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Conventional Arms Control on the Korea Peninsula

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Conventional Arms Control on the Korea Peninsula Policy Brief No. 20 APLN/CNND1 Policy Brief No. 59 November 2019 Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: The Current State and Prospects Yong-Sup Han I. Introduction At the end of 2017, the Korean Peninsula reached the brink of a nuclear war, as the US president Donald Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un exchanged words of nuclear threats each other. A tug of war as to whose nuclear button is bigger and stronger exacerbated the nuclear crisis. However, the South Korean President Moon Jae-in intervened to resolve the crisis by taking advantage of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. In doing so, President Moon intended to pursue denuclearisation and peace-building on the Korean Peninsula at the same time. North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un responded positively to the South Korean call to hold the inter-Korean summit and the Trump-Kim summit. In order to end the Korean war and promote peace-building on the Korean Peninsula including termination of hostile acts on inter-Korean relations, the two Koreas adopted the April 27 Panmunjom Declaration, the September 19 Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the Inter-Korean Military Agreement at their summit in 2018. The Military Agreement is aimed at reducing tension and building trust between the two Koreas through conventional arms control, while the North Korean nuclear issue is being resolved through the US-DPRK sum- mit. The September 19 Military Agreement is a modest but remarkable success in arms control history when compared with a long-term stalemate or even retreat in the contemporary international arms control arena. Indeed, arms control is at its lowest point in history, so dim are its prospects. Nevertheless, heated debates are taking place, both inside South Korea and abroad, over the legitimacy and rationality of the September 19 Military Agreement. With little 2 Policy Brief No. 59 Toda Peace Institute progress on the denuclearisation issue at the Kim-Trump summit and no sign of easing economic sanctions on Pyongyang, North Korea has test-fired short-range missiles ten times to exert pressure on the United States, undermining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Against this backdrop, this policy brief intends to analyse the true meaning of the Septem- ber 19 Military Agreement between the two Koreas, to identify its problems and policy implications in order to draw up supplementary measures to implement it successfully. Furthermore, the paper will draw some implications for the relationship between progress on North Korea's denuclearisation issue and further conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula. II. Policy of Four Actors on Korean Conventional Arms Control (Seoul, Pyongyang, Washington, and Beijing) Throughout 2018 and 2019, efforts have been made to resolve the nuclear crisis and to accomplish a peaceful co-existence on the Korean Peninsula through summit diplomacy. Three summits between the two Koreas, two summits between the United States and North Korea with their one encounter at Panmunjom, and five summits between North Korea and China were held. Accordingly, the Korean Peninsula could be transformed from being on the threshold of a nuclear war into holding talks for a durable peace, thus making the advent of conventional arms control between the two Koreas possible. This policy brief tries to explain reasons why conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula was made possible, by comparing the policies of the two Koreas, the United States and China. 1. President Moon Jae-in’s Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative While trying to resolve the nuclear crisis, President Moon Jae-in played a crucial role in inducing North Korea to participate in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in February 2018 and leading Kim Jong-un to dialogue with top leaders from the United States and China respectively. Not only did it broker a U.S.-North Korea summit, Seoul also provided clues to the reduction of military tension and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean government's idea is to, simultaneously or flexibly, pursue three pillars: “peace building in the Korean peninsula”, “denuclearisation”, and “conven- tional arms control”.1 Experts call it a work to pursue denuclearisation, peace, and arms control into a virtuous cycle.2 First, President Moon Jae-in had a strong political will to realise the Roh Moo-hyun govern- ment’s October 4th Joint Statement and Defense Ministers’ Agreement in November 2007 to put an end to hostilities between the two Koreas. Given that there was no time left to implement the two Agreements because of an inter-Korean summit held at the end of President Roh Moo-hyun’s term in 2007, President Moon wanted to rapidly develop 1 The ROK Ministry of National Unification, “The Moon Jae-in’s Korean Peninsula Policy,” (Seoul, Korea: The Ministry of National Unification, 2018). http://www.unikorea.go.kr/koreapolicy/index.html. 2 Park Jong-chul, "The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime and Arms Control," Paper presented in the Special Semi- nar on Arms Control hosted by the National Defense University, 2019.5.27." Yong-Sup Han Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula 3 inter-Korean relations during the early years of his term, making peace on the Korean Peninsula and making it impossible to return to the past of confrontation. Second, by brokering the first-ever U.S.-DPRK summit which was going to address the denuclearisation issue of North Korea, Moon could focus on the peace issue on the Korean peninsula. In order to settle a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula, Moon thought that the September 19 Military Agreement at the Pyongyang summit was inevitable. Further- more, in order to prevent the linkage between North Korea's nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, and to restrain the ladder of crisis escalation to go up to a nuclear war, conventional arms control in tension reduction and separation of forces facing each other needed to be agreed, if possible. Third, whereas the conventional arms control policy of the South Korean government in the past had three phases starting from military confidence-building to military constraints to arms reduction, Moon’s conventional arms control policy took a flexible approach so as to produce a meaningful outcome pertaining to the peace on the Korean Peninsula by incorporating North Korea’s threat perception as equally important to build an inclusive framework for conventional arms control. Given that there have been a dozen military clashes between the two Koreas in the 21st century, the Korean Peninsula could easily go back to the confrontation of the past, unless measures to prevent such military clashes are taken beforehand. Therefore, the September 19 Military Agreement was considered to be necessary to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and build mutual confidence. 3 In addition, if North Korea were to be brought to the complete denuclearisation decision, South Korea and the United States must consider ways to mitigate North Korea’s security threat perception. This strategic consideration was reflected in the give-and-take negotia- tion, such as military talks between the two Koreas.4 Fourth, Moon’s expectation that denuclearisation will take a long time led South Korea to make efforts in the short-and mid-term to build trust and ease military tension on the Korean Peninsula so that such progress will reinforce the denuclearisation process and certainly bring about peace on the Korean peninsula later. 2. Kim Jong-un's Push for Inter-Korean Conventional Arms Control First, it is noted that political and strategic confidence Kim Jong-un has gained through possessing nuclear weapons has enabled him to pursue operational arms control in the military talks between the two Koreas. The Kim-Trump summit showed that Kim Jong-un has emerged as an international figure to deal one-on-one with U.S. President Trump. Thus, after Kim Jung-un got the US concession on the suspension of the US-South Korean joint military exercises at the June 12 Singapore Summit, Kim may have thought that he could 3 Jeong Kyong-doo,“ Making Progress in Inter-Korean Peace,” Speech by South Korean Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo at the 18th Asia Security Summit in Singapore by the international Institute for Strategic Studies, Citing from Arms Control Today, July/August 2019. 4 Cho Sung-ryul, Report on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Comprehensive Security to Security Ex- change (Seoul: Baeksan Seodang, 2019). 4 Policy Brief No. 59 Toda Peace Institute extract more on the conventional military issue by negotiating a conventional arms control agenda with the South Korean counterpart. Second, reading President Moon’s strong will to set up a peace zone, which was agreed in the 2007 inter-Korean summit between Kim Jong-il and Roh Moo-hyun, Chairman Kim intended to take advantage of military talks in North Korea’s favour, resulting in setting up a no-fly zone along the DMZ (Demilitarised Zone on the ground) and the sea buffer zone in the West and East. Third, though the Kim Jong-il regime had made efforts to nullify the Armistice Agreement while refusing any military confidence building between the two Koreas under the banner of the military-first politics, the Kim Jong-un regime admitted the reality of the Armistice Agreement, acknowledging the need for confidence building talks with the South. Therefore, Seoul and Pyongyang could engage in military talks to take measures to reduce military tension and build confidence between the two Koreas. Pyongyang’s motivation on engaging in military talks with South Korea turned out to be an attempt to secure economic aid from the South for its economic development, including resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Kumkang Mountain Tourism Project.
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