Smoke-Free Policies in New Zealand
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WHO/NHM/TFI/05.9 Smoke-free Policies in New Zealand Murray Laugesen Health New Zealand World Health Organization Tobacco Free Initiative Headquarters would like to thank the Regional Offices for their contribution to this project. WHO Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) WHO Regional Office for Europe (EURO) Cite du Djoue 8, Scherfigsvej Boîte postale 6 DK-2100 Copenhagen Brazzaville Denmark Congo Telephone: +(45) 39 17 17 17 Telephone: +(1-321) 95 39 100/+242 839100 WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (EMRO) WHO Regional Office for the Americas / Pan American Health Organization (AMRO/PAHO) WHO Post Office Abdul Razzak Al Sanhouri Street, (opposite Children’s 525, 23rd Street, N.W. Library) Washington, DC 20037 Nasr City, Cairo 11371 U.S.A. Egypt Telephone: +1 (202) 974-3000 Telephone: +202 670 2535 WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia (SEARO) WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific (WPRO) World Health House, Indraprastha Estate Mahatma Gandhi Road P.O. Box 2932 New Delhi 110002 1000 Manila India Philippines 2 Telephone: +(91) 11 337 0804 or 11 337 8805 Telephone: (00632) 528.80.01 Smoke-free Policies in New Zealand Introduction health centres and lifts. Through a local retailer, the Tobacco Institute challenged the by-law in court, claim- In 1985, when the New Zealand comprehensive tobacco ing councils did not have this power. The retailer finally control programme was launched, one of its goals was withdrew, but litigation successfully prevented most other smoke-free workplaces. In that year, 30% of adults councils from enacting similar smoke-free by-laws. Medical smoked, consuming an average 23 cigarettes per day.(1) students surveyed workers in Wellington City and found Smoking was common in offices, even in the Department 75% were exposed to cigarette smoke during tea breaks of Health. Legislation in 1990 made offices smoke-free, and 44% during actual work time. ASH (membership and further legislation in 2003 dealt with remaining work- 380) submitted a petition signed by 11 200 others to places. Smoking restrictions commenced with passenger Parliament to ban or restrict smoking in enclosed public aircraft, then spread to public places, offices, and finally to places, including workplaces. Health officials sought their all remaining workplaces including hospitality venues. Minister’s support to develop policy with a view to leg- islation. Smoke-free legislation enacted in Canada made Smoke-free workplaces it easier for politicians to support a similar law. Domestic airlines went totally smoke-free voluntarily in response First steps to passenger demand. Opinion polls commissioned by the Department of Health found very strong support for 1970s. Smoking was banned only for fire safety or food smoke-free environments. hygiene reasons. The Department of Health banned smok- ing in its official meetings during this decade. 1989. Palmerston North City Council passed a clean indoor air by-law. 1980s. Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) campaigned for and achieved restrictions on smoking in some airline Preparing the intervention: policy seats. development 1984. The South Canterbury branch of the Asthma Society 1988. The Department of Health was charged with pro- and 470 others petitioned Parliament to ban smoking in all ducing the evidence and devising a blueprint for smoke- public places. The Tobacco Institute argued that a ban was free legislation, for which there was little precedent. unscientific and unenforceable. In its annual report that “Creating Smoke-free Environments”was a discussion year, the Department of Health supported the concept of paper setting out the evidence about harm from sec- a smoke-free society for work, travel and leisure. A Cancer ond-hand smoke and giving policy alternatives for public Society poll showed that 75% of adults (including 53% of comment.(3) Faced with a voluminous tobacco industry smokers) agreed no smoking should be allowed in public submission(4) purporting to review the scientific literature, places. the Department commissioned a report “Through the 1986. The US Surgeon General’s report focused on sec- Smokescreen”,(5) which examined the tobacco industry’s ond-hand smoke, as did a report from the Australian use of the scientific literature and concluded that the latter Health and Medical Research Council. had been misused in order to minimize the harm caused. Information was selective, incomplete and relied on poor 1987 A Cancer Society poll showed that 82% favoured quality sources (letters to the editor written by industry- further restriction of workplace smoking. In December the related consultants). New Zealand Department of Health, following a similar 1986 move in the Australian (Federal) Department of The first intervention: the 1990 Smoke-free Health in Canberra, declared, after a three-month transi- Environments Act tion period, all its many offices and vehicles to be smoke- The 1990 Act restricted smoking at work and also banned free. The move was widely reported and well-received. In tobacco product and sponsorship advertising. The public 1987, second-hand smoke deaths in New Zealand (homes support for smoke-free workplaces was high and carried and workplaces combined) were estimated for the first support for the bill as a whole, while sports sponsorship time at 273 per year.(2) advertising restrictions were less popular. 1988 Waitemata City Council, lobbied by ASH, passed a The Smoke-free Environments Act 1990 required every by-law restricting smoking in public places: shops, banks, employer to have a written policy on smoking with annual 3 World Health Organization policy review in consultation with employees. The law increasingly adopted smoke-free policies for buildings, banned smoking in all offices (unless all present agreed which many extended to grounds also, during the 1990s. otherwise in writing) and in the public parts of workplaces (thus making shopping smoke-free), and created smoke- Effect of the first intervention – the 1990 law free conditions for travellers and smoke-free tables (a making offices smoke-free contiguous 51% of the seating as the minimum) in restau- Effect on second-hand smoke exposure rants. Bars were exempt. School classrooms were regarded – health protection of non-smokers as a student’s workplace, to be smoke-free at all times. The explicit purpose of the smoke-free part of the 1990 As of 1996, the smoking ban in shops and offices was well Act was to protect people from other peoples’ unwanted observed, with only 12% of white collar workers exposed cigarette smoke, whether they smoked at work, smoked to smoke while working. (Table 1). only at home, or did not smoke at all. The Act gave smok- Steps towards implementation ers about six months before the new smoke bans came into force in February 1991. If office workers were week- The focus for the workplace was to adopt a smoking end smokers only, their workplace became a smoke-free policy, and to provide a complaints procedure that would haven. If they did smoke at work, many coped with the ensure compliance. Employers were free to make their impending change by attempting to quit smoking, and workplace entirely smoke-free, and some did so. many workplaces assisted them in doing so. The 1990 Act avoided any draconian overtones by not Protection of white-collar workers. The 1990 law banned imposing fines on smokers except for passengers smok- smoking in offices and shops. The 1990 definition of ing on aircraft. Elsewhere the onus was on the employer workplace did not include shopping malls. Between 1989 or café manager to enforce the law, by persuading and and 1991 there was a 50% reduction in smoke exposure if necessary ejecting people, as with any other anti-social among white-collar (office) workers. The ban in offices behaviour. Smoke-free health promoters worked alongside but not factories reflected lower smoking prevalence and smoke-free enforcement officers who handled complaints greater support for smoking restrictions among white-col- from workers and information requests from employers. lar workers before enactment of the law. No office was prosecuted. Several passengers were pros- Blue-collar workers. The 1990 law was not designed ecuted for smoking on aircraft. The smokiest remaining to, and did not apply to factories or homes. Smoking public places were bars, bar-cafés and some factory work- prevalence was higher among blue-collar workers, and place canteens. fewer supported smoking restrictions. Exposure to smoke at home declined no more than did the consumption of In 1994 one restaurant was prosecuted for not providing tobacco products generally. Factory workers reported little a smoke-free dining area. In 1996 the Ministry of Health effect if any (Table 1). established a regional smoke-free enforcement serv- ice, which due to resource constraints mainly addressed Note: In 1991 and 1996, smoking was permitted in half of enquiries from workers or employers. (6) all workplace cafeterias but not in offices. While white-col- lar workers would not be exposed to smoke in the office, Between 1989 and 1996 total consumption of cigarettes they might be when moving through non-office work and tobacco per adult decreased by 19%, (Table 1) thus areas. The 1990 Act halved the workplace cigarette smoke reducing non-smokers’ second-hand smoke exposure exposure for this group. except in cafés in high-smoking low-income suburbs and public bars. Social pressures on smokers not to light Effect of smoke bans on smoking prevalence up inside cafés increased. Health promoters distributed Smoking prevalence among white-collar workers was 20% smoke-free stickers and persuaded most shopping malls in 1989, 22% in 1991, and 19% in 1996.(8) Smoking and many cafés to become smoke-free. Airports made prevalence in all adults was 26.7% in1989, 26.2% in their buildings smoke-free, with provision of a single 1991, and 25.6% in 1996.(9) The Act did not lower smok- smoking room for international terminals.