Fertility Decline in Algeria 1980–2006 Public Disclosure Authorized A Case Study
THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433 The World Bank May 2010 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Fertility Decline in Algeria 1980–2006 A Case Study
May 2010
iii Contents
Acknowledgements v
List of Acronyms vi
Executive Summary vii
Algeria’s Fertility Transition in Context 1
Algeria’s Fertility Transition 3
National Family Planning Policies and Programs Emerged Slowly 5
Key Determinants of Fertility are Age at Marriage and Contraceptive Use 8 Increased Age at Marriage and Delayed Onset of Childbearing 8 Birth Interval and Tempo of Childbearing 9 Fertility Preferences 10 Contraception 11 Other Proximate Causes Have Less Influence on Fertility 13 Postpartum infecundibility 13 Abortion 14 Sterilization 14
Socioeconomic and Cultural Factors Affect Fertility 15 Female Education 15 Urbanization and Housing 16 Religion 17 Women’s Labor Force Participation 18 Education and Women’s Employment 19
Conclusions 21
References 23
ANNEX: Sources and Methodology 26
End Notes 27
iv Tables
Table 1. Proximate Determinants of Fertility in Algeria, 2001 8 Table 2. Demographic Surveys in Algeria 26
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Algeria ix Figure 2. Algeria’s Population Growth and Total Fertility Rate, Selected Years (1980–2005) 3 Figure 3. Algerian Total Fertility Rate, 1970–2002, by Residence 4 Figure 4. Birth Spacing Centers in Algeria, 1967–1988 6 Figure 5. Decomposition of Proximate Determinants of Fertility in Algeria, 1970–2002 8 Figure 6. Life Table Estimate of Women’s Median Age at Marriage and First Birth 9 Figure 7. Ideal Number of Children among Algerian Women, by Age, 1992 11 Figure 8. Ideal Number of Children among Algerian Women, by Number of Living Children, 1992 11 Figure 9. Contraceptive Prevalence Rate in Algeria, 1962–2006 12 Figure 10. Percent of Algerian Married Women Using Contraceptives, by Residence and Educational Level, 1966–1992 13 Figure 11. Percent of Married Algerian Women Using Contraceptives, by Method (1986 and 1992) 13 Figure 12. Female Primary School Enrollment in Algeria (percent gross) 15 Figure 13. Algeria Female Secondary School Enrollment 1962–2005 (percent gross) 16 Figure 14. Female Literacy Rate in Algeria, by Age Group (percent) 16 Figure 15. Average Number of People per Household in Algeria, Selected Years 17
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study v Acknowledgements
his report was prepared by Robbyn Lewis Amy Tsui (Johns Hopkins University, Bloom- (Johns Hopkins University, Bloom- berg School of Public Health), and Wasim Tberg School of Public Health) and Sadia Zaman (International Council on Manage- Chowdhury of the Health, Nutrition, and ment of Population Programmes). The World Population unit of the Human Development Bank advisory group comprised: Martha Ain- Network (HDNHE). sworth (IEGWB), Peter Berman (HDNHE), The authors are grateful to the World Eduard Bos (HDNHE), Rodolfo Bulatao Bank Library Research Services for assisting (HDNHE), Hugo Diaz Etchevere (HDNVP), with the literature search. Mukesh Chawla, Rama Lakshminarayanan (HDNHE), John Sector Manager (HDNHE), and Julian Sch- May (AFTHE), Elizabeth Lule (AFTQK), and weitzer, Sector Director (HDNHE), provided Thomas Merrick (WBIHS). overall guidance and support. Thanks to Vic- Bruce Ross-Larson, Communications De- toriano Arias (HDNHE) for providing ad- velopment Incorporated, edited the draft re- ministrative support. port and Samuel Mills (HDNHE) reviewed This case study was part of a larger World the final draft. The authors would like to Bank Economic and Sector Work entitled Ad- thank the government of the Netherlands, dressing the Neglected MDG: World Bank Re- which provided financial support through the view of Population and High Fertility with an World Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program external advisory group comprising: Stan Ber- (BNPP). nstein (United Nations Population Fund), John Bongaarts (Population Council), John Correspondence Details: Casterline (Ohio State University), Bar- bara Crane (IPAS), Adrienne Germain (In- ÆÆSadia Chowdhury (HDNHE), World ternational Women’s Health Coalition), Jean Bank, Mail Stop G7-701, 1818 H Street Pierre Guengant (L’Institut de recherché pour N.W., Washington, DC 20433, USA, Tel: le développement), Jose Guzman (United 202-458-1984, email: schowdhury3@ Nations Population Fund), Karen Hardee worldbank.org (Population Action International), Daniel ÆÆThis report is available on the following Kraushaar (Bill and Melinda Gates Founda- website: http://www.worldbank.org/ tion), Gilda Sedgh (Guttmacher Institute), hnppublications
vi List of Acronyms
AFTHE Health, Nutrition, and Population IEGWB Independent Evaluation Group, unit of the Africa region World Bank AFTQK Africa Operational Quality and IMF International Monetary Fund Knowledge Services IUD intrauterine contraceptive device FLN Front Liberation Nationale MENA Middle East and North Africa HDNHE Human Development Network, UNFPA United Nations Population Fund Health, Nutrition, and Population WBIHS World Bank Institute Health unit Systems HDNVP Office of the Senior Vice President and Head of Human Development Network
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study vii Executive Summary
ike other countries in the Middle East The average age at first marriage for Alge- and North Africa region, Algeria has un- rian women is now nearly 30; their preferred Ldergone a demographic transition. But form of contraception is oral contraceptives. Algeria’s fertility decline defies conventional ex- Increased age at marriage can be attributed to planation. Despite inauspicious starting con- greater female education. Women who receive ditions—a high total fertility rate, reluctant at least primary education delay childbearing policy environment, and delayed implementa- and consequently experience lower rates of tion of a national family planning program— lifetime fertility. Almost all Algerian women Algeria has surpassed some of its neighbors in enroll in primary school, more than 80 per- fertility reduction. cent completing it. And more than 86 percent Before its fertility transition, Algeria had of women enroll in secondary school. one of the highest crude birth rates in the Certain macro-economic forces can also world, nearly 50 per 1,000. The fertility tran- contribute to increased age at marriage, for ex- sition began in 1965–70, before any signifi- ample, increased female labor participation, cant government support for or investment high rates of unemployment among young in population control or family planning and adults, urbanization, and the related urban before significant external donor funding be- housing shortage. Young couples confronted came available. Since then, profound changes by unemployment may feel obliged to post- in the traditional family model have led to a pone marriage—and, consequently, child- 64 percent decline in the total fertility rate in bearing. Other practical considerations, such recent decades, from 6.76 in 1980 to 2.41 in as the lack of privacy associated when living 2006. in cramped quarters with parents and in-laws, The factors that have most contributed to might also induce young couples to volun- Algeria’s fertility decline are increased age at tarily postpone childbearing, or reduce family first marriage, increased contraceptive use, and size altogether. expanded female education. These factors ex- Although Algerian women’s demand for erted their strongest influence during different children remains strong, their ideal number phases of the fertility transition—a phased of children is decreasing. A shift from the phenomenon resulting from sociocultural and large family model to that of the smaller nu- economic changes in the country. Increased clear unit is probably partly in response to age at marriage was most influential early in strained living conditions created by unem- the fertility transition. Later, use of contracep- ployment and the housing shortage, as well tives contributed more to fertility decline. as more subtle sociocultural changes. Nation-
viii ally Algeria’s model is not yet at two children condition or quality of women’s lives. Despite per couple, as there remain variations between enormous advances in primary education and rural and urban norms and behavior. But literacy, the struggle against gender inequality the ideal number of children has decreased. is far from over. Younger Algerian women prefer around 3.5 Overall, Algeria’s fertility decline is best children, older women prefer 4 children. understood in terms of changes in behavior, Islam has not constituted an obstacle to especially the delay in age at first marriage, socio-demographic change in Algeria. But en- the increase in contraceptive use, and—to trenched cultural attitudes do present salient a certain degree—the negative effects of the obstacles to women’s development. Declining economic crisis manifested in the housing fertility does not imply improvement in the shortage and unemployment of young adults.
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study ix Figure 1 | Map of Algeria
Source: World Bank Map Design Unit.
1 Algeria’s Fertility Transition in Context
ocated in northern Africa along the Med- republic under the leadership of an elected iterranean, Algeria comprises two million president. Since the late 1980s struggles be- Lsquare kilometers of coastal plain, high tween the Algerian military and Islamist mili- mountains, and the Sahara desert—four-fifths tants have destabilized the country, a bloody of its area (figure 1). As only about 3 percent civil war in the 1990s killing more than of the land is arable, most of Algeria’s 33 mil- 150,000 people and destroying hundreds of lion inhabitants—predominantly Arab-Berber health facilities and schools. Political amnesty and Muslim—reside on its Mediterranean in 1999 helped reduce the violence, but un- coast. Algeria’s total fertility rate has decreased fortunately some unrest continues today. threefold in recent decades, from 6.76 in 1980 Algeria had one of the highest fertility to 2.41 in 2006. Because this rapid reduction rates in the world during most of the 20th cen- in fertility predates the emergence of strong tury. The rate of population growth accelerated national family planning policies or programs, rapidly during the first half of the twentieth Algeria is a remarkable case study. century, reaching 3 percent by Independence Algeria is a key global exporter of oil and in 1962. By 2007, the most recent year for natural gas, with a gross national income per which data are available, the rate of population capita of $3,620. Only 14 percent of the pop- growth had dropped dramatically to just 1.5 ulation works in the agricultural sector.1 Al- percent.4 Associated with this declining rate of geria’s first post-Independence governments population growth is an astonishing change in adhered to a rigid form of state socialism and total fertility. The total fertility rate increased prioritized rapid economic development over during most of the 20th century, reaching as other social goods. Though its economy ini- high as 9 among younger women.5 In 1980, tially grew rapidly, in the wake of the 1970s the total fertility rate was a relatively high at oil shocks and fall in oil revenues, Algeria was 6.76, but by 2006, it had fallen to just 2.41, a heavily indebted by the late 1980s.2 The gov- decline of 64 percent during that period.6 ernment’s focus on capital-intensive develop- Algeria has also made good progress in ment had unfortunately produced few jobs, as achieving two key Millennium Development those born during the 1960s discovered when Goals: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger they finally entered the job market.3 In 1994 (goal 1), and reducing child mortality (goal 4). the government undertook a program of struc- Although poverty data is scarce for Algeria, in tural adjustment to liberalize the economy. 1995 only 6.8 percent of the population was Since Independence from France in 1962, living below the target of $1 purchasing power Algeria has been a democratic parliamentary parity per day, 7 and in 1990–2006 the propor-
2 tion of underweight children under age five de- tinued rapid rate of population growth (2 per- creased by almost one-third—suggesting that cent), it has entered the fertility transition. Algeria is well on its way to achieving eradi- And although the transition came later to the cation of extreme poverty and hunger. Avail- MENA region, it has generally proceeded at a able data on infant and under-five mortality or faster pace.9 On average, women in this region Algeria are also sparse, but the trend suggests now have 3.4 children, compared with 2.0 in that Algeria has achieved this goal well in ad- East Asia and 2.5 in Latin America.10 Mea- vance of the 2015 target. The infant mortality sures of nuptiality and fertility all suggest that rate declined 64 percent from 1980 to 2006, significant changes in the traditionally domi- from 94 per 1,000 to 33 per 1,000 live births. nant family model are under way throughout The under-5 mortality rate decreased 71%, the MENA region, shifting from a large family mostly during the 15 years preceding 1995. model to that of the smaller nuclear unit, pos- And Algeria has achieved nearly universal rates sibly in response to constrained living situa- of measles immunization for one-year-olds, 91 tions affected by employment, housing, and percent in 2006.8 The downward trend in in- cost of living, but also reflecting urbanization fant and child mortality may have influenced and cultural change. Ideal family size has been desired family size during this period. decreasing for almost two decades among mar- Because it defies conventional explana- ried women aged 15–49, and the proportion tions for demographic change, Algeria’s recent of married women aged 30–34 who report fertility decline deserves close examination. Al- not wanting any more children is increasing.11 geria adopted a population policy two decades Nevertheless, the demand for children remains later than its neighbors in the Maghreb. It was high.12 saddled with a remarkably high total fertility Demographic transition in the MENA rate, a reluctant policy environment, and an region—including Algeria’s neighbors in the unstable civil and political environment. Yet Maghreb, Tunisia and Morocco—indicates despite these constraints, Algeria has caught that the conventional logic linking Arab and up with—and even exceeded—other coun- Islamist culture to resistance to fertility change tries’ fertility transition benchmarks, achieving deserves reconsideration.13 Islam does not nec- a more than 60 percent decline in total fer- essarily constitute an obstacle to demographic tility rate in about 20 years. or social change, as demonstrated by data that Algeria’s declining fertility to some ex- the MENA region experienced fertility de- tent echoes demographic changes in the en- clines comparable in scale—if not tempo—to tire Middle East and North Africa (MENA) other regions. Nor are high fertility and early region. Despite the MENA region’s con- marriage inherent to Islamist culture.14
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 3 Algeria’s Fertility Transition
uring the first half of the twentieth cen- completed fertility between urban and rural tury, Algeria’s population growth rate women.18 Dsoared. The crude birth rate rose from Around 1970, the birth rate reached a re- 35 per 1,000 in 1911–15 to nearly 50 by cord high of 50 per 1000.19 After reaching 1969.15 Algeria’s total fertility rate reached its peak, the rate of population growth began 7.8 in 1955–60. For young married women to fall, dropping significantly during 1980– between the ages of 17 and 19, total fertility 2000 and leveling off afterward (figure 2). The in 1965 was 9—one of the highest rates in turning point occurred between the first na- the world. This soaring rate of population tional fertility survey in 1970 and the 1987 growth was made possible by a large number census. Birth and mortality rates both fell, age of women of reproductive age, decreasing age at first marriage rose, the total fertility rate de- at marriage (especially after World War II), clined, and contraceptive prevalence substan- very high marital fertility,16 and decreased tially increased. duration of breastfeeding.17 During this pre- Throughout the 1970–2002 decline in transition period, there was little difference in total fertility rate, urban fertility was distinctly
Figure 2 Algeria’s Population Growth and Total Fertility Rate, Selected Years | (1980–2005)
8 7 6 5 4
Rate 3 2 1 0 1980 1990 2000 2005 Year Rate of population growth(percent per year) Total fertility
Source: World Bank 2007.
4 lower than rural fertility, particularly during the in urban fertility was nearly uniform across all 1970s–90s. By the late 1990s the urban-rural age groups (except ages 45–49),20 but rural fer- divide began to converge (figure 3). The decline tility dropped only for women up to age 25.
Figure 3 | Algerian Total Fertility Rate, 1970–2002, by Residence
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 Total Fertility Rate Total 2 1 0 1970 1986 1992 1998 2002 Year Urban Rural
Source: Tabutin 2005.
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 5 National Family Planning Policies and Programs Emerged Slowly
y the time Algeria’s bloody war for in- post-independence years, policymakers in favor dependence (1954–1962) ended, the of family planning had to move slowly. Bcountry had one of the highest fertility Despite the recalcitrance of politicians, rates in the world.21 Algeria’s independent Algerian women wanted access to family plan- government launched a campaign to provide ning and demand for family planning was broad access to health care and education22 but growing. By the mid-1960’s, when the FLN did not view rapid population growth as a se- came to power, women’s groups were already rious concern. As a consequence of this policy demanding family planning services as a right. focus, infant mortality declined substantially, Not long after, the ministries of public health the proportion of children in school increased, and national education opened the first birth while the population growth rate soared. spacing center at the Centre Hospitalo-Uni- During the early years after independence, vérsitaire in 1967.26 Further, a fatwa (religious political consensus was weak and anti-colonial edict) was issued in support of the volun- feeling strong; in such an environment, there is tary use of contraception.27 While politicians reluctance to embrace Western notions about dithered about the sinister nature of “popu- links between economic development and pop- lation control,” more birth spacing centers, ulation growth.23 The Front Liberation Natio- providing access to modern contraception, nale (FLN) came to power in 1965 without a appeared. Because of the dearth of physi- strong constituency, and so its ability to build cians, midwives were trained and authorized political consensus was impaired. Skeptical to provide contraception. Although no pri- about the link between economic development vate family planning association existed in and population reduction, Algeria’s leaders de- Algeria at that time, the World Health Orga- clared that family planning was a false solution nization provided some assistance in maternal imposed by the West and that the issue for Al- and child health initiatives, including training geria was not population growth but economic and services for the early birth spacing efforts. development.24 President Boumedienne, un- Within about ten years, almost 2,000 birthing convinced about the potential value of limiting centers existed (figure 4).28 population growth, called family planning a During the 1970s Algeria’s government “false solution”, adding further that “the best continued to prioritize economic growth, pro- pill is development.”25 Without a clear polit- moting productivity and development as the ical majority to push forward any agenda in the most effective way to raise living standards,
6 and thereby indirectly reduce fertility.29 The volve midwives and paramedical workers in government’s official population policy was the program. to establish a balance between population size The impact of economic factors in popu- and available resources, but “population con- lation policy making cannot be ignored. As an trol” was not a national priority. oil producer and member of the Organization However, the government did see the of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Algeria en- value in demographic analysis, and under- joyed dramatic increase in oil revenues during took efforts to collect more robust data: the the 1970’s , which encouraged policy makers planning and statistics sections of the govern- to believe that sufficient resources existed to ment began to conduct demographic surveys meet all of society’s requirements, without re- to better estimate fertility, mortality, and mi- sorting to forced population control. Algeria gration patterns. The goal of these efforts was declined to mimic its neighbors embrace of to evaluate information on national problems national family planning programs; despite its while closely watching the efforts of other greater oil wealth during this era, Algeria com- countries—especially Maghreb neighbors—to mitted less public funding to family planning introduce family planning, allowing some lim- than Tunisia.30 ited family planning activities to reach a few By 1980, the national birth spacing pro- hundred women annually, and relying on eco- gram had established 260 Maternal & Child nomic development. Clinics, also known as Postes Maternelle In 1974, seven years after the introduc- et Infantile, offering birth spacing services tion of the first birth spacing clinic in Al- throughout the country.31 Integration of these giers, the government officially launched a services normalized the idea of family plan- formal national program for birth spacing. ning and instituted a linked program of in- Funded by the United Nations Population service or “on-the-job” capacity building. Fund (UNFPA), the program sought to com- Training strategies evolved over time, be- pletely integrate birth spacing into maternal coming shorter, more decentralized, and more and child health promotion efforts and in- efficient. From 1974 to 1980, 421 health pro-
Figure 4 | Birth Spacing Centers in Algeria, 1967–1988
2,500 1,955 2,000 1,87
1,500 1,40
1,000 74 500 Number of centers 26 1 0 1967 1980 1984 1986 1987 1988
Source: Ladjali 1984; Tahar 1999.
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 7 viders—including physicians and midwives— their own national family planning policies. were trained in family planning.32 During the The Algerian program’s strategy was to inte- 20 years between 1962 to 1982, contraceptive grate family planning services into the public prevalence rose from an estimated 2–3 percent health units and train midwives to provide to 50 percent—while the total fertility rate contraceptive services. But many women still plummeted by nearly half, from 7 to 3.9. accessed contraceptives through the private But policy-makers’ attitudes regarding sector. The following year, Algerian policy- family planning were changing. One sign makers voiced their acceptance that “the de- of this shift occurred in 1980, when the mographic problem constitutes the principle ministry of planning presciently issued a cause of underdevelopment.”34 This shift led statement in the general report for its first to a new objective: to reduce the rate of popu- five-year plan, affirming that “action to re- lation growth from 3 percent to 2 percent by duce the birth rate has become indispensable 2000. The national family planning program to ameliorate economic growth and may well began to expand after donor agencies became answer many of the social needs of the Alge- involved in the late 1980s. Algeria established rian people.”33 a program of cooperation with the UNFPA Ultimately, industrial development failed and also began to receive substantial U.S. to keep pace with the needs and demands of family planning aid in 1989.35 a rapidly growing population, and eventually While a supportive policy environment forced the government to embrace an explicit and national family planning service system population reduction strategy. Algeria’s offi- did increase women’s access to contraception, cial policy on family planning evolved over the these phenomena alone are insufficient to ex- years as it became clear that an exclusive focus plain Algeria’s extraordinary fertility decline, on economic development could not solve the especially during the earliest phase of the de- country’s problems. mographic transition, before 1980. The es- Algeria’s official national family plan- tablishment of 260 centers between 1967 and ning program, Programme National de Maî- 1980 did increase access to modern contracep- trise de la Croissance Démographique, was tives for some women, but not all. There were launched in 1983 with a continued focus over 4,000,000 Algerian women of reproduc- on birth spacing rather than population re- tive age (15–49). There were far too few clinics duction. This program began almost twenty to serve all of them. Therefore, other determi- years after Tunisia and Morocco had adopted nants of fertility decline must be examined.
8 Key Determinants of Fertility are Age at Marriage and Contraceptive Use
he key proximate determinants of fer- Age at first marriage continued to increase tility include age at marriage, postpartum between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s Tinfecundibility and contraceptive use. (figure 5). By 2002 contraception had become Each of these factors contributed to Algeria’s the most important determinant, contributing overall fertility to different degrees at different to about 39% of the fertility reduction.37 By times. Delay in marriage and the increased use 2001 contraceptive prevalence was about 51 of contraceptives are the principle motors now percent among married women, about 40 per- driving down fertility in Algeria.36 cent of whom preferred oral contraceptives.38 Algeria’s pretransition, “natural” fertility Strikingly, 50 percent of married women de- rate reflected traditional norms and behaviors, sired no more children (table 1).39 including early age at marriage and low preva- lence of contraceptive use. When norms and Increased Age at Marriage and behaviors changed, so did the fertility rate. Delayed Onset of Childbearing Marriage and childbearing are viewed as inter- related social and demographic events in Al- Figure 5 Decomposition of Proximate geria, and illegitimate births are traditionally Determinants of Fertility in | Algeria, 1970–2002 Table 1 Proximate Determinants of 100% | Fertility in Algeria, 2001 90% Variable 80% 70% Median duration of breastfeeding (months) 11.2 60% Median duration postpartum amenorrhea NA 50% Median duration postpartum abstinence NA 40% Contraceptive prevalence 50.7% 30% Ever use of contraceptive methods 74.9% 20% Percent of married women using oral 38.7% 10% contraceptives 0% Percent of married women using IUD 2.4% 1970 1992 2002 Mean number of children desired 4.2 Breastfeeding Contraception Marriage Married women wanting no more children 50.1% Source: Ouadah-Bedidi and Lebugle 2007. Source: Eltigani 2001.
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 9 uncommon; hence, age at first marriage has a shortages.45 Uneducated and underemployed profound impact on fertility.40 Changes in mar- women are bearing the burden of Algeria’s ital patterns may account for long-term fertility nuptiality transition.46 Among never-married changes in Algeria,41 rather than changes in de- women ages 15–49, 62.4 percent have pri- liberate birth-limiting strategies alone. mary education or less.47 Of those, only 6.6 The turning point in marriage patterns percent have paid employment. This pattern began after Independence. In 1966 over half underscores the ambiguous nature of the fer- of all women were married by age 19, and tility transition for women’s progress—and 87 percent by age 24. Twenty years later presents a greater social challenge. those proportions were reversed: 90 per- The increasing age at first marriage is cent of women up to age 19 were unmarried, closely associated with a rise in the age at and about half of women up to age 24.42 By onset of childbearing. This suggests that the 2002, the average age at first marriage in Al- delay in childbearing, associated with delay in geria was 29—a spectacular leap forward, ex- marriage, plays an important role in reducing ceeding even the United States.43 The median the fertility level in Algeria. age at first marriage rose across cohorts. For example, women aged 25–29 marry and have Birth Interval and Tempo of their first child approximately three years Childbearing later than their older sisters, aged 30–34, did As discussed above, the reduction in the total (figure 6).44 fertility rate is mainly the result of increased Reasons for the delayed age at mar- age at marriage and the use of contraceptives riage may include increases in the duration of among married women to limit and/or space women’s education, economic pressures that childbearing. While useful, when taken alone prevent saving enough money to marry—re- the total fertility measure tells only part of lated to male unemployment—and housing the story; it does not distinguish between the
Figure 6 | Life Table Estimate of Women’s Median Age at Marriage and First Birth
30 25 20 15 10 Age in years 5 0 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 Age cohort (years) Women’s median age at mariage Women’s median age at first birth
Source: Eltigani 2001.
10 impact of childbearing onset, birth spacing, within 60 months, following the second birth or birth limitation. During the 1990’s, when does not decrease until parity 5. The degree to total fertility rate was around 4.4, a large pro- which these higher-order births are limited is portion of ever-married Algerian women were an important factor in the overall fertility rate. still having high numbers of births, and their The fast tempo of childbearing in Al- tempo of childbearing was somewhat fast.48 In geria is an interesting finding, especially given 2001, to gain a more complete understanding the reported high rate of contraceptive prev- of fertility patterns, an analysis of birth order, alence. One possible explanation for this using life tables, was conducted. The results phenomenon is that the length of the birth of the analysis provide some illumination into interval is influenced by postpartum amen- the overall picture of the fertility transition orrhea (directly related to both duration and during the early 1990’s period of Algeria’s fer- intensity of breastfeeding) and postpartum tility transition. sexual abstinence. It is also possible that the The increase in age at first marriage data on contraceptive prevalence might be is closely associated with a rise in the age exaggerated, or the efficiency of method use of onset of childbearing. Women in the might be poor overall. The results of this younger age cohort are marrying later, and analysis of childbearing patterns strengthens are consequently older at the time of first the argument in support of delay in child- childbirth than women in previous cohorts.49 bearing on fertility reduction in Algeria. The Once married, the average Algerian woman study’s author suggested that since the rise gives birth within the first five years of mar- in age at marriage could not increase indefi- riage, and has children in relatively quick nitely, that unless other forces came to bear, succession. At the time of the study, the me- Algeria could face upward pressure on its fer- dian length of the interval between mar- tility rate. In reality, Algeria’s fertility rate riage and first birth, was about 14 months. continued to decline throughout the years Younger women, who are likely to be more following this study. A key force driving fecund and to breastfeed for shorter dura- this downward pressure was, in fact, the in- tions, are at higher risk of having a short creasing use of contraceptives among married birth interval.50 Older women are more likely women. to have longer birth intervals, possibly be- cause of decreasing fecundity or longer dura- Fertility Preferences tion of breastfeeding. Evidence indicates that during the 1990s However, the tempo, or median length of many Algerian women wanted to stop child- the birth interval by parity, is also important bearing—possibly signaling a large unmet in overall fertility. The interval between the need for contraception.51 The percentage of second and subsequent births has increased. currently married Algerian women wanting no In other words, as the number of children in- more children was 53 percent in 199252 and creases, so does the birth interval, with a me- 50.1 percent in 2001.53 dian length ranging from 27 to 50 months. A 1992 survey revealed that younger Al- The probability of bearing another child gerian women prefer a smaller family size than
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 11 Figure 7 | Ideal Number of Children among Algerian Women, by Age, 1992
5.0 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.4 4.0 4.1 3.5 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5
Number of children 1.0 0.5 0 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 Age (years)
Source: Pan Arab Project for Child Development Survey 1992.
their mothers did. Women aged 15–19 de- sire a smaller family size than those having sired only 3.5 children; older women (45–49) more living children (figure 8).55 Conclusions felt that 4.7 children represented the ideal about current trends in desired family size will family size (figure 7).54 The most recent esti- be more robust once more recent data become mate, dated 2001, gives the mean number of available. desired children as 4.2; more recent data on this trend was not available at the time of this Contraception writing. Paradoxically, this ideal family size There is no question that increased contra- was higher than the current total fertility rate, ceptive prevalence has contributed to fertility which is nearly at replacement level. And Al- decline in Algeria. Survey data from 1986, gerian women with fewer living children de- 1992, and 2007 all show increasing use of
Figure 8 Ideal Number of Children among Algerian Women, by Number of Living | Children, 1992
6 5 4.8 4 4.2 3 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 2 1 Number of children 0 0 1 2 3 4 5+ Number of living children
Source: Pan Arab Project for Child Development Survey 1992.
12 Figure 9 | Contraceptive Prevalence Rate in Algeria, 1962–2006
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1962 1968 1984 1986 1987 1992 1995 2000 2002 2005
Source: Tahar 1999; World Bank 2007.
contraception among married women aged and 30 percent of rural men were aware. And 15–49.56 If the delay in age at marriage is a the desire for family planning increased with key determinant of reduced fertility, it alone higher levels of education.62 More recent data would not have sufficed without the coin- also indicate that a greater percentage of urban cident increase in contraceptive prevalence women use contraceptives than rural women among married women.57 (figure 10). Women with secondary or greater The contraceptive prevalence rate in the level of education are also more likely to use era before widespread family planning was contraceptives,63 but the data suggest that the negligible—just 2 percent in 1962.58 After gap between no education and primary educa- jumping significantly during the late 1960s tion is greater than the gap between primary ed- and 1970s, it reached over 30 percent by ucation and secondary education.64 198459 and remained constant until 1988. Among Algerian women using modern From 1992 on, the contraceptive prevalence contraceptive methods, the majority chose rate began to climb upward again, reaching oral contraceptives (figure 11). The intra- 61.4 percent by 2006 (figure 9).60 The unmet uterine contraceptive device (IUD) is the need for contraception was estimated at 25 second most common method, though con- percent in 2008.61 siderably less popular.65 The level of contraceptive use varies by The 1992 survey also revealed several urban-rural residence and by educational level. common reasons why married women did not An early survey of reproductive health knowl- use contraception. Among women aged 15– edge, attitudes and behaviors conducted by the 29, the most commonly reported reasons were Algerian health services demographic research the “husband disapproves” (19 percent of re- unit in 1966—one year before the first birth spondents), followed by the desire for another spacing center opened—revealed that 44.5 per- child. Among women aged 30–49, the most cent of urban women and 65 percent of urban common reason was “menopause/infertile” men were aware of at least one method of con- (26 percent of respondents), followed by con- traception, but only 15 percent of rural women cern about side effects.66
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 13 Figure 10 Percent of Algerian Married Women Using Contraceptives, by | Residence and Educational Level, 1966–1992
60 50 40 30
Percent 20 10 0 Urban Rural No education Primary Secondary+ Residence and educational
Source: Population Council 1994.
Other Proximate Causes Have 40 days—likely somewhat shorter among edu- Less Influence on Fertility cated and younger couples, and among urban dwellers.67 The sharp decline in breastfeeding Postpartum infecundibility among young women, an important proxi- Reduced postpartum fecundability is caused mate determinant of “natural” fertility, was by breastfeeding and postpartum sexual absti- a key factor in Algeria’s high fertility before nence. Post-partum abstinence is traditionally the transition. Breastfeeding continues to be brief in the MENA region, averaging around widely practiced in Algeria, usually for around
Figure 11 Percent of Married Algerian Women Using Contraceptives, by Method | (1986 and 1992)
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 Percent women Percent 10 5 0 Any method Oral IUD Female Other modern contraceptives sterilization mthods Method
1986 ENAF survey 1992 PAPCHILD survey
Source: Enquète Nationale sure la Fécondité data 1986; Pan Arab Project for Child Development survey data 1992.
14 13–15 months,68 without any major changes not translated into law. Although religious since the pretransition decline. support for abortion is important, the ratio- nale behind such arguments does not include Abortion women’s rights. Though it can influence fertility rates, abor- Another potential motive for abor- tion is a taboo subject in the MENA region. tion in Algeria stems from the persistence Unsafe abortions are thought to contribute of marriage between blood relatives for so- to 6 percent of maternal deaths in the re- cial reasons.77 More than 20 percent of Al- gion,69 but access to safe abortion services is gerian marriages are consanguineous,78 a increasing as public attitudes begin to change rate that has decreased slightly since 1970 despite legal barriers.70 Algeria allows abortion but remains relatively stable. Given the fre- in the event that pregnancy will cause risk to quency of consanguineous marriage in Al- the physical and mental health of a woman— geria, recessive hemoglobin disorders—such the mental health indication was added during as thalassemia—are not uncommon. Ge- a reform effort in 1985.71 netic counseling and antenatal testing have Through data on abortion in Algeria is increased,79 and more couples who face de- very limited, a recent estimate suggests that cisions about whether to carry a fetus with a during 1995–2000 about 14,373 abortions lethal genetic condition to term may consider were performed in Algeria each year72—sug- abortion. gesting that about 8 percent of pregnancies in Despite relaxation of some social mores Algeria during that period ended in abortion.73 in some settings, illegitimate birth remains Although this rate of abortion is lower than the a taboo. In a documented link between un- region overall, it does suggest an unmet need wanted pregnancy, lack of access to abortion, for contraception—estimated at 25 percent.74 and suicide among young women, 30 percent In April 1998, Algeria’s Islamic supreme of attempted suicides in an Algerian psychiatric Council was said to have issued a fatwa that ward followed unwanted pregnancies.80 This shocked many in the Arab and Muslim world. finding lends further support to the problem The Council stated that abortions would be of unmet need for contraception. Women’s allowed for women raped during attacks by groups in Algeria have formed to advocate for Islamic extremists, who used sexual assault expanded reproductive rights.81 as a weapon of war.75 This edict was seen as a victory for women’s groups and organiza- Sterilization tions working for human rights. Despite some Rates remain very low in Algeria—and are controversy over whether the Council had ac- therefore not a significant cause of declining tually issued the fatwa, eventually it was con- fertility. Only 1.1 percent of Algerian women firmed, with the Algerian government stating had undergone permanent sterilization in at the United Nations that abortion was al- 1992, most having already reached four or five lowed in cases of rape.76 But the edict was births before the procedure.82
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 15 Socioeconomic and Cultural Factors Affect Fertility
lgeria’s fertility transition has also been ductive behavior considerably; secondary or strongly influenced by socioeconomic higher education further enhances this effect.84 Aand cultural change. Increased female Education in Algeria is free and compul- education, insufficient housing, and unem- sory up to age 16. Obligatory coeducational ployment have delayed marriage or child- school enrollment was mandated in 1965. By bearing and reduced desired family size. 1970, girl’s primary school enrollment reached 43% of the total primary school population.85 Female Education By 2002 girl’s primary school enrollment had The relationship between Algeria’s declining reached 100% (figure 12).86 Just as important, total fertility rate and Algerian women’s high girls’ school completion rates also increased. rates of primary and secondary school comple- Girl’s primary school completion rates in 1989 tion is strong.83 The education of women has were 73% and increased thereafter, reaching played a key role in reproductive behavior to a high of over 95% in 2005 and subsiding to the degree that it modifies other intermediate 84% in 2006.87 fertility variables, such as age at marriage and Reflecting the increasing rate of primary desired family size. Receiving a primary edu- school enrollment, female literacy also in- cation is sufficient in itself to modify repro- creased between 1987 and 2002, with younger
Figure 12 | Female Primary School Enrollment in Algeria (percent gross)
120
100
80
60
40
20
0 1962 1970 1980 1991 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Source: des Forts 1998; World Bank 2007/MDG.
16 Figure 13 Female Literacy Rate in (1,277) of Algeria’s 5,823 lycée students were Algeria, by Age Group female (Des Forts 1998). By 1985 the per- | (percent) centage of females had increased by a factor of
100 nearly forty while the total number of lycéens 88 90 had increased by a factor of twenty. By 2005 80 the gross rate of female secondary school en- 70 rollment had reached over 86%, a remarkable 60 achievement in the space of little more than a 50 generation.89 40 30 Literacy Rate (percent) Literacy Urbanization and Housing 20 10 Despite its expansive geographic size, Algeria’s 0 population is quite dense, and most inhabitants 1987 2002 dwell in the urbanized, coastal areas. The rate Literacy rate, Literacy rate, of urbanization in Algeria appears to be acceler- adult female youth female (% of females ages (% of females ating faster than the rate of population growth, 15 and above) ages 15–24) which was about 1.5% annually in 200790 but 91 Source: World Bank 2007. increased to 2.5% in 2009. In 1980, over 8 million Algerians lived in urban areas; by 2007, that number had more than tripled to 21 mil- women achieving greater rates of literacy than lion92—about 64.5 percent of the population.93 older women (figure 13). The Mediterranean coast is the most urbanized Female enrollment in secondary school has region, though it constitutes only 12 percent of also increased (figure 14). In 1962 one-fifth the country’s total land mass.
Figure 14 | Algeria Female Secondary School Enrollment 1962–2005 (percent gross)
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1962 1985 1988 1991 2002 2003 2004 2005
Source: Des Forts 1998; World Bank 2007.
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 17 Urbanization is associated with crowded This housing crisis has affected fertility in housing conditions, and Algeria’s average two ways. First, it discourages young couples household size has grown from an average from marrying until they are almost 30 years of 6.7 people in 1977 to 7.0 in 1995 (figure old, thereby reducing fertility. For example, in 15).94 And a more recent estimate indicates 1992 married women living with their spouse that Algeria has only 4 million housing units in an independent dwelling had postponed for 33 million inhabitants—a ratio of 8.25 marriage at least 2–3 years longer than women residents per household.95 The shortage of who shared a dwelling with their in-laws.98 housing appears to be greater for adults. The Second, it puts pressure on these couples to average number of children under age 15 have fewer children, especially if they are still per household was 2.8 in 1995, the average trapped within the already crowded confines number of adults 4.2,96 with an average of of their parents’ or in-law’s homes.99 3.2 people sharing a bedroom and 2.7 people occupying each room. These statistics suggest Religion the extreme difficulty that young adults face The argument that religious precepts or Is- when attempting to establish their own au- lamist policies held back fertility reduction in tonomous households, leading to an increase Algeria is not supported by available data. In in multiple generations of families sharing fact, Algeria’s fertility decline and the increase the same dwelling. The growing number of in women’s age at marriage actually increased unmarried women—and men—also may be during the 1990s, the height of the country’s contributing to crowding, as women con- Islamist movement.100 tinue living with their families of origin Algerian religious leaders have partici- rather than relocating to a new home with a pated in development of family planning pol- spouse.97 icies since the early post-Independence era. In 1968, the ministry of public health solic- ited guidance from the Conseil Supérieur Is- Figure 15 Average Number of People lamique on the question of birth spacing. The per Household in Algeria, Council’s fatwa was liberal in its support for | Selected Years birth spacing as a reasonable choice to pro- 7.2 tect the interests of mothers and children and 7.1 in its awareness of the risk women might take 7.0 in acting to control the timing of childbirth. 6.9 Declaring birth spacing to be practiced at the 6.8 discretion of those concerned, the fatwa re- 6.7 quested that any government action on birth Number of people 6.6 spacing focus on raising healthy babies rather 6.5 than limiting births.101 In 1982, a second 1995 1977 1987 fatwa was issued in support of further gov- Year ernment action to provide birth spacing.102 Source: Courbage 1996. These edicts contradict the commonly held
18 stereotype that Islamic precepts are incom- geria even used its windfall from oil profits to patible with or hostile to family planning, champion equality for developing nations. particularly when framed in the context of Algeria’s economy has been in a state of safeguarding the health of mother and child. emergency since the last 1980’s.106 At that More recent analyses have also affirmed that time, oil revenues began to decline, while the Islamic law does not prohibit the use of con- country simultaneously took on high levels traception.103 of indebtedness to international creditors. Fi- nally, in 1994 the International Monetary Women’s Labor Force Participation Fund (IMF) worked with Algerian leaders to Women who work in the formal labor market initiate a structural adjustment program. One have, on average, fewer children. What re- concern was that structural adjustment poli- lationship, if any, exists between these two cies might have adverse effects on positive so- phenomena? To the degree individual choice cial outcomes such as fertility decline, which exists, decisions regarding marriage, child- would undermine an important social objec- bearing and formal work are mutually tive of development. A second concern was interdependent, and tend to be made contem- that the fertility decline could slow down be- poraneously, in Algeria no less than elsewhere. cause of economic problems that were unre- Moreover, these decisions are made within an lated to structural adjustment.107 However, economic context—with very real opportuni- this appears not to have been the case, as fer- ties and constraints—that affects individual tility levels continued to decline during this outcomes. Therefore, any discussion of the period. impact of women’s labor on fertility is incom- Despite this intervention of the IMF, Al- plete without consideration of the country’s geria suffered a decade-long economic decline, larger political economy. and was plunged into an era of political and From Independence through the 1970’s, social instability, with violent confrontations the Algerian state promoted industrializa- between the military regime and Islamists. As tion as a way to expand wealth while also a result, by the mid-2000’s, Algeria had fallen strengthening the social status quo. Popula- in esteem, due to its high rates of unemploy- tion growth reached its peak in the 1970’s—at ment and low rates of economic productivity. a time when three-quarters of the population Algeria’s economy remains dependent on was under the age of 30. At that time, Algeria the oil industry with over 60 percent of State was held up as an example for the entire Arab revenues from oil taxes108.When Algeria had a world, thanks to its development model. It centrally planned economy, the public sector boasted powerful heavy industry and generous provided most jobs. Since the 1980’s, the social benefits; universal schooling and free country has moved away from this model and health care and medicines; an advanced code towards a new approach of economic and so- of workers’ rights; subsidized consumer prices; cial reforms to promote private sector devel- and improving urban infrastructure.104 In opment and economic growth. While public 1984, the New Family Code gave women the sector is still the main source of new job cre- legal right to work outside the home.105 Al- ation, its share of the job market is shrinking.
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 19 In 2000, 23 percent of total employment was the rate had increased to 70 percent, as noted in the public sector, compared to only 18 per- above. cent, five years later.109 Nevertheless, high rates of unemploy- Algeria is the Arab country—with the ment persist. Macroeconomic shocks, such exception of Iraq and Palestine—with the as low labor productivity, also contributed to highest rates of unemployment, affecting 30 unemployment rates. Persistently low pro- percent of the labor force (3 million people). ductivity threatens the country’s ability to The vast majority of the unemployed are overcome unemployment; unless this changes, under 30 years of age, which is the average age the collateral impacts of unemployment on at which couples marry. Seventy percent of Al- key determinants of fertility (delayed age at gerians are under 30 years of age; this group marriage, contraceptive prevalence) might represents a demographic force that will con- continue to affect the life choices of young tinue to put pressure on the Algerian economy couples and married women. and society for decades to come. In addition, while the proportion of Education and Women’s women in the population has remained con- Employment stant, their share of the labor force rose by In economies, which offer opportunities for almost 50 percent, and the female participa- women’s formal employment, families can tion rate increased by 70 percent, though this make different decisions about allocation of figure is still lower than that of men. Further, resources. When families know that girls will job prospects for women have also improved, be able to earn their own income, they tend owing to explicit government policies to fa- to invest more in their education and their cilitate their participation.110 Despite the in- health.116 Higher family expectations con- crease in women’s formal employment, gender tribute to increases in female school enroll- equality in the Algerian labor force remains ment and literacy. The pursuit of formal work elusive, possibly because of the influence of is also driven by women’s personal aspirations. the country’s oil economy,111 as oil production Women who earn income may enjoy a greater tends to reduce the number of women in the degree of personal autonomy, and so might labor force. feel incentivized to postpone childbearing, Forty years ago, it was rare to find Al- a choice whose consequences include lower gerian women working outside the home.112 parity during their lifetime. Until the 1960s, the majority of women who During the early years of Algeria’s indus- worked were employed in agriculture,113 but trialization, women possessing higher levels of this rate began to decline as the economy education were more likely to participate in the modernized. Women’s participation in the formal labor market, even while they remained paid labor market increased, albeit slowly, as a minority in the overall Algerian workplace.117 industrialization proceeded. In 1977 only 2.61 In Algeria today, highly educated women percent of Algerian women participated in the are actually more likely to be unemployed paid labor force114. In the late 1990’s the rate than highly educated men.118 The likelihood was still low—only 8 percent.115 But by 2008, of being unemployed actually increases with
20 education. In 2005, secondary school and uni- helps to further postpone their entry into mar- versity graduates had the highest rates of un- riage and childbearing; these women may be employment. This phenomenon might be eager, once their educations are complete, to due to skills mismatch, and/or to the fact that begin families and remain at home to raise young people, by definition, are more likely them. This scenario is not uncommon in than their elders to be unemployed. Another the Western context, and may also apply to explanation is that highly educated women are the Algerian one, though further research is likely to spend more years in school, which needed to clarify this.
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 21 Conclusions
ike other countries in the MENA region, now nearly 30; their preferred form of contra- Algeria has undergone a demographic ception is oral contraceptives. Ltransition, but Algeria’s fertility decline Increased age at marriage can be attrib- defies conventional explanations. Despite in- uted to greater female education. Women who auspicious starting conditions—a high total receive at least primary education delay child- fertility rate, reluctant policy environment, and bearing and consequently experience lower delayed implementation of a national family rates of lifetime fertility. Almost all Algerian planning program—Algeria has surpassed women enroll in primary school, more than some of its neighbors in fertility reduction. 80 percent completing it. And more than 86 During its pretransition phase, Algeria percent of women enroll in secondary school. had one of the highest crude birth rates in the Increased age at marriage is also influ- world, nearly 50 per 1,000. The fertility tran- enced by macro-level economic changes, such sition began in 1965–70, before any signifi- as unemployment, urbanization and the re- cant government support for or investment in lated housing shortage. Couples who are un- population control or family planning and be- able to establish their own households because fore significant external donor funding became of the housing shortage delay marriage and available. Since then, profound changes in the therefore childbearing. And with so many traditional family model have led to 64 percent living in cramped quarters with parents and decline in the total fertility rate in recent de- in-laws, couples are inclined to voluntarily re- cades, from 6.76 in 1980 to 2.41 in 2006. duce family size as well. The factors that most contributed to Al- Although Algerian women’s demand for geria’s fertility decline were increased age at children remains strong, their ideal number first marriage, increased contraceptive use, and of children is decreasing. A shift from the expanded female education. These factors ex- large family model to that of the smaller nu- erted their strongest influence during different clear unit is probably partly in response to phases of the fertility transition—a phased strained living conditions created by unem- phenomenon resulting from sociocultural and ployment and the housing shortage, as well economic changes in the country. as more subtle sociocultural changes. Na- Increased age at marriage was most influ- tionally Algeria’s model is not yet at two ential early in the fertility transition. Later, use children per couple, as there remains varia- of contraceptives among married women con- tion between rural and urban norms and be- tributed more to fertility decline. The average havior. But the ideal number of children has age at first marriage for Algerian women is decreased. Younger Algerian women prefer
22 around 3.5 children, older women prefer 4 and literacy, the struggle against illiteracy and children. gender inequality is far from over. Islam has not constituted an obstacle to Overall, Algeria’s fertility decline is best sociodemographic change in Algeria. But en- understood in terms of changes in behavior, trenched cultural attitudes present other ob- especially the delay in age at first marriage, stacles to women’s development. Declining the increase in contraceptive use, and—to fertility does not imply improvement in the a certain degree—the negative effects of the conditions or quality of women’s lives. De- economic crisis manifested in the housing spite enormous advances in primary education shortage and unemployment.
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 23 References
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26 ANNEX: Sources and Methodology
his paper draws on a review of secondary lation, Resultats de l’Enquete Fecondite, was data sources, including analyses of pub- conducted in 1970. Sources also draw on Tlished statistical surveys (table 2). The data from a second survey, Enquete Natio- three official national censuses after Indepen- nale Algerienne sur la Fecondite, conducted dence were conducted in 1966, 1977, and in 1986. A 1988 comparison of the data from 1987. Some vital statistics gathered during these two surveys demonstrated that the data the pretransition colonial era are also avail- sets were consistent in structure, nuptiality, able but known to be unreliable; nevertheless, and fertility. The Algeria Maternal and Child some sources do refer to national censuses Health Survey, conducted within the frame- conducted in 1948 and 1954. The first na- work of the Pan Arab Project for Child De- tional multifocal fertility survey in Algeria, velopment in 1994, is another well-validated the Etude Statistique Nationale de la Popu- data source in the literature.
Table 2 | Demographic Surveys in Algeria Report Title Source Year National Census National Commissioner for Censuses and 1966, 1977, Statistical Surveys 1987 Étude Statistique Nationale de la National Commissioner for Censuses and 1970 Population Statistical Surveys Enquète Sociodémographique: la Direction Generale du Plan et des Études 1967 régulation des naissainces, Association Économiques Algérienne pour la Rechereche Démographique, Économique et Sociale Enquète Nationale sure la Fécondité Centre Nationale d’Études et d’Analyses pour 1989 la Planification Algeria 1992 Maternal and Child Health National Office of Statistics (Algiers) and Pan 1994 Survey Arab Project for Child Development/League of Arab States
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 27 End Notes
1 Central Intelligence Agency 2009. 31 Ladjali 1984. 2 Pierre and Quandt 1996. 32 Ladjali 1984. 3 Pierre and Quandt 1996. 33 Tahar 1999, p. 64, translated by Robbyn 4 World Bank. 2007. Lewis. 5 World Bank. 2007. 34 Tahar 1999, p. 64, translated by Robbyn 6 World Bank. 2007. Lewis. 7 World Bank. 2007. 35 Tahar 1999; Lee and others 1998. 8 World Bank 2007. 36 Tahar 1999; Rashad 2001; Tabutin and 9 Rashad 2001; Tabutin and Schoumaker Schoumaker 2005; Ouadah-Bedidi and 2005. Lebugle 2007. 10 Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005. 37 Ouadah-Bedidi and Lebugle 2007. 11 Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005. 38 Eltigani 2001. 12 Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005. 39 Eltigani 2001. 13 Rashad 2000, 2001. 40 Kouaouci 1993a and b; Courbage 1996; 14 Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005. Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005. 15 Vallin 1978. 41 Rashad 2001; Ouadah-Bedidi and LeBugle 16 Kouaouci 1993a and b. 2007. 17 Vallin 1978. 42 Kouaouci 1993. 18 Vallin 1978. 43 Ouadah-Bedidi and LeBugle 2007. 19 Kouaouci 1993b. 44 Eltigani 2001. 20 Kouaouci 1993a and b. 45 Westoff 1992; Kouaouci 1993a and b. 21 Vallin 1978. 46 Rashad 2001. 22 Pierre and Quandt 1996. 47 Rashad 2001. 23 Lee 1998. 48 Eltigani 2001. 24 Lapham 1972. 49 Eltigani 2001. 25 Lapham 1972. 50 Roudi 1995. 26 Benotmane, des Forts, and Benotmane 51 Unmet need for contraception is defined as 2002; Ladjali 1984. the proportion of currently married women 27 Lee and others 1998. A fatwa is a religious who do not want any more children but edict. are not using any form of family planning 28 Ladjali 1984; Tahar 1999. (unmet need for contraception for lim- 29 Lapham 1972; Tahar 1999. iting) or currently married women who 30 Lee and others 1998. want to postpone their next birth for two
28 years but are not using any form of family performed in 2000, and there were 177,000 planning (unmet need for contraception births that year, then approximately 8 for spacing). percent, or 1:12.5, pregnancies in Algeria 52 Population Council 1994; Ayad and Kumar ended in abortion. This falls slightly lower 1995. than Hessini’s (2007) estimate of 1:10 for 53 Eltigani 2001. the MENA region. 54 Population Council 1994 74 Dabash and Roudi-Fahimi 2008. Unmet 55 Population Council 1994. need is defined as the proportion of mar- 56 Enquète Nationale sure la Fécondité 1989, ried women who prefer to avoid a preg- Pan Arab Project for Child Development nancy but are not using contraception. 1994, and World Bank 2007 surveys. 75 Chelala 1998. 57 Ouada-Bedidi and Vallin 2001 76 Hessini 2007. 58 Tahar 1999. 77 Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005. 59 Tahar 1999. 78 Hessini 2007. 60 World Bank 2007. 79 Hessini 2007. 61 Dabash and Roudi-Fahimi 2008. 80 Hessini 2007. 62 Ladjali 1984. 81 Hessini 2007. 63 Ayad and Kumar 1995. 82 Population Council 1994. 64 Ayad and Kumar 1995. 83 Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005. 65 Ayad and Kumar 1995. 84 Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005. 66 Pan Arab Project for Child Development 85 des Forts 1998. survey data 1992. 86 World Bank 2007. 67 Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005. 87 World Bank 2007. 68 Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005. 88 Des Forts 1998. 69 Hessini 2007. 89 World Bank 2007. 70 Dabash and Roudi-Fahimi 2008; Hessini 90 World Bank 2007. 2007; Slackman 2007. 91 Central Intelligence Agency 2009. 71 Hessini 2007. 92 Central Intelligence Agency 2009. 72 Hessini 2007. 93 World Bank 2007. 73 There were approximately 8,196,000 fe- 94 Courbage 1995. males aged 15-49 in Algeria in 2000 95 Central Intelligence Agency 2009. (United Nations data accessed May 8, 96 Courbage 1995. 2009, from http://data.un.org/Default. 97 Courbage 1995. aspx). The 2000 total fertility rate was 2.67, 98 Ouadah-Bedidi and Lebugle 2005. and the crude birth rate was 21.6 births 99 Ouadah-Bedidi and Lebugle 2005. per thousand women of reproductive age. 100 Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005. Based on the crude birth weight, we can es- 101 Ladjali 1984. timate that approximately 177,000 births 102 Ladjali 1984. occurred each year. Extrapolating from 103 Guend 1993. these estimates, if 14,373 abortions were 104 Martin 2008.
Fertility Decline in Algeria, 1980–2006 | A Case Study 29 105 Kpodar 2008. 112 Vallin 1978. 106 Martin 2003. 113 Baffoun 1982. 107 Standing 1983. 114 Baffoun 1982. 108 Martin 2008. 115 Eltigani 2001. 109 Kpodar 2008. 116 Ross 2008. 110 Assaad and El-Hamidi 2001. 117 Ouadah-Bedidi and Lebugle 2005. 111 Ross 2008. 118 Kpodar 2008.
Fertility Decline in Algeria 1980–2006
A Case Study
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