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Private Military Companies in Counter-Insurgency Strategy

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Private Military Companies in Counter-Insurgency Strategy DIIS POLICY BRIEF Private Military Companies in Counter-insurgency Strategy March 2011 Financial restrictions, budget cuts and declining birth rates all restrain military capacity, while on top of that the number of conflicts and demand for security are rising. Private military companies take over some of the burden, relieving soldiers from non-military tasks. But lessons from Iraq show that the overall military strategy must be ensured. During the last decade, states have increasingly used civilian contractors to provide additional capacity for RECOMMENDATIONS facing the security challenges in state- and nation-build- Political actors and the military must ing. Since military budgets are strained and military ca- • initiate a debate on how private military pacity fully occupied with duties both inside and outside companies should be included in the defence their normal portfolio, outsourcing of non-core security architecture. • clarify the scope and involvement of private functions and tasks becomes as an attractive solution. Al- military companies. though outsourcing’s specific level and extent may still • define the core and essential functions of be contested, it is important to clarify how to make op- the military that should not be outsourced. timal use of contractors on the operational level without • decide whether private companies should be jeopardizing the overall military strategy and objectives. limited to provision of logistic services or if There is a need for political debate on the scope of the out- they should also be used in intelligence and/or sourcing. Also, a rigorous selection process is needed when in direct combat. outsourcing does take place. The contractors must be • together with the private contractors, aim better integrated into the military structure, and their at clear contract management. accountability must be ensured. • ensure that private actors act according to and support the overall strategy and tactics, so that they do not undermine the over- Although this policy brief is based on lessons learned from arching aims. the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq, they are gene- • ascertain that they communicate new strate- rally applicable to other theaters of war, in Afghanistan gies to the private military companies so they and future areas of engagement. One lesson is that overall can act in accordance with these strategies. population-centered strategies – such as the counter-insur- • co-ordinate the ways and means of communi- gency strategy COIN, which aimed at winning the ‘hearts cating with private contractors in the theatre and minds’ of the local peoples – must be supported by all of operations. actors, be they national military or private military com- • ensure accountability of the private military panies. Experiences from Iraq have identified at least seven companies so that they respect the laws of areas of concern in ensuring this and each of them is dis- the country to which they are deployed and cussed in this brief. fulfill their tasks. DIIS POLICY BRIEF MORE WARS, MORE PERSONNEL NEEDED measures like VIP and convoy protection make it possi- The increasing number of low-intensity conflicts around ble to free resources, which can then be allocated to areas the world place considerable strain on military re- where additional troops are needed. sources. Add to this the large-scale interventions in Iraq It is estimated that the number of contractors operating and Afghanistan, and it is apparent that miltary re- in Iraq is between 30,000 and 100,000 (excluding sub- sources are spread out very thin. This is mainly perceiv- contractors and contractors employed by private compa- ed as an American problem, since the US, as the world’s nies). Contractors make up approximately 50 percent of only remaining superpower, risks the problem of imperial the US Department of Defence workforce in Iraq. The overstretch. However, the same dynamic applies to smaller reason for the uncertainty is that US authorities have no countries that choose to involve themselves in internatio- official statistics. While the fact that the US does not know nal military endevaours. the actual number of contractors deployed to Iraq is in There are two opposing dynamics at play here. Financial itself problematic, it also raises the question of how private restrictions, budget cuts and declining birth rates, com- military and security actors fit in with the overall military bined with the number of conflicts and rising demand for strategy, and whether or not there is any supervision of the security. This makes contracting an attractive solution. way private contractors fulfil their tasks. Private military and security contractors appear to be Stepping up outsourcing – in Iraq and in the future a permanent feature of military architecture. The recent The 2003 invasion of Iraq was over relatively quickly. engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq have also shown that Winning peace and ensuring a stable environment for the COIN will in all likelihood also play a prominent role in rebuilding effort were another matter, and the Americans the future. soon contracted out a previously unseen number of tasks. This was a symptom of the changing environment for the military forces. As opposed to earlier, soldiers must now INVOLVING PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES take part in rebuilding initiatives (under the overall de- IN THE RIGHT WAY signation ‘Military Operations Other Than War’) in add- Since outsourcing is by all means a lasting element in ition to their traditional military tasks. COIN operations, it is important to consider how to best In cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan several factors utilize the resources of private military and security con- regarding capacity and functionality explain why US mi- tractors. Nothing suggests that the private military compa- litary personnel and State Department see outsourcing nies undermine COIN simply because they are private and of military functions as a viable option. First, the pre- fall outside the usual chain of command. It is a question of sence of private contractors engaged in actual fighting involving them in the right way and ensuring a coherent can function as a force-multiplier and improve stability strategy and structure, that enables a quick communica- in conflicts characterized by complex ethnic agendas and tion of changes to all actors in the theatre of operations. insurgency. Second, outsourcing logistics and support Several issues should be addressed in this regard – for instance, how to: 1. communicate strategic changes and make sure the Contract Personel as Percentage private military companies consent to them of the Workforce in Recent Operations 2. develop the necessary procedures and interfaces for co-ordination 70 % 3. circumvent the fact that contractors are not subordi- 60 % nated to any chain of command at the operational level 4. handle ‘friction’ when private military companies add 50 % internal errors to already uncertain and complex situa- 40 % tions; 30 % 5. handle the fact that private military companies are not 20 % obliged to co-operate with military initiatives 10 % 6. make sure that private military companies act in 0 % Balkans Afghanistan Iraq accordance with existing laws and are held account- able for their actions 7. improve training to ensure quality in services and com- Source: Balkans: Congressional Budget Office. pliance with human rights regimes. Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq. August 2008. p. 13; Afghanistan and Iraq: Con- 1. Communicating changed strategies gressional Research Service analysis of Department As conflicts endure and the military forces gather experi- of Defense data as of March 2010. ence, strategies are adapted to the enemy and the environ- ment of the confrontation. Such strategic changes should be communicated effectively to private military forces, and private military forces should consent to them. In Iraq 2007, the US changed its strategy, which had profound implications for their operations and rules of engagement, and also for how they involved the private military companies. After substantial human losses and in- creased civil strife, their primary focus shifted from ‘force protection’ to ‘civilian population protection’. This was a result of a protracted process in which the military and political leadership had to come to terms with the in- adequacy of the existing counter-insurgency methods. The elements of the altered strategy in Iraq included: securing and serving the population; living among people; promoting reconciliation; fostering Iraqi legitimacy; build- A US contractor looks away from a dust cloud whipped up by ing relationships; being first with the truth; and ‘living the a helicopter departing over a gatepost Kandahar, Afghanistan, values’. All of these changes are part of a classical counter- 2010. © Polfoto / AP Photo/Rodrigo Abd. insurgency strategy and even though they sound simple, implementing them in a hostile environment is easier said As the US Armed Forces changed their behaviour, the need than done. to ensure the consent of the private military companies was highlighted since non-consent would jeopardize the efficiency of the US effort. At that time, however, the lo- Department of Defense Surveys cal population still perceived the behaviour of the private military companies as confrontational and antagonistic, which ran counter with the overall aims of the new stra- Threatening Action tegy. At the heart of COIN, and also of the SURGE stra- “During your time in the region during OIF, how often did you tegy, also lay the fight for legitimacy, upholding rule of law, have firsthand knowledge of armed contractors performing an unnecessarily threatening, arrogant, or belligerent action?” and holding violators of the rule of law accountable. But while the US promoted this strategy in relation to the local 90 % population, the local population could see that the private Experience with contractors (n = 152) 80 % No experience with contractors (n = 97) military companies largely enjoyed impunity. Since this of 70 % course undermined the effort, this problem must be dealt 60 % with in future situations of this kind.
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