of the MSME data collection network. Currently in Indonesia, no major platform collects and manages the financial and credit information of MSMEs. Developing the SIKP may be the start of an integrated management system for MSME information. However, it will be a challenge to transform the SIKP into a key component of the credit information infrastructure because it only collects data on KUR beneficiaries, who are mostly microbusinesses, and thus does not cover MSMEs of all sizes.

2.3.2. Financial Information Services System and Credit Bureaus

In Indonesia, the SID has been operated by Bank Indonesia (the central bank) since June 2006, who collects loan information from financial institutions and provides this

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 141 information to financial institutions in response to specific inquiries. Banks and credit card companies must join the SID, while non-banking financial institutions and public financial institutions do not have this requirement; thus, information from these institutions is not collected. SID operations were handed over from the central bank to the OJK. As it was designed and operated by the central bank, the SID collected internal evaluation information on bank customers, corporate credit information, and basic loan information for its credit registry. The SID also collected a limited range of SME loan information. However, because the scope, target, and frequency of the data collection was relatively low and responses to inquiries were very slow, the OJK began overhauling the system in 2015 under a new name, the Financial Information Services System (SLIK). The new system will be put into full service in 2018 after testing in a pilot program in 2017 (Figure 3-6). The SLIK will collect financial data from financial institutions on a monthly basis as SID currently does.

[Figure 3-6] SLIK Development Timeline

2016 2017 2018

December November June January Development Start Industrial Test Soft Lanching Fully Operated

Source: The Indonesian Financial Services Authority (OJK).

The OJK also plans to issue licenses for the establishment of one or two private Credit Bureaus (CBs). As in other nations, a private CB will collect financial data separately in addition to credit information from the PCR (SLIK) and provide credit ratings for individuals. However, as the SLIK is still in development, a financial information inquiry service is not yet available; thus, it will take more time before CBs can be established. Another challenge is how to differentiate the financial information collected by private CBs, such as telecommunication service billing, credit card information, utility bill payment, and tax payment information. Without such differentiation, CBs may not ultimately be successful due to the ignorance of its potential customers such as financial institutions and public organizations.

2.3.3. Development of a Credit Evaluation Model by Jamkrindo

Currently in Indonesia, no intermediary institutions (e.g., commercial credit reporting firms or MSME credit bureaus) exist to collect, distribute, and share credit information from MSMEs. Other than the large enterprises listed on the stock exchange that are subject to evaluation by credit rating agencies, MSME information

142 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia such as financial statements is rarely collected and managed by information services companies.

On OJK’s request in 2015, the credit guarantee corporation Jamkrindo has been developing a standard MSME credit evaluation model (Figure 3-7). This model uses credit variables and benchmarked model development processes from other countries rather than being based on a statistical analysis of Indonesian corporate information. Microbusinesses in particular have been excluded from the model because insufficient data on the key credit variables are available for them. The model is designed to provide credit rating certification services for MSMEs so that they can easily get loans from banks by submitting the rating certificates (Table 3-9). However, based on what has happened in other countries, it is unclear whether banks will actually extend loans based on the credit ratings offered by Jamkrindo because it is highly likely that the banks will simply continue to use their own internal credit ratings.

[Figure 3-7] Process for MSME Documentation and Rating

JAMKRINDOs SME SME DATA UPDATE Valuation DATABASE (ON SITE VISIT) Process (Scoring System)

Source: Perum Jamkrindo.

Jamkrindo Credit Rating Scale

Rating scale Rating Criteria Micro Small Medium 1 Very recommended (AA) - - 751–1000 2 Recommended (A) - 667–1000 501–750 3 To be supervised (BB) 501–1000 334–666 251–500 4 Not recommended (B) 0–500 0–333 0–250

Source: Perum Jamkrindo.

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 143 2.3.4. Challenges for SME Credit Information Infrastructure

Considering the stage of development the PCR and private CBs are in, it appears unlikely that an extensive universal MSME credit information system can be established quickly. Commercial banks rarely share the corporate credit information collected in the process of evaluating individual loan applications. Indonesia’s loan market is not currently set up to share loan information because the banks avoid direct competition over MSME loans by focusing on their own strengths in a specific target area. However, to expand the SME loan market, it is essential to create an environment that facilitates easier access to SME credit information and promotes competition among banks in terms of cost and services.

If the voluntary sharing of information within the private financial sector is unrealistic, the government is required to step in and create the environment it wants. The Ministry of Finance could serve as an SME credit information hub, leveraging the credit information collected by the SIKP as a public resource. Currently, most of the SIKP’s information is from microbusinesses as they are the main targets of KUR. However, if its data collection is expanded to include data from various government-funded programs, the SIKP will be able to serve as a reliable component of the SME credit information infrastructure. Of course, there is the possibility that the government may not run this infrastructure efficiently. The Indonesian government’s plan to develop the credit information infrastructure, particularly for MSMEs, may not be easy to achieve considering the current stage of development of the other credit information systems in Indonesia.

3. Status of the MSME Credit Support System and Credit Information Infrastructure in Korea 3.1. MSME Credit Support System in Korea

3.1.1. Status Before recommending ways to improve the credit support system in Indonesia, this chapter will review the operational status of MSME credit support systems in other nations and draw insights from these. MSMEs can acquire capital through either direct financing (i.e., stock and corporate bonds) or indirect financing (i.e., loans from financial institutions). However, most developing nations lack a fully developed stock market or bond market, which leaves indirect financing from financial institutions such as banks as the main sources of MSME capital.

144 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia In Korea, MSMEs have good access to bank loans; in fact, recently there have even been concerns raised about the possible oversupply of loans. The widespread access to indirect financing for MSMEs is the result of the gradual implementation of various assistance programs since 1960, when not many loans were granted to MSMEs.

Assistance programs run by the central bank include financial intermediary support loans (previously called aggregate credit ceiling low-rate loans) and the obligatory SME loan ratio at commercial banks. Financial intermediary support loans provide funds at low interest rates for certain purposes or specific industries. Guaranteed loans with a letter of credit from credit guarantee institutions are the largest and most effective government-assistance program. “Sunshine” loans and “Smile” loans for microbusinesses with low credit ratings can also be considered an effective policy even though they were only introduced relatively recently. On- lending loans from the Korea Development Bank and direct loans from the Small and Medium Business Corporation are also important government-assistance program. Figure 3-8 provides a summary of these assistance programs.

[Figure 3-8] Credit Program for MSMEs in Korea

Credit Commercial Bank of Korea IBK Other programs Guarantee Banks Large Enterprise

Medium • Aggregate Business KODIT Market and Credit Ceiling KOTEC SME risk-based loan Small specialized • Obligatory Business Bank SME Loan Micro Ratio Regional • Sunshine loan Business CGFs • Smile loan

Interst rate 10% 2~3% 4~5% 4~8% 4~8% (All-in-cost) 4.5%

Source: Author’s Own Analysis.

3.1.2. Support Systems by Institution

3.1.2.1. Bank of Korea

The Bank of Korea (BOK) runs two major programs to boost SME loan activity: obligatory SME loan ratios and financial intermediary support loans.

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 145 The obligatory SME loan ratio program sets the MSME loan ratios at commercial banks. Currently, more than 45% of increase amount of loans at commercial banks are required to be allocated to MSMEs. The ratio is 60% for regional banks and 35% for foreign-based banks. In the 1970s and 1980s, the ratio was higher, which contributed significantly to the increase in MSME loans. In the program’s early stages, the ratio was just a recommendation, but later a regulation was put in place to penalize banks that did not maintain the ratio by putting them at a disadvantage in terms of inspections, licensing, and low-rate financing.

The financial intermediary support loan was formerly known as the aggregate credit ceiling low-rate loan. The BOK provides funds to banks at a low rate under a pre-set ceiling for SME loans to promote the growth of priority industries and balanced development between regions. The targets of low-rate financing include loans for trade financing, facility investment, and MSMEs in remote areas. When the program was renamed as the financial intermediary support loan, technology-based startups were added to the target list. By the end of 2016, KRW 17.3 trillion had been provided in loans. The interest rate that the BOK charges commercial banks is around 0.50% to 0.75%, lower than the standard rate of 1.25%. This program in Korea is unique in that the central bank provides funds to commercial banks to promote MSME development, which does not often happen in other countries.

3.1.2.2. Credit Guarantee Companies

Together with Japan and Taiwan, Korea is a country that actively uses a credit guarantee system to facilitate SME loans. There are many types of credit guarantee system, but in most cases, independent guarantee companies issue letters of credit based on direct and indirect evaluation, with which MSMEs can more easily receive approval from banks for loans.

In Korea, a few guarantee institutions provide MSME loans, including the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT), the Korea Technology Finance Corporation, and 16 regional credit guarantee foundations. KODIT was founded in 1976 and currently holds a 57% market share. The credit guarantee system is a key policy tool in promoting Korea’s SME loan market. As of 2015, 12.7% of all SME loans extended by banks were supported by credit guarantees, and the total credit guarantee balance accounted for more than 5% of the GDP. In addition, of Korea’s 3.5 million MSMEs, about 35% have benefited from credit guarantees.

Under the credit guarantee system, if the MSME borrower goes bankrupt, the guarantee company pays back the loan to the bank. Thus, depending on the size of the guaranteed loan, significant capital resources are required, which means that financial support from the government is required to maintain the system. The ability

146 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia to accurately assess the credit status of MSMEs is the competitive edge for credit guarantee institutions. It is also important to run a market-friendly system in which guarantee fees and loan rates are based on the risk level of the customers.

3.1.2.3. Industrial Bank of Korea

In the early stage of industrialization, Korea established IBK, a bank that specialized in supporting MSMEs, to promote SME financing. Currently, IBK remains a state-owned bank, but it carries out many activities that are typically conducted by commercial banks. However, despite the number of banks that specialize in SME support, IBK is still required for SME customers.

First, unlike private commercial banks, SME-specialized banks can directly and indirectly manage and control the size of SME loans. According to the Industrial Bank of Korea Act, more than 70% of IBK’s loans must go to MSMEs. Additionally, in terms of financing, IBK depends more on market-friendly measures, including issuing bank bonds, rather than depending on government funding. IBK has been permitted to issue SME bonds since 1982. In addition, banks specializing in SME support can play a greater role during an economic depression or financial crisis when private commercial banks cannot afford to provide loans to MSMEs. Finally, IBK contributes to the strengthening of specialized MSME credit evaluations, which are more complicated and riskier than other types of credit. With IBK and commercial banks competing in the SME loan market, the credit-based loan market has expanded, rather than the collateral-based loan market.

3.1.2.4. Other Support Systems

Other than the Bank of Korea, credit guarantee institutions, and SME-specialized banks, MSMEs have relatively easy access to finance through other channels. For example, private commercial banks in Korea actively extend loans to small businesses due in part to government interest support programs and credit guarantees reducing the credit risk, and competition among these banks contributes to a favorable lending environment for MSMEs. Most commercial banks in Korea have their own internal credit evaluation model for risk-based pricing. This means MSMEs in Korea can take out loans at a relatively low interest rate equal to the standard rate +3%p when they have sufficient collateral, such as real estate or a letter of credit, thanks to the banks’ robust credit information infrastructure and competition between banks to attract customers.

In addition, the government provides direct funding managed by the Small and Medium Business Corporation and on-lending through the Korea Development Bank. These organizations provide money at low rates to target companies. Because

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 147 the Small and Medium Business Corporation has its own facilities for extending loans, it offers direct loans to companies that have facility investment plans and strong technological capabilities.

Added to this, regional credit guarantee institutions offer Sunshine Loans at mid- range interest rates, and the Korea Inclusive Finance agency offers Smile Loans to encourage the transfer of high-interest MSME or individual loans to mid-range or low-interest loans supported by the government.

3.1.3. Implications

Korea’s MSME support system was first designed and established in the 1960s, and since then it has developed a diverse range of credit support programs. The primary targets of each program differ, and efforts have been made to avoid redundancy in government assistance. Currently, various types of debtor, from microbusiness owners to innovative technology-based SMEs, can receive tailored support via one of these government programs. In fact, so widespread and accessible are MSME loans, some believe that they have reached a point of oversupply or that they promote excessive competition. However, this assistance remains a useful way to help overcome financial crises and the failure of the private financial market.

In addition, financial assistance programs in Korea are becoming more market friendly. Most of the government’s SME support programs are implemented through private financial institutions. The government sets the criteria and requirements for loan applicants, while the private financial institutions have the right to approve individual loans as they see fit, as long as the government’s stipulations are met. This system makes the approval of loans transparent and allows for pricing based on credit risk. Other advantages include the loans being based on accurate credit information because the guarantee institutions and banks have their own corporate evaluation systems, the improvement in loan services, and a reduction in interest rates due to open competition.

In Korea, MSME access to finance has improved because the government has put great emphasis on financing policy, but there have been complaints about the financial institutions’ slim profit margins. Some argue that financial institutions are making sacrifices to ensure the success of the government’s business-oriented policies. In contrast, Indonesian financial institutions generate large profits while the financial environment for MSMEs remains relatively poor. The direction should be determined following each nation’s policy priority.

148 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 3.2. Development of Korea’s SME Credit Rating Model

3.2.1. Korea’s Credit Evaluation System

Corporate credit ratings are typically used to assess a company so that conclusions can be made about its corporate bonds or business management activities. These ratings and letters of credit are generally issued by professional credit evaluation agencies after investigating a specific company. Credit evaluations can come in many forms depending on the nature of the subject company and in Korea are performed by specialized agencies. Some of the results that can be reported following a credit evaluation include short-term ratings such as an issuer rating or a security issue rating, corporate bond ratings, venture company ratings, guarantor credit ratings, ABS ratings, stock and company valuations, credit reports for corporate restructuring, and business feasibility reports.

lists the types of credit evaluation performed by Korea’s credit evaluation agencies.

Types of Corporate Credit Ratings in Korea

Type Evaluation Focus Corporate Rating A corporation's ability to service its financial debts The risk of default for bonds issued by corporations or public Bond Rating institutions; published with the credit ratings Corporate Stock price for an IPO or M&A Valuation Corporate A firm’s value for the rehabilitation of a corporation managed by a Valuation for bankruptcy court Rehabilitation Business Feasibility A new project or business model based on financial status and Evaluation technology development Venture Firm A venture company’s innovation and business model Evaluation Rating of Asset- The risk of default for a financial institution’s or corporation’s asset- Backed Securities backed securities

Source: Author’s Own Analysis.

With the continuous increase in the number of specialized credit evaluation agencies, various forms of credit evaluation are available to meet the demand from particular business groups. However, this chapter only discusses the credit evaluation systems used by banks and guarantee institutions.

After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, financial institutions in Korea introduced credit rating systems based on debt repayment ability, with the ratings used when

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 149 deciding to extend loans. Initially, a credit scoring system had been developed with the limited use of information to decide whether to approve a loan or not. From 1999 to 2000, most financial institutions switched from the credit scoring to the credit rating system to assess credit risk.

In the credit rating system, most Korean banks use a 10-level credit rating, with some using auxiliary grades marked with + or - to differentiate ratings within the same level. This was based on the credit rating framework of commercial banks in the U.S. and that of credit evaluation agencies both at home and abroad.

In most cases, Korea’s financial institutions use the corporate credit rating system for both the quantitative evaluation of financial factors such as financial ratios or cash flow and the qualitative evaluation of non-financial factors such as industrial risk and management capability. In general, Korean banks make active use of quantitative data, i.e., items from financial statements, but different weightings for the quantitative and qualitative evaluations are applied by the banks depending on the reliability of financial statements that are externally audited and other quantitative factors. For example, a weighting of 60:40 is used for companies that have received external audits and 50:50 for companies that have not. Evaluation scores are calculated based on the ratio and the credit rating is determined from this. Some banks set a credit rating ceiling (Level 3 in a 10-level scheme) for companies whose financial statements are less reliable because they have not been externally audited.

Financial institutions usually conduct quantitative evaluations on profitability, stability, activity ratio, and cash flow, and they use a comprehensive scoring method to calculate scores based on the weighted value of each credit factor. However, financial institutions with advanced systems use the Probability of Default (PD) method to determine credit ratings based on cash flow and other indicators instead.

3.2.2. Development of the Credit Evaluation System of the KODIT

The Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT) is a leading MSME support institution that conducts its own company audits and evaluations to provide direct credit guarantees for MSMEs. Guarantee institutions are as specialized in terms of the direct investigation of individual MSMEs as commercial banks. Accordingly, it is worth reviewing the development process of the guarantee institutions’ credit evaluation system as an introduction to the SME credit evaluation model.

KODIT launched the Corporate Credit Rating System (CCRS) to enable a systematic evaluation of SME credit risk in 2001. Before this, the fund constructed an internal scoring model in 1989 based on the BOK’s Comprehensive Corporate Scoring Table,

150 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia which categorizes companies by asset size (less than KRW 500 million, KRW 500 million to 1 billion, KRW 1–3 billion, KRW 3–6 billion, and KRW 6 billion or more and by business type (manufacturing, construction, wholesale/retail, and others). The table applies different evaluation variables depending on the size of the business size and its type. The weighted values of financial and non-financial factors in the score calculations differ according to business type. Depending on the calculated scores, companies were given one of five grades from A to E, and this grade determined the provision of guarantee service.

The Comprehensive Corporate Scoring Table makes decision-making easier by presenting corporate credit risk as a score and grade. However, it was not consistent because the selection of items, the score allocated to each item, and the scores for each grade were not based on actual statistics and default risk.

Criteria Used in KODIT Credit Evaluation (Manufacturing)

Financial Factors Criteria Scores Capital adequacy ratio, fixed rate, total borrowings to Stability 20 total assets Liquidity Quick ratio 5 Ordinary income to total assets, ratio of net income to net Profitability 15 sales, financial burden ratio Turnover ratio of total operating capital, inventory Activity 6 turnover ratio Productivity Gross value added to total assets 4 Total 50

Non-Financial Criteria Scores Factors Sales channel, procurement of raw materials, marketability Feasibility of products and business sector, quality, and technology 17 levels Reliability Transactions with financial institutions, business stability 11 Administrative capacity, representative’s career, labor Management Capacity 12 conditions Corporation Size and Sales volume, corporate type 10 Type Score Affiliation with large-business groups, business records 6 Additional Added (over 15 years) Factors Score “E rating” for cash flow, impairment of capital -6 Deducted Total 50

Source: Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT).

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 151 The grade structure and definitions for the Comprehensive Corporate Scoring Table are shown in

.

KODIT Credit Grades and Scores

Grade Score Definition A 75–100 Outstanding B 65–74 Satisfactory C 50–64 Average D 35–49 Unsatisfactory E 0–34 Warning

Source: Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT).

In Korea, the importance of risk management at financial institutions has been emphasized since the 1997 financial crisis. Because the demand for credit guarantees has rapidly grown, a statistics-based credit evaluation model specifically for guarantee services was required to reduce processing times. KODIT thus started developing a corporate credit evaluation system based on the probability of default, using the vast amount of SME data that it had accumulated internally. The new credit rating system was implemented in 2001.

The key systems that KODIT actively uses are the CCRS and the Startup Business Scoring System (SBSS). The CCRS is a system used exclusively for SME credit assessment to determine credit ratings divided into 15 grades by evaluating quantitative and non-quantitative factors that affect corporate credit, such as financial risk, business risk, and management risk (Figure 3-9).

The SBSS was developed in 2007 to reflect the unique nature of startups. Compared to the CCRS, the SBSS reduced the importance of financial factors while increasing the weighting of non-financial quantitative and qualitative factors.

152 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia [Figure 3-9] KODIT’s CCRS Rating Model

Financial Model Quantitative Model Qualitative Model

Scores from Financial Factors Scores from Non-Financial Quan. Scores from Qualitive factors

Credit Modified Investigation CB

Combination of Model (Combined Score)

Pre-Rating

Filtering

CCRS Rating (final)

Source: Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT).

3.2.3. Implications

In Korea, most financial institutions and credit guarantee institutions use internal or external credit rating models for the assessment of MSME credit risk. There are a wide variety of ratings available depending on the purpose of the evaluation and the criteria included in the model. This active use of credit rating models are the foundation of risk-based pricing for financial institutions and guarantee companies. The role of credit guarantee institutions in the development of an MSME credit rating model has been significant because they provide credit guarantees based on the direct assessment of MSMEs using its own assessment criteria. However, the development of a sound MSME credit rating model relies on the quality of the credit information infrastructure within the country of interest, including individual credit information. To develop a sophisticated credit rating model for MSMEs in Indonesia, it is important for the government and financial regulators to focus on improving the credit infrastructure for individuals as well.

3.3. Credit Information Infrastructure Management in Korea

3.3.1. Overview

In Korea, credit information is managed and protected according to the Credit Information Use and Protection Act, which aims to establish sound credit orders by

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 153 nurturing the credit information industry, ensuring the effective use and systematic management of credit information, and preventing the abuse or misuse of the information. The credit information industry can be divided into credit inquiry, credit investigation, and debt collection. Each of these sections must obtain business permission from the Financial Services Commission (FSC). A credit inquiry business handles inquiries about the credit status of a company, the authentication and identification of a credit information holder, and the development and distribution of credit evaluation models and risk management models, including activities approved by the FSC.

As of June 2016, data from the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) shows that there were 22 debt collection companies, one credit research company, six credit inquiry companies, and four companies offering credit information services. Credit information companies that have obtained permission to conduct credit inquiries play a key role in promoting SME businesses by serving as corporate credit bureaus, by providing corporate evaluations specializing in SMEs, and by offering corporate research services.

presents a list of the most significant credit information companies in Korea.

Credit Information Companies in Korea

Licensed Services Equity Capital Company Established (USD million) Information Credit Debt Service Inquiry Collection

Nice D&B Oct. 12, 2002 7 ● ● Information Service Feb. 28, 1985 27 ● SCI Information Service Apr. 23, 1992 16 ● ● ● e-Credible Aug. 6, 2001 5 ● Korea Credit Bureau (KCB) Feb. 22, 2005 9 ● ● Korea Enterprise Data Feb. 22, 2005 62 (KED) ● ●

Source: Financial Supervisory ServiceFinancial Supervisory Service.

3.3.2. Status

Korea’s corporate credit information management framework has a dual structure consisting of the Public Credit Registry (PCR), managed in compliance with relevant laws and regulations, and private credit information companies (Figure 3-10). The two components cooperate to provide services to financial institutions,

154 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia including banks and other users of individual and corporate credit information. Private credit information companies can be divided into Credit Bureaus (CBs) which deal with individual credit information (individual CBs), and credit information companies specializing in MSMEs (SME CBs).

Individual CBs collect various forms of financial and non-financial credit information on individuals, including credit card and telecommunication information and utility bills, in addition to financial transaction data provided by the PCR. The CBs then assess the data to generate a credit rating for each individual. The credit ratings and credit information for individuals provided by individual CBs are the primary determinants of whether a loan application at a financial institution will be successful. On the other hand, SME CBs collect the latest corporate information based on loan and guarantee evaluation data provided by commercial banks and credit guarantee institutions. They process the data in order to compile and issue corporate credit ratings and company reports. The growth in the number of individual and SME CBs has made a significant contribution to facilitating the extension of loans by banks and non-banking financial institutions in Korea.

[Figure 3-10] Korea’s Credit Information Infrastructure

Financial Institutions Public Entities (Court, tax agency, (Bank, credit card, etc.) public insurance)

PCR KCIS (Korea Credit Information Service)

Banks, Financial Institutions Guarantee Institutions CB SME CB (F/s and assessment) (NICE, KCB) (KED, NICE) Private companies FSS & Dart (Electricity, telecom, (financial statement) trade information)

Financial Public Private Companies Institutions Organizations

Source: Author’s Own Analysis.

Unlike many other nations where central banks serve as PCRs, this role was taken by the Korea Federation of Banks. However, with a revision of the law in January 2016, Korea Credit Information Services was founded to serve as an independent PCR. This institution integrates and manages the credit information collected from

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 155 various financial institutions, including the Credit Finance Association, Life Insurance Association, and General Insurance Association. The credit information managed by the PCR includes general credit information, technology information, and insurance information. General credit information (loan data) is collected to help financial institutions assess borrowers’ credit status. Recently, financial institutions have begun to use technology information in their technology assessments of companies applying for corporate loans. Information is also gathered on insurance contracts and insurance claim payments to prevent insurance fraud.

The Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer (DART) system run by the FSS is a comprehensive corporate disclosure system where corporations who have received external audits can submit their disclosure documents, including financial statements, to the Internet, through which users, including investors, can review the submitted information. SME CBs can collect these audit reports, corporate financial statements, and business reports from the DART system, enabling them to evaluate companies accurately and efficiently.

3.3.3. Achievements and Implications

Korea’s credit information infrastructure has served as a strong foundation for the expansion of the SME loan market. As in many other countries, Korea’s commercial banks typically prefer to see evidence of solid collateral when extending loans to individuals and corporate debtors. However, a loan market based on credit ratings rather than collateral has rapidly grown. To discourage collateral-dependent loan practices, it is essential that credit information is actively shared across the entire financial market.

Unlike Indonesia, when an individual or a company receives a bank loan in Korea, the information is shared with other banks in real time or at least updated daily. This rapid and efficient information sharing encourages competition between banks, which allows companies to borrow money under more favorable conditions. In Korea, even micro or small businesses can access bank loans without difficulty if they manage and control their credit well. Because this credit environment is familiar to SMEs, they are extra careful in managing their corporate credit, such as paying their loan interest before it is due and not defaulting on their taxes. In addition, companies make an extra effort to ensure transparent accounting and accurate financial statements, leading to corporate accounting and commercial transaction data having greater reliability in society. In addition, because as much public information and commercial transaction data as possible is shared without violating privacy, financial institutions and credit information companies have actively used this public information and data to develop a credit-based financial market.

156 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia In Indonesia, the development of credit information companies has been slow, even though the central bank began its efforts in the early 2000s. The government has to recognize the importance of developing the credit information infrastructure in order to expand the individual credit market, encourage the issuance of more MSME loans, and promote transparent commercial trade.

3.4. SME-Integrated Management System

3.4.1. Overview

Departments in the central government, municipal governments, and related organizations offer SME support programs for business startups, technology development, job creation, and investment. In 2014, both direct and indirect funding from the government was given to 1,322 projects totalling KRW 13.65 trillion. However, because there has been a lack of integration in terms of collecting and combining information about the beneficiaries of these support programs, financial distribution has been inefficient, with growing concern about redundant support and skewed support of certain companies. To improve the efficiency of the financial support for MSMEs, an integrated management system was established in three phases from 2013 to 2015. Before it began operation, the basis for establishing and operating the system was outlined in the Prime Minister Order (August 2013) revision of the Framework Act on Small and Medium Enterprises and the enforcement order and enactment of operation notification in October 2014. The Korea Small Business Institute was appointed to run the system.

3.4.2. Status

The integrated management system collects and manages information from government agencies and local governments related to the application and support history of companies (Figure 3-11). It also gathers corporate information from the Ministry of Employment and Labor, the National Tax Service, the Korea Customs Service, the Korean Intellectual Property Office, and private corporate credit information companies. It acts as a portal for SME support, as users can search and review relevant information on the various government assistance programs and SME beneficiaries.

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 157 [Figure 3-11] SME Information Management System Framework (Oct. 2014)

Program Information Central Government MSME Information

Support Perfomance (2010~) 14 ministry & 156 programs 1.12 million beneficiaries

• Total 1.95 million case with • SMBA programs & • Basic info.(Tax agency, Credit KRW 185 trillion financing programs of other Bureau) ministries : 104 programs Tax ID, ownership, data of SMBA : 1.30 million cases • Workforce, export : 52 establishment with KRW 90 trillion programs Region, Industry sector, financial FSC : 0.44 million cases with status, etc. KRW 27 trillion

• Additional Information (combining sources of ministries) Revenue, business shutdown (Tax agency) • 1.12 million MSMEs 400 Programs No. of employee (Ministry of Labor) • Application data, support date, Export amount (Customs Service) support amount, etc. Local Government Intellectual Property (Patent Office)

Source: Small and Medium Business Administration.

The system offers real-time information on government-assistance programs; for example, the status of 1,332 SME support programs provided by 25 government departments and 17 local government agencies in 2014. Information is available on a company’s application history and duplication of support can be identified (Figure 3-12). Information is also provided on business performance including differences in performance before and after entering the support program.

[Figure 3-12] SIMS Operational Framework

Central Publicagency Integrated SME info. government Duplication Mgmt Statistics (Tax authority, etc) support check analysis mgmt history Support history Central Local government government support scheme Connected Optimized Information support support analysis Management system of local Local government SMEs government support scheme

Source: Small and Medium Business Administration.

158 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia 3.4.3. Implications

It is possible that the MSME support policies promoted by various ministries within the Indonesian government will lead to inefficient management and redundant support. In this situation, it is important to record which companies received what type of assistance, thus increasing the objectivity of policy evaluation and improving the efficiency of budget allocation and management. It will also contribute to reducing program redundancy among government departments because adopting an integrated management system will ensure that new projects are not too similar to existing projects.

4. Policy Recommendations 4.1. Improvement of the KUR

4.1.1. Clearly Defining Targets for the KUR Support

It is necessary to establish more specific KUR objectives. Currently, KUR is more similar to a financial inclusion program that supports low-income families rather than one that supports MSMEs. This is especially true for KUR Micro, given that the maximum loan per company is quite low at IDR 25 million. Despite this, setting clear KUR objectives for SME development may cause confusion when determining a policy direction. Thus, it should be made clear that KUR Micro is designed to support the livelihood of those living in poverty in rural areas. In contrast, KUR Retail is more like a SME development program, with its loan ceiling of IDR 500 million. Therefore, it may be necessary to take separate approaches to these two programs, even if it means that the budgeting, program design, and operating entities are separated. The targets of the programs can be differentiated depending on separate policy objectives. Because the objective of KUR Retail is to promote SME growth and economic development, eligibility criteria should be determined based on an SME’s potential for job creation and sustainable growth. On the other hand, eligibility for KUR Micro should reflect the fact that the program focuses on poverty reduction and should thus act as the first source of financing for low-income families, irrespective of what type of business they run.

It is also necessary to determine clear target businesses and industries for KUR support. Currently, priority target industries (agriculture, fishery, and manufacturing) account for only 23% of KUR support loans, while the wholesale and retail industries account for 66%. The government has already acknowledged this discrepancy. Another issue is that many customers with poor credit scores are rejected by the KUR program even though they are priority targets because banks focus more on

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 159 customers with high credit ratings for internal risk management purposes. It appears that no clear guidelines have been presented to banks with regards to KUR eligibility in target industries.

To improve the situation, the government first needs to define KUR target businesses based on an analysis of the impact KUR support will have on particular industries and the specify the eligibility requirements in its KUR agreement with banks. In the future, interest subsidies or credit guarantee payments should be restricted for loans extended to companies outside the target industries. If the criteria for eligibility remain unclear, banks will inevitably focus more on companies with better credit histories to avoid risk and improve procedural efficiency.

It is also necessary to consider whether restricting KUR support to the agriculture, fishery, and manufacturing industries is the correct decision. The belief that the support of a small group of target industries is economically more beneficial may not necessarily be true in practice because industries are interconnected as part of a diverse and complex value chain. Beginning in 2017, the CMEA plans to extend KUR to priority industries only. However, banks oppose this plan, arguing that it is not ideal in terms of risk management or cost efficiency. It is natural for banks to extend loans based on credit status following market principles, thus the loan market should be based on market demand and not government intentions. Thus, instead of blocking access to KUR for companies in the wholesale and retail industries, who have been the main beneficiaries of KUR thus far, it would be better to set a loan ceiling for each industry and encourage gradual changes within the KUR loan portfolio.

4.1.2. Improvement in KUR Operations

To reduce MSME loan interest rates, it is more important to develop policies that encourage a gradual decrease in interest rates through market principles and competition than it is to rely on excessive government spending on KUR interest subsidies. As of 2016, IDR 3.6 trillion in interest subsidies were paid to banks by the government. Because the number of loans taken out through KUR will increase in the coming years, the money required for interest subsidies will also rise. The interest subsidy policy is a short-term contingency to accelerate the development of the low-interest loan market. It is worth considering whether KUR customers will still have access to bank loans if the government stops paying interest subsidies. If the use of KUR loans only increases in proportion to the size of government subsidies, it would be necessary to review the validity of the KUR policy itself. If the KUR Retail program is separated from the rest of KUR and redesigned to rely on credit guarantees instead of interest subsidies, government spending will reduce. However, the government may have to become more involved in credit guarantee institutions

160 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia such as Jamkrindo and regional credit guarantee institutions in order to ensure their efficient operation.

To address this situation, rather than providing a high interest rate subsidy (10%) to a limited number of companies, the size of the subsidy should be reduced but offered to as many companies as possible. At the same time, measures should be explored to further reduce the subsidy rate gradually, such as allowing companies with good repayment histories with KUR to borrow additional money from their bank. Loan conditions can also be improved by encouraging free competition among banks based on the sharing of information about companies using government funding programs, including KUR. To this end, it is necessary to improve the SIKP so that it can serve as an integrated management system for SME support information.

KUR should also be aligned with other financing schemes such as credit guarantees and regulation by the OJK in order to create a synergy between them. In Indonesia, as in other countries, the credit guarantee system is directly and indirectly financed with government money. Thus, rather than treating KUR as a separate policy from the credit guarantee scheme, it is worth combining the two to maximize their effect. Under KUR’s current system, Jamkrindo does not play a significant role because it automatically provides guarantees for loans. While maintaining the current KUR system for microbusinesses, it is worth considering expanding the role of credit guarantee institutions for small and medium businesses that are KUR Retail targets. At the same time, various incentives and penalties from financial authorities like the OJK could increase accessibility to bank loans for MSMEs.

4.1.3. External Assessment of KUR Performance

Given that significant government budgetary support is required for the operation of KUR, it is essential to evaluate KUR’s performance and achievements objectively and thoroughly. Provided that this assessment is favorable, the government can then continue to refine and expand the KUR scheme. Currently, the SIKP has been developed to make basic statistics available for various stakeholders. However, these statistics are not detailed enough to aid in the decision making surrounding KUR improvement. The statistics on regions, participating banks, business types, gender, and educational background that are currently collected and shared through the SIKP are not much help in improving the KUR system.

For a more systematic achievement and performance analysis, external experts, such as professors or researchers in the field, should be invited to analyze KUR’s performance and achievement. For SME support analysis, various statistical approaches are required, such as an extensive comparative analysis of companies receiving KUR and those who are not. SIKP data could be used for this purpose, but

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 161 most of its data is too broad for this type of analysis. Therefore, qualitative measures using sampling and surveys are needed. In addition, it would be better to wait for a few years after launching the new KUR scheme before conducting a performance analysis because any effects of KUR support on the performance of beneficiaries will take time to appear.

4.2. Improvement of the SIKP

4.2.1. Credit Information Infrastructure Improvement

The SIKP has constructed a robust IT environment to amass MSME information. Based on network connections with local governments, relevant government departments, guarantee institutions, and financial institutions, key information is being collected, although there are differences in the quality and quantity depending on the information provider. Because the information that is shared is restricted to that relevant to KUR’s operation and management, the SIKP is limited in its capacity to become a full MSME information platform. However, it can become a key part of Indonesia’s credit information infrastructure if its limitations are overcome. The collection of credit information in the short term and the development of an integrated management system for MSME support in the long term are two key initiatives in this respect.

The collection of credit information in one place is a necessary first step towards the development of both an MSME credit rating model and an integrated management system for MSME support. The SIKP must collect as much MSME information as possible that is relevant to KUR and firms’ credit risk. The Ministry of Finance has already been collecting or plans to collect information from a diverse range of sources such as information on prospective KUR applicants from local governments and line ministries, SID (the SLIK after the upgrade) information from the OJK, public information from the government and relevant agencies, and KUR loan information from banks and guarantee institutions (Figure 3-13). Because the current sources of MSME information are not numerous enough for the SIKP to act as an MSME credit information hub and thus contribute to the expansion of the MSME loan market, the scope of SIKP data collection, which currently focuses only on microbusinesses, must be expanded to include larger SMEs and beneficiaries of other government-assistance programs.

If the SIKP successfully gathers a large pool of MSME credit information, then the Ministry of Finance needs to find ways to share this information with financial institutions. This information will be useful for many banks who are looking to expand their MSME loan programs. The development of a market-friendly MSME loan market through the sharing of credit information and free competition

162 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia between financial institutions is a key objective of the SIKP. Competition in the MSME loan market will gradually decrease the interest margins of financial institutions and expand the MSME loan market. In the long run, the government can reduce its spending on KUR and similar MSME assistance programs by relying more on free market principles.

[Figure 3-13] SIKP as an Integrated Management System for MSME Support

SIKP

KUR ② Government or Public Entity (Similar programs) (For additional support) Integrated Government Line Ministry Assistance Assistance Information

Local Government ① Financial Institution (Banks) Assistance MSME (For commercial loans) (Credit) Information Guarantee Institutions

③ Research Institutes SLIK Public Info. (Measuring policy performance) (OJK) (Tax, ID, etc)

Source: Author’s Own Analysis.

Once a sufficient amount of relevant information has been amassed, the government will need to analyze its SME support programs and plan the development of an integrated management system. In particular, relevant laws must be introduced to act as the basis for system development and operations, and an organization needs to be designated to run the system.

The following tasks are required to collect information from government- assistance programs: ① define criteria for the categorization of SME support projects, ② designate target projects subject to data collection and manage support history, and ③ define the items connected across projects. To ensure systematic criteria for the categorization of SME support projects, a framework based on function and target group must be established, with functions divided into finance, technology, HR, export, domestic consumption, startups, management, taxation, and mutual growth depending on the support project’s objectives. Meanwhile, targets should be grouped into startup ventures, small business owners (microbusinesses), and general SMEs. The projects that are subject to assistance history management are those capable of managing and providing assistance history data.

If the SIKP is transformed into an integrated management system for MSME

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 163 support, it can provide information about the credit history of MSMEs that have received financial and non-financial assistance from the government. This information sharing will increase competition between commercial banks over MSME loans and provide better loan conditions, such as low interest rates and longer maturity periods, for MSME customers. In addition, the system will offer MSME support information that can prevent inefficient spending by allowing redundant support to be detected or optimal assistance to be delivered to promising MSMEs. Finally, researchers can also have access to this information, and any relevant research results that arise from this can be used to improve the government assistance programs in the long run.

4.2.2. Development of a Microbusiness Credit Rating Model

Based on the credit history of companies of similar business types or sizes, the variables that are strongly associated with credit risk can be identified. These variables can then be utilized in a correlation analysis to develop a credit rating model that allows the default risk of individual companies to be calculated and their rank listed. This model can ensure an objective and reliable evaluation of corporate credit risk. Given the quantitative and qualitative limitations of the data that KUR and the SIKP currently collect, this approach will be difficult to implement. Thus, a credit scoring system based on Korea’s comprehensive corporate scoring method is recommended (Figure 3-14).

[Figure 3-14] Rating Model for Potential KUR Customers

Local gov’t SIKP Banks SIKP

• Demand and MSME upload • Combine with SLIK, recommend • Refer to the rating upload • Feedback to local profile info. public information and • KUR loan approval or gov’t • Non-financial policy criteria qualitative assessment • Calculate final rating regection • Rating model upgrade

KUR Candidate Rating

Entity Model Category Weight Rating Factors Others

Local 1) Qualitative (1) management capability, (2) industry risk, (3) Non-statistic 30 Gov’t Assessment operational risk, (4) growth potential, (5) collateral judgement

Financial transaction record, delinquency 2) SLIK 30 OJK (Jan 2018~) information

DG Tax, Interior 3) Public Information 20 Tax payment record, sales amount SIKP Ministry, etc.

4) Policy Criteria 20 Priority sector, Number of emlpoyees, etc. MoF, CMEA

Source: Author’s Own Analysis.

164 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia A credit scoring system quantitatively evaluates the credit status of companies based on various credit-related variables and eligibility criteria. The scoring process includes ① selecting the evaluation variables, ② determining the weights for each variable, ③ calculating the scores for each variable, and ④ producing an overall credit score based on the sum of the variables. This system has the advantage of including both quantitative and qualitative criteria in its calculation, but it is limited in that there is room for subjective judgment in selecting credit variables and determining the weights.

To develop the proposed model shown in [Figure 3-14], changes must be made to the SIKP’s data collection. First, local governments must report the results of their qualitative assessment of MSME candidates, including information such as management capability, industrial risk, operation risk, growth potential, and collateral level. The SIKP must also collect credit information, such as financial transaction data and delinquency data, in cooperation with the OJK through the SLIK system. Public data such as tax payment information and annual revenue from DG Tax and the authentication of ID numbers from the Interior Ministry will also be necessary. Finally, policy-oriented criteria should be weighted to prioritize particular policy targets. Factors such as industry sector, number of employees, and regional location can be used for policy purposes. As an outcome of the credit rating procedure, the SIKP can generate credit ratings for potential KUR customers recommended by local governments. Based on these ratings, the Ministry of Finance can select applicants that can be directed towards a bank for a KUR loan. For the recommended companies, the deadline for bank feedback should set to manage and facilitate the actual loan extension process. Additionally, if a rating model for existing KUR customers is developed, it can be used for the management of credit risk of the portfolio and serve as an early warning.

4.2.3. SIKP Topology Improvement

To protect the SIKP’s internal IT resources from external risk, an information protection system such as a firewall should be put in place. Using a host-to-host connection to external entities should be integrated into the Web service to improve operational efficiency. The existing transaction server that handles program operation and access to the database should be replaced by a dedicated application server and a database server to speed up the process. In addition, the servers should be duplicated to create a double architecture to prevent errors within the system. To manage the excessive workload generated by the duplicate application servers, a load-balancing server should also be adopted. Adoption of a Storage Area Network (SAN) will ensure flexibility, expandability, and convenience in data management. The report and OLAP servers should remain as they are.

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 165 [Figure 3-15] SIKP Topology Improvement

Internet WAN Firewall

Application Application Server 1 Server 2 Web Service Server

BANK, Loader Report Local Governments, Server Server Line Ministries, Etc. Database Database Server 1 Server 2

OLAP SAN Server storage

Source: Author’s Own Analysis.

166 • 2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia References

Anton H Gunawan, Issues and Challenges in the Indonesia Banking Sector, 2017. Bank Mandiri, Result Presentation (FY 2016), 2017. Jamkrindo, The Development of Rating System for Indonesian MSMEs, 2016. KIF, Financial Market Review of Indonesia, 2015. KIF, Framework of SME Financing in Korea, 2015. Kim Ilhwan, Understanding of Credit Evaluation, 2005. KODIT, Improvement of KUR Program and Establishment of Credit Rating System for MSMEs in Indonesia (KSP Report), 2015. KODIT, Improvement of MSME Credit Rating system for Vietnam (KSP Report), 2014. KODIT, International Review of Credit Guarantee Schemes, 2012. Korea Credit Information Services, Credit Reporting System in Korea, 2017 OJK. Lee Inho, Credit Evaluation System of Korea, 2007. The World Bank, Impact of Assessment Framework: SME Finance, 2012.

Chapter 3 _ Improvement of the Credit Program Information System to Support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia • 167

2016/17 Knowledge Sharing Program with Indonesia

.go.kr www. ksp ity 30149, Korea C

Center for International Development, KDI cid.kdi.re.kr Knowledge Sharing Program www.ksp.go.kr (set) www.kpmg.com/kr www.mosf.go.kr www.kdi.re.kr 5 3 www.kodit.co.kr Floor, Gangnam Finance Center, 152, Teheran-ro, Gangnam-gu, Seoul 06236, Korea Floor, Gangnam Finance Center, 152, Teheran-ro, Gangnam-gu, Seoul 06236, Korea SBN 979-11-5932-249- SBN 979-11-5932-227- I I th Tel. 82-1588-6565 Tel. 82-2-2112-0062 Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT) Cheomdallo 7 (Sinseo-dong), Dong-gu, Daegu Metropolitan City 41068, Korea Tel. 82-44-550-4114 Samjong KPMG Economic Research Institute Inc. 27 Korea Development Institute 263 Namsejong-ro, Sejong Special Self-Governing Ministry of Strategy and Finance Sejong Special Self-Governing City 30109, Korea Government Complex-Sejong, 477, Galmae-ro, Tel. 82-44-215-7762